



DADA, SURREALISM, AND THE **CINEMATIC** EFFECT

R. BRUCE ELDER



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Dr. Philippa Gates Email: pgates@wlu.ca

Dr. Russell Kilbourn Email: rkilbourn@wlu.ca

Dr. Ute Lischke Email: ulischke@wlu.ca

Department of English and Film Studies

Wilfrid Laurier University

75 University Avenue West

Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5

Canada

Phone: 519-884-0710

Fax: 519-884-8307

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R . B R U C E E L D E R



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INTRODUCTION

This book is one in a series of volumes whose topic is the early intellectual reception of the cinema, especially its reception by those who were associated with advanced artistic practices. The series considers the manner in which art theorists, philosophers, cultural theorists, and, especially, artists of the first decades of the twentieth century responded to the advent of the cinema. *DADA, Surrealism, and the Cinematic Effect* concerns the cinema's reception by those who were associated with the Dada and Surrealist movements.

The common view of the cinema's early intellectual reception is that art lovers wrote about it in an embarrassed and apologetic tone. The online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* has an entry for the "Philosophy of Film" that provides a useful overview of the field, expounding the common view:

The question that dominated early philosophical inquiry into film was whether the cinema—a term that emphasizes the institutional structure within which films were produced, distributed, and viewed—could be regarded as an artform. There were two reasons why cinema did not seem worthy of the honorific designation of an art. The first was that early contexts for the exhibition of films included such venues as the vaudeville peep show and the circus side show. As a popular cultural form, film seemed to have a vulgarity that made it an unsuitable

companion to theater, painting, opera, and the other fine arts. A second problem was that film seemed to borrow too much from other art forms. To many, early films seemed little more than recordings of either theatrical performances or everyday life. The rationale for the former was that they could be disseminated to a wider audience than that which could see a live performance. But film then only seems to be a means of access to art and not an independent art form on its own. The latter, on the other hand, seemed too direct a reproduction of life to qualify as art, for there seemed little mediation by any guiding consciousness.¹

The idea that early writers on film were troubled by the cinema's origins in "the vaudeville peep show and the circus side show," fearing that its vulgarity made it unworthy of the honorific designation "art" and an unsuitable companion for the great high arts, has achieved a near hegemony.

That was indeed one strain of the response to the new medium. However, I argue there was another strain that has gone largely unrecognized. This other response was far from anxious about film's lowly provenance in popular entertainment. On the contrary, it embraced the new medium as the first art that truly was capable of reflecting modern, largely urban, life. In *Harmony and Dissent: Film and Avant-garde Art Movements in the Early Twentieth Century* (Waterloo: WLU Press, 2008)—a companion volume to the present book—I made the point this way: with the appearance of the cinema, a new paragon erupted, with many thinkers declaring that the cinema was the *ottima arte* (i.e., the top art), or that it was destined to become so when the "true" cinema emerged.² Take, for example, this passage from an early text on cinema, "The Birth of the Sixth Art," published in 1911 by Ricciotto Canudo, a scholar, literary entrepreneur, and friend of Guillaume Apollinaire, Gabriele d'Annunzio, Abel Gance, and Blaise Cendrars (and who is usually said to be the first film theorist, even though Vaclav Tille, author of the 1908 "Kinéma," likely has a stronger claim to the title):

In fact, the cinematographic theater *is the first new theater*, the first authentic and fundamental theater of our time. When it becomes truly aesthetic, complemented with a worthy musical score played by a good orchestra, even if only representing life, real life, momentarily fixed by the photographic lens, we shall be able to feel then our first *sacred* emotion, we shall have a glimpse of the spirits, moving towards a vision of the temple, where Theater and Museum will once more be restored for a new religious communion of the spectacle and Aesthetics. The cinematograph as it is today will evoke for the historians of the future the image of the first extremely rudimentary wooden theaters, where goats have their throats slashed and the primitive "goat song" and "tragedy" were danced, before the stone apotheosis consecrated by Lycurgus, even before Aeschylus' birth, to the Dionysian theater.

...

It is desire for a new *Festival*, for a new joyous *unanimity*, realized at a show, in a place where together, all men can forget in greater or lesser measure, their isolated individuality. This forgetting, soul of any religion and spirit of any aesthetic, will one day be superbly triumphant. And the Theater, which still holds the vague promise of something never dreamt of in previous ages: *the creation of a sixth art, the plastic Art in motion*, having already achieved the rudimentary form of the modern pantomime.

Present day life lends itself to such a victory...³

For Canudo, the cinema was the “fundamental theater of our time.”

The view that the cinema was the top art was especially common among those whose commitments were to advanced artistic practices, and many poets, painters, playwrights, and sculptors excitedly declared that the arrival of this new art—which was so paradigmatically fitted for the modern urban world—had imposed on them the demand that the media in which they worked (or the forms they created using the materials of their various media) be reconstituted so that they might take on at least *some* of the attributes that made the cinema the *ottima arte*. Notions about how to recast the art media (or the forms forged in those media), and about the urgency of doing so, became, I argue, a principal part—indeed, *the* principal part—of the conceptual core of the artistic programs advanced by the vanguard art movements of the first half of the twentieth century.

It is taking several volumes for me to lay out my thesis regarding the cinema’s influence on avant-garde movements and to provide evidence to support it. Dividing my argument among those volumes has not been a straightforward task.⁴ In *Harmony and Dissent*, I analyzed various proclamations that called for a *gegenstandlose Kunst* (objectless art) and interpreted the ideals of various Russian and early Soviet art movements (Suprematism, Rayonism, Cubo-Futurism, Productivism, and Constructivism). In this volume, I home in on two of the most vital art movements of the early twentieth century, DADA and Surrealism.

Those two related movements are of special importance to my thesis. I maintain that many, if not most, artists involved in these art movements were very enthusiastic about the cinema and deemed it the top art. That claim, however, raises the question of what these artists and thinkers understood the cinema to be. What features did the cinema possess that made it seem to these enthusiasts to be the *ottima arte*? Some, likely most, of the thinkers of the early twentieth century who proclaimed the cinema to be the top art held extreme, even bizarre conceptions of the cinema, and the artists and thinkers who associated themselves with DADA and Surrealism were no different in this regard. A wide assortment of esoteric beliefs were common in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth.

The bone structure of the argument that led to celebrating the cinema as the top art was this (and here I reduce the argument to no more than a crude caricature): the value of artworks / art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects; the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device; therefore, the cinema is the top art.⁵ One can well feel shock at the extravagance of this deduction. Why would the artists and thinkers involved in the Dada and Surrealist movements have believed that the value of artworks / art forms depends on the capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects? And why would they have believed that the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device? This book is an effort to answer those two questions. To explore their answers requires us to examine the discursive context in which those movements arose. And to understand the discursive context into which the cinema was introduced requires us to appraise the intellectual morphology of European culture at the beginning of the twentieth century; only in this way we will be able to understand how that culture responded to the advent of the cinema.

We begin our investigation by noting that DADA and Surrealism (along with a number of other vanguard art movements that flourished from 1909 through to the 1960s) embraced some form of irrationalism. Indeed, we can understand DADA and Surrealism as celebrations of what human beings might become when instrumental reason no longer is the dominant agent in identity formation. But why did so many vanguard artists (and vanguard art movements) embrace irrationalism? In answer to that question, often a sociological/historical account is given: the horrors of the First World War, a war that was made all the more brutal by the deployment of chemical and mechanical weapons that so-called “advanced” technology had made possible, led to the discreditation of reason. Historians of ideas have argued that by the beginning of the twentieth century, it was already becoming clear that technology was more than simply a means for increasing productivity and for overcoming scarcity and want; technology, it was becoming evident, had become a closed system, forged by the application of instrumental reason to the administration of nature (including human beings). If that lesson was becoming clear by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Great War drove it home with a vengeance: it revealed reason to be an antagonist to humans’ animal connections with one another, an adversary to their charity and mutual concern.

The claim that the Great War exposed reason’s destructive character relies on three propositions: first, that it was one of the first experiences of mass killing; second, that such mass killing had been made possible by new technologies; and third, that these new technologies were products of science and reason. But this explanation leaves a very important question

unanswered: Why was reason identified as the agent that precipitated this historic calamity? Any number of other explanations might have presented themselves: nationalist ideologies were ascendant, often provoking enmity between nations; the rise of *realpolitik* undermined the moral principles that had limited the harm that nations were willing to do one another; the pace of historical change had accelerated to the point that no certainties—and definitely no moral certainties—could lay claim to people’s allegiance, and the mind became terrified of plummeting into the abyss; technological developments had increased humans’ sense of mastery over the circumambient world, thereby bolstering a voluntarist view of human being and enhancing propensities towards violence; and/or the violence perpetrated by the rapid introduction of industrial (technological) capitalism was being answered with an irrational counter-violence. Most of these positions have been argued, some of them by Hugo Ball (1886–1927) after he broke with the Dada movement. By way of comparison, the claim that reason was responsible for the calamity that destroyed Europe as it had existed before the war hardly seems, *prima facie*, the most plausible explanation for the Great War.

The First World War did play a key role in exposing the folly of reason and the tragedy to which the Enlightenment’s dream of reason had condemned us. That admitted, there are other events that exposed the pernicious course on which the dream of reason had set Europeans (and those belonging to cultures derived from Europe), and the nature of those events affected the forms of irrationalism that artists adopted over the quarter-century this book examines. Among the most important of these developments were those in mathematics (specifically in set theory, including Cantor’s transfinite set theory, and in the foundations of mathematics) and in philosophy that unmade reason’s overarching claims. Those developments, I maintain, created a context—more precisely, they created new *discourse protocols*—for how reason, nature, mentality, and humanity would be understood and spoken of (just as Darwin’s evolutionary theory earlier had shifted the protocols governing discussions of nature, time, and humans’ relations to animals). The discourse protocols that arose from these momentous developments in philosophy and mathematics affected thinkers whose interests lay outside those of the technical philosophers and mathematicians whose works were contributing to these developments. Soon afterwards, Europeans began to identify reason as responsible for (what seemed at the time to be) the West’s great historical calamity.

From the seventeenth century onwards, a compelling image of reality—of the realm of matter and of consciousness’s/spirit’s relation to it—had consolidated itself, becoming at once ever more restrictive and more normative. The *imago mundi* that emerged in the seventeenth century no longer figured

matter as a realm whose origin was divine and whose order was providential and purposive. Rather, nature, as depicted in this image, was a realm whose constitution could not be accounted for by petitioning to any principles lying beyond the material, and especially not (as the Greeks and Christian theologians down to the end of the Middle Ages explained beings) through the purposes that entities and their activities served. The task of understanding nature, in this view, became that of understanding the regularities in events, of identifying laws that describe patterns in the succession of events. The belief that cognition would afford knowledge only of the regularities in occurrences was a principal factor in limiting moderns' conception of the modalities of time to nothing more than a linear process. Since the work of consciousness was understood to be solely cognition, and since cognition was understood as nothing other than organizing and classifying the world according to the laws governing the succession of appearances, knowledge was reduced to the products of calculative reason. Thus, some of the most profound realms of human consciousness were reconceived so that they came to be understood as lying beyond the bounds of the legitimate activities of the cognitive enterprise. This image of reality depicted consciousness as confronting a world the reasons for whose order we cannot know—a world that is indifferent to individual lives, that came into being by accident, and that will disappear at a time mandated by the initial accidental conditions that gave rise to it. The vagaries of these indifferent, accidental congeries of matter were all we could hope to know.

For many later moderns, this image of consciousness and reality seemed utterly inadequate. They felt the noetic strength and richness of forms of experience that modernity had disenfranchised. As Walter Benjamin did in “The Project for a Coming Philosophy,” they claimed that cognition encompassed a broader range of experiences, including experiential modalities richer and more fulfilling than reason. Prayer, meditation, trance, dream, and contemplative pursuits, they maintained, provide genuine understanding of reality, including the divine. These domains of experience are the provinces of the religious seeker, the mystic, and the artist. Intuitive bodily knowledge, which remains largely preconscious and unconceptualized, informs us of the continuity of our be-ing (throughout this volume I use the hyphenated term “be-ing” to refer to the actualizing power that sustains beings in their existence; and as the Greeks did, I believe that power maintaining beings in existence has to do with their “esse-*nce*”) with that of other beings. Religious figures, mystics, and artists have insisted that only a participatory form of experience—a mode of experience that recognizes that when we know, we engage with and act upon the reality that is known—can overcome the deleterious effects of instrumental reason, which pretends to be *θεωρία* (theoria,

theory), the observation of nature as though from the position of an outside spectator, and which conceives of knowledge as arising at the position of the outside spectator even while its *τέλος* (telos) is the control and regulation of nature (and the elimination of chance). But some later moderns knew too that the performative dimension is the legitimate domain of religion and art. The artists associated with a number of the vanguard art movements of the twentieth century felt the importance of these disenfranchised modes of experience and strived to develop artistic forms that might revitalize them, preparing the way for them to assume a greater role in the knowledge enterprise when a new understanding of reality emerged. Indeed, many of these artists believed that one of the purposes of vanguard art was to hasten this emergence.

The disenfranchisement of non-rational ways of knowing came at a great cost. One result was that our capacity for these experiences withered, like organs (such as the human appendix) that, in losing their purpose, are reduced to vestigial forms. Their loss of purpose accounts for the strange forms that these experiences have assumed in recent times, an oddity most conspicuous in the pale and wan “new age” theologies that any strong-minded thinker must deem as being among the banes of our age. Nevertheless, the occult’s spiritual, moral, and perhaps even noetic worth helps account for the importance of the vanguard movements in the arts of the early twentieth century.

In the first chapter of this volume, I explore how calculative reason undid its own claim to be the foundation for all knowledge. I maintain that the early stages by which calculative reason dismantled its foundational role created the conditions under which the sociological and historical reasons for embracing irrationalism had the effects they did. I contend that if reason (or what moderns identify as reason, viz., calculative reason) had not weakened itself, the external, sociological/historical factors that impelled, first, artists and thinkers, and, later, the greater portion of humanity, towards irrationalism would not have had the sweeping, not to say apocalyptic, effects they did. In this section of the work, I begin by examining the earlier phases of the process by which reason dismantled itself, phases that preceded or were contemporaneous with the time when the Dadaist activities were at their apogee. I then deal with later phases of this process, which I follow to their conclusion in the work of the logician Kurt Gödel, after DADA had dissolved and the Surrealist movement was well under way. Examining this phase provides an illuminating parallel to the work of the artists I consider—in the fields of formal logic and the foundations of mathematics, we will find a critique that resonates with the one that Dada and Surrealist artists offered of reason’s overreaching ambition. An examination of Gödel’s work and its implications will help buttress my argument concerning the fate of reason in the first half of the twentieth century. In the main body of the text, I take only a cursory

look at Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems, but I invite interested readers to explore them in slightly greater depth in Appendix 3. We must understand the process whereby reason was dislodged from its place of authority if we wish to apprehend why the irrationalism of the early twentieth century took on the particular character it did. I urge even readers whose mathematical interests are slight to take up the challenge of the first three appendices, as the parallels between developments in formal logic and the foundations of mathematics and those in the arts are striking.

If, during the first decades of the twentieth century, when the authority of reason was collapsing, the cinema was seen as an exemplary art form and as vital to the "modern sensibility" then being formed, one would expect the intellectual reception of the early cinema to reflect not only the developing crisis in belief but also the notions about overcoming the challenges that crisis posed. A study of the intellectual reception of the early cinema bears out that expectation—a good part of the task I have set myself in this volume is to offer proof of my claim. The cinema, I argue, was seen as embodying the era's *Geist*, a new form of thinking that might serve as an antidote to the pernicious despondency generated by the collapse of calculative reason, which had been exposed as an impostor. To understand exactly why the cinema was thought of as providing an antidote to those effects, we have to understand how artists and thinkers of the first decades of the twentieth century conceived of the cinema and how reason revealed its own shortcomings. In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine two vanguard artistic movements that extolled the value of escaping reason's enfeebling effects. In Chapter 2, I challenge the view of DADA that considers it as chiefly a negative or protest movement: I show that spiritual themes had a role in that movement and steered it towards constructive ends. Following that, I turn to DADA's successor movement, Surrealism, and show that DADA's spiritual and occult interests were taken up by it. In my consideration of the relations between film and the artistic movements known as DADA and Surrealism, I take two approaches. The first is to explore the cinema's role as a model for those movements and to demonstrate that the film medium had a privileged status for Dadaists and Surrealists, who wanted to reformulate poetry, theatre, music, and painting so that those forms might take on some of the cinema's virtues. The second is to study how the advanced ideas about art and artmaking proposed by the Dada and Surrealist circles, and the advanced artistic practices to which those ideas gave rise, reciprocally influenced the cinema.

In Chapter 3, which is given over to Surrealism, I pay special attention to Max Ernst's *Une semaine de bonté* (1934). I do so for several reasons. First, I understand that claims regarding the Surrealists' interest in alchemy and Spiritualism will seem to some *outré* and highly doubtful, and that no single

work could be used as the final evidence of my claims for the pneumatic character of DADA and Surrealism—this should be abundantly clear to anyone who considers how widespread the interest in esoteric phenomena was in the period this book covers. Nonetheless, the depth of understanding of alchemy that work evinces, and the many points of connection of alchemy to psychoanalytic theory that a careful analysis that work can reveal, make an in-depth study of Ernst's collage novel well suited to our purposes. I hope that a fine-grain analysis of this work, set in the context of my more general commentary on alchemy, psychoanalysis, and Surrealism, will make plausible my seemingly extravagant claims about the extent of Surrealists' interest in alchemy (and, more generally, esoterism and pneumatic philosophies).

My second reason for focusing on *Une semaine de bonté* (A Week of Kindness, 1934) is that Ernst's novel provides an occasion to deliberate on the Surrealists' use of collage, and to demonstrate how deeply imbued with the spirit of cinema Surrealist collage really is. My third reason relates to the fact that *Une semaine de bonté* is a sequence and presents a tale—an unusually formed tale, it is true, the meaning of which can be discerned only by applying interpretive procedures analogous to those learned in the course of a psychoanalysis. In that way, the tale recounted in *Une semaine de bonté* resembles those recounted in such Surrealist films as *Un chien andalou* (An Andalusian Dog, 1929), *L'âge d'or* (The Golden Age, 1930), and *Étoile de mer* (Starfish, 1928). Finally, our eyes tell us there is an extraordinary resemblance between Max Ernst's collages and those of Lawrence Jordan, who has felt a deep connection to Ernst's world, so Jordan's work (as I show) brings Surrealism into the present.

I recognize it is odd that a book stressing the role of the cinema on twentieth-century art hardly mentions film in the first 150 pages, but I contend that Dada and Surrealist artists were led to their belief that the cinema was the top art by way of an extravagant deduction: the value of art depends on its capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects, and given that the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device, it is therefore the top art. I will be attempting to answer two key questions that arise from their claim. First, what led the artists and thinkers involved in the Dada and Surrealist movements to believe that the value of artworks / art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects? And second, what led them to believe that the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device?

The first of those questions constitutes the substance of the first chapter, which examines the discursive context in which that belief arose. That context was shaped by developments that were taking place in philosophy, science, and mathematics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to which few art historians dealing with the period have given adequate attention. These

developments had a momentous impact on how humans understood the nature of mind and its grasp on reality—indeed, on what humans understood thinking to be. The Dada and Surrealist movements made it plain that notions about the nature of thinking (and about the character of strong thought) were changing; so too did the development of psychoanalysis in that period. I would argue, though the evidence is less definite, that so did the birth and early development of the cinema. The relations among these new ways of understanding what thinking *really is* constitute the problematic I address in this book. I claim that these phenomena were understood through their connections to irrationalisms (of several varieties). An examination of the discursive context in which the arts and ideas existed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveals that an enthusiasm for irrationalism was widespread. That enthusiasm goes a long way towards explaining why people embraced the first premise of our extravagant syllogism that the value of artworks / art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects; it also provides a context for understanding why they would have placed such a high stake on its second premise—that the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device.

A common method in art and cinema history is to relate art forms to their social context. But this is often done without systematically addressing how that social context was understood in its time. In the first part of this book, I attempt to unpack the developments that changed the discursive context in which art and artmaking was understood at the time of which I am writing, for that sort of context moulds perceptions and their interpretations; at the level of the individual mind, it also produces schemata that help us decide what we are likely to perceive. It is important to forge a model that develops from the understanding that the relation between social context and mentality is not a direct, mirroring relation—a model that figures the relation between social context and mentality as a *mediated* relation, one that recognizes that what we understand as a social context is not given to us but is something we *make*. Indeed, there are many tiers of mediation between social context and artistic form and between socio-economic history (or, more exactly, representations of socio-economic history) and forms of thought.

An example drawn from the present, though somewhat oversimplified, might help make my point. Consider the relation between increasing global flows of people and commodities that the past two or three decades have seen (and that we will continue to see for the foreseeable future) and the rise of postmodernist thinking to its present, normative position. There is not a simple, mirroring relation here: postmodernist thinking did not arise directly out of increased global flows of people and commodities (and even these global flows themselves demand to be understood not as givens but as representations constructed by ideology). More important, to understand the

relationship between the two, we would have to understand how juxtaposing ideas from different cultures have brought people to challenge the belief that the modern Western paradigm embodies absolute and universal truths. More important still, we would have to understand how intellectual developments in the later modern period (including the waning of the onto-theologies based in Christianity and the epistemologies associated with them) prepared the ground that would make it possible for people to formulate the idea of the diversity of truths. To simply assert that global flows of people and commodities produced postmodern thinking is to leave many necessary intricacies unaccounted for. So it is with DADA and Surrealism: to assert simply that the First World War produced DADA, and that DADA shaped its successor movement, Surrealism, is to conveniently ignore how intellectual developments in the period preceding their founding provided schemata that make it possible to formulate their founding ideas.

Consider the claim that the First World War led to DADA, which was essentially a protest movement. The first questions that should arise regard what DADA was and how its ideas reflected the trauma that the First World War inflicted. One might respond that, in reaction to the First World War, DADA raised a protest against bourgeois culture and its art. But in considering those claims, one would have to ask what features of bourgeois culture it was protesting. Nationalism, imperialism, and militarism, along with capitalism, would be obvious candidates. No doubt all of these were objects of the spleen of the *Dadisten*, but these claims are much unaccounted for. Why do so few of the writings of Dada artists directly address political issues? Why is there so much emphasis on rhythm and the body in the writings of Dada artists? How could Hans Richter and Viking Eggeling think of their pure abstract films as Dada works when they didn't explicitly attack, or even allude to, nationalism or militarism? How can Hans (Jean) Arp's elegant works, which cross biomorphic with geometric abstraction, be discussed as anti-nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-militarist, anti-capitalist works? They *can* be understood that way, but I believe that a rich understanding of the relation between the elegant forms of his work and the anti-militarist beliefs of the *Dadaisten* involves taking into account several tiers of mediation between those forms and this content. To be precise, it demands that we take into account the discursive context of DADA. It is that discursive context that I plumb in the first part of this book.

As I have noted, it is commonly said that the First World War produced DADA. I have also noted that I do not disagree—I simply think that conceiving the relation between that social context and the Dada movement as a direct, mirroring relation is an oversimplification. We have to take into account the discursive context that mediates between representations of the

social context and the beliefs of the *Dadaisten*. Consider this: the Dada artists made creative efforts to develop raw, savage, elemental forms for their works. In learning that, one might ask why, when the First World War represented a slide into barbarism and brutality, a protest movement would have committed itself to formulating raw, savage, elemental forms. “Perhaps to reflect the violence of the culture they were protesting,” might come the reply. That response seems fine, or it *would* seem fine if not for the fact that the Dada artists actually *celebrated* these elemental forms as an antidote to the toxic effects of a bourgeois, capitalist culture that had descended into barbarism. The question of *why* they adopted the elementalism they did can be answered adequately only by taking into account the discursive context in which DADA arose. A key feature of that context was a belief that modern cultures (especially in the West) had invested too heavily in reason and that reason had turned out to be a false god. Its effects were stifling. In this period, irrationalist ideas were often associated with vitalist ideas (which in Germany went under the banner of *Lebensphilosophie*), and the discursive context of the era often associated a functional hypertrophism of the intellectual faculties with a lack of vitality. Conversely, the elementalism that the *Dadaisten* embraced was associated with irrationalist vitalism. A discursive context that celebrated vitalism and that had become skeptical about reason’s overreaching claims made it possible for the *Dadaisten* to formulate their vitalist, irrationalist tenets—and that context explains why, implausibly, those tenets could be connected to the celebration of raw, savage forms as a protest against the currents in modern culture that steered it towards barbarism. They believed that the pernicious effects of reason’s overreaching claims were what had led modern culture into barbarism, and that vitalism (even a vitalism gingered by reason’s implosion) could serve as an antidote to reason’s toxic effects. A culture of the body could undo the enfeebling effects of a culture that had invested too heavily in the mind.

Accordingly, in what follows, I emphasize how reason (understood as deduction and inference), by applying its own methods, came to expose its own limitations. Other developments in the science of the time—for example, the theory of special relativity and the theory of general relativity (1905 and 1916, respectively)—certainly affected common conceptions about time and space (often in ways that Albert Einstein would not have endorsed). Ernest Rutherford’s discrediting in 1909 of the “plum pudding model” of the atom offered by his teacher J.J. Thomson and his (Rutherford’s) demonstration that most of an atom’s mass as well as its positive charge are concentrated in a very small fraction of its volume (he proposed a planetary model, according to which electrons orbited a small, compact nucleus of positive charge) had a great impact on thinking beyond the narrow scientific community.⁶ Even

the cursory examination of Wassily Kandinsky's writings will serve to make one aware of the shock—and excitement—that artist felt in discovering that matter was mostly void. For him, that discovery confirmed the truth of the Buddhist and Hindu ideas that Theosophy incorporated: that matter is empty, illusory, void, nothingness.

But reason's undermining of itself by its own methods arguably had a more fundamental impact than either Einstein's theories of relativity or Rutherford's planetary model of the atom. For one thing, reason undid itself (in the sense of demonstrating that it had no certain application to reality) with mathematical methods, and mathematics had long been held to be a means for establishing indisputable truths: for millennia, thinkers had maintained that so long as mathematical methods were correctly applied, mathematical thinking would divulge truths about reality. Leibniz wrote this famous passage advocating for his *characteristica universalis* (a forerunner of modern symbolic logic):

Whence it is manifest that if we could find characters or signs appropriate for expressing all our thoughts as definitely and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometric analysis expresses lines, we could in all subjects *in so far as they are amenable to reasoning* accomplish what is done in Arithmetic and Geometry.

For all inquiries which depend on reasoning would be performed by the transposition of characters and by a kind of calculus, which would immediately facilitate the discovery of beautiful results. For we should not have to break our heads as much as is necessary today, and yet we should be sure of accomplishing everything the given facts allow.

Moreover, we should be able to convince the world what we should have found or concluded, since it would be easy to verify the calculation either by doing it over or by trying tests similar to that of casting out nines in arithmetic. And if someone would doubt my results, I should say to him: "Let us calculate, Sir," and thus by taking to pen and ink, we should soon settle the question.⁷

Leibniz's dream was to perfect reason by giving it signs appropriate to expressing definitely and exactly all our thoughts, so that then "we could in all subjects in so far as they are amenable to reasoning accomplish what is done in Arithmetic and Geometry." This was the dream that dominated the eras from Plato to Russell. Describing this *calculus ratiocinator* (who, reading that term, would not think of George Boole's *Laws of Thought*, which established the basis for the digital computer?), the twenty-year-old G.W. Leibniz wrote in 1663, in "De arte combinatoria," that the fundamental purpose towards which he was directing his efforts was to develop "a general method in which all truths of the reason would be reduced to a kind of calculation. At the same time this would be a sort of universal language or script, but infinitely different

from all those projected hitherto; for the symbols and even the words in it would direct reason; and errors, except those of fact, would be mere mistakes in calculation.” The idea here was that care in thinking (with thinking here being understood as calculation) would allow us, step by step, to learn the truths about nature. That confidence was demolished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. When reason was seen to have ceded its grip on reality, the mind became unmoored from reality. Some responded to this as a catastrophe of the first order; others deemed that cutting the ligatures that bound the mind to reality unbridled the imagination and created the conditions for the realization of that historical advance that Romantics had proclaimed was necessary to save humankind, viz., the triumph of the imagination over reason. Sometimes, as we shall see, thinkers and artists maintained that by setting aside the rational faculty, one releases a noetic process even higher than the imagination, a pneumatic process that liquefies all the fixed certainties of the limited bourgeois self and enables us to live a new life of openness to all.

As momentous as the discoveries were that time and space are not absolutes and that the atom (and, it follows, matter) is mostly void, I believe (as I remarked above) that the critique of reason was more fundamental. What Einstein and Rutherford revealed was that the world is not as our senses perceive it to be. But the idea that the world is not constituted as it seems to be can be traced back to thinkers before Plato—indeed, arguably, it was one of those truths that earlier thinkers would have been bound to uncover. But traditionally, reason was assigned the role of *correcting* the senses (Plato, for example, maintained reason served that role). Do the senses (touch and sight) yield the impression that matter is solid? Rutherford’s mathematics (applied to the deflection of alpha particles bombarding a thin sheet of gold foil) would correct that. The feeling that reason itself had lost its grip on reality (and so could not fulfill its traditional role of correcting sense errors) had broader implications than Rutherford’s or Einstein’s discovery. One could make the same point with regard to that other great, but troubling, principle discovered by early-twentieth-century physics: Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which tells us that one cannot measure simultaneously, and to any arbitrary degree of precision, both the present position and the future momentum (or trajectory) of an electron. Heisenberg’s discovery had a powerful and widespread impact, but it was contained by the discovery that applying Fourier transforms to an electron’s orbital frequencies enables us to manage that uncertainty.

There is another basis for understanding reason’s displacement from its place of authority as having a broader and deeper impact than those other discoveries of early twentieth-century science and mathematics. Human’s self-image, and the value that humans attach to their species, has traditionally

been associated with reason. The Classical definition of the human being is that we are rational animals. The discovery that reason's grasp on reality was feeble was experienced as a traumatic insult to humanity's self-image. To help humans recover from this insult, an alternative nobility was required, and many thinkers and artists found it in humans' pneumatic connection with a vital source. As I have noted, the belief that minds had become untethered from reality invited diverse responses. For many, it was a source of alarm. Others, though, took it as permission to liberate the imagination (or some other non-rational faculty): If the mind can't fathom reality, why then should it try? If our beliefs are erroneous, if they are no better than imaginings, why then should we not at least strive to make those ideas—those imaginings—as rich, as intense, as vital, as life-giving as possible? For the most part, the members of the Dada and Surrealist movements embraced that conclusion and propounded it with a remarkable vigour.

But there was more to this embrace of irrationalism. Artists recognized that there was irrationalism and there was irrationalism. It could be pallid, feeble, defeatist, or it could be vital, intense, sexy, vibrant—because it could affirm the life force. It could even lead to transcendental experiences. Irrationalisms that promoted experiences with the latter characteristics were obviously those that would be of greatest value to artists, for they would sustain and even enhance the imagination. Artists recognized there was a long tradition of a vital, life-enhancing, occult irrationalism that provided symbols with which the imagination could work in elaborating an alternative, intense fantasy-reality.

Moreover, when reason came under assault, humans could no longer turn to science to help them understand reality. But the idea that the mind has no access to truth was one that many found unendurable. People longed to believe there was an alternative, irrational, or super-rational means to discover truth. The noesis (higher intuition) celebrated in many spiritual, esoteric, and occult traditions fit the bill—the occult traditions provided an alternative means of apprehending higher truths. Many thinkers and many artists found that alternative (and the truths it purported to reveal) very appealing. The widespread interest in esoteric and occult topics (often forgotten today) influenced DADA and Surrealism in important ways, and I argue that this interest also shaped the ways in which the cinema was understood. These esoteric interests formed part of the discursive context that arose in response to reason's limits being exposed; they also help explain how it was possible for thinkers to formulate and embrace the extravagant beliefs that the value of art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects and that the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device. And these tenets were the basis for the conclusion that the cinema was the top art, at least for modern times.

The seeming oddity of the book's shape—it opens with an extended treatment of developments in philosophy and mathematics around the time when DADA and Surrealism emerged—can be connected to the peculiarity of the book's character. Most scholarship about the relation between film and those two artistic movements has analyzed the influence that DADA and Surrealism had on the cinema (often by commenting on Dada and Surrealist films). This book takes a different approach: it focuses on the influence that the cinema had on the ideals of those two movements. It proposes that many painters and writers in the early twentieth century were struck by the cinema's extravagantly modern character, and proclaimed that it would be necessary to reconstitute literature and visual art so that they took on some of the attributes that made the cinema the most important modern art form (some artists even believed that in doing so, they might surpass the cinema). The central claim—that the birth of the cinema played a vital role in establishing the agendas of DADA and Surrealism, and that the manifestos of those two movements can be understood as proposals, formulated in the wake of the recognition that the cinema was the most important art form for moderns—is entirely novel. I see this book more as a contribution to the history of twentieth-century art than as a film studies book, although I hope my approach opens up some unique insights into avant-garde film studies. The work contains a great deal of material on the cinema (specifically, on the intellectual reception of the early cinema) because it is important to understand how artists who affiliated themselves with DADA and Surrealism understood the cinema if we are to understand how the cinema influenced their proposals for reconstituting poetry, painting, theatre, music, and dance.

One way to understand the Dada and Surrealist artists' ideas about the cinema is to read what they wrote about the cinema and the other arts (often their writings on painting and music are more revealing of what they thought about cinema than their writings specifically on cinema). Another important way is to study the films that Dada artists like Man Ray and Francis Picabia made (or helped make), as well as films that Surrealist artists like Salvador Dalí and Luis Buñuel made. If we know how to analyze those works, we can find there evidence of what their thoughts on the cinema were and why those thoughts led them to engage with this heartbreaking medium. It is for what they reveal about the Dadaists' and Surrealists' ideas on the cinema and its strengths that I analyze *Entr'acte* (1924), *Retour à la raison* (1923), *Un chien andalou* (1929), *Las Hurdes: Tierra Sin Pan* (1933/34), and *Duo Concertantes* (1964). I do not intend these analyses to be taken as "case studies" for the thesis that the cinema was the "reigning art among arts for Dadaism and Surrealism." The relation of the film analyses to my thesis is more indirect. Nor are these analyses meant to be complete and exhaustive—I mine the films that

the *Dadaisten* and Surrealists made for information about what they thought about the cinema. (In that respect, I treat the films in a somewhat similar way to how I treat other primary documents.) I point out that the commentary on Dada ideas about the structural homologies among cinema, dream, collage, and consciousness arises out of my analysis of Man Ray's film *Emak Bakia*. My claim that the cinema was considered the top art requires asking the question "How did the *Dadaisten* and the Surrealists understand the cinema—what did they believe the cinema to be?" My answer is that they considered the cinema to be a pneumatic device. But the idea that the cinema is a pneumatic device is not one that would occur to many contemporary thinkers, so some effort will be required to establish that Dada and Surrealist artists thought of the cinema as an occult-influencing machine, and why my film analyses help make my case that they *did* in fact think of the cinema in that way.

The commentaries on specific films that are embedded in the text and in the film analyses in the appendices overlap: some of the material that appears in the main text is repeated in the appendices. There is a reason for this repetition. Take Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí's *Un chien andalou*, for example. I observe in that film a thorough and systematic use of what I call spatial ruptures—something that has hardly been discussed in the criticism. In the main text, I highlight a small number of instances where that device was used and try to put its use in context. In the appendix, I analyze the complete work—or, at least, a large portion of the work—in order to demonstrate its systematic use throughout the whole. Something similar could be claimed about the demands of exposing the theme of reality's dreamlike nature in Man Ray's *Emak Bakia* (and in fact, about the themes I trace into any of the films that I analyze). The films can be found readily in electronic form.

The film analyses presented in the appendices serve another purpose. Their form is modelled on Marshall McLuhan and Harley Parker's *Through the Vanishing Point: Space in Poetry and Painting* (1968), the first book of his I heard McLuhan discuss. Readers familiar with that book will recall that its authors juxtaposed artworks (I have had to rely on descriptions) and commentary to show that art reveals features of its cultural background (the environment in which it is made) that generally go unnoticed. One advantage of that form is that it can import utterly salient connections that, by being introduced, would disrupt the step-by-step-by-step march of the argumentative or demonstrative form used in the main text, from which I have pruned much useful information in order to throw the argument's form into high relief. The "*Through the Vanishing Point*" form of the film commentaries in the appendices has allowed me to introduce much indispensable information about the artistic, social, intellectual, and cultural environment in which these films were made, and to do so without disrupting an unfolding argument.

The conception of DADA and Surrealism I propound is grounded in a close reading of Dada and Surrealist sources. I interpret these in a way that (obviously) I believe is consistent with the discursive context that helped generate them. Accordingly, I devote a great deal of attention to primary sources, providing close readings of writings of artists who affiliated themselves with DADA and Surrealism, as well as of the works produced in the same period, or slightly earlier, that I take to give evidence of the discursive context of DADA and Surrealism. I have generally relegated my remarks on more contemporary, secondary sources to the notes.

I understand very well that there are many topics quite directly related to the book's central thesis that I could have discussed and have not. But I am also aware the book should be no longer than it is now. I have tried to maintain a sharp focus on the central argument (which, I point out again, involves unfamiliar, and seemingly strange, claims about the pneumatic function of art and extravagant beliefs about the cinema's nature as an occult-influencing machine). I have tried my very best to find that "sweet spot," at which I have amassed just enough evidence to establish incontrovertibly the central thesis and (without overtaxing readers' patience) provided sufficiently detailed treatments of a few important topics that sympathetic readers will be able to figure out how I would have treated topics that I have not deal with.

Two final notes, one concerning a matter of idiolect, the other concerning a convention I have adopted, on a matter of idiolect. I give "DADA" in full capitals when I refer to the movement begun in the Zürich *Künstlerkneipe*; when using it as an adjective, I have capitalized only the first letter. Admittedly, this usage is not universal, but it seems that it conforms to Tristan Tzara's "Dada Manifesto" of 1918. Furthermore, the *Dadaisten* declared that art had become entertainment for the bourgeoisie—for the burghers who had sent hundreds and hundreds of thousands of young men to appalling deaths in the mudfields of northern Europe. They rejected art. But they proposed to bring forth something else, DADA, to take the place that art could have had, were it not for its having renounced its moral claim to that position. In fact, their use of the term "DADA" is somewhat ambiguous; sometimes it refers to the yet unknown practice that would be the successor to art, and sometimes to the provisional practice that would sweep away art and lead to art's successor coming forth. Capitalization highlights the phenomenon's anomalous, unknown status.

Strictly, it is not correct to speak of Dada art or Dada artists. However, one would soon tire of reading over and over again the phrase "the successor to art"—of reading repeatedly not my shorthand "Dada art must become..." but "the Dadaists saw that whatever would take the place of art would have become..." Nor does it do simply to substitute the word "DADA" for the

phrase “what the Dadaists believed would be art’s successor”: it is confusing to say “the Dadaists saw what DADA would have to become” when writing about their views on practices that would take the place of artmaking. For that reason, I have used the phrases “Dada art” and “Dada artists,” even though the Dadaists themselves might have protested.

As for the matter of convention, I note that I generally give titles of paintings, films, articles, books, and manifestos in their original language. Only on their first appearance do I give an English translation—the title by which the work is commonly referred to in English-language literature, if there is one, or a literal translation if there is not. With articles, books, and manifestos, I also include on their first appearance publication information for the translation I used—thereafter, I generally use the original title in my citations, but (unless explicitly stated otherwise) the page references are to the English translation noted. I generally prefer to use existing translations; so when I have not included publication information for an English translation, that is because I could find none that I considered reliable and have translated the cited passage myself. Though I have taken care with my translations, I am not a professional translator. When I did a translation myself, I have generally provided the original passage, so readers can adjust my reading, if I have made errors.

NOTES

- 1 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/film/>
- 2 The paragone is a specific type of debate in which one form of art—for example, architecture, sculpture, or painting—is championed as superior to all others. The term in Italian means “comparison” (with connotations of strife). This form of debate was of particular importance during the Renaissance, though it had existed even in ancient times and also figured in Dante’s *Commedia*.
- 3 Ricciotto Canudo, “The Birth of a Sixth Art” (1911), in *French Film Theory and Criticism: A History/Anthology*, vol. 1: 1907–1939, ed. Richard Abel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 64–65. Emphases in original.
- 4 One reviewer criticized the section concerning Dada collage because it did not include a discussion of the earlier history of collage, including the Cubists’ use of it. The point the reviewer was making was well taken, as the Cubist artists played a major role in shaping the theory and practice of collage at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, another volume in this series deals with the Cubist and Futurist movements, and in that volume I deal with the origins and character of the Cubist practice of collage at considerable length. The analysis I offer there connects that topic to the fundamental argument about the nature of cinema’s influence on Cubism (and on Futurism). I do not wish to repeat that commentary in this volume. Furthermore, Dada collage has a different character than Cubist collage, and for that reason I did not incorporate my discussion of Dada collage in the section in the Cubist book in which Cubism’s influence is discussed. For that difference relates to the Dada’s a-rationality and so fits with

the overall theme of this book and contributes to the discussion of its argument (just as the discussion of Cubist collage in the volume on Cubism and Futurism fits with the overall theme of *that* book and contributes to the discussion of *its* argument).

Conversely, even though I dealt with Russian and Soviet art in the early twentieth century in the previous volume in this series (*Harmony and Dissent*), I have treated the a-rationalist Russian movement *заум* (*zaum*, trans-sense) in this volume. Dealing with *zaum* here amplifies the argument that an interest in a-rationality—and even a celebration of a magical irrationality—were phenomena that gave evidence of a belief in the beneficial effects of a higher unreason (or anti-reason). This decision means that details about the artistic ferment in Russia that gave rise to *zaum* are missing from this volume. But they were dealt with at length in *Harmony and Dissent*, and I have not wanted to repeat that material here. So (not without reason) the reviewer who complained that I did not deal with Cubist collage in this volume also protested that the section on *zaum* is out of place here. The reviewer's comments highlight the difficulties of dividing the argument among different volumes.

- 5 Recall that Canudo argued that the art of the cinema synthesized the spatial arts (architecture, sculpture, and painting) with the temporal arts (music and dance). Later, in his better-known 1923 manifesto, "Reflections on the Seventh Art," he added poetry to the arts that the cinema was bringing together in a new, synthetic theatre. The new, synthetic theatre, the cinema, would provoke sacred emotions, he averred.

Canudo also wrote *Music as a Religion of the Future*, trans. Barnett D. Conlan (Edinburgh and London: T.N. Foulis, 1913). There he contended that art and religion alike strive for self-oblivion and that this self-forgetfulness is the secret of their power. That work proposes that music alone is capable of "this indispensable condition of Oblivion which all Religions bestowed on their faithful" (13). We need a religion without ritual, and music alone can furnish this. So in that work, Canudo argued that music is the top art. In "The Birth of the Sixth Art," he argued that the cinema would become a synthetic theatre that would incorporate the values of plastic arts and music (an art of time). When it had achieved that synthesis, cinema would become the top art once it had incorporated music. Theosophists found Canudo's arguments congenial: *Music as a Religion of the Future* received a positive notice in the *Theosophist Magazine* (April–June 1914): 462–63.

- 6 The "plum pudding" model of the atom held that negatively charged particles, which Thomson called "corpuscles" (later scientists would refer to them as electrons), were distributed in a uniform sea of positive charge—that is, they were embedded in a cloud of positive charge like pieces of fruit in a plum pudding.
- 7 G.W. Leibniz, "Preface to the General Science (1677)," in Philip Wiener, *Leibniz: Selections* (New York: Scribner's, 1951), 15.

THE FATE OF REASON IN MODERNITY

Vanguard art is not a single, homogeneous phenomenon—it is plural, differentiated, variegated. The variety of forms it has assumed, however, should not mislead us into overestimating the differences among the various practices commonly called modernism. There are, I believe, two main types of vanguard practices. One type is characterized by a rigorous formalism, based in the belief that aesthetic relations have a transcendental status and are grasped in a higher cognitive act enabled by humans' quest for form. The aesthetic paradigm for this sort of modernist practice is Immanuel Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Critique of Power of Judgment, 1790). I restrict the term modernism to apply to art of this sort. The second category of vanguard art seems more eclectic, at least at first glance. The various artistic movements that this broad category comprises have a wilder character: the exponents of these various movements issued many ringing manifestos, protesting prevailing social conditions and proposing that they had discovered artistic forms and practices that, by reawakening the senses, would refashion human be-ing and, in so doing, revitalize society. The Futurists (the first great manifesto writers), the Dadaists, and the Surrealists all asserted such claims.

There are points of connection between these two strains in artmaking; nonetheless, the Dadaists and Surrealists were “dissident” artists in the era of modernism—they were more interested in producing pneumatic effects than they were in bringing the forms of their art into alignment with the material features of the media with which they worked. That acknowledged, they did work in an era dominated by ideas about materiality and pure form (however misunderstood those ideals might be), and their thinking was affected by modernist ideals. Moreover, for both the modernist and the dissident strain in modern art, perception was an issue of first importance. Their practices had their basis in a proposition to which the Soviet formalist Viktor Shklovsky gave what is likely the richest, and certainly the best-known, formulation—that artworks defamiliarize the materials they contain, and, by rendering them strange, make perception more difficult. Difficulty enlivens perception by challenging it.

But recognizing this common interest in perception raises an important question: Why did aestheticians, art theorists, and artists so eagerly embrace the idea that perception needs to be refreshed and revitalized and that revitalizing perception, by making it strange and therefore difficult, is the primary role of a work of art? There are many other plausible conjectures about the value of artworks: that they provoke feelings of pleasure by harmonizing imagination, perception, and understanding; that they engender satisfaction by developing (each artwork in its own way) a pattern for reconciling discord; that they elicit delight by presenting a world that is lawful, but one whose laws are attuned to desire; that they create a sense of liberty by constructing a world that is free of the physical (and perhaps even moral) laws of the everyday world. Even if one accepts the claim that artworks engage perception in a special way, and that any view of art’s importance must take into account the perceptual intensity that artworks can elicit, several alternative notions of their nature and importance come readily to mind. One could plausibly assert that artworks create harmony among sensations and thereby create a sense of dynamic equilibrium—by bringing, if even for only a moment, opposing forces to a point of stillness. Or one could suggest that turning our apperceptive faculties towards sensations that are as intense as those that artworks sometimes elicit can so concentrate attention that we can discover the harmoniousness of phenomena that, *prima facie*, seemed to contend with one another (or, at least, to be of such discordant diversity that they would defy all attempts to bring them into accord), and that in doing so, artworks bring the senses to a satisfying rest.

None of these conjectures are without merit, but several factors conspire to compel widespread assent to the proposition that the purpose of artworks is to revivify perception. Shklovsky’s claim that this is artworks’

primary purpose reflects a despondent assessment of the validity of perceptual reports—an assessment conditioned by the collapse of a world view that held sway from the seventeenth century until the late nineteenth century. The uncertainty, confusion, and despondency implicit in Shklovsky's ideas about perception reflect the traumatizing effects of the collapse of a paradigm that had governed Western European thinking for hundreds of years.

THE MODERN PARADIGM: PRIVILEGING REASON

The fundamental purpose of this book is to examine the early reception of the cinema. I have pointed out that one view of the intellectual reception of the early cinema has achieved a near hegemony. That view is that most early writers on film were troubled by the cinema's origins in the vaudeville peep show and the circus side show, and feared that its vulgarity made it unworthy of the honorific designation "art" and an unsuitable companion for the great high arts. While that view of the cinema is central to one strain in the intellectual response to the new medium, I contend there is another view that has gone largely unrecognized. This view was far from anxious about film's lowly provenance in popular entertainment; on the contrary, it embraced the new medium as the first art that truly exemplified modern, largely urban, life. The view that the cinema was the *ottima arte* (the optimal or top art) was especially common among those whose commitments were to advanced artistic practices. Indeed, many poets, painters, playwrights, and sculptors declared excitedly that this new art, so paradigmatically fitted for the modern urban world, would demand that the media in which they worked (or the forms they created in the materials of their various media) be remade so that they might take on at least some of the attributes that made cinema the top art (and, according to some thereby surpassing it in vitality). Notions about how to recast the art media (or the forms forged from those media) and about the urgency of doing so became a principal part—indeed, *the* principal part—of the conceptual core of the artistic programs advanced by the vanguard art movements of the first half of the twentieth century. As a consequence, the cinema became a pivotal artistic force around which took shape a remarkable variety and number of aesthetic forms; among these can be counted the radical forms that Dada and Surrealist artists produced in reckless abundance.

In this volume, I home in on DADA and Surrealism and trace the influence that the cinema had in constituting the aesthetic agendas of those movements. But to understand the reasons why Dada and Surrealist artists celebrated the cinema, and the influence the cinema exerted on their proposals for developing new forms for traditional media, we have to examine how they understood

the cinema and what made it, for them, the *ottima arte* (top art). This will involve examining, first, what the era understood the value of art to be, and second, what the era understood the cinema to be—what features of the cinema made it a paragon of aesthetic value. The bone structure of the argument that led to celebrating the cinema as the top art is this: the value of art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects; the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device; therefore, the cinema is the top art. But to grasp that argument in its true complexity, we have to consider why the artists and thinkers involved in DADA and Surrealism would have believed that the value of artworks / art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects and that the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device. My argument advancing these claims is, I believe, a novel one that challenges received views and will, I suspect, in turn be challenged, so I proceed by amassing what I feel is incontrovertible documentary evidence relating to the premises and conclusion of the syllogism that shapes this text.

The belief that the value of artworks / art forms depends on the capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects was generated by a discursive regime that was formed in response to a historical process through which calculative reason undid its own claims to be the foundation for all knowledge. Furthermore, calculative reason's undoing created the conditions under which the sociological/historical reasons for embracing irrationalism had the effects they did. If reason—or what moderns identify as reason, viz., calculative reason—had not weakened itself so, the external, sociological/historical factors that impelled artists and thinkers towards irrationalism would not have had such powerful and all-encompassing effects. The dismantling of reason's overreaching claims turned people towards irrationalisms of many different varieties. The discursive context for celebrating art's pneumatic effects reveals that a belief in the beneficial effects of a higher unreason (or anti-reason) was widespread in the era that gave birth to DADA and Surrealism, along with a number of other irrational vanguard art movements of the time. We can understand DADA and Surrealism as celebrating what human beings might become when instrumental reason no longer is the dominant agent in the formation of identity—indeed, DADA (to some extent), Surrealism, and the hippie movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s were the last movements that took claims for humans' higher potential as plausible. The discursive context of irrationalist exuberance influenced the character of both DADA and Surrealism—as well as the age's conception of the cinema. To understand that context and character, we must understand something about the historical process that discredited calculative reason's overreaching claims.

The last half of the nineteenth century was in Western societies a period of what the historian of science Thomas Kuhn calls “conventional science.” It

was also a period during which an intellectual paradigm was able to compel widespread acceptance. Indeed, few times in human history have seen the ruling paradigm attain such a complete hegemony. That paradigm valorized objective knowledge and scientific analysis, and the advantages of according so much importance to objective knowledge were everywhere obvious: in the vast expansion of productive capacities (which, of course, was not without attendant difficulties, although most believed that reason would supply the means—which might entail more or less radical action—to sort out these problems); the extraordinary increase in mobility of goods and people; the discovery of keys to unlock many of the mysteries of nature, including the origin of life (although the picture that science presented of the solution to that riddle was painted in broad strokes); the revelation of patterns in history's unfolding; and insight into the human mind's operation. For the popular mind, the success of the paradigm was represented by the ideas of slow, steady, progressive development and the triumph of the human mind over doubt and mystery (including the secret operations of nature).

It seems to be a fundamental truth of history, as of individual life, that no sooner is something accepted as indubitable—so certain that we can make plans based on it—than that certainty is cast into doubt; the greater the confidence we accord the seeming certainty, the more devastating is the experience of its collapse. The story of the rise of vanguard art is that of the collapse of the paradigm just described, of the belief in human history as progressive development towards an ever deeper understanding of nature (including human nature), and the consequences of that implosion. We must explore the hold that this ruling paradigm had on the Western mind of the late nineteenth century if we are to assess why its repudiation seemed to so many a calamity (although, it should be acknowledged, some adventurous thinkers considered it to be wholly good), as well as the role it played in the rise of successive vanguard art movements.

The foundation for the paradigm was a conception of the relation of mind to matter that accorded reason pride of place—or, more precisely, that gave pride of place to a notion of reason that identified it with calculation. Still more precisely, humans are thrown into an alien world of objects that they do not understand, and the function of reason is to discern the patterns that order the operations of the world of objects. According to this model, the most potent tool for the discovery and control of these patterns is mathematics, along with the various sciences that mathematics makes possible, such as mathematical physics, mathematical biology, and mathematical chemistry. This world view had two key effects. One was that it disenchanting the material realm. The Christian conception of reality, which had governed thinking through the Middle Ages, viewed matter as the product of divine creativity.

Indeed, the First Covenant begins with an account of the creation of the heavens and the earth:

And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so.

And the earth brought forth grass, and the herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good . . .

And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years:

And let there be for lights in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth: and it was so.

And God made two great lights; the great light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night: he made the stars also.

And God set them in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth.

And to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness: and God saw that it was good.

...

And God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind: and God saw that it was good.

And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth . . .

And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so.

And God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind: and God saw that it was good. (Genesis [AV] 11, 12, 14–18, 21–22, 25)

The second effect was to credit the subject with a broader degree of freedom than heretofore acknowledged. The Classical and Christian world views maintained that human willing (and human knowing) had limits that followed either from the nature of human being, or from divine ordinance, or from both. There were activities for which human nature suited human beings, and to pursue those activities (i.e., to live in accordance with human nature) was to pursue the good. Such views were entailed as much by the Classical theory of natural law as they were by the Christian account of the creation.

A new, modern paradigm emerged in the seventeenth century, one that rejected the view that the order of nature is providential. Ours is an accidental universe—the combinations of atoms that, at the moment I write this, constitute the fleeting condition of reality could have been different if reality's initial conditions had been different. There is no necessity to the order of things. Reverence for the providential order of nature placed limits

on what humans could rightfully do to nature; indeed, in the Classical and Christian Eras, it was believed that human willing should align itself with the pattern of creation. When that idea was rejected, the question arose, “If the order of nature does not constrain human willing, what does?” The answer the moderns offered was simple: “Nothing does.” Value is not imposed on human willing from without. Values reflect the choices that human beings make and the preferences that human beings elect. The philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche makes this clear (and that is what makes Nietzsche’s thought an exemplar of the modern paradigm)—the potent, creative human is the person with the ability to effect “transvaluation.”

A world view that detaches matter from its source in divine creativity, that views matter as a brute given, and that at the same time proclaims that all value is the product of the subject’s acts of will has a tendency to develop along Gnostic lines; and indeed, the modern world view did take on Gnostic features. Like the Gnostics, moderns believe that the world in which one lives is an alien reality from which the true seeker strives to escape. The soul alone has value (not the body, which more orthodox Christians believe was given to us by the divine so that we might sensuously enjoy the beauty of his creation and the delights of having flesh). The true seeker will strive to set the soul free to return whence it came, a realm of light free of all taint of the material world.

To understand the evolution of this modern Gnosticism, we must consider in greater detail the modern paradigm and especially its collapse. I do so here by considering one of the most momentous developments in logic and the foundations of mathematics. It occurred at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. In that development we can see most clearly what drove thinkers and artists from what had for so long seemed certainties—certainties that, at the middle of the nineteenth century, most philosophers still believed would provide the basis for a comprehensive account of reality’s constitution (many even believed that scientists were close to completing that account and were on the verge of bringing philosophy to an effulgent conclusion). Mathematicians and philosophers, working in set theory, logic, and the foundations of mathematics at the beginning of the twentieth century, were the first to feel the icy blasts that were to blow away these “certainties.”

GEOMETRY AND GEOMETRIES

Let us begin this story by considering, as a case study, some comments on mathematics and art made by the Russian artist El Lissitzky (Elizar, or Lazar, or Eliezer Markovich Lissitzky, 1890–1947). El Lissitzky is sometimes offered as the model of the artist-designer-engineer of the type that Sergei Eisenstein

also exemplified. Here are some comments the artist offered about the belief that mathematics provides us with models of universal applicability and about the use of models for contemporary advanced mathematics in artmaking:

It is commonly assumed that perspective representation of space is objective, unequivocal, and obvious. People say, “the camera too sees the world in terms of perspective,” but this ignores the fact that, contrary to common practice in the West, the Chinese have built a camera with concave rather than convex lenses, thereby producing an equally objective image of the world in the mechanical sense, but obviously quite different in all other respects. Perspective representation of space is based on a rigid three-dimensional view of the world based on the laws of Euclidean geometry. The world is put into a cubic box and transformed within the picture plane into something resembling a pyramidal form. . . . Here, the apex of the visual cone has its location either in our eye, i.e., in front of the object, or is projected to the horizon, i.e., behind the object. The former approach has been taken by the East, the latter by the West.¹

El Lissitzky asserts that truths that are commonly supposed to be objective, and therefore universal, are actually relative. He continues by revealing that he is aware of the developments in mathematics that have undermined these supposedly objective, universal truths: “A fundamental reorientation has taken place in science. The geocentric cosmic order of Ptolemy has been replaced by the heliocentric order of Copernicus. Rigid Euclidean space has been destroyed by Lobachevsky, Gauss, and Riemann.”² Here he is referring to the development of non-Euclidean geometries that destroyed the belief in the certainty and universal applicability of Euclidean geometry.

El Lissitzky goes on to argue that if reason (as manifested in mathematics and science) cannot provide us with certain knowledge, we must take up other means to grasp the higher truths—we must rely on intuition of a nearly religious or mystical sort, of the sort that Symbolists celebrate. He remarks on the new art’s identification of space not with the pyramidal viewing form of perspectival painting but with the effects of the surface, and on the seeming anomaly of converting a surface into a plastic space in its own right—of creating push-and-pull relations between elements that are not determined by any perspectival relation and that, in fact, are known to lie flat on the surface of the painting:

New optical experience has taught us that two surfaces of different intensity must be conceived as having a varying distance relationship between them, even though they may lie in the same plane.

Irrational Space

Strictly speaking, distances in this space are measured only by the intensity and position of rigidly defined color planes. Such space is structured within

a framework of the most unequivocal directions: vertically, horizontally, or diagonally. It is a positional system. These distances cannot be measured with a finite scale, as for instance objects in planimetric or perspective space. Here distances are irrational and cannot be represented as a finite relationship of two whole numbers. . . .

Suprematism has extended the apex of the finite visual cone of perspective into infinity.

It has broken through the “blue lampshade of the heavens.” The color of space is no longer assumed to be a single *blue* ray of the color spectrum, but the whole spectrum—*white*. Suprematist space can be formed in front of the surface as well as in *depth*. If one assigns the value 0 to the picture surface, then one may call the depth direction – (negative), and the frontal direction + (positive), or vice versa. Thus suprematism has swept away the illusion of three-dimensional space on a plane, replacing it by the ultimate illusion of *irrational* space with attributes of infinite extensibility in depth and foreground.³

El Lissitzky’s remarks highlight the role played by an emergent sense of new, “irrational” spaces as well as the loosening of the grip that Euclidean space (which founds geometric optics and the perspectival system) had long maintained on European intelligence. Accordingly, they testify to the loss of conviction regarding the authority of the conception of space implicit in the successive world views that had ruled Western thinking for two thousand years. Other artists testify to the loss of conviction about the authority of the conception of time that likewise had been implicit in the dominant world view for at least five hundred years. Consider the extraordinary number of artistic movements that accorded the idea of simultaneity remarkable importance (there were even several artistic movements that took the name Simultaneism). What accounts for the importance that the early modernists attached to this concept? An answer is readily available: the acceleration of movements and events that was a result of industrialization encouraged people to imagine a time and place where this acceleration would have reached the stage when all events might be experienced as simultaneous. There is merit to this proposal, although I do not think it is radical enough to expose the real roots of the issue. For, in fact, I believe that what made the issue of simultaneity seem so pressing is that the idea of time as a continuous unfolding process had been brought into doubt. This is something we can witness as clearly in Henri Bergson’s philosophy as in Albert Einstein’s science.

How space and time are conceived is fundamental to science, the groundwork of the modern paradigm. The challenge to the way moderns had conceived time was really a challenge to the paradigm of the modern age, one that would lead to its wholesale destruction. Several mathematicians/philosophers could serve us in the role of protagonists in the story of its demise, but the philosophical scope of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead’s efforts

recommend them especially. Considering their work and how it contributed to the destruction of the modern paradigm is essential, for although external factors also played a role, they cannot alone explain how the dream of reason fell apart: it was undone as much, or more, by internal developments as by external conditions.

FOUNDATIONALISM COLLAPSES

Mathematics had long been a collection of discrete subjects—geometry, algebra, analysis, number theory—each with its own methods. Many dreamt of unifying mathematics by showing that the derivations of mathematical theorems could be reduced to exercises in deduction. For two millennia, Euclidean geometry had stood, as El Lissitzky (and Duchamp) must have realized, for all that was certain. It gave evidence of the power of axiomatization. For centuries and centuries, Euclid's *Elements* (written about 300 BCE) had stood as the paragon of exact, irrefutable demonstration, and it continued to serve in this role even through the 1960s (when, to the end of internalizing the standards of reasoning that geometry exemplified, all schoolchildren were still required to memorize the first two books of Euclid's famous work).

But troubles arose with Euclidean geometry: it proved possible to construct other geometries that were just as consistent as Euclid's, geometries that treated what we ordinarily think of as a 2-D plane surface as the surface of an ellipse or as the surface of a hyperbola, geometries in which interior angles of a triangle are greater than, or alternatively less than, two right angles. More disturbing yet, there turned out to be no reason, either internal to the geometric system or (many believed) concerning the correspondence of the geometric system to reality, for preferring any one of the geometric systems. This lent credence to the claim that Euclid's system could not claim unique authority in informing us about the nature of the world. More troubling yet, we cannot visualize any true Lobachevskian spaces (a geometry on which a "flat" surface is the surface of a hyperbola, in which there is more than one line that can be extended through any given point parallel to another line of which that point is not part, and in which the sum of angles in a triangle must be less than 180 degrees), nor can we visualize any non-Euclidean spaces with more than two dimensions. The Euclidean nature of our imagination led Kant to say that, although the denial of the axioms of Euclid could be conceived without contradiction, our intuition is limited by the form of space imposed by our own minds on the world. That the imagination cannot conceive non-Euclidean space, even though non-Euclidean geometries are logically consistent, raised a spectre that terrified European intellectuals. A basic assumption of Western thinkers for two-and-a-half millennia had been that

what determined whether the idea of some thing represented a possible being (a being that could have actual existence) was reason. Reason decides whether the idea of a quadrilateral with four equal sides represents a possible being (it does, for the description defines a rhombus), whether the idea of a plane figure with three sides whose interior angles sum to 280 represents a possible being (it does not, for the notion of such a figure is contradictory), or whether the idea of a married bachelor represents a possible being (it does not, for the term bachelor means “unmarried man,” so the phrase “a married bachelor” means a married unmarried man—and since the phrase “a married unmarried man” is a contradiction, it cannot denote any actually existing being). It was reason that decided whether what we imagine (or intuit) can be made real. Furthermore, it was maintained that the imagination could conceive clearly only possible beings: the idea of a being that is not possible is not a truly clear idea (for it harbours a contradiction).

Thus, reason and imagination were thought to be harmonious. Non-Euclidean geometries brought doubt to this belief, for they exposed that although reason could find no formal incoherence in some non-Euclidean or n -dimensional geometries (strictly speaking, one can have an n -dimensional Euclidean geometry, but the rise of, and interest in, non-Euclidean and n -dimensional were linked historically), humans could not imagine (intuit) the spaces that non-Euclidean geometries study (nor all of the forms that can fill it). Thus, they brought into question the faith that reason and imagination (intuition) correspond to reality: reason could not expose any contradiction in the idea of non-Euclidean space, even though the properties of some non-Euclidean (and especially n -dimensional) figures seemed so extravagant that it was difficult to concede that such figures could possibly be real. Our imagination (intuition) might not be able to picture clearly the nature of an n -dimensional space; nonetheless, reason cannot expose any incoherence in the ideas of such a space. In Appendix 1, I sketch a few of the details of non-Euclidean geometries’ role in unleashing this spectre of reason’s impotence.

By the early twentieth century, most mathematicians, so far as they thought about such questions at all, preferred to argue that such axiomatic systems were purely formal and that they described no reality whatsoever. Nonetheless, it was not long before thinkers from outside the mathematical community, and of a more populist bent, began to consider these different geometrical systems as providing different narratives of space. And it was a short step from there to the conclusion that all systems of knowledge/representation fail to present the real nature of their purported objects of study, but only provide fictions about them: we develop methods for comparing distances and for understanding relations between points based on a conceptual system and on what we say is true within a system (true of space as

described by Euclid's postulates, for example), which is all we can know. But our knowledge never reaches outside the system of representation.

It was more than just the description of space that was at stake here: the deeper issue concerned reason's purchase on reality. Euclid's axioms and postulates were founded in simple, unchallengeable intuitions about the nature of reality. These axioms and postulates are true (i.e., they correspond to reality)—so whatever follows from them by valid inferential methods must also be true (i.e., agree with reality). All of this confirmed that reason was attuned to reality: if we reason rightly, our conclusions are true (and this is so not just because, as we learned in elementary logic, for a valid argument form, from true premises, a true conclusion follows necessarily). A much deeper harmony accounts for the right reason's accord with reality: a foundational principle of Western thought, from Greece's Classical Era until the late 1800s, was the belief that rational conclusions accord with reality because reality and the mind are similarly rational. It was believed, conversely, that if we err, eventually an incoherence in the system will be exposed. The idea—one which grounded the abstractionism of formalist mathematics—that reason could lose its purchase on reality was deeply, deeply troubling. Nonetheless, in the late 1800s, as thinkers began to map the limits of reason, that idea was embraced.

The effects of the collapse of the belief that right reason corresponds to reality reverberated through the twentieth century, affecting social and political thought and even artmaking. Some examples from a few major thinkers will demonstrate how thoroughgoing these effects were. In the first volume of his widely read autobiography, Bertrand Russell encapsulated the problems he found, even as a young boy, with Euclid's system:

At the age of eleven, I began Euclid, with my brother as my tutor. This was one of the great events of my life, as dazzling as first love. I had not imagined that there was anything so delicious in the world. After I had learned the fifth proposition, my brother told me that it was generally considered difficult, but I had found no difficulty whatever. This was the first time it had dawned upon me that I might have some intelligence. From that moment until Whitehead and I finished *Principia Mathematica*, when I was thirty-eight, mathematics was my chief interest, and my chief source of happiness. Like all happiness, however, it was not unalloyed. I had been told that Euclid proved things, and was much disappointed that he started with axioms. At first I refused to accept them unless my brother could offer me some reason for doing so, but he said: "If you don't accept them, we cannot go on," and as I wished to go on, I reluctantly admitted them *pro tem*. The doubt as to the premisses of mathematics which I felt at that moment remained with me, and determined the course of my subsequent work.⁴

For a later example showing just how widespread the disillusionment was with Euclidean conceptions and with reason itself, let us turn to Marcel

Duchamp's *3 stoppages étalon* (3 Standard Stoppages, 1913–14), which testifies to the erosion of the belief that Euclid, in framing his axiomatic system, had developed a potent means of revealing truths about the constitution of space. In a collection of notes commonly known as *The 1914 Box*, Duchamp states,

The Idea of the Fabrication

–If a straight horizontal thread one meter long falls from a height of one meter onto a horizontal plane distorting itself *as it pleases* and creates a new shape of the measure of length...

–3 patterns obtained in more or less similar conditions: *considered in their relation to one another* they are an *approximate reconstitution* of the measure of length.

The 3 *standard stoppages* are the meter diminished.⁵

In her important study of the fourth dimension in modernist art, Linda Dalrymple Henderson remarks that Duchamp in this passage is contemplating forms that bring the Euclidean assumptions into question: “In Duchamp’s *Stoppages*, it is simply the movement of a line (the thread) from one area of space to another, which illustrates that geometrical figures do not necessarily retain their shape when moved about, as Euclid and geometers for two thousand years after him had assumed they would.”⁶ And *Stoppages* is not the only work of Duchamp that testifies to the deep impact on him of the dismantling of the eternal verities Euclid had seemed to offer. *Readymade malheureux* (Unhappy Ready-made, 1919), a work executed by Marcel’s sister Suzanne, following her brother’s instructions (and intended as a wedding gift for her), shows pages from a geometry textbook that had been suspended from a corner of an outdoor porch for a period of time, allowing rain (water) to drench the book, the sun (fire) to bleach it, wind (air) to tear it, and dirt (earth) to discolour it. Consequently, the geometric figures it contains are warped to the point of no longer being mathematically accurate (the Euclidean diagrams are distressed and unhappy about their condition). A photograph showing two pages with geometric figures was made by either Suzanne or Jean Crotti.

LOGIC AND PARADOX

Duchamp had grasped the historical dynamic through which reason had lost its grip on reality. By now, that dynamic has been assimilated, and it is easy for us to overlook the profound despair it unleashed at the time of its discovery. Russell’s autobiographical writings provide a moving description of its devastating effects. Russell’s work was inspired by the discoveries of the Italian mathematician Guiseppe Peano, whom he met at the International Congress

of Philosophy in July 1900. Russell had been impressed with Peano's ability to prevail in any argument he entered, and decided this must be a result of his mastery of mathematical logic. Accordingly, he took up the study of Peano's works and those of his school. What he discovered in them filled him with excitement:

It became clear to me that his notation afforded an instrument of logical analysis such as I had been seeking for years, and that by studying him I was acquiring a new and powerful technique for the work that I had long wanted to do. By the end of August I had become completely familiar with all the work of his school. I spent September in extending his methods to the logic of relations. It seems to me in retrospect that, through that month, every day was warm and sunny. The Whiteheads stayed with us at Fernhurst, and I explained my new ideas to him. Every evening the discussion ended with some difficulty, and every morning I found that the difficulty of the previous evening had solved itself while I slept. The time was one of intellectual intoxication.⁷

He goes on to explain the reason for his excitement:

For years I had been endeavouring to analyse the fundamental notions of mathematics, such as order and cardinal numbers. Suddenly, in the space of a few weeks, I discovered what appeared to be definitive answers to the problems which had baffled me for years. And in the course of discovering these answers, I was introducing a new mathematical technique, by which regions formerly abandoned to the vaguenesses of philosophers were conquered for the precision of exact formulae. Intellectually, the month of September 1900 was the highest point of my life. I went about saying to myself that now at last I had done something worth doing, and I had the feeling that I must be careful not to be run over in the street before I had written it down.⁸

Peano, then, gave Russell a clue to how difficulties in the foundations of mathematics might be overcome by reducing mathematics to logic. But his delight proved short-lived—it would die before the year was out:

Oddly enough, the end of the century marked the end of this sense of triumph, and from that moment onwards I began to be assailed simultaneously by intellectual and emotional problems which plunged me into the darkest despair that I have ever known.⁹

In the wake of a personal crisis, precipitated by seeing Mrs. Whitehead in deep, deep pain, Russell came to realize that his program to make mathematics a branch of logic had run into difficulties:

At the end of the Lent Term, Alys and I went back to Fernhurst where I set to work to write out the logical deduction of mathematics which afterwards became *Principia Mathematica*. I thought the work was nearly finished, but in the month of May I had an intellectual set-back almost as severe as the emo-

tional set-back which I had had in February. Cantor had a proof that there is no greatest number, and it seemed to me that the number of all the things in the world ought to be the greatest possible. Accordingly, I examined his proof with some minuteness, and endeavoured to apply it to the class of all the things there are. This led me to consider those classes which are not members of themselves, and to ask whether the class of such classes is or is not a member of itself. I found that either answer implies its contradictory. At first I supposed that I should be able to overcome the contradiction quite easily, and that probably there was some trivial error in the reasoning. Gradually, however, it became clear that this was not the case. Burali-Forti had already discovered a similar contradiction, and it turned out on logical analysis that there was an affinity with the ancient Greek contradiction about Epimenides the Cretan, who said that all Cretans are liars. A contradiction essentially similar to that of Epimenides can be created by giving a person a piece of paper on which is written: "The statement on the other side of this paper is false." The person turns the paper over, and finds on the other side: "The statement on the other side of this paper is true." It seemed unworthy of a grown man to spend his time on such trivialities, but what was I to do? There was something wrong, since such contradictions were unavoidable on ordinary premisses.¹⁰

There we have it in a nutshell: Russell had discovered a contradiction at the basis of mathematics.

The summers of 1903 and 1904 we spent at Churt and Tilford. I made a practice of wandering about the common every night from eleven till one, by which means I came to know the three different noises made by nightjars. (Most people only know one.) I was trying hard to solve the contradictions mentioned above. Every morning I would sit down before a blank sheet of paper. Throughout the day, with a brief interval for lunch, I would stare at the blank sheet. Often when evening came it was still empty. We spent our winters in London, and during the winters I did not attempt to work, but the two summers of 1903 and 1904 remain in my mind as a period of complete intellectual deadlock. It was clear to me that I could not get on without solving the contradictions, and I was determined that no difficulty should turn me aside from the completion of *Principia Mathematica*, but it seemed quite likely that the whole of the rest of my life might be consumed in looking at that blank sheet of paper. What made it the more annoying was that the contradictions were trivial, and that my time was spent in considering matters that seemed unworthy of serious attention.¹¹

Russell broke down in despair.

The program that Russell and Whitehead set for themselves in *Principia Mathematica* was to deduce mathematics from logic. In their effort to achieve this, they used Cantor's set theory. A set is simply a collection of things. A key principle of set theory is that a set must be well defined—that is, we must have some procedure that will allow us to decide whether any item is or is

not a member of the set. The set of all apples is well defined because we have a way of determining whether a given object is a member: we take an object and determine whether or not it is an apple. If it is an apple, then it belongs to the set; if it is not an apple, it doesn't. Similarly, we have a means of determining whether a given number belongs to the set of even numbers: we take a number and divide it by two—if there is no remainder, then the number belongs to the set; if there is a remainder, then it does not.

Consider the problem that confronts a mathematician who defines a set as made up of all those sets that are not members of themselves. Is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves a member of itself or not? This paradox associated with the definition of that set has a similar logical structure to another paradox that Russell described, that of the barber of Seville: himself a man of Seville, the barber is charged with the task of shaving all the men of Seville who do not shave themselves (and *only* the men who do not shave themselves). The question of deciding whether the set of all sets that are not members of themselves is itself a member of that set is analogous to asking whether the barber of Seville shaves himself or not. Suppose the barber of Seville shaves himself; then, according to his mandate, he cannot shave himself, for he only shaves those men who do not shave themselves. So, if he shaves himself, then he must not shave himself. Suppose, on the other hand, that he does not shave himself; then, since he is a man of Seville, and since his mandate is to shave all the men of Seville who do not shave themselves, he must shave himself. So, if he does not shave himself, he must shave himself. Whichever assumption we make—that the barber of Seville does not shave himself, or that he does shave himself—a contradiction results. We can show a similar result about the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. If the set of all sets that are not members of themselves is a member of itself, then, by definition, it is not a member of itself (only those sets that are not members of themselves can be a member of that set); while if it is not a member of itself, it must include itself, since the set is defined to include all sets that are not members of itself.

The implications of all this struck deep into the heart of beliefs about reason as calculation: the notion of a set is a key to the program of deriving mathematics (arithmetic) from logic, and the concept of inclusion is a key to defining a set. But the notion of inclusion had been seen to eventuate in a contradiction—it was shown to be implicitly paradoxical. The attempt to lay the foundations of mathematics depended on the viability of set theory; however, set theory depends upon inclusion, and the concept of inclusion harbours a contradiction. The program for laying the foundations of mathematics (the “queen of the sciences”) had collapsed under its own weight, the burden of reason.

The collapse of the Russell-Whitehead program was of such historic importance that we should try to get a more adequate understanding of how it occurred. The discovery of what has come to be called Russell's paradox had a key role. There are two types of sets: (a) those sets that are not elements of themselves (most sets are of this type), and (b) those sets that are elements of themselves. As an example of the latter, consider the set

$$J = \{\text{all sets that can be described by an English phrase consisting of fewer than twenty words}\}$$

One member of this set would be {the set of even numbers between 6 and 26}; another member would be {the set of all positive integers less than 12}; and another member would be J itself, that is, $J \in J$ (here \in means *is a member of*, *belongs to*, or *is an element of*; so $J \in J$ means J belongs to J).

In summary, there are two types of sets: a set P is of type (a) if it is not the case that $P \in P$; while a set Q is of type (b) if it is the case that $Q \in Q$.

We can suppose that there exists a set R defined in the following way:

$$R = \{\text{all sets of type (a)}\}$$

or, using the implicit form for set construction:

$$R = \{A \mid \sim (A \in A)\}$$

Russell recognized the possibility of defining this set R . A basic principle of set theory is that a set is well defined if and only if, given any object, we can decide whether that object is a member of the set as it is described. R is an object, so we can ask whether R belongs to the set of sets of type (a); that is, we can ask whether R contains R . This is tantamount to asking whether the set R is of type (a) or of type (b) (and this is analogous to our question whether the barber of Seville shaves himself).

Assume that R is of type (a), that is, that it belongs to the class of sets that do not contain themselves as elements. Then R does not belong to R . But by definition, R is the class of all sets that do not contain themselves as members. So, we must conclude, by the definition of set R , that R contains itself as a member. Thus, if we assume that R does not contain itself as a member, then we are required to conclude that R must contain itself as a member. And this conclusion contradicts our initial assumption. Assume conversely that R is of type (b), that it does contain itself as a member. Then R must be a member of R . However, the elements of R are just those sets that do not contain themselves as members, and since R contains itself, then it cannot be a member of R . But this is a contradiction. Thus, whether we assume that R is or is not a member of itself, we generate a contradiction.

There is, we must conclude, something incoherent in the definition of set R . But set R is defined through the ordinary ideas about set membership, which is the core idea of set theory.¹² Therefore, the ordinary descriptions that we give of set membership can generate contradiction.¹³ Yet set theory was to be the foundation of mathematics: it was supposed to provide the basis of such higher reaches of mathematics as real and complex analysis, where functions are described as mapping a relation between one set and another. Set theory was to be the link between logic and mathematics (Boolean algebra illustrates how easily logic and set theory can be connected); so the discovery of an incoherence in the process whereby sets are defined (that is, the idea of set membership) was a real blow to mathematicians' and philosophers' efforts to derive mathematics from logic.

So profound were the implications of this paradox that Russell attempted to contain its destructive effects: he tried to eliminate the paradox by introducing the theory of types. In the end, he was satisfied that the theory he devised had resolved all the logical difficulties the paradox had posed for the program of reducing mathematics to logic. But he had been exhausted by the labour the project had demanded:

In the spring of 1905...I discovered my Theory of Descriptions, which was the first step towards overcoming the difficulties which had baffled me for so long...In 1906 I discovered the Theory of Types. After this it only remained to write the book [*Principia Mathematica*] out. Whitehead's teaching work left him not enough leisure for this mechanical job. I worked at it from ten to twelve hours a day for about eight months in the year, from 1907 to 1910. The manuscript became more and more vast, and every time that I went out for a walk I used to be afraid that the house would catch fire and the manuscript get burnt up. It was not, of course, the sort of manuscript that could be typed, or even copied. When we finally took it to the University Press, it was so large that we had to hire an old four-wheeler for the purpose. Even then our difficulties were not at an end. The University Press estimated that there would be a loss of £600 on the book, and while the syndics were willing to bear a loss of £300, they did not feel that they could go above this figure. The Royal Society very generously contributed £200, and the remaining £100 we had to find ourselves. We thus earned minus £50 each by ten years' work. This beats the record of *Paradise Lost*.¹⁴

Even this assessment of their labours was too optimistic. There were difficulties with Russell's proposed solution to the question of how to avoid the paradoxes of inclusion, and few mathematicians or logicians accepted it. The problem presented by the paradox of set inclusion remained unsolved.

The alarm felt by thinkers was captured by David Hilbert, who was, beyond question, the greatest mathematician of his day: "The present state

of affairs . . . is intolerable. Just think, the definitions and deductive methods which everyone learns, teaches and uses in mathematics, the paragon of truth and certitude, lead to absurdities! If mathematical thinking is defective, where are we to find truth and certitude?"¹⁵ To sense the weight of Russell's discovery, consider the model of proof on which early modern philosophers relied. The late Renaissance witnessed the development of strains of thought with which contemporary postmodern thinkers would fundamentally agree. At the time, the rediscovery of ancient skepticism was generating enthusiasm for the writings of Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, and Pyrrhonism. (This rediscovery led to doubts about universal truth that were bolstered by the Age of Discovery, through which Europeans became aware of different ways of living and sets of beliefs; by Reformation and Counter-Reformation debates about the basis of religious authority; and by the cosmological discoveries of Kepler and Copernicus, which brought into question long-held beliefs about the order of the cosmos). Phrryonian skepticism was generally understood as *requiring* one to suspend belief in whatever could possibly be doubted (in any proposition that could be denied without contradicting either itself or some other proposition of whose truth one is certain). Descartes went some distance with the skeptics, for like them, he refused any claim on the basis of authority alone—the simple fact that the Bible, Aristotle, or the Scholastics had asserted some proposition was not itself sufficient grounds for giving it our assent. Also like the skeptics, Descartes supposed that to doubt anything that is not self-evident (any belief that could be denied without contradiction) could result in rejecting false propositions that had been accepted on authority.

Though he agreed with his skeptical contemporaries on some matters, Descartes became troubled by the implications of thoroughgoing skepticism. In fact, at the heart of Descartes's method was (what he felt was) a genuine doubt about the senses. He recognized that people trust what they see and touch. But Descartes thought that was quite wrong: in a gesture that helped found early modern philosophy, he asserted that real things are nothing like what we see and touch: real things are, at root, made up of tiny corpuscles, which are too small to be observed. Nor do real things possess secondary qualities, such as the colours we see or the warmth we feel—our experiences of colour and warmth are the results of our bodies being affected by other material objects. Descartes used the method of doubt to shake us loose from our preconceptions so that we might inquire into the true nature of things (i.e., according to another assumption that helped inaugurate the modern era of thought, so we might know the way the scientist-mathematician knows them, as *res extensa*). Our thoughts are a jumble, and it is a thinker's job to put them in order (that belief, too, became common in the modern era); he or she does so by understanding them through reason.

So Descartes sought certainty: he strived to establish as being beyond question whatever could be known truly and to provide a means for distinguishing what could be known genuinely (i.e., with the certainty of reason) from what could not. This hungering for the certainty of reason became characteristic of early modern philosophy, and the philosophers left it as their legacy to the modern age. Moreover, for the early modern philosophers, rational certainty was the product of inference, based on principles that could not be doubted—that is, it had the same form as mathematical reasoning. Mathematics provided the model for what was known with certainty—and we see that belief at work in the early modern philosophies of Descartes, of Baruch Spinoza, and of G.W. Leibniz. All three modelled their systems on mathematics—they began with definitions and axioms, assuming that those were perfectly clear and beyond doubt. They proceeded from those as would a mathematician, deducing from these absolutely certain truths, by absolutely rigorous means, other truths that could on this basis be known to be solidly established. Checking and rechecking each step in the argument along the way, they could elaborate a system of knowledge as a set of interrelated truths.

That was the conception of knowledge and truth inaugurated in the philosophy of Plato, and between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries the same conception seemed close to finding fulfillment. With Russell's paradox, however, that program unravelled. The question Hilbert proposed—"If mathematical thinking is defective [and mathematical thinking has served as the very model of reason], where are we to find truth?"—reverberated through the intellectual and artistic communities. For some (including those whom we examine in this volume), the answer was to proclaim some other form of thinking, usually a more "primitive" one, as the means for disclosing truth; others—the *de Stijl* artists, for example—attempted to *reform* reason in order to eliminate its pernicious tendencies.¹⁶ More recently, postmodern thinkers have simply accepted that we cannot find "truth and certitude" and have argued that the illusion that it is possible to find truth has contributed to the enfeebling of Western consciousness at least since Plato (if that illusion is not the product of an inherent tendency of the human mind).

Around the time that Russell was exposing a paradox at the heart of the principles of set inclusion, philosophers were discovering ordinary language statements that seemed on the surface not in the least pernicious but that turned out to be contradictory. Grelling's Paradox—also known as the paradox of heterologicality—discovered by the German logician Kurt Grelling in 1908, is a fine example. Again, the paradox arises through self-reference—specifically, when we ask whether certain adjectives apply to themselves. Some adjectives, such as *short* and *English*, do apply to themselves: *short* is a short word, and *English* is an English word. Yet other adjectives, such as *long* and

German, do not: *long* is not a long word, and *German* is not a German word. Let us call those adjectives that belong to the first group (i.e., that describe themselves) as autological, and those that belong to the second group (i.e., that do not describe themselves) as heterological. Then the question arises, in the most ordinary and, therefore, troubling way: “Is the adjective *heterological* itself heterological?” If it is heterological, then it applies to itself and hence is autological; and if it is *not* heterological—that is, if it is autological—then it must have the property that it is used to attribute, that is, it must be heterological. In short, if it is heterological then it must not be heterological, and if it is not heterological, then it must be heterological.

That ordinary language (or something close to ordinary language), when used correctly, could lead so readily to contradictions was troubling. Thinkers suspected that the appearance of such contradictions implied that English cannot express its semantics completely (as the extension of the term *heterological* cannot comprise the term itself).¹⁷ The logician Alfred Tarski proposed a solution to the problem that many now take almost for granted: he made a sharp distinction between language and metalanguage (and, ultimately, a hierarchy of metalanguages)—that is, between statements *in* a language and statements *about* a language. “This book is easy to read” is a sentence about a *book* (I hope a true sentence), not about language; “*Cat* is a four-letter word” is a false statement about language. Tarski’s semantics stressed the need to ascertain whether a proposition is being used to make a statement about sentences belonging to a language. If it does make such a statement, then it cannot belong to the language that the sentences it refers to do, but must belong to a metalanguage. A difficulty presents itself, however. What are we to make of sentences that assert that a proposition is true *or* false—for example, “It is true that this book is easy to read”? This proposition, strictly speaking, belongs to a metalanguage, for its form is really given by “The proposition ‘this book is easy to read’ is true.” This example, which is typical of truth-claims, shows that we cannot have a criterion of truth within a language (or a logical system)—to state a truth-claim, we must step outside the language and into a metalanguage.

Such paradoxes as Grelling’s showed logicians that we must distinguish clearly between statements made *with* a language and statements made *about* a language; what is more, they led to the realization that statements *about* propositions’ truth or falsity are metalinguistic assertions. This implied that no statements about the world could be self-validating. The discovery of these paradoxes, then, made philosophers realize that no logical system can present evidence of its truth (i.e., that a system cannot be self-validating). This realization drove human thinking and truth farther apart. When the criterion for truth is removed from the logical system itself and moved into

a metalanguage, then the relation between the truth criterion and the system is extrinsic. Essentially, this means that one can create systems at one's pleasure so long as they are consistent. In other words, logical systems are not constrained by the conditions of the world. And that finding laid the groundwork for the development of alternatives to Classical Aristotelian logic: modal logics, three-valued logics, and multi-valued logics.

The discovery that no statement concerning the world (rather than sentence form) is self-validating, and that many consistent language systems are possible, unmade long-held beliefs about the correspondence between thought and the world. Just as the appearance of geometries other than the Classical (specifically three-dimensional Euclidean system) shattered people's conviction that Greek geometry reflected the actual nature of space, the appearance of logical systems other than Aristotle's undermined the belief that there is one logical system that tells us how things *are* in the world.

That was one among several shock waves that undermined the edifice of mathematical (that is to say, rational) certainty, to the point that it finally collapsed. The development of non-Euclidean geometries led thinkers to embrace the view that geometries can be developed as purely formalized systems, independent of intuitions about space and extension. Formal sciences are characterized by having the rules of logic as their sole principles of procedure: they are not about features or phases of an existing realm, but about a world postulated by thought alone. Mathematics came to be seen as an abstract formal discipline—a view that was widespread during the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, a period that saw the rise of a veritable riot of irrationalist doctrines. This is not purely coincidence: mathematics, to ensure its foundations, turned inward, away from reality, and as it did so, reason lost its grip on reality.

CONTINUITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS

Julius Wilhelm Richard Dedekind (1831–1916) was among those who sought to give analysis a rigorous basis. In 1872, Dedekind, who had spent most of his academic life organizing and commenting on the work of his mentor and former teacher, Peter Gustav Lejeune Dirichlet, published a short, clearly written pamphlet titled *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen* (Continuity and Irrational Numbers). It is an exemplary piece of reasoning that changed how mathematicians and scientists think about continuity.¹⁸

Dedekind undertook to show that even though we cannot write down, in a finite number of digits, an exact value for π or e or $\sqrt{2}$, such numbers are necessary if there is to be a one-to-one correspondence between the points on the line

and numbers (if every point on the line is to have one, and only one, number corresponding to it, and if every number is to have one, and only one, point on a line corresponding to it).¹⁹ Our commonsense understanding supposes that a line has the following properties: a line is *infinite*, that is, it is made up of infinitely many points; a line is *dense*, that is, between any two points on a line there is a third; a line is *ordered*, that is, points on a line have a position so that a given point comes before one point and after another; and a line is *continuous*, that is, every point is adjacent to some other point, not to an empty space.

At first it seems that the quality of being dense (i.e., of there being a third point between any two given points) and the quality of being continuous are one and the same—the reason any point is adjacent to another point, and not to empty space, is that no matter how close together two points are, there is another point between them. Many mathematicians and physicists believed the two qualities to be the same. However, it is not so: between any two rational numbers, there is another rational number. We know this because we can explain how to produce such a number. Any rational number can be written as a fraction, and we can generate a number between those rational numbers by finding their arithmetic mean (i.e., by adding the two fractions together and dividing by two).

So the density of the line would be guaranteed simply by the rational numbers. But a line is richer than the rational numbers, since there are points on the line that do not correspond to any rational number; we know this because there is, for example, a point on the line that corresponds to the circumference of a circle whose radius is 2 units—after all, we could cut the circle and stretch it out along the number line, and its circumference would end somewhere on the line—but its length would be an irrational number (4π units). So the series of rational numbers is dense, but it is not continuous—it is missing some values. If we consider the analogy between points on a line and numbers, this means there are points on the line (e.g., π , $\pi+1$, $\pi+2$, 2π , $2\pi+1$, $2\pi+2$, 3π , $3\pi+1$, $3\pi+2$, e , $e+1$, $e+2$, etc.—indeed, there are infinitely many such points) to which no rational number corresponds. As Dedekind stated in his landmark essay, “Of the greatest importance, however, is the fact that in the straight line L there are infinitely many points which correspond to no rational number.”²⁰ What, then, explains the continuity of the line? That was one of the questions that Dedekind set out to answer in his great essay.²¹

Dedekind showed that the irrational numbers bring the real numbers (the set including all the rational numbers and all the irrational numbers) into a one-to-one correspondence with a line. He did so by thinking of a real number as a cut (*Schnitt*) in the line. The cut divides a line into parts. Every point on the line determines one, and only one, cut. Dedekind conceived of

every real number as a cut $[L, R]$ of the rational numbers. The cut defines the relation between any real number and the set of rational numbers in the following way: if a real number is defined as a cut $[L, R]$, then every rational number is either in L or in R , where every member of L is less than the cut $[L, R]$ and every member of R is greater than the cut $[L, R]$. Thus, we could represent the (irrational) value of the square root of 2 as a cut $[\{a_1/b_1; a_2/b_2 < \sqrt{2}\}, \{a_1/b_1; a_2/b_2 > \sqrt{2}\}]$. Each real number, then, is defined by not just one but a pair of infinite sets (in the case above, the infinite set consisting of all the rational numbers whose squares are less than 2, and the infinite set consisting of all the rational numbers whose squares are greater than 2).

To this point, we have dealt with the more prosaic part of Dedekind's insight; largely, it consists in the immediate consequence of recognizing that "every point p of the straight line produces a separation of the same into two portions such that every point of one portion lies to the left of every point of the other" (or its correlative for number theory: every real number partitions the set of rational numbers in such a way that every rational number less than the given real number belongs to one set and every rational number greater than the given number belongs to the other set).²² The more exhilarating part of Dedekind's paper advanced the idea that continuity was explained through the converse of this proposition. Dedekind writes,

I find the essence of continuity in the converse, i.e., in the following principle:

"If all points of the straight line fall into two classes such that every point of the first class lies to the left of every point in the second class, then there exists one and only one point which produces this division of all points into two classes, this severing of the straight line into two portions."

As already said I think I shall not err in assuming that every one will at once grant the truth of this statement; the majority of my readers will be very much disappointed in learning that by this commonplace remark the secret of continuity is to be revealed. To this I may say that I am glad if every one finds the above principle so obvious and so in harmony with his own ideas of a line; for I am utterly unable to adduce any proof of its correctness, nor has any one the power. The assumption of this property of the line is nothing else than an axiom by which we attribute to the line its continuity...²³

Dedekind proceeded to relate the real numbers to the points on a line.

From the last remarks it is sufficiently obvious how the discontinuous domain R of rational numbers may be rendered complete so as to form a continuous domain. It has been pointed out that every rational number a effects a separation of the system R into two classes such that every number a_1 of the first class A_1 is less than every number a_2 of the second class A_2 ... If now any separation of the system R into two classes A_1, A_2 , is given which possesses only *this* characteristic property that every number a_1 in A_1 is less than every number a_2 in A_2 ,

then for brevity we shall call such a separation a *cut* [Schnitt] and designate it by (A_1, A_2) . . . [Moreover] it is easy to show that there exist infinitely many cuts not produced by rational numbers.²⁴

Thus we prove that there is neither in class *A* a greatest, nor in class *B* a least, number. This shows that not all cuts are produced by rational numbers and that irrational numbers are needed for continuity of the number line.

Dedekind's proof established that there are "infinitely many cuts not produced by a rational number." But the cuts correspond to points on the line, so if there are infinitely many cuts that are not produced by rational numbers, then there are infinitely many points on the line that do not correspond to rational numbers. If we use \mathbf{Q} (the set of rational numbers) to extract points from a line, we have a series of points with many gaps between them. The irrationals are needed to fill the gaps.

What did Dedekind accomplish by showing this? And why should this finding have produced distress among mathematicians? In essence, he showed that the same procedure defines all the numbers in the set \mathbf{R} (the set of real numbers), rational and irrational alike. All numbers are defined in terms of cuts, with each number being defined as making a division in the set of real numbers. A rational number differs from an irrational number only in this way—that a rational number belongs to one of the two sets into which it divides \mathbf{R} (it is either the greatest member of the set that contains all values less than or equal to the cut, or it is the least member of the set that contains all values greater than or equal to the cut). There are two points to note about Dedekind's definition of a number. First, it is not an essentialist definition (it does not say what the essence of a number is), but a procedural one (it tells us how to obtain a number). Second, Dedekind showed that the only way to get a mathematical representation of some arbitrary real number is to represent the number by actually infinite sets. Our problem with explaining continuity, and so with establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the line and the set of real numbers, is solved, but only at the expense of defining all real numbers through that troubling conception of an infinite number. The definition of a number we rely on to explain continuity is a procedural definition—that is, the definition depends on explaining the steps to follow to produce the number. This involves constructing two sets (the set of all reals *less* than the number and the set of all reals *greater* than the number). For an irrational number, the sets we must build are infinite sets, and infinite sets cannot be composed in a finite number of steps. Thus, we have no viable means of producing the irrational number—the irrationals remain merely theoretical entities of the sort rejected by finitist mathematicians (who demanded that all proofs be such that they can be carried out in

a finite number of steps). Our proof that reals are continuous rests on a less than ideal footing. The trouble arose through Dedekind's recognition that "there exist infinitely many cuts not produced by rational numbers." Only rational numbers can be specified by finitist means—he had shown that if the points in a number line were set in one-to-one correspondence with all the rational numbers, then the number line would have many gaps in it (in fact, an infinite number of gaps). The imperatives associated with finitist methods and the demands of continuity turn out to be incompatible. Can either be rejected without doing violence to the scientific world view?

Obviously, we cannot simply dismiss the claims of those who favour finitist methods—after all, finitist claims simply require that there be a way of terminating the procedures that we use when stipulating the values with which we are concerned. But what about continuity? Is there any problem with jettisoning the demand for continuity? Can't we simply agree to go along, leaping from one value to the next, and hopping over the gaps in the number line? In fact, the very idea flew in the face of an assumption basic to Classical physics. The distinguished quantum physicist Erwin Schrödinger provided an elegant summary of how Classical physicists thought about the matter:

From our experiences on a large scale, from our notion of geometry and of mechanics—particularly the mechanics of the celestial bodies—physicists had distilled the one clear-cut demand that a truly clear and complete description of any physical happening has to fulfill: it ought to inform you precisely of what happens at any point in space at any moment of time—of course, within the spatial domain and the period of time covered by the physical events you wish to describe. We may call this demand the *postulate of continuity of the description*. It is this postulate of continuity that appears to be unfulfillable! There are, as it were, gaps in our picture...

That this ideal breaks down has a very momentous consequence. For in the times when this ideal of continuity of description was not doubted, the physicists had used it to formulate the *principle of causality* for the purposes of their science in a very clear and precise fashion—the only one in which they could use it, the ordinary enouncements being much too ambiguous and imprecise. It includes in this form, the principle of 'close action' (or the absence of *actio in distans*) and runs as follows: The exact physical situation at *any* point P at a given moment t is unambiguously determined by the exact physical situation within a certain surrounding of P at any previous time, say t- τ . If τ is large, that is, if the previous time lies far back, it may be necessary to know the previous situation for a wide domain around P. But the 'domain of influence' becomes smaller and smaller as τ becomes smaller, and becomes infinitesimal as τ becomes infinitesimal. Or, in plain, though less precise, words: what happens anywhere at a given moment depends only and unambiguously on what has been going on in the immediate neighbourhood 'just a moment earlier.'

Classical physics rested entirely on this principle. The mathematical instrument to implement it was in all cases a system of partial differential equations—the so-called field equations.

Obviously, if the ideal of continuous, ‘gap-less,’ description breaks down, this precise formulation of the principle of causality breaks down. And we must not be astonished to meet in this order of ideas with new, unprecedented difficulties as regards causation.²⁵

To be sure, Schrödinger was not discussing the shock that followed Dedekind’s discovery of the essential discontinuity of the rational numbers, but a later (and more troubling) discovery of discontinuities that characterize quantum processes. He would probably have been content with the procedure that physicists used (based on calculus) of letting the “area surrounding of P at any previous time, say $t-\tau$,” become smaller and smaller, until in principle it reached infinitesimal proportions. But it is just a leap of faith to assume that as $t-\tau$ approaches infinitesimal dimensions, the mathematics describing the behaviour of the entity under scrutiny remains just the same as it did over finite ranges—and developments in mathematics we shall soon explore (including Cantor’s discovery of the “paradoxes of the infinite,” e.g., that a proper subset of an infinite number can be of equal magnitude to the entire set) made that leap seem a dangerous one to take. So the ideal of continuous, “gap-less,” description breaks down in fact: if no means of dealing with infinite magnitudes can be offered, we cannot be sure what is going on in the gaps between rational numbers on the number lines.

This is why Schrödinger went on to acknowledge that

the idea of a *continuous range*, so familiar to mathematicians in our days, is something quite exorbitant, an enormous extrapolation of what is really accessible to us. The idea that you should *really* indicate the exact values of any physical quantity—temperature, density, potential, field strength, or whatever it might be—for *all* the points of a continuous range, say between zero and 1, is a bold extrapolation. We *never* do anything else than determine the quantity approximately for a very limited number of points and then “draw a smooth curve through them.” This serves us well for many practical purposes, but from the epistemological point of view, from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, it is totally different from a supposed exact continual description... Physical dependences can always be approximated by this simple kind of functions (the mathematician calls them “analytical,” which means something like “they can be analysed”). But to assume that physical dependence *is* of this simple type, is a bold epistemological step, and probably an inadmissible step.²⁶

“But from the epistemological point of view”: the use of that phrase is testimony that cognition—for our purposes, let’s call it “reason”—is losing its grip on reality.

Mathematicians tried to salvage reason from the troubling implications of the Dedekind cut. Dedekind had shown that every real number can be represented with two infinite numbers. If this assertion could be established on solid ground, then we would have provided the needed undergirding to support the claim that every mathematical object can be represented by a set. Perhaps, then, the study of infinity could help place the science of mathematics on a firm ground. A key figure associated with that conjecture was Georg Cantor.

CANTOR AND THE STRANGENESS OF INFINITY

Georg Cantor (1845–1918) was one of the founders of set theory, which, with the first-order logic, forms a field of study often referred to as the foundations of mathematics. Cantor’s work led him into explorations of infinite sets—that is, sets that contain an infinite number of members (or transfinite numbers of members, as Cantor preferred to say). Cantor asked whether there were different magnitudes of infinity, and the answers he uncovered set his mind spinning.

One of Cantor’s core claims was that we can answer the question whether two sets, including transfinite sets (sets with infinite members), are equal by putting the elements of the set into a one-to-one correspondence: the sets $\{0, 2, 4\}$ and $\{1, 2, 3\}$ have the same number of members because we can match 0 with 1, 2 with 2, and 4 with 3, and when we are finished putting the elements of the two sets into correspondence, there are no members of either set “left over” (i.e., that are not a part of the pairs we have created). According to that principle (to which the Constructivist mathematicians objected), Cantor realized, there are as many even integers as there are integers, because for every integer we can produce an even number to correspond to it (we can multiply any integer by two to generate an even number). Likewise, there are as many square numbers (numbers that, when we take their square root, leave no remainder, for given any integer, we can multiply it by itself to produce a square). Therefore, the series 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81, 100, . . . must have as many members as the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, . . . The idea that an infinite set can have the same number of members as a proper subset of itself seems strange, and it is not true of sets with finite numbers of members.

These findings seem strange: indeed, they seem to defy reason. But other strangenesses manifested themselves as Cantor pursued the study of transfinite sets. (In Appendix 2, I present some of Cantor’s seemingly bizarre findings.) Infinity’s strangeness seemed to confound reason and thereby expose its limitations. So Cantor’s work became another episode in the story of the failure of the dream that reason might tell us about reality.

FORMALIST MATHEMATICS AND THE LIMITS OF REASON

The fate of reason during the first three decades of the twentieth century is most evident in the history of what has come to be known as the Hilbert program. Russell had discovered paradoxes at the heart of mathematics, in the very idea of set membership; and that momentous discovery made him strive to identify and eliminate those procedures that produced paradoxical results.²⁷ Hilbert deemed Russell's proposed solution (the ramified theory of types) an inadequate—an insufficiently *radical*—response to the problem. He longed to do something more—to prove the self-consistency of the axioms of arithmetic (i.e., to show that no contradictions could be derived from the axioms of arithmetic using the procedures that arithmetic accepted as valid).²⁸

The very fact that it was considered necessary to prove that the axioms of arithmetic are not logically incoherent suggests that doubts had arisen about even them. Since Plato's time, at least, the basic principles of mathematics had been taken as sure and certain knowledge. "Why, the very idea that one might need to prove that arithmetic is a consistent system!" thinkers of an earlier time might have exclaimed. "Arithmetic applies to the world—we use its methods correctly, and the findings at which we arrive apply to the world! Here is one place where we know that, if we reason correctly (if we do not err in applying our rules of inference), the result we get fits the world. It works! Who could believe that its foundational principles are not sound?! What a colossal waste of time to try to prove it!" By the beginning of the twentieth century, this optimism no longer prevailed, and even the axioms of arithmetic needed to be shown to found a consistent system.

The fate of Hilbert's program only confirmed that anxiety. What Hilbert wanted to show was that no contradictions could be derived from the axioms of arithmetic, using the procedures (the methods of inference) that arithmetic judged valid. But how could one go about showing that no contradictions could be derived from the axioms of arithmetic? After all, we can imagine all the world's professional mathematicians spending many lifetimes deriving theorems that do not contradict one another, and then one day, some bright graduate student could strike on one that contradicts a known theorem. How exactly could one go about showing that it is not possible to derive a contradiction?

One does so by showing that there is some statement in the system (a statement that, under some interpretative rule, we would deem true) that cannot be derived from the axioms by showing that there is a true assertion (one that belongs to the system) that cannot be proved. That it might be possible to do this seems, *prima facie*, counterintuitive, for the claim it appears to offer is that the weaker a system is, the more likely it is to be consistent—and we associate that feebleness with inconsistency and error. However, consider the

following: A system is inconsistent if a statement and its negation can both be proved true. One can show that if a statement and its opposite can both be proved true, then any statement whatever can be derived.²⁹ Thus, if a system is inconsistent, then any statement in the system is derivable. And conversely, if a system is consistent, then it is at least possible that some statement in the system (a statement that under some interpretative procedure we consider to be true) cannot be derived from the axioms of the systems by the rules of inference. Indeed, many committed to the Hilbert program believed that if there are no statements that cannot be derived from the axioms of the system, then the system is consistent. In other words, they suspected the claim that a system is consistent is equivalent to the assertion there are statements in the system that cannot be deduced from the axioms of the system by the rules of inference.

Hilbert pictured mathematics as a web of logically interconnected propositions. Over the years, mathematicians have provided us with an ever more complete picture of what follows from a consistent set of axioms. The axioms of mathematics are tautologies, and the propositions that are drawn from them are all tautologies; and tautologies are true by their logical form alone. We need not concern ourselves with identifying what the symbols of the statement apply to, only with the statement forms themselves. Indeed, mathematics is best considered as a formal system—as a set of rules and procedures for rewriting strings of symbols (e.g., $(a^3)^{-3}$) into other strings (in this case, simply a). We don't need to worry about what a refers to—about its meaning; all we need is a rule authorizing us to treat negative exponents as fractional exponents with a positive sign, a rule authorizing the multiplication of positive exponents, and a rule that a^1 can be rewritten as a .

Hilbert's formalist program lasted until 1931, when Gödel's "Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der *Principia Mathematica* und verwandter Systeme" (On Formally Undecidable Propositions of *Principia Mathematica* and Related Systems, the most famous paper in mathematics in the twentieth century) exposed a fateful flaw in the program—a flaw that was to have destructive consequences for the dream of reason that had dominated modernity.³⁰ His dismantling of the formalist program occurred in two phases. Recall that Russell and Whitehead had attempted to show that all arithmetic could be reduced to logic. The first phase of Gödel's demolition of the formalist program was to show that any logical system powerful enough to provide the basis for arithmetic was necessarily incomplete. The second was to prove, *contra* Hilbert and his followers, that if a logical system is complete, then it must be inconsistent.³¹ I should have liked to provide a summary demonstration of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems, as there is universal consensus among mathematicians that these two proofs rank among the greatest intellectual

achievements in the field. Presenting the demonstration (even in a more popular summary form) would have offered readers the opportunity to follow the means by which reason (at least a certain sort of reason) worked itself into an impasse and found itself at the end of its project. In the interests of brevity, however, I provide only Gödel's conclusions and a brief account of their effect on intellectual culture (an impact that, to be sure, outstripped what is warranted by the actual theorems themselves). My account of the proof, suited for poets, painters, and art historians, can be found in Appendix 3.

Gödel established this fundamental, and terrible, result about axiomatic systems: that in any axiomatic mathematical system there are propositions that cannot be proved or disproved within the axioms of the system. In particular, the consistency of the axioms cannot be proved. Gödel's 1931 proof ended a hundred years of attempts to put the whole of mathematics on an axiomatic basis, efforts that had culminated in Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. Hilbert's formalism was also dealt a severe blow by Gödel's results, for while the theorem did not destroy the fundamental idea of formalism, it did show that any system would have to be more comprehensive than that envisaged by Hilbert.³² Gödel exposed as illusory the hope of finding a proof of the consistency of a deductive system in which all the formulas of arithmetic can be expressed. Gödel also showed that there are arithmetical statements—indeed, an endless number of arithmetical statements—that cannot be derived from a stipulated set of axioms by a closed set of inferential rules.

CONSEQUENCES OF REASON'S RETREAT

Gödel's proof was one of the great achievements of the twentieth century, and it resounded through intellectual circles from the time of its discovery, in 1931, right through the century, greatly altering peoples' understanding of the powers of reason. Many interpreted it, not with complete justification, as proving that mathematics could not be established on a sure and solid axiomatic basis. This was tantamount to the loss of mathematical certainty, and the consequences of this loss were enormous. Reasoning from first principles had stood as the model for thinking since before Euclid, and mathematics was its exemplar. Mathematical theorems had stood as the strictest form of eternal truth—truth that exists outside the subjective ego. Mathematicians often speak of their sense when they have worked out a new theorem that they have come upon a pre-existent truth, not that they have forged a novel relation between terms.

With the loss of certainty of mathematical truth came the loss of another belief: that humans do not make truth, but only serve it. Nietzsche's

perspectivism gives clear evidence of that. The best that can be salvaged is a pragmatic conception that casts truth (or truth's successor) as a fiction shared in common that serves us in our struggle for survival (that enables one to survive and prevail). But even this modest conception of truth was too grand for most: the conception more commonly adopted was that truth is simply an unfounded consensus that one social group happens to arrive at. In either event, truth is folded into the domain of the ego.

“PRIMITIVISM” AS A RESPONSE TO THE COLLAPSE OF REASON

Reason's collapse, as Hilbert noted, was intolerable. Many artists concluded that reason had been exposed as an impostor and, worse, a dangerous seducer, and philosophical writings nothing more than seducers' diaries. These beliefs about reason were to play a crucial role in the artistic movements discussed in this book. Reactions to the discovery that symbol manipulation and string-rewriting processes—thought to be at the heart of all rational thinking—had severe limits reverberated through the intellectual life and culture of the twentieth century, including the arts. Logic and reason seemed feebler than they had been thought to be, and that allowed the province of other forms of thinking, including primitive modes, to expand. Philosophers and cultural theorists began to acknowledge that more savage forms of thinking were more fundamentally human than they had heretofore recognized—the proposition that “a human is a rational animal” seemed thin and weak. As a result, many thinkers (and especially vanguard artists) advocated that savage thought be granted broader scope.

The important role of primitive modes of thinking was one of the major themes of the Warburg Institute, which was founded by the wealthy Classical scholar Aby Warburg (1866–1929); despite its founder's interest in primitive modes of thinking, the scholarly spirit of that institution epitomized the intellectual and spiritual values of the Enlightenment. In his many travels (in 1895, he visited the southwestern United States to observe Navajo and Pueblo traditions), Warburg had accumulated a vast library; when he required a cure at a Swiss sanitarium, he left the collection in the care of the new University of Hamburg. This library (founded in 1909, its original name was the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg or the Warburg Library for the Science of Culture) was the kernel around which the Warburg Institute (founded 1919) grew. Warburg's own interests have been obscured by the approach to cultural studies (“cultural studies” in the sense of *Geisteswissenschaft*) for which the institute became well known—that is, by an approach that rejected earlier methods founded on exclusively stylistic (or formal) analysis (such as Heinrich Wölfflin's *Renaissance und Barock* [Renaissance and Baroque, 1888]

and his *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe* [Principles of Art History, 1915]) in favour of iconographic and iconological approaches or, more generally, more programmatic approaches.³³ Warburg was obsessed with discerning the traces of pagan and Classical civilizations in contemporary Europe. The best presentation of his convictions can be found in his collection *Die Erneuerung der heidnischen Antike* (The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity, 1932), though one can detect his interest in how antique iconography was transmitted to other cultures as early as in his 1891 dissertation on Botticelli.³⁴ The idea that key features of classical antiquity survived in loftier forms of European (and especially German) culture had attracted the interest of German scholars at least since the time of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832); it is especially evident in Hölderlin's writing. Warburg's meticulous historical scholarship contributed to what by his time was an ongoing project; the art historian and cultural theorist Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), and the philologist and student of comparative religion Hermann Usener (1834–1905) all had ideas on the topic. Warburg recognized that the Classical legacy encompassed more than the model of rationality that Athens had bequeathed European civilization, and more than the harmonious serenity of Classical temple construction or Classical poetry. It also encompassed superstitious beliefs and magical practices, Eleusinian as well as Socratic discourse, Dionysus along with Apollo, religion (and even mystery religions) as well as mathematics and philosophy.³⁵ Warburg's project was pitched against the Enlightenment's narrative of progress. The zeitgeist, with its enthusiasm for the mystical and the occult, played a role in shaping Warburg's interests, particularly in the institutionalization of his thought (among the admittedly narrow band of those who were ready to receive it). Figures associated with Warburg's institute included the great philosopher of symbolic forms Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945). Fritz Saxl (1890–1948), the librarian in charge of the Warburg Bibliothek, provided a charming account of Cassirer's introduction to the collection:

I showed Cassirer around. He was a gracious visitor, who listened attentively as I explained to him Warburg's intentions in placing books on philosophy next to books on astrology, magic, and folklore, and in linking the sections on art with those on literature, religion, and philosophy. The study of philosophy was for Warburg inseparable from that of the so-called primitive mind: neither could be isolated from the study of imagery in religion, literature, and art. These ideas had found expression in the unorthodox arrangements of books on the shelves.

Cassirer understood at once. Yet, when he was ready to leave, he said, in the kind and clear manner so typical of him: "This library is dangerous. I shall either have to avoid it altogether or imprison myself here for years. The philosophical problems involved are close to my own, but the concrete historical material which Warburg has collected is overwhelming."³⁶

Like Cassirer, Warburg was interested in the persistence of irrational forms of thinking in so-called civilized cultures. Both scholars were deeply troubled by the possibility that dangerous irrational forces might erupt. We might characterize Aby Warburg's project as a psychopathology of culture: he strove to show that history consists of one catastrophe after another, as irrational impulses lead to violence. He sought to stave off further violent eruptions and the possibility (the recognition of which was so apposite to the time) that history might end in calamity. His way of expressing his fears about the West's psychopathology was to say that Athens (in his view, the society of reason) must continually be recovered from Alexandria (in his view, the society of magic and mysticism). Indeed, he identified progress as the triumph over superstition, and he battled the demons that inhabited primitive cultures (and, too often, their modern descendants)—demons that he combated in his personal life as well. For Warburg, this man of reason, found himself hospitalized for depression. While in the hospital, he gave a lecture that addressed the underside of the reason—the mythopoeic mentality—that gave early (“primitive”) humans the means to confront the harsh realities of the universe, such as drought and famine. Warburg explained that creating anthropomorphic and biomorphic images was an effort to understand causes of events in life. The quest for causes was a cognitive effort that, he believed, created a measure of detachment from threatening phenomena—a space that the imagination opened up for thought. However, that distance—an essentially anthropogenetic detachment—was threatened by modern technology. The instantaneousness of electricity was destroying the space of contemplation, he noted prophetically.

A key concept in Warburg's study of the persistence of pagan antiquity was that of *Pathosformel*. There are, Warburg maintained, certain patterns that preserve the energy of antiquity and its power to disrupt rational order and harmonious form.³⁷ Western artists, right down to the present, have drawn on these energies to create new artworks. While historians of antiquity such as Johann Winckelmann (1717–68) and Goethe highlighted the stately calm and harmonious repose that they claimed constituted the Classical ideal of beauty, Warburg highlighted the dynamism of these elementary forms and their explosive energy, which often evidenced itself in the desire to break into motion.³⁸ That is, Warburg revealed a convulsive force, an explosive Dionysian energy within Apollonian form, a destructive force threatening to undo good “Gestalt.”³⁹ The legacy the Classical world left to the image was not good “Gestalt” but something closer to the *informe*, an archaic expression of the relation man has with the gods or with elemental forces.⁴⁰ The *ur-forms* left by this primal confrontation manifest themselves as ritual or dance, through which humanity negotiates with these forces—they are the

deposit precipitated by these primal confrontations that Warburg referred to as the *Pathosformel* or “pathos formula.” The traces of these *ur*-forms deposited in the image reside in it to this day; thus, Warburg saw the work of the cultural historian as at once archaeological and contemporary. The Dada artists would take on a similar task—creating work that thrived on the energy of humanity’s primal confrontation with elemental forces and yet was committedly contemporary, an art that was as much archaeology as it was topical and transformative, an art that released a disruptive archaic force to combat modernity.

According to Warburg, these elementary forms impressed the mind with perseverant dispositions (which we might consider as similar to Martin Heidegger’s *Gestell* or Ernst Jünger’s *Gestalten*). Warburg asserted that “the inherited consciousness of maximalized impressions stamped on the mind (engrams) passes them on without taking cognizance of the direction of their emotional charge, simply as an experience of energy tensions; this unpolarized continuum can also function as continuum. The imparting of a new meaning to these energies serves as a protective screen.”⁴¹ He used the terms *engram*, *dynamogramme*, and *symbol* to refer to the traces of this explosive force, and the three terms were pretty much synonymous in Warburg’s lexicon: all referred to the accumulation of an energetic charge resulting from the frequent repetition of an intense event, a charge sufficiently forceful that it indelibly inscribes its trace on collective memory, constituting, in essence, its *ur*-material.

The notion here is that the image is not simply a harmonious arrangement of visual elements, but a device that registers the impression of intense emotions—one marked by traces of cultural energies that might be reawakened. We might go so far as to consider the primitivist activities of Dada artists as part of the *Nachleben*, or afterlife, of this *Pathosformel*. The idea of studying the *Nachleben der Antike* led to Warburg’s Mnemosyne project. Warburg proposed to create an “image atlas,” as he called it. In the form in which he left it, the atlas consisted of forty large “canvases” (they were actually pieces of black cloth), to which many (nearly one thousand) images were affixed. The image atlas, along with the accompanying commentary, would constitute a comprehensive inventory of the major leading artistic and symbolic images that form the collective memory of the West. The format for the display was intended to allow Warburg to represent graphically the relationships among images. Warburg grouped the images by categories (such as pathos, human sacrifice, redemption, and Oriental astrology) and juxtaposed them in ways that would define them through their contrast with the other images. Thus, images that followed a similar formula but were separated by centuries would be juxtaposed so as to suggest the similar energies and common memories

that linked them across time. One panel placed an allegorical image of the Roman god Mars from a fifteenth-century manuscript next to illustrations from Kepler's *Mysterium Cosmographicum* (1621) representing the elliptical orbit of Mars next to a martial photograph of the Graf Zeppelin dirigible tailed by a Japanese coast guard plane. On another panel, an image of a young golfer in mid-swing was juxtaposed to Donatello's *Giuditta e Oloferne* (Judith Beheading Holofernes, 1453–57). Like Warburg's library, the Mnemosyne Atlas was intended to trace the mysterious movements of a culture's memory.

Aby Warburg's ethnographic interests were far from unique among German thinkers—indeed, Germany in the mid-1800s saw the rise of the field known as *Kulturwissenschaft* (The Science of Culture, 1873–1938). One renowned exponent of that field, Leo Frobenius, had wide influence among artists, particularly, among those who harboured “primitivist” proclivities. Frobenius's *Kulturwissenschaft* relied heavily on the concept of *paideuma*. *Paideuma* in Greek is a polyvalent term: it means “the cultured one,” but it also means “a place where things happen,” “a place where something is generated,” “a place where you learn,” or “the taught,” in both senses of that word—that is, those who are instructed and the content of the instruction. However, all of its uses relate to fundamental education. In his introduction to Burton Raffel's *Pure Pagan: Seven Centuries of Greek Poems and Fragments* (2004), Guy Davenport defined its Greek meaning as “the content of a culture”—in other words, what you know just by being a Greek, a Dogon, or an Icelander. All the tacit assumptions of daily life constitute *paideuma*. So poets compose for an audience that understands them. In another piece, Davenport outlined Frobenius's influence: “Frobenius's work... has been recognized... in the field by three irreconcilable enterprises: Ezra Pound's enthusiasm; Dr. Carl Jung's use of his theories, mainly those concerning mythology; and the work of Oswald Spengler, who regarded Frobenius as a teacher and whose *Untergang des Abendlandes* is the most obvious and celebrated offshoot of Frobenius's work.”

Frobenius used the term *paideuma* to suggest the idea that culture is a unified, organic whole—a whole in which each part influences all the others. He used the term to encapsulate conclusions he had arrived at while doing fieldwork in Africa (he undertook his first expedition in 1904 to the Kasai district of the Congo, and until 1918 he travelled in the western and central Sudan and in northern and northeastern Africa). In 1920, he founded the Institute for Cultural Morphology in Munich, and in 1921 he published *Paideuma: Umriss einer Kultur- und Seelenlehre* (Outline of a Theory of Culture and Spirit), an entire book devoted to the study of cultural forms. In 1932, he became Honorary Professor at the University of Frankfurt, and, in 1935, director of the municipal ethnographic museum.

Kulturmorphologie (the science of cultural morphology or the shape of culture) centred on two principle areas of study: religion and art. The German ethnologists were convinced that examining the central forms of spiritual life would enable them to understand the basic shapes a culture assumes. The notion of *Kulturmorphologie* was first broached in the 1770s by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who argued that all arts and sciences derive from natural communities of humans living together in local groupings; arts and sciences, then, are products of the communal mind and not exclusively of the minds of “great men”—minds that, in any event, would have been nurtured by the community around them. The books “the great man” has read, lectures he has attended, apprenticeships he has served, the language he acquired in childhood (Herder was among the first to point out the intimate relation of thought to language), the education he received—in sum, everything necessary to develop his talents of genius—are products of the community. Therefore, the proper study of human society is not the “great man” but, rather, the community, the nation, the *ethnos*. Herder’s ideas were taken up with great enthusiasm in Romantic anthropology. As one result, the idea that religion and art occupy a special place in the study of human civilizations became linked to a specific methodology. Romantic anthropology took religion and art to be the exemplary expressive loci for a culture: studying the religious grounds for cultural forms would allow the anthropologist to unveil the truth of the whole culture, while studying the artistic characteristics of a culture’s artifacts would afford ethnologists access to the spiritual configuration of a civilization. The idea that a culture is an organic and integral form that takes its shape from a core collective *Geist* specific to that culture entered German cultural morphology and was connected with the interest that *Kulturmorphologie* took in art. Cultural morphologists understood human civilizations as the concrete products of an “active faculty” moved by a formative impulse.

In the middle and late 1800s, German ethnology departed from this interest in the specific features of particular cultures and embraced more universalist views, based largely on an evolutionary notion of culture. To be sure, this development was really in a dialectical relation with the strain represented by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). In Romantic anthropology, the commitment to the principle that every historical phenomenon is irreducibly unique was balanced by the belief that all phenomena are expressions of a universal Absolute that, in the course of its development, realizes itself in innumerable concrete forms (as the Hegelian *Geist* does).⁴² In fact, each of the poles in this dialectic represented a strain in the historic development of German ethnology/anthropology. One, represented by Herder and Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), was historiographic: it was concerned with the cultural specificity of particular historical societies. The other, represented by

Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling (1775–1854), was forthrightly speculative: it emphasized the universal strain, the Absolute as the night in which all cows are black. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the first strain was predominant. Then, as the Romantic school arose and flourished, the second strain became predominant and remained so until the beginning of the twentieth century.

Frobenius's works belong to the first school. He tilted against this universalizing strain in German historical ethnology generally and, more specifically, in reaction to evolutionism's generalizing models, he advocated returning to the earlier, more culturally specific ethnology of Herder and his followers. Frobenius sought out the individuality of a culture by first identifying its geographic core and then, as though describing a set of concentric circles of an increasing diameter, by uncovering the links that certain significant elements of the culture have to that central core. The school that Frobenius founded in Frankfurt focused on the spiritual aspects of culture; in this way, it was associated with the Romantic Germanic tradition in ethnography (whose most famous spokesperson was the founder of comparative religion, Friedrich Max Müller, 1823–1900).

In the 1920s, Frobenius made it his goal to grasp the essence, the soul, of culture—its *paideuma*. Every culture, he argued, possesses laws that determine its process independently of the individual human beings who participate in it. Under the influence of neo-Kantian philosophy, Frobenius used the term *paideuma* to refer to a Gestalt, a meaning-creating force (*Sinnstiftung*) specific to a particular stage of economic development. He also provided many examples to demonstrate that grasping the Gestalt of an early culture allowed one to piece together its world view. In a 1921 volume that caught the imagination of Ezra Pound, Frobenius described the two basic *paideia* operating on the planet, one defined by the cave mentality, the other defined by the wide-open-spaces mentality (*Hohlengefühl* and *Weitengefühl*). The former belonged to the Hamitic and Semitic people of the Orient, the latter to the Ethiopian and Germanic peoples.

As a reaction against the role that the speculative, universalist strain accorded to reason, Frobenius's approach to studying *Kulturmorphologie* relied heavily on intuition, as did the methods of Herder's followers. The strain in German ethnology and anthropology that emphasized historical specificity proposed to explore concrete historical phenomena, employing tools (such as philology, archaeology, and historical criticism) that might illuminate the uniqueness of particular past societies. The universal was to be discovered in the prolific variations of historical phenomena and in the organic interconnections of all the elements constituting the form of each.

Their emphasis on the concrete specifics of the particular resulted in a stress on the universal's links with lived reality. This inner core within lived reality was understood to be a fundamentally irrational principle; intuition was required to grasp the structuring force that was immanent in each historical phenomenon and that gave each their uniqueness. Frobenius embraced this view, claiming that since any culture is a complete organic form, and since each of these organisms is unique, we cannot grasp the principles that govern its form through general causal laws. Rather, borrowing from Goethe, Frobenius asserted that the governing principles of any cultural form could be apprehended through an "*exakte sinnliche Phantasie*" (exact sensory imagination), the fundamental method that Goethe used in his morphological studies.⁴³ Exercising *exakte sinnliche Phantasie* allowed one to participate in the inner life of the object (culture) one studied. In this way, one could overcome the limitations of merely conceptual approaches. The concept, Goethe believed, is the product of reason, and reason can only separate; it cannot unite. Only imagination can synthesize. Goethe maintained that the higher organic forms develop on the basis of a sort of prototype and that the diversity of forms results from the relations with the outside world; as a result, organic form displays simultaneously both diversity and continuous, gradual change. Because life must be grasped as a whole, as an organic form, whose elements are interrelated, it must be understood through the imagination. Goethe applied this insight to the variety of forms that a living organism assumes: only the imagination (to be precise, only *exakte sinnliche Phantasie*) can understand the principle this gives rise to, for instance, the variety of forms assumed by the leaves of some plants in the course of their development. If it is the imagination alone that can grasp the unity behind such morphological variety in nature; so too must it be the imagination that grasps the principle behind the morphological variety that cultural expressions assume in the course of a culture's development.

Goethe also maintained that in apprehending the principle that unifies the morphological variety that expresses some phenomenon, the scientist grasps at once in imagination and in intuitive thought the *Urphänomenon*, the pure or primal phenomenon, whose striving produces this morphological variety. Eckermann recounts that in a conversation with Goethe on the topic of his colour theory, Goethe pointed out the dull figures on which yellow appears against the light and blue against the dark, and asserted that this phenomenon allowed the observation of an *Urphänomenon*. Goethe went on to say,

The highest which man can attain in these matters is astonishment; if the primary [primitive] phenomenon [*Urphänomenon*] causes this, let him be satisfied; more it cannot bring; and he should forbear to seek for anything

further behind it: here is the limit. But the sight of a primitive phenomenon [*Urphänomenon*] is generally not enough for people; they think they must go still further; and are thus like children who, after peeping into a mirror, turn it round to see what is on the other side.⁴⁴

Frobenius's *paideuma* is an *Urphänomenon*. By its analogy to the aesthetic phenomenon, the morphological approach overcomes the opposition between content and form, means and end, since the form makes visible a content understood as the stylistic principle that is irreducible to anything other than itself. What is more, Frobenius maintained that at the origin of all cultural experiences lies the experience of ecstasy, and ecstasy, or primal awe, can only be experienced—it cannot be explained or conveyed in concepts. Nonetheless, ecstasy reveals an ontological truth. Frobenius's emphasis on ecstasy as primal experience reinforced the emphasis on intuition in this strain of German ethnology.

The emphasis on intuition took history as irrational at its core: the motor of history, in this view, is spiritual, and its motives spring from spiritual experiences whose nature is external to logic and to instrumental rationality. Consequently, aesthetic understanding was important for German anthropologists of this group. Historical research overtook philosophical construction as the means for discovering the irrational form-giving principle that shapes each particular historical phenomenon. Only painstaking empirical historical study could reveal the working out of the universal in the particular.

Aby Warburg's particular version of *Geisteswissenschaft* (science of mind or spirit) shared these concerns with German *Kulturmorphologie*: like Frobenius's cultural morphology, Warburg's *Geisteswissenschaft* sought understanding of the form of artworks in spiritual motives (motives that, for him as for Frobenius, arose through a challenging and potentially traumatic encounter between humans and the circumambient world, and that in Warburg's case involved a "phobic arousal" that impelled the mind to grasp the "most distinct and lucid shape" of the object that aroused fear, relegating that which was not as distinctively formed to an excess; the persistent return of that excess then created the *topoi* of art). In considering the notion of excess that Warburg's idea of *Pathosformel* requires, we can see that the idea of *Pathosformel* reflects a Levinasian interest in the effects of the process (ontogenetic and phylogenetic) through which humans come to cope with the *il-y-a* (the "there is"). For Levinas, *il-y-a* is a sheer presence, an atmospheric density—he likens it to what would be left when all things, beings, and persons return to nothingness. This bare, anonymous, and impersonal fact of existing, this existence without existents, this glut of being, is experienced as an icy impersonality and indifference that strikes people with the impact of a blunt force. Humans

respond by using their rational capacities, countering the *il-y-a*'s lack of form by organizing an orderly world of their own (cf. Warburg's distinct and lucid forms). We construct a sense of an ordered cosmos, one that has a rational historical plan. But a transcendent force (in Levinas, that which is revealed in the face of the Other; in Warburg, the unrepresentable elemental) erupts into this ordered realm and shatters it into pieces.⁴⁵

This is the real meaning of Dada "nihilism": this sense that everything that exists stands forth out of an atmosphere that is no-thing, an excess, for which no reason can be given. We delude ourselves into believing that we live in an orderly cosmos that has a providential warrant, a reason for being as it is. We delude ourselves into believing that the cosmos is unfolding according to a plan. But we do so at a cost of authenticity; what is more, we are living on borrowed time when we pretend we live in an ordered cosmos: the primal will erupt and require from us the bare form of existence in which we realize that we are here without a ground for our being. DADA strove to reawaken the experience of that primal trauma of bare existence.⁴⁶

Warburg, as we have noted, spent a long period of time in an insane asylum; Cantor, too, spent time in a *Nervenlinik*; Russell was afflicted by depression; Gödel became paranoid. These thinkers stared into the abyss that the new developments in mathematics and changing beliefs about reason had opened up; the fate of these thinkers shows the human toll exacted when reason goes into convulsion. If philosophy since Plato had valorized reason, and reason no longer sufficed, then thinkers would have to reach back, beyond the pre-Socratics, to discover primal truths—failing in that task threatened madness. If modernity, by its too-great emphasis on reason, had disenfranchised valid ways of knowing and veridical ways of experiencing—if, as Walter Benjamin put it, modernity represented the nadir of experience—then thinkers would have to attempt to reawaken those modes of experience that modernity had devalued. Thus, the widespread craving to sweep away tradition, so common among early twentieth-century thinkers and artists, was often accompanied by the desire—expressed in different ways and with different consequences—to revitalize primitive ways of experiencing and to rediscover truths that lay closer to the origin of thought. The idea of the primitive was construed differently by various cultural movements in the late modernist period and played different roles in each. But its general importance is indisputable: the idea of the primitive had the same defining importance for modernism that the idea of Classical civilization had for the Renaissance.

In 1913, Russell and Whitehead published *Principia Mathematica*, a project that had occupied them since 1900; that same year, D.H. Lawrence's (1885–1930) *Sons and Lovers*, Thomas Mann's (1875–1955) *Der Tod im Venedig*

(Death in Venice, 1912), and Marcel Proust's (1871–1922) *Du côté de chez Swann* (Swann's Way, the first part of *À la recherche du temps perdu* [In Search of Lost Time, 1913–27]) appeared. All three of these literary works, but especially the last, involve a turning towards the subject evidenced, too, in the increasing interest at the time in taking a phenomenological approach to writing, a tendency confirmed by the appearance that same year of Miguel de Unamuno's *Del Sentimiento Trágico de la Vida* (The Tragic Sentiment of Life), Karl Jaspers' *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* (General Psychopathology), and Edmund Husserl's *Ideen: zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie* (Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology). Rudolf Steiner's founding, in Dornach, Switzerland, of his Goetheanum (begun 1913, completed 1920) gives further evidence of that same turn towards the subject, as does Alexander Scriabin's famous symphonic poem *Prometheus: The Poem of Fire* (1910).⁴⁷ Consider the godlike status that Stefan George's (1868–1933) followers—his contingent of *Schwämer und Schwämerinnen*—accorded him in the first and second decades of the twentieth century, or that which Rainer Maria Rilke's (1875–1926) followers accorded that exemplary poet: the same anti-rational enthusiasm is evident. Or consider the rediscovery of the works of the nearly forgotten Friedrich Hölderlin (including his late works and his formidably difficult hymns), or the Heinrich von Kleist (1777–1811) revival. Consider the equally irrational paratactical method that Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot employed.⁴⁸

On 29 May 1913, Igor Stravinsky's (1882–1971) *Le sacre du printemps* had its notorious première, in Paris at the Théâtre des Champs Élysées. That work is, perhaps, the greatest example of so-called “primitivism,” but its primitivist tendencies, and the social and cultural views they expressed, were by then widespread. At the time the Dada movement was founded, the work of Paul Gauguin (1848–1903), fuelled by primitivist fantasies, was not so far in the past. The “primitivism” of *Die Brücke*—seen in the work of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner (1880–1938), Karl Schmidt-Rottluff (1884–1976), and Erich Heckel (1883–1970)—or that of Pablo Picasso's (1881–1973) *Les demoiselles d'Avignon* (1907) was only a decade old. Amadeo Modigliani (1884–1920), encouraged by Brancusi, began studying African tribal masks and around 1911, under that influence, began producing portraits and nudes with elongated and flattened forms that by 1918 were just beginning to receive some recognition. Vachel Lindsay's (1879–1931) *The Congo and Other Poems*, which appeared in 1914, summed up the spirit that animated this turn towards primitivism: that book evokes European civilization and its American descendant tottering on the brink of collapse.

NOTES

- 1 El Lissitzky, "A. and Pangeometry" ("A." is El Lissitzky's standard abbreviation for "art"), originally published in German in Carl Einstein and Paul Westheim, eds., *Europa Almanach* (Potsdam: 1925); included in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, eds., *Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). The passage cited appears on page 304.
- 2 Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory 1900–1990*, 304.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 305.
- 4 Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, vol. I: 1872–1914 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), 33–34.
- 5 Marcel Duchamp, *The Writings of Marcel Duchamp (Marchand du Sel)*, ed. Michel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 22.
- 6 Linda Dalrymple Henderson, *The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Chapter 3 of her book is devoted to the topic "Marcel Duchamp and the New Geometries." The quotation just given appears on page 132.
 This is a work by Marcel Duchamp, and we would expect it to be massively over-determined. It is. One of its meanings arises from the acts by which the French state, immediately following the French Revolution, attempted to give mensuration a rational foundation. To this end, they defined a metre as the distance between two notches on a rod made of an alloy of platinum and iridium. The rod and two copies (three standard rods) were then deposited in a vault in the Breteuil Observatory, near Paris, together with a standard kilogram measure.
- 7 Russell, *Autobiography*, I:192.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 192.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 193.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 194–95
- 11 *Ibid.*, 200–201.
- 12 Another way of illustrating the problem: Assume that x is a set and that the statement $\sim(x \in x)$ is well defined. Then there is a set of all the sets x that have the property that set x does not belong to x . Let us call this set y . It follows that $(x) (x \in y = x \in x)$. Then substituting y for x , as we can because our statement is a universal statement, true of all x 's, and y is an x , we get $(y \in y = \sim(y \in y))$. But $y \in y = \sim(y \in y)$ is self-contradictory.
- 13 In fact, the French mathematician Henri Poincaré (1854–1912) used what we have called the self-reflexive nature of the definition of these sets in the effort to exorcise the demons that Russell had shown haunt mathematics. He recognized that the paradoxes of Eubulides, Epimenides, and Russell all involve some collection and some member of that collection whose definition depends upon the collection as a whole. He called such definitions "impredicative" and argued that impredicative definitions are circular (in the sense that the definition of the Barber of Seville depends on the concept "the people of Seville" and that the characterization of the Barber of Seville is that he counts among the people of Seville). Poincaré believed that impredicative definition was the source of paradoxes; Russell himself was attracted to this and expressed it as his "vicious circle" principle, through which he proposed to use to eliminate that source of mischief: "No set S is allowed to contain members definable only in terms of S , or members involving or presupposing S ."

The principle would work as follows: Russell's paradox arises from naive set theory's so-called "unrestricted comprehension" (or "abstraction") axiom. That axiom had been introduced by Georg Cantor, and states that any predicate expression, $P(x)$, that contains x as a free variable, will determine a set whose members are exactly those elements that satisfy $P(x)$. The axiom formalizes our simple intuition that any coherent condition may be used to determine a set—that is, simply, that the condition x is member of A if x is an apple; or x is member of A , the set of integers, if x is an integer. Most mathematicians have attempted to undo the potentially pernicious effects of Russell's paradox by identifying a viable means of restricting the scope of this axiom.

Russell, on the other hand, attempted to resolve it by introducing his theory of types. His basic idea was that one might avoid reference to noxious sets (such as the set of all sets that are not members of themselves) by arranging all mathematical sentences into a hierarchy (starting with sentences about individuals, then sentences about sets of individuals at the next level, then sentences about sets of sets of individuals, etc.). Russell's theory of types resembled, and in part was based on, Poincaré's "vicious circle" principle.

Poincaré enunciated the vicious circle principle to block certain purported definitions in which the object in question is defined in terms of itself. Poincaré advocated that all mathematical objects beyond the natural numbers be introduced by explicit definitions. A definition that refers to a presumed totality—of which the object being defined is a member of the object being introduced—locks one into a circle, since the object then is itself a constituent of its own definition. Poincaré called such definitions "impredicative" definitions; proper definitions, which he called predicative definitions, refer only to totalities that are established prior to the object being defined. Poincaré enjoined the use of impredicative definitions because he believed that doing so would exclude paradoxes.

Poincaré's injunction also depended upon his "no class" theory of classes (although each class may have as members classes of lower orders, no class can contain any class of its own order, including itself).

Using those two principles, Russell was able to explain why Cantor's unrestricted comprehension axiom fails: propositional functions, such as the function " x is a set," should not be applied to themselves since self-reference locks one into a vicious circle. In this view, it follows that it is possible to refer to a collection of objects for which a given condition (or predicate) holds only if they are all at the same level or of the same "type."

- 14 Russell, *Autobiography*, I:201–202. *Principia Mathematica* is Russell and Whitehead's demonstration that mathematics (up to real analysis) could be developed from a few axioms and rules.
- 15 This quotation appears in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, eds., *Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964). I have taken it from Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh, *The Mathematical Experience* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 336.
- 16 They usually attempted to do this by rejecting reason's reliance on picture thinking and stressing instead its capacity for reconciling opposites.
- 17 The logician Alfred Tarski (1901–83) was later to confirm the suspicion (showing, by rigorous means, that any language that is logically consistent fails to be logically complete).
- 18 Julius Wilhelm Richard Dedekind, *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen* (Continuity and Irrational Numbers). An excerpt from this lucid piece of mathematical reasoning can be found in James R. Newman's famous anthology, *The World of Mathematics: A Small Library of the Literature of Mathematics from A'h-mosé the Scribe to Albert Einstein*, vol. 1,

presented with commentaries and notes by James R. Newman, foreword by Philip and Phyllis Morrison (Redmond: Tempus Books, 1988), 519–27.

- 19 Dedekind's paper showed that our commonsense understanding of a line is incorrect.
- 20 Richard Dedekind, "Irrational Numbers," in Newman, *The World of Mathematics*, I:519.
- 21 The role that continuity had in nineteenth-century thought made Dedekind's an epochal answer.
- 22 Dedekind, "Irrational Numbers," I:520.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 520–21.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 521. The proof couldn't be easier, and for the sake of those who are attempting to get on serious terms with the nineteenth-century concept of continuity (and the difficulties it ran into), I will summarize it, not using Dedekind's example but constructing one with the same form. Divide the rational numbers into two classes, **A** and **B**, so that every number in **A**, when squared, is less than 2 and every number in **B**, when squared, is greater than 2. Since every number in **A** is less than any number in **B**, **A** and **B** determine a cut. We prove that this cut is produced by no rational number; we do so using an indirect proof, showing that assuming that the cut is produced by a rational number results in absurdity. That is, suppose there is a rational number r that determines this cut. Then r is larger than any element in **A** except for r ' itself. Let r' be an arbitrary rational number larger than r . Then r' must be in **B**.

However, we can show that if we assume that there exist rational numbers in **A** greater than r —that is, that there exist r' , rational numbers greater than r whose square is less than 2 (i.e., that belong to **A**, not **B**)—a contradiction results. If we can show this, then we will have deduced a contradiction, for we will have shown that r' is in **A** and **B**, but **A** and **B** partition the rational numbers (i.e., any rational value belongs either to **A** or to **B**, but not to both). Here is how we show that there exist r' that belong to **A**. Let $c = 2 - r^2$; take r' to be $r + c/4$. Then r'^2 equals $r^2 + rc/2 + c^2/16$. But $r^2 + rc/2 + c^2/16$ is less than, or, at most, equal to, $r^2 + r^2c/2 + c^2/16$ (since $r^2c/2$ is greater than $rc/2$, as r is a positive value greater than or equal to 1). But by simple arithmetic we can show that $r^2 + r^2c/2 + c^2/16$ is equal to $2 - (7/16)c^2$ (use 16 as the common denominator for all the terms of the polynomial) but $2 - (7/16)c^2$ is smaller than 2 (since c^2 , as a square, must be a positive value). But then r'^2 (which, as we saw equals $r^2 + rc/2 + c^2/16$) must be less than $2 - (7/16)c^2$ (which is simply another way of expressing $r^2 + r^2c/2 + c^2/16$); so r'^2 is certainly less than 2, and hence it belongs to **A**. But our initial assumption was that r'^2 is greater than r implies r'^2 is greater than 2, so then r' belongs to **B**. So r' belongs to both **A** and **B**. But this is absurd, since the cut partitions **R** (the set of real numbers) into distinct domains, **A** and **B**.

- 25 Originally published in Erwin Schrödinger, *Science and Humanism: Physics in Our Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), and reprinted in Erwin Schrödinger, "Causality and Wave Mechanics," in Newman, *The World of Mathematics*, II:1035–37.
- 26 Schrödinger, in Newman, *The World of Mathematics*, II:1038–39.
- 27 Essentially, by forbidding what Poincaré had termed "impredicative definitions."
- 28 In fact, this challenge to mathematicians was the second in a very famous list of twenty-three unsolved problems that David Hilbert posed to mathematicians at the beginning of the twentieth century, at the International Congress of Mathematicians, held in Paris.
- 29 For if one of the statements' contradictories is true, then we can negate that, and that negation too, though false, will be a theorem of the system, and it can be used as the premise for other inferences. But any statement of conditional implication with a

false antecedent is true—and that implies that any statement in the system can be the consequent of the conditional implication. Thus, if a material contradiction can be derived from a system's premises, any statement expressible in the terms of the system is a theorem of the system.

- 30 It is important to highlight one point regarding the logic of the argument I am propounding here—that the secessionist or oppositional tendencies that several of the artistic movements of the twentieth century exhibited were a response to the collapse of that dream: Gödel's theorem might represent the end of the dream, but his famous paper appeared more than a decade after these tendencies had manifested themselves intensively, in the Futurist and Dada movements. Nonetheless, Gödel's theorems were only the termination of a process—the discrediting of the belief that reason could unlock the mysteries of existence. Previous stages are clear: mathematics (reason) was shown to be fraught with paradoxes (contradictions), and in response to this threat, mathematicians undertook to eliminate the procedures that led to those paradoxes and to demonstrate that what was left over when those procedures were eliminated was self-consistent; thus, mathematics turns away from the world and proclaims itself to be a purely formal system that is true only because all its theorems are really simply gussied-up tautologies—and if you consider what that means for the analogy between mathematics and reason, you come to the very sad recognition that reason can't tell us anything about the world. That is already a discouragingly limited claim. But what Gödel showed was worse: that mathematics itself cannot be a complete and consistent (even if meaningless) system. And many took the point to apply to reason itself and to entail that reason cannot provide a complete and coherent account of its own processes.
- 31 Gödel's work was done after DADA had dissolved and the Surrealist movement was well under way. Still, examining this phase of the process provides an illuminating parallel to the work of the Dada and Surrealist artists. Considering Gödel's work and its implications buttresses my argument concerning the fate of reason in the first half of the twentieth century.
- 32 An implication of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem is that a computer cannot be programmed to answer all mathematical questions. Imagine that a century had been spent trying to create a computer to do exactly that, and then a young mathematician was to establish that those efforts would never achieve their goal. From that example, you would get some sense of the impact that Gödel's paper had—though the response to that discovery would be attenuated, in comparison with the impact of Gödel's paper (because it was logic itself, which was believed to capture the very process of thinking, and not just some machine, that was discovered to be wanting).
- 33 To be sure, Wölfflin's massively influential *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe* was published after Warburg's Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek had been established. Nonetheless, its art-historical approach was consistent with that of his earlier *Renaissance und Barock* (1888), a work that Wölfflin published several years before the Warburg library had been established.
- 34 In his dissertation, Warburg argued that Classical patterns appeal to artists, for they preserve antiquity's energy and revitalize any work of art into which they are implanted. Renaissance artists too used these antique patterns; when these forms are reused, their power once again asserts itself.

See Aby Warburg, *The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity: Contributions to the Cultural History of the European Renaissance*, intro. Kurt W. Forster, trans. David Britt (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1999).

- 35 It should not be imagined that either the Warburg Institute or Aby Warburg wished to enlarge the scope of irrational thinking in the modern world. On the contrary, their interest was in recovering Athens from Alexandria, in dispensing with the alchemical and astrological enthusiasms of the Renaissance. It was, simply, the responsibility of scholarly accuracy that made Warburg testify to the importance of Dionysian aspects of Classical culture.
- 36 Fritz Saxl, "Ernst Cassirer," in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), 47–48.
- 37 Compare this with Walter Benjamin's statement in "Theses on the Philosophy of History":

There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain.

Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (German 1955; the English translation can be found in New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), 256–57.

- 38 On this theme, see Philippe-Alain Michaud, *Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion*, trans. Sophie Hawkes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).
- 39 Warburg had personal reasons to be interested in this elementary force that threatens to disrupt good order. He was born into a "good" family (he was the scion of a wealthy and highly respected family of Jewish bankers in Hamburg). He also suffered from manic depression and was hospitalized for long periods. Convinced at times that the family's cooks were serving him the flesh of his own kin, he became a vegetarian. During his stay in the hospital for the insane, he seemed, during the late afternoon and evening, to be lucid and outgoing; but his mornings were given over to bouts of energetic roaring.
- At the same time, the anti-Semitism that was surging during Warburg's era meant that, like "primitives," he also was confronting an increasingly disappointing and unstable world. This theme is taken up in Charlotte Schoell-Glass, *Aby Warburg and Anti-Semitism: Political Perspectives on Images and Culture* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2008).
- 40 Ulrich Raulff's *Wilde Energien: Vier Versuche zu Aby Warburg* (Wild Energies: Four Essays on Aby Warburg) (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2003).
- 41 Aby Warburg, *Journal*, vol. 7 (1929): 255. The *Journal* is made up of entries composed by Fritz Saxl, Gertrud Bing, and Aby Warburg between 1926 and 1929. The entire journal has been collected as *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 7: *Tagebuch der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek Warburg*, ed. Karen Michels and Charlotte Schoell-Glass (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001).
- 42 The filmmaker Hollis Frampton (1936–84) also recognized the two-sided nature of cultural inquiry (which for him was essentially coterminous with inquiry into forms of human thought). Writing, for Frampton, represents the *logos*, reason; images represent intuition. So he wrote, for the Preface to *Circles of Confusion*,

Language and image are the substances of which we are made; so it is much more than a matter of interest—it is our most inescapable and natural desire—that we undertake to invent, and to specify (using language, and even subverting it, if we can) the system of images. Such a project needs forbearance: even the notion of a grammar of the image,

which must, itself, finally wither away in favor of a syntax, recedes perpetually, merging imperceptibly into that zone where intelligence struggles to preserve a distinction between what may be brought into focus and what may not. Eventually, we may come to visualize an intellectual space in which the systems of words and images will both, as Jonas Mekas once said of semiology, “seem like half of something,” a universe in which image and word, each resolving the contradictions inherent in the other, will constitute the system of consciousness. Frampton, *Circles of Confusion* (Rochester: Visual Studies Workshop, 1983), 9–10.

- 43 I simplify excessively by saying that what Goethe means by “*exakte sinnliche Phantasie*” is exact and precise attention to the sensuous forms of phenomena, so exact and precise that one can virtually participate in the inner dynamic that brings them into being and that sustains them in being.
- 44 “Das Höchste, wozu der Mensch gelangen kann . . . ist das Erstaunen, und wenn ihn das Urphänomenon in Erstaunen setzt, so sei er zufrieden; ein Höheres kann es ihm nicht gewähren, und ein Weiteres soll er nicht dahinter suchen; hier ist die Grenze. Aber den Menschen ist der Anblick eines Urphänomens gewöhnlich noch nicht genug, sie denken, es müsse noch weiter gehen, und sie sind den Kindern ähnlich, die, wenn sie in einen Spiegel geguckt, ihn sogleich umwenden, um zu sehen, was auf der anderen Seite ist.” English translation in Goethe, *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret*, trans. John Oxenford (London: George Bell and Sons, 1883), rev. ed. 369–70.
- 45 Levinas acknowledges the role that anthropological writings had in the genesis of the notion of the *il-y-a*, though it was not those by Frobenius (nor the ethnographic theories of Aby Warburg) but the writings of the anthropologist Lévy-Bruhl that were crucial to him.
- 46 In this way, it becomes quite understandable that DADA would have attracted the loyalty of Richard Hülsenbeck (1892–1974), a “primitivist” artist and psychoanalyst.
- 47 The appearance, exactly at the same time, of John B. Watson’s (1876–1958) *Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*—in its own way as fantastic, extravagant, and hyperbolic a text as anything the California Orphites have given us—indicates just how much the mind itself had become a problem to be thematized.
- 48 I wrote extensively on the paratactical method in *The Films of Stan Brakhage in the American Tradition of Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein, and Charles Olson* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998). My reasons for associating that form of construction with irrationalism are given there.

DADAISM AND THE DISASTERS OF WAR

It would be easy enough to frame a history of modern art along Hegelian lines, which represent art history as one of progress, with each advance marked by a decrease in illusion, the elimination from artistic form of features that were accidental to the medium, and an increased truth to the medium's material. That history would depict modernism's march of progress as advancing from Impressionism to Post-Impressionism, then to Fauvism and Expressionism, Analytical Cubism and Synthetic Cubism, and onward, in chronological sequence, to Synchronism, Abstract Expressionism, Minimalism, and Post-Painterly Abstraction.¹ But it would be hard to understand where to fit DADA or Surrealism into this evolutionary schema. Indeed, within such a schema both would appear as deviant practices—Surrealism even more than DADA. Modernism's leading ideas (or what are believed to be its leading ideas)—of producing an exquisitely wrought form, of engendering a contemplative experience, of avoiding political involvement so as to transcend everyday modes of perceiving and experiencing—had little appeal for Dadaists and Surrealists.² Most of the Dadaists were political dissenters (some were more active in protest of this sort than others): Hugo Ball (1886–1927), Richard Hülsenbeck (1892–1974), and Raoul Hausmann (1886–1971) were anarcho-communists; George Grosz (1893–1959) and the

Herzfelde/Heartfield brothers (John, 1891–1986; and Wieland, 1896–1988) were strict communists; Johannes Baader's spiritual beliefs (inspired, perhaps, by some degree of psychosis) led him to adopt a form of radical communitarianism. Moreover, Dadaist and Surrealist painters did not strive to bring their painted forms to coincide with the canvas's flat surface, as modernism taught that they should; in fact, some Surrealist painters revelled in the illusion of deep space. Nor were Dadaists and Surrealists programmatically progressive, seeking to bring forth an art whose nature conformed to the spirit of the modern; rather, they deliberately sought to induce regressive experiential modes and infantile states, often using primitivist or populist forms, which were sometimes derived from mass entertainment forms such as the cabaret show, and which often mixed political satire with carnivalesque displays of bodies.

Modernist visual arts celebrated a distinctively optical mode of experience, the belief being that the optical intelligence provided a higher form of knowledge (i.e., a purer, more intense knowledge more attuned to reality's true character). This belief provided the ground for the modernists' adopting and deepening the Romantics' claims that imagery engages with a higher form of awareness than language does and that, in consequence, the visual arts should be purged of any influences that language (or verbal thinking) has had on them. By contrast, the Dada and Surrealist movements both started out as literary movements, and the visual art produced by both (especially by the Surrealists) sometimes employed ekphrastic constructions. Both DADA and Surrealism thrived on the interactions between verbal and visual thinking.

Furthermore, while modernists strove to consolidate the experience of a work in the immediate self-presence of Husserl's "now-apprehension," Surrealists relished psychoanalytic time, in which the present is always continuous with the past and can be understood only *through* the past. But more than that, it is time full of contradiction, for different temporalities can be simultaneously present: occurrences can belong to both the present and the past. This simultaneity, which is due to the nature of primary-process thinking (which does not distinguish illusion from reality, fantasy or memory from perception, or, consequently, the past from the present), is not at all like the optical simultaneity of modernist art. Furthermore, modernist art, by and large, tried to identify meaning and self-disclosure. Against that, psychoanalytic theory and practice have their origin in the very opposite of immediate self-presence—they discover the self and meaning exactly where it hides itself away. Dada and Surrealist art emulated the psychoanalytic method in conceiving of meaning as covert and undisclosed. In this chapter we begin to explore this purported opposition, which, by the end of the book, we will have thoroughly reworked.

THE ZÜRICH COTERIE AND THEIR ANTICS

By the winter of 1915, Zürich had convened a remarkable collection of dissenters, pacifists, anti-capitalist activists, revolutionaries, schemers, ranters and, of course, poets, painters, instrumentalists, singers, and dancers. They had come from Germany, Yugoslavia, France, Russia, Romania, Poland, and Italy, because Zürich sheltered them from serving in the military and because Switzerland was not as swept up in the war fever that had gripped other countries. Among those who assembled in Zürich were Vladimir Ulyanov (1870–1924, after 1901 known as V.I. Lenin) and his entourage, which included Grigory Zinoviev (1883–1936) and Karl Radek (1885–1939). Zinoviev, a Ukrainian Jew, was one of the original members of the Bolshevik faction (founded in 1903); Lenin would periodically expel him from the Soviet hierarchy and then rehabilitate him. Radek had taken part in the 1905 revolution in Warsaw and thereafter moved to Germany, which tossed him out—and that exclusion, along with Lenin’s presence in Zürich, helps explain why he was there. Zinoviev, when he was a high-ranking member of the Politburo, would pin the blame (which he himself deserved) on Radek for the failure of the Communist-led revolt in Germany in 1923. Also present on the Zürich scene were Franz Werfel (1890–1945), Rudolf Laban (1879–1958), Else Laske-Schüler (1869–1945), James Joyce (1882–1941), and Viking Eggeling (1880–1925). Werfel was a poet, novelist, and playwright who would become Alma Mahler’s lover. Laban was born to a high-ranking Austro-Hungarian military family and raised largely in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the towns of Sarajevo and Mostar. His family was established in Viennese court life and in the theatre circles of Bratislava. While a student at the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris, he became interested in movement, so he migrated first to Munich and then to Zürich to work out his ideas on *Bewegungskunst* (the art of movement). Laske-Schüler, with her book of poems *Meine Wunder* (1911), had established herself as the foremost woman Expressionist, though when she separated from her second husband, she found herself penniless, until Karl Kraus (1874–1936) and, later, Gottfried Benn (1886–1956) came to her aid. She became the latter’s lover, and the two exchanged love poems. Joyce, whose great theme was history, hardly needs introduction. Eggeling was an impoverished painter who together with Hans Richter would extend Walther Ruttmann’s (1887–1941) exploration of a new, abstract cinema (the May 1919 issue of *Dada* 4–5 contains two drawings, *Basse générale de la peinture: Orchestration de la ligne* [Thorough Bass of Painting: Orchestration of Line] and *Basse générale de la peinture* [Generalbaß der Malerei]: *Extension*, on pages 8 and 23, respectively, both of which are very much in the style of the drawing for his film *Symphonie Diagonale*, 1924).³

All these men and women took part in Zürich's cultural life, alongside the Dada artists Marcel Janco (1895–1984) and his brothers George and Jules, who came from a Jewish Romanian family; Arthur Segal (1875–1944), another Romanian who had exhibited with *Die Brücke* and *Der Blaue Reiter* and who had already produced *Vom Strande: acht Original-Holzschnitte* (From the Shore: Original Woodcuts, 1913), an astonishing set of eight woodcuts; Marcel Slodki (1892–1943), a Polish artist who, though he sometimes exhibited with the Dada artists (and made the poster for the first evening of the Cabaret Voltaire promising “Musik-Vortrage und Rezitationen im Saale der ‘Meierei’ Spiegelgasse 1”), was never in the inner circle; and the artists who will serve as the protagonists for the next sections of this work—Tristan Tzara (1896–1963), Richard Hülsenbeck (1892–1974), Francis Picabia (1879–1953), Hugo Ball, and Emmy Hennings (1885–1948). The vehemently anti-dogmatist Tzara was one of the first to have experienced what by the end of the century would be commonplace—the experience of words being emptied of meaning and becoming mere *flatus vocis*. Hülsenbeck was a poet and drummer (he advocated using “negro rhythms” to intensify life energies) who, after DADA had entered history, became a Jungian analyst. Picabia was a painter and lover of fast cars (he is said to have owned 150) who had occult leanings—he had been a member of *Section d’or* and of the Puteaux Group. Ball, an anarchist, had been influenced by the writings of Bakunin and was a critic of technology (he and Picabia were often at odds with each other). Hennings (1885–1948), Ball’s wife, was a cabaret singer and poet of real accomplishment, whose religio-mystical leanings guided Ball towards the religiosity he would soon embrace and who, even when having to resort to prostitution to support her husband and herself, remained resolutely cheerful.

The members of this colourful group found one another and decided to mount collective art activities at what they called the Cabaret Voltaire. The first event established the type:

at about six in the evening, while we were still busy hammering and putting up futuristic posters, an Oriental-looking deputation of four little men arrived, with portfolios and pictures under their arms; repeatedly they bowed politely. They introduced themselves: Marcel Janco the painter, Tristan Tzara, Georges Janco and a fourth gentleman whose name I [Hugo Ball] did not quite catch. Arp happened to be there also, and we were able to communicate without too many words. Soon Janco’s sumptuous *Archangels* was hanging with the other beautiful objects, and on that same evening Tzara read some traditional-style poems, which he fished out of his various coat pockets in a rather charming way... Mme. Hennings and Mme. Laconte sang, in French and Danish. Mr. Tristan Tzara read some of his Roumanian poetry. A balalaika orchestra played popular tunes and Russian dances.⁴

Thus, the idea of the Cabaret Voltaire was introduced to the public on 5 February 1916. Andrei Codrescu describes that event more expansively:⁵

Emmy Hennings recalls that Tzara was the first to take the stage, a beautiful man-child who recited emotional words of farewell to his parents, bringing tears to the eyes of the many orphaned members of the... audience (standing room only) and then read Max Jacob's poem, "La Côte" [one of Jacob's extraordinary poems inspired by Brittany, its coast, and its people, and based on Breton legends. His volume's first edition, in 1911, was illustrated by Picasso]. The small, dark-haired Romanian with the pince-nez was followed by Emmy Hennings singing "A la villette," a popular Aristide Bruant song, accompanied on the piano by Hugo Ball. They were followed by Marietta di Monaco [1893–1981], who read the popular Gallows-songs [*Galgenlieder*, 1905] by Christian Morgenstern [1871–1914] (the favorite black-humor poet of the trenches), and also poetry by Gottfried Benn and Georg Heym [Benn: 1886–1956; Heym: 1887–1912; both poets were associated with Expressionism and both created terrifying images of war, urban life, oppression, and illness in their lyric poetry]. They were followed by the six-piece balalaika orchestra, assisting Ball in the playing of "Totentanz," the Death Dance, another wartime hit. Hugo Ball then read poems by Blaise Cendrars [1887–1961]. Emmy Hennings performed again... and then betook her sweaty body from table to table lasciviously distributing pictures of herself. Suddenly, nonsense noises, whistling, and shrieks were heard behind the curtain, and the lights went out. A green spotlight revealed four masked figures on stilts, each hissing a different sound: ssssssss, prrrrr, muuuuh, ayayayayay. The figures alternated their sounds and began a crazy dance. While the grotesques flailed and stomped, one of them tore open his coat to reveal a cuckoo clock on his chest. The audience stomped and shouted, and soon got into the act, rhythmically joining in by making the sounds, too. At a frenzied point when the shouting reached its most feverish pitch, Tzara reappeared onstage dressed in tails and white spats, shooed away the dancers, and started to recite nonsense in French. The performance ended with Tzara unrolling a roll of toilet paper with the word "merde" written on it.⁶

THE DADA CONSPIRATORS: TRISTAN TZARA

DADA was founded by the Romanians Tristan Tzara and Marcel Janco (1895–1984), the Alsatian Hans (Jean) Arp (1886–1966), and the Germans Hugo Ball and Richard Hülsenbeck. Tzara assumed the role of leader of Zürich's Dada movement.⁷ He had been christened Samuel Rosenstock on 16 April 1896 in Moinesti, a small town in Romania. He attended school first in his native town and later in Bucharest. In 1912, when he was sixteen, he along with Ion Vinea (1895–1964) and Marcel Janco founded a poetry magazine titled *Simbolul*; by then, he was already publishing his poems in other magazines. In 1914 and

1915, he studied mathematics and philosophy at the university in Bucharest; in 1915, his parents sent him to university in Zürich for further studies. In Zürich, Tzara was able to find many like-minded people who would join him and Janco in founding the Dada movement. While in Zürich, Tzara adopted French as the language in which he wrote, and French remained the language of his literary production for the rest of his life.

THE DADA CONSPIRATORS: HUGO BALL AND EMMY HENNINGS

Hugo Ball and his wife, Emmy Hennings, arrived in Zürich in the summer of 1915, eight months after Hennings had been released from prison for forging foreign passports for individuals wishing to avoid military service. Indeed, Ball himself was carrying forged papers when he arrived there, and at first he lived under an assumed name, Willibald. He attempted to resume his studies, but the Swiss police discovered the imposture, and he fled to Geneva. He soon returned to Zürich, served twelve days in prison, and then was left alone. His financial circumstances, however, went from bad to worse, and that autumn he apparently attempted suicide. To keep body and soul together, he joined a troupe of performers called the Flamingo, which toured all over Switzerland (because he had received a draft notice from Germany, he began living under the assumed name Géry). During this period, he tried to discern the conditions of the culture that had sent him into exile. He also began to prepare his book *Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz* (A Critique of the German Intelligensia, 1919), wrote many pieces on the intellectual and spiritual destitution of the times, and began to correspond with the Futurist leader Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944), who was also developing a critique of bourgeois society. He espoused pacifism and took up practices that would bring him respite from pain by fostering expanded states of awareness, including taking narcotics and engaging in meditation to summon altered states of consciousness.

As *Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz* reveals, Ball brought to DADA a keen theoretical intelligence. By the time he arrived in Zürich, he had already accumulated an impressive formal education and considerable artistic experience. After studying at the University of Munich, he had left for Berlin, where he worked briefly with Max Reinhardt (1873–1943), who recognized the young man's directorial talents. Two years later, in 1912, he returned to Munich, where he took part in its Expressionist vanguard. In 1913, he collaborated with the poet Hans Leybold (1892–1914) to found *Die Revolution*, a journal that carried as its masthead "Lässt uns chaotisch sein" (Let us be chaotic) and that declared itself opposed to almost everything that German culture represented. The first issue was confiscated because of the irreverence

of Ball's poem "The Hangman." In 1914, he embraced Bakunian anarchism and Kandinskian abstraction as the last battle cry of Russian Romanticism (he was convinced that the latter testified to the grandeur of colour and the purity of intuition). After a visit to the Belgian Front in 1914, Ball returned to Berlin, more than ever committed to the Russian anarchists Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Merezhovsky.

The Dada movement (if I may be allowed to characterize it that way, though in a strict sense it was never really an artistic movement) consolidated itself around the impressive manifestations that took place in Zürich, at a cabaret established by Hugo Ball and his wife.⁸ Ball and Hennings approached Jan Ephraim, patron of the Holländische Meierei (Holland Milkbar) at Spiegelgasse 1, in Zürich's somewhat rundown Niederdorf district. In the same narrow alley, at Spiegelgasse 14, lived a Herr Ulyanov, a.k.a. V.I. Lenin. The authorities took much greater interest in the chaotic antics of Dadaists than in what the quiet, studious Russian living farther down the street was doing. The Holländische Meierei had already hosted Zürich's first literary cabaret, the Pantagruel, in 1915, and Herr Ephraim allowed them to use the backroom for their activities. So Ball, Hennings, and Tzara set up the Cabaret Voltaire, modelling it on the café-cabarets of Munich. Ball and Hennings held these events frequently from 5 February to 23 June 1916, in Ephraim's establishment.

THE DADA CONSPIRATORS: FRANCIS PICABIA

DADA was founded to protest the civilization that had produced the Great War. But to attribute such motivations to the participants in the Dada movement would be to represent it as more programmatic than it actually was. For there was a strong streak of moral and aesthetic nihilism to DADA. Tzara engaged a coterie of Parisian artists in lengthy correspondence before the movement expanded to Paris in 1920: these artists included André Breton (1896–1966), Philippe Soupault (1897–1990), Louis Aragon (1897–1982), Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes (1884–1974, an older and somewhat better-established Cubist painter from Cuba), and the *bon vivant* Francis Picabia. The last welcomed the movement with the epistolary declaration "The Dadaists are nothing, nothing, nothing, assuredly they will amount to nothing, nothing, nothing, signed Francis Picabia who knows nothing nothing nothing."⁹ In January 1923 he declared,

There is no such thing as a moral problem; morality like modesty is one of the greatest stupidities. The asshole of morality should take the form of a chamberpot, that's all the objectivity I ask of it.

This contagious disease called morality has succeeded in contaminating all of the so-called artistic milieux; writers and painters become serious people,

and soon we shall have a minister of painting and literature; I don't doubt that there will be still more frightful assinities. The poets no longer know what to say, so some are becoming Catholics, others believers . . .¹⁰

Picabia presented his thoroughgoing nihilism as a radicalization of the Cartesian doctrine of total doubt, expanded so that Descartes's epistemological method became the basis for a social, moral, and aesthetic anarchy. At the same time, he held in contempt the French intellectual tradition's overestimation of *clarté* (clear, logical thinking).

THE KÜNSTLERKNEIPE CABARET VOLTAIRE AND THE GALERIE DADA

These young artists and writers joined with Ball and Hennings to create a centre for new art in Zürich. Hennings and Ball named the events that took place at the Cabaret Voltaire, in homage to France's caustic freethinker.¹¹ To be sure, cabaret theatre had been both a popular form of entertainment and a vital form of art long before the Dadaists began staging their events at the Cabaret Voltaire—in fact, Hugo Ball met Emmy Hennings at Munich's Café Simplicissimus, where artists discussed their works and ideas while dancers, singers, poets, and magicians presented, on a small platform stage, satirical sketches of daily life in the antebellum capital of art.¹² An earlier cabaret, founded in Berlin in 1901 and devoted to ennobling vaudeville, was the Buntes Theater (Motley Theatre) or Überbretti (Super-Stage) of Baron Ernst von Volzogen (1855–1934). This cabaret, one of the first (if not *the* first) in Germany, was hardly progressive: a famous opening act presented a couple dressed in Biedermeier costume extolling the theatre's separation from the cares of the world. Much closer to the spirit of DADA was a cabaret opened in Munich in April 1901 by Die Elf Scharfrichter (the Eleven Executioners). Comic Grotesque artists had been prompted to found the theatre by a bill then before the Reichstag—the “Lex Heinze,” which would have strengthened the already stringent censorship measures under which artists laboured. The Elf Scharfrichters' performances took place in the backroom of a restaurant that held around one hundred people. In the middle of the room was a pillory topped by a bewigged skull and cleaved in half by an axe. Posted on the pillory were handbills lampooning the political insanities of the time. At the start of each performance (called an “execution” by the artists), the eleven members of the company marched on stage dressed in red robes and carrying enormous axes. They sang a Grotesque song about death. The executioners' theatre was both innovative and corrosive, as Dada cabaret was.

Among the artists who presented their works in such “intimate theatres” as the Café Simplicissimus was Benjamin Franklin Wedekind (1864–1918),

better known as Frank Wedekind. Wedekind was especially active in Café Simplicissimus when he lacked the finances necessary to produce plays or when he found himself under official censorship, as he so often did. Wedekind was an erstwhile member of Die Elf Scharfrichter, and his conduct, both in his public life and in his art, was calculated to inflame bourgeois sensibilities: when introduced to a young woman, his response was to ask, “Are you still a virgin?” and to pull a face if she was; and he sometimes urinated or masturbated on stage. Hugo Ball claimed that Wedekind’s performance pieces would induce convulsions “in his arms, his legs, his ____ [sic] and even in his brain.”¹³ Wedekind’s theatre pieces were no less inflammatory, and he often spent time in prison for affronting public morality. Ball summarized the impact of Wedekind’s performance pieces: “My strongest impression was of the poet as a fearful cynical spectacle: Frank Wedekind. I saw him at many rehearsals and in almost all of his plays. In the theatre he was struggling to eliminate both himself and the last remains of a once-firmly-established civilization.”¹⁴

The original plan for the Cabaret Voltaire was to establish a *Künstlerkneipe*, a bar where young artists could give musical performances and readings. An entry from Tristan Tzara’s chronicle of this time in Zürich contains this description of the goings-on of one evening at the cabaret.

February 26, 1916—HÜLSENBECK ARRIVES—bang! bang! bangbang-bang... Gala night—simultaneous poem 3 languages, protest noise Negro music... *invention dialogue!! DADA! latest novelty!!!* bourgeois syncope, BRUITIST music, latest rage, song Tzara dance protests—the big drum—red light...¹⁵

Hülsenbeck had arrived in Zürich by train on 11 February, the day of the third Cabaret Voltaire event, and on disembarking had gone straight to Spiegelgasse 1. Hülsenbeck’s art was elemental and primitive—the purpose of Tzara’s juxtaposing Hülsenbeck’s arrival and the sounds of a drum was to convey the savage effect the Dada drum had on the group. Arp commented in his diary entry for 12 February 1916 on Hülsenbeck’s anti-language: “Hülsenbeck has arrived. He pleads for stronger rhythm (Negro rhythm). He would prefer to drum literature into the ground.”

The poem recited on the evening of 26 February (Ball gives 29 March as the date) was “L’admiral cherche une maison à louer” (The Admiral Searches for a House to Rent), which Hülsenbeck recited in German, Janco in English, and Tzara in French. Ball recorded his impression of the new form:

All the styles of the last twenty years came together yesterday. Hülsenbeck, Tzara and Janco took the floor with a *poème simultané* [simultaneous poem]. That is a contrapuntal recitative in which three or more voices speak, sing,

whistle, etc., all at the same time in such a way that the elegiac, humorous, or bizarre content of the piece is brought out by these combinations. In such a simultaneous poem, the willful quality of an organic work is given powerful expression, and so is its limitation by the accompaniment. Noises (an **rrrrr** drawn out for minutes, or crashes, or sirens, etc.) are superior to the human voice in energy.

The “simultaneous poem” has to do with the value of the voice. The human organ represents the soul, the individuality in its wanderings with demonic companions. The noises represent the background—the inarticulate, the disastrous, the decisive. The poem tries to elucidate the fact that man is swallowed up in the mechanistic process. In a typically compressed way it shows the conflict of the *vox humana* [human voice] with a world that threatens, ensnares, and destroys it, in a world whose rhythm and noise are ineluctable.¹⁶

That evening the *Simultangedicht* was in three languages: in time, these *poèmes simultanés* would be in as many as five (at the last Zürich Dada event, on 9 April 1919, when a poem was presented in twenty voices speaking at once, to produce an achoral effect, the members of the group failed to keep time with one another).

Hülsenbeck himself recorded his own more analytical reflections on the *Simultangedicht* in *En Avant Dada: Eine Geschichte des Dadaismus* (1920):

Simultaneity (first used by Marinetti in this literary sense) is an abstraction, a concept referring to the occurrence of different events at the same time. It presupposes a heightened sensitivity to the passage of things in time, it turns the sequence $a=b=c=d$ into an $a-b-c-d$, and attempts to transform the problem of the ear into a problem of the face. Simultaneity is against what has become, and for what is becoming . . . Simultaneity is a direct reminder of life, and very closely bound up with bruitism. Just as physics distinguishes between tones (which can be expressed in mathematical formulae) and noises, which are completely baffling to its symbolism and abstractionism, because they are a direct objectivization of a dark vital force [note the Schopenhauerian inflection here], here the distinction is between a succession and a “simultaneity,” which defies formulation because it is a direct symbol of action. And so ultimately a simultaneous poem means nothing but “Hurrah for Life!”¹⁷

Note the lexis here: simultaneity is the direct symbol of action, and action, one might argue, is the province of the cinema. Furthermore, the cinema is an expression of life: its pictures live. Life and immediate dynamism are antithetical to calculative reason.

Hülsenbeck explained the appeal of what was, in 1916, the “latest rage,” viz., Bruitism.

From Marinetti we also borrowed “bruitism,” or noise music, *le concert bruitiste*, which, of blessed memory, had created such a stir at the first appearance of

the futurists in Milan, where they had regaled the audience with *le reveil de la capitale* . . . “Le bruit,” noise with imitative effects, was introduced into art (in this connection we can hardly speak of individual arts, music or literature) by Marinetti, who used a chorus of typewriters, kettledrums, rattles, and pot-covers, to suggest the “awakening of the capital”; at first it was intended as nothing more than a rather violent reminder of the colorfulness of life. In contrast to the cubists or for that matter the German expressionists, the futurists regarded themselves as pure activists. While all “abstract artists” maintained the position that a table is not the wood and nails it is made of but the idea of all tables, and forgot that a table could be used to put things on, the futurists wanted to immerse themselves in the “angularity” of things . . .

. . . Every movement naturally produces noise. While number, and consequently melody, are symbols presupposing a faculty for abstraction, noise is a direct call to action. Music of whatever nature is harmonious, artistic, an activity of reason—but bruitism is life itself, it cannot be judged like a book, but rather is part of our personality, which attacks us, pursues us and tears us to pieces. Bruitism is a view of life, which, strange as it might seem at first, compels us to make an absolute decision. There are only bruitists and others . . . In modern Europe, the same initiative which in America made ragtime a national music led to the convulsion of bruitism.¹⁸

Noise is the product of movement, and movement is the province of the cinema. As he did when he dealt with the concept of simultaneity, Hülsenbeck was positing a polarity between vitality and abstraction. Noise, like cinema, is on the side of vitality. (Cinema as an art is a matter of no importance: it is vital, while art is dead.) Moreover, cinema’s images come from life and are not abstractions.

Hülsenbeck’s assertions—that simultaneity is a direct reminder of life, and that a simultaneous poem means nothing but “Hurrah for Life!”—highlight the role that the concept of life played in Dada (and Surrealist) thought. The late nineteenth century saw an organic conception of reality displace the earlier mechanical conception of reality (that had arisen out of Descartes and the scientific philosophers of the seventeenth century), and this organic conception was often associated with the idea of a life force as a principle of surging energy striving continually to produce new (organic) forms. Among thinkers who were enthusiastic about this new, organic conception of reality, alienation was understood as loss of an immediate, vital connection to the life force. The end of history would be the result of reconnecting human being to the surging life-principle, which would result in the emergence of the New Human or (what was then referred to as) the Total Man.

Hülsenbeck seems to have first performed what the Dada performers referred to as *Negerlieder* (“Negro Songs”), even though they were, in fact, nonsense poems that he had concocted himself. Hülsenbeck met Jan Ephraim, the owner of the property where the Cabaret Voltaire was located, on his

(Hülsenbeck's) first visit there. When Ephraim had entertained Hülsenbeck with stories of his time as a sailor and of his trips to Africa, in response, Hülsenbeck had recited some of his *Negerlieder* for Ephraim. The Dada drummer described Ephraim's reaction:

"They sound very good . . . but unfortunately they're not Negro poems. I have spent a good part of my life among Negroes, and the songs they sing are very different from the ones you just recited." He [Ephraim] was one of those people who take things literally, and retain them verbatim. My Negro poems all ended with the refrain "Umba, umba," [In Swahili, "umba" refers to a divine act of creation] which I roared and spouted over and over again into the audience.¹⁹

Hugo Ball, who was also a party to the discussion, suggested that Hülsenbeck recite some authentic African poems. Hülsenbeck turned to Ephraim for information, and the Dutch landlord came back some days later with the words

Trabadja La Modjere
Magamore Magagere
Trabadja Bobo

Hülsenbeck reports that he recited some of his "authentic" African poems and that the audience was pleased with them; he also reports that he continued to shout "Umba, umba" at the end of the poem, while Ephraim shook his head in dismay. Despite Ephraim's chagrin, *Negerlieder* became a staple of the Cabaret Voltaire.

There is no doubt that to our current sensibilities, the use Dada artists made of stereotypes of the "Black African" was a colonialist atrocity—that much we must acknowledge. But I don't think the politics and tastes of our own times should have the last or only word on the subject. Keeping company with these appalling colonialist attitudes was a genuine interest in the "Black Africans" and a belief that Africans had preserved a more authentic mode of living while Europeans had succumbed to the destitution of modernity. For them, the figure of the "African" represented the antithesis of broken modernity. James Clifford offers a judicious view of the matter that neither overlooks the questionable features of these *faux-primitif* imitations nor dismisses those aspects that could be recuperated:

At about the time Cendrars began to bring African motive and jazzlike compositional patterns into his writing, the Zürich Dadaists were organizing their notorious "Soirees" at the Cabaret Voltaire. The program for 14 July 1916 announced "noises, Negro music (trabatgea bonooooooo oo ooooo)." Hugo Ball and Tristan Tzara beat on drums and intoned invented "Negro" chants, simulating a return to wild, purely rhythmical, presyntactic forms of expression presumed to be typical of black cultures. These racist displays—stereotypical

savagery recast as scandal and poetic regeneration—were short-lived. But the influence of black culture on Tzara's "poèmes nègres" (most of them unpublished during his lifetime) was more enduring... Transcribing African and Australian aboriginal myths and chants, Tzara used scholarly word-for-word translations rather than smoothed-over, "literary" versions. His literalism resulted in obscure, syntactically disjointed "poems" that, like the language experiments of the Italian and Russian futurists, estranged and reassembled basic linguistic components. Whereas for Cendrars black cultures were a source of poetic inspiration, for Tzara the promised renewal presupposed a destruction of civilized literature and proper forms of discourse.²⁰

Their enthusiasm for African poems (or recitations that Dada performers somewhat naively thought of as sounding African) was linked to a disaffection with traditional poetic forms and styles, traditional poetic diction, conventional rhyme schemes, and conventional rhythms, and to the belief that European language and European forms of expression had been corrupted to the point of being unsalvageable. Most avant-garde movements of the early twentieth century shared the belief that language was in crisis. What the participants in these movements thought of as forms of expression that were imbued with a primitive vitality might provide a remedy: *Negerlieder* figured among these forms (as did the cinema).

Dada soirées spread beyond Switzerland's borders. On 12 April 1918, there was a *Dada-Abend* at the Berliner Sezession. There, Hülsenbeck read a long manifesto that declared his (and DADA's) antipathy for art and his interest in popular culture, including film. Then Else Hadwiger (born 1877, year of death unknown), accompanied by Hülsenbeck on a little drum and a child's rattle, read her translations of all or part of the "Bombardimento" section of F.T. Marinetti's *Zang Tumb Tumb* (1912) and perhaps some of its "Treno di soldati ammalati" (Train with Sick Solidiers), sections that emphasize the horrors of war (whatever Marinetti may have thought about that). Next (according to Jeanpaul Goergen) came three poems on Berlin, from the anthologist and librettist Paolo Buzzi's (1874–1956) *Versi liberi* (1913), that had appeared in German translations in the left-wing Expressionist and literary periodical *Die Aktion*: one, by Libero Altomare (1883–1966), had been published as "Die Häuser sprechen" (The Houses Speak, 1912) in 1917; one, by Luciano Folgare (1888–1966), had appeared as "Der Marsch" (The March, 1912) in 1916; and one, by Corrado Govini (1884–1965), had appeared as "Seele" (Soul) in 1911. These were followed by Tristan Tzara's "Retraite" (Retreat, 1917) from *Vingt-cinq poèmes*; and a *Lautgedicht* of Aldo Palazzeschi (1885–1974), "Nun lass mich meinen Spass haben" (Now Let Me Have My Fun).²¹ One remarkable feature of this list of poems is that, Tzara's aside, all the poems were by Futurists. In part, this reflected the artistic ideals the two movements had in common

(at this time Hugo Ball was proposing to compile an anthology of German Expressionist and Italian Futurist poetry, to highlight what the movements had in common); but there was provocation involved as well—that of reading, in a time of war, the militaristic and triumphalist poems of the enemy (at the end of April 1915, Italy had entered the war on the side on the Triple Entente). Grosz then read some of his scurrilous city poems, written when the Futurist influence on him was at its acme. The evening concluded with a reading of Raoul Hausmann’s “Synthetische Cino [*sic*] der Malerei” (Synthetic Kinema of Painting), a Boccioni-influenced tract.

The next day’s *Berliner Börsen-Courier* carried a review of the evening’s event under the title “Da-Da. Literatur-Narrheiten in der Sezession” (Da-Da. The Literature of Madness in the Secession).

Some acted like they had St. Vitus Dance [*Einige gebärdeten sich eitstanzerich*]. A young poet puked white foam in anger. The highlight was Marinetti’s poem “Bombardimento,” which seemed the product of a word lottery and which Raoul Hausman accompanied with a little drum and a child’s rattle . . . When Hausman shrieked programmatically into the crowd about Dada painting, the leaders of the *Sezession* switched off the lights. However, the evening reached its goal; a row . . . What have they achieved, the do-gooders (the improvers of the world), the meliorists? Did they provoke the European world to ecstasy? . . . The Dadaist . . . is no do-gooder. He doesn’t believe in the definite. He is a relativist, but neither passive nor pacifist. He is a fanatic for dynamism, and far from sentimentality. Life is more important than art. He is an internationalist and an individualist. He constantly has to separate the elements of his personality from the chaotic, and still has to be prepared to surrender himself at any moment. His metaphysical insight is into brutality. [*Seine metaphysische Erkenntnis ist die der Brutalität.*] Dada involves at once the most primitive relation to life and the most intense. Dada is the art of the highest form of movement [*gesteigertsten Bewegung*] and the greatest artist is the one who has the most dynamic life. Its relation to things is simultaneously abandon and irony. [Its] goal: The film of sensation. [*Ideal: der Sensationfilm.*]

We see that as early as 1918, DADA was understood as striving to transform art, under the influence of *Lebensphilosophie*, into cinema.

The title of Hausmann’s manifesto, “Synthetische Cino der Malerei,” says much about the goals of the Dada movement—goals that had been recognized by the review in the *Berliner Börsen-Courier*. Hausmann had considered calling the manifesto “Psychoanalytisches Cino der Malerei” (The Psychoanalytical Kinema of Painting). The piece proposed that life is chaos: it is “ein simultanes Gewirr von Geräuschen, Farben, und geistigen Rhythmen [*sic*]” (a simultaneous confusion of noises, colours, and spirited rhythms).²² The appropriate response to this chaos was to develop a primitive relation to

life, as DADA had: DADA had “das primitiviste Verhältnis zur umgebenden Wirklichkeit” (the most primitive relation to circumambient reality), and to cope with the confusion of reality, one had to have the means to deal with irrational forces, including sexuality.

On 18 March 1917, a year after their first performances at their Künstlerkneipe, the Dada group in Zürich opened the Gallerie DADA. For this, Ball and Tzara had taken over the rooms of the gallery Corray at Bahnhofstrasse 19. There they exhibited works by Wassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee (1879–1940), Jean Arp, Giorgio de Chirico (1888–1978), Lyonel Feininger (1871–1956), Max Ernst (1891–1976), Marcel Janco, Amedeo Modigliani (1884–1920), August Macke (1887–1914), Oskar Kokoschka (1886–1980), and others. Tzara insisted on publishing a magazine, and Ball’s suggestion to name it *Dada* was accepted. Though war was still raging, the periodical circulated widely, reaching Guillaume Apollinaire, for example. Four issues were published, from July 1917 to May 1919. The third number contained articles by Francis Picabia as well as contributions by members of the Berlin “Club Dada.” *Dada* 4–5 contained work by members of the Paris group, including André Breton and Louis Aragon. A number of important figures in DADA were soon to move to Paris, and Paris would transform the movement.

DADA: WAR AND POLITICS

“Dada,” as André Breton said, was a “state of mind,” that led to rejection of a culture that accorded too high a value to reason and too low a value to Dionysian impulses, that constrained high spirits and destroyed spontaneity.²³ But if these beliefs had been common since the end of the nineteenth century, the Great War gave them a particular focus. The Great War had a cataclysmic effect on European consciousness. Touched off by a diplomatic error, it was fought in unimaginably miserable conditions and with unspeakably hideous means: the experience of life in the frigid trenches, among rats, poison gas to corrode the lungs, and land mines to blow off limbs even when no one was around, and the sheer number of dead led all thinking people to question how a society could ever have produced such a horror. The war’s scale was unimaginable. Between nine and ten million combatants died. One in six mobilized French men was killed, and the country lost around 10.5 per cent of its male population. Almost nine hundred Frenchmen and thirteen hundred Germans died every day between the outbreak of the war (August 1914) and the armistice (November 1918). On 1 July 1916, some twenty thousand men in the British and Dominion forces were killed and another forty thousand wounded. About 40 per cent of all combatants sent to the fronts were wounded at least once, and the severity of the wounds soldiers suffered

had no precedent in the history of warfare. New weapons of mass destruction had been invented that unleashed a level of harm unknown in previous wars. The suffering of the soldiers (the overwhelming majority of whom were from civilian populations) was unspeakable. Among these weapons belonging to a new league of cruelty were tanks, flame-throwers, mortars, hand grenades, submarines, airplanes, and poison gas. The machine gun was “improved” and “improved” again until it became a key item in the full-metal arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

The Great War was the first total and industrialized war that mobilized science for the mass production of corpses. The chains of production in the combatant countries meant that biology and the physical sciences had been harnessed for tasks of destruction and that civilians working in wartime factories had become enemy targets just as much as soldiers in the trenches. In total war, large numbers of people become acquainted with the shuddering horror of an artillery bombardment, the obscenity of chance’s fickle sovereignty, the vileness of poison gas attacks, the misery of being maimed, the agony of pain without limit, and the ubiquity of death. Erich Maria Remarque’s *Im Westen Nichts Neues* (All Quiet on the Western Front, 1929) describes all of these experiences in the most graphic manner. Contributing to the sense of revulsion was the doubt held by many about whether this was a justifiable war: there were no death camps to give evidence of the justice of one state’s destroying another, even at the cost of much life on both sides. Thus, Richard Hülsenbeck noted, “We were agreed that the war had been contrived by the various governments for the most autocratic, sordid and materialistic reasons.”²⁴

Hülsenbeck had a particularly keen ability to recognize the political implications of Dada thought and practice:

Art in its execution and direction is dependent on the time in which it lives, and artists are creatures of their epoch. The highest art will be that which in its conscious content presents the thousandfold problems of the day, the art which has been visibly shattered by the explosions of last week, which is forever trying to collect its limbs after yesterday’s crash. The best and most extraordinary artists will be those who every hour snatch the tatters of their bodies out of the frenzied cataract of life, who, with bleeding hands and hearts, hold fast to the intelligence of their time.²⁵

Such attitudes prompted Hülsenbeck to ally Berlin’s Dada faction to German Bolshevism; with this action, the Berlin Dadaists became the most politically engaged (and the most programmatic) of the various Dada groups.²⁶

For the Dadaists, war was a consequence of elevating abstract reason to a privileged place in the scientific-industrial world: it was abstract thinking that had made it possible to send young men, in the interest of increasing piles

of capital, to fronts where their bodies would be torn apart by shrapnel and land mines; it was abstract reason that allowed financial interests, purely for their own aggrandizement, to impose convulsive horrors on people. DADA responded to reason gone mad with a spirituality that would express itself in high-spiritedness.

The experience of the horrors of war precipitated a movement that celebrated spontaneity, irrationality, and humour. Hugo Ball summed up the matter:

What we are celebrating is both buffoonery and a requiem mass... Our cabaret is a gesture. Every word that is spoken and sung here says at least this one thing: that this humiliating age has not succeeded in winning our respect. What could be respectable and impressive about it? Its cannons? Our big drum drowns them. Its idealism? That has long been a laughingstock, in its popular and its academic edition... What we call dada is a farce of nothingness in which all higher questions are involved; a gladiator's gesture, a play with shabby leftovers, the death warrant of posturing morality and abundance... The dadaist fights against the agony and the death throes of this age... He knows that the world system has fallen apart, and that this age, with its insistence on cash payment, has opened a jumble sale of godless philosophies.²⁷

Richard Hülsenbeck confirmed the point in *En Avant Dada*:

We had all left our countries as a result of the war... We were agreed that the war had been contrived by the various governments for the most autocratic, sordid and materialistic reasons; we Germans were familiar with the book "*J'accuse*," and even without it we would have had little confidence in the decency of the German Kaiser and his generals. Ball was a conscientious objector, and I had escaped by the skin of my teeth from the pursuit of the police myrmidons who, for their so-called patriotic purposes, were massing men in the trenches of Northern France and giving them shells to eat. None of us had much appreciation for the kind of courage it takes to get shot for the idea of a nation which is at best a cartel of pelt merchants and profiteers in leather, at worst a cultural association of psychopaths who, like the Germans, marched off with a volume of Goethe in their knapsacks, to skewer Frenchmen and Russians on their bayonets.²⁸

Considering the Dada movement in retrospect, Tzara reflected on how the Great War had shattered all moral standards:

We proclaimed our disgust... This war was not our war... Dada was born from an urgent moral need, from an implacable desire to attain a moral absolute, from the deep feeling that man, at the centre of all creations of the spirit, must affirm his supremacy over notions emptied of all human substance, over dead objects and ill-gotten gains... Honour, Country, Morality, Family, Art, Religion, Liberty, Fraternity, I don't know what, all these notions had once answered to human needs, now nothing remained of them but a skeleton of conventions, they had been divested of their initial content.²⁹

DADA AGAINST THE BURGEONING OF NATIONALISM: WHAT DADA MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED

We always learn of the inner meaning of any phenomenon through its relation to its opposite. DADA is no different. We can gain further understanding of DADA's mission by considering the intellectual context, which at the time of the Great War was riven by conflicting responses to the war. DADA represented the extreme wing of the anti-corporatism/pro-individualism faction. Those beliefs stood in contrast to the views of thinkers who proposed that the Great War called for a resolute decision that would found a new world order. Ernst Jünger epitomized the latter position. His writings did not emerge until DADA was about to disband, but he represented a tendency that had been developing in Germany before the Great War and with which the participants in the Dada circle would certainly have been familiar. His subsequent writings were expressions of a fully developed viewpoint that, *in statu nascendi*, was DADA's principal adversary. Jünger thought that his fellow combatants were mistaken to ask what idea or cause gave meaning to the war: "They did not understand that the war was the meaning of their lives."³⁰ Erich Maria Remarque's (1896–1970) and Ernst Jünger's (1895–1998) writings typify opposing reflections on the experience of war. For Remarque, life has supreme value. Nothing, not even the wages of defeat, justifies killing, and nothing is worth dying for. For Jünger, war is an inescapable fact of the human condition, a necessity we cannot escape, but can redeem by discovering that the experience of war gives life meaning.³¹

Jünger had been educated at various boarding schools (in Hanover, Schwarzenberg, Brunswick, and finally in Hanover again) whose discipline and stuffiness produced annoyance over the confining and unsympathetic school system and contributed greatly to his desire for autonomy and escape. These desires, as well as his belief in the spiritual value of *Männerbund* (male bonding), were reinforced when, in 1911, he joined the Wunstdorf section of the Wandervogel, which generally took a dissenting attitude towards conventional society.³² In time, the young man's desire for autonomy and freedom transmuted into a yearning for a more vital, authentic existence.³³ The literature he read in his youth encouraged him to focus on Africa—he had read Stanley's accounts of his travels in Africa (as well as *Don Quixote*, *Robinson Crusoe*, and *The Arabian Nights*), and they fuelled his fancy. Jünger imagined that in Africa he would be able to live a more exciting, more dynamic life with much greater potential for self-fulfillment. Lured by the imaginary primitive, Jünger ran away from home in 1913, fitted out with a guidebook to Africa, a map of the city of Trier, a pipe, and a pistol; at Verdun, he signed up for the French Foreign Legion. He had begun training in Algeria when his father found

him and persuaded him to return to Germany. He attended the Hanover Guild Institute, where he began reading the works of Friedrich Nietzsche.

However, the young man still wanted to escape from what he felt was an oppressive social order. In August 1914, war broke out, providing him the opportunity he longed for. He volunteered for the German army and served as an officer on the Western Front throughout the conflict. Driven by the desire to affirm warrior values, he conducted himself with striking valour. He started as a volunteer foot soldier and on 16 December 1916 was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and, in December 1917, the Knight's Cross of the Order of the Hohenzollerns. Junger was also awarded the *Pour le mérite* (the "Blue Max"), the highest honour in the German army—only twelve lower-ranked officers in the German army received this award during the Great War; among the other eleven was the future Field Marshal Erwin Rommel.

Jünger experienced the war as a thrilling and darkly fascinating spectacle. After it ended, he embarked on a search for new certainties to replace those that the war had swept away. He read widely, especially history and metahistory, including Oswald Spengler's (1880–1936) *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (The Decline of the West, 1918–22) and became well versed in the strange realms of intoxicants and demonologies. Spengler's metahistory would have an enormous influence on Jünger. Spengler proposed a morphological study of history, one based on the idea that certain spatio-temporal shapes, *Gestalten*, operate as governing symbols to shape history and organize socio-political reality. Thus, they manifest the operation of Will. For Spengler, then, history was a symbolic phenomenon, one that could be understood through aesthetic principles. Indeed, aesthetic understanding was required, Spengler believed, since each historical epoch is unique and must be understood in its own terms. Jünger would embrace many of these beliefs. Like Spengler, Jünger contrasted *Gestalt* with reason: reason is listless and abstract, while *Gestalt* is lively and concrete. *Gestalt* grounds a vital *Kultur*, while reason founds a lifeless *Zivilisation* (to use Thomas Mann's distinction).

Jünger's first published work was *In Stahlgewittern* (The Storm of Steel, 1920), a memoir of the four years he had spent on the Western Front. Although the hostilities had ended, Jünger's war lust had not diminished one iota. In this novel in the form of a diary, Jünger offers an impassive, objective description of circumstances he and his fellow soldiers found themselves in during the bloody stalemate on the Western Front. André Gide deemed *In Stahlgewittern* "the finest book on war that I know: utterly honest, truthful, in good faith." The book was a success with critics and public alike in Germany and in other countries.

That same book gives us an insight into Jünger's character and the trajectory that his development as an author and individual would follow. The title

refers to his belief that modern technology is a natural phenomenon, like a storm. The work thus contains the germ of the idea that would become the core of his work—that modern technology is the most recent manifestation of the eternal Will to Power. Jünger depicts technology as a sublime and terrifying force, one that transcends considerations of morality: “The notion that a soldier becomes hardier and bolder as war proceeds is mistaken. What he gains in the science and art of attacking his enemy he loses in strength of nerve. The only dam against this loss is a sense of honour so resolute that few attain to it. For this reason I consider that troops composed of boys of twenty, under experienced leadership, are the most formidable.”³⁴ In *Storm of Steel* and other early works, we see Jünger examining but not resolving the contradiction between the vital importance of human will and the awesome power of mechanized warfare. Engaged in war, Jünger felt that he was part of “ancient history.” The book proposes that the great men of any war are not mere soldiers: they are *warriors*. They fight to test themselves and, above all, to uphold the truth. They do not fight for ideologies; rather, they are participants in a ritual that initiates them into the autochthonal mysteries of earth, blood, and fire.

But the advent of total war had changed the character of armed conflict, though it had not eliminated its ritual significance. In the fury of battle, Jünger experienced himself as a cog in the vast machine that society had become; thus, he foresaw the emergence of a new imagined community, one produced by brutalist technology. By surrendering himself to this force, he experienced life as intensity. The foot soldiers were able to withstand the most brutal of wars, the trench war, because their rage made it possible for them to measure up to this test of their manhood. They had no mercy and would never retreat. They had committed their lives to their sacred cause.

Jünger concluded that the best way for humankind to deal with technology is to embrace it, to become one with the technological *Übermensch*. His book presents an astonishing image of humankind to come, an image glimpsed on the field of battle at the Somme:

And it seemed that man, on this landscape he had himself created, became different, more mysterious and hardy and callous than in any previous battle... After this battle the German soldier wore the steel helmet, and in his features there were chiselled the lines of an energy stretched to the utmost pitch, lines that future generations will perhaps find as fascinating and imposing as those of many heads of classical or Renaissance times.³⁵

Jünger experienced war as an aesthetic phenomenon. Ansgar Hillach, a commentator on reactionary modernism, wrote on views of this sort:

The fight, stripped of any remaining moral motivation, could thus be carried on for its own sake, as the expression and correlate of inner experience. The

monstrously senseless battles and their total challenge to the subjective, boundless ability to hold one's ground could be grasped irrationally as a "volcanic process," a "well of life" . . . By mystical submission one could achieve the most painful, yet most heroic experience.³⁶

The warriors' beauty made them "princes of the trenches, with their hard set faces, brave to madness, tough and agile to leap forward or back, with keen, bloodthirsty nerves, whom no despatch ever mentions."³⁷ They revelled in blood, and the beauty of their weapons and of their war sanctified their committed decision, whatever the cause for which they were fighting. He tells us that "the overpowering desire to kill winged his feet" while "rage squeezed bitter tears from his eyes."³⁸ His resolution allowed him to salvage his heroism, however quixotic it might have been, from the general collapse of ideals.

Jünger's second book, *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis* (Battle as Inner Experience, 1922; a second, substantially revised edition was published in 1943), is an even more artistically ambitious work that offers an expressionist polyphony of voices. In it he seeks an inner truth that could justify the immense suffering that war imposes. Jünger pays tribute to the *Gestalt*, the invisible force that makes history (as well as to the force that gives rise to historical events, the Will to Power). The *Gestalt*, Jünger maintained, can only be understood dialectically, for it encompasses many different aspects. It is at once unchanging and localized. The *Gestalt* is beyond good and evil, for it and it alone makes morality possible: to identify with it is a revolutionary act. "We are now confronted with a riddle: the mystery of the spirit that pours out now and then across the world, seizing whole multitudes of men together. No one knows where it originates."³⁹ Humans are the most bloodthirsty of all beings, Jünger averred. To live is to kill. Man will never overcome war, because what drives men to war is higher than human being.⁴⁰ No human encounter is more powerful, no exchange more intense, than that of two people meeting on the field of war. War is the great teacher, and in war, the soldier encounters life on a more primal level than any book can provide. War is not barbarous. It is an urge not to be suppressed as it is an expression of an enduring, unchanging life force. On one dangerous point, however, Jünger agreed with the members of the Dada movement: the overrefined intellect had been given too much scope; the path to redemption was to become primal again.⁴¹

Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis goes even farther than *In Stahlgewittern* in celebrating the aesthetic experience of war. The book concludes,

All goals are past, only movement is eternal, and it brings forth unceasingly magnificent and merciless spectacles. To sink into their lofty goallessness as into an artwork or as into the starry sky, that is granted only to the few. But who experiences in this war only negation, only inherent suffering and not

affirmation, the higher movement, he has experienced it as a slave. He has no inner, but only external experience.⁴²

Jünger agreed with the *Dadaisten* (and those affiliated with a number of other vanguard movements): modernity had witnessed an epochal impoverishment of experience. Modernity was technological through and through, and it offered moderns a poisoned chalice. Humans could have pretty much everything their hearts desired, and since most people were not given to philosophy, what they desired was intellectually enfeebling and spiritually debilitating—wealth, pleasure, and endless entertainment. The immediate fulfillment of desires was reducing them to the conditions of children or beasts, who also cannot abide delays in gratification. Jünger was not alone among interwar thinkers in his anxiety over this enfeeblement of human being. Alexandre Kojève (1902–68) was appalled by this bestialization of humans; Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was aghast at the trivialization of life. Jünger, Kojève, and Schmitt were all persuaded that liberal economics would turn life into entertainment and destroy politics, and all three understood politics as conflict among mutually hostile groups who were willing to engage one another in battle and, ultimately, in a fight to the death. Schmitt, in his most famous paper, “Der Begriff des Politischen” (The Concept of the Political, 1928), argued as much. For Schmitt, as for Jünger (and, largely, for Kojève), only the violence of war could overturn the modern project, which emphasized self-preservation and “creature comforts.” Through war, life could once again be politicized; and humans, in raising themselves to the level of a political life, would be restored to their humanity. Of course, the *Dadaisten* did not directly embrace the idea that commitment to the violence of war would shake moderns free from a feeble life of wealth, pleasure, creature comforts, and endless entertainments, but their reasons for proclaiming the superior humanity of “primitive humans” had sufficient similarity to a strain in German thought in the years between the two world wars that they should give one pause.

Jünger’s next novel, *Sturm* (1923), was an extraordinarily allusive and polyphonic work (as *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis* had been), and self-reflexive to the point that it could be described as essentially a book about writing a book that examines the relationship between the writer’s intricate and distanced contemplation of war and the bravery of the young men of action. The formal complexity of the work is somewhat surprising, given that it first appeared in serial form in the *Hannoverscher Kurier*. Between 1918 and 1923, while apprenticing as a writer, Jünger had lived in the barracks at Hanover. But the peacetime army had little appeal for him, and in 1923, he left the *Reichswehr* and entered Leipzig University to study biology, zoology, and philosophy. At this time there was a turning in his writing (that proved

to be only temporary) from more experimental and innovative forms to styles appropriate to a more forthright advocacy. For the Nazi *Völkischer Beobachter*, edited by the racial theorist Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946), he wrote an article titled “Revolution und Idee” that preached revolutionary nationalism and the need for dictatorship, and praised the *Nationalsozialisten* for placing national integration above class warfare.⁴³ The change in Jünger’s writing, away from marked formal concerns, may have been motivated by anxiety over the instability of the Weimar Republic and the many extremist ideologies that were flourishing in the wake of the economic adversities that had been plaguing Germany since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.⁴⁴ Put more simply, he may have been yearning for a more stable world.

Within a few months, Jünger had become one of the principal advocates for the Conservative Revolution. In September 1925, a former commando leader, Helmut Franke, launched the review *Die Standarte: Wochenschrift des neues Nationalismus*, which proclaimed that its purpose was to “contribute towards a spiritual deepening of the Front mentality.” At first, *Die Standarte* was issued as a supplement to *Der Stahlhelm*, the organ of the Steel Helmet movement, an association of former combatants opposed to the Treaty of Versailles.⁴⁵ Jünger was on the editorial board of *Die Standarte*, and in his writings for that periodical he took a more radical stand than that of most Steel Helmet followers. In an article published in October 1925, he criticized the near-legendary idea of the “stab in the back” (*Dolchstoßlegend*)—that is, that the German army had been defeated not at the front but rather by a “stab in the back” at home, from Jews and leftists (the notion of a “Judeo-Bolshevist” conspiracy was also widely accepted in nationalist circles—almost every nationalist at the time accepted the *Dolchstoßlegend*). Jünger even pointed out that some leftist revolutionaries had been valiant soldiers in the Great War. These claims shocked members of the Steel Helmet movement, and it closed *Die Standarte*. Jünger helped found a successor, called simply *Standarte*, and on 3 June 1926 called on former soldiers to establish a “Nationalist Workers Republic.”

The proposal provoked outrage. In 1924, Otto Hörsing had co-founded the *Reichsbanner Schwarz–Rot–Gold*, a republican paramilitary force affiliated with the liberal Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Its principal goals were to defend against internal subversion, to teach Germans to celebrate the founding of their new Republic, and to honour their nation’s flag and constitution. Hörsing read Jünger’s article and asked the government to ban the magazine. The Steel Helmet leader Franz Selte seized this excuse to fire its leading editor, Helmut Franke, a thinker who after visiting Rome in 1925 had tried to commit the *Stahlhelm* organization to Fascism, on the grounds that Fascism represented a new and potent form of nationalism.⁴⁶

Jünger left with Franke, motivated partly by dismay at Franke's dismissal and partly by frustration with Steel Helmet's petty bickering, which stalled action: Jünger's great principle was decisionism. With Wilhelm Weiss and Captain Hermann Ehrhardt, an ex-*Freikorps* member and nationalist fundraiser, Jünger launched yet another review, *Arminnius*. In 1927, Jünger moved from Leipzig to Berlin, where he established relations with the *bündisch* movement and even became a mentor to one Bund.

Jünger's interest in the Bunds indicates his desire to help institutionalize the era's romantic revival. In keeping with that, in the same year, Jünger helped launch yet another publication, *Der Vormarsch* (Advance), which was the brainchild of a young nationalist revolutionary, Werner Lass. The journal was dedicated to attempting to unite all conservative revolutionary factions. Jünger's contributions advocated a Fascist-style polity, headed by an elite cadre of workers. In the 1920s, Jünger published articles in several right-wing nationalist journals, and more novels. In his next novel, *Feuer und Blut* (Fire and Blood, 1925), he glorified war for its ability to provoke an essentially mystical experience that inwardly transforms the warrior. He again celebrated war in aesthetic terms, arguing that the extreme nature of modern military operations probed the limits of the human senses. He criticized the Weimar Republic's political instability, and he claimed to hate ochlocracy. In 1930, Jünger brought out *Die totale Mobilmachung* (Total Mobilization), an extended essay in which he worked out the central notions of the subsequent *Der Arbeiter*. The book offered one of the first theorizations of the phenomenon of "total war." Total war, Jünger wrote, is industrialized war, which uses science for destruction. It recognizes that the entire economy, the complete means of production any state can mobilize, is a unified system; accordingly, civilians working in wartime factories are as much enemy targets as soldiers in the trenches. The Great War had seen a collectivist (as opposed to individualistic) era emerge—a *Wirzeit* as opposed to an *Ichzeit* (a "we-time" as opposed to an "I-time"). The rural world had receded into the past as highways were built, political parties had proliferated, the screen had come to prevail over the stage, and the photograph had triumphed over the portrait—processes only in their beginning stages. National planning was assuming increased importance; leisure was becoming a commodity. The essence of mechanization is interchangeability, so production would become standardized and statistics would govern all. Automation, already common, would increase and gradually bring about restrictions on individual liberty. The individual frame of reference would be transcended as the *Gestalt* organized all efforts towards economic objectives. Industry and state would collaborate. Clearly, Jünger suggested, the individuated human was being supplanted by the uniform and typical person. In this regard, Jünger

noted that typologies abounded—for example, of the “metallic” male face and the “cosmetic” female face. Jünger in fact celebrated this new *Geist*, in which that product of Enlightenment philosophy, the rootless, atomistic *Individuum*, was being replaced with the *Einzelne*, the rooted individual bound to an organic community. The advent of the *Einzelne* marked a deeper change characterized by the voluntary adherence of the common person to a new *Gestalt*, that of the *Arbeiter*. Henceforth, Jünger maintained, a person’s station would be determined not by birth or rank but by his identification with the *Gestalt* of the *Arbeiter*. The Dada artists would have been aghast at much of this, but Jünger (like the Italian Futurists) saw these developments as exhilarating.

The Great War had been the first total war, so in *Die totale Mobilmachung*, Jünger was still working out the implications of his experiences of the fury of battle, during which he felt himself a cog in a vast social machine: “We have already left behind us the age of aimed bullets. The squadron leader . . . no longer knows the difference between combatants and non-combatants, and the deadly cloud of gas draws in as an element over every living thing. The possibility of such threats, however, presupposes neither a partial nor a general, but a *total* mobilization, which extends itself even to the child in the cradle.”²⁴⁷ When any social group places all its resources and energies at the disposal of the state, a regime acquires the historically unprecedented capacity to invest all national life in warfare—that is the dynamic of total mobilization. In *Die totale Mobilmachung*, the complete machine becomes the technological sublime, virtually a mystical being. *Die totale Mobilmachung* took stock of Germany’s defeat in 1918 and, especially, looked for its causes. Its assessment was that Germany had failed in the task of total mobilization: the German bourgeoisie cherished comfort, security, and rationality.

Germany’s intellectual right took it as a given that the Weimar Republic would collapse in short order and be superseded by an authoritarian government of one kind or another. The real question that consumed that circle was how the state, and society, should be reshaped. Jünger dismissed Marxism, which he saw as merely capitalism in an inverted form: the Marxist solution maintained capitalism’s belief in the primacy of economics, though it proposed that the proletariat take over the capitalist means of production and redesign the capitalist system. Like other radical conservatives, Jünger deemed this solution inadequate. It did not reach the root causes of the capitalist affliction. Again like other radical conservatives, he maintained that politics, not economics, is primary, and that adopting an anti-materialist ethos and ethics would redress some of capitalism’s deleterious effects. A corporatist state would go a long distance towards meeting these needs. In such a state, the realms of state and society would be fused into a larger, homogeneous,

“spiritual” entity, and the dictates of national self-interest would regulate productive activities.

The great source of corporatist philosophy, especially in Germany, is G.W.F. Hegel, and Jünger’s next book, in *Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt* (The Worker: Mastery and Form, 1932), among his more explicitly corporatist texts, offers a neo-Hegelian philosophy of *Gestalt*. He sublimes the contradiction between the vital importance of human will and the awesome power of mechanized warfare in a “will to utilize technology” by elaborating his notion of *Gestalt*. Jünger’s *Gestalt* resembles Heidegger’s *Gestell* (enframing), inasmuch as it stamps everyone, predisposing them to certain forms of experience. The *Gestalt* of the worker is a stamping (*Prägung*) of the worker, which results in an imprinting (*Stempeln*) that shapes the worker’s experience and comportment. It is, more exactly, an imprint that marks a period in time and that gives the period its characteristic being (another claim that resembles those which Heidegger made about *Gestell*). The *Gestalt* allows history to take place. It determines how the historical process unfolds. It manifests itself as impressions of reality, meaningful representations, and meaningful symbols—indeed, Jünger used the term *Gestalt* because he conceived of its meaning to be “a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.” It is the deepest reality, a “metaphysical power” that gives sense to phenomena.⁴⁸ It operates beyond the reach of conscious experience, and, like a magnet that arranges iron filings, gives shape to experience-as-meaning. Humans are drawn into the *Gestalt*’s operation, for it is through human being that the *Gestalt* accedes to being. The *Gestalt* is the “pre-formed power” (*vorgeformte Macht*), which becomes actual by being willed into being by one who succumbs to its attraction in its inchoate state. “The ways and means of how the worker’s form [*Gestalt*] begins to penetrate the world are the total character of work,” which is a “new and particular will to power.”⁴⁹ Through human being, *Gestalt* acquires the status of a true existent.

In *Der Arbeiter*, Jünger worked out the crucial, troubling insight that in our age, the form that the Will to Power has assumed is technology. It is technology that gives rise to the *Gestalten* that shape history. Jünger came to believe that the vitalizing effect of war’s savagery allowed him to understand the *Gestalt* that shaped history in his time: caught up in the machine of war, he gained insight into the transformation of the earth into a totally administered technological being. “Domination is today possible as the representation of the worker’s form [*Gestalt*], which lays claim to planetary validity.”⁵⁰ One could compare this view with Heidegger’s idea of the *Bestand* (generally, and quite accurately, translated “standing reserve,” though “resource” seems to me preferable)—indeed, Jünger proposed that *Gestalt* mobilizes all entities so that they come forth as raw material in the process of total mobilization,

and he stated that “the *Gestalt* of the worker mobilizes the whole standing-reserve [*Bestand*] without distinction.”⁵¹ He even offered the Heideggerian claim that “the farm worked with machines and fertilized with artificial nitrogen from factories no longer is the same farm.”⁵² *Der Arbeiter* proposed that the worker arises as a result of the death of the individual. *Der Arbeiter* celebrates a new humanity, which would be compelled to produce more and more powerful technologies.

Our technological world is not an area of unlimited possibilities; rather it possesses an embryonic character which drives toward a predetermined maturity. So it is that our world resembles a monstrous foundry... [I]ts means have a provisional, workshop character, destined for temporary use.

In this condition it corresponds that our environment has a transitional nature. There is no stability of forms; all forms are constantly moulded by dynamic unrest. There is no stability of means; nothing is stable outside of the rise of production curves.⁵³

With this, the reactionary thinker entered the space of postmodernism.

In *Der Arbeiter*, Jünger proposed that technology is the “symbol of the worker’s form” and “the ways and means in which the worker’s form [*Gestalt*] mobilizes the world.”⁵⁴ “As mobilization of the world through the *Gestalt* of the *Arbeiter*,” technology is “the destroyer of every faith in general, and thus also the most decisive anti-Christian power that has appeared up to now.”⁵⁵ In this way, *Der Arbeiter* offers views similar to those of Marinetti and the Italian Futurists. *Der Arbeiter*’s “heroischer Realismus” (heroic realism) looked forward (as Marshall McLuhan would later) to a universal society of worker-soldier technocrats in which technology had rendered ideological conflict and nationalism anachronistic.

And he celebrated frenzied activity.

One begins to acquire a disposition for higher temperatures, the icy geometry of light, and the white glare of superheated metals. The environment becomes more constructive and more dangerous, colder and more luminous; there disappear from it the last remains of *Gemütlichkeit*... One avoids secondary goals such as taste; one elevates the formulation of technical questions to the decisive position; and one does well thereby, since more than the technological is concealed behind these questions.⁵⁶

In the essay “Über den Schmerz” (On Pain), written and published in 1934, Jünger rejected the liberal values of liberty, security, ease, and comfort, and sought instead the measure of man in the capacity to withstand pain and sacrifice. That gives valuable insights into the cult of courage and death in *nationalsozialistischen* Germany. In this work, Jünger presented photography as the optimal art for new social order, because photography is a technical

method and, therefore, fitted to the era of technology. Moreover, its temporality is in keeping with the ecstatic temporality of the technological era. The photograph “holds fast the bird in flight just as much [as it does] the man in the moment-of-truth [*Augenblick*] in which he gets torn apart by an explosion. That is . . . the mode of seeing is peculiar to us; and photography is nothing other than a tool for this our peculiarity.”⁵⁷ Photography also makes it possible to objectify pain, which is associated with all forms of discipline, including the discipline of the new, hard man; discipline is nothing more than the form under which humans maintain contact with pain.

In the postwar years, Jünger became an ever more isolated figure. He travelled around the world in search of uninhabited patches where pristine nature survived, or where isolated tribal communities lived, unaffected by technological modernity. On occasion, he would publish brief pieces from his travel diaries. In the 1950s, he met Albert Hoffman, the Swiss scientist who had discovered the psychotropic effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and who happened to admire Jünger’s writing. Jünger took the drug and wrote about his experiences in *Annäherungen: Drogen und Rausch* (Approaches: Drugs and Intoxicants, 1970).⁵⁸ He writes in *Annäherungen* that his various quests for forms of experience that modernity had rendered vestigial had brought him to experiment in the early to the mid-1920s with alcohol, ether, chloroform, hashish, and opium. The concepts of exhilaration and ecstasy are integral to his oeuvre. Jünger had even tried to write while under the influence of these drugs, though his early experiments in this yielded no significant results. Mescaline, which he also took in the 1950s, was his drug of choice. Jünger identified the Enlightenment as the source of modernity’s afflictions: he claimed that it had broken human’s relation with the transcendental by destroying religion, faith in the fatherland, and higher moral notions. Drugs provided an alternative. “I only take drugs under medical supervision,” he said, “as a literary experiment . . . it all comes from my curiosity for transcendental spaces.”⁵⁹ In the “Ortner’s Erzählung” (Ortner’s Tale) section of *Heliopolis. Rückblick auf eine Stadt* (Heliopolis [retrospective on a city] 1949), an ophthalmologist named Dr. Fancy, who is about to perform an operation on the painter Ortner’s eyes to endow him with clairvoyance, says that “the world is formed on the example of a dual chamber, a chambre double. As all living organisms are created from two leaves, it is created from two layers, which stand in the relation of inner and outer, one of which has a higher, the other, a lower reality. But the reality of the lower part is determined by the path to the finest part of the higher.”⁶⁰ A key character in that novel is the drug researcher Antonio Peri, who finds inner freedom (he is a member of Heliopolis’s oppressed minority, the Tarsen) through entheogens (Jünger’s term for psychoactive agents). Peri could stand for Jünger’s interest in drugs

as a device for exploring his mental topography. The psychonaut Jünger (the word “psychonaut” was a Jüngerian neologism) similarly hoped that drugs, taken under the right conditions, might reconnect us with mythological and metaphysical truths; in its fantasy of the primitive, this “research” connects to the primitivism of Frobenius, to the interest in, and fear of, the primitive in Warburg’s work, and to the utopian primitivism of DADA.

A PRECURSOR OF DADA: THE COMIC GROTESQUE

Art historians generally write of DADA as a movement that the Great War brought into being. There is much truth to that assertion, but it is not the whole truth. There was a very important precursor to the Dada movement that is rarely discussed. Until almost the middle of the nineteenth century, German thinkers and artists had generally treated comic forms as aesthetically suspect and as having an uneasy relationship to the arts. That this view was changing became apparent when Friedrich Theodor Vischer and Karl Rosenkranz proposed arguments that the comic mode was potentially of equal aesthetic value to the tragic and the sublime. Vischer’s *Über das Erhabene und Komischer und andere Texte zur Ästhetik* (Concerning the Sublime and the Comic and Other Texts on Aesthetic, 1837) argues that humour possesses a poetic quality. He describes the grotesque in terms similar to those in which Kristeva describes the abject: “Animal and human forms mix, as do organic and inorganic, technical objects seem to become limbs of the human body.”⁶¹ Rosenkranz’s ideas were closer to Heinrich Wöfflin’s: in his *Ästhetik des Hässlichen* (The Aesthetic of Ugliness, 1853), the grotesque is a subspecies of the lowly mode (*die Niedrigen*), anchored in “that which changes [*Wechselnde*] and that which remains unstable [*Haltlose*], the accidental [*Zufällige*] and arbitrary [*Willkürliche*].”⁶²

A major late-nineteenth-century artist whose work was often discussed as exemplifying the grotesque was the Swiss Symbolist Arnold Böcklin (1827–1901); Böcklin’s works would have significant influence on Dada artists (and later, largely through de Chirico, on the Surrealists). Beginning around 1870, Böcklin’s paintings epitomize a visual culture that is full of images of monsters. Much of his art seems at first sight to be of a mythological cast, yet it is also ironic: he treated respected classic mythological themes with iconoclastic humour, transforming sirens into feathered harpies with chicken legs and clawed feet, and picturing a centaur being shod by a village blacksmith. It is true that his is an art of dislocation—dislocation that is the outcome of the cohabitation of different natures—and that the disturbing value of Böcklin’s art is the result of our “dissatisfaction with civilization.” A similar cohabitation is to be found in the shaman, the human who reaches

the divine through animals. The impossible but real relation between human and animal (in their origin as in their form) is Böcklin's central topic. This theme is traumatic because that relation is both terrifying and nauseating. Yet it is at the centre of the primitive world, and civilization is, in part, a means for separating ourselves from it, for relegating our animal being to that of a repudiated part. The novelist and art theorist Carl Einstein (1885–1940) wrote that the grotesque is the result of an “optical fantasy” in which a visual ideality overwhelms the subject: it is, he wrote, “the result of a struggle between the way the artist sees something and the characteristics of the motif.”⁶³ Einstein went on to characterize the grotesque as the mode of art in which discordant relations obtain. (When he wrote this, Einstein was not writing specifically about Arnold Böcklin's art, but he might as well have been.) In a similar vein, the critic Franz Servaes argued that Böcklin's greatness was the result of his bringing together “realism and idealism, naturalism and the fantastic . . . tragedy and humor.”⁶⁴

This understanding of the grotesque (the *Groteske*) as a style that brings together incongruous elements so as to draw the resulting form into the realm of the spiritual (this purpose is what differentiates the grotesque from caricature) was widespread in Germany in these years. The 1895 edition of the *Meyers-Konversations Lexikon* offered this gloss on the term: “Grotesque (Ital. grottésco). Description of a type of minor comic style in literature, music and the visual arts. The grotesque is above all the foolishly strange, the product of a humor that unreservedly combines the most disparate elements. Indifferent to particulars, it plays with its own extraordinariness by seizing anything from everywhere that can underscore its high-spiritedness and life-embracing pluckiness.”⁶⁵

Böcklin created imaginary hybrid forms whose motifs comprised vegetal and animal, human and mechanical elements—and these hybrid forms would be compounded by ambiguities and categorical uncertainties, liminal forms that exist at the boundaries between the real and the imaginary realms, between the domains of the sacred and the base, the profound and the superficial. The unfathomability of these liminal forms, which imparted to them some of the effects of the sublime, was multiplied by the use of chance, whose result was to make the forms seem all the more shocking, because unexpected. Böcklin's work was influential, extending to artists whom the Dadaists admired and, in some instances, with whom they were close. His German admirers included Emil Nolde (1867–1956), whose transformations of alpine peaks into monstrous ogres share a real affinity with Böcklin's work; Alfred Kubin (actually a Czech painter, 1877–1959), whose ink drawings of ludicrous imaginary creatures seem like Surrealist pieces *avant la lettre*; and

Paul Klee (1879–1940), whose caustic early etchings of the faces of evil wearing the mask of comedy resemble Dada art in so many ways.

Another *Groteske* artist who influenced members of the Dada movement was Salomo Friedländer (1871–1946), a professional philosopher and bohemian literary figure who adopted the pseudonym “Mynona” (which reverses the letters of the word “anonym”). His philosophical writing addressed a theme that has occupied philosophers since the time of Descartes, and his solution to the problem was really a variant of Fichte’s.⁶⁶ Kant’s critical philosophy propounded the doctrine that the Transcendental Ego organizes the data presented by the senses according to subjective, *a priori* forms, thereby producing experience. The Transcendental Ego does not bring the objects of experience into being; rather, it sets the conditions for objects to be experienced. Fichte, however, maintained the ego *is* a creative agency and the source of what we know of as reality. The ego—or what Fichte called the “Pure Ego”—presupposes nothing. It alone is the cause of nature in its totality. It alone truly exists. In this way, Fichte undoes Kant’s dualisms of subject and object.

Friedländer, too, saw the world as the result of the Ego’s activity. The Ego, as a creative agency, can secure its being only through creativity, that is, through generating the contradictions (polarities) that produce what people usually call reality. However, the objects the Ego creates have a tendency to present themselves as if they were independent of the subject; the struggle this illusory independence instaurates leads to conflict of all sorts—including, often, chaos and war. Even in this depiction of the conflict the Ego can produce, Friedländer followed Fichte, who maintained that the basic element of the Pure Ego’s activity is an endless struggle between what any individual ego is and what it should be. The fulfillment of each action begets a further obligation in its turn, and the fulfillment of this obligation evokes another, and so on. It was on this matter of creative struggle that Friedländer separated himself from Fichte: he wanted to establish the world-creating and peace-making power of a *schöpferische Indifferenz* (creative indifference). The power of *schöpferische Indifferenz* was afforded the greatest scope by creating polarities, which it could then bring into harmony (as yin and yang, brought into harmony, bring peace and stillness).⁶⁷ Friedländer therefore advocated extreme polarization—all antitheses should be taken to their extreme, he proposed.

The first book in which Friedländer presented these ideas took the form of a study of Nietzsche, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine intellektuale Biographie* (1911), which, among other themes, celebrated the Dionysiac individual. Friedländer’s widely read philosophical work, *Schöpferische Indifferenz*, had been finished earlier, but it appeared only in 1918. Both works (and his essays on the philosophy of polarity, published from 1910 onward) appealed to denizens

of the art world. This period witnessed the collapse of faith in traditional value systems and the repudiation of inherited models for understanding the world—both were thought to have become outmoded as a result of scientific, political, and economic developments in the second half of the nineteenth century (largely in response to urbanization and industrialization). Reality seemed to have broken into a million irreconcilable facts, and the Ego and the World to have broken off their relationship. Friedländer’s philosophy seemed in this context to be one of reconciliation (as Hegel’s was for his time). Also, Friedländer’s thought appeared to many to be a thoroughly rich response to Nietzsche and to embrace Nietzsche’s lofty estimation of creativity. Friedländer’s appeal was enhanced by his distinguished appearance, his resolute conviction about the value of “creative indifference,” and his sharp wit. In 1911 he began publishing hundreds of *Schnurren*—amusingly grotesque tales with titles like *Die Jungfrau als Zahnpulver* (The Virgin as Toothpaste), *Der gebildete Wüstling* (The Learned Lecher), and *Sautomat* (The Swine Machine)—that gave evidence of an astonishing verbal agility. The masterly puns they contained (*Tschitscherotik*, i.e., “Ciceroticism,” and *Schamhaarsträubend*, i.e., “pubic-hair-raising”), and their extraordinary potpourri of styles and forms (including fables, astral fantasies, and pulp fiction), reinforced his appeal. By 1915, Alfred Kubin had engaged him in correspondence and made great efforts to bring *Schöpferische Indifferenz* to the attention of publishers. Berlin’s Dada circle had elected Friedländer an honorary member, and Raoul Hausmann had taken up Friedländer’s philosophy of polarity; later, he would try to combine these ideas with notions drawn from Otto Gross’s “The Psychology of the Unconscious Is the Philosophy of the Revolution!” to advocate for a psychoanalytic anarchism.⁶⁸ The title of an essay Hausmann published nearly fifty years later, in 1963, “Morphopsychologische Indifferenz,” reveals the continuing influence that Friedländer’s ideas exerted on his friend. The introduction to Richard Hülsenbeck’s renowned *Dada Almanach* (1920) alludes also to Friedländer’s philosophy of polarities: “Dada is the neutral point between content and form, male and female, matter and spirit, since it is the apex of that magical triangle that rises from the linear polarity of human affairs and concepts.”⁶⁹

THE DIFFUSION OF DADA

When the war ended, the members of the Zürich Dada group scattered, taking their Dada experiences with them—to Cologne, Berlin, and Paris. DADA acquired different characteristics in each different location. The participants in the movement were encouraged to tolerate (indeed, even to relish) those differences because the Dada leaders laid down no firm artistic credo (other

than the commitment to bringing forth a more salutary art, one that might help create a healthier era in European history). “Dada is not an artistic movement,” Dada leaders proclaimed. “In Switzerland Dada is for abstract (non-objective) art, in Berlin—against.”

Berlin DADA was largely communist; Cologne DADA, largely anarchist (in a proto-Situationist vein). The leader of the Cologne group was the painter and collagist Max Ernst (1891–1976); the group consisted, mainly, of Ernst, the social activist, painter, and poet Johannes Baargeld (pseudo. Alfred Grünwald 1892–1927), and the sculptor, painter, and poet Hans (Jean) Arp (1886–1966). Arp moved from Zürich to Cologne in 1919, and almost as soon as he relocated, he and Ernst founded the Cologne Dada group, who collaborated in collages, magazines, and exhibitions. In 1920, the Cologne Dadaists mounted a Dada Fair. Entrance to the exhibition was through the men’s toilet of a beer hall (*Brauhaus*). Near the entranceway was a statue, created by Ernst himself, with an axe attached to it, as an invitation to destroy the statue. Among the attractions was a young woman of virginal appearance, dressed in a wedding gown, reading obscene poems. The exhibition contained as well many disturbing objects, mysterious collages, and provocative photomontages. Baargeld contributed the immensely enigmatic object *Fluidoskeptrick der Rotzwitha van Gandersheim*, which consisted of a tank of red-coloured water; a fine head of hair floated on the water, a wooden replica of a human hand protruded from the water, and an alarm clock lay at the bottom of the tank.⁷⁰ Like many Dada exhibitions, Ernst’s Dada Fair was closed by the city authorities; however, Cologne’s administration proved more open-minded than many, and allowed it to reopen almost immediately, having discovered that the only piece in the exhibition they might have deemed obscene was by the German nation’s hero Albrecht Dürer. In 1920, at Breton’s invitation, Max Ernst exhibited in Paris for the first time (presenting his collages); in 1922, he moved to Paris, where he took an active part in founding Surrealism and became one of the leading Surrealist painters.

In 1917, Richard Hülsenbeck moved from Zürich to Berlin and there met Franz Jung (1886–1963), activist and *Der Sturm* and *Die Aktion* contributor Wieland Herzfelde (1896–1988), and Herzfelde’s brother, John Heartfield (1891–1968). Other members of Club Dada (as the Berliners called their group) were Johannes Baader (1875–1955), the anti-militarist Expressionist George Grosz (1893–1959), Hannah Höch (1889–1955), who had trained as a craftsperson and worked in dress and textile design, the satirist Expressionist poet Walter Mehring (1896–1981), and Raoul Hausmann (1886–1971). DADA in Berlin was much influenced by political conditions and commercial mass-media practices as well as by modern practices of propaganda that had emerged during the Great War; it was also more socially committed than the other Dada groups. The

Berliner Dadaisten noticed that the proliferation of juxtaposed brand names and agglutinated slogans in public spaces amounted to a sort of vernacular poetry, so they turned that sloganeering against itself, in a sort of proto-détournement, to encourage resistance to a vile economic-political order. They understood that visual and verbal signs were the *real* socio-political entities with which they needed to negotiate. The Berlin group issued magazines as provocations: their journals, titled *Club Dada*, *Der Dada*, and *Dada Almanach*, contained photomontages, manifestos, and Grosz's anti-bourgeois caricatures. Montage became the main technique used by the Berlin Dadaists. The photomontages of John Heartfield—also called *Dada-Monteur*—exemplified this tendency. The Berlin Dadaists' montage techniques would be copied years later by the Lettrists and later still by the punk-Situationists, who in turn would influence the commercial "punk" graphics of fanzines and record covers. DADA in Hanover was represented solely by Kurt Schwitters and his MERZ practices (which we have already discussed). Here it is important to point out as a distinguishing feature of MERZ its incorporation of abstract elements that give evidence of having been influenced by Constructivist work done both in Russia and Holland.

In January 1920, Tzara moved to Paris and met André Breton, who with Picabia was publishing the magazine *Littérature*; while in Paris, he also had extensive contact with other writers who had published in *Dada* 4–5, including Louis Aragon (1897–1982). That same year, Arp moved to Paris from Cologne; he was followed in 1921 by Ernst. Around then, Man Ray arrived from New York, and Paris became the last important centre of DADA. Other members of Paris DADA were Marcel Duchamp, the Orphist painter Jean Crotti (1878–1958), Suzanne Duchamp (1889–1963), Jacques Rigaut (1898–1929), Paul Éluard (1895–1952), Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes, Benjamin Péret (1899–1959), and Théodore Fraenkel (1896–1964), who had served as a medical orderly in World War I, and became a fierce critic of one-dimensional culture that valorized science. Breton's literary bias ensured that Paris DADA would have a literary character, and that tendency was reinforced by Tzara's work with the journal *Dada*, by Picabia's *391* and *Cannibale*, by Éluard's *Provverbes*, and by the literary bent of the performance activities at the *Soirées du Coeur à Barbe*. The magazines themselves gave evidence of diverse interests: Picabia and Tzara were prone to dissolving texts—or, rather, typographic constructions—into their linguistic and visual elements, as the Constructivists had done. Breton and Soupault, on the other hand, strove to bring forth art based on the subconscious. Bitter disputes about the right way to treat texts and Breton's efforts to build a new movement put an end to the co-operative spirit among Paris's Dada contingent. As a movement, DADA was at an end.

THE CONDITIONS THAT PRODUCED THE STATE OF MIND KNOWN AS DADA

DADA was not simply a response to the Great War, nor was it really a movement. Tzara was even more thoroughgoing than Picabia on the matter of DADA's non-programmatic character. He averred that no program, even that of having no program, could contain Dadaist energies. In 1918 he wrote, "We've had enough of the cubist and futurist academies: laboratories of formal ideas. Do we make art in order to earn money and keep the dear bourgeoisie happy? Rhymes have the smack of money, and inflexion slides along the line of the stomach in profile. Every group of artists has ended up at this bank, straddling various comets. Leaving the door open to the possibility of wallowing in comfort and food."⁷¹ Though the war was a precipitating factor, DADA reflected a pervasive state of mind that predated that conflict. It incorporated a sense of the failure of reason, as well as disgust at all authority and all existing political, religious, and artistic systems that had been developing throughout Europe for several decades before the outbreak of hostilities.

The diversity that marked Dada activities in various European cities reflects the fact that DADA was more a widespread state of mind than an artistic *cénacle*. There were proto-Dada artists in New York by 1915, centred on Alfred Stieglitz's circle, which rallied around his 291 gallery and his magazine *Camera Work* (which he later renamed *291*), and a proto-Dada spirit was evident in Picabia's machine drawings and Duchamp's ready-mades. Duchamp and Man Ray were among the leaders of this circle, and together they edited *The Blind Man* and *Rongwrong* (both 1917). They had also made a film of Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven (1874–1927) shaving her pubis.⁷² Travelling between the United States and Europe, Picabia helped link the Dada groups in New York City, Zürich, and Paris; his Dada periodical, *391*, was published in Barcelona, New York City, Zürich, and Paris from 1917 through to 1924. Another centre for proto-Dada activity in the United States (one that attracted many of the same artistic personnel as Stieglitz's 291 gallery) was Walter Arensberg's studio.

The number of groups that expounded similar convictions notwithstanding, it should not be thought that "group dynamism" accounted for these shared ideals. Duchamp had produced some of his most famous "Dada" ready-mades before becoming acquainted with the group. By 1917, Duchamp had made *Broyeuse de chocolat no. 2* (Chocolate Grinder No. 2, 1914), *Roue de bicyclette* (Bicycle Wheel, 1913), *Egouttoir* (or *Porte-bouteilles*) (Bottle Rack, 1914), *Fountain* (1917), *In Advance of a Broken Arm* (1915), and *A bruit secret* (With Hidden Noise, 1916) and was already at work on studies for *La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même* (The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors,

Even, a.k.a The Large Glass), a work that included *Le passage de la vierge à la mariée* (Transition of the Virgin into the Bride, 1912) and *Neuf moules mâlic* (9 Malic Moulds, 1914).⁷³ Indeed, in the famous and much reprinted text for his October 1961 lecture at the Museum of Modern Art, Duchamp asserted that he first had the happy thought of fastening a bicycle wheel to a stool in 1913 (before he had even thought of the term “readymade”).⁷⁴ His *Broyeuse de chocolat* was reproduced on the cover of *The Blind Man*’s first issue, published before the founding of the Dada movement.

Indeed, Dadaists tapped into a current of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century intellectual and artistic life—one that has persisted into the present. The Dada movement had important precursors. The monumental Armory Show of 1913 included its share of impudent productions. As we have noted, both Duchamp and Picabia engaged in insolent manifestations before the Dada movement was founded. Man Ray’s photographs from before and during the Great War exhibit the playful if corrosive sarcasm that was one of the movement’s hallmarks. The poet, boxer, and mind-spinning show-off Arthur Craven (1887–?—the date of his death is unknown; he was last seen on Mexico’s Pacific coast in 1918)—a famous celebrator of the body and all its products, and a disrespecter of all boundaries and divisions—made himself notable as a *conférencier* who would arrive at the Société des Savantes wearing tights and waving a pistol in the air as he extolled homosexuals, thieves, athletes, poets, and madmen, or read his poems aloud while standing on one foot and hurling projectiles towards his listeners.

Even before the Great War, a circle that included Baargeld and Arp had gathered in Cologne around Ernst, who was already using both collage and *frottage* towards ends that we now identify with the Dada movement. At the same time in Berlin, Schwitters was issuing nonsense poems under the banner of his MERZ movement, a name he took in sarcastic contempt for commercial culture.⁷⁵ Dada-like intentions and Dada-like practices have persisted to this day. Here is a partial list of Dada precursors and successors to indicate the vitality this current has generated and its powers of perseverance: Georges Bataille (1897–1962), Charles Baudelaire (1827–67), Ambrose Bierce (1842–1918), Guy Debord (1931–94), Jean Dubuffet (1901–85), Isidore Ducasse (who called himself the comte de Lautréamont, 1846–70), Jean Genet (1910–86), Eugène Ionesco (1909–94), Alfred Jarry (1873–1907), Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–98), Gérard de Nerval (pseudo. Gérard Labrunie, 1808–55), the poet Jacques Prévert (1900–77, the screenwriter for *Les enfants du paradis*, 1945), Arthur Rimbaud (1854–91), Jacques Rigaut (1891–1929), Raymond Roussel (1877–1933), perhaps the very mysterious B. Traven (a one-time *Spartakist*, 1882–64), Jacques Vaché (1895–1919), the polymath Boris Vian (1920–59), and Jacques Villon (1875–1963).

ELEMENTALISM'S MENACING LURE

Hugo Ball declared, "In an age like ours, when people are assaulted daily by the most monstrous things without being able to keep account of their impressions, in such an age aesthetic production becomes a prescribed course. But all living art will be irrational, primitive, complex: it will speak a secret language and leave behind documents not of edification but of paradox."⁷⁶ That is, these aesthetic productions will offer no resolved propositional meanings; on the contrary, they will be documents whose meaning is sabotaged by paradox. Paradox will render them meaningless and subversive.

Tristan Tzara offered a similar idea when, in a letter of 1922, he wrote that he was attempting to void his poetry of meaning: "Already in 1914 I had tried to take away from words their meaning, and to use them in order to give a new global sense to the verse by the tonality and the auditory contrast. These experiments ended with an abstract poem, 'Toto-Vaca,' composed of pure sounds invented by me and containing no allusion to reality."⁷⁷

Ball and Tzara contended that artworks would offer a more primordial experience than that associated with propositional meaning, an experience that would "be irrational, primitive, complex" and that would "speak a secret language." This idea proved to have great historical importance: it led, immediately, to experiments in typographical and concrete poetry and, at a further remove, to Maurice Lemaître (1926–) and Jean-Isidore Isou's (1925–2007) *Lettrisme*. The idea that art would "speak a secret language," an "irrational, primitive, complex" language, is a key to DADA's artistic significance—the last entry Ball made into his diary before moving to Zürich reads, "if language really makes us kings of our nation, then without doubt it is we, the poets and thinkers, who are to blame for this bloodbath and who have to atone for it." A language of atonement and a language of redemption would have to be forged. If the members of the Dada circle separated themselves from the ambitions of the mainstream of modernist art, this was because they wanted to strip art of all that would quiet the soul, calm it, give it a place to rest. Modernists wanted to produce work the form of which was so nearly perfect that it would lift it out of the realm of flux and give it a rightful place in the realm of the changeless, where it might be permanently available to refresh and enrich experience, no matter how many times we had previously engaged in transactions with it. For the Dadaists, on the contrary, experience needed to be made vital again (as Breton would later say, "Beauty will be made convulsive, or it will not be"). This drive explains their stress on novelty and brute sensation: they wanted to preclude any possibility that spectators/listeners/readers might rely on conventional responses. Rather, they hoped to create a response that would be close to dementia or hysteria.

The Dadaists' mission had troubling implications. They strove to return humans to more elemental social relations—and, for that matter, to a more elemental relation to Being (as their critique of language revealed). This was a reaction to a destructive, materialist culture that overestimated reason. Still, as contrarian as their position was, any reasonable historian has to acknowledge that their critique allied itself with the reactionary ideas that were becoming widespread in Germany—indeed, throughout Europe and North America. Hugo Ball's *Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz*, an interesting post-Dada document that art historians have largely ignored, makes that clear. Ball conceived the book in the fall of 1917 (and published it in January 1919). Its composition coincided, then, with Ball's second and decisive withdrawal from the Dada movement—he had withdrawn the first time late in the summer of 1916, shortly after the first Dada soirée, and left Zürich, partly because of personal quarrels within the movement, but also because of its growing renown (which, he felt, threatened to turn DADA into just another art movement and Dada artists into “the worst bourgeoisie,” as he wrote Tzara). But he returned to Zürich in November and rejoined the movement. Then in March 1917 came the Galerie Dada opening, which marked the beginning of the movement's second phase (during which Ball became ever more interested in the spirit of freedom)—during this period, Ball took the Russian anarchists Bakunin and Kropotkin as representing freedom's spirit and began to praise Russian Christianity as the final bulwark of Romanticism in Europe.⁷⁸ In May 1917, Ball broke with DADA a second time and moved to Berne, the centre of German expatriates' anti-war activities.

In *Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz*, Ball attacked German intellectual authoritarianism and blamed the German disaster in the Great War on such German philosophers as Luther, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche. Also in that work, he accused the German intelligentsia of co-operating with one another to create a morally bankrupt modern ideology. He praised the democratic traditions of England and France and criticized the authoritarianism (both intellectual and material) of German culture. A principal theme of his book was the cultural and political distinctiveness of German intellectual culture and its isolation from Western Europe and America (which helped account for its anti-democratic ethos).⁷⁹ Ball accused German intellectuals of being closed to democratic and liberal trends and of being steeped in traditions of dynastic absolutism and militarism. He argued that over the centuries, German intellectuals had abetted the growth of an increasingly militaristic culture. The book offered a critique of nationalism generally and of German nationalism in particular that, again, was consistent with the Dada program. Developing this idea, he contrasted the liberal humanism of the Western democracies with the dreamy liberalism of the German Romantic

philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Alexander von Humboldt, who, by repudiating the Catholic core of Romanticism, had surrendered its universalism. According to Ball, the inadequacies of the later tradition had contributed to the debacle that had begun in August 1914.

Yet the same work is shot through with a messianism that makes clear it is not aligned with the secular, materialist culture of English liberalism. At the work's outset, Ball suggests that the very essence of culture is to intercede for the poorest and most humble among the people, for it is from them that the noblest beings and the rich plenitudes of heaven are to be born. This claim is Romantic to an extreme. The Romantic (Bakuninist) anarchism that the book combines with enthusiasm for chiliastic revolt leads Ball to declare that the Christian ideal of justice has been sacrificed to both secular and ecclesiastical authority. Historical events, he writes, have become thin, because history has worn itself out as events have lost their sacred dimension. That is, history has become what Nietzsche (the topic of Ball's unfinished dissertation for the University of Munich) understood it to be: a product of the subjective will. Historical events are arbitrary—they do not contain categories (whether pertaining to economic developments or cultural traditions) that might serve as the basis for coherent interpretive judgment.⁸⁰ Satanic forces are afoot, Ball warns, and as a result, the torment into which everyone is born is doubled by existence instead of being relieved. So Ball turns to messianism, his view being that a messianic hermeneutic will give cohesion to what has become fragmentary and thereby redeem the sufferings of the past. In this way, he transforms Utopia—previously conceived by Marx as immanent within history—into an external standpoint from which to judge progress.

Ball's *Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz* was, in most respects, a conservative Romantic's critique of German culture. It had important similarities to the work of Carl Schmitt (so one should not be surprised to learn that within a few years of writing this work, Ball would publish "Carl Schmitts Politische Theologie" [Carl Schmitt's Political Theology]).⁸¹ *Zur Kritik* emphasized the connection between modernity's—especially German modernity's—lacking a transcendental dimension and Germans' weak regard for human rights. This emphasis on the connection between the immanent dimension of human subjectivity and the transcendental dimension of the godly related Ball's work to a theocratic strain in German thought (including that of German expatriates then living in Switzerland) typified in Gustav Landauer's *Aufruf zum Sozialismus* (Call to Socialism, 1919), Ernst Bloch's *Geist der Utopie* (Spirit of Utopia, 1918), Walter Benjamin's metaphysico-political reflections, and Gershom Scholem's political theology, which was rooted in the Cabala. The tone of such writing was often apocalyptic, as befits a time of war, and many of these writings (including Ball's *Zur Kritik*) spoke for a political theology of

spiritual regeneration and invoked a notion of divine justice. Like others of this sort (including Martin Heidegger), Ball saw the choice between Western liberal democracy and Soviet communism as no choice at all: the takeover of Russian communism by the Bolsheviks had ensured that communism there would be nothing more than another calamity that the Great War had brought on.

Nonetheless, liberalism represented an impoverishment of experience. It lacked the spiritual energies that were necessary for it to achieve its destiny. The German belief in progress had resulted in the profaning of the notion of destiny. Energies must be raised from profane history to the transcendent realm. Luther, according to Ball, was especially culpable: his text-fetishism had drained Christianity of its mystery (which helps account for Ball's McLuhanesque interest in the revitalization of the spoken word). Liberalism and Protestantism were both inadequate to the task of regenerating Christianity and Christian morality. Only a genuine Catholicism was up to the inner struggle that was required; only a Catholicism that was aware of the secret teachings of Christianity could meet the demands. Ball believed that the political collapse that would mark the end of the war would reawaken Romantic longings.

As exemplars of those who had the spiritual strength to sustain these demands, Ball named Louis de Bonald (1758–1840), François-René Chateaubriand (1768–1848), and, most of all, Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821). Cardinal de Bonald was a staunch defender of ecclesiastical independence, an adversary of secular officials' authority over education, and—surprisingly—a defender of the French Revolution (because it spoke for the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity). Chateaubriand had been a powerful influence on the Romantic movement; after years of living in dire poverty, and following the death of a sister, he returned to Christianity and published *Le génie du christianisme* (The Genius of Christianity, 1802). That work is an apology for Christianity based on its aesthetic rather than doctrinal virtues; its medievalism would strongly influence those in subsequent generations who, like Ball, were critical of the *philosophes*.

Maistre belonged to Masonic lodges in Chambéry and participated in the esoteric and “illuminist” Scottish Rite of Freemasonry circles in neighbouring Lyon, all the while maintaining an avid interest in Roman Catholic theology. The mystical doctrines taught in the Masonic circles that Maistre frequented must have struck him as a providential counterforce to the rationalism and irreligion of the time—his early education, presided over by the Jesuits, had inspired him with an intense love of religion and a detestation of eighteenth-century philosophical rationalism, which he always resolutely opposed. Ball must have come to see the Dada revolution in much the same way as Maistre

viewed the French Revolution: as a providential event that, however cruel to so many, would atone for the sins of the *haute bourgeoisie* who had turned society towards rationalism.⁸²

In Ball's interest in Maistre we can see his leaning towards a combination of authoritarianism and a devotional anti-rationalism—a common proclivity in the 1920s. Thus, Ball proposed that the redemption of Romanticism (and he did believe that the renewal of Romanticism would have redemptorist effects) would occur through a return to the ecclesiastical ideal of discipline. Ball was not unaware that there was a conservative streak in the Romantics he admired. Nonetheless, he counted them as valuable allies in his battle against Enlightenment rationalism and the humanly impoverishing secularism it encouraged. What is more, he held a view of the French Revolution that was as conflicted as Maistre's: at the same time as he waged battle against the Enlightenment, he maintained that the French Revolution, though an event the Enlightenment brought on, was nonetheless a deeply Christian event—and he affirmed this while fully aware of the horrors of the Terror.

Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz argued that the intellectual debacle of 1914 could be traced back to principles from the Earlier Covenant that Luther admired, which had become the foundation of a Protestant conception of the state as an instrument of power.⁸³ This, Ball argued, had led to the destruction of religion and morals. It was this spirit that had authorized the ideals of the movement Ball had once seen as valuable. His spiritual leanings drove him to search for the lost unity that religion had once provided, but he no longer attempted to recover that force by combining the various arts. He had become convinced that the effort to revitalize morality should not be diverted into the aesthetic sphere; rather, it should cleave to the magic of religion. If Catholicism—a true Catholicism that embraced the magic of ritual—underwent a recrudescence, then people would find all that they wished within the pale of the Church, and the sad grotesqueries of DADA (and the *Komische Grotesk*), whose character he helped shape, would be abandoned.

In 1920, Ball published a novel, *Tenderenda der Phantast* (Tenderenda the Dreamer). The protagonist, Laurentius Tenderenda, is patterned on Ball himself. He is a dreamer but also, in his own fashion, a “church poet” who loves to go about in a Don Quixote suit (he is a “shiny-paper knight”). He is melancholic, wary of crowds; after a life of miracles and adventures, he longs for quiet. After publishing his novel, Ball formally re-entered the fold of the Catholic Church and wrote a book on Byzantine Christianity. He spent his remaining years in a mountain hut near Ticino (an Italian-speaking canton of Switzerland), essentially leading the life of a contemplative. He became interested in demons and began a book on exorcism, which he thought of as the Church's therapy for the soul.

DADA: ART AND ANTI-ART

DADA stood for a total revolt against bourgeois society, against the arts that bourgeois society had produced, and against human nature as bourgeois society had formed it. All of this reflected a widespread state of mind that had developed in both Europe and America somewhere around 1915, to which DADA gave expression. DADA was setting out to destroy a civilization that, by overestimating reason, had become self-destructive. Thus, Tristan Tzara, who had installed himself as the unofficial leader of the Dada movement, wrote in his manifesto of 1918 that “there is great destructive, negative work to be done. To sweep, to clean.”⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Great War had stripped the Dadaists of the beliefs (the fictions, the illusions, the myths, and, perhaps most important, the unconscious assumptions) that were necessary to social cohesion. Consequently, the members of DADA became exponents of a radical individualism. The Great War had discredited the social stability that humans count on in better times; all that remained for them was the personal triumph of living imaginatively and according to their individual whims. Their individualism, strengthened by trench warfare’s assault on humanity, drove them to protest the military-industrial totalitarianism of the society in which they had come to maturity. Dadaists claimed to be nihilistic about society, though in some cases what they called nihilism should really be called antinomianism. They celebrated the imagination by producing an extraordinary variety of artistic forms in reckless abundance. Consider here their simultaneous verse, Ball and Schwitters’ phonetic and visual poetry, Tzara and Picabia’s automatic texts, Arp’s baseless sculpture, Ernst’s collages, and Duchamp’s “object transformers/transformations.”⁸⁵

The Dada movement’s nihilistic (or in some cases antinomian) principles and practices developed out of the same atmosphere of cultural and political crisis that had produced the (very different) philosophies of Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger. That crisis developed within a German tradition that had progressed from Schelling to Nietzsche. The Romantic tradition and its Heideggerian heirs increasingly saw the individual as a place of truth abiding within an untrue social whole. The individual self had assumed the terrible burden that once had been the role of the divine—the role of serving as the support for truth. Heidegger represented the peak of this existential solipsism: for him, Being-in-the-world entailed a loss of original purity. In Heidegger’s philosophy, then, there was no acknowledgment that living with others might be anthropogenetic. The world of the ordinary person, the world of “any and every” person, the world of what Heidegger called “das Man” (“the They”), was a world of inauthenticity. The struggle for recognition, the struggle that

an earlier tradition had recognized as producing the self, was seen by this later tradition as lacking any value because it was a struggle with a world that was without merit. What is more, this later tradition conceived of the self as dissolving into nothingness. Confronted with a world lacking worth or significance, one either retreated into the abyss of the self (a self that had dissolved into nothingness) or tried to reclaim the self by individuating (authenticating) it (by seeking to create radically intense forms of experience). That is, one either retreated into one's own nothingness or revolted. DADA did both.

One way of claiming the self was to assert its freedom. In his 1918 manifesto, Tzara wrote,

After the carnage we are left with the hope of a purified humanity. I always speak about myself because I don't want to convince, and I have no right to drag others in my wake, I'm not compelling anyone to follow me, because everyone makes his art in his own way, if he knows anything about the joy that rises like an arrow up to the astral strata, or that which descends into the mines strewn with the flowers of corpses and fertile spasms... Thus DADA was born, out of a need for independence, out of mistrust for the community. People who join us keep their freedom. We don't accept any theories.⁸⁶

The self, not a program, was the goal. Tzara therefore declared that art—at least as it was practised in his time—must be destroyed, to be replaced by DADA—or a handkerchief:

“ART”—*a parrot word*—replaced by DADA,
PLESIOSAURUS, or handkerchief...

MUSICIANS SMASH YOUR BLIND INSTRUMENTS
on the stage...

Art is a PRETENSION heated at the
TIMIDITY of the urinary basin, *hysteria* born
in the **studio**.⁸⁷

Art, as the members of the Dada circle had been raised to understand it, was high-minded; but the Great War had cured poets, painters, and dancers of the folly of ideals. They deployed strategies of sarcasm and irony against all high-minded conceptions of art—then, as now, irony was the trope of subversion *par excellence*. Irony marks the most basic form of counter-discourse; irony is a repository of oppositional strategies. Tzara commented ironically on the nature of art, and where the Dadaists would take it: “Art used to be a game of nuts in May, children would go gathering words that had a final ring, then they would exude, shout out the verse, and dress it up in dolls' bootees, and the verse became a queen in order to die a little, and the queen became a sardine, and the children ran hither and yon, unseen...”⁸⁸ Outside a Dada

exhibition in Berlin, in June 1920, was a poster with the ironic exhortation: “Dilettantes, rise up against art!” The trope was simply one of rejection: Dadaists believed that once they had liberated art from the sanctity that surrounded it, they would be free to subject it to multiple transformations.

Picabia encapsulated the core conviction behind the Dadaists’ animus against art: “The only truly unsightly things are Art and anti-art!”⁸⁹ Tzara was more expansive, laying out the reasons for his contempt for the arts—as they were practised in his time, at least—in the “Dada Manifesto” of 1918:

Philosophy is the question: from which side shall we look at life, God, the idea or other phenomena. Everything one looks at is false. I do not consider the relative result more important than the choice between cake and cherries after dinner. The system of quickly looking at the other side of a thing in order to impose your opinion indirectly is called dialectics, in other words, haggling over the spirit of fried potatoes while dancing method around it.

If I cry out:

*Ideal, ideal, ideal,
Knowledge, knowledge, knowledge,
Boomboom, boomboom, boomboom,*

I have given a pretty faithful version of progress, law, morality and all other fine qualities that various highly intelligent men have discussed in so many books, only to conclude that after all everyone dances to his own personal boomboom, and that the writer is entitled to his boomboom... Some people think they can explain rationally, by thought, what they think. But that is extremely relative. Psychoanalysis is a dangerous disease, it puts to sleep the anti-objective impulses of man and systematizes the bourgeoisie. There is no ultimate Truth. The dialectic is an amusing mechanism which guides us / in a banal kind of way / to the opinions we had in the first place. Does anyone think that, by a minute refinement of logic, he has demonstrated the truth and established the correctness of these opinions? Logic imprisoned by the senses is an organic disease. To this element philosophers always like to add: the power of observation. But actually this magnificent quality of the mind is the proof of its impotence. We observe, we regard from one or more points of view, we choose them among the millions that exist. Experience is also a product of chance and individual faculties. Science disgusts me as soon as it becomes a speculative system, loses its character of utility—that is so useless... I detest greasy objectivity, and harmony, the science that finds everything in order... I am against systems; the most acceptable system is on principle to have none.

... Measured by the scale of eternity, all activity is vain... But supposing life to be a poor farce, without aim or initial parturition, and because we think it our duty to extricate ourselves as fresh and clean as washed chrysanthemums, we have proclaimed as the sole basis for agreement: art... Art is a private affair, the artist produces it for himself; and intelligible work is the product of a journalist... The artist, the poet rejoice at the venom of the masses condensed into

a section chief of this industry, he is happy to be insulted: it is a proof of his immutability. When a writer or artist is praised by the newspapers, it is proof of the intelligibility of his work: wretched lining of a coat for public use; tatters covering brutality, piss contributing to the warmth of an animal brooding vile instincts. Flabby, insipid flesh reproducing with the help of typographical microbes...

Any infiltration of this kind is candied diarrhea. To encourage this act is to digest it. What we need is works that are strong straight precise and forever beyond understanding. Logic is a complication. Logic is always wrong. It draws the threads of notions, words, in their formal exterior, toward illusory ends and centers. Its chains kill, it is an enormous centipede stifling independence. Married to logic, art would live in incest, swallowing, engulfing its own tail, still part of its own body, fornicating within itself, and passion would become a nightmare tarred with protestantism, a monument, a heap of ponderous gray entrails... [A]ll flowers are not sacred, fortunately, and the divine thing in us is our call to anti-human action... Morality creates atrophy like every plague produced by intelligence. The control of morality and logic has inflicted us with impassivity in the presence of policemen—who are the cause of slavery, putrid rats infecting the bowels of the bourgeoisie which have infected the only luminous clean corridors of glass that remained open to artists.

Let each man proclaim: there is a great negative work of destruction to be accomplished. We must sweep and clean. Affirm the cleanliness of the individual after the state of madness, aggressive complete madness of a world abandoned to the hands of bandits, who rend one another and destroy the centuries.⁹⁰

One notes the despair, even bitterness, that permeates this passage. These emotions had been generated by the Great War—the last paragraph especially makes that achingly obvious. Richard Hülsenbeck confirms that it was disgust at the Great War and all that it had revealed about Western civilization that led him to DADA: “None of us had much appreciation for the kind of courage it takes to get shot for the idea of a nation which is at best a cartel of pelt merchants and profiteers in leather, at worst a cultural association of psychopaths who, like the Germans, marched off with a volume of Goethe in their knapsacks, to skewer Frenchmen and Russians on their bayonets.”⁹¹ Yet the ideas the Dadaists offered had a life that would extend far beyond the context in which they had been developed. The notion that the individual is pure, clean, and decent (“as clean as washed chrysanthemums”), whereas the world is in the hands of bandits who have created an aggressively mad regime, is one that American artists were to rework after the Second World War (though, it needs to be said, the American roots of the idea go back to the country’s Puritan founders). Furthermore, several American artists after the Second World War would develop the Dadaists’ claim that conceptual and philosophical thinking draw us away from our bodies’ natural rhythms (“even so everyone has danced to his personal boomboom”); and like the

Dadaists, many of them would propose that morality is a system of codes that relies on abstract thought. After the Second World War, antipathy towards abstract thought led some American artists (and thinkers) into moral nihilism, as it had the Dada artists before them.

DADA AND THE LIFE-PRINCIPLE

Tzara's manifesto offers a total rejection of modernity's valorization of reason, and of all that results when reason is accorded a place of such privilege:

Morals have given rise to charity and pity, two dumplings that have grown like elephants, planets, which people call good. There is nothing good about them. Goodness is lucid, clear and resolute, and ruthless towards compromise and politics. Morality infuses chocolate into every man's veins. This task is not ordained by a supernatural force, but by a trust of ideas-merchants and academic monopolists. Sentimentality: seeing a group of bored and quarrelling men, they invented the calendar and wisdom as a remedy. By sticking labels on to things, the battle of the philosophers was let loose (money-grubbing, mean and meticulous weights and measures) and one understood once again that pity is a feeling, like diarrhoea in relation to disgust, that undermines health, the filthy carrion job of jeopardizing the sun. I proclaim the opposition of all the cosmic faculties to that blennorrhoea of a putrid sun that issues from the factories of philosophical thought, the fight to the death, with all the resources of

DADAIST DISGUST

Every product of disgust that is capable of becoming a negation of the family is *dada*; protest with the fists of one's whole being in destructive action: **DADA**; acquaintance with all the means hitherto rejected by the sexual prudishness of easy compromise and good manners: **DADA**; abolition of logic, dance of those who are incapable of creation: **DADA**;... abolition of memory: **DADA**; the abolition of archaeology: **DADA**; the abolition of prophets: **DADA**; the abolition of the future: **DADA**; the absolute and indisputable belief in every god that is an immediate product of spontaneity: **DADA**; the elegant and unprejudiced leap from one harmony to another sphere; the trajectory of a word, a cry, thrown into the air like an acoustic disc; to respect all individualities in their folly of the moment, whether serious, fearful, timid, ardent, vigorous, decided or enthusiastic; to strip one's church of every useless and unwieldy accessory; to spew out like a luminous cascade any offensive or loving thought, or to cherish it—with the lively satisfaction that it's all precisely the same thing—with the same intensity in the bush, which is free of insects for the blue-blooded, and gilded with the bodies of archangels, with one's soul. Liberty: **DADA DADA DADA**—the roar of contorted pains, the interweaving of contraries and of all contradictions, freaks and irrelevancies: LIFE⁹²

The thrust of the passage might seem negative through and through. But it is not. It is framed on a basic opposition between all that affirms the sense of life and all that denies it. Life depends on a sense of the vital, so the passage also extols all forms of immediacy and renounces life-denying concern with an elsewhere (whether that elsewhere be in time, in space, or in consciousness). Prudishness, the family, logic, and every form of hierarchy are rejected as life-denying; also jettisoned are memory and archaeology (both directed towards the past), along with prophets (whose thoughts are directed towards the future). Tzara thought poetry to be a product of energy unleashed through the interaction of opposites. This energy can force open the closed system of reason. It derives from the body: that is why it is individual, why spontaneity releases it, and why Dadaists will “spew out like a luminous cascade any offensive or loving thought.” The idea that all that is good (“every god”) is the immediate product of spontaneity—that spontaneity is redemptive, for by healing the wounds that reason has inflicted on the soul, it returns humans to their natural, good state—is among the most influential of Dadaist ideas. It would later influence the Surrealists, the American Abstract Expressionists, and the French *tachiste* painters of the 1950s.

Tzara’s comments reflect what the Dada artists stood for: “LIFE.” DADA was against reason, because reason builds systems that limit life. Just as bad, reason *escapes from* life: much as Kierkegaard had accused Hegel and the Hegelian system of forgetting existence, DADA accused reason of overlooking life and the vitality of the life force. DADA emerged at the time when *Lebensphilosophie*, life-philosophy, had become the dominant current in German intellectual life outside the universities. “Life” was a central category of the new discourse. “Life,” in *Lebensphilosophie*, stood for the contrary of the view that we understand the world through reason or through traditional, hand-me-down values. It stood for the contrary of materialism, for life is the quest of the spirit towards higher states of being. It was in this vein that Picabia was writing when he reiterated Tzara’s celebration of the life force in his *Manifeste cannibale*: “Stand up . . . Rise . . . You are all defendants . . . Stand up before Dada which represents life.” “Life” stood for spirit, dynamism, and creativity. “Life” stood for the view that reality is transformative, plural, protean, an endless variety of shapes and forms, a treasury of invention, boundless possibility. “Life” stood for all that is elemental and pulsional; energy was thought to be the sum of all that is productive and creative. “Life” stood for nature’s attempt to know itself through its very restlessness, for the recognition that reality cannot be contained in any system, since life is richer than any theory. These were the deepest meanings of the word “life” in the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, Henri Bergson, and Max Scheler, all of whom contributed to the form of *Lebensphilosophie* that would come to

dominate Germany's non-academic intellectual life. The urgency that Dada art suggested, the violence it represented, its *informel* quality, were all to convey the dynamics of the vital principle. DADA's dissemination through manifestos, fugitive magazines, performances in clubs, and all other sorts of ephemera, its reliance on literary forms involving chance and simultaneity, and its enthusiasm for the technologies of mechanical reproduction (which furnished the basis for the phenomenon of the multiple)—for photomontage and assemblage, for photography and Rayography, and above all, for film—all suggest the life force's mutable and plural qualities.

Art had become associated with ideas, and ideas were the product of reason—and it was reason, in its manifestation as technique, that had sent young men to wait in the trenches for horrible deaths. If art was associated with lifeless, life-denying reason, then DADA, the successor to art, would be dynamic; a Dada work would constitute itself through gesture and would be nothing but gesture. The instincts had long been disenfranchised by a culture that had valorized reason, but now they would reveal themselves again, even if their expression might be crippled by their long neglect. Hugo Ball wrote, "As the bankruptcy of ideas has stripped the human image down to its innermost layers, instincts and backgrounds are emerging in a pathological way. As no art, politics, or knowledge seems able to hold back this flood, the only thing left is the joke and the bloody pose."⁹³ Art, religion, politics might once have served to restrain the pathological expression of corrupted instincts, but they had become impotent. A successor, DADA, must emerge that could achieve what those antecedent institutions had failed to achieve.

CONSTRUCTIVE DADA

The Dada movement is commonly taken to have been a movement of protest, rejection, negativity. It is not sufficiently acknowledged that it stood for the recognition of negative forces' power to liberate. The Dadaists' celebration of the life-principle provides some evidence there was an affirmative side to DADA. In Chapter 1 we surveyed the process by which belief in reason's grasp on reality was discredited. The belief that the mind had become untethered from reality invited different responses. For the members of the Dada circle, this was, of course, a source of alarm. But more important, by far, was that they took that discovery as giving permission to liberate the imagination (or some other non-rational faculty): If the mind can't fathom reality, why then should it try? If our beliefs are erroneous, if they are no better than imaginings, why then should we not at least strive to make those imaginings as rich, as intense, as vital, as life-giving as possible? That commitment became central to the spirit of DADA.

But there is another aspect to DADA's response to the notion that the mind had become untethered from reality. It is difficult to accept that assertion, and confronted with such, thinkers and artists typically strain to discover alternative means to (calculative) reason that might reveal truth—that is, irrational or (in this case, better) super-rational means to discover truth. So it was with DADA. Indeed, some *Dadaisten*, as we shall see, even valorized that noesis, or higher intuition, celebrated in spiritual, esoteric, and occult traditions. They retained a commitment to the idea of art as a way of knowing associated with the pneumatic tradition. Gianni Vattimo points out that

a good deal of twentieth-century philosophy describes the future in a way deeply tinged with the grandiose. Such descriptions range from the early Heidegger's definition of existence as project and transcendence to Sartre's notion of transcendence, to Ernst Bloch's utopianism (which is emblematic of all Hegelian/Marxist philosophy) ... The same may naturally be said of the twentieth-century artistic avant-garde movements, whose radically anti-historicist inspiration is most authentically expressed by Futurism and Dadaism. Both in philosophy and in avant-garde poetics, the pathos of the future is still accompanied by an appeal to the authentic, according to a model of thought characteristic of all *modern* "futurism": the tension towards the future is seen as a tension aimed towards a renewal and return to a condition of originary authenticity.⁹⁴

Tzara's world view confirmed Vattimo's assertion. Tzara's nihilism *was* thoroughgoing. But even his idea of DADA had a constructive aspect. Marcel Janco, one of the movement's founding members, distinguished two tendencies in the Dada movement in his note "Dada at Two Speeds": there was a destructive tendency (on which most of the commentators on DADA have focused), and there was a helpful, constructive tendency.⁹⁵ When writing about the goals of MERZ, which was his version of DADA, Schwitters (who admittedly suffered criticism from some *Dadaisten* for these views) distinguished between the "kernel Dadaists," or Hülsendadaists (after their purported leader Richard Hülsenbeck; *Hülse* means "core" in German), and MERZ:

In the history of Dadaism Hülsenbeck writes: "All in all art should get a sound trashing." In his introduction to the recent *Dada Almanach*, Hülsenbeck writes: "Dada is carrying on a kind of propaganda against culture." Thus Hülsendadism is oriented towards politics and against art and against culture. I am tolerant and allow every man his own opinions, but I am compelled to state that such an outlook is alien to Merz. As a matter of principle, Merz aims only at art, because no man can serve two masters ... Merz energetically rejects Herr Richard Hülsenbeck's inconsequential and dilettantish views on art ...⁹⁶

Dawn Ades offers a similar distinction between two main approaches among the various people who identified themselves with the Dada movement, or who have subsequently been identified with it:

On the one hand there were those like Ball and Arp who were looking for a new art to replace an outworn and irrelevant aestheticism, and on the other hand those like Tzara and Picabia who were intent on destruction by mockery, and were also prepared to exploit the irony of their position by fooling the public about their social identity as artists. Picabia enjoyed an enormous success in Paris as the dada artist.⁹⁷

The Dadaists, in their writing, used startling, fortuitous juxtapositions of fragments in diverse fonts; in their *Lautgedichten* they used meaningless sounds, emitted at high volume and speed; and in their performance works they used diverse events presented simultaneously to produce sensations of dynamism, intensity, and velocity. They wanted to create energetic oppositions between contradictory elements that followed one another in an accelerated rush that defeated reason, and that engendered an ecstatic state of consciousness able to do without propositional meaning. These features of Dada art have affinities with the cinema—a fact that Raoul Hausmann testified to when he referred to his photomontages as “static film.”⁹⁸ They testify to the belief that the cinema was the optimal art as well as to the desire to recast other arts so that they might assume the aesthetic virtues of the cinema.

Against the closed systems of reason, with their emphasis on clarity and on resolving conflicting ideas, the Dadaists offered intensity and ecstasy. This difference between Dada works and the artworks that preceded them was reflected in the new sort of unity that Dada works exemplified: it was not an *absorptive* unity of the type that cancelled the differences among its various elements by abolishing their independent identities; rather, it was a form of unity that allowed each fragment to preserve something of its own character. The introduction of extrinsic materials—first, in 1912, into Cubist painting, and then, in 1916, into Dada works—and the subsequent development of various collage styles constituted a corrosive challenge to the aesthetic integrity of the completed work—and thus to the principle that underlies organic composition: that there is an integral relationship between part and whole in the artwork. A unity that does not cancel the differences among the elements that constitute it—a type of unity essential to collage—was among DADA’s greatest contributions. Dada collage celebrated contradiction as a means for apprehending the absolute—by defeating reason, it gave a larger scope to a higher form of understanding.

Years after the Dada movement disbanded, Canadian literary theorist Marshall McLuhan (1911–80), with an interest in the influence that media exerts on the mentality of an era, pondered the importance of the montage/collage method that became so important with the Cubist and Dada movements. McLuhan formulated his thoughts on the matter while deliberating on the work of two writers, one an American poet who had moved to Europe,

the other a writer who, after years of wandering,⁹⁹ settled for a while, after 1915, in Zürich, where he became acquainted with the *Dadaisten*. The first writer was poet Ezra Pound; the second was James Joyce (who opened Dublin's first movie theatre, in 1909), who published *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916) and began serious work on *Ulysses* (1922) while living in Zürich. When McLuhan's thoughts on montage/collage were still in their incipient stage, he wrote to Pound, who was then incarcerated in Chesnut Ward, a forensic ward for the criminally insane at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C.: "Your Cantos, I now judge to be the first and only serious use of the great technical possibilities of the cinematograph. Am I right in thinking of them as a montage of personae and sculptured images? Flash-backs providing perceptions of simultaneities?"¹⁰⁰

Three years later, having achieved a more thorough understanding of Pound's technique and historical approach, McLuhan wrote to Pound again, expanding on his thoughts about collage's relation to the cinema. Pound had once described the first sections of his *Cantos* as a detective story, and that description prompted the remark McLuhan makes in the passage concerning the detective genre:

Cinema was immediate consequence of discovery of discontinuity as principle of picturesque landscape. MOVING PICTURES were made and shown in Naples and London in 1770. Painted scenes on rollers projected by lantern. This led at once to discovery of principle of reconstruction of situation by intellectual retracing. Retracing conditions leading to apprehension and arrest was Poe's discovery. Led to detective story and symbolist poem. Detective story as reconstruction of crime by cinematic projection within the mind. Crime not explained but revealed. . . If I'd got hold of your work 15 years ago I'd be somewhere further along now. [Now referring to his role as teacher] Can at least get you into some young minds here and now.¹⁰¹

Later still, in a 1956 address to the Eastern Arts Association, he noted that symbolism's musicality and synaesthesia had introduced a new spatial form into poetry, acoustic space based on hearing:

If visual space is greatly dependent on our habits of seeing, acoustic space is entirely structured by our hearing. Psychologists tell us that acoustic space is spherical because we hear simultaneously from all directions. It has no lines or directions. It contains nothing and it is contained in nothing. It has no horizons, no boundary lines. All its relations are simultaneous, and it is a physical entity defined by these dynamic relations. In fact the more one says about acoustic space the more one realizes that it is the thing that mathematicians and physicists of the past fifty years have been calling space-time, relativity, and non-Euclidean systems of geometry. And it was into this acoustic world that the poets and painters began to thrust in the mid-nineteenth century. . . It was

to be a world in which the eye listens, the ear sees, and in which all the senses assist each other in concert.

Now from one point of view words themselves are a kind of symphony of the senses. Words are a cinematic flow which includes all of our “five and country senses” as Dylan Thomas puts it . . . *The Four Quartets* of T. S. Eliot are a complete guide to our own recovery of acoustic modes of knowing our own and past experience. The *Finnegans Wake* of James Joyce is a verbal universe in which press, movie, radio and TV merge with the languages of the world to form a Feenichts Playhouse. I am saying that modern technology which began by a visual recovery of the past in print has now come to the point of acoustic and visual recovery which installs us once more in the heart of primeval consciousness and experience. If the Romantics pushed at the walls of vision until they yielded and became a shell of sound, we have all of us pounded on the doors of perception until they admitted us to a world which is both an end and a beginning. In our time we are re-living at high speed the whole of the human past. As in a speeded-up film we are traversing all ages and all experience including the experience of pre-historic men.

McLuhan, in pondering the influence of technology on mentality, came to link the movies (and other electric media) with “primitivism” and paratactical construction, and (in his writings on retribalization) linked parataxis with an alternative noesis. The *Dadaisten* shared with many of their cutting-edge contemporaries an interest in exploring this new “tribalism” and new mentality. They can hardly be seen as they often are—as a group of activists who were intent solely on destruction.

Tristan Tzara was often the spokesperson for the constructive tendency in DADA, just as Picabia was the spokesperson for the negative. In September 1922, Tzara offered surprisingly positive propositions in a lecture on DADA that he acknowledged not all Dadaists would agree with:

Dada isn't at all modern, it's rather a return to a quasi-buddhist religion of indifference. Dada places an artificial sweetness on things, a snow of butterflies which have come out of a conjuror's head. Dada is immobility and doesn't understand the passions. You'll say that this is a paradox because Dada manifests itself by violent actions. Yes, the reactions of individuals contaminated by *destruction* are fairly violent, but once these reactions have been exhausted and annihilated by the continuous and progressive satanic insistence of a “*what's the use?*,” what remains and predominates is *indifference*.¹⁰²

DADA, Tzara proposed, was a cathartic art that employed violent, destructive means to purge the corrupting effects that a destructive society was having on individuals. Once these effects had been eliminated, quietude and indifference would follow. This “indifference” would in turn promote a charitable attitude—one that would not distinguish among the relative values of different objects:

You'll never know why you exist, but you'll always allow yourselves to be easily persuaded to take life seriously. You'll never understand that life is a play on words, because you'll never be alone enough to refuse hate, judgments, and everything that needs a great effort, in favour of an even, calm state of mind in which everything is equal and unimportant.¹⁰³

In a review/commentary on Pierre Reverdy's (1889–1960) *Le voleur de Talan* (1917), Tzara stressed the radical implications of an attitude that treated all things charitably, as equals:

Le Voleur de Talan is above all a radiator of vibrations, and the images which are discharged in all directions (an almost electrical effect as they go past) unite around it; because of this, Reverdy's work is COSMIC. But this ambulant and ever-renewed halo leaves us with a cloudy impression and the bitter taste that man is the centre of it and that he can, in his little world, become a god-master.

What I call "cosmic" is an essential quality of a work of art. Because it implies order, which is the necessary condition of the life of every organism. Multiple, diverse and distant elements are, more or less intensely, concentrated in the work; the artist collects them, chooses them, arranges them, makes them into a construction or a composition. Order is the representation of a unity governed by those universal faculties, sobriety and the purity of precision.¹⁰⁴

He continued by expounding his notion of the cosmic:

There are two principles in the cosmic:

- (1) To attach equal importance to each object, being, material, and organism in the universe.
- (2) To stress man's importance, to group round him, in order to subordinate them to him, beings, objects, etc...¹⁰⁵

The two principles are contradictory, certainly, so one might well wonder why Tzara included the second. The likely reason was that it set out the traditional ideal of a "psychological" novel; and though Tzara detected in Reverdy's novel a method that wanted to accord equal importance to every object, he did not go the distance—his novel had not entirely freed itself from tradition, and so it gave the impression of stressing the centrality of human beings: "But this ambulant and ever-renewed halo leaves us with a cloudy impression and the bitter taste that man is the centre of it and that he can, in his little world, become a god-master." The implication here is that the next step forward for the novel, and for artworks generally, would be to treat all elements, including humans, simultaneously and equitably.¹⁰⁶ Tzara might not have wanted to frankly acknowledge the religious attitude towards reality this principle implies, but he did understand that it had important implications for the forms of artworks. So, in a splendid spirit of defiance of the principle of contradiction, Tzara linked this great principle with a second principle:

that “to stress man’s importance, [the artist should] . . . group round him, in order to subordinate them to him, beings, objects, etc.” Tzara continued by stating what improvement would come of this:

The nucleus of the latter principle is a psychological method; the danger is the need to CORRECT men. They should be left to what they want to become—superior beings. The poet allows himself to be implicated at the whim of succession and impression. [This is the basis of the psychological novel and the psychological poem.] For the former principle, this need takes on a new form: to place men beside the other elements, just as they are, to make men BETTER. To work together, anonymously, on the great cathedral of life we are preparing, to level man’s instincts, for if we were to stress his personality too much, he would take on babylonian proportions of spite and cynicism.¹⁰⁷

Richard Hülsenbeck, at one time a participant in Zürich’s Dada circle and, later, the leader of the Berlin Dada movement, shared Tzara’s belief that Dada Dionysianism could serve a higher cause. Hülsenbeck offered this statement of Dionysian Dada’s intention to establish a more spiritual, more elemental (experiential) relation with reality:

The word Dada symbolizes the most primitive relation to the reality of the environment; with Dadaism a new reality comes into its own. Life appears as a simultaneous muddle of noises, colors and spiritual rhythms, which is taken unmodified into Dadaist art, with all the sensational screams and fevers of its reckless everyday psyche and with all its brutal reality. This is the sharp dividing line separating Dadaism from all artistic directions up until now and particularly from FUTURISM which not long ago some puddingheads took to be a new version of impressionist realization. Dadaism for the first time has ceased to take an aesthetic attitude toward life, and this it accomplishes by tearing all the slogans of ethics, culture and inwardness, which are merely cloaks for weak muscles, into their components.¹⁰⁸

The constructive side of DADA was developed partly under the aegis of Wassily Kandinsky, whose *Über das Geistige in der Kunst* (Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 1912) had enormous influence in the second and third decades of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁹ Kandinsky’s work was well known in Dada circles: Ball, Arp, and Hülsenbeck all kept contact with the pioneering abstract artist after they left Munich, and they paid close attention to his theoretical writings: his poetry was incorporated into Dada performances at the Cabaret Voltaire, and his artworks were presented in Dada exhibitions.¹¹⁰ Even before the Great War, Kandinsky had concluded that the regime of modernity was having deleterious effects on the human soul and that this had created a need for spiritual regeneration. Like the Dadaists, Kandinsky identified the material and rational bent of the industrial societies that had dominated Europe since the second half of the nineteenth century as responsible for

impoverishing the human spirit. If a too-rational culture was neglecting the care and nurture of the soul, art could provide a remedy, Kandinsky believed. The old way of thinking, which had led to industrialization, had lost all sense of purpose by ignoring the inner life; art offered a prophetic opening towards the spiritual dimension of existence. Artists should be alert to the potential for regenerating life and for a renewal of the soul.¹¹¹

Kandinsky devoted his writings to overcoming what later would be referred to as “the tyranny of the object.” His introduction to *Über das Geistige in der Kunst* outlined the explosive effect in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth of the loss of certainty in mathematics and science, which had been traditional bulwarks of the belief in absolute, incontestable knowledge. These developments—especially the discovery that the atom is not the solid, uniform entity one arrives at when one partitions an object into ever smaller units—also affected Kandinsky. Scientists had revealed that the atom is mostly empty space, and this “dissolution of the atom,” as thinkers of the early twentieth century described it, brought into question the reality of tangible matter, given that matter, it was now known, was mostly nothingness. Some responded to this (seeming) evidence of the unreality of the material world with alarm; others, including Kandinsky, took it as scientific evidence that reality is ultimately spiritual and that matter and void are identical, as Buddhists have long claimed. Thus, this scientific discovery (or, rather, a particular interpretation of it) led thinkers to explore spiritual traditions that posited that the material world is unreal and that humans should therefore devote themselves to cultivating the soul (for the soul is real, and allied with all that is real).

Hans Arp echoed these themes. He stated baldly, “The starting-point for my work is from the inexplicable, from the divine.”¹¹² DADA in Zürich, under Arp’s influence, was more given to exploring occult themes than DADA in Paris or Berlin; Cologne was another key centre of Dada occultism. Thus, among the Zürich Dadaists (Arp, Ball, Tzara, Hülsenbeck), an elusive form of order emerged from within the tumultuous clatter of the works; a still point harboured in a dynamic entity was revealed. The revelation of that still point has traditionally been one of the hallmarks of occult and (more recently) Theosophist and psychedelic work. This is the basis for Richard Sheppard’s sage claims, in *Dada Spectrum: The Dialectics of Revolt* (1979), that DADA’s origins can be traced to Lao-tzu (lived in the Spring and Autumn Period, 6th century BCE) and Chuang-tzu (flourished during the Warring States Period, 4th century BCE)—the former founder of Daoism, the latter an early Daoist philosopher—Jakob Böhme (1575–1624), Meister Eckhart (1260–1327), and Zen.¹¹³

Arp’s religious ideas were influenced by the German Romantic writers, whom he began reading as a child, and by the occult and mystical writers

whom the German Romantics read (in particular, he was influenced by Jakob Böhme). Several of Arp's contemporaries commented on his interest in the German mystic. Further, Arp's younger brother, François, tells us that from childhood, Jean (Hans) used to read Böhme to him; Arp, we also know, read from Böhme's *Aurora* (1612) at Dada events on 12 and 19 May 1917. Böhme, an extraordinary autodidact, had written nearly all his works while under an official ban imposed by the Lutheran Church. Notwithstanding that official censure, his works circulated secretly throughout Europe until, in the seventeenth century, they began to be published, first in the liberal Netherlands and then in England. According to Böhme, the originary Being, a unity that he referred to as the *Ungrund* (similar to the Gnostic abyss), manifested itself by becoming dual: through division into two, each aspect of the *Ungrund* became more determinate, each revealing something of itself through its opposition to the other. Were it not for this division, the divine force would exist only as pure potential: the *Ungrund* would be unfathomable—it would not even know itself. Böhme had come to understand the role of duality while gazing at the sun's reflection on a darkened pewter plate. He concluded from that experience that the brightness of the reflections was recognizable only by contrast with the darkness of the pewter surface: it was darkness that made the brightness visible.

Böhme explained the dialectical relation in his first book, *Aurora*. After writing it, he fell silent for five years, for in 1613 the Lutheran Church forbade him to write. For some of this time, Böhme studied with the followers of Paracelsus. By the end of these five years, he had developed his system of the dialectic further by incorporating the alchemical tradition's idea that base matter (which the alchemists called prime matter, *prima materia*) could be transmuted into higher levels of corporeality. According to the alchemists, the glorification of the *prima materia* took place through the sexual union of opposites. Modifying this traditional alchemical view, Böhme developed a seven-step dialectical progression (though he insisted that the unreality of time meant that what seemed like a progression was actually a single simultaneous state with differentiated facets). In Böhme's system, then, matter was subject to progressive development through transmutations, in the course of which it attained the sublime state of divine corporeality. The divine recognized itself in this form of matter and took pleasure with itself. Each phase in the process was characterized by a specific type of motion: the first stage was contraction and concentration (Böhme referred to this as the sour source); the second was expansion and dispersion (he referred to this as the sweet source); the third stage was agitation, brought about by conflict between the sour and the sweet source (he called this the bitter source). Matter, driven into bitter motion through the conflict between centripetal and centrifugal forces,

was excited into the fourth stage, ignition (which he called the fire source). This stage was a crucial one in the transmutation of matter, for its dynamics were such that from it, matter could either fall back into the tormented state of *prima materia* or, by sublimation, enter into the paradisiacal realm of divine corporeality (which he referred to as the love source). Böhme called the sixth source “the Logos,” the sound that, by propagating form, effects differentiation. The seventh source, which Böhme designated “Sophia,” was participation in embodied divinity.

Böhme’s ideas on conflict and transformation were also shared by Hugo Ball. His diary entry for 12 June 1916 reads,

The dadaist fights against the agony and death throes of this age. Averse to all clever reticence, he cultivates the curiosity of one who feels joy even at the most questionable forms of rebellion. He knows that the world of systems has fallen apart, and that this age, with its insistence on cash payment, has opened a jumble sale of godless philosophies. Where fear and bad conscience begin for the shopkeeper, hearty laughter and gentle encouragement begin for the Dadaist . . . (June 12, 1916)

His entry for 13 June 1916 reads (in part),

The word and the image are one. Painter and poet belong together. Christ is image and word. The word and the image are crucified.¹¹⁴

Several days later, on June 18, he wrote another diary entry:

We have now driven the plasticity of the word to the point where it can scarcely be equaled. We achieved this at the expense of the rational, logically constructed sentence, and also by abandoning documentary work (which is possible only by means of a time-consuming grouping of sentences in logically ordered syntax) . . . You may laugh; language will one day reward us for our zeal, even if it does not achieve any directly visible results. We have loaded the word with strengths and energies that helped us to rediscover the evangelical concept of the “word” (logos) as a magical complex image.¹¹⁵

On 18 April 1917, he went even further in announcing his spiritual interests: “Perhaps the art which we are seeking is the key to every former art: a Solomonic key that opens secrets.”¹¹⁶ And again, later in his diaries, “When we said Kandinsky and Picasso, we meant not painters, but priests; not craftsmen, but creators of new worlds and new paradises.” Ball developed these ideas out of deep spiritual interests and from reading religio-mystical texts. Even before DADA’s founding, he had read with a devotee’s enthusiasm Wilhelm Jahn’s *Das Saurapurānam* (1908), a compendium of texts relating to the Hindu god Shiva, which had been translated from Sanskrit and published in Strasbourg in 1908.¹¹⁷ He also celebrated Heraclitus as “*ein Paradoxologe*”

(a paradoxologist), and took an interest in the writings of philosopher Henri Bergson, who was sometimes viewed as sympathetic to spiritual matters.

This constructive, anti-nihilist tendency within DADA found its consummate expression in the work of Marcel Duchamp, who himself alluded to that tendency when he remarked to Pierre Cabanne, “Before [Courbet], painting had other functions: it could be religious, philosophical, moral... [but] our whole century is completely retinal, except for the Surrealists, who tried to go outside it somewhat. And still, they didn’t go so far!”¹¹⁸ The curator Maurice Tuchman furnishes an elegant summary of the occultist influences on Duchamp:

Duchamp’s involvement with the occult, a fascination tempered by his intellectualism, humor, irony, and detachment, is manifested in much of his work, especially in *The Large Glass*, 1915–23. The main visual sources for Duchamp’s interest in nonretinal matters, as first cited by Jean Clair, are the photographs by Charles Brandt and other photographers presented in Albert de Rochas d’Aiglun’s 1895 volume, *L’Extériorisation de la sensibilité*, a compendium of spiritualism and psychokinesis. Duchamp was also influenced by the involvement of his brother Raymond Duchamp-Villon with psychophysiological thought and by Kupka’s ideas on spiritualism, which Kupka shared with Duchamp while the two were neighbors in Puteaux in 1901. Duchamp read extensively on alchemy, androgyny (manifested in his Rose Sélavy persona), the tarot, the fourth dimension. He created plastic metaphors from the literature of occult symbolism and insisted on the importance of the artist as a parareligious leader in modern life. During a three-month sojourn in Munich in 1912 Duchamp purchased Kandinsky’s *On the Spiritual in Art* and conceived the plan for his *Large Glass*. He translated the most important passages of *On the Spiritual in Art* from German into French, line by line, probably for his brothers Raymond Duchamp-Villon and Jacques Villon, who read no German.¹¹⁹

When Duchamp criticized “retinal art,” he was criticizing, *inter alia*, art that could deal only with the *visible* (which was not the subject matter of spiritual art). While it is generally accepted that Duchamp took an interest in esoteric ideas, it is difficult to identify Duchamp’s occult influences. Maurizio Calvesi argues (persuasively, in my opinion) that there is a relationship between Athanasius Kircher’s *Ars Magna Sciendi* (The Great Art of Knowing, 1669) and *Anémic cinéma* (1924–26, with Man Ray and the director and screenwriter Marc Allegret, 1900–73), particularly in the use of rotational forms with inscriptions; but any actual proof that Duchamp was acquainted with that text is, unfortunately, non-existent.¹²⁰ Similarly, speculations regarding the relevance of Albert Poisson’s *Théories et symboles des alchimistes* (Theories and Symbols of Alchemists, 1891) to Duchamp’s *The Large Glass* have not been confirmed by scholarly investigation.¹²¹ The only occult texts that Duchamp is known to have possessed are Kandinsky’s

On the Spiritual in Art and P. Camille Revel's (1853–1932) *Le hasard, sa loi et ses conséquences dans les sciences et en philosophie...* (The Law of Chance and Its Consequences in Science and Philosophy..., 1905; 2nd expanded edition, 1907), and the only occult text he openly cited was Nicéron's *Thaumaturgus opticus* (1646).¹²² Moffitt points out the difficulties of tracing Duchamp's occult influences: "The major lacuna is essentially bibliographic: where specifically did Duchamp get his unquestionably learned knowledge of alchemical ideas and iconography? Knowledge of Duchamp's sources is largely limited to Pierre Cabanne's reference to having seen some unnamed 'books on the occult in Marcel Duchamp's New York studio, but that was in 1967.'"¹²³

We do know, however, that in 1912 Duchamp spent time in Munich, then an important occult centre. The *Gesellschaft für Psychologie*, established by Baron von Prell and Doctor Albert von Schrenck-Notzing, was a lively centre that exchanged ideas with Spiritualists and occultists in England, Italy, and France. The spiritual subculture felt then that Munich belonged to them: in 1907, the annual meeting of the Theosophical Society was held in Munich, and between 1909 and 1913, the *Mysteries of Rudolf Steiner* regularly played there. After Steiner broke with Madame Blavatsky (in 1913), he held many of his conferences in Munich—and those conferences were attended by Klee, Kandinsky, Jawlensky, Gabriele Münter, and Marianna van Werefkin. We know that Duchamp was reading *Du spirituel dans l'art* (the French translation of Kandinsky's *Über das Geistige in der Kunst*) so earnestly that he made notes in his copy; so perhaps he attended some of these conferences. And perhaps he also visited the Alchemy Museum (in the future Deutsches Museum), where he would have seen *cornues* threaded one into the other like the sieves of *The Large Glass*. Certainly Duchamp explored many of the themes of his *grand oeuvre* *Le grand verre* (1915–23) in Munich—this is suggested in the highly similar work he did there: *La vierge no. 1* (Virgin No. 1, July 1912); *La vierge no. 2* (Virgin No. 2 July 1912); *Mécanisme de la pudeur / Pudeur mécanique* (Mechanism of Modesty / Mechanical Modesty, July 1912); *Passage de la vierge à la mariée* (Transition of the Virgin into the Bride, July–August 1912); and *Mariée* (Bride, August 1912).

From his work, we can infer that Duchamp was interested in the fourth dimension and in alchemical ideas of transformation—indeed, that he was drawn to these ideas early in his career and expanded on them in Munich. And his interest in the fourth dimension was not limited to ancient occult ideas—he was also attracted to notions about the fourth dimension that were circulating in intellectual and artistic circles in the early decades of the twentieth century. It interested him that a single four-dimensional form could be viewed in a number of different ways, from various three-dimensional vantage points. Furthermore, several of his works from this period

include references to the alchemist's alembic as well as to other instruments of transformation. For example, the image of the alembic is central to *Passage de la vierge à la mariée* as well as to *Mariée*; and *Moulin à café* (Coffee Mill, 1911), *Broyeuse de chocolat no. 1* (Chocolate Grinder No. 1, 1913), *Broyeuse de chocolat no. 2* (Chocolate Grinder No. 2, 1914), and *Glissière contenant un moulin à eau en métaux voisins* (Glider Containing a Water Mill in Neighbouring Metals, 1913–15) all make reference to pulverizing, the activity that prepares *prima materia* for transformation (a metaphor for preparing the self for change).

Duchamp's interest in the fourth dimension can be seen in his film *Anémic cinéma*, which is composed of a series of spirals within spirals that rotate in such a way as to produce an optical effect that suggests, ironically, both swelling and physical penetration—Duchamp even intended the film's title card, which presents the two words of the film's palindromic title as mirror reflections of one another, to suggest the fourth dimension. Initially, Duchamp and his collaborator Man Ray worked on an anaglyphic film, *Moustiques domestiques demi-stock* (1920). For this, they filmed a spiral from slightly different perspectives, with different filters to create a three-dimensional relief. Jean Clair has noted that the spiralling demispheres were already being used by “theorists of the fourth dimension to explain the appearance of the space-time continuum of n dimensions when it is manifested in... a universe of $n - 1$ dimensions. The rotational movement of a spiral, combined with anaglyphic vision, ... [yields] a multiplicity of n dimensions creating a unity of $n + 1$ dimensions.”¹²⁴ Duchamp later simplified the film into a single perspective, perhaps after reading Claude Bragdon's *A Primer on Higher Space* (1913), which would have led him to realize that the spiral form alone was enough to carry his ideas on the fourth dimension. Bragdon notes,

If we pass a helix (a spiral in three dimensions) through a film (a 2-space), the intersection will give a point moving in a circle... represented in the film by the consecutive positions of the point of intersection. The permanent existence of the spiral will be experienced as a *time series*... We consider the intersections of these filaments with the film as it passes to represent the atoms of a filmar [or “roto-relief” type] universe... Now imagine a four-dimensional spiral passing through a three-dimensional space; the point of intersection, instead of moving in a circle, will now trace out a sphere... Its presentiment [*sic*] in three-space will consist of bodies built up of spheres of various magnitudes moving harmoniously among one another, and requiring Time for their development.¹²⁵

This description clearly suggests a close resemblance to the spirals in *Anémic cinéma*. Duchamp likely knew Bragdon's work, for Bragdon was a favourite of Duchamp's patron, Katherine Dreier (a committed Theosophist).¹²⁶

Anémic cinéma grew out of Duchamp's interest in language, a concern central to his oeuvre. In 1916 he had produced an "inscribed" ready-made, *Rendezvous 1916*. The work consists of four postcards taped together to form a rectangular grid; for these he created a text that has neither a beginning nor an end and is composed of phrases with recognizable syntax but whose meanings are as oblique as those of any phrases that appear in Gertrude Stein's most experimental poetry, as Duchamp had substituted for words one might have expected (given the grammatical form) others that had no meaning in the context in which they had been placed. (The analogy between these *inscribed* ready-mades and ready-mades fashioned from non-verbal entities should be clear: both place familiar entities—in the one case quotidian objects, in the other case words—in a new context, and in doing so, dispense with their ordinary meaning and encourage people to examine the material qualities of the entity and meanings that might arise from those material qualities.) He even formulated plans for the construction of a new language. This new, formal language, derived from formal mathematical systems, would accomplish rigorously what his emphasis on puns, assonance, and alliteration did:

Conditions of a language:

The search for "prime words" ("divisible" only by themselves and by unity).

Take a Larousse [a renowned publisher of dictionaries, especially French-language dictionaries] dict. and copy all the so-called "abstract" words. i.e., those which have no concrete reference

Compose a schematic sign designating each of these words. (this sign can be composed with the standard stops)

These signs must be thought of as the letters of the new alphabet.¹²⁷

The invention of new "signs" for an abstract language corresponding to terms in a dictionary without concrete reference divests language of its meaning, allowing its manipulation in purely technical terms.

Anémic cinéma alternates purely graphic shots ("rotoreliefs," each about twenty seconds long, presenting patterns of concentric yet off-centre circles that when mechanically rotated seem to recede into or proceed from the picture plane) with shots containing words.¹²⁸ This alternation mimics a feature of the silent cinema: the new dimension that opens when the forms are rotated (to the two dimensions of the flat form, time is added, and time opens up an additional spatial dimension of depth) also serves as an analogy between the three dimensions of our everyday world and the fourth dimension. Furthermore, the rotation tends to somewhat drain the titles of their significance. Consequently, the opposition between the two sorts—those rotoreliefs with titles and those without—changes in character: sometimes

(generally, when we attempt to read the text), it is experienced primarily as a tension between words and images, and at other times (generally, when we stop reading and simply look), it is experienced as a tension between two sorts of visual forms, those that remain flat on the surface of the screen and those that create an illusion of depth.¹²⁹ (Works such as Georges Braque's *Le bougeoir* [The Candlestick, 1911] had already opened up the effects of contrasts of the second sort.) The kind of attention we pay the words changes from one sort (attempting to read them and to make sense of them) to the other (just looking at the text layout as a graphic form) and back again—that is, they chase each other, like a snake chasing its tail.

The words Duchamp used in *Anémic cinéma* function as *objets trouvés*; as with his (other) inscribed ready-mades, the sentences he used in the film are constructed according to regular syntactical principles, but he chose words more for their aural properties (to create assonance and alliteration) than for their ordinary meaning—though their conventional meanings do have a role (and in fact, the interplay between the words' conventional meanings and the associations triggered by the words' aural properties are a source of much of the pleasure we take from Duchamp's verbal constructions). The emphasis on words' material (aural) properties overturns our familiar relation to language, as a transparent system that delivers the real to us, and makes us aware of the mediated condition of our perception and understanding.

The texts included in *Anémic cinéma* are as follows:

BAINS DE GROS THÉ POUR GRAINS DE BEAUTÉ SANS TROP DE BENGUÉ.

L'ENFANT QUI TÊTE EST UN SOUFFLEUR DE CHAIR CHAUDE ET N'AI ME PAS LE CHOUX – FLEUR DE SERRE CHAUDE.

SI JE TE DONNE UN SOU, ME DONNERAS-TU UNE PAIRE DE CISEAUX ?

ON DEMANDE DES MOUSTIQUES DOMESTIQUES (DEMI-STOCKS) POUR LA CURE D'AZOTE SUR LA CÔTE D'AZUR.

INCESTE OU PASSION DE FAMILLE, À COUPS TROP TIRÉS. ESQUISONS LES ECCHYMOSES DES ESQUIMAUX AUX MOTS EXQUIS.

AVEZ-VOUS DÉJÀ MIS LA MOELLE DE L'AIMÉE DANS LA POÊLE DE L'AIMÉE ?

PARMI NOS ARTICLES DE QUINCAILLERIE PARESSEUSE, NOUS RECOMMANDERONS LE ROBINET QUI S'ARRÊTE DE COULER QUAND ON NE L'ÉCOUTE PAS.

L'ASPIRANT HABITE JAVEL ET MOI J'AVAIS L'HABITE EN SPIRALE.

As Katrina Martin pointed out in a remarkable article on the wordplay in *Anémic cinéma*, the playful verbal constructions draw the material features of

language to the fore.¹³⁰ Take the title “BAIN DE GROS THÉ POUR GRAINS DE BEAUTÉ SANS TROP DE BENGUÉ”—the construction is syntactically regular (it is simply an elaborate noun phrase). Like many alchemical (and dialectical) forms, it is triadic:

Bains de gros thé
pour grains de beauté
sans trop de bengué.

They are three subsidiary noun phrases, joined by two prepositions, so the component forms mirror the overall form that comprises them. This nested composition itself is very alchemical, for it reflects the belief that microcosmic orders reflect macrocosmic orders (and that what is below mirrors what is above). As Martin points out, there are permutational (metaphorically, spiraling) relations among the sounds in the three noun phrases: *b-g-t*; *g-b-t*; *t-b-g*. In French, phrases of the form “gros + name of a product” often signify goods bought cheaply and in bulk (cognate to an English phrase, buying goods “by the gross,” a construction that has largely fallen from use)—“du gros rouge,” for example, is used colloquially for “cheap red wine, bought in bulk” (one carries one’s own bottles to the shop to get them filled). Thus, for a French speaker, “BAINS DE GROS THÉ” would sound like “baths of cheap tea, bought in bulk”; but there is an irony here, for in France, tea is more a snob’s drink (coffee is a national passion), so “BAINS DE GROS THÉ” would seem to a French speaker something like a Champagne bath to an English speaker (indeed, there are legends about tea baths being good for the skin), except it is cheap tea that is used (so the bath is perhaps more like a prosecco bath than a Champagne bath). This oscillation (this spiraling) between luxuriance and grossness is characteristic of the entire phrase. French often uses the suffix *té* to create abstract nouns (*liberté, égalité, fraternité*), so French readers could take the *gros thé* of the first line to be a homonym for “grosté”—not a French word, but it might be taken as a neologism for “grossness” or “crudeness”; but it is a lofty, abstract word that nonetheless refers to the condition of being gross. Along similar lines, the term *de gros thé* sounds rather like the term *décrotter* (a slang expression for sprucing oneself up)—it literally means to “de-crap” oneself—so the idea of purifying oneself of grossness (a very alchemical idea) arises this way as well. *Gros thé* also sounds somewhat like *croter*, a mild vulgarism for defecating, and [*faire*] *son gross* is a very coarse expression for the same activity (“to have a shit”). But defecating is our way of ridding ourselves of base elements (to de-crap—*décrotter*—ourselves), and that, to be sure, is the goal of the alchemical quest: it purifies us and raises us to a higher level. A *bain* also bathes a person, so it makes an allusion to the second stage of alchemical transformation, the stage of dissolution, which

dissolves the ashes from the first stage, the stage of calcination, in water; thus, the illusion of the ego is broken down by immersion in the unconscious, non-rational, or rejected part of our minds. The ego (in alchemical thought, the rational part of the mind) lets go of control, and buried material is allowed to surface (in the same way that defecation brings material hidden inside us into evidence).

These “BAINS DE GROS THÉ” are for (POUR) “GRAINS DE BEAUTÉ”—which, literally, are beauty marks. But, as Katrina Martin pointed out, *grains de beauté* surely sounds like *grains de beau thé*, which association would surely connect with *grains de café* (coffee grounds); but *grains de café* is a colloquialism that refers to the clitoris, so the beauty mark (*grain de beauté*) is a clitoris. The “BAINS DE GROS THÉ” are therefore baths for (POUR) the clitoris; so the first two phrases together suggest bathing the clitoris in seminal fluid. The control of seminal fluids is a central topic in the sex-magical ideas that constitute one of alchemy’s components.

Next: “SANS TROP DE BENGUÉ” (WITHOUT TOO MUCH *BENGUÉ*): *bengué* is a homonym for *bain gai* (a gay bath)—so the seminal bathing of the clitoris is not too intense a pleasure. *Bengué* is also a slang term for being tipsy, so the expression *sans trop de bengué* also suggests that the clitoral bath doesn’t require too much alcohol—it is not too much of a *bain gai*. The bath also takes place without too much Ben Gay (an unguent, invented by a doctor by the name of Bengue, that provides a chemical heat to the muscles to relax them): the erotic connotations are obvious.

“L’ENFANT QUI TÊTE EST UN SOUFFLEUR DE CHAIR CHAUDE ET N’AIME PAS LE CHOUX-FLEUR DE SERRE CHAUDE.” This sentence, as Katrina Martin again pointed out, is a regular construction and can be divided into three parts:

L’enfant qui tête
est un souffleur de chair chaude
et n’aime pas le chou-fleur de serre chaude.

A strict translation would be, “The child who suckles is a breath of hot flesh and does not love hot-house cauliflower.” So the sentence seems to suggest that the child suckles at the mother’s breast because he/she doesn’t like vegetables. However, there are many ambiguities that make the phrase much more complex. The word *souffler* means “to blow” (and so “to blow lightly on” or “to breathe on”—as one blows on hot food or, as this sentence has it, on hot flesh) or “to sigh” or “to whisper.” Unloosing all these possibilities, the sentence suggests breath (another central occult concern).

The play on words depends crucially on the interrelation of the “souffleur de chair chaude” (one who blows on warm flesh, i.e., the mother’s breast) and the “chou-fleur de serre chaude” (hot-house cauliflower). As Stephen Jay

Gould points out, both the baby's head and the cauliflower are round heads, so the trope alludes to a similarity-in-difference. The word *chair* is a homonym for *cher/chère*, that is, "dear"; so *chair chaude* also suggests a "hot dear" (or a "hot honey," or a "hot babe" or "hot guy"). *Chou* is also used as a term of endearment, as is *fleur* (so the conjoined *chou-fleur* should double the effect, somewhat like "honey dear" or my "sweet honey"). And *serre* is cognate with *serrer*, that is, "to hug," so the sentence suggests that the person who blows gently on hot flesh doesn't like his/her "sweet honey" who gives "hot hugs." The sentence contains several terms of endearment and makes reference to children and to blowing gently; but it also has a darker underside. This is reinforced by connotations of the term *tête*: *têtu* means "stubborn," and the association with stubbornness is emphasized by the phrase *n'aime pas* ("doesn't like"). Still more important, *souffleur* sounds like *sou-fleur*—a "penny flower" or a "penny girl," that is, a whore in a *serre chaude* (a hot-house, or brothel)—and that encourages us to read the sentence as implying that the child who blows on hot flesh (or, since *chair* is a homonym of *cher*, i.e., expensive, who blows on costly, hot flesh) does not like the prostitute in the brothel. Moreover, *faire chou-chou* is French slang for engaging in homosexual relations, so the statement that the child (who blows softly on hot flesh) "*n'aime pas le chou-fleur de serre chaude*" means that he/she doesn't like homosexual lovemaking in a hothouse. The word *souffler* often arises in contexts having to do with homosexuality: *souffler dans la canne* and *souffler dans le merliton* are expressions used for fellatio, and the word *tête* ("head") has the same ambiguity as the English term. *Fleur* is also a slang term for the genitals, and *chou-fleur* sounds rather like *souffleur*, which, as we have noted, can be used to refer to fellatio. Finally, a *souffleur* is used in French alchemy to refer to someone who is in quest of the philosopher's stone: Duchamp was no doubt interested in the sex-magical implications of using the same term to refer to a philosophical seeker and one who engages in oral sex.

The sentence "SI JE TE DONNE UN SOU, ME DONNERAS-TU UNE PAIRE DE CISEAUX" seems to have the form of a simple French question: If I give you a penny, will you give me a pair of scissors? But the (common) association of the scissors with pairing suggests the subject matter is intercourse, and the tone conveyed by the image is one of violence, of castration. Duchamp made a similar link in another note:

LHOOQ

Elle a chaud au cul / comme des ciseaux ouverts.

[LHOOQ / She has a hot ass / Like open scissors.]¹³¹

"ON DEMANDE DES MOUSTIQUES DOMESTIQUES (DEMI-STOCK) POUR LA CURE D'AZOTE SUR LA COTE D'AZUR." The structure of the sentence is that of a want ad. A literal translation would be, "We are (one is)

asking for some domesticated mosquitoes (half-stock) for the nitrogen cure on the Côte d'Azur" (the French Riviera). This sentence, too, can be divided into three parts, joined by prepositions:

On demande des moustiques domestiques (demi-stock)
pour la cure d'azote,
sur la Côte d'Azur.

The first phrase plays on the alternations of three consonants (*d*, *m*, *s*) and three vowels (*o* and its variant *ou*, *e*, *i*). The last two phrases are permutations of each other. Duchamp and Man Ray had used the phrase *Moustiques domestiques* (*demi-stock*) earlier, tiled on the background of bonds they had issued for an imaginary casino in Monte Carlo (on the Côte d'Azur); so one may infer that gambling is the nitrogen cure, and that its curative power is to explode our expectations (such as that mosquitoes cannot be domesticated). The nitrogen cure, then, teaches one to submit to chance (to the order of nature); the cure requires learning one of the elements of the occult gnosis.

"INCESTE OU PASSION DE FAMILLE, À COUPS TROP TIRÉS" is not a sentence, but simply a sentence fragment, a noun phrase: "Incest or family passion, in too drawn-out blows." *À coups trop tirés* resembles the first part of the expression *tirer un coup de fusil* or "to shoot a rifle." The erotic association suggests that the prolongation of this "malic" climax offends by being too drawn out—by being in "slow motion." Another homonymous association is with *à cous trop tirés* ("with necks that are stretched too far"). Aside from the obvious "malic" reference (accusing the participant of taking his penis out too often and "stretching" it too much), the allusion to the stretched neck suggests strangulation or asphyxiation, an offence against the breath control practices of occult groups; but there is also a paraphiliac practice known as erotic asphyxiation, a voluntary reduction of oxygen intake (through breath control), which is used to produce an erection—a colloquialism for a person who engages in this practice is a gasper.

"ESQUIVONS LES ECCHYMOSES DES ESQUIMAUX AUX MOTS EXQUIS" is an exhortative sentence made up of four nearly regular parts (the parts having three, four, four, and four syllables, respectively) and follows a strict metrical pattern of alternating heavy and light stresses and a repetition of sounds ("s," "q," "o"). As Stephen Jay Gould points out, each of the four parts presents an almost identical-sounding phrase ("esquivons," "ecchymoses," "Esquimaux") or, in the case of "mots exquis," a phrase inverts syllables in the primary phrase. A common sound "moze" appears in variant spellings in three of the four parts: "moses," "maux," and "mots." The other principal sound of the four parts is composed of variant forms "es-qui" ("es-kee")

“ecchy” (“ek-key”), “es-qui” (“es-kee”), and “ex-quis” (“ex-kee”). The result is a spiral permutation of the sounds “es,” “key,” “kee.”

The sentence means “Let us escape (or slip away) from the bruises of Eskimos of exquisite words.” This is one of Duchamp’s favourite verbal constructions: a variant of it appeared on the cover of *The Little Review* (40, no. 1 [Spring 1925]): “Rose Sélavy et moi estimons les ecchymoses des esquimaux aux mots exquis” (Rose Sélavy and I esteem the bruises of eskimos of exquisite words). In 1925, Duchamp engraved a similar sentence—“Rose Sélavy et moi esquivons les ecchymoses des esquimaux aux mots exquis”—around the edge of his sculpture *Rotative demi-sphere*, which also includes many concentric black-and-white circles arranged to produce (by reason of the varying widths of the circles and varying spacings between them) an optical illusion of an outwardly cascading spiral as the device turns.

The sentence links pain (“les ecchymoses”) and beauty (“les mots exquis”); the link is reinforced by the allusion to severe cold (“Les esquimaux”), which we associate both with the severe coldness of extreme beauty and with punishing pain. The coldness of extreme beauty suggests its bloodlessness (one of *Anémic cinéma*’s themes).

Anémic cinéma’s puns play on one of alchemy’s chief interests: the dissolution and regeneration of matter. The “ubiquitous hermetic symbol that links the spiraling images of *Anémic Cinéma* . . . is the alchemical *ouroboros* . . . ‘the dragon that devours its own tail.’”¹³² The *ouroboros* is the alchemical symbol for the circular movement of matter. A dragon is pictured devouring its own tail, killing and regenerating itself in the same movement. Many of Duchamp’s puns, as Stephen Jay Gould has pointed out, contain elements of annihilation; the end of the pun annihilates the object of the pun.¹³³ Hence, as Jean Clair points out, “les sentences se mordent la queue à la façon dont les cercles s’enroulent sur eux-mêmes” (the sentences bite their tails just as the circles roll up upon themselves).¹³⁴

Take for example one of the puns in the film: “AVEZ VOUS DÉJÀ MIS LA MOËLLE DE L’ÉPÉE DANS LE POËLE DE L’AIMÉE?” The question asked is, “Have you ever put the pith of the sword in the oven of the beloved [female]?” The pun is created by a transposition of the *m* and the *p*, and the transposition pierces the whole. The effect is of a whole that is composed of the consumption of one half by the other: the oven of the beloved swallows the sword. Katrina Martin points out that the word “MOËLLE” most commonly appears in the expression *moëlle d’épine* (spinal cord); that expression’s audial similarity with “moëlle de l’épée”—*moëlle* is also slang for a penis, while *l’épée* means sword—suggests that the beloved’s swallowing a sword is a cover image for fellatio. *Moëlle de l’épée* is also close in sound to *moëlle*

de l'épée (the spy's penis)—one can associate a spy with a voyeur, and so the phrase can imply the voyeur's penis. In view of the scandalous allusions this text makes (including the suggestion that the voyeur's penis becomes a sword), we understand that we are in the position of the voyeur (spying on the erotic activities implied by these swirling forms); and we make the connection between the phallic shaft and the penetrating gaze.

A *poêle* refers both to an oven and to a sheet used to cover the dead. Duchamp later extended the sexual allusions of this phrase: in 1940, he issued *Morceaux moisis* (Rotten Bits or Mouldy Morsels) as part of the *Boîte-en-valise*. The *Morceaux moisis* are a collection of puns—the title, *Morceaux moisis*, itself is a play on words: *Morceaux choisis* (Selected Fragments) is a term an anthologist/scholar might use as the title for a collection of texts that exist only in fragmentary form, such as those of Heraclitus or Pythagoras, but it could also be used to refer to choice selected morsels, the tasty bits of some culinary preparation. One pun in this collection involves the homonymous construction "... dans le poil de l'aimée [*poil* means hair/body fur, but here refers to pubic hair] of the [female] lover." The play on *poêle/poil* associates sex with death and suggests why beauty is bloodless—it belongs to death's frigid realm. In fact, there is, in the play on the words *poêle* and *poil*—as in the juxtaposition of (hot) beauty and (cold) bloodlessness—a similar duality as the word *poêle* itself harbours; for as noted, a *poêle* can refer either to a (hot) oven or a cold shroud. As Martin notes, the associations among sex, death, and beauty's frigidity are reinforced by a near homonym of *l'épée*: *la paix* ("peace"). As the phrase *requiescat in pacem* makes clear, peace, too, is associated with death. Furthermore, *l'épée* in alchemical literature refers to the transforming fire: alchemy uses imagery of death and resurrection.

The pun can also be associated with the Klein bottle, which Duchamp famously adapted for his *L'air de Paris* (1916). The Klein bottle, kept at the Henri Poincaré Institute, seems "born from the twisting of a spout turning in on itself, a spout reminiscent of a gloved finger, which so to speak invades itself... with neither an inside nor an outside..."¹³⁵ Therefore, not only could the pun refer to the *ouroboros*, but it could also reference the fourth dimension. Perhaps this is the anaglyphic vision of *Anémic cinéma*; instead of filming two spirals, he created a physical *ouroboros*, and a metaphysical *ouroboros*, thereby yielding a multiplicity of dimensions. One could say much the same about other titles: "ON DEMANDE DES MOUSTIQUES DOMESTIQUES (DEMI-STOCK) POUR LA CURE D'AZOTE SUR LA COTE D'AZUR" or "PARMI NOS ARTICLES DE QUINCAILLERIE PARESSEUSE, NOUS RECOMMANDONS LE ROBINET QUI S'ARRÊTE DE COULER QUAND ON NE L'ÉCOUTE PAS."

The syntactical form of that second title, “PARMI NOS ARTICLES DE QUINCAILLERIE PARESEUSE, NOUS RECOMMANDONS LE ROBINET QUI S’ARRÊTE DE COULER QUAND ON NE L’ÉCOUTE PAS,” is also regular—it resembles an advertisement: “Among our articles of lazy hardware, we recommend the faucet that stops running when no one is listening to it.” The *robinet* (faucet) is obviously the penis: this piece of hardware drips until no one pays attention any longer and it becomes lazy. *The Large Glass*’s Bachelor Machine presents sexual desire as a relentless engine; the attitude expressed in this sentence is similar. The arousal of sexual energy and its discharge is a cyclical process.

“L’ASPIRANT HABITE JAVEL ET MOI J’AVAIS L’HABITE EN SPIRALE.” The sentence has almost a palindromic form: the last two syllables (“spiral”) reverse the first two (“l’aspir”); the third, fourth, and fifth syllables (“...ant habite”) are mirrored by the syllables fourth, third, and second from the end (“habite en”); the sixth and seventh syllables (“javel”) are mirrored by the seventh and sixth from the end (“j’avais”); it is, then, another *ouroboros*. Unlike most of the *Anémic cinéma*’s other titles, this sentence is not in standard grammatical form: *l’habite* is not a standard French word. “J’AVAIS L’HABITE” is an expression that Marcel Duchamp coined, based, most evidently, on the French verb *habiter*, which means to dwell (*J’habite Javel*: “I live in Javel”). But the deviation from standard French of the objective pronoun (the use of *moi*) suggests a contamination from English, so it raises the notion of a habit. But the phrase invites another association, to *la bitte*, which, as Katrina Martin points out, is a slang term for the penis: so we take another meaning from “j’avais l’habite en spirale” as meaning “I had my penis in a spiral.” Again, one could construe the phrase *J’avais l’habite* as a subject-verb-object phrase—however, *l’habite* is not a French noun, but *l’habit* is: it is used to refer to a suit of clothes. So we might interpret the phrase as saying “I had my clothes in a spiral,” that is, I twisted them (in having sex). Moreover, as in English, a monk’s outfit—or, sometimes, a priest’s—is referred to as a *habit*: *le prêtre porte l’habit religieux* (the priest wears a habit). The connection between “habit” and “religious garb” is perhaps not quite so close in French as it is in English (for in French, any suit is referred to as *un habit*), but another term in the sentence supports the association: an “aspirant” can be used to refer to a person in the first stage of the process of becoming a member of a religious order, so the sentence can be taken as saying, “The aspirant [religious novice] lives in Javel, and me, I have my habit in a twist.” The phrase then suggests sexual activities between an older priest and a young religious novice living in Javel; that the film’s visual forms are also spirals adds another dimension of significance to the film, a layer of

homosexual referents. Furthermore, “Javel” invites association with *l'eau de Javel* (or just *Javel*), a yellowy liquid chlorine bleach commonly used in France for cleaning and sterilizing; the expression *blanc d'oeuf et Javel* is a very nasty phrase used to refer to male ejaculate. There is more. “Aspirant,” as Martin notes, derives from *aspirer*, “to breathe”; thus, the sentence relates to the *souffleur* in the title “L'ENFANT QUI TÊTE EST UN SOUFFLEUR DE CHAIR CHAUDE...” Breathing relates to processive and recessive movement of the spiral forms. Breath control is one of the principal teachings of esoteric groups (who might have their own aspirants).

Maurizio Calvesi relates *Anémic cinéma* to Athanasius Kircher's Anemic Machine. Kircher (1601 or 1602–80) was a German Jesuit, both a theologian and an expert in the occult sciences. His book *Ars Magna Sciendi* offers an engraving of what he called an Anemic Machine, a gigantic pipe crowned with a top that resembles the top of a mill, which rotates with the wind.¹³⁶ Calvesi traces the word *anémic* (which does not exist in French, though the word *anémique*, meaning anaemic or unhealthy, does) back to the Greek word *anemos*, meaning “breath” or “wind” (it is a root for the term “anemometer”).¹³⁷ He suggests that the hidden meaning of “breath” or “wind” is God. The diagram then takes on a celestial meaning, where the force of the machine, the spirals, the sense of regeneration, all have their source in the hidden God. Clearly the anagrammatic pun embodied in the title *Anémic cinéma* can be taken as alluding to a “bloodless” cinema, a cinema that bears no traces of corporeality; but we can also interpret the title as offering an etymological allusion to divine breath—the reference the title then makes is to a cinema inspired (in the most literal sense of that word) by the breath of God.

One of the more intriguing puns embedded in the texts for the film seems based on divine breath: “L'aspirant habite Javel et moi j'avais l'habite en spirale.” Calvesi makes the following connections: *l'aspirant* is etymologically related to breath; *Javel* easily calls to mind Jahweh, like Jehovah, a variant pronunciation of the Tetragrammatron YHWH), the name of God (parts of the First Covenant) and in the Cabala; *j'avais* and *Javel* are nearly homophones and can therefore be transposed.¹³⁸ Therefore the aspirant, one who breathes the air of God, lives in God and so has the appearance or clothing of a spiral. The spiral motif, running through the whole film, is recontextualized; it is symbolic for the God in the machine.

Calvesi's claim that the phrase offers an allusion to divine breath is backed by one of Duchamp's most frequently repeated quotes: “To all appearances, the artist acts like a mediumistic being who, from the labyrinth beyond time and space, seeks his way out to a clearing.”¹³⁹ John F. Moffit comments that “unlike his artistic peers immersed in often generalized antimaterialistic

pursuits,” Duchamp made “esotericism the essential basis of his iconography, expressing specific alchemical motifs both pictorially and textually.”¹⁴⁰ *Anémic cinéma* contains the traces of Duchamp’s wide-ranging occult erudition, which spans topics from the fourth dimension to the *deus ex machina*.

HANS RICHTER ON THE SIX FORMS OF USE IN RETURNING ART TO ITS ELEMENTARY CONDITION

Previously I noted that several of the *Dadaisten* responded to the notion that (calculative) reason had become untethered from reality by valorizing art’s pneumatic effects and by striving to bring forth art forms that could produce them. My analysis of Duchamp’s *Anémic cinéma* also suggested that he turned to cinema because he recognized that it can serve as a pneumatic device. In this section, I use Richter’s taxonomy of Dada forms to further elucidate DADA’s connection to a super-rational noesis.

Richter surveyed the forms that the *Dadaisten* developed to move art towards a discovery of its fundamental, “elementary” conditions. The first form on his list was the *Simultangedicht*, developed by Hugo Ball. About the *Simultangedicht*, Richter wrote,

[A] contrapuntal recitative in which three or more voices speak, sing, whistle, etc., simultaneously, in such a way that the resulting combinations account for the total effect of the work, elegiac, funny or bizarre. The simultaneous poem is a powerful illustration of the fact that an organic work of art has a will of its own, and also illustrates the decisive role played by accompaniment. Noises (a drawn-out rrr sustained for minutes on end, sudden crashes, sirens wailing) are existentially more powerful than the human voice.¹⁴¹

The collaborative *Die Hyperbel von Krokodilcoiffeur und dem Spazierstock* (The Hyperbole of the Crocodile’s Hairdresser and the Walking-Stick, 1919, published in *Der Zettweg*), composed spontaneously by Arp, Tzara, and Walter Serner in the Café de la Terrasse, provides an example. The Simultaneist work was one that captured the everyday phenomenological reality that, even in one’s immediate vicinity, many events are occurring at once—including events with antithetical characteristics.¹⁴² The *poème simultané* is also a form for protesting humans’ being swallowed up by the machine. Richter quotes a passage from Ball that we have already cited:

The subject of the *poème simultané* is the value of the human voice . . . the noises represent the inarticulate, inexorable and ultimately decisive forces which constitute the background. The poem carries the message that mankind is swallowed up in a mechanistic process. In a generalized and compressed form, it

represents the battle of the human voice against a world which menaces, ensnares and finally destroys it, a world whose rhythm and din are inescapable.¹⁴³

We have noted in the section titled “The Künstlerkneipe Cabaret Voltaire and the Galerie Dada” that Hülsenbeck in 1920 related the *Simultangedicht* to the Italian Futurist idea of *simultaneità*. Richter himself opined that the simultaneous poem foreshadowed automatic poetry, which “springs directly from the poet’s bowels or other organs, which have stored up reserves of usable material.”¹⁴⁴ Hugo Ball’s and Hans Richter’s claims make evident the connection of DADA to Warburg’s *Pathosformel*, which surveyed stored-up reserves of ancient material and form.

Another verse form associated with the simultaneous poem was the “abstract” poem (sometimes referred to as the *Lautgedicht* or sound poem, *Verse ohne Worte* or poems without words, or the phonetic poem). Examples include Ball’s “gadji beri bimba gandridi laula lonni cadori,” and Kurt Schwitters’s *Ursonate* (Primeval Sonata, 1922–32). The *Lautgedicht* actually predated the *Simultangedicht*: Paul Scheerbart presented one, titled “Kikakoku,” in his collection *Ich liebe dich!* (I Love You!), published in 1897. Christian Morgenstern included one, “Das grosse Lalula,” in his 1905 collection *Galgenlieder*. But it was only with the Dada movement that the *Lautgedicht* became a genre to be developed rather than a curiosity to be tried and abandoned. Ball in particular was interested in the idea of abstract literature, on the model of abstract painting. In an entry in his diary for 5 March 1916 (Ball did not perform an abstract poem until 23 June 1916), he proposed the idea of an abstract literary work, a *Verse ohne Worte*, as a parallel to abstract painting (which he in turn connected with the desire to avoid the human form, and all material reality, which had become abominable): “The image of the human form is gradually disappearing from the painting of these times and all objects appear only in fragments. This is one more proof of how ugly and worn the human countenance has become, and of how all the objects of our environment have become repulsive to us. The next step is for poetry to do away with language for similar reasons. These are things that have probably never happened before.”¹⁴⁵ Note that Ball here was testifying to the influence of visual art on literature—but his examples suggest he was deliberating on the influence that the new art of lumiform ephemera, the cinema, was exerting on the literature and drama (though he did not realize it).

Phonetic poetry, another Dada invention, emphasized the fullness of the experience of the individual syllable and its relation to the primitive (indeed, to a form of experience akin to that which H. Levy-Bruhl referred to as *participation mystique*). Ball reflected on how the Dada poets extended the pioneering work of the Russian Futurists:

With the sentence having given way to the word, the circle around Marinetti began resolutely with “parole in libertà” [a form of poetry in which the typographical arrangement of the words on page led to asyntax]. They took the word out of the sentence frame (the world image) that had been thoughtlessly and automatically assigned to it, nourished the emaciated big-city vocables with light and air, and gave them back their warmth, emotion, and their original untroubled freedom. We others went a step further. We tried to give the isolated vocables the fullness of an oath, the glow of a star. And curiously enough the magically inspired vocables conceived and gave birth to a *new* sentence that was not limited and confined to any conventional meaning. Touching lightly on a hundred ideas at the same time [another form of simultaneism] without naming them, this sentence made it possible to hear the innately playful, but hidden, irrational character of the listener; it awakened and strengthened the lowest strata of memory. Our experiments touched on areas of philosophy and life that our environment—so rational and precocious—scarcely let us dream of.¹⁴⁶

The Dadaists’ phonetic poetry exerted a mammoth influence on *Lettrisme* as well as on the sound poetry of the 1960s.

If the *poème simultané* was especially important to the Dadaists, not the least of the reasons for this was the radical significance they accorded the concept of simultaneity. Octavio Paz would comment expansively on the importance of the general shift of attention away from diachronic towards synchronic forms in the first two decades of the twentieth century:

All these experiments were influenced by the new techniques of reproducing reality. The major attraction, particularly for the poets, was photography in motion: the cinema. The great theoretician of montage, Sergei Eisenstein, notes in one of his essays that the absence of rules of syntax and punctuation marks in film had revealed to him the true nature of this art: juxtaposition and simultaneity. In other words, the breakup of the linear nature of narrative. Eisenstein discovered predecessors of the use of simultaneity in the art of the East: Japanese theater, Chinese ideography. Years later Jung... maintained... [t]he *I Ching* depends on the simultaneous presence of a number of causes. Jung called this coincidence *synchronicity*, a conjunction of times that is also a conjunction of spaces. In short, in the second decade of the twentieth century there appeared in painting, poetry, and the novel an art of temporal and spatial conjunctions that both dissolved and juxtaposed the dichotomies of before and after, front and back, internal and external. This art had many names; the best of them, the most descriptive, was Simultaneism.

Painters advanced the notion that a painting should be a simultaneous presentation of the various facets of an object. A Cubist painting showed both the interior and exterior of the object, the front and the back of reality, while a Futurist painting provided the before and after: a dog running, a trolley crossing a public square. Painting is a spatial art; the eye can see at the same time a

number of representations and forms on a single surface. Sight is simultaneous. Juxtaposition results in a system of visual relations. The principle ruling this type of representation is *contiguity*: things next to each other are perceived simultaneously. In the temporal arts, such as music and poetry, things follow one after the other. Sound follows sound, word follows word. The ruling principle here is not contiguity but *succession*. Yet there is an essential difference between music and poetry... Poetry... is made of words—sounds that are meanings. Each sound must be heard clearly, so that the listener will understand its meaning. Harmony, the essence of music, in poetry produces only confusion. Poetry cannot be synchronous without going against its very nature and renouncing the great power of the word. And yet simultaneity is a powerful device present in the basic elements of the poem. Comparison, metaphor, rhythm, and rhyme are conjunctions and repetitions that obey the same laws as simultaneous presentation. This was the challenge that confronted poets around 1910: How to adapt spatial simultaneity to an art ruled by temporal *succession*?

In 1911, “Dramatism” made its appearance in Paris; it was later called “Simultaneism.” Both the word and concept had been used slightly earlier by the Futurists. The procedure was simplicity itself: different parts of the poem were read aloud at the same time... [I]n Zurich during the war, the Dadaist Hugo Ball rediscovered the “speaking in tongues” of the early Christians, the Gnostics and other religions. In Moscow and Saint Petersburg, at about the same time, the Russian Futurists exploited the possibilities of glossolalia, which they called “transrational language”...

Cubism, and above all the Orphism of Delaunay, inspired the first experiments by Cendrars and Apollinaire, with whom Simultaneism truly began. In the case of Cendrars especially, the influence of film techniques—montage, flashback—was decisive...

Simultaneism, sometimes called Poetic Cubism, was yet another manifestation, often crude but nearly always effective, of the cardinal principle of Romantic and Symbolist poetry: analogy.¹⁴⁷

Of course, Paz’s commentary goes well beyond the Simultaneism of the *Dadaisten*, but the strain he identified did include the Dada *Simultangedicht*. Paz was right to argue that a broader principle was at stake here—namely, the collapse of the principle of linear succession as a basis for understanding. The methods of the Dadaists succeeded in bringing that principle into question. Paz was also correct in asserting that the forms of cinema were implicated in this new sense of space and time. In his remarkable discussion of Simultaneism, Paz went on to assert that the paratactical principle (he did not use the term)—a principle the adoption of which marked a sea change in the arts—was really just a version of the principle of Simultaneism.¹⁴⁸

The other forms that Richter listed in his catalogue of the forms that Dada artists developed to move art towards a discovery of its fundamental, “elementary” conditions were as follows:

- (2) The *manifesto* as both an artistic form and an eristic instrument. The Dadaists owed much to the Futurists for their ideas about the nature, form, and function of the artistic manifesto.
- (3) The *exhibition*, as a Gesamtkunstwerk, that brings together lectures, performance (even simultaneous performances of sound poems and dance), and “wall-art.” The Dada “exhibition” was a forerunner of the 1960s “happenings” and of contemporary performance art.
- (4) *Abstract painting*. Francis Picabia’s claim to have produced the first abstract painting may not be warranted (Malevich painted his famous *Cherniy kvadrat* [Black Square] in 1915, before the Dada movement crystallized), but Dada artists were in the forefront of the development of abstraction: Hans Arp, Sophie Täuber-Arp, Marcel Janco, and Hans Richter were all pioneers of abstract art. Abstract art served the Dadaists in their efforts to purify the imagination of conventional conceptions and conventional ways of thinking. Richter went as far as to call abstract painting “the language of paradise.”
- (5) *Collage*, an assemblage made from real-world materials (cardboard, wire, train tickets, and newspaper fragments). Kurt Schwitters’s MERZ works can serve as examples of early collage works; the photomontage of Raoul Hausmann, John Heartfield, and Hannah Höch is a variant of this extremely important Dada form.
- (6) *Aleatory Works*, inscrutable combinations of elements drawn from a hat or (Arp’s discovery) from discarded scraps of paper that have fallen or been tossed on the floor. “Absolute acceptance of chance brought us into the realm of magic, conjunction, oracles and divination.”¹⁴⁹

The Dadaists’ use of aleatory methods marked another sharp break with traditional aesthetics—and even DADA’s “destructive” wing made interesting use of chance operations. Consider Tzara’s well-known description of how to create a poem using aleatory means:

TO MAKE A DADAIST POEM

Take a newspaper.
 Take some scissors.
 Choose from this paper an article of the length you want to make your poem.
 Cut out the article.
 Next carefully cut out each of the words that makes up this article and put them all in a bag.
 Shake gently.
 Next take out each cutting one after the other.
 Copy conscientiously in the order in which they left the bag.
 The poem will resemble you.
 And there you are—an infinitely original author of charming sensibility, even though unappreciated by the vulgar herd.¹⁵⁰

The final lines mock the Romantic emphasis on subjectivity—anti-psychological remarks of this sort appear occasionally in Dada polemics.

Dada experiments with aleatory form began with Hans Arp and Sophie Täuber's (1889–1943) work with fabric and paper: they cut out geometric shapes and arranged them gratuitously, at whim.¹⁵¹ Arp would recall that the idea of relying on gratuitous arrangements occurred to him after he had torn up a drawing and was struck by the natural appearance of both the torn pieces and forms the torn fragments constituted when he allowed them to fall on the floor. He was inspired to create a work by pasting the pieces of the torn-up drawing on a sheet of paper exactly as they had fallen on the floor. The arbitrary juxtapositions resulting from these procedures serve as provocations for the unconscious.

Arp extended the method of random assembly to literature, using it to compose poetry. He picked words or sentences at random from a newspaper to produce sentences that exhibited a high degree of syntactic disjunctiveness; for example, "World wonder sends card immediately here is a part of a pig all 12 parts put together stuck on flat will give the clear side view of a stencil amazingly cheap all buy."¹⁵² The use of chance operations, Richter wrote, "restore[s] to the work of art its primeval magic power... the incantatory power that we seek, in this age of general unbelief, more than ever before."¹⁵³ Richter thus states his interest in reviving elementary forms of experience. Arp was even more expansive:

In Zürich, in 1915, disgusted by the butchery of World War I, we devoted ourselves to the Fine Arts. Despite the remote booming of artillery we sang, painted, pasted, and wrote poetry with all our might and main. We were seeking an elementary art to cure man of the frenzy of the times... The Renaissance taught men to arrogantly exalt their reason. Modern times with their sciences and technologies have consecrated men to megalomania. The chaos of our era is the result of that overestimating of reason. We sought an anonymous and collective art... In 1915, Sophie Täuber and I painted, embroidered, and did collages; all these works were drawn from the simplest forms... These works are Realities, pure and independent, with no meaning or cerebral intention. We rejected all mimesis and description, giving free rein to the Elementary and the Spontaneous. Since the arrangement of planes and their proportions and colors seemed to hinge solely on chance, I declared that these works were arranged "according to the law of chance," as in the order of nature, chance being for me simply a part of an inexplicable reason, of an inaccessible order.¹⁵⁴

Collage, along with the (conscious) use of chance operations in artistic creation, figures among the most important items in the Dadaists' legacy for vanguard art. For Arp, the purpose of collage was to create an art that was anonymously transpersonal. To this end, he eliminated representational

imagery from his collages and instead created works using impersonal and universal geometric forms. What he produced by these means evinced the order of nature.¹⁵⁵ But of the new forms the Dada artists developed, it was collage that gave the strongest evidence of their interest in super-rational noesis.

DADA FORMS: COLLAGE

The use of collage, especially in advertising, has become so commonplace that it is difficult to imagine the excitement it caused and the radical nature of its implications.¹⁵⁶ Even more difficult to conceptualize is that a form closely related to collage—so close that it is generally (though not completely accurately) called “the collage film”—is nearly as old as the cinema itself. Jay Leyda has shown that as early as 1898, less than three years after the invention of the cinema, a Lumière cameraman named Francis Doublier recontextualized archival images to reanimate or reinterpret prior events or historical figures.¹⁵⁷ Specifically, he created a summary presentation of *l'affaire Dreyfus*, using generic shots—a military parade, a government building, a departing boat—none of which bore any direct relation to the event the film “depicted.” Filmmakers struck upon the collage principle early; indeed, that principle took an especially strong hold in the cinema—by the 1920s, the foregrounding through juxtaposition of aesthetic features of quotidian objects was providing the basis for films by Hans Richter (*Filmstudie*, 1926, but also, to some extent, *Zweigroschenzauber* [Tuppence Magic], 1930); Walther Ruttmann (*Berlin, Symphonie einer Grossstadt* [Berlin Symphony of a Great City], 1927; also, his great sound collage, *Weekend*, 1930, created by cutting and joining sounds recorded on 35mm film); and Charles DeKeukeleire (especially his *Visions de Lourdes*, 1932, though the tendency is also apparent in his *Combat de boxe*, 1927; *Impatience*, 1928, and *Flamme blanche*, 1930). Meanwhile, the release of latent ideas, buried in the conventional form of newsreels or documentary, constituted the premise of works by Esfir Shub (*The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty*, 1927) and Dziga Vertov (*Kino-Pravda* [Film-Truth], 1922). Works by Len Lye (e.g., *Trade Tattoo*, 1937) formed a bridge between those two cinematic uses of “collage.”

Collage—both what is commonly called collage in film, and true collage in painting—corrodes the authority of the realist image. This is nowhere more evident than in the cinema, where the immediacy and directness of the detailed image is often used as an index of the image’s repletion as a signifier of the real.¹⁵⁸ It is exactly that repletion that the incorporation of disembodied, materially discrete, and iconographically variable images challenges. The collage film assumes that any image can elicit multiple responses, that the weight of its meaning shifts according to its context, and—what is just

as important—that an image changes through historic time as well. As Paul Arthur points out in his (online) *Documentary Box* (vol. 11) article, “On the Virtues and Limitations of Collage,” the determining principles of the collage film have a bifurcated existence: they are split between the enunciative trace in the original footage (which encompasses both stylistic features and attributes of the image that result from the vagaries of changing materials and methods of production, including qualities of film stocks, sound recording technologies, different aspect ratios, etc.) and organizing principles that are imposed on the image by the film’s formal protocols, which generally smooth over the differences among images. The collage film always results from a dialogic urge—its images are always what Walter Benjamin (a theorist who took great interest in DADA and Surrealism) called “dialectical images.” But the key quality of film “collage” also characterizes collage in the other visual arts: the object glued to the surface has an ambiguous status; it is divided between being a real-world object and being an element in an autonomous form; between evoking a particular moment and a timeless, higher unity—as a part of the commodity system of capitalism and as a part of the pure aesthetic form. To put the matter otherwise, the aesthetic unity does not manage to do what it ordinarily does, which is, to negate the individuality of the elements it incorporates. The similarity of the aesthetic challenge offered by film “collage” and collage in other visual media, along with the cinema’s precocious development of the collage principle, suggests that the cinema had a role in forging the new conception of artistic unity, a conception that would affect all the arts.

Sergei Eisenstein (1898–1948) highlighted the importance that montage has in film, where the montage principle is especially potent because the film image is bound so tightly to reality. He maintained that art transforms the reality it incorporates and that the photographic image is especially resistant to transformation; that resistance dialectically ensures the only means of transformation available to the cinema, montage, will be elevated to unprecedented potency. Following the dialectical principle that quantitative change that becomes sufficiently great turns into qualitative change, Eisenstein maintained that the montage principle in cinema had become a novel force in the arts. There is ample evidence that Eisenstein was right, at least about the special character and importance of montage in film. He was also right to argue that the cinema was, for his time, the top art that other arts would strive to emulate. That the cinema first formulated the collage principle (i.e., collage as a technique for unleashing what I call dissent, that force in artistic work that undoes the effort to achieve an all-embracing unity) is supported by the fact that a number of early Dada collages overtly testified to their aspiration to emulate the cinema. Take, for example, a work that George Grosz and John

Heartfield realized jointly—*Leben und Treiben in Universal-City 12 Uhr 5 Mittags* (Life and Business in Universal City at 12:05 in the Afternoon). That work has the appearance of juxtaposed film strips. Raoul Hausmann's collage for the first issue of *Dada*, "Synthetischer Film / Kino der Malerei" (1917), makes the same point, as does his *Dada Cino* (1920). Hannah Höch's *Schnitt mit dem Küchenmesser DADA durch die letzte weimarer Bierbauchkulturepoche Deutschlands* (Cut with the Dada Kitchen Knife Through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch in Germany, 1919) also declares an interest in the cinema's experience with photomontage.

But Eisenstein may have overestimated the transformative potential of montage, for the bond between the cinematic image and reality cannot be entirely severed—something that Tzara recognized. In his notable "Note on Poetry" (1918), Tzara announced,

Art is a procession of continual differences. For there is no measurable distance between the "how are you," the level where worlds are expanded, and human actions seen from this angle of submarine purity. The strength to formulate in *the instant* this very succession is the work itself. Globe of duration, volume born under a fortuitious pressure.

The mind carries in it new rays of possibilities: centralize them, capture them on the lens which is neither physical nor defined—popularly—the soul. The ways of expressing them, transforming them: the means. Clear golden brilliance—a faster beating of spring wings.¹⁵⁹

Art has now become a clear golden brilliance, beating faster than wings, a procession of continual differences, carried on rays, through the lens of the soul. That is to say, art has become the cinema (or the cinema, as the top art, has subsumed all others). Tzara related this new art to collage, and in doing so, tied together collage and film.

Giving to each element its integrity, its autonomy, a necessary condition for the creation of new constellations each has its place in the group. A will to the word: a being upright, an image, a unique, fervent construction, of a dense color and intensity, communion with life.¹⁶⁰

The cinema impressed on the *Dadaisten* what Anton Kaes has called "a revolutionary conception," and that conception—derived from the importance of the montage principle in film—made collage urgent for the Dada artists. "Montage problematizes the relationship between [the] object of perception and the subject of perception. Montage does not allow a coherent perspective in which the subject is in control."¹⁶¹ Dada collage also acknowledged our inability to form a coherent perspective on an object, and this was among DADA's most radical contributions to the arts. Their embracing that practice indicates how the cinema was influencing the other arts.

The idea of collage also played a role in the development of the art of noise. Before Dadaists developed the idea of an assemblage of noises, Futurists had conceived of *Bruitismo* or Bruitism, which extended the strategy of integrating existing materials into the work of art from the visual arts to music. Dada music followed suit: in 1917, Erik Satie (1866–1925), a composer associated with the Dada movement, collaborated with Pablo Picasso, Jean Cocteau (1889–1963), and Léonide Massine (1895–1979) on *Parade*, the famous ballet. Apart from his piano music, this is probably Satie's best-known piece. For performances, orchestras had to be supplemented by typewriters, pistols, factory sirens, and airplane engines. The work, which depicts the passing of a circus parade, contains much musical slapstick. Like much Dada collage, its juxtapositions are often humorous.

An interest in chance operations also helped foster collage. Duchamp embraced with an enthusiasm equal to Arp's the idea of using aleatory procedures to control features of his constructions. Thus, when making *The Large Glass*, he fired paint-tipped matchsticks at the glass with a toy pistol. Max Ernst, too, gave chance a key role in shaping his canvases, and in his writings he acknowledged the important role that chance sometimes played in his collage work: "One can define the collage as an alchemical composite of two or more heterogeneous elements, resulting from their unexpected meeting, owing either to a wilful act working out of a clairvoyant move towards systematic confusion and the *dérèglement de tous les sens* (disordering of all the senses; Rimbaud), or chance, or a will predisposed to chance."¹⁶²

Their statements suggest that some of the Dadaists were interested mainly in the individualist implications of chance operations (this, despite the anti-psychological quip that Tzara appended to his instructions on "How to Make a Dadaist Poem"). Duchamp offered the view that the outcomes of chance are affected by the subject: "Your chance is not the same as mine," he once explained, "just as your throw of the dice will rarely be the same as mine."¹⁶³ Ball and Arp seem to have believed that the results of chance are determined in some measure, if not completely, by the unconscious. But that does not mean that their use of chance operations was without religious significance, for they seemed to believe that the language of the unconscious had divine origins: "Alles, was wir Zufall nennen, ist von Gott [All that we call chance comes from God]," Novalis had said. Ball and Arp might have agreed.

Dadaists also realized that chance operations had the effect of dissolving the self so that something higher might enter the space the self formerly occupied: "The dadaist puts more trust in the honesty of events than in the wit of people. He can get people cheaply, himself included. He no longer believes in the comprehension of things from *one* point of view, and yet he is still so convinced of the unity of all beings, of the totality of all things, that he suffers from the dissonances to the point of self-disintegration."¹⁶⁴

The politics implicit in a radical decentring of the self, in displacing the self from the centre of all activities, and of allowing the soul to communicate in new ways with the non-self, were formulated by the early members of the Dada circle:¹⁶⁵ “November 21, 1916—On the criticism of individualism. The emphatic Ego always has interests, whether they are greedy, domineering, vain, or lazy. It always follows appetites . . . Renunciation of interests means renunciation of one’s Ego. The Ego and the interests are identical. That is why the individualistic-egotistic ideal of the Renaissance developed into the combination of mechanized appetites that we see bleeding and rotting before our eyes.”¹⁶⁶

FURTHER ON COLLAGE’S NEW NOTION OF FORM

Dada artists’ interest in collage makes evident just how radical their notion of form was and how markedly it diverged from the conception of form that had undergirded the more Kantian practices within modernism, which rested on a conviction about the unifying power of aesthetic form. The Kantian strain in modernism posited that a successfully wrought form is one that has sufficient strength to wrest the materials from which it is made out of their conventional contexts and, by so doing, to strip them of their conventional significations. In the stead of those significations that the recontextualization of every element has stripped away, and of those ways of experiencing dependent on convention, the successfully wrought form offers new significations and new ways of experiencing the materials that depend on the relations the elements take on as they are incorporated into the artwork. A successfully wrought form cancels many of the attributes that had belonged to the element in its independent existence and endows that element with new qualities that depend on the relations it assumes to the artwork’s other elements and to the overarching form. Collage dispenses with this conception of form: the overarching form of the artwork (and the very notion of an overarching form had a considerably attenuated importance in collage by comparison with the aesthetic forms that the mainstream of modernism favoured) does not cancel the attributes that belong to the elements in their independent existence.

The radical nature of DADA’s difference can be seen when we compare the ways that the Dadaists on one hand, and the Cubists and Futurists on the other, used simultaneity. One must allow that the Dadaists’ interest in simultaneity no doubt derived partly from the explorations of the Futurists and Cubists. The visual styles of both the Futurists and the Cubists were urban styles that developed out of the sense that in cities (the modern megalopolis), the pace of life had sped up so much that succession was accelerating towards simultaneity—and some Dadaists shared these interests. Also like the Futurists, the Dadaists took it that the dynamism of technology was responsible for this acceleration; and like some of the Cubists (and Fernand Léger, 1881–1955,

a painter with strong affinities for Cubism), Dadaists sometimes celebrated the effects of this acceleration on consciousness. However, the Futurists and Cubists strove to incorporate paintings' dynamic qualities into a balanced form over which the principles of harmony held sway, while Dadaists, however, attempted no such resolution. They remained committed to recovering a form of the primitive within technology.

Similar remarks can be made about the differences between Cubist and Dada collage. The influence of aesthetic principles derived from Kant has persuaded many to overestimate the degree to which individual elements are transformed by entering into collage relations, for all forms of collage accord the incorporated elements an unusually high degree of autonomy. Cubist collage had pioneered a form of unity different from that which characterized any preceding art. Georges Braque (1882–1963) and Picasso, but especially Braque, used collage to incorporate an alien entity (a bit of newspaper, wallpaper, partial words, letters, and other found images) into a painting, but these alien entities were not subsumed into the painting's pictorial space; because of its stern resistance to being changed, the element was not transformed to the same degree that elements incorporated into artworks usually are, and as a result, it imposed itself on the work's formal system. Elements are what they are, and they remain so even as they are incorporated into a formal system—the only space in which they exist is the painting's intractably physical support. Thus, collage challenged the idea of a unity that transfigured every element in the painting, and in the process cancelled completely its independent being and subsumed the transformed element into the whole, as an aspect of the whole.

Yet some collages accord the elements they incorporate more autonomy and some less, and Cubist and Futurist collages are usually highly integrated wholes. Regarding the real-world elements incorporated into Cubist and Futurist collages, we can comment on the relation between their textures and that of their enviroing elements, on the relation between their colours and those of their enviroing elements, and on their mass as a factor that balances masses around them. In Picasso's *Still Life with Chair Caning* (1912)—the first Cubist collage—the piece of imitation wicker-cane linoleum is an integral part of the composition: the painted forms above are all strongly linear and so harmonize with the faux caning. The rope that is used as the frame forms a rhythmic counterpoint to the faux wicker caning. To the left of the composition are the painted letters "JOU"—presumably from *jour* or *journal* (or perhaps *jouer*)—and the forms of the letters mirror the shape of the chair caning (the dark circular forms in the chair-caning mirror the shape of the "O" especially, but also the "U" and the "J"). More than that, the painted letters testify to the transformation of an ordinary graphic form into an aes-

thetic element: the word's truncation drains the series of letters of meaning and thereby turns the letters into simple, graphic shapes. Overpainting the "O" with a mist of colour, and piercing the "U" with a ray of light, further aestheticizes these graphic elements. Placing the faux wicker-caning linoleum in the bottom half of the canvas makes it seem to represent a tabletop—but Picasso also distances the form from what it represents by painting lateral and cross strokes over the linoleum piece.

Braque's early collage also harmonizes the elements it incorporates into a tight aesthetic unity. His *Aria de Bach* (Still Life BACH, 1912–13) includes three differently coloured strips of paper that do not represent any object; rather, they serve to create chromatic variety (as the different instruments in a string trio do). Braque also plays with the conventions of spatial illusionism: the paper strip at the far left of the canvas is cut out around the charcoal lines that suggest the form of the violin at the centre of the canvas; accordingly, it seems to disappear behind the violin—that is, it seems to be a background for the violin. On the other hand, the centre swatch, which (because it has forms drawn on it) also seems transparent, appears to be layered over the violin (while the third is neutral). Braque interrelates the drawn forms with the paper strips using an oblique line that crosses the strings (a bow?) and a heavily charcoaled f-hole. Each element of the composition thus modifies the other elements.

The same point can be made concerning Juan Gris's (1887–1927) oil and collage *Bouteille de vin rosé* (Bottle of Rosé Wine, 1914). That work is an extraordinary exercise in balance and harmony: the white rim of the bottle rhymes with the white of the advertisement for "Vin" below, creating a fine contrapuntal balance.¹⁶⁷

Dada collage is different—fewer of the qualities of the elements it incorporates have been cancelled. Dada collage aspires to that condition in which the individual elements incorporated into the artwork become aesthetic signifiers without first having undergone any semiotic transformation. To achieve this, they must function as signs of themselves, for only by being signs of themselves can they escape being subjected to the artist's preconceived ideas and from roles imposed on them from without (whether or not these roles take into account their inherent characteristics). The spiritual relevance of allowing every object to come to full presence in the work, rather than converting it into a sign of another reality (as the elements of a representational work are), was not lost on Dada artists. Is not the language that grows out of objects themselves "the real language of paradise?" Ball asked.¹⁶⁸

Dadaist collage, then, aspired to be a conglomerate of elements that are nearly untransformed by the aesthetic whole into which they are incorporated. Tzara's art, to take it for our example, allows contradiction; and not only

that—it also permits nearly independent elements to develop, each along its own line, allowing them to intersect of their own accord, as though randomly, *sans cause et sans théorie*. Where they intersect, these disparate elements (these contraries) become equivalent to one another, and so to all that is. Thus the new art is “absolute in the purity of its cosmic and regulated chaos, eternal in that globule that is a second which has no duration, no breath, no light and no control.”¹⁶⁹

Dadaists, at their most radical, sought to decompose the work of art so that its collapse might provoke extreme, even violent sensations. They sought to do away with systems that ensured that a created form would be a plenitude sufficient to render the work of art a wholly present, fully divulged all-in-all that could be completely taken in, even if only through the most devoted attention. They rejected the notions of formal plenitude (believing it offered no analogy to the plenitude of all beings), coherence, and unity of synthesized form as emblematic of the culture of *logos*, of reason, which had led to the trench warfare that played such an important role in spawning the movement. The Kantian aesthetics of form (the basis of the mainstream of modernist aesthetics) had valorized the integral form over the elements it comprised, for they celebrated the capacity of form to transform the elements that enter a work of art to bring their features into accord with those of the work’s other elements and with the work’s overarching unity. Dadaists’ conception of form was the opposite: Dadaists’ tactic of affording a high measure of autonomy to the elements that an artwork comprises allowed the elements to preserve many of their ordinary features. The contradictory, illogical discourse they used rendered undecipherable and indeterminate the meaning of the whole and, accordingly, the contribution of each incorporated element to it. The truth of the work’s overall form never attains the fullness of presence; but conversely, the attenuation of the force of the work’s overall form strengthens the force and presence with which each of the constitutive elements asserts itself. The metaleptic riot that forments defies discursivity.

Dadaist collage constructions allow the constitutive elements to assert themselves with an almost primitive intensity. The raw presence with which elements assert themselves underpins the primitiveness of Dada art, strengthening the force with which it can testify to a longing for the world before the machine—Janco’s use of masks, various Dadaist performers’ use of African percussion instruments (including cowbells), and the atavistic costuming of the Zürich cabaret events testify to this longing. The modern cultures of abundance have made us jaded, and as a result, the feel, the smell, and the taste of objects that surround us no longer cause strong sensations. And we have lost the connection with nature in another way—industrialization itself has ensured that manufactured objects claim priority over the raw materials that

nature supplies. Dadaists tried, by a thousand means, to revitalize perception so that it might recover some of the mystery and intensity it had before commodity capitalism had dulled it with an endless stream of manufactured goods of a decidedly limited variety; and this revitalization, they believed, should be directed towards the world we live in, not some transcendent realm of perfected form that denies the individuality of its elements. Reawakening our perception of the individual, concrete existents was a means of undoing the deleterious effects of capitalist economics, the very system that had sent young men to appalling deaths in the trenches of northern Europe. If capitalist economics used ideas of fine design to aestheticize our surroundings, and if it deployed the idea of refining perception to justify this aestheticization, Dadaists proposed to turn perception savage—and one means to this end was to allow objects to present themselves in their full brutality. This was why Dadaist artists adopted *Bruitism* from Luigi Russolo (1883–1947), Balilla Pratella (1880–1955), and Filippo Tommaso Marinetti. The mechanomorphic character of some of their output, and the harshness of their collage forms—the piling up of gears, wheels, spark plugs, and re-engineered humanoid forms in the drawings and paintings of Francis Picabia's mechanical period, for example—are testimony to this desire. Schwitters's habit of composing his works with society's cast-offs and his willingness to use whatever came his way—postmarked stamps, bits of wire, cogs, doorknobs, used packing materials, the detritus of the advertising industry (such as tobacco labels)—speak of the same aim. The raw presence of the brutal object itself cannot be discounted or explained away by any transcendent principle; thus, that presence serves to overcome the aestheticization of reality, which Dadaists viewed as a means of cloaking the horrible practices perpetrated by those who collude in the social lie.¹⁷⁰ Dadaists proposed to use shock effects—a technique pitched against the pacification of spectators by the anticathexes to which they have been subjected—to jolt those spectators into an atavistic awareness of objects and the recognition that they really *are* animate beings.

But the most radical implication of Dadaist collage was directed against the phenomenon of power itself. Foucault has demonstrated, with admirable cogency, that power is what sanctions meaning. The anti-logical character of Dada art was aimed at subverting power.¹⁷¹ For it is power that, within any epistemic system, regulates the integration of primary fragments of meaning; but for power, the primary elements of meaning would constitute nothing but an untotizable assembly. In establishing the law that regulates this integration, power determines what is good. In a Dada work, no *logos* rules definitively over the integration of the fragments. The form of the work is not measured against the standard of perfected, harmonious form. Dadaists believed that to deconstruct the integrity of the artwork, to affirm the intrinsic value of

the fragment that was not incorporated into a form regulated by law (i.e., by power), was to weaken the hold of the prevailing epistémè, the undergirdings of the system of meaning (of thinking) that had sent so many good young men to their deaths.

The Dada approach to producing collages ensured that the objects incorporated would clash rather than fuse into a balanced, satisfyingly proportionate whole. This is also evident in Dada typography as encountered in their publications *Cabaret Voltaire*, *Dada*, *Der Zeltweg*, *Der Dada*, and *Die Schammade* (*Dadameter*); in the *Lautgedichten* (sound poetry) of Hugo Ball, Raoul Hausmann, and Kurt Schwitters; in the photomontage of the Berlin Dadaists John Heartfield (Johann Herzfelde), Hanna Höch, Johannes Baader, and George Grosz; in Schwitters's MERZ constructions; and in Hans Arp's marvellous, whimsical wooden constructions.¹⁷² But it is most obvious in their performances, for they often allowed activities to go on simultaneously, without determining in advance precisely how the simultaneous events would interact.

Among the most radical of the Dada collage artists was Max Ernst, who produced an extraordinarily varied body of collage work during his Dada years, moving freely among various source materials and techniques. One can easily feel when surveying his collage work that he pressed a variety of visual forms, drawn from the veritable glut of the imagery mechanical reproduction had made widely available, into the service of a new artistic practice, *au-delà de la peinture* (beyond painting)—and, in moving art beyond painting towards collage, he would move it towards cinema.

Around 1920 he developed a technique called “overpainting,” which involved partially painting over a photograph or illustration, isolating certain fragments of the images while effacing others. Overpainting was perhaps the perfect Dada pursuit, as the role of the artist became that of playfully modifying real-world elements.¹⁷³ Through clever games of hiding and revealing necessary details, Ernst accentuated the contradictory relationships that already existed on a perfectly banal catalogue page, emphasizing disparities in size and scale and forcing orderly elements into nonsensical relationships.

In 1920 he produced an overpainted work titled *1 kupferblech 1 zinkblech 1 gummituch 2 tastzirkel 1 abflußfernrohr 1 röhrender mensch* (1 Copper Plate 1 Zinc Plate 1 Rubber Cloth 2 Calipers 1 Drainpipe Telescope 1 Pipe Man; sometimes referred to as *Two Ambiguous Figures*). This piece depicts two humanoid forms: the first is small, made up of slightly rounded shapes; the second is taller and sharper in its lines and forms. The painted lines and forms serve to emphasize the uneven composition, making the figures seem even more absurd. Yet the reference to the classic, turn-of-the-century husband-and-wife portrait is unmistakable and biting—most notably in the blankness of expression produced by their empty, goggle eyes. Both figures stare

placidly towards what would be the camera's eye if this were the traditional husband-and-wife portrait that it alludes to. Ernst has built up the forms from the page of a teaching-aids catalogue. Two pairs of goggles form heads, while various bottles, pipes, and fragments of mechanisms are joined by colourfully painted shapes, lines, and shadows to form the bodies angling out beneath the heads. Ernst has covered over much of the catalogue page with an empty landscape that provides little more than rudimentary depth by alluding to a horizon line and a few cloudlike forms.

The overpainted work is full of bright colours and visual contradictions. The woodcut illustrations are recognizable enough to remain linked to their mundane origins. By overpainting, Ernst has isolated and emphasized these real-world elements, thus heightening their value as signs of themselves. The realism of the straps and bits of hose is in direct conflict with the exaggerated flatness of the landscape that surrounds the figures and with the painted elements that join their various body organs into two discombobulated wholes.

Ernst's collages were different from most of those produced by Dada artists in one key respect: while most Dada collages set their elements into stark contention, Ernst obscured the distinctions between the part and the whole—however stylistically dissimilar the materials of his Dada works were, the resulting works achieved an impressive unity. (This unity was so important to Ernst that he rephotographed many of his collages in order to conceal the edges of the component elements; furthermore, he asked Tzara to instruct the engraver of his *FaTaGaGa* [*Fabrication de Tableaux Gasométriques Garantis*] collages—pieces for which Arp supplied the poetic captions and titles and Ernst the visuals—to hide the seams so that the manner in which they were constructed would be concealed.) Ernst's technique suggests that he was straining towards Surrealism *ab initio*: his collage compositions usually involve surprising juxtapositions and seem like dream images; yet, by virtue of the detail and seamlessness of their representation, they take on the density of the real. The phantasmic becomes actual in these works.

Arp's work highlights several other purposes of collage techniques (though ones that we have already alluded to), viz., to overcome "sense" (by which he meant propositional thinking) and power, because sense stimulates the life-negating activities of reason; and to dynamize a more elemental, more natural, more primitive form of thinking:¹⁷⁴

Dada aimed to destroy the reasonable deceptions of man and recover the natural and unreasonable order. Dada wanted to replace the logical nonsense of the men of today by the illogically senseless. That is why we pounded with all our might on the big drum of Dada and trumpeted the praises of unreason. Dada gave the Venus de Milo an enema and permitted Laöcoon and his sons to relieve themselves after thousands of years of struggle with the good sausage Python.

Philosophies have less value for Dada than an old abandoned toothbrush, and Dada abandons them to the great world leaders. Dada denounced the infernal ruses of the official vocabulary of wisdom. Dada is for the senseless, which does not mean nonsense. Dada is senseless like nature. Dada is for nature and against art. Dada is direct like nature. Dada is for infinite sense and definite means.¹⁷⁵

This explains well the idea behind tearing up a drawing and allowing the pieces to fall where they may: the pieces' relations to one another, as they settle on the floor, have been decided by natural processes, not by any aesthetic principles as conceived by the artist. Arp's woodcuts use primitive forms to a similar end, for they produce unnerving and mysterious effects. Hugo Ball's sound poems were also intended to produce experiences of religious significance. He sought peace—the peace that passeth understanding. In a quite similar vein, Tristan Tzara later expressed his reasons for refusing to join André Breton's Surrealist movement in pacifist terms. In a letter dated 3 February 1922, he wrote, "I consider that the present stagnation, resulting from the mixture of tendencies, from the confusion of genres and the substitution of groups for individualities, is more dangerous than reaction. I prefer therefore to hold myself apart [*tranquille*] rather than to encourage an action I consider harmful to that *search for the new*, which I love so much, even if it takes the form of indifference."¹⁷⁶ Tzara's ideas about indifference here were in line with the "quasi-Buddhist" ideas that were so important to him.

Dada artists (Ernst aside) used various means to ensure that the elements their works comprised maintained a strong measure of independence. The political commitments of the Berlin Dadaists led them to insist that their Dada works maintain a close relation to reality. So John Heartfield began to create photomontages. Like Ernst's collages, these works provoked astonishment by fragmenting forms and then recombining those fragments in novel ways; but whereas Ernst's collage practices resulted in a poetic reorganization of reality, Heartfield's efforts resulted in stinging political diatribes against corruption, greed, capitalism, and militarism. A principal means for ensuring that the elements in their works maintained a strong measure of independence was to use aleatory processes to decide the combinations of those elements. Kurt Schwitters continued to produce his MERZ works; these included collages created by using anything that came his way, but especially the ephemera of commercial culture, which he rescued from its customarily rapid fall into oblivion.¹⁷⁷ A typical collage by Schwitters might include discarded bus tickets that he had found in the street, fragments of commercial flyers, pieces of string and bits of wire, little pieces of coloured paper, and a bit of wood broken off from some unidentifiable object. In this way, he made the detritus of commercial society seem valuable. He created sculptures (or assemblies) and poems using the same principle—with the

latter, he created compositions by arranging phrases culled from billboards, newspapers, posters, and other sorts of public notices.

The Dadaists extended collage techniques by incorporating forms created by stochastic processes. In their use of aleatory techniques, they anticipated the Surrealists. Indeed, collage (that ever so cinematic method) had a crucial role in the origins of Surrealism. Breton first saw Max Ernst's collages when he was unpacking them for an exhibition at the Paris gallery Au Sans Pareil. Later, he asserted that in them he discovered the principles of Surrealist painting already fully developed. Ernst's collages represented a completely new concept of visual organization. In November 1922, Breton denounced DADA and called for a new art that would overcome its limitations. The Surrealists would use chance operations to generate spiritual and metaphysical revelations, while many Dada artists (the "destructive" faction) used them more as attacks on the affiliation of *logos* and power and as means to gain access to the primal.¹⁷⁸ Dadaists belonging to Dada's "destructive" wing used collage and aleatory techniques to produce shock or humour and, especially, the liberatory delight of nonsense, while the Surrealists would seek to reveal the workings of a higher power, which they often located in the subconscious. Dadaists generally believed that through aleatory techniques they could escape sense (Tristan Tzara declared that "a comprehensible work is the product of a journalist").¹⁷⁹ This distinguished both Dada factions from Surrealism: as Surrealists understood it, all automatist linguistic productions, even those that seemed nonsensical, were, like the verbal production of the insane, invested with meaning, and this meaning addressed us and affected us, even when we weren't conscious of it.¹⁸⁰ While the Surrealists sought to produce hermetic structures, the Dadaists tried to rend the tissue of language, for language is the house of reason. Thus, Kurt Schwitters's most famous creations, his sound poems, which are compositions of non-verbal sounds, return the human voice to its primal condition. While the Surrealists traced automatism's provenance to trance sessions, séances, divinations, and crystal gazing (and celebrated those connections), the Dadaists were more interested in automatism's potential to release consciousness from the authoritarian constraints of the *logos*, and the binding together of elements in an apprehensive gestalt.

DADA AND LANGUAGE

As we have seen, the ideas about language that some of the Dadaists held were related to spiritual beliefs. Indeed, the Dadaist Hugo Ball expounded ideas about the primal word that were similar to those of some of the other participants in the Dada movement—and he linked these to a religio-magical

conception of *logos*. In *Die Flucht aus der Zeit* (Flight Out of Time, 1927), he wrote of charging words with strengths and energies that would help us rediscover the evangelical concept of the “word” (*logos*) as a magical, complex image.¹⁸¹ Ball’s reference to charging the word with new forces and energies relates to the Dada conception of art as gesture; the Bavarian composer Carl Orff, only slightly later, would expound similar ideas about *music* as gesture—ideas that likewise arose from convictions about the importance of primitive, non-intellectual experience.¹⁸² It is within this matrix that Ball’s allusion to *logos* in the passage above finds its significance, for the religious conception of *logos* highlights the creating power of the word. Ball was claiming, then, that Dada actions were returning to the word those primitive energies that empowered it to bring forth the world—this was the essence of Ball’s views on the strength of Dadaist language.

But Ball was not the only Dada artist who took an interest in occult ideas of a creative life force (or of signatures and correspondences). So did Raoul Hausmann, who related those ideas explicitly to the cinema. “Film is a form of life,” Hausmann wrote in 1930, “and, like all forms, it is to be understood only as an expression of the correspondences among the forces living in things.”¹⁸³

The belief that it would be possible to restore a primitive force to language, and that to do so would help cure society’s ills, was a common one in Dada circles. Thus, an entire evening at the Galerie Dada, early in 1917, was devoted to Ball’s reading of a phonetic poem. The evening was an extraordinary performance: Ball first had himself inserted into a shiny blue cardboard pillar; he then had himself carried onto the stage, since he could not move himself, and began reciting, in a majestic fashion, “gadji beri bimba glandridi laula lonni cadori . . .”¹⁸⁴ He continued declaiming the poems and, as the reading continued (and despite howls from the audience, who took the performance as a gag), more and more adopted the manner of a priest.

Language must be reformed, Ball insisted; its connections with the ruling *logos* must be severed. He insisted on creating an individual language, one that was dependent on his personal rhythms and on his own manner of enunciating vowels and consonants. He devoted himself to formulating words, the pulsations of which were adequate to the particular experiences they were intended to convey. This enterprise would recast language’s semiotic status by abolishing the relation between signifier and referent that is the usual basis of meaning. Indeed, as Martin Gaughan points out in “Dada Poetics: Flight Out of Sign?” (1996), Dadaist practices were implicitly allied to the linguistic theory of the Bakhtin circle (comprising Bakhtin himself, Volosinov, and Medvedev).¹⁸⁵ Gaughan writes that the Bahktin circle in its semiotic theories accorded primacy to language as practice (utterance) and that they criticized indirectly the “abstract rationalism” of Sausurrean linguistic theories and,

more directly, the methods of Russian Formalist literary criticism. Against Saussure, they argued that a word does not have fixed meaning, assigned to it by its place within the system of language—in fact, language is not a system. Language, indeed even the individual word, is the site of a struggle; the whole of language, and every one of its terms, is fissured by the variety of social contexts in which it operates.¹⁸⁶ In the most celebrated chapter of his most renowned book, Bakhtin averred that the word

is shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and accents . . . Directed towards its object [it] enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments, and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all of this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers.¹⁸⁷

Even if it is impossible to return language (and consciousness) to their adamic condition, Ball believed, we can develop a poetic form of performance that will activate words' primal force.

For poetry, Ball maintained, we must withdraw into the deepest alchemy of words, into their most sacred ground. Such ideas would have appealed to Velimir Khlebnikov, a self-described “eternal prisoner of assonance.” Khlebnikov thought of the alphabet as a table of sounds; accordingly, he attempted to immerse himself in the depths of the Russian etymons, in search of a mythical pan-Slavonic language whose shoots were growing through the thickets of modern Russian.

PARALLELS WITH THE RUSSIAN TRANSRATIONALISTS AND ANDREI BELY

The theories of Bakhtin's circle were in part a response (by way of both celebration and critique) to the radical poetic experiments of Velimir (Viktor) Khlebnikov (1885–1922) and Aleksei Kruchenykh (1886–1968). These experiments, conducted under the banner of *заум* (zaum or transrationalism), had similarities with Dada *Lautgedichten*.¹⁸⁸ The *zaum* group of Russian Futurists emphasized the intrinsic features of words (i.e., their graphic and phonetic characteristics) over their extrinsic properties (i.e., their reference). Accordingly, they focused their experimentation on developing the visual and aural potentials of language. Citing the example of hieroglyphs, Nikolai Burliuk (1890–1920) proposed heightening the super-rational communicative possibilities of the word by enhancing words through synaesthetic uses of colour and graphics. (He even claimed that Nikoli Fedorov's [1827–1903] cosmist philosophy endorsed such practices.) In a similar vein, Velimir Khlebnikov

asserted, “We have stopped considering word formation and word pronunciation according to grammatical rules, having come to see in letters only *what guides speech* . . . We have come to ascribe content to words according to their graphic and *phonetic characteristics*.”¹⁸⁹ In their manifesto “The Word as Such” (written in 1913, published 1930), Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh proposed that words be separated from references and that the word be valued for its own sake.

A key to understanding what they meant by “valuing the word for its own sake” is to recognize that the *zaum* poets drew on a primitivist idea of language that celebrated an irrationalism that they associated with premodern cultures. They embraced the idea of premodern culture’s strength and glory when they took, as the name for their group (founded in 1910), Hylaea, the old Greek name for their region, Scythia—this new gesture drew on a myth of the ancient Scythians that extolled a mystical nationalism.¹⁹⁰

A slightly later, but related, avant-garde group actually called themselves the Scythians after the fierce spiritual revolutionaries who swept across the Russian steppe around 500 BCE; it formed around the critic Ivanov-Razumnik (pseudonym of Razumnik Vasilievich Ivanov, 1878–1946). The group produced no coherent philosophy, nor any coherent literary theory; their interests, however, revolved around the integration of East and West (i.e., of the spiritual/intuitive and the material/rational orders) and the destruction and renewal of the world. They disdained Marx’s philosophy as a bourgeois ideology, but they also believed that the Bolshevik Revolution was a prelude to a far-reaching spiritual revolution. Their program (such as it was) integrated ideas drawn from Russian Symbolism with ideas adopted from socialist revolutionaries. In many respects, their agenda sought to realize a mystical anarchism erected on an Anthroposophic base. Efforts such as Andrei Bely’s (1880–1934) to combine Marxism with spirituality would continue for many years, until the declaration of the one true scientific teaching ended them, and the Scythians’ political theology of language became a dead issue with the publication of Stalin’s contribution to linguistics, “Concerning Marxism in Linguistics” (or “Marxism and Problems of Linguistics,” 1950), though for some time before, it had been experiencing great difficulty.

Hylaea developed out of the first Futurist group in Russia, the Ego-Futurists of 1911. Because they did not form a cohesive unit, the Ego-Futurists had little impact on the Russian art scene. Their demise led to the founding of Hylaea, whose members fused ideas drawn from Italian Futurism with ideas taken from French Cubism (Hylaea later renamed itself the Cubo-Futurists). Hylaea was led by the iconoclastic graphic artist David Burliuk, the father of Russian Futurism (whose influence on the direction of the Russian Futurist movement was comparable to that which Marinetti had on Italian Futur-

ism). Hylaea's leading figures included poets (Velimir Khlebnikov, Aleksei Kruchenykh [1886–1968], Vladimir Vladimirovitch Mayakovsky [1893–1930], David Burliuk [1882–1967], Elena Guro [1887–1913]), the painter-composer Mikhail Matiushin (1861–1934), and musicians (Nikolai Kulbin [1868–1917], Vladimir Baranoff-Rossine [1888–1944]).

Hylaea was militant on matters of art—they called their first manifesto, issued in 1912, “Пощёчина Общественному Вкусу” (Poshchetchina obshchestvennomu vkusu, A Slap in the Face of Public Taste).¹⁹¹ In its style, it was reminiscent of Marinetti's manifestos; in its content, it was ultra-progressive—the Hylaea poets exhorted the public to “throw Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc., etc.,” the heroes of progressive Russians, “overboard from the Ship of Modernity.”¹⁹² Yet its hypermodernity was tinged with primitivism.¹⁹³ Khlebnikov praised peasant folk magic incantations as manifestations of transrational language in folklore, and his interests in these matters led him to assert that the magic of words had always exerted the utmost power on humans—the power of sorcery.¹⁹⁴ Khlebnikov was especially intrigued by the primitive roots of language: he believed that everyday language had evolved from speech sounds with primitive root meanings. He maintained that these primary sounds and their meanings were common to all languages, and he asserted that elementary terms of language represented spatial relations / visual forms. Thus, in all languages, “v” denoted rotation around a point; “kh,” a sort of “x” sound usually denoted by a closed curve; and “sh” denoted the fusion of several planes into a common being. It was from common sounds like these that he constructed *zaum*. *Zaum*, therefore, could become a universal language. The task facing the new artists, the “artists of thought, was to build words out of these basic units of thought”—of *gestural* thought (the idea is reminiscent of G. Vico). In carrying out these tasks, artists should understand that the first sound in any word has a key role, guiding all those that come after it (so words that begin with the same consonant relate to concepts that are generically related). We shall return to Khlebnikov's ideas on primary meaning presently.

This universal language would assume its place beside ordinary language by an act of will. Accordingly, the Russian Futurists associated this avant-garde language with masculinity. Kruchenykh went so far as to declare that “because of a foul / contempt for / women and / children in our / language there will be / only the masculine / gender.”¹⁹⁵ He later tried to put this principle into effect in his libretto for *Победа над Солнцем* (Pobeda nad solntsem, Victory over the Sun, 1913).

These ideas were later developed by the Scythian Andrei Bely, a major writer whose poems circulated among Western European avant-gardists. In the fall of 1922, Bely published *Глоссалолія: Поэма о звуке* (Glossalolija:

Poema o zvuke, Glossalolia [*sic*]: A Poem about Sound) at the Hermann & Co. Typographie.¹⁹⁶ The work is a complex amalgam of philosophy, poetry, and religion (cosmogony)—an extended exploration of the hermeneutics of sound in which Bely attempts to fathom the esoteric relationship between sound and sense (Rudolf Steiner and Jacob Böhme figure prominently in the text). Bely described the work as “an improvisation on sound-themes” (*импровизация на звуковые темы*, *improvizacija na zvukovye temy*) and as “a poem of sound” (*звуковая поэма*, *zvukovaja poema*); and he separated his interests from the interests of those who were developing scientific principles for analyzing literary texts (the application of such principles to his texts would, he averred, be “completely senseless”).¹⁹⁷ At the same time, the work is a speculative treatise on the origins of language and on the hermetic relationship between sound and meaning, grounded in an examination of common Indo-European roots (after the fashion of Kruchenykh).

Bely’s interests in etymological questions were influenced by his exposure to the writings of the Ukrainian linguist Aleksandr Afanas’evich Potebnia (1835–91). For Potebnia, the individual word was a poetic form. A psychological/ontological theory undergirded this conclusion. A human mind is informed by a reserve of knowledge about the world; when that mind encounters an unknown entity, it draws on those reserves to produce an image of that object. The image, therefore, is an amalgam of self and other, for it is constituted through the comparison of the brain activities induced by the unknown object with data in the mind’s reserve. What Potebnia called the “inner form” of the word then registered this comparison. For example, he pointed out, *язвить* (*iazvit’*) means “to inflict wounds” (the Russian word for “wound” is *язвы* [*iazvy*]); *язва* (*iazva*), the Russian word for “ulcer,” *то, что болит* (*to, chto bolit*), “that which burns,” while *боль* (*bol’*), the Russian word for “pain,” denotes *то, что жжёт* (*to, cho zhzhjet*), also “that which burns.” Potebnia inferred from these connections that the “inner form” of *язвить* (*iazvit’*) involved an image of burning; he proposed that this inner form was connected to the Sanskrit root, *indh*, meaning “to burn.” Potebnia conjectured that the connection between the ideas of a wound and of burning was through a synecdochal isolation—among all the possible features of our experience of being wounded—of a burning sensation. The experience of being wounded is protean, multivalent, and labile, and the mind focuses on a single one among all these possible sensations. The word associated with the experience is characterized by an unconscious intentionality, a sort of cognitive agency that fixes meaning by isolating one among a variety of sensations. The word *язвить* (*iazvit’*) is itself a trope, a figure of speech in which a part (a single feature) stands for the whole. Poetry and language—at its origin, at least—are therefore ontologically identical: poetry differs from the single

word (in its originary state) only by being more elaborated. The *energeia* that brings each into being, and that maintains each in being, is the same, viz., the impulse to produce a synthetic representation of reality. Potebnia argued that this desire to produce a synthetic picture of the world gave rise to the inner form of words, not to fixed, standardized tokens with which to think. (This conception of language resembles that of the twentieth-century English literary theorist and philosopher of art T.E. Hulme. Like Hulme, Potebnia recognized that over time the originary word lost its poetic thrust and entered a second mode of existence, as prose; in this mode, it served the purposes of scientific cognition.) *Zaum* poet Aleksei Kruchenykh, in “Дэкларацiи слова, как такового” (Deklaratsiia slova, kak takovogo, Declaration of the Word as Such, 1913), contended that terms in natural languages had become shopworn and that artists had the right to create new words. His account parallels Potebnia’s account of ordinary poetic impulses declining into prosaic ones. Kruchenykh also proposed that “language that has not yet frozen” could be taken as a synonym for *zaum*.

During the writing of *Петербург* (Peterburg, Petersburg; begun ca. 1912, this work first appeared in Berlin in 1922 and then again, in a different version, in 1928), Bely became interested in Anthroposophy. He also read Madame Blavatsky’s *The Secret Doctrine* (1888). Bely spent the years 1910 to 1916 abroad and for several of those years lived in Dornach, Switzerland, studying Anthroposophy with Rudolf Steiner. What Bely added to Kruchenykh’s views derived from his deep interest in eurhythmy, which was stimulated by his Anthroposophical studies. According to Bely, language originated in the tongue’s impulse to move and, thereby, to produce sound. That the single Russian word *язык* (*jazyk*) refers to both “language” and “tongue” is a clue to this identification. In a strange extension of Vico’s thought, Bely maintained sounds are gestures of the tongue (an “armless dancer”) in the mouth, comparable to other physical gestures (of the sort a eurhythmist refines and expands). Combinations of certain root sounds originally held meanings that we can no longer recognize. Thus, Bely connects his *звукословие* (*zvukoslovie*, “sound wording”) with *glossolalia* (*glossa*, Greek, “tongue”; and *lalia*, Greek, “speaking”; so together, *glossa* and *lalia* mean “speaking in tongues”).

As Thomas R. Beyer Jr. points out, Bely expanded this core principle into a cosmology, a “physiological” refinement of eurhythmy. According to Bely, these core lingual gestures (these gestures of the tongue associated with Indo-European root words) embodied the root of an ancient consciousness that arose in the land of Aeria (or Arya), where inflected languages began. These roots were the basis for comparative Indo-European philology. In his “поэм,” Bely examined the roots of the Russian *понятие* (*ponyatie*) and

понятие (poyatie) (for “comprehending,” “grasping”) and of the German *Begriff* and *begreifen* (“concept” and “to grasp” [*схватил*, *skhvatil*]) to reveal their etymological basis (in the case of concept/comprehension words, in the root “to grasp” [*skhvatil*]). In the course of that exploration, intertwining etymological with poetic associations, Bely often constructed fanciful etymologies—for example, by linking the Latin “nomen” (name) and “nemo” (no one) and the Russian “nem on,” he inferred that the names of things are dumb or voiceless.

Philologists, of course, deem efforts at discerning the original sense (*смысл*, *smysl*) of words as “mindlessness” or “madness” (*безумие*, *bezumie*). Bely, however, made a Kierkegaardian leap to embrace the idea that the sound and spirit of God presides over the creation of the word, and that led him to conclude that the conflict between the visible and invisible worlds, between seeing (*видеть*, *videt’*) and knowing (*ведать*, *vedat’*), can be resolved only in sound, for sound points towards a realm beyond the image (a trans-imaginal realm). To comprehend, to grasp, the Truth embodied in the *ur*-root, we must move beyond the lineal, temporal form in which sentences unfold themselves, to the supersensible beyond time. We accomplish this through *звукословие* (*zvukoslovie*, “sound wording”). Bely’s notion of *zvukoslovie* drew on ideas from esoteric literature, occult notions about the electromagnetic body circulating in German body culture, popularized conceptions of four-dimensional geometry, Platonic arguments on anamnesis, current thoughts on the photograph as memory, and *Lebensphilosophie*. One specific text that interested him was Rudolf Steiner’s discussion of the German “Am Anfang schuf Gott Himmel und Erden” (In the beginning, God created Heaven and Earth—*Anfang* is German for “beginning,” a fact relevant to the passage below) and the Hebrew “B’reschit bara élohim et haschamajim w’et ha’arez.”

In the sounds under discussion is manifested “am-an-an” (Am-Anfang); what is interesting is that “m,” “n,” semi-consonants or sonants; “am-an” or “man” are the sounds of thought/thinking; in fact *man-gni* [or *man-yti*] means “to understand” in Lithuanian, “*man-am*” the same in Armenian; in Zedic thought is “*mana*,” and in Sanskrit thought is “*manah*,” prayer both “*man-ma*,” and “*man-tra*,” mind is—“*mana-s*,” they thought [or they had in mind]—“*mamn-ate*”; “mn” are the sounds of thinking: Russian *mn-it’* is *me think* and *mn-enie* is *my opinion* [or my imagining in Russian]; *min-eti* is to “*have in mind*” [imet’ na ume] (in Lithuanian); *mind* is—“*menos*,” and both “*men-s*” and “*men-me*” (in Irish)—are mind. Now we can keep these sounds in mind.—“Am Anfang”—they have in them is the combination of “am-an-an” [Bely uses an obsolete form of “comprehend”], which is tranformed into (a)mana(n)—(“am Anfang”)—“in the beginning” voices, by the sound of words, that “*in the beginning there was reasoning mind*.” The very beginning is a reasoning mind: In the beginning was the word.¹⁹⁸

For Bely, the word came first: the word came before other existents. The beginning was *Λόγος*, Mind.

In the above passage, Bely is surveying the sounds *mn*, *man*, and *men* in various Indo-European languages, exploring philological, mystical, and poetic connections. His search for comparisons carries him across linguistic and disciplinary boundaries. All the while, he is testifying to his rudimentary understanding of the notions he is exploring, and testifying, too, that our self-awareness of the sounds inside us is still in an inchoate, almost infantile, state. Yet he insists his poem propounds an “absurd truth” (*дикую истину*, *dikuju istinu*).¹⁹⁹

Glossalolia is an amalgam of free associations (which sometimes seem to have run wild). These associations are inspired by the energies of sound and are (rather awkwardly) tacked onto Steiner’s cosmogony of Saturn, Sun, Moon, Earth as presented in his *Die Geheimwissenschaft in Umriß* (Occult Science—An Outline, 1910). The poem offers a creation myth fashioned after the Judaeo-Christian accounts presented in Genesis and the first chapter of John, but one that (like Vedic cosmogenic theories) takes the divine energy to be sound. This leads him to describe how the world of consonants and vowels came to be inside-the-mouth (a relation reinforced by Bely’s connecting the Russian words *небо* [*nebo*], “sky,” and *нёбо* [*n’obo*], or “palate”). This is just one example of Bely shifting between the philological and the mythical-mystical levels.

Rea and rei; this time pours in [or flows in] from the beginning: it pours out—from “U”; and “u-h-r” [“Uhr” in German means hour, but “ur” in most Indo-European languages signifies “first” or “primal”] means: primary [or original] sky: “Uranos” and “Uhr-alte” [the oldest time] are one.²⁰⁰

Thomas R. Beyer Jr. notes of this passage:

“Time,” “hour” emerge from “ha” and “er” and Arché gives rise to Chronos, the “Herr” who conquers “Uhr” and “Ur,” Uranus. A graphic depiction of this first day, Saturn, inside the mouth is a cross “h, r, w, sch,” within the circle “a-e-i,” the vowels for Yahweh, and æggs, æternal, eve, avva, abba, father, Jupiter.²⁰¹

The associations Bely made were generally to words with Indo-European roots; however, in two instances, he resorted to nonsense sounds. One is “wi-we-wa-wo-wu, hi-he-ha-ho-hu, wir-wer-war-wor-wur, chri-chre-chra-chro-chru, wri-wre-wra-wro-wru.”²⁰² In this example, the sounds, not directly related to known roots, resemble the glossolalia of modern-day Pentecostals. The second example of an association to nonsense sounds occurs in this passage, which is of mystical import:

In ancient-ancient Aeria, in Aer, once upon a time we lived—sound-people; and there we were sounds of exhaled lights: the sounds of lights live silently in us; and sometimes we express them by a sound-word, by glossolalia.

It will encounter no response
Amidst the noise of people

...

“Re-Ra-Aer-Aes-Ao-Iao-ia.”

And there resounds, like a faraway sound: “Ya-Az-Aziya” (I-I am-Asia),” Ra-Ar-Yar,” Zar-Zhar-Shar”: (Sunrise-Ashen heat-Sphere-shaped):—

-Zaratas-Zarei-Zarathustra!

“I am with you to the end of time.”²⁰³

Glossolia's sonic cosmology turns out to be connected to the vibratory, electromagnetic modernism that accorded such importance to the cinema. The same is true of Dada sound poetry.

ZAUM AND THE HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS OF TRANS-SENSE

The *zaumniks*' deep interest in elevated states of consciousness, which it shared with the Cubo-Futurists, led them to take an interest in the ecstatic speech of certain Russian religious sects. Desiring to bring forth an intensified language with a higher power, an ecstatic language that could convey what the anthropologist Victor Turner refers to as the “limen,” they turned to the ecstatic glossolia of certain Russian religious groups that practised speaking in tongues. They embraced the ideas of M.V. Lodyzhensky (1852–1917), the author of the widely read *Сверхсознание и пути к его достижению* (Sverkhsoznanie i puti k ego dostizheniiu, Superconsciousness and Ways to Achieve It, 1911). Lodyzhensky had for his part drawn ideas from D.G. Konovalov's *Религиозный экстаз в русском мистическом сектантстве* (Religioznyi ekstaz v russkom misticheskom sektantsve, Religious Ecstasy in Russian Mystical Sectarianism, 1908). Konovalov in turn had drawn on information that had been collected in the nineteenth century, and recorded in ethnographical field reports, concerning the worship practices of the Flagellants, the Castrators, and other minority religious groups. Konovalov's *Religioznyi ekstaz*, which also anticipated Victor Turner's ideas, provided precise physical descriptions of the ecstatic state (which, for Kruchenykh, would justify claims for the gestural nature of glossolia). He recorded changes in participants' organic functioning as they reached the pinnacle of their ecstasy—in their facial expressions and gestures, in their body movements, and in their automatic utterances (which Pentecostals refer to as “speaking in tongues”). Combing over these ethnographic field reports, Konovalov listed a large number of invented “words” that the worshippers uttered. He even considered the claim that would become so important to the Cubo-Futurists

and *zaum*—that these worshippers’ glossolalia constituted a new language. Thus, he noted that one group insisted that their glossolaliac conversations were expressed in the language of Jerusalem. Kruchenykh was familiar with Konovalov’s work, and he quoted examples that Konovalov had given in *Religioznyi ekstaz*, his anthropological studies of sectarian automatic speech. In *Взорвал* (*Vzorval*, Exploded, June 1913), Kruchenykh would claim that Konovalov’s studies were one of the sources of *zaum*; and in “Новые пути слова” (*Novye puti slova*, New Ways of the Word), he would refer to Konovalov’s book on religious ecstasy when expounding his ideas on language.

Lodyzhensky’s popular book also drew on Konovalov’s more scholarly work. *Superconsciousness and Ways to Achieve It* outlined the methods that Christian ascetics and practitioners of Rāja-Yoga used to attain states of “superconsciousness.” Lodyzhensky also linked superconsciousness and glossolalia: on the basis of Konovalov’s account, he claimed that when these sectarians, at a moment of religious ecstasy, emit a stream of meaningless sounds, they are in a state that resembles what Buddhists and Hindus refer to as *samadhi*. Kruchenykh’s *zaum* poetry, then, modelled the immediate and spontaneous expression of a person experiencing superconsciousness, or *samadhi*.

Khlebnikov had to travel some distance to embrace these ideas. He had been trained in mathematics at the University of Kazan, where Lobachevsky had worked out his revolutionary non-Euclidean geometry. In Khlebnikov’s time (as in ours), Lobachevsky was much revered in Kazan, where a bust of the great mathematician now dominates a beautiful public square. Kazan had been the Tatar capital, and it is still a multicultural city with a Muslim character—there, Khlebnikov would have been exposed to other languages and ways of thinking. He took great interest in Lobachevsky’s non-Euclidean geometry and in Charles Howard Hinton’s *The Fourth Dimension* (1904, a work that discussed Lobachevsky’s geometry and that appealed to many Theosophists and other heterodox thinkers).²⁰⁴ Khlebnikov would later assert the right of Russians to create a new language, just as Lobachevsky had exercised the right that Cantor had proclaimed—to create new mathematical domains, including non-Euclidean geometries. By 1919, Khlebnikov had become acquainted with another book that commanded considerable interest in occult circles, the Canadian Maurice Bucke’s *Cosmic Consciousness* (1915). Around the same time (i.e., the 1910s and 1920s), there was widespread enthusiasm in Russia for Rudolf Steiner’s eurythmy.²⁰⁵ What is not well known is that Steiner’s ideas on movement were connected with ideas on speech.²⁰⁶ Steiner maintained that the laws of the extrasensory sphere were embedded in language, and even in the organs of speech. Among those who were influenced by these ideas was the playwright Anton Chekov’s nephew Mikhail Aleksandrovich Chekhov (Michael, 1891–1955), an actor in Stanislavsky’s Moscow Art Theatre who

attempted to meld the ideas of his artistic mentor with Steiner's ideas on language. Central to Chekhov's ideas on language was the notion that the character of one's language embodied a view about the relation between the individual and the supra-individual, and Chekhov, too, embraced the idea of superconsciousness.

Steiner's ideas about language led Chekhov to believe that every sound had a life of its own, its own *gestus*, which existed independently of the use anyone made of it, but which still influenced an individual's being when he or she made use of the sound. Vowels corresponded to the inner world of emotions, desires, and passions, while consonants imitated the outer world, and the interplay between vowels and consonants in speech embodied the interaction between the inner and outer realms.

Chekhov declared that language had a higher as well as a lower nature. Furthermore, he claimed, actors could realize the higher nature of language through acts of self-abnegation (eurythmy was a good propaedeutic for this); they could empty themselves of their personal experiences to give way to the role, which he believed had its own existence as an independent being. In this way, the laws of the cosmos and of the earth would be embodied in the actor's gestures and speech. These ideas, of course, have their provenance in the occult tradition.

Other occult ideas went into the making of the *zaum* aesthetic. These ideas had been given new life by the Russian Symbolists (among whom some of the *zaum* poets once had a place). Like many *fin de siècle* thinkers, the Symbolists maintained an apocalyptic belief in the impending end of this old, imperfect world and the advent of a new, perfect world; and ideas about the perfect language were a part of their ideas about a perfect world. Their conception of a perfect language held, for one thing, that in this language there would be no distinction between the signifier and the signified. It would be a magical language, in which word and thing are one, so that speaking the word would conjure up the object with which it was associated. This magical, sacerdotal language would be of unprecedented ontological and epistemological powers, for using it, in the future world, would enable one to bring entities into being. Some Symbolists even developed this conception of language into a mythology of a glottogenetic process, averring that the magic language they were developing would be able to generate new life in the world to come. This conception of language has affinities with the cinema, in which the natural object itself becomes as a sign and the sign itself conjures up (or, at least, can seem to conjure up) the natural object itself. Because it possessed these potentials, the cinema was often taken to be a magical device. Indeed, its potency as a magical device explains why many artists and thinkers hailed its arrival as the appearance of not just a new art but the future's *ottima arte*.

For the Russian Symbolists, a principal source of ideas like these was

Soloviev's theology/philosophy. Soloviev had declared that artists would be able to command future incarnations of beings through their work. Aleksandr Blok had a deep interest in primordial language and was fascinated by incantational language (as was the Symbolist poet Konstantin Balmont). Indeed, Blok published a text, "Поэзия заговоров и заклинаний" (*Poeziya zagovorov i zaklinanii*, Poetry of Spells and Incantations, 1906–8), in which he argued (after the fashion of Soloviev) that, unlike moderns, premoderns made no distinctions among knowledge, religion, mystery, and poetry: for our ancestors, religion, mystery, and poetry were all means of knowing the higher reality. In this way, Blok supported an epistemological synthesis that resembled Soloviev's.

In "The Magic of Words," Andrei Bely stated,

It is no coincidence that so many ancient traditions refer to the existence of a magic language whose words were able to subdue and regulate nature . . . [and] that one hears the myth of a certain sacred dialect called *Senzar*, in which all the highest revelations were given to mankind. The natural deductions as well as the myths of language express, independently of the degree of their objectivity, an involuntary tendency to symbolize the magic power of the word.²⁰⁷

Bely also claimed that words come into existence through naming "an object with a word," a proposition that, he believed, entailed that "cognition is impossible without words." Cognition, for him, was essentially a process of "establishing . . . relations between words, which only subsequently are related to objects corresponding to them."²⁰⁸ The word, then, was a symbol uniting cognition and magical incantation in one nuclear unit (just as naming was the process of producing these symbols). For the Symbolists, the poet was akin to the magus.

The erstwhile Symbolists who created the theory and practice of *zaum* carried most of their Symbolist attitudes and beliefs about language with them into their new efforts. Kruchenykh remained a primitivist; against the Italian Futurists, he decried "that extremist twaddle about contemporaneity as a patented panacea for all misfortunes and ailments."²⁰⁹ The *zaum* poets maintained that their ideas had descended to them from primitive cultures—in particular, from the Asian nomads who had threatened to destroy European culture and its faith in reason. They valorized the incantational language of folklore and the chants of mystical sectarians, and these served them as models for their new poetic language. Khlebnikov, in characterizing their new language, *zaum*, as the revelation of invisible things, propounded a prophetic conception of human language. *Zaum* poets demanded freedom from logic, which they viewed as responsible for separating humans from the forces that animate life. They proposed to jettison logical thinking—or,

sometimes, to bend logic—to revitalize a participatory, as distinguished from a procedural, model of knowledge.

Annette Michelson, a fine scholar of revolutionary Soviet culture and its immediate antecedents, has commented on the means the *zaum* poets used in their revolt against reason:

The linguistic utopia of Russian futurism was certainly sympathetic to the wireless imagination. It proposed an analysis and resynthesis of language in the creation of a poetics whose universality was contingent upon a transcendence of the limits of nationality, as of rationality. Thus *zaum*, the transrational, trans-mental idiom of its radical poetics, is a Russian phonemic condensation of special resonance. One may see *zaum* as the radical challenge of the *Logos* as *ratio* within the Western metaphysical tradition. The fragmentation of the word, the reassemblage, in invented orders (those which in rhetoric we call *anacoluthia*) of the elementary root structures, of old Russian morphemes, of onomatopoeias, characterizes the futurist publications, enhanced by the advanced graphic design of the time, its typography, and sense of *mise en page*...

She quotes from Kruchenykh to support her assertions:

For the Russians—and Kruchonykh’s view is perhaps the clearest at this early stage: “Artists until now had proceeded to the word through thought, and we, we grasp immediacy through the word. We declare the word to be larger, wider than meaning; the word (and its component parts) is not only idea, not only logic, it is, above all, transmental, related to the irrational, the mystical, the aesthetic. And each letter counts, each sound. We must master our materials as the mystics, members of religious sects have, speaking in tongues.” And an entire linguistic tradition, from Rosenstein in the nineteenth century, through Tynianov and Jakobson in the twentieth, will define the significance of the word as indeterminate except in relation to other words—subject, in any case, to fluctuating signification, susceptible to the loosening of signifier from signified that we on occasion term non-sense.²¹⁰

Michelson’s remarks are perceptive, as usual. Certainly there was a linguistic utopianism to Kruchenykh, who in 1913 wrote, “For the depiction of the new and the future *completely new words and a new combination of them* are necessary... A new content is only revealed when new devices of expression, a new form, is attained.”²¹¹ However, I believe that in this passage (and in the remainder of the article), Michelson underestimates the positive side of the *zaum* program (which overlapped that of the Dada movement). Specifically, she underplays the importance of Kruchenykh’s assertion that *zaumniks*’ interest in the “transmental” related “to the irrational, the mystical, the aesthetic,” key concerns of Eisenstein’s later writings on imitation.²¹²

Khlebnikov’s and Kruchenykh’s ideas and practices displayed atavistic features. Because the figurative structures of representation played no role

in their writings, aural-visual constructions became completely autonomous (or nearly so). Not only that, but these constructions, as Michelson points out, were not regulated by the laws of *logos*. Instead, their work took on the perlocutionary features of young children's vocalizations. Their poems were, in effect, ejaculated from the body. Kruchenykh and Khlebnikov offered the following explanation of the interests of Futurian painters:²¹³ “[They] love to use parts of the body, its cross sections, and the Futurian wordwrights use chopped-up words, half-words, and their odd artful combinations (transrational language), thus achieving the very greatest expressiveness, and precisely this distinguishes the swift language of modernity, which has annihilated the previous frozen language.”²¹⁴

Words do not represent a domain beyond language; rather, they become concrete elements that, when uttered, have material effects on those who hear or see them. The Hylaea poets' concern with the graphic and phonic properties of language reveals that they believed the material of language was key to its effects (thus, one of the Hylaea poets, Benedikt Livshits, accused Marinetti of being indifferent to the material of verse).

Khlebnikov in particular believed it possible to construct a language in which meaning does not depend upon reference, but strictly on the language's intrinsic properties. This conviction was founded on the idea that there is a primitive substratum to language that reference had concealed.²¹⁵ That idea, as we have seen, impelled Khlebnikov to embark on palaeolinguistic excursions in an effort to distill pure meanings for the basic phonemes. Such investigations, he believed, would allow him to devise a universal syntagmatics of roots and affixes. Thus, he collected words that had the same initial phoneme in order to show that all denoted similar concepts. He proposed, for example, that words such as *чашка* (*chashka*, cup), *чара* (*chara*, goblet), *чупур* (*chupur*, dipper), *череп* (*cherep*, skull), *черпак* (*cherpak*, scoop), *чум* (*chum*, ladle), and *чеботы* (*cheboty*, boots) showed that the sound “ч” (*ch*) denoted vessel-like things, while words such as *хижина* (*khizhina*, shack), *хлев* (*khlev*, barn), *халабуда* (*khalabuda*, cabin), *хиба* (*khiba*, shanty), and *хата* (*khata*, hut) revealed that the “kh” sound—the Cyrillic “х”—signified a barrier between one point and another.²¹⁶ The substratum operates beyond reason—so the *zaum* poets claimed, in this way according transrational knowledge and transrational experience a role. Furthermore, they added, the substratum affects us immediately, without our being aware of it. These ideas about the substratum's impact associated individual phonemes with particular results—that is, each sound produced a distinctive result. Thus, each sound had a distinct meaning that depended not at all on reference. That individual phonemes are individually significant seems an odd claim, but probably only because our understanding of language takes as basic the idea of double articulation (i.e.,

the idea that the most basic constituents of language, the phonemes, are not significant in and of themselves, but only in combination). Khlebnikov's transrationalist theories relied on the idea that it is possible to forge linguistic constructs that altogether bypass reference and representation—that our responses to individual phonemes are as immediate and physical as the optical/physical/emotional sensations provoked by colours.²¹⁷

The recitation of sound poetry, then, created a series of momentary sensations. That they adopted this as a goal in their artistic practices suggests much about the world view shared by artists as different in temperament, and as distant in space, as the *zaum* poets and the members of the Dada circle. It suggests a view of reality that sees its objects becoming impermanent, empty, unreal—of reality ephemerizing into the phantasmagoria of sensations. The sense that objects had been exposed as unreal explains why the *zaumniks* and Dadaists strove to escape representation. It also explains why members of these groups figured among the pioneering Abstractionists. Thus, Roman Jakobson remarked that Khlebnikov's similes “are hardly ever motivated by any impression of real similarity of objects, but are simply compositional effects.”²¹⁸

For these ideas, Khlebnikov (and other *zaum* poets) drew on a tradition of thinking about language that had been inaugurated by Potebnia, whose theory of language was a massive elaboration of Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767–1835) notion that language and the concept of the self are indissolubly linked. Like Humboldt before him, and like Bakhtin after him, Potebnia laid stress on language as dynamic. Humboldt had conceived of language as *energeia* (activity), not *ergon* (a thing); in Potebnia's version, this became the distinction between language's “*doing* something” and “*being* something.” Potebnia argued that language does not represent discrete existing entities; rather, it acquires meanings through the antinomies it embodies. Nor does language use convey thoughts from speaker to listener; rather, language use awakens an analogous thought process in the listener's mind. Language use also enables us to become aware of our own thoughts. We do not have thoughts that precede language, nor do we have direct, unmediated apprehension of the self—but the effect of language is to cleave the speaker's mental world into the “I” and the “not-I”; moreover, it is language, the word, that enables the speaker's apperception of his thoughts. Before we acquire language, our mental processes are a stream of fugitive perceptions—these mental states are inchoate and inapprehensible. Only when they find expression in language do they become clear to us. Through articulate sound, inchoate perceptions are objectified and made available to higher cognitive processes.

One matter on which Potebnia's theory diverges from Humboldt's concerns “inner form.” Humboldt conceived “inner form” to be the basic (inner) structure of language as a whole—indeed, he often wrote of *innere Sprachform* (inner form of language). Potebnia's conception, however, concerned words,

not language as a whole. He proposed that a word has three aspects: its outer form—that is, its sound (the chain of phonemes with which we articulate it); its content—that is, that through which the outer form, the sound, attaches to a particular referent or set of referents; and the inner form (sometimes Potebnia used the term “inner image”)—that is, the word’s etymological import, in which, he believed, resides the verbal potential for expression. This potential, he believed, always exceeds any specific referent. Its dynamic, unrestricted possibility is what gives poetry its special vitality, for this inner form transcends the meaning that arises through reference and acts as the *energeia* beneath the word—this enlivening impulse constitutes the poetic potential of the word. Khlebnikov’s interest in the primal meanings of sounds—and Bely’s as well—had affinities with Potebnia’s ideas on “inner form.”

Hylaea and the *zaum* poets acted on an urge to escape the trap of imitating what they deemed to be unreal; this urge helps account for the caustic remarks they made about Marinetti’s *parole in libertà* (words in freedom). The Hylaeian poet Benedikt Livshits pointed out that Marinetti’s onomatopoeia had the effect of restoring traditional verbal structures to his verse.²¹⁹ Marinetti’s use of onomatopoeia connected the sound to the object it represented. That is the very essence of onomatopoeia, of course, but the frequency with which Marinetti used the device and the intensity of his onomatopoeic constructions suggests that he wished to make the signifier identical with the represented object. Marinetti’s verse suggests that he believed the force of spoken language—*performed* language—could effect that identification.²²⁰ Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh, on the contrary, stressed the autonomy of the written sign and accorded only an attenuated role to speech (whether inner or vocalized). Moreover, Marinetti’s verse swaggers, and that suggests the domineering ego; consequently, performances of Marinetti’s texts give the impression that we are following the trajectory of a person’s thinking. Marinetti used language to evoke a pre-linguistic reality (consciousness), which we therefore assume must have played a role in structuring the text. Khlebnikov and the *zaum* poets, on the contrary, produced meaning simply by articulating the properties intrinsic to language, separate from the performer’s subjectivity (and even, sometimes, without need of a performer).

The similarities between the *zaum* group’s ideas about language and those of the Dada circle are clear (though Dada poets more often embraced the ambition of creating an Adamic language that would bring into being the objects they referred to).²²¹ There may be more to this than their sharing the zeitgeist: as Martin Gaughan points out, it is likely that Hugo Ball and other Dada poets knew of Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh’s work through Kandinsky.²²² And Kandinsky, as his writing around *Der gelbe Klang* (The Yellow Sound, 1909) makes clear, was enormously interested in the physical effects of vibratory energies (i.e., of sound waves). We know, moreover, from

Kandinsky's biography, that this interest in the effect of vibratory energies was associated with his Theosophical interests. Khlebnikov arrived at similar conclusions through his "primitivist" interests: he strove to identify the ethnic and zoomorphic roots of his native language, and these studies drove him to try to transform language into a plastic sonic phenomenon, one whose sounds could be shaped, stretched, and transformed at will. Kruchenykh shared this interest in the primal—his transrational, universal, and transmental *zaum* language was to be as close to physical experience as possible. *Zaum*, he imagined, must resemble the primordial language, the *ur-language*. Thus, his ecstatic poetic drama "Zangezi" (1922), his most extensive use of *zaum*, was a conversation among the gods, carried on in the language of the gods (which Kruchenykh invented). To heighten the effect of the primordial in language—that is to say, to emphasize language's sound—he developed a system of "poetic irregularities," using chopped words and half-words in whimsical, intricate combinations. The written texts of his compositions made extensive use of typographical irregularities such as capitalizing letters in the middle of words, incorporating handwritten letters, using different fonts, and printing letters upside down.

PICABIA, MAN RAY, AND THE DADAIST ART OF THE MACHINE

A similarly perlocutionary conception of language to that which served the Dada artists is implicit in Antonin Artaud's notion of the Theatre of Cruelty. Artaud was not alone among vanguard artists to connect language-as-action to theatrical gesture. Of all the Dadaists, it was Francis Picabia who furthest advanced DADA as acts of performance. Picabia organized one of the events at the first Dada matinée in Paris, in January 1921. The event began with André Breton showing the audience paintings by Juan Gris and Fernand Léger (which, presumably, were influenced by Cubist work); by Giorgio de Chirico (which, presumably, exemplified his *metafisico* style); and, finally, by Francis Picabia. Picabia's painting *Le double monde* (The Double World, 1919) was a minimalist work before its time, for it consisted simply of a few black lines, some counterfactual inscriptions, such *Bas* (Bottom) at the top of the painting, *Haut* (Top) at the bottom of the painting, and the scathing *Fragile* (Fragile), to satirize bourgeois preciousness over matters of art. In a gesture of provocation, there appeared at the bottom in enormous red letters "L.H.O.O.Q"—if the French names of the letters are read quickly, they sound like "elle a chaud au cul" (she has a hot ass, or, to emphasize its alchemical significance, there is a fire below her).²²³ The audience, as they became aware of the scandalous implications of the letters, protested vigorously. Their outrage probably encouraged Breton to carry on: a blackboard

was rolled out onto the stage; on it were a few inscriptions, such as “Riz au nez” (Rice in the Nose, but almost a homophone of *raisonner*), which Breton at once erased.²²⁴

Picabia also developed a practice that we commonly identify with Marcel Duchamp (who had strong ties to the Dada movement), of designating something that comes to hand as a work of art. The purpose for doing this was to detach the artwork from the subjective condition of the artist and to link it with the state of *schöpferische Indifferenz*. The artist need not experience any surge of emotion to create a work of art, nor is the artist’s production dependent on an easily ignited sensibility or any highly developed sensation of beauty. Thus, Duchamp said this about his ready-mades: “A point which I want very much to establish is that the choice of these ‘readymades’ was never dictated by an aesthetic delectation. This choice was based on a reaction of visual *indifference* with at the same time a total absence of good or bad taste . . . in fact a complete anaesthesia.”²²⁵ Duchamp’s comment on indifference echoes that of Tristan Tzara with which this chapter began.

The theatre has often been understood as an influencing machine—as a machine for producing effects (and this conception of it was especially widespread in the early decades of the twentieth century). So it should not be surprising that another feature of DADA was an interest in the machine. Like the Futurists, the Dada artists thought of the machine as a force for change that could blast away the ballast of tradition.

Just before the Dada movement got under way, Picabia produced *Udnie* (1913), whose hard, cold colours evoke metal, and *Je revois en souvenir ma chère Udnie* (I See Again in Memory My Dear Udnie, 1914).²²⁶ Both works convert the female form into mysterious machine parts. They suggest that since sex is merely a physical process, like the actions of machines, then the body of the beloved might equally be seen as a system of cogs and gears, albeit one linked to human emotions. In watercolours that Picabia made during a 1913 transatlantic crossing (to visit the Armory Show), we can observe the gradual breakdown of form and its reconstitution into mechanomorphic shapes. Picabia would later declare that the Great War had killed European art and that, since the soul of the modern world is the machine and the genius of the machine had achieved its highest expression in America, art would henceforth find its highest flowering in America.

By the second decade of the twentieth century, mechanization had revolutionized everyday life: typewriters, telephones, electrical appliances, and automobiles had become middle-class possessions. Industrial exhibits at world fairs, exhilarating inventions such as the airplane, the automobile, and the cinema, and startling developments in science, including X-rays and atomic theory, had an enormous impact on popular consciousness.²²⁷ Picabia

was interested in these changes: he had been acquainted with the work of the Italian Futurists since 1912 and with the Rayonist-Futurist paintings of Natalia Goncharova (1881–1962) and Mikhail Larionov (1881–1964) since the winter of 1913–14, which were influenced by developments in technology. He was a member of the Section d'or group of writers and critics, which included Blaise Cendrars, the mystically inclined Henri Martin Barzun (1881–1974), and art critic, pioneer of concrete poetry, and author of erotic novels Guillaume Apollinaire (1880–1918)—that group was also deeply interested in the new technology. Picabia was fascinated with machinery as a metaphor for the human mind—machines were loci of thought and feelings, and so objects of both desire and aversion. One of Picabia's pre-Dada works, *Paroxysm of Suffering* (1915), depicts machine parts that resemble the figure of a woman; the title suggests that her arousal would cause him pain. He was likely acquainted with the writings of Alfred Jarry, whose book *Le surmâle* (The Supermale, 1902) treated sexual intercourse as a scientific experiment at the same time as it mocked science and technology and portrayed humans as bereft of higher emotions, and impelled simply by sexual desire.²²⁸ The book's hero is a superman who wins a bicycle race against a six-man team, who has sex eighty-two times with a woman, and whose experience culminates in a climax with an amorous machine. Like Marcel Duchamp, Jarry was likely influenced by Raymond Roussel, especially by Roussel's *Impressions d'Afrique* (1910). Roussel's works, which revel in wordplay, present humans who operate at a machine-like level of precision or who possess such a depth of scientific knowledge that they appear to function magically. Like Duchamp and Jarry, Roussel presented such perfection as futile, because it was unconnected to any deeper meaning and because life was thereby denied fulfillment and lacked any order-giving purpose.

In 1922, at the end of the Dada phase of his career, Picabia mounted his "Spanish Portrait—Machine" exhibition at the Dalmau Gallery in Barcelona. In that exhibition, he mixed portraits of Spanish women and *toreros* with mechanical schematic drawings. The incorporation of elements from Spanish culture—the bullfight, the flamenco, and Gypsies—suggested the desire for all that is dark in tone and that has *duende*—a brooding mysterious power that none can explain. In evoking the power of *duende*, the works implied the existence of a soul, and the exhibition overall suggested the impact (sometimes negative) of technology on human being. The works in the exhibition elided physical embodiment and machine existence, subjectivity and machine forms; this was evident, for example, in works that created machine metaphors for the *corrida*.

The Dadaists' enthusiasm for the machine encouraged their interest in the camera (and, accordingly, in the cinema). Hence the famous alliance between Picabia and Alfred Stieglitz (and between Picabia and Stieglitz's associate

Marius de Zayas, 1880–1961, who by 1913 was proposing that the scientific method, applied to art, would finally yield true knowledge about the artistic phenomenon, which had always been a great mystery). Picabia's tribute to the Mexican proto-Dadaist and caricaturist Zayas, *De Zayas! De Zayas!*, completed during the summer of 1915, presents a portrait of the writer as machine, composed of components chiefly derived from schematic diagrams of electrical systems. (The cinema is a machine that introduced electricity into art in a non-incidental way.) DADA's interest in the machine also helps explain the influence that DADA had on that great poet of the industrial age, Hart Crane (1899–1932). A statement by Paul Haviland (1880–1951), Picabia's associate on *291* (as close to a Dada journal as America had), offers an eloquent commentary on the relation between humans and machines and, by implication, on the art of the machine:

We are living in the age of the machine. Man made the machine in his own image. She has limbs which act; lungs which breathe; a heart which beats; a nervous system through which runs electricity. The phonograph is the image of his voice; the camera the image of his eye. The machine is his "daughter born without a mother." That is why he loves her. He has made the machine superior to himself. That is why he admires her. Having made her superior to himself, he endows the superior beings which he conceives in his poetry and in his *plastique* with the qualities of machines. After making the machine in his own image he has made his human ideal machinomorphic.²²⁹

The consummate art of the machine, of course, was the cinema.

Man Ray's Dada works also give evidence of a similar fascination with the machine (and with the human metaphors that machine forms provide). His fascination was conceived before his involvement in DADA: immediately after the Armory Show (1913), while still living in America, he became interested in the idea *behind* the work of art, rather than in the physical art object itself. At that time, too, he began to develop an interest in the mechanical rather than the naturalistic realm. Diverging from his traditional approach, he began to develop a way of working that made him more aware of mechanical constructions as well as more susceptible to their appeal.²³⁰ But interest in machines and fascination with the cinema often went hand in hand—both expressed a passion for the modern industrial world. Consider Man Ray's *Admiration of the Orchestrelle for the Cinematograph* (1918).

DUCHAMP AND DADA'S ART OF THE MACHINE

In previous sections, I tracked the Dadaists' commitment to art that produces pneumatic effects into their interests in language and in machine art. I connected this interest in art that has spiritual effects to the dismantling of calculative reason's overreaching claims and the resulting effort to identify

means to generate an intuitive, super-rational noesis. I also related the Dadaists' engagement with language and machines to their commitment to creating an art of effects (or an art of gestures) and to their alchemical interests. I have already commented on Duchamp's esoteric interests, which included alchemy and higher-dimensional geometry. But Duchamp also shared Picabia's and Man Ray's involvement with machine art, and this involvement testifies to his belief in an art of effects—in his works, Duchamp repeatedly attempted to produce pneumatic effects. As we will see, his interest in a machine art that produced pneumatic (in his case, alchemical) effects was modelled on the cinema.

Duchamp, like Picabia, used the machine as a metaphor for the human mind. His *The Large Glass*, a work created between 1915 and 1923 (with accompanying notes, mostly completed between 1911 and 1915) is divided vertically, into upper and lower sections, by a horizontal band (suggesting a horizon) designated as the "Bride's clothes." It is constructed of two sexual machines: one is in the realm of the Bride, the other in the realm of the Bachelors. The working parts of these two machines seem "out of whack," their relations arbitrary and excessively complicated. Until the release of the notes Duchamp collected under the title *À l'infinif* (White Box) in February 1967, the occult implications of the division of the work into the realm of Bachelors and realm of the Bride was not widely understood. The speculative physics of *The Large Glass* assigns its elements to two realms: below, there is the realm to which the Bachelor machine belongs, a three-dimensional realm ruled by gravity and understood perspectively; above, there is the realm of the Bride, which Duchamp wanted to define as four-dimensional. Duchamp considered using mirrors and virtual images to indicate that the Bride belongs to the fourth dimension, but in the end he settled on a simpler way of suggesting the idea—that is, suggesting that the three-dimensional image of the Bride is the shadow or projection of a being that belongs to the fourth dimension.

The construction develops out a number of pieces that Duchamp produced while living in Munich: *La vierge no. 1*, *La vierge no. 2*, *Le passage de la vierge à la mariée*, and *Mariée*. All of these grew out of Duchamp's interest in chronophotographic representation—an interest that relates to his fascination with the fourth dimension.²³¹ Duchamp understood that if an object exists in three dimensions of space and one of time, then the question of how the object can be represented on a static two-dimensional surface becomes pressing—and especially vexing becomes the question of how an object can be transformed from one state or condition to another (a phenomenon that Duchamp's alchemical interests made central to art). *Le passage de la vierge à la mariée* presses that problematic to the fore: the transition from virgin to bride is not a transposition in space. The subject undergoes a change in identity, and the question of how that change can be represented is the central problematic of that work.

Concerns with identity and transformation are central to *The Large Glass*. Like the works he produced in Munich, the piece has a machine-like character: the Bride is composed of several mechanically interacting parts. The motor that drives her (which Duchamp's notes describe as "a motor with quite feeble cylinders") operates on love gasoline, which the bride herself secretes.²³² The bride is divided into two parts—Duchamp's notes call these the "second blossoming." On the left there is the *Pendu femelle*, a Duchampian neologism generally taken to mean the hanging female, whom Duchamp's notes also characterize as the "arbor-type," a "steam engine," a "skeleton," and a "virgin"—indeed, "the apotheosis of virginity"—but though she is a virgin, she has reached "the goal of her desires."²³³ Extending off to the right, from roughly the virgin's forehead, there is the "halo of the bride" (which Duchamp's notes also characterize as a "cinematic blossoming" and a "milky way").²³⁴ The *Pendu femelle* was originally to be produced by projecting a negative of *Mariée* onto the glass with a photographic enlarger; the process was unsuccessful, so Duchamp painted the *Pendu femelle* in black-and-white gradations to resemble the photograph of *Mariée*. The process indicates the importance that Duchamp attached to the idea of geometric projection—an interest reflected in *Broyeuse de chocolat no. 1* (a study in the perspectival projection) and *Broyeuse de chocolat no. 2* (a study of an object flattened onto a two-dimensional surface).

Duchamp mingles male and female characteristics in the figure of the Bride—the flesh-coloured protruding veil has obvious male qualities. But there is a more concrete male attribute to the Bride: the three squares in the "cinematic blossoming" (Duchamp's notes refer to them as "draft pistons," even though they are soft) derive from sections of the curtain, a net one metre square that Duchamp has hung above a radiator, so rising currents of air disturb the netting. Duchamp took photographs, producing images of three different three-dimensional transformations of the 2-D plane (the netting), and since the nets had spots distributed at regular intervals, the photographs indicate precisely the topology of the disturbance.²³⁵ Perhaps Duchamp referred to these forms as "draft pistons" in order to suggest how disturbances of 2-D planes form three-dimensional objects; in any case, their shape and functioning suggest the male. The "cinematic blossoming" as a whole suggests a moving (transforming) shape arrested in one of the configurations in the four-dimensional world—indeed, the Bride has the appearance of a three-dimensional object attached to the top edge of the glass by *trompe l'oeil* hooks.

If the draft pistons indicate the male element in the Bride's cinematic blossoming, the colours draw our attention to the female dimension: it is painted in the pinks and green-tinged peach tones of a voluptuous, Rubenesque nude. The draft pistons also highlight Duchamp's use of the triads in this work:

Duchamp associated three with mass production (or better, machine production)—with the opposite of the unique, handmade object. Other triads appear in the work: there are nine (three times three) Bachelors; three rollers grind chocolate; there are three *stoppages étalons*, each used three times to form the capillary tubes; the capillary tubes themselves come from the “nine malic moulds”; and there are nine “shots.”

The principle of three—a principle that we saw applies to the Bride’s realm—also applies to the work’s larger structure, for in the Bachelors’ domain, events of three orders take place. First, there is the birth of the Bachelors’ desires (represented by “the Illuminating Gas”) in the “nine malic moulds” in Eros’s matrix. Second, there is the arduous journey of the Bachelors’ desires, on their way to meet with the Bride. The obstacles to this are formidable: the desires pass through nine narrow “capillary tubes”; then they are stopped by seven “sieves,” which filter the desires, straighten them, and redirect them towards their original aim (Duchamp may have been alluding to social pressures to divert his sexual impulses away from his sister Suzanne, and to mechanisms redirecting them towards his *soror mystica*).²³⁶ Finally, the desires are channelled into the “toboggan,” where they crash three times (the principle of three again) at the base before being resurrected and rising through the three “oculist witnesses” to the Bride’s domain, where they organize themselves like “jets of water which weave forms in their transparency” to form the “picture of the cast shadows” (another allusion to projection) in the upper half of the *Glass*. The Bachelors’ desires, represented by the volatile “illuminating gas,” mingle with the “love gasoline” secreted by the Bride’s sexual organs: the *coniunctio* rehearses the alchemical mingling into an unfathomable physical compound of the two sperms—the earthly sperm and the astral sperm—in the incestuous copulation of the androgynous seeker (the Bachelors’ domain, the Earth) and his *soror mystica* (the Bride’s domain, the Sky). This union of Earth and Sky, this fusion of brother and sister, of what is below and what is above, suggests that *The Large Glass* should be understood as Duchamp’s mechanical rendering of a (mechanical) cosmic *coniunctio*.

Besides the obstacles that the path towards the Bride inevitably places in the way of desire’s progress, there are threats made by castrating machines, which represent the Bachelors’ masturbatory desires. The first is the complex of the water mill and the scissors—the water mill’s rocking movement causes the castrating scissors to open and close; the second is the chocolate grinder, whose onanistic, gyratory movement produces “milk chocolate.” The two castration machines are linked: the scissors are balanced on the tip of a bayonet that emerges from the heart of the chocolate grinder.

The Bride experiences lust to the degree that her “motor with quite feeble cylinders” will allow, and through the mediation of the “wasp sex cylinder,”

she emits sparks that control the “desire-magneto.” She also has the power to communicate through inscriptions. A “letter box” (i.e., the alphabet) provides a communication channel between the vertical and horizontal parts of the Bride. The letters form a text that crosses over the pistons as it moves holes on the upper right, whose locations were determined by firing matchsticks from a toy cannon (the “nine Shots”).

The Bride’s domain is separated from that of the Bachelors by a “cooler.”²³⁷ The realm of the Bachelors contrasts with that of the Bride: while the Bride’s realm is filled with irregular organic shapes, the Bachelors’ realm is filled with rectilinear forms, simple, mechanical movements, and, above all, measured volumes. Recoiling from the tactile pleasures of painting *Mariée*, Duchamp plotted the “bachelor machine” to a millimetre’s precision, relying on drafting instruments, which he relished for their clinical precision; furthermore, the work was produced by projecting a draftsman’s drawing onto a surface.

The realm of the Bachelors is impressively complex. Nine Bachelors, who personify the viewer, are crowded together to the left. Behind a strange framework that Duchamp’s notes characterize as a “chariot,” a “glider,” a “sleigh,” and a “slide” are the “oculist witnesses” (to the extreme right of the Bachelors’ domain). The term “oculist witness” probably derives from *témoin oculiste*, French for “eyewitness,” but also from the term for the charts that ophthalmologists use for testing eyes—that is why the oculist witnesses resemble both eyes and opticians’ charts. The nine Bachelors resemble nine pieces of clothing hung out on a line to dry. Most seem headless, though one Bachelor has a tiny head (which resembles a wheel) tilted back in perspective. Duchamp’s notes refer to the Bachelors as “malic moulds” (“malic” for “male,” so this description corresponds to his characterization of the Bride as a *Pendu femelle*). The notes also assign professions to the Bachelors (the nine include a priest, a department-store delivery boy, a *gendarme*, a *cuirassier* or cavalryman, a policeman, an undertaker, a flunky or liveried servant, a busboy, and a stationmaster). Thus, they belong in the “cemetery of uniforms and liveries.”

The Bride and the Bachelors are all to be filled with illuminating gas. As the Bride secretes love gasoline, the Bachelors ejaculate gas that travels from their head-regions along “capillary lines” (so these figures are malic because they represent male members). While travelling along these “capillary lines,” the gas undergoes transformation, first by changing state, to a solid, as a result of stretching, and then by breaking into short needles (“spangles,” according to the notes) that penetrate upwards into cone-shaped “sieves” or “parasols,” within which are the “drainage slopes.”²³⁸ (These solids represent movement—the dimension of time added to the dimensions of space through which the gas travels—but their formation also suggests a change of identity, analogous to the Virgin turning into the Bride.) These glass sieves

have taken on the tint of the dust that collected on them while they lay on the floor of Duchamp's studio for several months.²³⁹ Duchamp fixed the dust to the sieves' glass surfaces with varnish. When they pass through the sieves the malic moulds ejaculate spangles that liquefy and flow down into spirals, forming a great splash (the orgasm).

At the same time as the ejaculate passes along the capillary tubes, the strange framework glides back and forth on its runners, powered by an invisible waterfall that turns the paddlewheel. The right side of the framework is affixed with (the aforementioned) scissorlike bars, which open and close with the "chariot's" movement. The chocolate grinder (painted an appropriate chocolate-brown), resting on a round table with curving legs ("Louis XV chassis"), "is connected to the threatening scissors at their joint."²⁴⁰ The Bachelors and the Bride do not exchange sexual energy here—as Duchamp suggested in his notes, the Bachelor has to grind his chocolate himself.

However much analysis and interpretation it is subjected to, *La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même* remains a puzzling work. One notes, for example, that while the piece incorporates a great deal of machinery, nothing is happening—and this contrasts with his motorized rotoreliefs. Most puzzling of all, perhaps, is the final word of the title, *même*, which is always translated as the adverb *even*. *Même* is a homonym of *m'aime*, so it affirms that the Bride "loves me [Duchamp]." Thus, substituting the homonymous *m'aime* for *même* in the title, and then translating, we get "The Bride, stripped bare by her Bachelors, loves me."²⁴¹ Duchamp added the verbal pendant *même* to the title after arriving in the United States in 1915. (In July–August 1912, shortly after arriving in Munich, Duchamp had produced a drawing on which he had written "Première recherche pour: La mariée mise à nu par les [*sic*] célibataires"; after moving to the United States, he lived by teaching the French language to Americans, and the experience brought him to realize the disjointedness of the French language.) If *même* were understood as an adjective—Duchamp himself said it was an adverb—it could mean "the same," as it does in *C'est la même chose* (That's the same thing), *C'est moi-même* (It's me), or *quand plusieurs verbes ont le même sujet* (when several verbs have the same subject). In any case, it seems possible that Duchamp used the word to hint that the Bride and the Bachelors could be diverging facets of a single person; thus it raises the idea of the androgyne—a key alchemical concept.²⁴²

Finally, the title raises the question of the relation of the work to the artist. If you say the French title out loud, what you are most likely to stress in *La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires* are the syllables MAR and CÉL (or CEL). Thus the title of the piece incorporates an autograph of the artist and could be construed as identifying the artist with the Bride. Recognizing this identification inscribed into the title brings in its trail many humorous associations: In

1973, John Golding, in his book *Marcel Duchamp*, pointed out that the work evokes the iconography of the paintings of the Assumption and Coronation of the Virgin—the *Mariée/Mary* is borne to heaven on a cloud while the Bachelors/disciples look upward longingly. That iconographic approach can lead one to believe that the painting is a bitter reflection on the relation of the artist to his followers, and that the former is dropping inspiring fluids to be distributed among the latter. One can combine this with the alchemical themes of the work and say that it also suggests the relation of the alchemical master to his disciples, or the “Bride” of Rosicrucian/Freemason/alchemical thought to the Masonic brotherhood, including the artist. Combining this interpretation with the previous one has the intriguing consequence that the artist is both the investigator and the investigated. Furthermore, that last interpretation invites us to consider the work as evoking the esoteric brotherhood’s investigating the female as the key to the mysteries. Relating that back to the autobiographic dimension of the work that its title highlights, we take the Bride to be Duchamp’s sister Suzanne and the painting as telling the story of the initiates exploring the *soror mystica* in their search for enlightenment—and, combining this with the first interpretation, the artist identifies with *soror mystica* and so is both the investigator and the investigated. This last interpretation says much about the idea of the artist as involved in self-examination or in the quest for the self. Finally, because the Bachelors also personify the viewer, the work alludes to the viewer’s examining the self of the artist-as-*soror mystica*—or, perhaps more exactly, the viewer’s participating in the artist’s examination of himself as *soror mystica*.

Duchamp’s emphasis on mechanical analogues to human sexual behaviour stemmed partly from his understanding that sexuality, because it is a universal human experience, has communicative potential, and partly from his recognition that sexuality can serve as a metaphor for cognition (a fact implicit in the famous biblical use of the verb “to know”), especially for profound and intimate knowledge. Duchamp remarked to Steefel on the analogy between the way the mind grasps reality and a vagina grasps the penis.

At the same time, figuring cognition as mechanical suggests the possibility of eliminating the invasive mental image from cognitive processes.²⁴³ This was a major reason why Duchamp used mechanical imagery: he was seeking to distance himself from his own fantasies by suggesting that mental representations have approximately the same role in human behaviour / human cognition as they do in mechanical processes. He was also seeking analogies to convey passivity being transformed into activity. He did so using a strategy of projection—projecting the mental states we suffer onto objects and machines. Duchamp claimed that he did not love the machine but that he used machines because he could freely act out against them: “it was better to

do it [express himself] to machines than to people, or doing it to me,” as he told the art historian Lawrence Steefel. By causing machines and mechanisms to suffer appallingly, Duchamp could develop the energies to go on creating.

This interest in the machine is reflected in Duchamp’s dislike of “painterly” painting in which the hand of the painter is evident. Duchamp’s animus against the high estimation of the painter’s hand—an estimation so evident in the art world of his time—was typical of the Dada artists, whose interest in the machine’s potential reflected antipathy towards traditional art’s valorization of the painter’s manual skill.²⁴⁴ This revulsion was in part a political protest: traditional art criticism often suggests that the feature that separates the fine artist from the common run of humanity is a special talent and sensitivity, for which the artist’s hand serves as a metonymic trope. Adopting mechanical methods of production was a way of promoting the arts’ democratization. The Dadaists’ interest in the machine extended to a curiosity about its social effects, which included the rise of the mass media, film, advertising, and popular music.

So it is to the Dadaists’ work in a machine-based medium—a medium whose nature disposes it towards collage and whose works are fashioned by assembling real components; a medium that inevitably incorporates chance and that is almost without a history, but insofar as it does have a history, it is largely of works of inspired nonsense—to which we now turn. In the course of this examination, we will see that Dada anti-art was not a complete and wholesale rejection of art—rather, it was a rejection of *bourgeois* art. It was a rejection of artworks whose content was discursive propositions that allied themselves with instrumental reason. The Dada artists called upon those who were committed to the life-principle to destroy what art had become. The art tradition that had existed in the era prior to the outbreak of the Great War had to be destroyed. But this was not a wholly negative advocacy. For the *Dadaisten* also set themselves the task of bringing forth a new form, one that would come to replace art in the new world that would be born from the ashes of the conflagration that was sweeping Europe (and the name DADA, I suggest, was a meaningless term that stood for a practice still unknown, a practice that the *Dadaisten* knew must come forth but whose nature eluded them).

The *Dadaisten* sought to produce works with super-rational, pneumatic effects. An examination of the films that Dada artists made will allow us to open up further their ideas about the cinema, and to gain further insight concerning the cinema’s relation to the Dada program. In the end, this will contribute to our understanding of why the *Dadaisten* made such an extravagant but nonetheless decisive inference concerning a possible salutary strain in the arts of their time (which we might call DADA), that inference being that the value of DADA forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful

pneumatic effects, that the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device, and that, therefore, the cinema is the top medium for DADA.

ENTR'ACTE: COMMENTARY

In November 1924, Francis Picabia produced the final issue (19) of his Dadaist magazine 391, which on this occasion was subtitled "Journal of Instantaneism." The same issue included a notice for the upcoming performance of his ballet, *Relâche*. By this time, Picabia had fallen out of André Breton's favour, as had Erik Satie (with whom Picabia collaborated on the ballet), and one of Picabia's purposes for the ballet was to out-DADA the other Parisian Dadaists. So the performance included many Dada provocations: spotlights were shined in the audience's eyes; a nude man and woman were periodically illuminated; and the dancers changed costume on stage.

Picabia referred to *Relâche* as an Instantaneist ballet. What was Instantaneism? The cover of the *Journal de l'instantanéisme* (Journal of Instantaneism) issue presented the following characterizations: "Instantaneism: only believes in today"; "Instantaneism: only believes in life"; "Instantaneism: only believes in perpetual movement." In the end, Instantaneism was a celebration of the immediate lived moment in all its intensity and transitoriness. In his piece on *Instantanéisme* for *Comoedia*, Picabia connected these violent sensations to the cinema: "The Cinema itself should as well give us vertigo; it should be a sort of artificial paradise, a promoter of intense sensations surpasses those of an airplane 'looping the loop' and 'the pleasure of opium.'" ²⁴⁵ Picabia offered to Paul Dermée's journal, *Mouvement accéléré*, this affirmation: "They will shout, 'To anarchy,' and then what? I don't believe in the Fatherland, I don't believe in God, I believe neither in Good nor in Evil, and even less in Art; I only accept the present moment, besides it's more available." ²⁴⁶ There Picabia also laid out (in exhilarated prose) his aspirations for *Relâche* and for art in general. He propounded the view that the purpose of art is not to create clear ideas but, rather, to create strong and delicious sensations: "That which I did, that which I will do, addresses itself more and more to truly physical pleasure. We were at the end of many cerebral possibilities. Now I only want to look for a joy comparable to the delight of lying in the sun, of doing 120 in a car, comparable to the pleasure of boxing or of being stretched out on the mat of an opium den." ²⁴⁷

At the end of 1924, Picabia began working with the renowned and artistically progressive Ballets Suédois, writing, staging, and designing the costumes for *Relâche*. Other European avant-garde artists had preceded Picabia in working with dance companies, the most renowned example being Pablo Picasso's involvement with Sergei Diaghilev's Ballets Russes. Between 1917

and 1924, Picasso designed a stage curtain for the Paris Opera (the “Palais Garnier”), where the company performed, as well as the costumes and scenery for five productions. But there were other examples: Pierre Bonnard (1867–1947) designed the curtain and stage set for *Jeux* (choreographed to Debussy’s music by Jean Börlin, and assisted by the composer, conductor, and close friend of Claude Debussy, Désiré-Emile Inghelbrecht, 1886–1967), and de Chirico the stage set for *La jarre* (1920; choreographed by Jean Börlin, also for the Ballets Suédois, 1923). In fact, when *Relâche* (1924) was first presented, it was not the only dance performance work of the season to have been designed partly by a painter: in the same season, the Ballet Suédois’s *Skating Rink* and *La création du monde* (The Creation of the World, the famous “ballet nègre,” based on a tale from Blaise Cendrars’s *Anthologie nègre*, 1921, with avant-jazz music composed by Darius Milhaud) appeared, both with sets by Fernand Léger.

The independently wealthy director of the Ballet Suédois and art collector, Rolf de Maré (1888–1964), had approached Picabia early in 1924 with the idea of collaborating. The ballet was to be based on a libretto by Blaise Cendrars (1887–1961) titled *Après-dîner*, and Erik Satie was to produce the musical score. The work of the four promised to be an exhilarating collaborative effort produced by some of the most advanced artistic talents in Europe. However, Cendrars unexpectedly decamped to Brazil, and Picabia stepped in to fill the vacancy. He took considerable delight in the project, and his great interest in it prompted him to rewrite it completely and to offer to produce a film to be shown with it. (Picabia’s role as producer was novel: *Entr’acte*, from 1924, is believed to be among the first films financed entirely from outside the film industry.)

Picabia believed the dominant commercial cinema had diverted film from its true path (his “Instantéisme” manifesto vehemently critiqued the theatricalized mode of the dominant cinema), and he aspired to set film on the right path. Picabia also wanted to use film’s true attributes to heighten the dynamic effect of dance—for film can move as rapidly as thought: “The cinema must not be an imitation, but an evocative invention as rapid as the thought of our brain, which has the ability to transport us from Cuba to Bécon-les-Bruyères, to make us jump on a spirited horse or from the top of the Eiffel Tower . . . while we eat radishes!”²⁴⁸ The notion that the cinema can capture the activities of the imagination was advanced by many twentieth-century art movements, but the Dadaists were among the first to propose it. Furthermore, de Maré was in agreement. An admirer of the Ballets Russes, he wanted to outdo them, and proposed to do so by making dance cinematic. We see, once again, that in the early decades of the twentieth century, the cinema was a pivotal artistic force that gave shape to radical artistic forms across all the arts.

The cinema's importance as a model for the arts was highlighted by yet another project that Picabia worked on in December 1924, a month after the success of *Relâche*. This project was titled *Ciné-Sketch* and, like *Relâche*, was a ballet. It was a Simultaneist piece: the stage was divided into three equal parts, with performers including Man Ray as Blabbermouth, Duchamp as Naked Man, and Börlin as Constable, dances (performed to music by Satie, Francis Poulenc, 1889–1963, and Georges Auric, 1899–1983) by Caryathis, recitations by a stage actress, choreography by Jan Börlin, music by Les Six member Arthur Honegger (1892–1955) and a Jazz band playing simultaneously all three parts. René Clair worked the lights, lighting first one area of the stage and then another, shifting the highlighted subject rather as one might do with a film. Picabia explained why he gave the work its title: “until the present the cinema was inspired by theater; [now] I have tried to do the opposite in bringing to the stage the method and live rhythm of the cinema.”²⁴⁹ Picabia here was drawing attention to the cinema's role in creating Instantaneism. Here the theatre was emulating the cinema.

Picabia's work with the Ballets Suédois provided him with inspiration, both for the dance performance as a whole and for *Entr'acte*, a film that was to be presented between the two acts of the performance work; more than that, his work with the Ballets Suédois seems to have been the source of his ideas about Instantaneism. Like *Ciné-Sketch*, *Relâche* had filmic properties. It consisted of two acts. The first took place against a backdrop of 370 parabolic reflectors, with lamps in them, the intensity of which varied with the dynamics of the music that was a part of the performance. The action began with a firefighter covered in medals walking onto the stage and lighting a cigarette. He was followed by a woman in a jewel-bedecked evening gown, who did a few dance steps, sat down, and herself lit a cigarette. Next, nine male dancers appeared, in formal dress complete with top hats, and began to dance with the woman. The woman then half-undressed while the men kneeled down and arched their backs to form a bridge, which other dancers crossed. As one of the men led the woman away, the act concluded: at this point, the film *Entr'acte* was presented.

Following the film, the curtain was ornamented with various bric-a-brac—mirrors, signs, cabalistic emblems, and slogans (many of them excoriating this performance, along with high culture and its audience, which presumably included members of the audience for *Relâche*—for example, “Do you prefer ballets at the Opéra? Poor imbecile!,” “At the door catcalls are for sale for two cents!,” and “If you're not satisfied, go to hell!”).²⁵⁰ The nine male dancers now returned to the stage, with the woman, who was transported in a wheelbarrow and accompanied by two lame men. The men took off their outerwear, which left them wearing white tights with spots on them and their top hats. Next, the firefighter reappeared and began to pour

water from one bucket into another. Everybody started to dance, except for the firefighter, who continued to transfer water from one container to a second and then back to the first. The woman left the stage, and in her place a terracotta figurine appeared, towards which everyone made scornful gestures. One of the male dancers offered a wreath of orange flowers to Mlle Marthe Cenal, who had accompanied Picabia to the performance. Picabia and Erik Satie drove onto the stage in a five-horsepower Citroën, and the performance ended.

Presenting a film as the “intermission” was just as provocative. René Clair described the effect that film had:

From the very first frames, a noise composed of discreet laughter and muttered grumbling rose from the crowd of spectators, and a slight shudder ran up and down the rows of seats. This is the sign of a coming storm, and soon the storm broke. Picabia, who had wished he could hear the audience yell, had every reason to be satisfied. Shouts and whistles mingled with the melodious clowning of Satie, who undoubtedly had the connoisseur’s appreciation of the harmonic support the protesters were lending his music. The bearded ballerina and the mortuary camel were received as was fitting, and when the whole audience felt itself swept away on the roller coaster of the amusement park, their howls brought the general disorder and our pleasure to their peak. Imperturbable, Roger Désormière, with furious forelock and set features, seemed to be simultaneously conducting the orchestra and unleashing a burlesque hurricane with his commanding baton. Thus was born, amid sound and fury, this little film, the end of which was greeted with applause as loud as the catcalls and whistles.

...

The critics were kind to us: ... it was the subtle Alexandre Arnoux who bestowed the most flattering praise on us. Seeing *Entr’acte* again at some film society, long after the première at the Champs-Élysées, he wrote: “This film is still young. Even today you feel like hissing it.”²⁵¹

The film’s provocations were troubling both for the audience and for the performers—especially for the performers: largely because it had participated in this Picabian spectacle, the Ballet Suédois dissolved after the event. The performers and managers felt drained by their involvement, believing that they had strayed too far from the organization’s founding spirit, and this exhaustion had a role in the company’s demise—furthermore, de Maré discovered he was the victim of a swindle perpetrated by his theatre manager.

When we consider the notions that DADA and Surrealist artists formed about the cinema, it is important for us to remember that the phenomenon they called the cinema was very different from the institution we know. The cinema has not been a fixed thing: it has undergone change, and the audiences the cinema has attracted have been differentiated historically. In 1995,

Christian-Marc Bosséno published “La place du spectateur,” an article that played an important role in shifting the study of spectatorship away from psychoanalytical approaches (which assume that the viewer is constructed primarily by the film itself, with one viewer pretty much the same as another) towards historical approaches (which propose that the experience of film viewing and the relation between viewer and film are changeable and, indeed, *have* changed throughout the history of the cinema). He noted that early film spectators were a *grande publique* who went to see *film*, and that only later did differentiated audiences emerge who were interested in particular *sorts* of films. Among the questions that Bosséno offered as key to the study of film spectatorship was this one: “When can we date the death of the ‘grand public’ and the birth of specialized, micro audiences?” The great enthusiasm that DADA and Surrealism had for filmgoing reflected the excitement of the “grand public” for going to see films, a “grand public that was only just beginning to differentiate itself into a number of cinema-going groups.”²⁵² People of the era being discussed here were still as interested in the cinema itself as in the particular stories that films told, and they still went to movies to experience, and to understand, that phenomenon. The time was right for Picabia to stake a claim for true cinema, and he sought Clair’s help.

The film *Entr’acte* credits Francis Picabia and René Clair as its co-makers. Clair had worked out his conception of the cinema in a series of critical articles, most of which were written between December 1922 and December 1924, when he was editor of *Films*, a supplement to Jacques Hébertot’s *Théâtre et comœdia illustré* (1922–24). These articles reveal that Clair was influenced by Louis Delluc’s “Impressionism.” Louis Delluc (1890–1924) was seeking a distinctively French film, one that was different from the Absolute Film of the German avant-garde, from the so-called “Expressionist” cinema of the German commercial industry (which so well expressed the soulful nature of the German character), and from the products of the American and Swedish film industries (which, though he admired them, Delluc felt only conveyed the American and the Swedish character). Most intellectuals of Delluc’s generation who conceived an enthusiasm for the cinema—including Émile Vuillermoz (1878–1960), a composer and musicologist who helped found cinema criticism in France in the 1910s—pointed out that the cinema possessed transformative powers at least as great as those of the acknowledged high arts and consequently was capable of creating forms as aesthetically valid as those of the recognized high arts. Other intellectuals, though, such as the young Marcel L’Herbier (1888–1979), dismissed the cinema as an unworthy competitor among the arts, since it *lacked* their transformative capabilities.

Many early film theorists tried to prove that the film was an art just like the acknowledged high arts. And since, at the time, modernist conceptions

of art were on the ascendency, most of these film critics, film theorists, and filmmakers tried to establish the cinema's value by showing that it could be brought into conformity with the fundamental tenets of modernism. Modernism proposed that the aesthetic value of a work of art depends on its ability to generate an experience of a sort that we have only through our connection with particular works (or, some modernists argued, with objects, especially natural objects, that display some of the features of art objects that give them the ability to generate this sort of experience). Art objects have this effect because we do not relate to them as we do to utilitarian objects, objects that are simply "at hand"; art objects capture our attention because of their form—because of the way we apprehend the mutual adaptation of the parts to one another and to the whole, and the whole itself as fitted to the nature of the material from which it is composed. Thus, modernists argued, the value of a work of art (i.e., its capacity to engender aesthetic experience) depended on its form, or on its expressive power, not on the accuracy of the representation it offers—in fact, several modernists argued that the more a representation resembles its model, the more likely we are to respond to the representation as we do to the model and, accordingly, the less likely we are to respond to the work aesthetically. Form was of paramount importance—specifically, form's capacity to attract attention both to itself (this helps account for the self-reflexive turn of modernist art) and to how the parts are fitted to one another and to the whole. The form of the work must accord with properties of the materials of which the work is made—and in order to align the form with the materials, the work must have an autonomous structure unconstrained by extrinsic relations. For Delluc, on the contrary, the issue of the cinema's status as an art (i.e., as possessing sufficient transformative power to produce an autonomous object) mattered not at all. Delluc took the unusual tack of celebrating the cinema not as a high art, but as a popular medium; he was convinced that popular art had a freshness and vitality that the traditional high arts lacked.²⁵³ Clair agreed, for the most part. Picabia's goal was slightly different: he aspired to a cinema that was as vital and comedic as the popular film, but less theatricalized and more formally outrageous.

Years after making *Entr'acte*, Clair revealed what it was like to work with the de Maré company:

Between 1920 and 1924, the Compagnie des Ballet Suédois (Swedish Ballet Company) became the most Parisian of all dance troupes. Its director, Rolf de Maré, surrounded by co-workers whose names testify to his second sight or clairvoyance, had rented the Théâtre des Champs-Élysées, which had been since 1914 a Sleeping Beauty's palace—new, sumptuous, and empty.

This theater, the direction of which he had entrusted to Jacques Hébertot, was at the time a delightful beehive of artistic activity. On the main stage, among other memorable attractions, the Ballets Suédois were followed by

Diaghilev's Ballets Russes, the Vienna Opera, Stanislavsky's company and that of Kamerny Theater of Moscow... And in the corridors, in the midst of the dancers, singers, conductors and actors of every nationality, could be found Claudel, Cocteau, Cendrars, Honegger, Milhaud, Poulenc, Auric, Bonnard, de Chirico, Laprade, Léger, Foujita and others...

In November 1924, the final production of the Ballet Suédois was announced as follows:

RELÂCHE

Instantaneist ballet in two acts
and a cinematographic entr'acte
and *The Dog's Tail*, by Francis
Picabia. Music by Mr. Erik Satie.
Sets by Mr. Picabia. Cinemato-
graphic entr'acte by Mr. René Clair.
Choreography by Mr. Jean Borlin.

... I must add that it was never known precisely why this ballet was "instantaneist." As for *The Dog's Tail*, no one ever saw hide or hair of it. But Picabia, one of the great inventive minds of that period, was not likely to run short of inventions. When I met him he explained to me that he wanted to have a film projected between the two acts of his ballet, something that had been done during the intermission of café-concert performances before the World War. Since I was the only staff member who worked in cinema, I was the one called upon.²⁵⁴

Clair here is being modest about his work in cinema, for his previous experience, while not extensive, was certainly distinguished. At the time impresario (and, later, playwright journalist, and director) Jacques Hébertot (1886–1970) brought Rolf de Maré, René Clair, and Francis Picabia together, Clair had finished *Paris qui dort* (Paris Sleeps or Paris Asleep, 1924) but had not yet presented it to the public. Though Clair considered the film to be nothing more than an apprenticeship piece, it is truly a comic masterpiece, a satiric recasting of the Faust story into a popular form close to that of other works of narrative avant-garde produced in France in the early 1920s (and a form to which Clair would return after *Entr'acte*). In form and style *Paris qui dort* helped establish a distinctively French avant-garde cinema, separate from the German Absolute Film. Dziga Vertov saw the film in Paris and became despondent, recognizing Clair had already realized an idea he was developing—that brought him to rework his plans, and *Moscow Asleep* was transformed into *Человек с киноаппаратом* (Chelovek s Kinoapparatom, A Man with a Movie Camera, 1929).²⁵⁵

Paris qui dort is about a night watchman from the Eiffel Tower and five passengers from a plane, along with their pilot. The plane had arrived in Paris on an overnight flight from Marseille (its passengers represent people

displaying different forms of greed—a “woman of means,” an industrialist, a detective, a prisoner, and a thief). A mad scientist has invented a machine for stopping time and has shot its rays through all of Paris (the film was released under the English title *The Crazy Ray*), freezing everyone in their tracks. The airplane passengers and the night watchman, however, were above the zone on which the mad scientist’s crazy ray has had its effects: so they alone, along with the scientist and his distraught daughter, are able to move about Paris.

When they discover this, they realize they can steal the wallets of men who were stopped in their tracks and finish the dinners and champagne of revellers in a Montmartre nightclub. Soon, however, they realize that without others to replenish the supply, they are doomed. So, after finding out from the scientist’s daughter what had caused time to stop, they take control of the scientist’s time machine and reanimate Paris. The pilot is rewarded for his efforts at finding the scientist with the love of the scientist’s daughter. But soon the pilot realizes that he has no money, so he decides to use the scientist’s time machine to stop Paris again (which enables him to steal more money). The scientist figures out what has happened and reverses the process, reanimating Paris; as a result, the police are able to arrest the pilot and the scientist’s daughter. They are taken to the police station, where they meet up with other people from the airplane. They try to tell the truth about what happened, but are not believed and are placed in a mental institution; when they abandon their efforts to tell the truth, they are immediately released. Thus, the film suggests that the social consensus tyrannizes the individual into conformity.

Paris qui dort, like *Entr’acte*, has a social theme—it depicts behaviour driven by greed.²⁵⁶ Clair was inclined towards making social commentary, and we can assume he was the principal source of *Entr’acte*’s social message. Furthermore, Clair’s previous experience in filmmaking, which Picabia lacked, gave him an important role in the project: he made his knowledge of filmmaking available for the task of rendering Picabia’s “scenario” cinematically. Clair’s social interests and his conviction that film must be popular introduced attitudes into the filmmaking process, and eventually into the film, that were inconsistent with the filmmakers’ Dadaist beliefs.²⁵⁷ Clair, it seems, accepted that the cinema was an intransigently popular art—a conviction that many film critics, film theorists, and filmmakers of this era already were challenging.

Clair’s ideas about new forms in film were conflicted. Sometimes he was inspired by the desire to claim for the cinema a rightful position among the arts (and to stake that claim, he formulated notions about film that were largely consistent with modernist ideals); at other times he was influenced by the widespread anti-rational spirit so common after the Great War—and this second set of ideas had much in common with DADA.

Thus, in *Cinéma d'hier, cinéma d'aujourd'hui* (Cinema Yesterday and Today, 1970), the middle-aged Clair (of 1951) imagines himself asking the young René Clair (of 1923) about the meaning of the word *cinema*, and imagines the young René Clair replying:

It is time to have done with words. Nothing is being improved because we are not wiping the slate clean. Real cinema cannot be put in words. But just try to get that across to people—you, myself and the rest—who have been twisted by thirty-odd centuries of chatter: poetry, the theater, the novel... They must learn again to see with the eyes of a savage, of a child less interested in the plot of a Punch and Judy show than in the drubbings the puppets give each other with their sticks.

... Just think [Clair says ruefully] that even today, there is the cinema that points a moral, the cinema with a message, and that we are told to expect color cinema and three-dimensional cinema. As if the things that surround us—in fact, our whole existence—were so beautiful that they just had to be reproduced exactly as they are! And the cinema is not dead. We are astonished at all the vitality it has. No doubt Providence wants to console us for our charming modernity—a five-year war, bankruptcies, remote-control destruction, taxes, poverty, influenza epidemics, stock market speculation—and for the still rosier future it holds in store, by making us a gift of this universal toy and then watching us to see that we do not break it.²⁵⁸

With its emphasis on savage experience, its celebration of violence, and its assertion that language (along with, by implication, rational thinking, ideas, and “messages” generally) has distanced both the cinema and human beings from what they might ideally be, this passage is pure DADA. Indeed, we sense him going quite a distance with those who claimed not just that the cinema might be an art like the other great high arts but something far more radical: that the cinema is the top art for our time, since it is non-discursive, raw, and vital. Yet when, after a few moments of this imaginary conversation, the young René Clair returns to this theme, he emphasizes charm:

Let's not always ask for masterpieces. Let's be content at times to be swept along by a torrent of images. Thirty seconds of pure cinema in the course of a film that runs an hour are enough to keep our hope alive. When we cease to care about a ridiculous plot and surrender ourselves instead to the charm of a series of images, forgetting the pretext for their appearance on the screen, we can taste a new pleasure. Images: a landscape in motion passes by. A hand appears. The bow of a boat. A woman's smile. Three trees outlined against the sky. Images... Do not tell me what they mean according to the arbitrary rules of your language. It is enough for me to see them, to take pleasure in their harmony and in their contrasts. Let's learn to look at what is in front of us. Words have acquired a highly exaggerated importance. We know almost all the combinations of words by heart. We have eyes, yet we see not.²⁵⁹

“Images: a landscape in motion passes by. A hand appears. The bow of a boat. A woman’s smile. Three trees outlined against the sky. Images.” That does sound like *Entr’acte*.

Most of the first part of the preceding quotation expounds Dadaist ideas in a nearly pure form. But the second part, which emphasizes an appreciation of harmony and contrast, proposes the more modernist ideas of the “pure cinema” movement (which was led by his brother Henri Chomette, who extolled practices through which film would become pure film, purged of the influence of the adjacent arts—literature, music, dance, painting, theatre). The next section of *Cinéma d’hier, cinéma d’aujourd’hui* becomes even more modernist: it consists of a series of quotations about films that the artists whom Clair polled would have wanted to see made. Their responses were rooted in advanced theory: from the avant-garde writer Pierre Albert-Birot (1876–1967) he got, “[t]he work of art begins where imitation ends.”²⁶⁰ From the painter Fernand Léger he received, “A cinematic concept [should find] its own methods. As long as the film is based on fiction or the theater, it will be nothing.”²⁶¹ The Surrealist poet Philippe Soupault (1876–1990) reported on his preference for those films “in which all the resources of the cinema would be used. It is a truism, but one that should be repeated at every opportunity and inscribed in every studio. Film-makers are making an effort to limit the cinema, to reduce it to the proportions of the theater.”²⁶² This text, then, can be read as a modernist text, mandating the cinema to seek its means only within itself. The great French modernist poet Paul Valéry remarked that “there is a need to institute an art of pure cinema, or cinema reduced to its own means. This art should steer clear of those—theater or novel—that deal in speech.”²⁶³ Clair conducted that survey for his earliest (1923) collection of writings about the cinema. In 1951, for *Réflexion faite*, he added the (overly general) remark, “It can be seen that these replies from the most diverse personalities all agreed more or less: the cinema is an autonomous medium of expression which ought to seek its future only in itself.”²⁶⁴ Clair was one third a modernist, one third a social crusader, and one third an anti-rational, anti-language Dadaist.

These contradictions in Clair’s ideas help explain why *Entr’acte* is neither a piece concerned exclusively with dynamic form nor a piece of pure DADA (though its Dadaism is nonetheless very pronounced); nor is it purely a social tract. The film’s non-Dada character is most evident in its use of discursive social commentary as the principal determinant of its form. Its Dada character is evident in its many impenetrable (or nearly impenetrable) moments; in its events, which cannot be formed into a narrative (and which almost defy rational interpretation); and in its humour, which veers at times towards a cinema of pure (a-rational or super-rational) effects. In its narrative form, *Entr’acte* resembles the cinema that Clair described in *Cinéma d’hier, cinéma*

d'aujourd'hui (and in *Réflexion faite*): it cares little for plot and encourages viewers to surrender to the charm of images. Nonetheless, however elliptical, poetic, and (at least on first viewings) resistant to interpretation, the first part of the film (which culminates in the shooting of the hunter) is structured to convey a theme; the second part of the film, however, is not so thematically determined and is much more involved than the previous part with building on the cinema's inherent potentials, especially its kinetic attributes.²⁶⁵

Clair's *Entr'acte* conforms to the artistic ideals that Tzara had proposed in his review of Reverdy's *Le voleur de Talan* (1917). First, the film is little involved with psychological concerns—its psychological implications, whatever they are, have more to do with freeing instincts than with “higher” spiritual states. Furthermore, objects are given as much weight as people are—the runaway hearse and the airplane that seems to be following it are as interesting as the supposedly legless man who rises from his roller-board to run. The film is cosmic, in the sense that all reality seems to become involved in the chase after the hearse (i.e., after death): all of Paris—first all the people in the funeral procession, then all its traffic (air traffic, bicycle traffic, and boat traffic included)—join in the death chase. Birds and animals are treated as equivalent to people (the bird that lands on the hunter's hat and the camel pulling the hearse are no less individuated than Satie or Duchamp) and objects as equivalent to any of them (the self-propelling cannon is no less individuated than the artists in the film). The result of this universal equivalence of folly is, as Tzara suggested, a universal letting-go.

The film's first section is the more thematically determined of its two parts. *Entr'acte* depicts civilization as death-driven. But desperate as the film's feelings about civilization are, the means are anything but bleak. Picabia declared in the program notes for the film that “*Entr'acte* does not believe in very much, in the pleasure of life perhaps; it believes in the pleasure of inventing, it respects nothing except the desire to *burst out laughing*.”²⁶⁶ The film consists largely of a series of sight gags: Picabia interrupts Man Ray and Marcel Duchamp's game of chess by spraying them, and the chessboard, with water from a garden hose, sweeping the chessmen off the board; a ballerina is filmed from below, with the lens looking up her legs at her crotch—or so it seems, until it is revealed that the ballet dancer is actually a man with a bushy beard and glasses, and rather paunchy; a hunter shoots an ostrich egg, then is himself shot; a funeral hearse is pulled by a camel—the hearse becomes unhitched from the camel and takes off on its own, making all of Paris chase after it (even while the members of the funeral procession entertain themselves in an amusement park). This chase resembles scenes from Keystone Cops movies, though it inverts one common trope of scenes of that sort: the unruly element the pursuers strive to subdue represents death.

These sight gags were largely Picabia's suggestions. Picabia reputedly wrote the "scenario" for *Entr'acte* (it was really no more than a brief outline) over dinner at Maxim's restaurant and on Maxim's stationery. It contains many highly implausible events, which remain implausible even when realized on celluloid. To Picabia's scenario, Clair added his own cinematic tricks, drawing on a large repertoire of cinematic devices for denaturalizing the action and for making it seem more fantastic and humorous—changes in tempo, from very slow (as when the hearse begins to move) to very fast (as when the funeral procession enters the amusement park and avails itself of a roller-coaster ride); unusual views of objects; sudden appearances and disappearances that defy the logic of narrative (for example, Picabia and Satie appear, leaping about on a Parisian rooftop, accompanying a self-propelled cannon; and a hunter in a Bavarian hat appears, again as though materializing out of nothing); and transformations of one object into another.

The zanily accelerated pace that is used in much of the film makes the proceedings seem sufficiently unreal that we are not concerned whether sequences of events conform to our expectations about actuality. At the same time, that accelerated pace endows happenings with enough momentum that Clair's cinematographic renderings of Picabia's script defeat our customary propensities towards evaluating critically the narrative's construction—this despite the scenario's implausibilities.

One part of the scenario, prefaced with the comment "ideas for the cinematic part of the ballet," reads as follows:

Curtain raiser:

Slow-motion loading of a cannon by Satie and Picabia; the shot must make as much noise as possible. Total length: 1 minute.

During the interval:

1. Boxing attack by white gloves, on a black screen. Length: 15 seconds. Written explanatory titles: 10 seconds.
2. Game of chess between Duchamp and Man Ray. Jet of water handled by Picabia sweeping away the game. Length: 30 seconds.
3. Juggler and father Lacolique. Length: 30 seconds.
4. Huntsman firing an ostrich egg on a fountain; a dove comes out of the egg and lands on the huntsman's head; a second huntsman, firing at it, kills the first huntsman: he falls, the bird flies away. Length 1 minute. Written titles: 20 seconds.
5. 21 people lying on their backs, showing the soles of their feet. Length: 10 seconds. Handwritten titles: 15 seconds.
6. Dancer on a transparent mirror, filmed from beneath. Length: 1 minute. Written titles: 5 seconds.
7. Blowing-up of rubber balloons and screens, on which figures will be drawn, accompanied by inscriptions. Length: 35 seconds.
8. A funeral: hearse drawn by a camel, etc. Length: 6 minutes. Written titles: 1 minute.²⁶⁷

Near the beginning of the film as it was realized, we see hands placed against the wall, as if grasping it in terror. Shortly afterwards, Clair gives us scenic shots of Paris—and then a cannon moves into the frame, as though moving by itself (thus, the image can be read as suggesting that the forces of destruction have taken on a life of their own). Picabia and Satie make fun of the weapons several times during this film. One of the first times is right near its beginning: the two Dada artists enter the frame, comically springing up and down, in extreme slow motion (which makes their behaviour appear even more comic); as they bounce in circles around the gun, it turns, as though following them. Finally, they align the cannon so that it takes aim at the centre of Paris, load it with a large explosive charge, and bounce off-screen in the same implausible bunny-hop that brought them on-screen. Picabia and Satie's action can be read in different ways, as pointing to the (negative) violence that has overwhelmed Paris, or as portraying their (supposedly positive) rage against Paris and their wish to destroy the civilization that Paris represents.

Clair's precise cutting and clever superimpositions suggest that Paris is overrun by violence. A superimposition turns Paris's night lights into boxing gloves (presented in photographic negative, so they are white), swatting it out. Burning matches singe human hair; behind the fire, the hair turns into the columns of a neoclassical façade to suggest that Paris itself is burning. Two images of a colonnaded façade, shot so that the columns appear on opposing diagonals, are superimposed with an image of the Place de la Concorde (ironic name!); the columns are thus turned into a chessboard, that is, into a place where a game of war is played out. In this way, Clair makes Parisians seem like participants in a chess game by day and a boxing match by night. The next shot presents a chess match washed away in the spray of a garden hose. The scene achieves its humour through the crossing of categories: chess is played indoors, while the spray of water belongs to the outdoors.

Dadaists celebrated life and movement, so the stiff, precise, overly restrained movements of classical ballet were anathema to them. (The incorporation of shots of a ballerina are appropriate to *Entr'acte*, since it was made, in fact, as the *entr'acte* for a ballet program—albeit one with a satiric edge.) To mock the restrained movements of classical ballet, Clair superimposes a dancer, who makes weak and “watery” gestures with her arms and hands—like those that Marius Petipa and Lev Ivanov's choreography for *Swan Lake* has made familiar—over a shot of flowing water. These images render absurd the escapism involved in grown women pretending (not very successfully) to be swans. In the ensuing sequence with a dancer, we see performed what could well be described as *amaterish entrechats*—the cover of Picabia's *Journal de l'Instantanéisme* had declared, “L'INSTANTANÉISME: FAIT DES ENTRECHATS” (Instantaneism: Make Entrechats). Then, taking the sarcasm even

further, Clair positions the camera under the ballerina, to imply that one interest that balletgoers take in ballet is that they get to peer up the dancers' tutus. Thus, Clair intercuts footage of violence and war with shots of the ballerina, to accentuate the idea that a repressive society that so sublimates voyeurism is bound to foster violence. Shortly after this, the camera tilts up the body of the dancer (whose movements have become very awkward) and shocks us by revealing that the ballerina is actually a man with a beard and glasses. The discomfort we experience is the result of recognizing that the voyeuristic pleasure we felt a moment earlier, from looking up the dancer's tutu, has actually been produced by looking up a man's legs. Moreover, the man's beard makes us think of his pubic beard, thus increasing the discomfiture that has resulted from staring up the man's legs (we are induced to think about his genitals). The lack of a phallus projecting from the (apparent) "pubic beard" heightens the discomfort even further.

The film as a whole is very much a film of movement, which, Clair recognized, is the very basis of cinematic lyricism. Indeed, the film generates its effects primarily through the ways it handles movement. The use of various speeds—of both the shooting and the cutting—sometimes converts the subject matter into almost pure (almost non-referential) figures, thus emphasizing the cinema's dynamic properties. This cutting also organizes the shapes, speeds, and directions of motion into a highly choreographed ensemble. The first part of the film relies largely on creating poetic connections among images by matching their actions: shots presenting previously unseen objects continue the shapes and motions of earlier shots, creating dynamic links that defy, or at least challenge, comprehension (as the conceptual links between dynamically associated shots are characteristically difficult to discern). In this part of the film, the links between shots seem to be determined more by their kinetic form than by their content (and in this, they differ from Eisensteinian montage): the sense of the appropriateness of the connections derives from our rhythmic and kinaesthetic sensibility (and that is part of what relates this film to DADA). In the second part of the film, the visual collisions *between* shots are replaced with collisions (absurdities) *within* shots: so, for example, instead of a ballerina being linked to a man's head photographed from above through editing, a camel is brought together with a funeral hearse in a single shot.

A central theme of the film (perhaps its principal theme) is the confinement of movement. The ballerina is one of the central visual motifs of the film's first half. She is viewed from below as she moves up and down. Obviously, the point of view is a scandalous gesture, but it is more than that: the viewpoint *confines* the action, suggesting that the dancer never gets anywhere. Similarly, the ostrich egg that the hunter takes aim at (after first pointing his gun at

the audience, in another gesture of provocation) contains a pigeon, and his shooting the egg releases the bird (which flies over to him and alights on his leather hat); the Place de la Corcorde is confined by columns, yet a paper boat floats over it (in superimposition), as though trying to escape. The hunter just mentioned was played by Jean Börlin, the choreographer and principal dancer in the Ballet Suédois—and that fact reinforces the suggestion that the hunter's ambition is to release movement. Picabia responds to Börlin's shooting the egg open by shooting him (Clair presents this by having the Swede's head dissolve into a target) as though in revenge for unleashing such dynamism (we might wonder whether this is not a paragonal moment). Picabia's action motivates the second half of the film, for Börlin (or, more exactly, a mannequin standing in for him) topples off the building, a theatre, to his death, and that death provides the inciting cause of the funeral.

The second half of the film, depicting the funeral procession, makes explicit the idea that Paris pursues death and destruction. The entire section reveals the enthusiasm that Dada artists felt for the inspired nonsense of the American comedy film and, generally, for comic forms in popular culture—an enthusiasm that derived from their anti-art leanings. The section begins with an act of violence—someone fires a handgun, a victim topples over, and the funeral takes place. We see the mourners coming out of church, but, nastily, Clair captures (or creates) a comic moment, when the mourners descend the church steps and wind blows up the women's skirts, uncovering their legs and exposing their stockinged thighs. The mourners fall in line behind a hearse, drawn (implausibly enough) by a camel; on the hearse is a mortuary escutcheon that displays the initials of Francis Picabia and Erik Satie; so the scene suggests, among other ideas, that the murderous culture of modernity has claimed the two creators' lives.

The authority figures in the funeral cortège are (quite proposterously) wearing Napoleonic hats. The mourners are dressed in Magrittean fashion, in black suits, bowlers, and top hats, and many carry umbrellas—this attire, of course, represents a sort of formality that DADA mocked. The man at the head of the procession picks leaves from the funeral wreath, puts them in his mouth, and begins chewing them—an irreverent gesture that makes sport of the solemnity of the occasion. This irreverent mocking of what society generally treats as a solemn occasion, this sport in the face of mortality, suggests Picabia's rebellious defiance of death. (Here, one might well think of his giving one of his books of poetry the title *L'athlète des pompes funèbres*.) The mourners' movements and bearing are stiff; the mourners themselves are unsmiling. Soon the procession begins, at first in lockstep, in extreme (mechanically produced) slow motion. In the same way that presenting the ballerina's steps and leaps in artificially slow motion draws our attention to

the character of her movements, the (mechanically produced) slow motion here emphasizes the dynamics of the traffic that the cortège passes *en route*, and, more importantly, the peculiar gait of each of the people in the funeral procession (which is not a normal gait at all, for the mourners are not walking but rather leaping ahead in giant strides). This also renders the solemn figures comical (and thus mocks, reflecting the common Dada wont, their all-too-proud dignity). This use of slow motion is a device for containing dynamism, an effect reinforced by having the people leap forward in giant strides so that we feel they should be moving at a brisk clip. This contained action presses for release, so the sequence progresses from slow to fast motion.

The funeral cortège—which at times resembles more of a manic chase from an American action comedy in pursuit of a runaway coffin than a sombre scene of funeral procession (though, ironically, the liberated element the pursuers seek to subdue is a hearse)—passes through an amusement park complete with a miniature Eiffel Tower; at the point where the hearse circles around the park's circus ring, it moves at normal speed.²⁶⁸ The rope that harnesses the camel to the hearse comes loose; the man with reins in his hand continues to guide the camel while the hearse slowly rolls away on its own, gradually accelerating so that the cortège steadily quickens its pace to keep up with it. The man guiding the camel, who until then has been unaware that the camel and the hearse have become separated, sees the procession, looks around as though to see why the camel has stopped, notices that he has lost the coach, panics, lets go of the camel, and runs after the crowd. The procession continues to speed up, and here Clair handles the action in an extraordinary manner: objects filmed at accelerated speeds virtually dissolve into pure motion (reminiscent of the intensified movement in Abel Gance's [1889–1981] *La roue*, 1922), and the superimpositions create opposing motions (when, for example, runners moving towards the camera merge with runners moving away from it). Ghostly humans pass through trees, and bicycles fuse with automobiles. This part of the film is a celebration of speed—of dynamism that has broken out of its constraints and liberated itself. That Picabia and Clair use a funeral cortège for this is another of the film's Dada aspects, but that context also encourages us to interpret this celebration of speed as a liberation of vital life force—that speed is what has caused camel and hearse to come uncoupled supports that interpretation.

The action speeds up artificially, by cinematic means (this part of the film includes a series of whip pans, presented in rapid succession, and for a time the travelling shots are so fast that their subject matter is virtually indiscernible, so that effect is pure, directional motion); as the action speeds up, some of the men have a harder and harder time keeping up with the action (there

is a self-reflexive irony to this sight gag, of course, for we are aware that the action is artificially accelerated)—so some remove their jackets, for comfort and to enable them to run faster. Little by little, the crowd dwindles as some people run out of breath. Traffic passes the carriage, travelling in the opposite direction (the carriage creates havoc by going the wrong way up a one-way street). A runner, wearing a jersey and running shorts, joins the mourners. His presence strengthens the impression that what we are watching is a chase scene of the sort that American action comedies have made familiar, but with this difference: what the people are chasing after is a runaway coffin. This impression is bolstered as a group of cyclists and cars join in, and then even an airplane and a boat (which moves at an artificially accelerated speed), until it seems that all of Paris has joined in the pursuit. At one point a man riding on a roller-board, who seems to have lost his legs, jumps up and runs off to join the rest of the gang, letting us in on the gag that the man's pitiable condition is a beggar's deceit. The action continues to speed up, reaching its maximum when the procession finds itself on a roller-coaster.²⁶⁹ The coffin falls off the hearse, bounces over the ground, and comes to a halt, giving the pursuers a chance to catch up with it. The action is jaunty, recalling Picabia's suggestion for what a burial should be like: "After our death we must be put inside a ball; this ball will be made of wood of different colors. They will roll it to the cemetery and the undertaker's assistants who will be in charge will wear transparent gloves in order to recall to the beloved the memory of our caresses."²⁷⁰ The dead man (Jean Börlin) comes to life again, arising from the coffin dressed as a magician with a magic wand. He climbs out of his enclosure as the dove escaped the ostrich egg: Börlin will not be confined in a coffin but must come alive—must break into motion—again (Börlin was extremely beautiful in that very feminine way of some men, and was de Maré's lover—the love between them was intense). The closing title, "FIN," appears, and the film seems to end with this triumph over Death. However, the magician leaps through the screen and, by waving his magic wand, makes the figures disappear one by one (though we realize that it is Clair who, after the fashion of Méliès, makes them vanish): the men had pursued Death, and now Death takes them. Death can pick whom it wants—and he can take them all, one by one. Finally, Rolf de Maré, the show's producer (here playing the role of management), intervenes and insists that this nonsense end and that the second part of the ballet (the more established art) begin.

Entr'acte was made in large part by a young man who was enthusiastic about Dada art, in collaboration with an important Dada artist and with the help of participants in the Dada movement in Paris. It manifests aspects of the Dada spirit, but it is too discursive (and therefore too closely tied to

reason) to be truly a Dada work. But there *are* truly Dadaist films, made by major contributors to the movement. Among the most important of these are the first films of Man Ray.

MAN RAY'S DADA CINEMA

Several themes traverse Man Ray's oeuvre. His photographic and cinematographic work developed out of the belief that these media imitate the dynamics of consciousness. That conception, a common one in the avant-garde cinema—especially the American avant-garde cinema—affected the way that art was made in the twentieth century. As concerns photography, Man Ray conceived an analogy not just between the eye (the retina) and the lens but also between the brain and the enlarger: the enlarger magnifies specific details in the large area the lens covers, just as the brain picks out details from the larger area covered by the eye. “I think that the truth lies in likening the lens to the human eye. Now . . . the eye, lens and dark room, sees little, and it is the brain which enlarges the images, which is transmitted by the retina. Therefore I think that I must always photograph very small and then enlarge, expecting that way to draw near to the vision of the human eye.”²⁷¹ This conception of photography as a means of revealing the mysterious, the marvellous, that lies within everyday reality—something that the extraordinary clarity and detail of the photographic images make all the more compelling—is inherently Surrealist, as we will see in the next chapter. Man Ray's films and photographs often provoke the sense of a startling confrontation with brute reality. Even the Rayograph, the photographic technique with which he is prominently associated, and which he is generally credited with inventing, has affinities with Surrealism.²⁷²

Ray discovered the “Rayograph” quite by accident: he had included an unexposed sheet of photographic paper in a darkroom tray. Of course, no image appeared on it when he put the paper in the developer; but then, quite by chance, he placed some objects on the sheets and turned on the light. An image appeared before his eyes. Tristan Tzara visited the next day and was intrigued by the image. Tzara and Ray immediately began to work on the method: Tzara, using the process to attack the medium itself, spread matches and pieces torn from a matchbox over a sheet in which he had burnt a hole; Man Ray created geometric forms—cones, triangles, and wire spirals. His description of these stark images in reversed tones conformed to the Surrealist program—they were, he said, “startlingly new and mysterious.”²⁷³ A year after the publication of the first Surrealist text, André Breton and Philippe Soupault's *Les champs magnétiques* (The Magnetic Fields, 1920), Man Ray published a collection of twelve Rayographs, with an introduction by Tzara,

and gave the collection the title *Les champs délicieux* (The Delicious Fields).

As his invention of the Rayograph shows, Man Ray was interested in working directly with light. The cinema provides that possibility: the film strip, after all, is just a medium for modulating a beam of projected light. Ray's experiments (evident in *Étoile de mer*, 1928) with filming through crystals or other refracting media testify to this interest as well—Ray wanted literally to “paint with light.”

But it is the connection of Man Ray's first two films to Dadaism that is our subject here.²⁷⁴ Ray's approach to filming was spontaneous and aleatoric, in keeping with one of the Dadaists' methods, which the Surrealists would then develop further. “All the films I have made have been improvisations,” he wrote. “I did not write scenarios. It was automatic cinema.”²⁷⁵ His first film, and his most conspicuously Dadaist, was *Le retour à la raison* (Return to Reason, 1923). The title, of course, is facetious. (In his program for the *Coeur à Barbe* evening at which the film was first shown, along with Charles Sheeler and Paul Strand's *Fumées de New York* [i.e., *Manhatta*, 1921], and a “new film” by Hans Richter, possibly *Rhythmus 21*, [1923], Tzara listed the title of Man Ray's film as *Le retour de la raison* [Reason's Return].) The film is a curious mélange of moving Rayographs, shots of artistic objects he had constructed, and straightforward cinematography. The brilliant American “bad boy” composer George Antheil (1900–59), then living in France, was supposed to do the music, but his work on *Sonata sauvage* (1922/23) prevented him from completing the score. Man Ray tells us that the film was the product of a curiosity aroused “by the idea of putting into motion some of the results I had obtained in still photography.”²⁷⁶ To satisfy his curiosity, he bought a small automatic camera and shot sequences of rotating objects that would eventually be incorporated into *Le retour à la raison*. These views of rotating forms, taken with a fixed camera, became a central feature of both *Le retour à la raison* and Ray's next film, *Emak Bakia* (1927). These rotating forms had antecedents in other works by May Ray. Between 1916 and 1919, he did several works based on the theme of rotating transparent objects: *The Revolving Door Collage* (1916–17), the famous *The Rope Dancer Accompanies Herself with Her Shadow* (1916), and *The Admiration of the Orchestrelle for the Cinematograph* (1919) all demonstrate the effects of motion on outline and shape.

Shortly after Man Ray made these shots of objects that he had constructed, Tristan Tzara, the only person who knew of these efforts, dropped in on Ray with an announcement about the upcoming *Coeur à Barbe* evening (a Dada soirée), which stated that Man Ray would be screening a Dada film. Man Ray pointed out to Tzara that the shots he had already made would not be enough for a film. Tzara suggested that he complete the film by adding some Rayographs to the footage he already had prepared. Man Ray complied.

The film involves many visual rhymes. The opening Rayograph, of salt scattered over the frame in an all-over composition that somewhat resembles a shimmering field (a sequence that, like the thumbtack and nails sequence that follows, transposes a set of Man Ray's photographic interests to the cinema), gives way to a field of daisies, shot from a high angle so that the flowers form an all-over composition similar to that which the salt particles had formed. This juxtaposition of abstract compositions with shots that depict familiar objects is common in *Le retour à la raison*—later, a rotating paper spiral, an egg crate, and a nude human torso are filmed so as to draw our attention to their similarities. The similarities depend partly on the formal properties of the objects, but even more on a technique that Man Ray had used in his photographic work and then extended into his work in film. That technique is the close-up, which in this film has the same general role as it has in his photographic work (i.e., of imitating the mind's selective attention), as well as the more specific role of stressing the texture of the objects photographed. Emphasizing these attributes creates a basis for the relationships among the images.

It is characteristic of the Rayograph, and even more so of moving Rayographs, that the object matter is often unidentifiable. The shots of the built objects, sometimes taken in close-up as they rotate, often have an enigmatic character, for they frequently (partly or completely) resist identification—in fact, as the object rotates, it sometimes changes from an identifiable object into an abstract, all-over field, and back again (though even when it returns to being an abstract form, our experience of it is inflected by our awareness of its source). The developing sequence of shots that present pure forms and shots that present nameable things affects the viewer as an ongoing process that from moment to moment resists being consolidated into a clear gestalt form. Such sequences have the character of what Jean-François Lyotard calls the figural, the trace of a space that is radically irreconcilable with the space of discourse. Man Ray uses devices that bolster the figural characteristics of the image. An egg crate is seen hanging by a string and rotating, creating a strong shadow on the wall, and combining the image with its shadow reflection reinforces the effect of the rotation: Man Ray then superimposes over that image another image of the rotating egg crate, again with its shadow, to create composite forms whose component elements so mesh with one another that their identities confound us (it becomes more difficult to separate one form from the other). The shot then appears upside down—this device further abstracts the image. More than that, it converts a discursive image (to modify that term from Lyotard) that is inflected by the figural into a pure instance of the figural. The sequence of “images” derived from the egg crate is followed by one that presents a torso (a sequence that translates Man Ray's photographic

interests into the medium of film), with slats of light and shadow from Venetian blinds projected on it. By repeating the torso's rotation, and by switching from positive to negative, Ray turns this form, too, into an abstract dynamic image—that is, he turns it into another instance of the figural.

This connivance with Lyotard's figural highlights Man Ray's understanding of the cinema (and, more generally, that of the *Dadaisten*). The figural resists the discursive; thus, it is experienced as a raw, even savage, effect. We have commented on this interest in elemental effects in other sections of this book, and we have noted that it is a response to the dismantling of reason's overreaching ambitions. Dada artists responded to the belief that the mind had lost its purchase on reality by developing an art of elementary, often corporeal effects—an art whose impact would overwhelm the thinking mind and generate an a-rational (or super-rational) response. Their art, then, was one of corporeally engendered, pneumatic influence.

EMAK BAKIA: INTRODUCTION

In the next section, I examine Man Ray's *Emak Bakia*, to show that the film proposes a three-termed homology among the cinema, collage, and the operations of the mind. Throughout this work, we have been examining various Dada valorizations of unreason. We have noted that the developments in mathematics and philosophy that occurred in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the years of the twentieth century that preceded the Great War and the founding of DADA led to a picture of reason as unmoored from reality. Many people viewed these momentous developments as calamities. The *Dadaisten*, by contrast, viewed them in the best possible light, insisting that by cutting the ligatures that bound the mind to reality, these developments unbridled the imagination. History had brought humanity to a point where, at last, the imagination would soar above reason.

Still, that humans are bereft of means to fathom the mysteries they confront is a hard admission to make. Even the Dada artists, though they looked positively on historical developments and were determined to seize the opportunities those developments furnished, wondered whether a faculty other than reason—perhaps a-rational or super-rational faculties that premoderns had exercised but moderns, corrupted by the Enlightenment's overemphasis on reason, had neglected—might afford us means to fathom the mysteries of our existence. The widespread belief that developments in mathematics and philosophy had exposed the baselessness of reason's overvaulting claims impelled artists and thinkers to turn their attention to the operations of the mind, and to ask themselves whether the mind had the resources to probe the ultimate questions of life.

So this era drove thinkers towards an interest in the mind's operations. To restrict our survey to the arts, this era saw Ezra Pound developing a paratactical poetry that juxtaposed images to imitate leaps of thought. Futurist painters attempted to capture the multi-sensory impact of a dynamic reality that dematerialized objects and left *linea di velocità* (or *linea di forza*, lines of velocity or lines of force) resonating in a reality that comprised both what we ordinarily take to be external reality and what we ordinarily take to be internal reality. The Cubists attempted to capture how the mind fuses optical reports with memory to create a percept. The Dada artists, too, attempted to create dynamic forms that show how the mind operates. Among the works that exemplify this strain in DADA are Man Ray's films, and of them, *Emak Bakia* is the paradigm example.

It shouldn't be surprising that films figure among the key examples of Dada interest in the operations of consciousness: one reason for the widespread appeal of the cinema in this era was the conviction that the cinema was suited—likely better suited than any of the other arts—to capturing the dynamics of consciousness. The three-termed homomorphism that *Emak Bakia* proposes—among cinema, collage, and the operations of consciousness—shed further light on that conviction. For the Dada artists in general, and for Man Ray in particular, collage was able to capture the mind's intuitive leaps as it vaulted over reason to help force open the doors to mystery. I explore that theme in the analysis of *Emak Bakia* I now offer.

*Tout ce qui peut être projeté sur l'écran appartient au cinéma.*²⁷⁷

(Everything that can be projected on the screen belongs to the cinema.)

Emak Bakia was shot in the Basque country around Biarritz. The title is usually said to mean “Leave me alone” in Euskara (the Basque language).²⁷⁸ The expression can also be interpreted as meaning “the female [gives] peace.” When he presented the film in America, Man Ray told people that the title means “Give Us a Rest”—a quip apparently directed at the press and reviewers.

Emak Bakia had an extraordinary conception. After the success of *Le retour à la raison*, a client named Arthur Wheeler contacted Man Ray to commission a portrait of his wife. During their negotiations, Wheeler told the artist that he would be willing to finance a film—in fact, he invited the artist to stay at the Wheelers' home near Biarritz. Intrigued by the offer, Man Ray went out and bought a top-quality camera and many accessories, including special lamps, crystals, and distorting mirrors, as well as a turntable driven by an electric motor. Wheeler allowed Ray great freedom, and Man Ray was, he tells us, “thrilled, more with the idea of doing what I pleased than with any technical and optical effects I planned to introduce.”²⁷⁹

Man Ray himself considered the film that resulted to be a Surrealist effort. Explaining this, he described the transformation of Dadaism into Surrealism

in terms that are now familiar: Dadaism was the negative program, aimed at destroying the society of reason that dominated Western culture. Its destructive program meant that it was limited in its purpose, so it transformed itself into a movement with a more positive goal—that of opening humans to the great mystery in which they live:

What Dada had accomplished was purely negative; its poems and painting were illogical, irreverent, and irrelevant. To continue its propaganda a more constructive program was needed, at least as an adjunct to its criticism of society. And Breton came up with Surrealism . . . Dada did not die; it was simply transformed, since the new movement was composed of all the original members of the Dada group.²⁸⁰

So the artist insisted on the Surrealist character of *Emak Bakia*:

My Surrealist friends whom I had invited to the showing were not very enthusiastic, although I thought I had complied with all the principles of Surrealism: irrationality, automatism, psychological and dreamlike sequences without apparent logic, and complete disregard of conventional storytelling. At first I thought this coolness was due to my not having discussed the project with them beforehand, as we did in the publication of magazines and in the arrangement of exhibitions. It was not sufficient to call a work Surrealist, as some outsiders had done to gain attention—one had to collaborate closely and obtain a stamp of approval—present the work under the auspices of the movement to be recognized as Surrealist. I had neglected this, been somewhat too individualist.²⁸¹

Despite what Man Ray asserts, I consider the film to be basically a Dada work—as Dadaistic as *Le retour à la raison*. That *Emak Bakia* incorporates the opening sequence of the earlier film offers some confirmation of that interpretation. Man Ray's description of the characteristics of the Dada and Surrealist movements stresses the continuities between the two as much as the differences. Some scholars, notably Michel Sanouillet, have asserted that Surrealism was nothing more than French DADA, and there are reasons to think that Man Ray would have agreed with that claim, at least in some measure.²⁸² The primary difference between this film and Ray's previous film is that it incorporates frequent allusions to narrative form—and the way in which Man Ray handles those allusions makes it even more directly an attack on reason (and on reason's commanding trope, that of understanding process by means of narrative) than the earlier one. So in Man Ray's own terms, it is an even more Dadaist work.

Modernists (such as Wassily Kandinsky from 1908 to 1944, Piet Mondrian, especially from 1912 to 1944, Kazimir Malevich, especially from 1913 to 1927, and Vladimir Tatlin, especially from 1912 to 1929) are generally understood as having set out a program that would bind artistic forms to that which, according to a narrow conception of the medium at hand, fit the nature of its

materials. In fact, modernists proposed a thoroughgoing reductionism that entailed eliminating from artworks any feature that could be eliminated, so as to reach an essential and irreducible core.²⁸³ Accordingly, modernists were averse to incorporating into their artworks elements belonging to any adjacent medium.

Man Ray's declaration challenged that ideal of purity—or, to be more precise, it challenged the most severely limiting versions of that ideal. It promoted a more open conception of a work of art and a more tolerant acceptance of diversity. He seems to have conceived the cinema as a medium that welcomes various representational modes. Even the first work of Man Ray's that displayed an interest in the cinema, his *Theatr* (1911), reveals this: like *Emak Bakia*, *Theatr* assembles diverse elements into an evocative and visually coherent unity. The work is made from a sheet of newspaper and uses words (and sometimes, like its title, parts of words) to convey meaning. Among the snippets it includes is the newspaper headline "CINEMA IDEAS TO HAVE A CHANCE."

Emak Bakia typifies Man Ray's more open conception of an artwork. First, at the beginning of the film, he incorporates, holus-bolus, sequences from *Le retour à la raison*—Rayographs, on film, of sprinkled salt and pepper, animated nails, and a thumbtack sequence. The modernist conception of the unity of an artwork was that of a form so intricately adjusted to its contents that it was unique. Against such a background, the notion that entire sections could be cut out of one work and dropped into another appeared to be downright extravagant.

Second, individual sequences incorporate a remarkable diversity of image types: highly graphic Rayographs are followed by a realistic scene of a field of daisies. The differing degrees of modelling, and the different means by which the two types of visual forms are produced, seem not to trouble Man Ray. After all, either sort of visual form can be produced on a strip of film and projected on the screen, so either sort is suitable to film.

The diversity that the film incorporates derives from a crucial analogy that film makes: between collage and dreams. Both dream and collage have a kinship with the cinema (and indeed, artists' interest in both dream and collage forms in the early years of the twentieth century were aroused in part by the general enthusiasm for the cinema). The kinship the cinema has with dreams is obvious (and we will be commenting on that affinity in the chapter on Surrealism). As for collage's kinship with the cinema, we have already noted that Raoul Hausmann referred to his photomontages as "static cinema" and that collage films were created soon after the cinema's birth.

One purpose for *Emak Bakia*'s diversity, to be sure, is to defy discursive meaning and to engender a non-rational response. *Emak Bakia* presents

no narrative; nor does it engage in psychological exploration (as Germaine Dulac's *La coquille et le clergyman* does); nor does it form movement into dramatic patterns of increasing and decreasing tension; nor are the film's many references to natural reality incorporated into any discernible discursive system. The repudiation of discursivity is in fact foregrounded. On occasion, the film elicits the expectation that a narrative is about to emerge—for example, at one point, Man Ray presents a series of shots (shots 37 to 44 in our analysis), including one created by tossing the camera thirty feet into the air, to suggest an automobile colliding with an animal; at another, we see a woman walking up a flight of stairs, then sitting in front of a dressing table, then walking onto a terrace, positioning herself between columns, pausing and looking off-screen, apparently over the sea. A final example—in the most intriguing of the incipient narrative episodes, we see the automobiles pulling up to the curb and letting people out. But our expectation that a narrative is in the process of constituting itself is soon dashed, as the film shifts abruptly back to objects and scenes that have no relationship with earlier or later scenes. By thwarting the narrative principle, these episodes make evident the incapacity of the rational principles of narrative sequence to grasp the mysteries of visual forms presented in succession (or of visual forms transmuting one into another). This is especially evident in the second narrative sequence mentioned: the matching of forms in the two shots with columns (we first see the two columns at the end of one shot, then the woman entering and positioning herself between the two columns). This sequence creates the feeling that something significant is being articulated, a sense that subsequently is dispelled by a series of shots that are introduced as presenting what the woman looks at, but it turns out clearly not to be that (because the shots offer sights out of her field of view).

The diversity of images on the film endows its various sequences with something of the quality of the succession of images in a dream. When we watch the film, it is as though we are dreaming with our eyes open: we are in the dark and immobilized, as we are when we dream, yet the perceptual mechanisms register film's impact. By defying discursivity, Man Ray is strengthening the features of cinema that resemble those of dreams. The film in this way confounds waking and sleeping. It articulates a three-termed analogy among film, dreams, and imagination; in so doing, it reflects on the character of cinema, including its analogy to dream and imagination. The self-reflexive interest in the film medium explains its incorporating images of light, water, and shining objects. The film's use of rack-focus—that is, shifting the focus from near objects to more distant objects or vice versa—creates continuity between the real and the abstract; incorporating abstract images also draws attention to the film medium itself. And it also suggests the

continuity between inside and outside, which figures among the film's principal themes. But this is a poetic mode of being, since, for the poetic attitude, dreams and imagining are continuous with reality—dreams are the stuff of life. This interest also accounts for the film's incorporating passages in which a coherent narrative (a consistent representation of unfolding events) almost emerges, only to be displaced again by arcane symbols or striking views. This alternation of modes of representation—between memory, fantasy, and the poetic construct—is typical of dreaming.

Emak Bakia stresses the continuity between waking and dream, as the film switches between dream and perception (or, more accurately, half-imagined perceptions). This explains the film's motif of eyes opening and closing, for in the film, each opening of the eyes marks a further confounding of dream and reality. Each time the eyes open, we conjecture that we are being returned to the real world, though, in fact, the event simply marks a transition to a new dream.

Why, given this interest in dreams, do I say that *Emak Bakia* is a Dada, not a Surrealist, film? Because what the film insists on most strongly is the pure play of motion, not the unconscious. This dynamism imbues *Emak Bakia* with a strong directional sense, driven by the rhythmic force of the juxtapositions between images of different sorts. It is a dynamism that cleaves the film's elements from the world of everyday reality and transforms them into a new reality. There is a Dadaesque quality to *Emak Bakia*'s rhythmic juxtapositions (cf. Schwitters's sound poetry), the use of Rayographs (cf. Max Ernst's *frottage* and *grattage*), and the absence of a strong through line.²⁸⁴

This *cinépoème* (as Man Ray referred to it in the film's titles), of landscapes and spiral studies (which resemble a dreamy take on *Anémic cinéma*'s basic device), draws attention to the cinema as a machine for transformation. Man Ray and Marcel Duchamp were artistic colleagues from their early years in New York, and their oeuvres are similar in many respects. Both artists worked in a variety of media; both made playful use of scientific and para-scientific concepts in their work; and (like the Canadian artist/filmmaker Michael Snow, whose works are sometimes discussed as Neo-Dada) both created works based on humorous literalisms. But it is their shared interest in the psychological dynamic through which literal and utilitarian seeing is transformed into aesthetic "seeing as" that is the fundamental similarity between Man Ray's art and that of Duchamp. When we look at R. Mutt's *Fountain* (1917) or Duchamp's *In Advance of a Broken Arm* (1915, and subsequent versions) and see the shipboard urinal, rotated (or "recycled") to resemble an alembic, or the snow shovel, simply placed in a gallery (an unlikely place for a shovel) and given a suggestive name and see them as works of art, our ordinary mode of response to the object must change from a utilitarian to an aesthetic

mode. We see the shovel as humorous sexual portent. Duchamp referred to the transformation, in rather poetic language, at a “Session on the Creative Active” at the Convention of the American Federation of the Arts, held in Houston, Texas, in 1957 (during a panel at which he appeared with Rudolf Arnheim and Gregory Bateson): “The creative act takes another aspect when the spectator experiences the phenomenon of transmutation: through the change from inert matter into a work of art, an actual transubstantiation has taken place, and the role of the spectator is to determine the weight of the work on the esthetic scale.”²⁸⁵

Duchamp’s ready-mades show that a slight change to an object (as slight as giving it a title) can turn it into a properly aesthetic object—can make us *see* a shovel *as* a sexual portent. Man Ray, too, was taken with the idea of how a slight change in its context could make us see an object in a new way. By marking a photograph of a woman’s back with a shape that resembles the f-holes in a cello, he encourages us to see the photograph of the woman’s back as a cello.²⁸⁶

Various treatments of the natural object in *Emak Bakia* encourage us to see the natural object in a new way. Man Ray, in producing Rayographs, treated the celluloid in a sculptural fashion. Rayographs (created by placing objects, such as pins, thumbs, and salt and pepper on the film strip, then exposing the film strip to a short burst of light) convert the impression of the natural object into an almost geometrical form, while the division of the strip into frames produces an interesting sort of continuity-with-variation, as the objects often straddle several frames. The result suggests nearly abstract forms in motion (and so somewhat resembles the *Bewegungskunst* of the German Absolute Film of the early 1920s). What is more, the rhythms and movement qualities of these passages link with other rhythms and movements of other segments in the film (those which dynamize the lampshade, egg crates, a merry-go-round, a female torso, colours from a man’s shirt, mirrors, and crystals, for example). Another form of transformation relied on a fixed camera trained on an object that “performed” (i.e., rotated) in front of it, to highlight the translation (transformation) of the image from a three-dimensional to a two-dimensional form, as the rotation of the objects and the juxtaposition of different objects allude to the third spatial dimension. Objects, too, are transformed by the light falling on them—they take on a different appearance when they are photographed than that which they generally present to the world. The tonal qualities of the image also emphasize the transformation of an object into an image: at times the images are contrasty (Man Ray likely used a high-contrast stock, which emphasizes the effect of contrasty lighting); this use of high contrast also serves to link juxtaposed images, and those linkages contribute to articulating a continuous rhythm. Multiple

exposures also make evident the transformational process at work; they serve as well to create a shallow but nonetheless significant three-dimensional space (which, by alluding to real, three-dimensional space, draws our attention to the effects of translating the object from three-space to two-space). Finally, these superimpositions evoke a momentarily discursive response, which, of course, is soon frustrated: we see an eye over top of a camera's lens, and take the point—but what role does the comparison between eye and lens play in the overall form of the film? Later we see an eye superimposed on the front grille of a car and also painted on Kiki's eyelids, and this series of superimpositions suggests the irrationality of these connections that *prima facie* seem to be discursive.²⁸⁷

In Appendix 4, I provide a shot list and a more detailed analysis of *Emak Bakia*. For now, I comment on a few features of the work that are most germane to the thesis of this book.

EMAK BAKIA: COMMENTARY

Sequence Description

- | | |
|-----|---|
| 1–5 | Opening sequence (see analysis of <i>Emak Bakia</i> in Appendix 4). |
| 6 | Salt & pepper effect (from <i>Le retour à la raison</i>). |
| 7 | Camera pans quickly over a field of daisies. |
| 8 | Nail sequence (from <i>Le retour à la raison</i>). |
| 9 | Thumbtack appears among the nails (from <i>Le retour à la raison</i>). |
| 10 | Moving thumbtack sequence (from <i>Le retour à la raison</i>) |

Man Ray often adopted spontaneous methods to produce his artworks. In keeping with that bent, he took an improvisatory approach to making *Emak Bakia*. It was not his way to produce fantastic scripts, as a number of Surrealist poets who would become fascinated by the cinema were to do. Man Ray began the film in Biarritz, shooting mostly what interested him. This left him, when he returned to Paris, with a “hodge-podge of realistic shots and of sparkling crystals and abstract forms”²⁸⁸—a comment that slyly alludes to a visual theme that dominates *Le retour à la raison* and the opening section of *Emak Bakia*: black-and-white dots and dashes are sometimes used as abstract forms, sometimes as representational forms, and sometimes as something in between. The various image modalities are brought together and merged into a single integrated form by the pace of the cutting and by repetition. Man Ray cut together the footage he brought back from Biarritz with other shots he had planned (“scripted”) and photographed. While the completed film draws images of different types into a tight, well-integrated nexus, the film as a whole and the opening section (shots 1 to 10) in particular nevertheless insist on highlighting their synthetic character—that they are composed of

a combination of images of diverse sorts: the juxtaposition of shimmering crystals (created by sprinkling salt on the film) with images of a field of daisies throws into high relief the differences among the various categories of visual forms (even while suggesting the visual continuities among them). The image of a single thumbtack, while interesting in its own right, links with the previous shot (which it resembles, both being all-over compositions) and also with the succeeding shot (since it shares its object matter); thus it serves as a bridge to the “animated” sequence, of a single thumbtack on each frame, which produces a flickering effect.

The juxtaposition of varying types of imagery continues throughout the film: traces of a light source abstracted by camera movement are placed alongside a realistic sequence, shot with a static camera, showing a woman putting on lipstick; inanimate objects, brought to life by camera movement, are juxtaposed with the human dynamics of a banjo player’s speedy hands.

The basis of *Emak Bakia* is a threefold analogy encompassing collage, dream, and film. The thumbtack section is in a collage form, and by laying emphasis on the articulation of light, it highlights the third term of this analogy, for it foregrounds qualities of the cinema:

Shots 11–29

[*Emak Bakia est une*] série de fragments, un cinépoème composé d’une certaine séquence optique constituent un ensemble qui reste à l’état de fragmentation.²⁸⁹

([*Emak Bakia* is a] series of fragments, a cinépoem composed of a certain optical sequence constituting a whole that still remains in a state of fragmentation.)

The opening sequences of the film present an extravagant array of diverse visual forms. By setting out this material at the beginning of the film, Man Ray is pointing out that his challenge will be to bring this diversity into a formal unity. To be sure, Man Ray’s conception of unity was not that of a smooth, seamless whole, with no joints showing. Ray had been influenced by the Cubists, who resolved the visual world into a series of facets, which they simply set against one another; by the Surrealists *avant la lettre*, whose automatic methods often resulted in startling juxtapositions of elements; and by Ezra Pound, whose paratactical methods involved suppressing connectives and eschewing hierarchical forms of organization for the collocation of raw particulars. All these influences impressed on Man Ray (as they had on Fernand Léger) the importance of the fragment. Sequences in *Emak Bakia* are joined in such a way that each image maintains its own unique qualities. Because of the diversity of image characteristics, the whole has no overarching characteristics that can cancel the differences among the individual shots. Furthermore, the relationship of shot to shot often seems baffling, inscrutable, beyond the reach of rational explanation. Consequently,

the montage of fragments takes on a mysterious, poetic quality. (As noted above, Man Ray referred to *Emak Bakia* as a *cinépoème*, a cinematic poem.) This poetic quality emphasizes film's affinity with dream and suggests that continuity between the poetic state of mind (in which everyday objects are charged with imaginative qualities) and dream.

These attributes also connect *Emak Bakia* to Dada collage: the film draws together segments from *Le retour à la raison*, footage shot while rambling through the streets of Paris, contrived quasi-narrative scenes, and visual elements that obsessed Man Ray. Among the latter are images of dark objects set against light backgrounds.

Shots 30–60

*Un film doit «rapporter» tout de suite...*²⁹⁰

(A film should elicit an immediate response...)

Among the developments that led to the paratactical style was an account of the Chinese written character, developed by a Harvard-trained philosopher and resident of Japan, Ernest Fenollosa, who wrote that the Chinese written character is a compound of pictures representing actions or “transferences of force”:²⁹¹

All truth has to be expressed in sentences because all truth is the *transference of power*. The type of sentence in nature is a flash of lightning. It passes between two terms, a cloud and the earth. No unit of natural process can be less than this... Light, heat, gravity, chemical affinity, human will have this in common, that they redistribute force.²⁹²

And further,

A true noun, an isolated thing, does not exist in nature. Things are only the terminal points, or rather the meeting points of actions, cross-sections cut through actions, snap-shots. Neither can a pure verb, an abstract motion, be possible in nature. The eye sees noun and verb as one: things in motion, motion in things... .

The sun underlying the bursting forth of plants = spring.

The sun sign tangled in the branches of the tree sign = east... no full sentence really completes a thought. The man who sees and the horse which is seen will not stand still. The man was planning a ride before he looked. The horse kicked when the man tried to catch him... And though we may string never so many clauses into a single compound sentence, motion leaks everywhere, like electricity from an exposed wire. All processes in nature are inter-related [How like Bergson!]...²⁹³

Fenollosa noted that the basic distinction in Western languages—the one between nouns and verbs—does not exist in Chinese. In the Chinese character, the eye “sees noun and verb as one”—sees, in other words, “things in motion, motion in things.” The Chinese conception of reality is truer than the Western conception, Fenollosa declared, because it acknowledges that reality is a

process whose events are what the Chinese conceive them to be, “the meeting points of actions.” He stressed that a “‘part of speech’ is only *what it does*.”²⁹⁴

The charge that passes between juxtaposed elements is a mental phenomenon. Man Ray maintained this as well: in *Emak Bakia*, the fragmented sequences are ultimately joined together by the viewer’s imagination. To be sure, in Man Ray’s case, the notion of a charge passing between juxtaposed elements (between, say, a collection of his “mathematical objects” and a sign composed of electric lights that seem to move)—a charge that propels the mind into another dimension—was closer to that of the Dadaists than to Fenollosa’s. This flash is visceral, non-intellectual. It was partly to ensure that that charge would pass between juxtaposed elements that Man Ray repudiated narrative, with its devices for suturing one element to the next. In the place of a narrative, Man Ray in *Emak Bakia* presents sequences of images that change brutally, one set against the next, without any apparent connections. The response this engenders is immediate, direct, visceral, and poetic.

The shots from *Le retour à la raison* that open *Emak Bakia* are followed by more abstract shots of rotating forms. These are similar to images that appear in the earlier film but are even more abstract, for here the forms that rotate are lights, or objects that reflect light. The first lights we see rotating are indistinct and distant—so indistinct that we cannot identify with what they might be associated. After that we see lights from a merry-go-round in close-up, lights on an illuminated message on a news or advertising marquee, lights moving along a curved path, and a complex array of moving reflections created by rotating a prism among several mirrors. This film literally is composed of moving light (as all films are).

The collage in this section, with its emphasis on light, contains many self-referential allusions and thus develops the analogy between collage and film; the poetic images incorporated into the collage (for example, the merry-go-round) and the use of parataxis together develop the analogy between film, dream, and imagination.

*Tout le monde a tendance à vouloir se perdre dans les illusions, comme le montre l’ardeur du public des cinémas à s’identifier à ses héros de l’écran. Ce “rêve” se moque d’eux.*²⁹⁵

(Everyone has a tendency to lose himself in illusions, which is shown by the public’s earnestness to identify himself with the heroes on the screen. This “dream” mocks them.)

Shots 60–74

A woman walks down a hallway and turns a corner. The film cuts to a blurred image of (presumably) the same woman sitting in front of a mirror, brushing her hair.

Time passes—we cannot tell how much time, however. Then, in a new sequence, we see the same woman, now with a shawl over her shoulder,

applying lipstick. She puts on a necklace and leaves the room. The next scene takes place in front of two pillars. A figure of a woman (is this the same woman we saw in the previous scenes?) walks up to the pillars, stands to one side, and turns slightly.

The camera pans across a landscape to a cliff, showing a beach. Again, we wonder if this is a subjective shot, presenting the view that our protagonist(?) sees as she stands between the two pillars. We are then presented with a closer view of a shoreline (is this the same shore we saw in the previous shot?), from various angles and viewpoints. At one point, we see a sunbather's legs—he slides his feet back and forth on the sand—and we wonder if this is the person whom the woman is looking at from the top of the cliff. The camera then moves away from the sand to present a reflection of the sun on rippling water. The camera continues, turning on its axis until the water is on top and sky on the bottom.

An underwater shot of several fish (likely goldfish) follows. The shot was probably taken from the side of a fish bowl, but there are enough distortions (double exposures that create shadowlike forms distorted by the glass bowl) to briefly disorient our perceptions.

Throughout these sequences, our expectations (illusions) are constantly being challenged. These sequences entice us into looking for a narrative that would guide us through them. Yet each moment leaves us only with conundrums. We are forced to abandon our illusions, to ignore what we thought were to be our “heroes” and “heroines,” and instead to allow these fragmented sequences to affect us in a different way—to affect us directly, on a visceral level.

At the beginning of this section, a narrative seems to be developing: we are encouraged to believe that a coherent representation of reality is forming. Our expectations are soon dashed, however. We realize that this section is just the beginning of another dream (or of a new section of an ongoing dream). In this way, Man Ray is suggesting the continuity between waking life and dreaming (and the analogy between film and dream). The use of anamorphic images (created by shooting through the glass bowl) and shadowlike forms develops further the idea that everyday objects can be perceived as magical, and so stresses the continuity between the imaginary apprehension of everyday objects and dream.

Shots 73–89

*... automatisme, improvisation, irrationalité, séquences psychologiques et oniriques, absence de logique et mépris pour la dramaturgie.*²⁹⁶

(... automatism, improvisation, irrationality, psychological and oneiric sequences, absence of logic, and contempt for narrative.)

La lumière est aussi maniable que la peinture, pourquoi ne pas oser se servir de la pellicule comme le peintre se sert de la toile? Et pourquoi ne pas aller plus loin que lui? Il est limité par l'immobilité et le cinéma nous donne le mouvement. Pourquoi aller à cheval quand on a une auto? Seulement il faut un but intéressant.²⁹⁷

(Light is as easy to manipulate as is paint, why not dare to use film as the painter uses his canvas? And why not go even further? He is limited by immobility, and the cinema gives us movement. Why go on horseback when one has a car? The only thing necessary is to have an interesting goal.)

Man Ray stated that he made *Emak Bakia* without a script, relying instead on the chance / automatic methods that were common in Dada and Surrealist circles. When editing the film, he joined fragments illogically and irrationally, guided by his automatic reflexes. Even when he did not employ automatic methods, he allowed himself to be guided more by the dynamism of images—linking shots because they had similar properties of movement—than by their represented content or their signifying properties. The viewer is left with a succession of images that do not produce any determinate meaning. The film solicits viewers into the flow of the images, to be carried away by their dynamism, which is forever changing in intensity, in sweep, and in direction. The inscrutability of the ligatures between images defeats the mind's efforts at forming a discursive explanation why any particular quality arises at any given time, or why any particular image is followed by the next in the sequence. Thus, the spectator's intellectual capacities are rendered passive, just as they seem to be in dreams, and the images seem to arise unbidden. At times, the irresolution of the film's narrative elements (one tries to resolve the story, but the sequences will not allow it) and the inscrutability of the associations between shots have an unsettling effect, not unlike that brought about by the irruption of the uncanny or by the return of the repressed; at other times (especially with sequences of choreographed light), being liberated from the bonds of meaning, and allowing oneself to be carried away by the flow of the images, produces pleasant, dreamlike or trancelike sensations. In this section, the three-termed relations among collage, dream, and film are developed further.

Many of the film's parts focus on light and use various means to throw into high relief Man Ray's interest in manipulating light as a painter handles paint. Man Ray first introduces light's magical properties by abstracting it into streams and flares of movement (shots 11–29, 31–32, 81–84, 89–93, 108–12). We are immersed in a choreography of pure light—light not shaped into any real or recognizable forms. As the film progresses and incorporates more recognizable elements, Man Ray continues to use self-reflexive devices that indicate his awareness that film is a medium for moulding light. For example, there is a short passage using the glittering light bulbs of a billboard spelling

out a message (sequence nos. 30 and 80). Although in these he presents us with a recognizable object, what draws us to them is the light bulbs' shimmering movements as they cross the dark background. In a later shot (73), Man Ray uses sunlight on water to depict its reflective qualities—the movements of the glistening reflections are enhanced by the movement of the camera, which sweeps across the water. Other explorations of light's reflective qualities include the use of a rotating mirror-covered cube that radiates jewel-like sparkles that bounce off the dark surroundings (shot 85). Back lighting and double exposures transform the swimming fish (shot 74) into dark patches moving through the bright water. The final shots (113–14) of a woman's face have an iridescent quality about them—the light transforms familiar objects into forms with visionary properties. The emphasis on light and water (flow) articulates a self-referential allusion to film, the relation of which to collage and dream forms the basis of the work's thematic.

Composing passages based on the dynamic properties of the component shots is the principal means Man Ray uses to defeat the mind's rationalizing tendency and to approximate the effects of free association. However, he does use other devices, and among these the eliciting of expectations and their subsequent thwarting has special importance. Thus, some sequences seem to foreshadow a narrative, but the narrative is either left unresolved or consummated by an illogical twist; inanimate objects are interposed between sequences by reason of their dynamic properties; smiling faces of women appear and disappear among seemingly unrelated scenes; realistic images of scenery (water and land) are set alongside shots that display unrealistic camera movements (for example, a 180-degree rotation of the camera so that the sky takes the place of the sea and sea the sky); then, seemingly for no reason, a woman's face, with eyes painted on her closed eyelids, appears.

The image of the eye painted on the eyelid confounds the image/imagination with reality (just as the camera movement confounds sea with sky) and so suggests the continuity of waking and sleeping life. The images of eyes also invite associations with other artworks that Man Ray produced: his famous *Objet indestructible* (Indestructible Object, 1923, remade 1933) consists of a metronome with a cutout of a photograph of an eye clipped to the pendulum, while his *Boule sans neige* (Snowball, 1927) is made of a glass ball mounted on a stand with a number of forms inside it and a picture of the eye on the outside—and these are associations only with Man Ray's own work.²⁹⁸ These protean sequences take on the character of free associations, whose meanings are unavailable to the rational mind.²⁹⁹ These are figural constructions (to adopt that term from Lyotard): only the subconscious can discern the significance of these associations, and it cannot speak of them.

Sky turning into sea, cavorting inanimate objects, dancing light, a human face becoming plastic and pliable—all are examples of processes that the film presents, though they do not occur in real life; such depictions lend the film an unreal, oneiric quality. Truly, they manifest the process of what Lyotard refers to as the figural—that is, processes that resist discursive meaning. The events are specifically cinematic—they could not be presented except for the cinema's mediation.

Shots 89–93

Je voudrais photographier une idée plutôt qu'un objet et un rêve plutôt qu'une idée.³⁰⁰

(I would rather photograph an idea than an object, and a dream rather than an idea.)

J'aime beaucoup partir à l'aventure avec un appareil de prises de vues. Il y a du nouveau, toujours, partout, il suffit de regarder autour de soi... Il faut trouver du nouveau, tant mieux si cela fait hurler les gens.³⁰¹

(I very much like to go on an adventure with a camera. There is something new, always, everywhere, one need only look around... One has to find new things, all the better if that makes people yell.)

Je n'aime pas voir dans les films ce qui se passent dans la vie.³⁰²

(I don't like to see in films what goes on in life.)

The search for new means, and especially new imagery, was Man Ray's attempt to pull people out of their lethargy and complacency and to affect them viscerally. His provocations and taunts, finally, were efforts at connecting with an audience that had become anaesthetized to what went on around it. Much better to incite the audience to angry reactions than to feed its complacency with imitations and reproductions.

Here the provocation is due largely to the passage's radical application of the collage principle.

Shots 94–115

*À ceux qui s'interrogeraient encore sur "la raison de cette extravagance," on répondra simplement en traduisant le titre *Emak Bakia*, vieille expression basque qui signifie "fichez-moi la paix!"³⁰³*

(To those who ask again "the reason for this extravagance," I will simply reply by translating the title *Emak Bakia*, an old Basque expression that means "Get lost!")

Near the end of the film (beginning with shot 94), the phrase "La raison de cette extravagance" appears as an intertitle like those in silent movies (Man Ray had the musicians stop playing at this moment). He wanted to end the

film “with some sort of a climax, so that the spectators would not think I was being too arty. This was to be a satire on the movies.”³⁰⁴ The satire takes the form of a parody of the narrative’s claims to offer causal explanations—to provide “a reason for this extravagance.” Thus, the purpose of including the intertitle, he explained, “was to reassure the spectator, like the title of my first Dada film: to let him think there would be an explanation of the previous disconnected images.”³⁰⁵

We expect the succeeding scenes to elaborate on this intriguing phrase and to provide a key to the film’s significance—to provide us with some explanation for what can so easily seem a jumble of unresolved stories, distorted images, swirling lights, erratic camera movements. But all we are given are a few scenes of a man ripping shirt collars apart (shots 95–104).³⁰⁶

Man Ray modulated tensions by changing the position of the spectator in different sections of the film: the spectator responds to some passages almost as to a “jumble” of images, and these sequences, which distance the spectator from the image, create considerable tension, while the incipient narrative episodes (and, in lesser measure, those episodes that provoke a sheer kinaesthetic pleasure in revolving objects) draw the spectator back into the work and reduce the tension (or, at least, transmute it into a different form). This modulation of tension is evident in the sequence following the intertitle. A classic movie sequence seems to be forming itself: a car drives up to a door, a man with a briefcase gets out, goes inside, and opens the briefcase. But the narrative drive soon dissipates: the briefcase turns out to be full of collars, which the man then rips (alluding to the fury so often depicted in the movies, but not really extending the narrative’s forward impulse); following this, the film turns towards the kinaesthetic pleasure of the collars’ round dance.

This is yet another moment when Man Ray entices the viewer into a dead end. It is another act of aggression against the spectator (so characteristic of DADA). Given that aggression, spectators might be inclined to think, “Emak bakia!,” “Fichez-moi la paix!,” “Leave me alone!”

This section involves many such dislocations, as what seems to be story turns back into dream. Thus, Man Ray implies the continuity between waking life and dream, a continuity that film is suited to revealing. The quality that affords film the ability to reveal the continuity between waking life and dream is its fundamentally poetic quality. (The poetic state of mind apprehends reality imaginatively—that is, in a manner akin to dream. It knows that dreams are the warp and woof of thinking.) And it is that which gives film a disposition towards the same formal syntax that collage and dream possess, for film, collage, and dream all operate by the fundamental poetic principle, the principle of parataxis.

Quand le cinéma nous aura donné la couleur, la troisième dimension, la chaleur et le froid, on n'aura plus qu'à aller dans les rues, on n'aura plus besoin d'aller au cinéma.

(When film has given us colour, the third dimension, heat and cold, we will only need to go into the streets, we will no longer need to go to the cinema.)

DADA: IN CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have seen that several of the Dada artists engaged deeply with the cinema: Man Ray, Marcel Duchamp, Hans Richter, Viking Eggeling, and Francis Picabia all completed film projects, while Hugo Ball, Richard Hülsenbeck, Emmy Hennings, Raoul Hausmann, Marcel Janco, and Hans Arp all participated in performance works that were a sort of paracinema. The Dada artists were also deeply engaged with collage: Kurt Schwitters, Raoul Hausmann, Johannes Theodor Baargeld, Max Ernst, and Hannah Höch all devoted considerable energies to making collages. Their collage forms resembled the cinema's montage construction and were clearly influenced by it. Consider Kurt Schwitters's collages, which incorporated ephemeral real-world items such as bus tickets, calendars, candy wrappers, lace, printed pamphlets, maps, and other disposable materials (Schwitters generally collected this material in the course of his daily excursions). Juxtaposed one with another, they conveyed the random collisions of incongruous elements that occur frequently in modern life; in this, they resembled the cinema. Even more telling are Hannah Höch's photomontages, whose connections with the cinema are, perhaps, even more striking. Consider, for example, the female figures in *Dada-Ernst* (1920–21): to the right, a gymnast and a languid "orientalist" seductress playing an angel's trumpet for a crouching exposed man; in the bottom-right corner, a woman with a Bubikopf hairdo; and to the upper right, separated from the rest of the picture by a large saw (alluding to the basic device of photomontage and the cinema alike, *découpage*), a figure represented only by a giant pair of legs, with a man's eye replacing the pubis, and just above that, a pair of shiny gold coins. All of these figures represent cinematic avatars of the "new woman" (who was herself brought into being by the cinema). Consider as well *Das schöne Mädchen* (The Beautiful Girl, 1919–20), with its eponymous "Beautiful Girl" in a modern bathing suit (another "modern" woman), with a light bulb for her head, seated on a steel girder, surrounded by images of the new industrial world (the Bayerische Motoren Werke insignia, tires, gears and cogs, and a severed hand holding a watch), a parasol, and a boxer leaping through a wheel of an automobile. Consider also her series *Aus einem ethnographischen Museum* (Out of an Ethnographic Museum, 1924–30, works deriving from DADA's

“primitivist/elementalist” interests). One work from this series (*Indische Tänzerin* ([Female] Indian Dancer, 1930) displays a half-flesh/half-metal face, the metallic half of which includes a sort of crown, or perhaps a warrior’s hat, with silhouettes of knives and forks, evoking the woman’s domestic being but also alluding to the method of *découpage*, and the flesh half of which is an image of the movie actor Maria (sometimes Marie) Falconetti. And consider, as well, *Marlene* (1930), which depicts two men sitting in the front row of some kind of theatre, looking up at a pedestal, on which are an inverted pair of woman’s legs; in the top-right corner is an advertising image of the chin and bright red lips of yet another “modern woman”; positioned at an angle between the male spectators and the chin-and-lips is the handwritten name “Marlene,” evidently for the movie actor Marlene Dietrich. One of the earliest instances of Dada photomontage (as we noted above) was Raoul Hausmann’s *Synthetisches Cino[sic] der Malerei* (the title is a homophone for the German for “Synthetic Cinema of Painting,” 1918), an assemblage of elements excised from photographs, bits torn from newspapers, and fragments culled from advertising images and typography, and his *Dada-Cinema* (1920). The work’s circular construction gives the impression of movement: Hausmann referred to photomontage as offering “a motionless moving picture.”³⁰⁷ Other artists who associated with the *Dadaisten* (even if they were not members of DADA’s inner circle) also remarked on photomontage’s affinity with the cinema. An early photomontage produced by George Grosz and John Heartfield was titled *Leben und Treiben in Universal-City, 12 Uhr 5 Mittags*, an allusion to the Hollywood studio. This work, which was reproduced (as a photolithograph) as the newspaper-sized cover page for the First International Dada Fair, incorporates numerous references to films and “photoplays,” including an image of Lillian Gish and a 35mm film strip—it is worth pointing out in connection with this that for the first five or ten years of its existence, films were shown primarily at travelling fairs (which featured entertaining spectacles of diverse sorts).³⁰⁸ Reading this list of works, one recognizes that the art of the era proved the exact converse of Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum: here the new medium (film) became the content of old media. Artists were attempting to make their media cinematic.

The catalogue for the Dada fair was written by the poet and publisher Wieland Herzfelde, John Heartfield’s younger brother.³⁰⁹

Dadaism is the reaction against all those attempts to disavow the factual, which has been the driving force of the Impressionists, Expressionists, Cubists, and Futurists (the latter included because they did not want to capitulate to the cinema); but the Dadaist does not undertake, once again, to compete with the photographic apparatus, let alone to breathe a soul into the apparatus by favor-

ing (like the Impressionists) the worst lens of all: the human eye, or turning the camera around (like the Expressionists) and endlessly presenting nothing but the world within their own breasts.

The Dadaists say: When in the past colossal quantities of time, love, and effort were directed toward the painting of a body, a flower, a hat, a heavy shadow, and so forth, now we need merely to take scissors and cut out all that we require from paintings and photographic representations of these things; when something on a smaller scale is involved, we do not need representations at all but take instead the objects themselves, for example, pocketknives, ashtrays, books, etc., all things that, in the museums of old art, have been painted very beautifully indeed, but have been, nonetheless, merely painted.³¹⁰

Wieland Herzfelde celebrated a “capitulation to the cinema”—that the other advanced arts capitulated to the cinema is a theme of this book. Herzfelde characterized this capitulation as a refusal to disavow the “actual” and embrace not an aesthetic of pure film but an aesthetic based on cutting and pasting (the fundamental operations involved in filmmaking). The birth of the cinema made the photomonteurs (and generally the collagists) aware that the time had passed when artists could construct form based on the single unchanging (monocular) vantage point implied by the conventions of the linear perspectives that had dominated art from the *quattrocento* to the beginning of the twentieth century (though before them, to be sure, the Impressionists and Cézanne had brought into question the coordination of conventions that linear perspective represents).³¹¹ The cinema made clear that the art of the present would have to be an art of mobile vantage points and of constantly shifting (and sometimes indeterminate) points of view.

Collage, photomontage, and paracinematic performance art (along with *Lautgedichten*) were important connections to the advent of cinema. They also reinforce my point: at the time to which this book relates, many poets, painters, playwrights, and sculptors were declaring that the cinema—a new medium, so paradigmatically fitted for the modern urban world—required that the media in which they worked (or the forms they created in the materials of their various media) be reconstituted so that they might take on at least some of the attributes that made cinema the top art. In *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce asked and answered a series of questions; one question was

what roserude and oragious grows gelb and greem, blue out the ind of it! Violet's dyed! then *what* would that fargazer seem to seemself to seem seeming of, dimm it all?

Answer: A collideorscape!³¹²

Joyce's collideorscape embodies the way in which hyperdynamized realities constantly collide with one another. Joyce was emphatic that the medium

of the collisions was light—that reality was becoming virtualized. The model for a light medium that conveys the dynamic quality of modern reality, in which events collide with one another continually, is clearly the cinema. Eisenstein’s remarks on Joyce suggest prophetically that the *telos* of film is a convergence of media—to carry us beyond media and beyond language as we know it. I have argued that notions about how to recast the art media (or the forms forged from those materials), and about the urgency of doing so, became a principal part—indeed, *the* principal part—of the conceptual core of the artistic programs advanced by the vanguard art movements of the first half of the twentieth century. Here we see further evidence of this. DADA was no exception to this general principle.

The formal similarities among Dada collage, photomontage, and paracinematic performance art, and the cinema are important. But in this chapter we have also seen that there were deep underlying reasons for Dadaists’ interest in film. Those reasons had to do with their rather peculiar conception of the cinema. DADA, we have seen, was one response among many to developments in mathematics and philosophy that brought into question (calculative) reason’s capacity to reveal truths about the conditions of our existence (and we live to this day with the effects of those discoveries). The belief that minds had become untethered from reality invited various responses. Some took it as an invitation to proclaim the triumph of the imagination: if the grounds for our scientific beliefs are less than certain, are they really any better than our imaginings? And if our beliefs are no better than imaginings, why then should we not at least strive to make those ideas as rich, as intense, as vital, as life-giving as possible? Indeed, sometimes (as we will see) setting aside the rational faculties might allow a noetic process even *higher* than the imagination to supervene, a negative process that would liquefy all the fixed certainties of the limited bourgeois self and enable us to live new lives. The members of the Dada and Surrealist movements for the most part embraced that conclusion and propounded it with remarkable vigour. The idea that life should be lived at maximum intensity brought in its wake an affirmation of the life-principle, an affirmation with which Tzara would conclude his “Dada Manifesto.” He proposed

to spew out like a luminous cascade any offensive or loving thought, or to cherish it—with the lively satisfaction that it’s all precisely the same thing—with the same intensity in the bush, which is free of insects for the blue-blooded, and gilded with the bodies of archangels, with one’s soul. Liberty: DADA DADA DADA;—the roar of contorted pains, the interweaving of contraries and of all contradictions, freaks and irrelevancies: LIFE

Still, as exhilarating as it was to feel that the imagination had been set free, the idea that mind had no access to truth was one that many found unendur-

able. People longed to believe in an alternative, irrational, or (in this case, better) super-rational means to discover truth. The occult traditions provided an alternative means of apprehending higher truths. It is often forgotten that a widespread interest in esoteric and occult subjects influenced DADA (and, we will see, Surrealism) in important ways. And as we saw when analyzing Duchamp's *Anémic cinéma* and the films of Man Ray, the cinema came to be understood in Dada circles as a sort of occult machine. The Dadaists celebrated forms that act on us—forms whose effects are beyond reason and understanding. Their notion of art (or of the successor to art they intended to forge) was of a construction/event that would act on us directly, immediately, even savagely. But the esoteric tradition also spoke of forces that acted upon us in *defiance* of understanding. Thus, art (or DADA, as the successor to art), the cinema, and esoteric rites were alike in this respect: they acted upon us directly, immediately, in defiance of reason.

DADA's interest in *pneuma* made dreams and other inspired ("induced") forms of thinking of special interest to them. But as Man Ray's *Emak Bakia* shows, the cinema is allied to dreams. Indeed, as we saw, Man Ray's *Emak Bakia* suggests a continuity between waking life and dream, a continuity that the ontology of film is well capable of revealing. Film elicits poetic thinking. The poetic afflatus allows the mind to apprehend reality imaginatively—it demolishes the little self, to permit entry to the greater self, and enables one to experience dream-like correspondences between the inner and the outer worlds. As I remarked earlier, it is that which gives film a disposition towards the same formal syntax that collage and dream possess, for film, collage, and dream all operate by the fundamental poetic principle, the principle of parataxis.

NOTES

- 1 With the last two movements, it is sometimes said, art brought its self-reflexive awareness of its nature into perfect alignment with its material form: so these movements represent the terminal phase of art (just as Hegel believed his philosophy, by bringing the Absolute to complete self-awareness, represented the end of philosophy and, indeed, the end of history).
- 2 It is possible to overemphasize this aspect of Dadaism; in fact, it is usually overstated. Among the Dadaists were artists who believed that political expression of any sort was alien to the artistic enterprise. This was the case with, for example, the purist Kurt Schwitters (though even he could comment with alarm, and despair, on modernity's triumphant campaign against individualism).
- 3 The styles of the drawings Eggeling made just before he made his film and during the making of it are very similar; the title "Orchestration d'une ligne" suggests a line evolving through time. Eggeling's drawing confirms my point that the appearance of the cinema prompted artists working in other media to consider how their media could be reformulated to take on attributes of the cinema. I deal with Viking Eggeling at

- some length in a companion volume to this, *Harmony and Dissent* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008). There I unfold his thoughts on the cinema in my shot analysis of his film *Symphonie diagonale*.
- 4 Hugo Ball, *Flight Out of Time: A Dada Diary* [*Flucht aus der Zeit*], ed. John Elderfield, trans. Ann Raimes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 50–51 and (following ellipsis) originally from *Die Flucht aus der Zeit*, 30; trans. in Robert Motherwell, *The Dada Painters and Poets: An Anthology* (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), xxv. Entry for 5 February 1916.
 - 5 Codrescu gives the date as 5 February 1915; it was actually 5 February 1916. Andrei Codrescu, *The Posthuman DADA GUIDE: Tzara and Lenin Play Chess* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
 - 6 Codrescu, *The Posthuman DADA GUIDE*, 28–30. Codrescu cites both Emmy Hennings, *Ruf und Echo: Mein Leben mit Hugo Ball* (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1953) and Tom Sandqvist, *Dada East: The Romanians of Cabaret Voltaire* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) as sources for his description.
 - 7 There are many legends about the origin of the term “DADA,” the best-known story being that Tzara struck upon the term when he inserted a paper knife into a French-German dictionary at random, and discovered it pointed to the word “dada.” Most of the stories are likely apocryphal—or invented to enhance the movement’s anti-rational proclivities. Duchamp told the interviewer Pierre Cabanne that he first came across the word “in Tzara’s book, *The First Celestial Adventure of Mr. Fire Extinguisher*—in 1917, or at the end of 1916. It interested us but I didn’t know what Dada was, or even that the word existed.” Pierre Cabanne, *Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp*, trans. Ron Padgett (New York: Viking, 1971), 56. Significantly, Hugo Ball, in 1921 (some time after he had separated himself from the Dada movement), connected alighting on the name to a moment of vocation: “When I came across the word dada I was called upon twice by Dionysius [the Aeropagite]. D. A. – D. A.” (*Flight Out of Time*, 210). Ball would subsequently devote considerable attention to Dionysius in his book on Byzantine Christianity.

I suspect that Tzara first used the word poetically, then applied it to the movement.

- 8 The participants did at times refer to “le mouvement Dada,” for example, on the cover of the only issue of *Cabaret Voltaire* magazine (“eine Sammlung Künstlerischer und literarischer Beiträge, herausgegeben von Hugo Ball”), published on 15 June 1916, which included contributions by Kandinsky, Arp, and Modigliani.
- 9 The original quotation appears in French as follows: “*Les Dadaïstes ne sont rien, rien, rien, bien certainement ils n’arriveront à rien, rien, rien—signé Francis Picabia qui ne sait rien rien rien.*” Originally published in 391, no. 12 (March 1920), cited in Michel Sanouillet, ed., *391: Revue Publiée de 1917 à 1924 par Francis Picabia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 79.

Picabia’s artistic background was actually more complex and varied than I have suggested here. He began by producing Impressionist canvases, entranced by the work of Alfred Sisley (1839–99); he continued to work in this style for over ten years, from 1897 until 1908, and had shows of this work in London and Berlin. At the end of 1908, he abruptly broke off working in this style and started to experiment, first with Fauvism, then Pointillism, then Cubism; finally he created a form of composition that related non-representational elements in a non-depictive structure—essentially his own version of Orphism. In fact, he has some claim to have created the first abstract painting—a watercolour he did in 1908–9, in the collection of Musée d’Art Moderne

in Paris, antedates Kandinsky's first abstracts (likely the first of which was untitled [*erste abstraktes Aquarelle*, First Abstract Watercolour], done in 1910). (However, we do well to heed the remark by the great American Surrealist Harry Smith [1923–91] that the first purely abstract paintings were those by Mr. John Varley, Mr. Prince and Miss Macfarlane," in Annie Besant and Charles Leadbeater's *Thought-Forms*, published in 1901. The consequences for the historiography of abstract art of taking Harry Smith's comment into account are momentous.) He continued to produce his own individual type of Orphic abstraction, characterized by bright colours and, even, motion (many were inspired by physical activity). At this point, he began to produce rather whimsical compositions of simplified, mechanomorphic elements representing hammers, screws, pistons, shafts, springs, and the like, often lacking in colour; this work seems to have been done under the influence of Marcel Duchamp, whom Picabia saw regularly in his teens. In 1916–17, he also produced a volume of poems, *52 miroirs*. In 1918, he was treated for neurological problems in Switzerland; after this treatment, he issued another volume, titled *Poèmes et dessins de la fille née sans mère* (poems and Drawings of the Girl Born without a Mother). This volume brought him to the attention of Tristan Tzara, and through Tzara, Picabia became involved in the activities of the Zürich Dada group. This involvement seems to have been restorative: Picabia renounced his machinist style and began to experiment with a form of collage composition, incorporating actual objects (buttons, cigarettes, matches, and feathers) into the works, as well as depictions of human figures in imaginary, even troublingly fantastic, contexts. (He also painted a number of precise, accurate nudes, which he offered for sale in Algiers.) While a participant in Zürich's Dada group, he produced two more volumes of poetry, *Pensées sans langage* (Thoughts without Language, 1919) and *Unique eunuque* (Unique Eunuch, 1920), as well as a prose work, *Jésus-Christ rastoquouère* (Jesus Christ, Phony Toff, also 1920) that incorporates sketches, poetry, aphorisms, and descriptions. And in addition to all this, he wrote the ballet *Rêlache* and conceived of the film *Entr'acte*, which would be a part of it.

- 10 From Francis Picabia, "Francis Merci!," *Littérature* New Series 8 (January 1923), trans. Lucy Lippard as "Thank You, Francis!," in *Dadas on Art*, ed. Lippard (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971), 172; reprinted in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, eds., *Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 272–73.
- 11 Ball's introduction to the magazine *Cabaret Voltaire* read

When I founded Cabaret Voltaire, I thought that among the Swiss I might find some young people, just like me, who not only wanted to enjoy their independence but also wanted to document it. I went to Mr. Ephraim, owner of the Meierei [bar], and said: "Mr. Ephraim, please give me your dance hall. I want to create a cabaret show. Mr. Ephraim agreed and gave me the dance hall. And I went to some acquaintances and begged them: "Please give me a statue, a drawing, an engraving. I want to combine the cabaret show with a small exhibition." Went to the friendly Zürich press and begged them: "Put in some notices. An international cabaret will take place. We will create beautiful things." And they gave me pictures and used my announcements. So, on February 5th, we mounted a cabaret show. Miss Hennings and Miss Leconte sang French and Danish chansons, Mr. Tristan Tzara recited Rumanian poems. A Balalaika Orchestra played delightful Russian folksongs and dance-tunes. I received much support and sympathy from Mr. M. Slodki, who designed the poster for the cabaret, from Mr. Hans Arp, who, besides his own work also put some Picassos at my disposal and acted as an intermediary for getting paintings from his friends O. van Rees and Artur Segall. Much support from

Mr. Tristan Tzara, Mr. Marcel Janco and Mr. Max Oppenheimer, who willingly agreed to appear in the cabaret. We organized a RUSSIAN and soon after that a FRENCH soirée (using works by Apollinaire, Max Jacob, André Salmon, A. Jarry, Laforgue and Rimbaud). On February 26th Richard Hülsenbeck came from Berlin and on March 30th, we presented wonderful “Negermusik” (toujours avec la grosse caisse: boum boum boum boum—drabatja mo gere drabatja mo *bonooooooooooooo*—). Mr Laban was present and the show was inspired. And through Mr. Tristan Tzara’s initiative, Messieurs Tzara, Hülsenbeck and Janco performed (for the first time in Zürich and in the whole world) simultaneous poems of Messieurs Henri Barzun and Fernand Divoire, as well as a *Poème simultan* [*sic*] of their own composition, which is printed on the sixth and seventh page. The tiny journal we publish at present, we owe to our initiative and the help of our friends in France, ITALY and Russia. It will describe the activities and interests of the cabaret, whose whole intention is aimed at leaving the War and Fatherlands behind and remembering the few independent people who live other ideals. The next goal of the artists which are gathered together here is the publication of an International Review. The review will appear in Zürich and have the name “DADA.” (“Dada”) Dada Dada Dada Dada.

ZÜRICH, May 15. 1916 H U G O B A L L
(Translation mine)

- 12 Before the Great War, Munich was a thriving art centre (it was in Munich that Kandinsky had painted some of the first abstract paintings, and Munich was the centre of the *Blaue Reiter* group of Expressionist painters); the borough of Schwabing was famous for its many Expressionist theatre performances and lively cafés and bars in which the city’s artists gathered.
- 13 Hugo Ball, quoted in RosaLee Goldberg, *Performance: Live Art 1909 to the Present*, 34. No source given.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 35. No source given.
- 15 Tristan Tzara, “Zurich Chronicle (1915–1919),” in Robert Motherwell, *The Dada Painters and Poets: An Anthology*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Belknap, 1981), 235.
- 16 Ball, *Flight Out of Time*, 57.
- 17 Richard Hülsenbeck, “En Avant Dada,” originally published in 1920; reprinted in an English translation in Motherwell, *The Dada Painters and Poets*, 2nd ed., 35–36.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 25–26.
- 19 Richard Hülsenbeck, *Memoirs of a Dada Drummer*, ed. Hans J. Kleinschmidt, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 9.
- 20 James Clifford, “1933, November: Negrophilia,” in *A New History of French Literature*, ed. Denis Hollier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 903.
- 21 Jeanpaul Goergen, *Urlaute dadalistischer Poesie. Der Berliner Dada-Abend am 12. April 1918* (Hannover: Postskriptum-Verlag, 1994).
The title of the Palazzeschi poem is “So Let Me Have My Fun.” It appeared in Palazzeschi’s very forward-looking volume *L’incendiario* (The Arsonist), 1910, which was published by F.T. Marinetti’s Futurist press, *Poesia*.
- 22 Note that once again, the experience of a welter of simultaneous events is the condition taken to define modernity.
- 23 André Breton, “Dada Manifesto,” *Littérature* 13 (May 1920). Quoted in Dawn Ades, “Dada and Surrealism,” in Tony Richardson and Nikos Stangos, *Concepts of Modern Art* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), 110.
- 24 Hülsenbeck, *En Avant Dada*, 23.

- 25 Richard Hülsenbeck, "Collective Dada Manifesto," (1920), in Motherwell, ed., *The Dada Painters and Poets*, 242–43.
- 26 To be sure, the Berlin Dadaists differed in the degree of their political interest and involvement. Grosz and the Heartfield/Herzfelde brothers joined the radical left, supporting the fledgling communist movement in Weimar, while Raoul Hausmann, Richard Hülsenbeck, and Hannah Höch, although sympathetic to workers' concerns, were less *engagé*.
- 27 Hugo Ball, *Flucht aus der Zeit* (Munich-Leipzig: Dunker and Humbolt, 1927); the passages cited appear in English translation on pages 56, 61, 65, and 66 of *Flight Out of Time*.
- 28 Richard Hülsenbeck, "En Avant Dada," passage cited in Motherwell, *The Dada Painters and Poets*, 23.
- 29 Tristan Tzara, *Le surréalisme et l'après-guerre* (Paris: Nagel, 1947). Quoted in Tzara, *Chanson Dada*, ed. Lee Harwood (Toronto: Coach House Press and Underwhich Press, 1987), 118.
- 30 Cited in Christopher Coker, *War and the 20th Century: A Study of War and Modern Consciousness* (London: Brassey, 1994), 119.
- 31 See Christopher Coker, *The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), *passim*.
- 32 Concerning the Wandervogel (migratory bird) movement: it was founded in 1901 and continued through the First World War. It provided the original type-form of the youth movement (so important for Walter Benjamin) and constituted its largest contingent. The Wandervogel movement sought to get boys to experience vital nature and a natural (male) community by freeing them from the constraints of school or parents. The boys of the Wandervogel movement hiked in small groups through the countryside, on trips that sometimes lasted weeks, and slept outside or in barns. In the first decades of the twentieth century, participating in this group was a classic gesture of protest against the stifling atmosphere of Wilhelmine Germany. There were no adults in the group of hikers—the group was led by an older boy. For clothes, they wore rough hiking gear and, sometimes, a hat decorated with feathers. The Wandervogel movement both influenced and was influenced by the political ideals of the time, for it embodied the ideals of anti-authoritarianism and of a community formed by a natural bond that, freed of the unnatural constraints of technological culture, is allowed to flourish. (Martin Buber was taken up as something of an unofficial spiritual guide by Blau-Weiss, a Jewish wing of the largely Protestant Wandervogel.)

Concerning the *Männerbund*: throughout the 1920s, Jünger's writing became increasingly a paean to a male voluntarism. By June 1926, he could write in "Schließt euch zusammen" (Let's Lock Ourselves Together) that "we want Germanness and we want it with might" and that the Führer would emerge from this "timeless and supreme exertion" (originally published in *Die Standarte: Wochenschrift des neues Nationalismus*; cited in translation in Bernd Weisbrod, "Violence and Sacrifice: Imagining the Nation in Weimar Germany," in *The Third Reich Between Vision and Reality: New Perspectives on German History 1918–1945*, ed. Hans Mommsen [Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2003], 5–22 at 15). In reading Jünger on the appearance of the Savior-Führer, one thinks of Heidegger's evocation of Hölderlin's "Aber wo die Gefahr ist / wächst das Rettende auch."

Also in "Violence and Sacrifice," Weisbrod describes the particular version of anti-Semitism that Jünger offered. In an article from the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* from 1930, Jünger proposed that promoting *deutsche Gestalt* (German form or German being) would rid Germany of the assimilated Jew, who posed the real threat. The bright sun

- of heroic Germanness would kill off even hidden germs, without the inefficiencies of the more vulgar forms of anti-Semitism. The promotion of the *deutsche Gestalt* would deprive Jews of the last illusion that they could live in Germany as Germans. They would be confronted with a stark decision: to live in Germany as Jews, or not to live at all (“in Deutschland Jude zu sein, oder nicht zu sein”).
- 33 In time, this desire for freedom and autonomy transmuted again into a form of *dés-involture*. Thus, Jünger could spend much of the Second World War in Paris. (The valiant and much-decorated war hero stated that “an army in which a Göring is a general is no place for me.” See Karl-Otto Paetel, *Ernst Jünger in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1962), 66. Jünger befriended Jean Cocteau, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Georges Braque, Pablo Picasso, Henri de Montherlant, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, and François Mauriac.
- 34 Ernst Jünger, *The Storm of Steel: From the Diary of a German Storm-troop Officer on the Western Front*, trans. Basil Creighton (London: Chatto & Windus, 1929), 4. In 2010 Jünger’s war diary *Kriegstagebuch 1914–1918* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag), which contains the source material for *Stahlgewittern*, was published. In this work the strangely appalling yet exhilarating mixture of matter-of-factness and bloody-mindedness is even more pronounced.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 109.
- 36 Ansgar Hillach, “The Aesthetics of Politics: Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theories of German Fascism,’” *New German Critique* 17 (Spring 1979): 101.
- 37 Jünger, *The Storm of Steel*, 235.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 235, 255.
- 39 Ernst Jünger, *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1926), 106.
- 40 Jünger did define war as a male activity, and he proposed that engaging in war makes males superior.
- 41 In fact, we shall see that one Dada artist, Hugo Ball, came to embrace some ideas that had a certain resemblance to those Jünger expounded.
- This point of contact raises general questions, however. There is a troubling aspect to Dada nihilism that reflects the great confusions of its time. Dada nihilism, with its interest in primal experience, was always on the verge of becoming reactionary. Troubling though this is, it must be understood in the context of the currents in the social and political thought of its day. Jean-Pierre Faye’s *Langages totalitaires: Critique de la raison, l’économie narrative* (Paris: Hermann, 1972) did a brilliant job of exposing that German political and cultural thought between 1890 and 1933 oscillated between the language (and beliefs) of the *Konservative Revolution* and Marxism. One of the more extreme oscillations occurred in 1923, with the KPD’s “Schlageter turn,” when the KPD decided to work with the Nazis against the Versailles treaty. Reading Faye’s brilliant work (even in part), one becomes convinced that ideas we see at a distance as easily classified as “right-wing” (or reactionary) or “left-wing” (or progressive) did not present themselves as so sharply demarcated to German thinkers (and artists) of the 1920s. Richard Wolin, in *The Seduction of Reason* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), covers similar topics, and does so brilliantly.
- 42 Jünger, *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis*, 82.
- 43 Ernst Jünger, “Die neue Nationalismus,” in *Die neue Front* (a supplement to *Völkischer Beobachter* 40, 23–24 January 1927). Having acknowledged this piece, it must be said that Jünger’s disposition was elitist in the extreme, and that he had a certain disdain not just for the *Nationalsozialisten* but for organizations of any stripe.

- 44 It must be pointed out that Jünger's conservatism had little in common with the National Socialist form. Josef Goebbels had courted the talented writer in the mid-1920s but was rebuffed. Jünger had contempt for the NSDAP, viewing it as pandering to the mob; for Jünger, that party was a typical product of modern mass democracy. During the Third Reich, Jünger retreated into an inner emigration. He left Berlin for Goslar in 1933, moved again in 1936, to Überlingen (to be near his brother), and moved yet again, to Kirchhorst, just before World War II broke out. He kept his distance from politics, and the Nazis pretty much left him alone (though the Gestapo did search his house in 1933). By 1938, he was convinced that the Hitler regime was not only coarse but also obviously unjust. In 1939, he published a novella, *Auf den Marmorclippen* (On the Marble Cliffs), about a small community living tranquilly on the shore of a large bay. However, their traditional morals begin to break down, and the unscrupulous head forester uses that threat of the descent into the abyss to establish a new order based on dictatorial rule. He attracts a large number of mindless followers, and violence, torture, and murder ensue. When the work appeared, many treated it as a *roman à clef* about National Socialism, and identified caricatures of Nazi leaders.
- 45 In 1925, the Stahlhelm movement had 250,000 members. When the National Socialist German Workers' Party came to power in 1933, they integrated the Stahlhelm association with the official National Socialist organization for former combatants (the NSDFB).
- 46 Franke's advocacy of Fascism provoked a backlash in the Stahlhelm movement that added momentum to the efforts to expel him as editor of *Standarte*. Most members of that movement had little interest in forming a new nationalism modelled on the oppressor of *Deutschtum* in Südtirol.
- 47 Ernst Jünger, "Die totale Mobilmachung," cited in Michael E. Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 55.
- 48 Ernst Jünger, *The Worker: Dominion and Gestalt; and Maxima-Minima: Additional Notes to 'The Worker'*, trans. Dirk Leach (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 113, 148.
- 49 *Ibid.*, 192.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 99, 70.
- 51 Ernst Jünger, *Der Arbeiter*, 160; cited in Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, 58.
- 52 *Ibid.*
- 53 *Ibid.*, 60.
- 54 Jünger, *The Worker*, 72, 150.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 154.
- 56 Jünger, *Der Arbeiter*, in Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, 62.
- 57 "Über den Schmerz," in Ernst Jünger, *Blätter und Steine* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934), 188; cited in Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, 57.
- 58 Jünger participated in four mescaline sessions, the first hosted by the conservative publisher Ernst Klett, and in two LSD sessions, presided over by Albert Hofmann.
- 59 Ben Witter, "Mit Ernst Jünger im Schlosspark," *Die Zeit* 8 (Feb. 23), 1968.
- 60 "Die Welt ist nach dem Vorbild der zweifachen Kammer, der Chambre double, ausgeformt. Wie alle Lebewesen aus zwei Blättern, so ist sie aus zwei Schichten angelegt, die im Verhältnis von Innen- und Außenseite stehen und von denen die eine höhere, die andere mindere Wirklichkeit besitzt. Doch wird die mindere Wirklichkeit bis in die feinsten Züge von der höheren bestimmt." Ernst Jünger, *Heliopolis* (Stuttgart

- Klett-Cotta, 1978), 122 (translation mine). Jünger almost certainly took the term “chambre double” from the title of Charles Baudelaire’s poem “La chambre double,” in which the intoxicated narrator sees his room as a sensory feast, and every object he looks at affords an experience of beauty and meaning. A knock on the door brings him back to reality, and he realizes that for the unintoxicated eye, his room is dirty and decrepit. The name Dr. Fancy probably alludes to Coleridge’s theories of fancy (a lower grade of imagination that simply reorganizes existing ideas) and imagination (a higher grade of imagination that is truly creative)—readers will recall the tale of Coleridge composing “Kubla Khan; Or, A Vision in a Dream: A Fragment” under the influence of opium and being interrupted by the man from Porlock.
- 61 Friedrich Theodor Vischer, *Über das Erhabene and Komische and andere Texte* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), 204. Cited, in translation, in Pamela Kort, “The Grotesque: Modernism’s Other,” in *Comic Grotesque: Wit and Mockery in German Art, 1870–1940*, ed. Kort (New York: Neue Gallerie and Prestel Verlag, 2004), 16. An important work in the study of the grotesque is Wolfgang Kayser’s *Das Grotesque: seine Gestaltung in Malerei und Dichtung* (Oldenburg and Hamburg: G. Stallung, 2nd edition, 1961; *The Grotesque in Art and Literature*, trans. Ulrich Weisstein [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963]). Kayser’s ideas on the grotesque were influenced by Christoph Martin Wieland’s *Unterredun mit dem Pfarrer* (1776) and, significantly, by Wieland’s claim that the grotesque arouses feelings of being simultaneously amused and appalled, of “surprise and horror, of unagonizing fear in the presence of a world which breaks apart and remains inaccessible” (Kayser, 31).
- 62 Karl Rosenkranz, *Ästhetik des Hässlichen* [1853] (Leipzig: Reclam, 1990), 164. Cited, in translation, in Kort, “The Grotesque: Modernism’s Other,” 16.
- 63 “Die Groteske ist das Ergebnis eines Kampfes zwischen der Sehweise eines Künstlers und der Merkmalen des Motives,” in Carl Einstein, *Die Kunst des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 2. Aufl., 1928, 165. Quoted in Kort, “The Grotesque: Modernism’s Other,” 19.
- 64 Franz Servaes, *Praeludien: Ein Essaybuch* (Berlin and Leipzig: Schuster & Loeffler, 1899), 251–52. Quoted in Kort, “The Grotesque: Modernism’s Other,” 19; I have altered this slightly.
- 65 Entry for “Grotesk” in *Meyers Konversations-Lexikon* 5th ed., 1895, VIII:6. Cited in *ibid.*, 20.
- 66 Another, absolutely key, philosophical influence is Max Stirner. Stirner (pseudonym for Johann Caspar Schmidt) was the author of *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (The Ego and Its Own, 1844, published in English 1907), a thinker who had studied with Hegel at the University of Berlin and who belonged to *Die Freien* (The Free Ones), a circle of the Young Hegelians who met at Hippel’s Weinstube on Friedrichstrasse. Arnold Ruge was the self-appointed leader of the group; Marx and Engels were sometimes visitors to the group’s meetings; Ludwig Feuerbach, Wilhelm Jordan, C.F. Köppen, Dr. Arthur Müller, Moses Hess, Ludwig Bühl, Adolf Rutenberg, Eduard Meyen, and Julius Faucher also frequented Hippel’s.
- Stirner’s great book *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (The Ego and Its Own, first published 1845) has a structure patterned after Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807). *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* is organized around a triphasal (dialectical) account of human experience that is advanced initially as a narrative about the stages of an individual life (as Hegel sometimes does in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*). Stirner calls the first phase in this account the “realistic” stage of childhood; in it children are constrained (negated, if one uses the Hegelian term)

by external and natural forces (emblemized in the parents' rod). The child achieves liberation from these external constraints with what Stirner calls the "self-discovery of mind," as children find the means to escape these constraints (the rod) in their own shrewdness and will. However (as with the negative—the "antithetical"—phase in this Hegelian dialectic), this youthful, idealistic stage becomes the source of new constraints (negation), this time internal, as individuals become even more enslaved, now to the spiritual forces of reason and moral sense. Only by attaining the adulthood of egoism do individuals escape both material (external) and spiritual (internal) constraints, learning to value their own pleasure above all other precepts.

As Hegel portrays his dialectic in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Stirner portrays his dialectic of individual growth as an analogue of historical development; the remaining parts of *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* are an account of historical development that presents history as having a similarly triphasic structure. History is chronologically divided into the eras of realism (the ancient or pre-Christian world), idealism (the modern or Christian world), and egoism (the future world). The First Part of *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* deals with developments up to the present (realism and idealism), and the Second Part with the coming egoist era.

Stirner was a radically anti-Enlightenment thinker who in his early years associated with the Left Hegelians. His early published writings reveal that he maintained that the supreme law is one's own welfare: everyone should learn how to enjoy life and expand it, for enjoying life is the basic imperative. All that an individual does should be directed towards personal satisfaction—nothing should be done for the sake of God or for anyone else. He maintained that the earth exists for humans to use. There are, according to Stirner, no rights, for a person is entitled to everything he has the power to possess and hold; the earth belongs to whoever knows how to take it.

A true thinker maintains that "I am all to myself and I do all for my sake. I am unique, nothing is more important to me than myself." Good and evil, truth and falsity, are concepts that have no meaning outside a God-centred conception of reality. Stirnerian egoism is not really the pursuit of self-interest, but rather a variety of individual self-government or autonomy. Egoism should really be understood as "ownness" (*Eigenheit*), Stirner avers, that is, as a form of autonomy that will not permit subjugating, even temporarily or voluntarily, one's powers of judgment to another. "I am my own," Stirner writes, "only when I am master of myself, instead of being mastered... by anything else" (*The Ego and Its Own*, ed. David Leopold [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 153). Stirner's notion of self-mastery stresses self-control: one must be free of constraint, both external and internal. The autonomous individual will not submit himself or herself to others; nor will she be simply dragged along (*ibid.*, 6) by her passions or appetites. To achieve this, Stirner counsels, one must cultivate a detachment from one's desires—one must be released from the natural body and construct a new body through will.

The object of the state is to bridle people, to subject the concrete, particular individual to something general. The state must be destroyed because it is the negation of the individual will; it approaches people as a collective unit. Stirner would annihilate the state and form in its place a Union of Egoists. The true thinker will realize that this union is not a sacred or spiritual power, but is created by men. In this union, humans would be held together by mutual advantage, through common "use" of one another. In joining the union, an individual increases his own individual power.

67 The psychologist Fritz Perls would later take up Salomo Friedländer's ideas on the integration of polarities.

- 68 The ground for Hausmann's synthesis is obvious. Stirner's influence on Friedländer made the struggle between the *Einzig*e (the ego) and its *Eigentum* (the ego's objects) central to Friedländer's thought. (Stirner used a word for objects that also means property and that comes from the same root as the word denoting distinctive individual characteristics [*Eigenheit*] or proper to one [*eigene*].) Otto Gross saw the core conflict in life as between that which is one's own and that which is the other's ("der Konflikt zwischen dem Eigenen und dem Fremden").
- 69 Richard Hülsenbeck, "Introduction," in *The Dada Almanac*, ed. Hülsenbeck, trans. Malcolm Green (London: Atlas Press, 1998), 9–10.
- 70 The title is pure DADA and utterly untranslatable. I can find no translation in any of my books on DADA, and when I was defeated in my efforts at the task, I asked a research assistant who was born and raised in Germany. She could come up with nothing either.
- 71 Tristan Tzara, "Dada Manifesto (1918)," the original French collected in Francis Picabia, *Sept manifestes Dada, lampisteries* (Paris: Editions Jean Jacques Pauvert, 1963). A translated version appears in Tzara, *Seven Dada Manifestos and Lampisteries*, trans. Barbara Wright (London: Calder Publications, 1977); the passage cited appears on page 5. A *lampiste* is a person who makes lamps; French argot uses the term to refer to a scapegoat. Tzara, in choosing to refer to his writings as *lampisteries*, may well have been poking fun at the Enlightenment's values and declaring himself an "en-lightened" figure in an anti-Enlightenment environment.
- 72 The Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven was a colourful figure. In New York in 1921, one might have found her nude, her head shaved and painted in bright vermilion lacquer, in the offices of *The Little Review*. From 1919 to 1923, the war widow, poet, sculptor, and model embodied the Dada spirit in New York. Matthew Josephson reports having seen her marching around Washington Square

wearing an inverted coal scuttle for a hat, a vegetable grater as a brooch, long ice-cream spoons for earrings, and metal teaballs attached to her pendulant breasts. Thus adorned and clad in an old fur coat, or simply a Mexican blanket, and very little underneath, she would saunter forth. (Josephson, *Life Among the Surrealists* [New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962], 75)

She built individualized, custom-made objects from mass-produced items: teaspoons, vegetables, battery taillights, and a bra made of tomato cans. Though she worked on this film project with Marcel Duchamp, and though her art shared with his the Dada spirit of protest, in the final analysis, her work was much different from his: hers was sensual and organic and did not partake in Duchamp's aesthetics of indifference; nor did it take an interest in machine forms (as the work of male Dadaists did). She was one of the earliest performance artists as well as an assemblage artist—perhaps America's first assemblage artist—who collected her raw materials in the streets (her sculpture *God*, 1917, was made of plumbing fixtures). Her boxing match with the poet William Carlos Williams was legendary, but that legend obscures an unseemly side of her management of personal relationships: she stalked the physician-poet. In a passing reference to the Baroness in "Canto XCV," Pound refers to her "principle of non-acquiescence"—an allusion to her truculent refusal to take "no" for an answer.

Several collections of von Freytag-Loringhoven's poetry are available. In my view, the best (and most knowledgeable) is Freytag-Loringhoven, *Mein Mund is lüsteren / I Got Lusting Palate*, trans. Irene Gammel (Berlin: Edition Ebersbach, 2005), which also includes a useful introduction (in German) by the editor.

- 73 A remarkable feature of this is the number of titles amalgamating male and female elements. Duchamp's term *une broyeuse* involves a confusion of gender. The standard term for a grinder is *un broyeur*—a meat grinder, for example, is *un broyeur à viande*. This mechanical grinder has been feminized. As for the renowned piece *Fountain* (1917), Duchamp took a *pissoir* (or *urinoir*) and turned it into a *fontaine*. Later, I comment on Duchamp's neologism *le pendu femelle*, which, though *femelle*, is assigned the masculine gender. These all belong to the realm of *la phallesse*.
- 74 He said to Pierre Cabanne, "When I put a bicycle wheel on a stool... there was no idea of a 'readymade' or anything else. It was just a distraction." Cabanne, *Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp*, trans. Ron Padgett (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 47.
- 75 Schwitters also established the movement as a gesture emphasizing his belief in individuality. Schwitters was an artist, graphic designer, typographer, and poet who moved to Hanover after completing his studies at Berlin's Akademie der Künste. He had contacts with the Dadaists in Berlin (Höch, Hausmann) and Zürich (Arp, Tzara), but he refused to be contained within DADA and offered his own movement to the world, which he called "MERZ." (Searching for a name for his one-person movement, Schwitters found it in one of his glued pictures: it was a part of an advertisement of the "ComMERZ- & Privat- Bank Hannover"; likely, the name also evokes "Schmerz," or "pain.") His interest in abstraction also led him to get in contact with Constructivists, including El Lissitzky and Theo van Doesburg—Schwitters organized various Dadaist events in the Netherlands with van Doesburg (who wrote Dada poems under two pseudonyms, I.K. Bonset and Aldo Camini). MERZ was intended to embrace dance, theatre, visual art, poetry, and performance. Schwitters aspired to create art that would be an all-encompassing, total environment, and to construct several *Merzbaus* (modern art houses). (Schwitters first erected the "Merzbau," a three-dimensional Constructivist room in his house. A copy—the original was destroyed during the Second World War—can be seen in the Sprengel-Museum in Hanover.) He published the magazine *MERZ* and the poem-book *Anna Blume tungen* (1919), one of DADA's most noble achievements, a book of love-hymns with a print run of thirteen thousand!
- 76 Hugo Ball, quoted in RosaLee Goldberg, *Performance: Live Art 1909 to the Present*, 37. No source given.

Ball was fascinated with the idea of paradox (which, as I have shown, by the second decade of the twentieth century had become something of a *topos* among artists and advanced thinkers). Ball recognized what Russell also knew—that logic was unraveling. Unlike Ball, Russell feared logic's demise, and tried to show it was illusory.

- 77 Tristan Tzara, "Unpublished letter to Jacques Doucet on October 30, 1922," in *Tristan Tzara: Approximate Man and Other Writings*, trans. Mary Ann Caws (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), 34. The poem itself appears in Hülsenbeck, *Dada Almanach*, 50–51, alongside poetry of pure sounds, composed by Hugo Ball, Adon Lacroix, and Hülsenbeck himself.

It is crucial to point out, however, that Tzara did not compose a piece from "pure sounds" he invented, as he claimed in the letter to Doucet. Publicly, he was more forthcoming. In the *Dada Almanach*, "Toto-Vaca" appears under the unexplained heading "Maori." Tzara had a deep and lifelong interest in non-Western art. In fact, the poem is a Maori work-song, "Dragging the Canoe," sung to ease the labour of dragging a canoe overland; it is usually referred to as "Totowaka." Tzara's posthumously published *Ceuvres complètes* contained a literal French translation from the Maori by an unknown author, and this French version has been translated into English by Pierre Joris. See

Tristan Tzara, “Poèmes nègres,” in *Œuvres complètes*, vol. I: 1912–1924, textes réunis et présentés par Henri Béhar (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 454–45. “Totowaka” was introduced into the West in Edward Shortland (1812–1893), *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders: With illustrations of Their Manners and Customs* (1856), though the version Tzara gives differs from Shortland’s (one presumes he may have been using a different source).

- 78 In 1917, in Bern, Ball began work on a two-volume “Bakunin Breviary.”
- 79 In this, Ball’s *Critique of the German Intelligentsia* was a rebuttal to the “Manifesto of the 93 Intellectuals,” a statement issued in October 1914 in which the elite of German arts and letters (anyway, not a group that Dadaists would have been very taken by) abjured any German responsibility for the war, blaming it on “the West.” The manifesto ended with the declaration “Have faith in us! Believe, that we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilized nation, to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant, is just as sacred as its own hearths and homes.” Among those who signed were Adolf von Harnack, Ernst Haeckl, Max Planck, Max Reinhardt, and Wilhelm Röntgen.

In critiquing German authoritarianism, Ball’s *Critique of the German Intelligentsia* continues in the spirit of Dada protest; in other ways, it departs from the spirit of DADA.

- 80 The thesis was basically an encomium to Nietzschean Dionysism: it presented Nietzsche as standing for the emancipation of the passions and the drives, and it celebrated the artistic *Übermensch*.
- 81 This is not to deny that Ball’s political theology evolved: in fact, in 1920, after publishing the *Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz*, he reconverted to Catholicism—this conversion followed an experience at the village chapel of Agnuzzo that offered Ball “the solution to the question of guilt”—and heavily revised his critique to reflect his new apolitical Catholicism, publishing it under the title *Die Folgen der Reformation* (The Consequences of the Reformation, 1924). Ball’s article on Schmitt appeared in *Hochland* 21, no. 2 (1923–24).
- 82 Even Ball’s attitude towards Protestantism seems similar to Maistre’s, who predicted that Protestantism, after passing through a phase of Socinianism, would inevitably degenerate into philosophical indifference. Maistre believed, as Ball did, that no religion (or religious denominations) save one can resist science.
- 83 Ball’s criticism of the alliance of the state power with religious interests led him to a brand of anti-Semitism. This was heightened by the interest that some of his Jewish friends (e.g., Gershom Scholem) took in the state of Israel—an interest that Ball (despite his anti-nationalism) viewed as a betrayal of their commitments to Germany.
- 84 Tzara, “Dada Manifesto (1918).” This manifesto was read in Zürich at the Salle Meise on 23 March 1918 and was first published in *Dada* 3 (1918). A translated version appears in Tzara, *Seven Dada Manifestos* and *Lampisteries*. The excerpt quoted appears on page 12.
- 85 The more formal wing of the modernist movement proposed that a work of art possesses a transcendent form that lifts the artwork out of the realm of flux and gives it a place in the realm of the unchangeable. The members of DADA rejected this conception of form: so many of the forms they developed stress change, variability, and, indeed, historicity.
- 86 Tzara, “Dada Manifesto (1918),” in *Seven Dada Manifestos*, 5.
- 87 Tzara, “Proclamation without Pretension,” in *Seven Dada Manifestos*, 15 and 16.
- 88 Tzara, “Manifesto of Mr. Antipyrine,” in *Seven Dada Manifestos*, 2.
- 89 Francis Picabia, “Chef-d’œuvre,” in *391*, no. 15 (10 July 1921), 5; cited in Francis Picabia,

Écrits, 1921–1953 et posthumes, ed. Olivier Revault d'Allones and Dominique Bouissou (Paris: Pierre Belfond, 1978), 24.

- 90 Tzara, "Dada Manifesto (1918)," printed in translation in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory*, 250–52. Reading the celebrations of the individual's personal "boom-boom," one thinks of Novalis's

Alle Methode ist Rhythmus. Hat man den Rhythmus der Welt weg—so hat man auch die Welt weg. Jeder Mensch hat seinen individuellen Rhythmus. / Die Algeber ist die Poësie. / Rhythmischer Sinn ist Genie. / Fichte hat nichts, als den Rhythmus der Philosophie entdeckt und Verbalacustisch ausgedrückt. (Novalis, *Schriften*, ed. Hans Joachim Mähl [München & Wien: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt & Carl Hanser Verlag, 1978], II:544n382)

The similarity, of course, highlights DADA's Romantic provenance.

- 91 Tzara, "Proclamation without Pretension," quoted in Ades, "Dada and Surrealism," 111.
 92 Tzara, "Dada Manifesto (1918)," in *Seven Data Manifestos*, 12–13.
 93 Hugo Ball, *Flucht aus der Zeit* (Munich & Leipzig: Dunker and Humbolt, 1927); English trans., *Flight Out of Time*, 65–66.
 94 Vattimo, "The Structure of Artistic Revolutions," in *The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture*, trans. John R. Snyder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 100.
 95 Marcel Janco, "Dada at Two Speeds," in Lippard, ed., *Dadas on Art*, 36–38.
 96 Schwitters, "Merz." He wrote this piece to defend himself against attacks by Hülsenbeck and other members of Berlin's Dada circle. In the elided section, Schwitters takes care to testify to his continuing admiration of some Hülsendadaists (e.g., Hans Arp, Picabia, Archipenko). "Merz 1920," in Lippard, ed., *Dadas on Art*, 102–103.
 97 Ades, "Dada and Surrealism," 112–13.
 98 Raoul Hausmann, "New Painting and Photomontage," trans. Mimi Wheeler in Lippard, ed., *Dadas on Art*, 64.

Christian Morgenstern wrote *Lautgedichten* before DADA was founded. Two of Morgenstern's best-known pieces are the phonetic poem "Das grosse Lalulla," written in 1890 (though not published until 1905), and "Fisches Nachtgesang" (The Fish's Nocturnal Song, 1897), a visual poem that dispenses with words and replaces them with notations for metric quantities (which allow for a sound reading). Also in 1897, Paul Scheerbarth, a contemporary of Morgenstern, published "Ich liebe dich! Ein Eisenbahnroman" (I Love You! A Railroad Novel), with sixty-six intermezzi, including the phonetic poem "kikakoku!" A few years later, Scheerbarth starved himself to death in a hunger strike protesting the outbreak of the Great War.

- 99 In 1909, while still in Dublin, Joyce had established that city's first cinema, Volta Cinematograph.
 100 Marshall McLuhan, Letters to Ezra Pound, Lilly Library, University of Indiana, Bloomington; letter dated 16 June 1948.
 101 *Ibid.*, letter dated 2 August 1951. In a tape recording of a conversation he had with the artist and Royal Ontario Museum exhibition design Harley Parker (1915–1992), Marshall McLuhan offered this remark, which sheds light on his assertion that detective stories and Pound's *Cantos* are cinematic works: "This is the whole charm of detective stories. You carefully pull out the links and connection between the evidence [think of Pound's use of evidence for his bizarre theory of history in *Cantos*] and the story bits [think of the history and metahistory expounded in that work] in order to get audience

participation” (*Exploration of the Ways, Means, and Values of Museum Communication with the Viewing Public* [New York: Museum of the City of New York, 1969], 4). McLuhan is known to be partial to Dada work, and we see in this remark that he sensed that the mechanisms detective fiction writers used (like the means that Dada artists used) to make the reader/viewer the subject of the work were cinematic—the cinema itself, which realizes its nature when it is formed as collage, has the effect of making the viewer the subject of the work. But that was a prominent feature of advanced artmaking in the twentieth century—it was another of the cinema’s paragonal effects.

- 102 Tristan Tzara, “Lecture on Dada,” given at Weimar and at Jena on 23 and 25 September 1922; originally published in *Merz* (Hanover, January 1924); reprinted in English in Tzara, *Seven Dada Manifestos*, 108. One might recall Salomo Friedländer’s notion of *schöpferische Indifferenz*, which Raoul Hausmann took up.

The date of the remark is significant: it was made six years after the founding of DADA, and Tzara had moved on from the ideas that originally stirred him to found the movement; in fact, what he moved on to, precisely, was a more religious conception of the remedial means that the social order requires. Roy F. Allen discusses the changes that the founders of DADA underwent in “Zurich Dada 1916–1919,” in *Dada/Dimensions*, ed. Stephen Foster (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1984). Allen, it should be pointed out, argues that the constructive dimension of DADA is a later development, while I would argue that Hans Arp and Hugo Ball (at least) conceived that DADA would have a constructive purpose right from the beginning. Arp, and those who, like him, wanted to replace outmoded artistic forms, were not interested simply in revitalizing the tradition they had inherited—they believed that tradition, too, had been corrupted by reason, technology, over-elaboration, and sophistication. They wanted to clear away what had been left to them and to create a new art that would be rooted in primitive modes of experience. Arp stated that

in Zürich in 1915, losing interest in the slaughterhouses of the world war, we turned to the Fine Arts. While the thunder of the batteries rumbled in the distance, we pasted, we recited, we versified, we sang with all our soul. We searched for an elementary art that would, we thought, save mankind from the madness of these times. (Arp, “Dadaland,” in *On My Way* [New York, 1948], 39; quoted in Ades, “Dada and Surrealism,” 113)

- 103 Tzara, “Lecture on Dada,” in *Seven Dada Manifestos* and *Lampisteries*, 108.
- 104 Tzara, “Pierre Reverdy, *Le voleur de Talan*,” originally published in Zürich in *Dada* 4–5 (1917). The translated version from which I quote appears in Tzara, *Seven Dada Manifestos*, 64. Note the wonderfully occult allusion to vibrations. Tzara used this term, which was a favourite of occultists in their writings on art, elsewhere in the second paragraph of his “Note on Art”; in the first paragraph of “Guillaume Apollinaire: ‘Le poète assassiné’ et ‘Les Mamelles de Tirésias’”; in the third paragraph of his “Note on Negro Poetry”; in the second paragraph of “Francis Picabia: ‘L’athlète des pompes funèbres’ et ‘Rateliers Platoniques’”; and in the seventh paragraph of “Francis Picabia: ‘Pensées sans langage.’”
- 105 Ibid.
- 106 Ibid., 65.
- 107 Ibid., 64–65.
- 108 Richard Hülsenbeck, “Collective Dada Manifesto.” Translated from the German by Ralph Manheim; reprinted in Motherwell, ed., *The Dada Painters and Poets*, 244. Once again we see Hülsenbeck affirming DADA’s intimacy with the life force.

- 109 Harriett Watts, "Arp, Kandinsky, and the Legacy of Jakob Böhme," in Maurice Tuchman, *The Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 1890–1985* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Museum of Art; New York: Abbeville Press, 1986), 239–55. Watts does an excellent job of connecting the spiritual interests of Arp and Kandinsky, and of relating Arp's biomorphic abstractions to his interest in Böhme.
- 110 On the Dadaists' contacts with Kandinsky, see Ball, "Prologue: The Backdrop," in *Flight Out of Time*, 7–10; Hugo Ball, *Briefe*, ed. Annemarie Shütt-Hennings (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1957), 17ff; Richard Hülsenbeck, *Memories of a Dada Drummer*, 2ff; and idem, "Dada, or the Meaning of Chaos," *Studio International* 183 (January 1972): 26. On the Dadaists' presenting Kandinsky's work, see Hugo Ball, *Flight Out of Time*, 8–10; idem, *Briefe*, 29f.; Richard Sheppard, "Sixteen Forgotten Items by Hugo Ball from the Pre-Dada Years," *German Life and Letters* 29 (1976): 362–69; and Roy F. Allen, *Literary Life in German Expressionism and the Berlin Circles* (Ann Arbor: UMI research Press, 1983), 116–68.
- 111 Consider Tzara's celebration of all that affirms life in the "Dada Manifesto (1918)."
- 112 Maurice Tuchman, "Hidden Meanings in Abstract Art," in Tuchman, ed., *The Spiritual in Art*, 45.
- 113 Richard Sheppard, "Dada and Mysticism: Influences and Affinities," in *Dada Spectrum: The Dialectics of Revolt*, ed. Stephen Foster and Rudolf Kuenzli (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1978), 92–113.

Many scholars are still chary around the topic of the occult. The great philosopher and theorist of the aesthetics of modernism, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, famously referred to occultism as "the metaphysic of dunces." See Adorno, "Theses against Occultism," in *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* (London: Verso, 1978), 240. He condemned occult beliefs as being the product of alienation that only further mystified the magic of commodity fetishism. Whether he is correct or not, that occult beliefs had a very important role in DADA and Surrealism is uncontested. The interest that the Dada and Surrealist artists took in the occult must be addressed if we are to understand why they deemed the cinema the top art.

- 114 Ball, *Flucht aus der Zeit*, entries dated 12 and 13 June 1916; appears on page 66 of the English translation, *Flight Out of Time*. Erdmunte Wenzel White's biography of Hugo Ball, *The Magic Bishop: Hugo Ball, Dada Poet* (Columbia: Camden House, 1998), offers much valuable information about Ball's spiritual development.
- 115 *Ibid.*, entry dated 18 June 1916; appears in English translation on pages 67–68.
- 116 *Ibid.*; entry dated 18 April 1917; appears in English translation on page 108.
- 117 Ball's entry in his diary for 3 July 1915 contains an excerpt from Jahn's *Saurapurānam*.
- 118 Cabanne, *Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp*, 43.
- 119 Tuchman, "Hidden Meanings in Abstract Art," in Tuchman, *The Spiritual in Art*, 45–47.
- 120 Maurizio Calvesi, "Duchamp und die Gelehrsamkeit," in *Marcel Duchamp* (exhibition catalogue) (Cologne: Museum Ludwig, 1984), 61–69.
- 121 Nadia Choucha makes a rather daring leap in saying Duchamp *must* have used the following parable for the starting point of his work:

That which is below, without wings, is the fixed, or male. That which is above, that is the volatile, or to put it another way, the black and obscure female, she who is about to seize control [of the alchemical work] for several months. The first (below) is called sulfur, or, instead heat and dryness, and the second (above) is called quicksilver, or frigidity and humidity.

While the parable certainly speaks to Duchamp's alchemical interests in transformation, there is still no definitive proof that he actually read the text. Nadia Choucha's commentary appears in "Dada and Duchamp: The Fusion of Mysticism and Materialism," in *Surrealism and the Occult* (Oxford: Mandrake, 1991), 37–46; the parable she discusses is taken from Albert Poisson, *Théories et symboles des alchimistes* (Paris: Bibliothèque Chacornac, 1891), 71. The original French for the passage above is as follows:

Celui qui est au-dessous sans ailes, c'est le fixe ou le male, celui qui est au-dessus, c'est le volatil ou bien la femelle noire et obscure qui va prendre la domination pendant plusieurs mois. Le premier est appelé Soufre ou bien calidité et siccité et le second Argentvif, ou frigidité et humidité.

- 122 Though Duchamp cited *Thaumaturgus opticus* (the title means Wonder-Working, Optical magician) as an influence, Stephen Jay Gould and Rhonda Roland Shearer revealed that it was another of Nicéron's texts, *La perspective curieuse* (1663), a playful French treatise on mathematics and perspective (and not *Thaumaturgus opticus*, its drier Latin counterpart) that was the actual influence on his work. Duchamp is coy about referencing his sources. Stephen Jay Gould and Rhonda Roland Shearer, "Drawing the Maxim from the Minim: The Unrecognized Source of Nicéron's Influence upon Duchamp," *Tout-fait: The Marcel Duchamp Studies Online Journal* 1, no. 3 (December 2000), (http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_3/News/stephen/stephen.html, 11 pages).
- 123 John F. Moffitt, "Marcel Duchamp: Alchemist of the Avant-Garde," in Tuchman, ed., *The Spiritual in Art*, 257. The quotation is taken from Pierre Cabanne, *The Brothers Duchamp* (Boston: New York Graphic Society, 1976), 101. Moffitt also stresses the difficulty that confronts one in attempting to inventory Duchamp's literary sources: Alexina (Teeny) Duchamp told Moffitt that Marcel "never kept any letters or papers, and once he was through with a book he generally gave it to someone else." (See "Marcel Duchamp: Alchemist of the Avant-Garde," in Tuchman, ed., *The Spiritual in Art*, note 7.)
- 124 Jean Clair, "La Boîte Magique," in *Sur Marcel Duchamp et la fin de l'art* (Paris: Galilimard, 2000), 266. Translation mine.
- 125 Claude Bragdon, *A Primer of Higher Space (The Fourth Dimension), to Which Is Added "Man the Square, A Higher Space Parable"* (Rochester: Manas Press, 1913), commentary to pl. 16; cited in Moffitt, "Marcel Duchamp," 271n62.
- 126 Linda Henderson, *The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 197–99.
- 127 Marcel Duchamp, *The Writings of Marcel Duchamp*, ed. Michael Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (New York: De Capo Press, 1973), 31.
- 128 In 1935, Duchamp rented an exhibition stand at a "Salon des inventions" in Paris, where he presented a set of six double-sided cardboard discs with twelve different visual spirals, many of which had appeared earlier, in *Anémic cinéma*. These spirals were designed to be put on a gramophone; when the spiral rotated, an optical illusion of depth was created. Duchamp named these discs "rotoreliefs" (Duchamp even registered the name "rotorelief" as a trademark owned by his female alter ego Rose Sélavy). The titles of the rotoreliefs were "Verre de bohème," "Montgolfière," "Spirale blanche," "Lampe," "Lanterne chinoise," "Poisson japonais," "Cerceaux," "Cage," "Oeuf à la coque," "Eclipse totale," "Escargot," and "Corolles."

I want to highlight the chronology: many people claim that *Anémic cinéma* was just a convenient way of packaging his rotoreliefs. But the chronology doesn't support

this assertion: *Anémic cinéma* was made nine years before Duchamp first presented rotoreliefs at Paris's Salon des Inventions.

- 129 In a paper delivered at a conference on "Early Film and the Avant-Garde," Bart Testa proposed that

the combined reading and viewing of silent films conventionally give rise to a third activity: our imaginative conjuration of a domain with all the space and furniture of a world. It is what film semioticians term diegesis. *Anémic cinéma* exposes, by its reduction, this third and paradoxically maximizing activity: our imaginary production of diegesis, which can still happen in *Anémic cinéma*. And the film does this, amazingly enough, by dismissing mimesis.

- This is exactly what it avoids doing: no diegesis is conjured—that is one (and only one) of the reasons why this film is anemic. To make the claim is to miss Duchamp's point about the power of the cinema, which normally yokes realistic images to a story (that, in the days of the silent cinema, was recounted partly in words): such a cinema generally does evoke the sense of a world with "space and furniture." But Duchamp's cinema is anemic—and this is one point he is making with the title—because it hasn't the power to evoke such a world. (Of course, indifference, a relative of anemia, has its rewards.)
- 130 Katrina Martin, "Marcel Duchamp's *Anémic cinéma*," *Studio International* 189 (February 1975): 53–60. I have adopted many ideas from Martin's insightful readings of Duchamp's text.
- 131 Marcel Duchamp, "Posthumous Note, number 248," in *Notes* (Paris: Flammarion, 1999), 143.
- 132 Moffitt, "Marcel Duchamp," 264. The quotation Moffitt cites is from Michael Maier, *Atalanta fugiens, hoc est: Emblemata nova de secretis naturae chymica* (Oppenheim, 1617), emblemata XIV.
- 133 Stephen Jay Gould, "The Substantial Ghost: Towards a General Exegesis of Duchamp's Artful Wordplays," *Tout-fait: The Marcel Duchamp Studies Online Journal* 1, no. 2 (May 2000), (http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_2/Articles/gould.html). For a more comprehensive analysis of Duchamp's wordplay, see André Gervais, *La raie alitée d'effets: A propos of Marcel Duchamp* (Montreal: Hurtubise, 1984).
- 134 Jean Clair, ed., *Marcel Duchamp*, vol. 2: *Catalogue raisonné* (Paris: Musée National d'Art Moderne, 1977), 119.
- 135 Jean Clair, "Duchamp at the Turn of the Centuries," an excerpt, translated by Sarah Skinner Kilborne, from Clair's "Duchamp, Fins de Siecle," *Marcel Duchamp et la fin de l'art* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 41. Taken from http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_3/News/clair/clair.html.
- 136 The dates are taken from Joscelyn Godwin, *Athanasius Kircher: A Renaissance Man and the Quest for Lost Knowledge* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979), 94.
- 137 Maurizio Calvesi, "Duchamp und die Gelehrsankeit," in *Duchamp: Eine Ausstellung in Museum Ludwig, Köln, 27.6–19.8, 1984*, ed. Gloria Moure (Köln: Museum der Stadt, 1984), 66.
- 138 *Ibid.*, 67–68.
- 139 Marcel Duchamp, "The Creative Act (Session on the Creative Act, Convention of the American Federation of the Arts, Houston, Texas, April, 1957)," in Tomkins, *Duchamp, a Biography* (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), Appendix 1, 509.
- 140 Moffitt, "Marcel Duchamp: Alchemist of the Avant-Garde," in Tuchman, ed., *The Spiritual in Art*, 257.

- 141 Hans Richter, *Dada: Art and Anti-Art*, trans. David Britt (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 30.
- 142 Given the emphasis on the interpenetration of antithetical elements, it should not be surprising that Hülsebeck linked the principle of Simultaneism to that of the dialectic in *En Avant Dada*.
- 143 Richter, *Dada*, 31.
- 144 *Ibid.*, 30.
- 145 Ball, *Flight out of Time*, 55.
- 146 *Ibid.*, 68. The language Ball used in this passage is hardly the language of an artist engaged merely in protest against the society gone wrong. The passage confirms again that the idea of “life” is never far from the Dadaists’ minds.
- 147 Octavio Paz, *The Other Voice: Essays on Modern Poetry*, trans. Helen Lane (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 47–52.
- 148 Paz asserts that this relatively little-known movement, Simultaneism, worked out one of the most important principles of the arts of the twentieth century.
- 149 Regarding (2), see *Art and Anti-art*, 33–34; regarding (3), *ibid.*, 35, 39; regarding (4) and “the language of paradise,” *ibid.*, 44–50; regarding (5), 57, 116–118; regarding (6), 50–62, “absolute acceptance” at page 60.
- 150 From “Dada Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter Love,” originally read at the Galerie Povolozky, Paris, on 12 December 1920, and originally published in *La vie des lettres* 4 (1921). A translated version appears in Tzara, *Seven Dada Manifestos*; the excerpted passage appears on page 39, as Part Eight of the manifesto.
- 151 The idea of *elementare Gestaltung* (elemental design) was central in some avant-garde circles from the first decade of the twentieth century. From around 1908, Sophie Täuber had been experimenting with elementary forms, and these interests continued throughout her life: her ongoing Constructivist sympathies are evident in her joining the *Cercle et carré* and *abstraction-création* groups in 1930. Her work with Hans Arp must be viewed in this context. Yet at the same time as she started working with Hans Arp, she also began studies with Rudolf Laban, becoming a close friend of Laban’s assistant, the *Ausdrucktanzer* Mary Wigman. Sophie Täuber was not alone in crossing *Ausdrucktanz* (Expressionist dance) and a sort of Constructivism founded on the principles of *elementare Gestaltung*: Emmy Hennings, Maja Kruscek, and Clara Vanselow combined those interests, and Hans Richter established close relations with the Laban school.
- There are close connections among the ideas of Rudolf Laban, the aesthetic ideas of *Ausdrucktanz*, and the core notions of DADA. All take rhythm as the key to emotional expression. Richter discusses this idea at some length in “The Badly-Trained Sensibility”; in *Harmony and Dissent*, I comment on his ideas on rhythm and emotion. I also point out there that the idea that rhythm is primal unites the Dada and Constructivist sensibilities.
- 152 Tristan Tzara, “Weltwunder,” 1917. A fragment from this poem is quoted by Ades in “Dada and Surrealism,” 114.
- 153 Hans Richter, *Dada*, 59.
- 154 Jean Arp, *Arp on Arp: Poems, Essays, Memories*, ed. Marcel Jean (New York: Viking Press, 1972), 232.
- 155 The Neo-Dadaist John Cage used chance operation for similar ends.
- 156 Theodor Adorno offered a radical assessment of these difficulties—he claimed that history depleted collage of its political potency. Specifically, he argued that whereas earlier collage experiments were important as a “negation of synthesis” or false unity

- of meaning, after the Second World War, collage effects were neutralized through overuse and the unproblematic display within collage forms of the detritus of mass culture. See Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 155. Paul Arthur connects Adorno's remark to the collage film in his online *Documentary Box* article, "The Virtues and Limitations of Collage." Were it not for the fact that Bruce Conner's work was done well into the postwar era (indeed, right up to 2008), the spate of recent collage films that lack any sense of the violence of dissenting elements and so are both politically innocuous and aesthetically depleted would seem to lend support to Adorno's claims.
- 157 Jay Leyda, *Films Beget Films* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), 13–14.
- 158 A feature of the realist image, and its synchronous sound accompaniment, that the cinéma-*vérité* filmmakers of the 1950s and 1960s used to their considerable advantage, to create the impression of a unique and highly ambiguous reality that only the individual subject can decode (and only by virtue of having direct access to it). The filmmaker's subjectivity is foregrounded by the performative aesthetic of the moving camera.
- 159 Tristan Tzara, "Note on Poetry," in *Manifesto: A Century of Isms*, ed. Mary Ann Caws (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 306.
- 160 Ibid.
- 161 Anton Kaes, "Verfremdung als Verfahren: Film und Dada" (Alienation as Process: Film and Dada," in *Sinn und Unsinn: Dada International* (Sense and Nonsense), ed. W. Paulsen and H. Hermann (Bern: Franke, 1982), 71–83 at 71–72, cited in Thomas Elsaesser, "Dada/Cinema," in *Dada and Surrealist Film*, ed. Rudolf E. Kuenzli (New York: Willis Locker & Owens, 1987), 16.
- 162 Max Ernst, "Au delà de la peinture," translated and quoted by John D. Erickson in "The Cultural Politics of Dada," in *Crisis and the Arts: The History of Dada*, vol. 1: *Dada: The Coordinates of Cultural Politics*, ed. Stephen C. Foster (New York: G.K. Hall, 1996), 17.
- 163 Quoted in Calvin Tomkins, *The World of Marcel Duchamp* (New York: Time-Life Books, 1966), 35.
- 164 Ball, *Flight Out of Time*, entry dated 12 June 1916, 66.
- 165 The psychoanalytic movement was simultaneously engaged in a similar rethinking of politics of the self.
- 166 Ball, *Flucht aus der Zeit*, entry dated 21 November 1916; English trans. on page 90 of *Flight Out of Time*.
- 167 *Roses*, another collage that Gris did in the same year, could also serve as an object study in the aesthetic transformation of everyday objects.
- 168 Ball, *Flight Out of Time*, entry dated 8 April 1917. Note again the value attached to being in touch with the life force.
- Tzara responded similarly to Hans Arp's use of natural objects, for he explained that Arp's work had helped make him see the importance of observing the imprints and effects of forces that exist everywhere in nature; these traces revealed "an essential language of numbers," he explained, "engraved on crystals, on seashells, on rail tracks, in clouds, in glass, inside snow, light, on coal, on the hand, in the radiations grouped around magnetic poles, on wings." Tzara, "Note on Poetry," *Dada* 4–5 (May 1919), quoted in *Tristan Tzara: Approximate Man and Other Writings*, 167.
- 169 Tzara, ed., "Manifeste Dada," originally in *Dada* 3 (1918): 2, reprinted in Tzara, *Seven Manifestos*, 7.
- 170 The idea of paring down form and eliminating all that serves merely decorative (read aesthetic) purposes in order that truth might reveal itself is one that many thinkers of

- the early decades of the twentieth century promulgated. Wittgenstein was probably the most well known (Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin make this aspect of his work central to their famous study of Wittgenstein and his contemporaries, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, 1973). Janik and Toulmin suggest that a desire to avoid deceptive language (that makes the social lie impossible) accounts for Wittgenstein's desire to bring the structure of propositions and the structure of facts into accord. A similar revulsion motivated the Berlin Dadaist Raoul Hausmann to strip away figuration, which he believed gave expression to moralistic and sentimental thinking, and to allow visual forms a completely autonomous existence. There is a precise accord between Hausmann's anarchistic dislike of communism for proposing to concentrate all power in the state and his resolve not to allow figuration, which imports its determining principle from the world outside the work, to dictate the forms that make up the work.
- 171 However, this point, too, can be overstated—and has been in the body of the text. Anti-logicism is the basis of a new epistémè—consider the paratactical structures of music videos. All readers should be familiar with the capacity of the ruling paradigm to defuse opposition by co-opting it; and to be sure, something of that is occurring as the music megaindustry appropriates not just Dada forms of construction but even something of the Dada spirit. My view on this is rather dark—I believe that the appropriation of Dada forms and the Dada spirit (in some transformed version) by the megaindustries of the cultural sector indicates something far more telling, and something far more rare, than this. I believe that this development reflects the rise of a new semiotic paradigm, in which a brutish anti-reason and a culture of raw sensations will accede to power. This brutish unreason has now partnered with “me-first” anti-government thinking to spread a new form of tyranny across the West.
- 172 Think, for example, of the way that Arp, in such pieces as *Forest* (1917), *Portrait of Tzara* (1916), and *Enak's Tears* (1917), would overlay a foreground element in one primary colour on a background in another primary colour, so that the primaries clashed, and the clash would animate the relation between foreground and background.
- 173 Overpainting is perhaps the perfect opposite of the collage work of the Cubists; this is particularly evident in Ernst's *1 Copper Plate* (discussed briefly in the main body of the text), where the fragments of images are used not as graphic elements in a harmonious composition of other graphic elements, but as the awkward and alien hinges from which the artist hangs his deformed humanoid characters.
- 174 It is not without significance that Arp possessed the strongest religious sensibilities among the major Dadaists.
- 175 Hans Arp, “I become more and more removed from aesthetics,” in *On My Way*, 48. Quoted by Ades, “Dada and Surrealism,” 113.
- 176 Tzara's letter was printed in *Les feuilles libres* (April–May 1922); it is quoted in Erickson, “The Cultural Politics of Dada,” in Foster, ed., *Crisis and the Arts*, vol. 1: 11.
- 177 By the time he founded MERZ, Schwitters was living in Hanover, after the Berlin Dadaist group refused him membership for having a “too bourgeois face.”
- 178 Of course, defeating reason can serve to open the self to something beyond the rational; so the distinction we have drawn is really too simple. But it will do to highlight what really is a difference in emphasis more than a distinction of kind.
- 179 Tzara, “Dada Manifesto (1918),” in *Seven Dada Manifestos*, 10.
- 180 Such differences between the two movements should not be overestimated, however. We have already seen that Hans Arp believed that his collage practices revealed the

- workings of nature (and, implicitly, the workings of a higher process), while the Dadaist circle of Cologne, for example, followed the example of its leading figure, Max Ernst, in creating an art whose illogicality evoked magic and fairy stories and the intense, alarming world of dreams. Max Ernst's collages and his novels in pictures elicit, exactly, the magical, mysterious world that a child encounters in an illustrated book.
- 181 Ball, *Flucht aus der Zeit*, entry dated 18 June 1916; *Flight Out of Time*, 67–68.
- 182 It is worth noting that the Elementarism implied here is a menacing lure: both Orff and Ball expounded reactionary political beliefs during the time when the Nazis were consolidating their power. That Carl Orff held these beliefs should indicate the dangers that confront those who expound ideas concerning the primordial in experience, for these ideas led Orff to embrace National Socialism and the National Socialists' *Reichskulturkammer* to bestow honours on Orff.
- 183 Raoul Hausmann, "Filmdämmerung," *Sieg Triumph Tabak mit Bohnen: Texte bis 1933* (Victory Triumph Tobacco with Beans: Writings Since 1933 [1982]) vol. 2, 119. Cited in Pavle Levi, "Cinema by Other Means," *October* 131 (Winter 2010): 57, whence I have taken it.
- 184 Ball, an excerpt from his phonetic poem reading at the Galerie Dada in 1917. Quoted in Richardson and Stangos, *Concepts of Modern Art*, 115.
- 185 Martin Gaughan, "Dada Poetics: Flight Out of Sign?" in Foster, ed., *Crisis and the Arts*, vol. 1: 29–58.
- 186 Against the Formalist conception of an artwork as a voluntaristically constructed set of devices that fix the meanings of the terms that make up the work, but also against the activities of the *заумь* (zaum) poets Velimir Khlebnikov and Aleksei Kruchenykh, which were premised on the individualistic belief that poets themselves can invent a new language that will elude sense and will be "transrational," Bakhtin and his circle (the argument is especially strongly connected with V.N. Vološinov's [Mikhail Bakhtin's?] *Марксизм и Философия Языка* [Marksizm i Filosofiya Yazyka, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 1929]) argued that these tendencies were based on positivism, the most extreme form of subjective idealism. Lenin himself had criticized the errors of that form in his finest piece of philosophy, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1909): language is a social practice, and the individual can no more make language in isolation than the individual can constitute a basis for founding the state as the liberal theory of the state would have us believe.
- 187 Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, ed. M. Holquist, trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 276.
- 188 Ball knew of the Russian Futurists' experiments, through Wassily Kandinsky: see Raoul Hausmann, "Introduction à l'histoire du poème phonétique," in *German Life and Letters* 19 (1965) and "Note sur le poème phonétique: Kandinsky et Ball," *German Life and Letters* 21, no. 1 (1967). On 14 July 1914, Ball wrote his sister to say that he had organized an exhibition of Futurist, Cubist, and Expressionist paintings. In his diary entry of 18 June 1916, he extols *parole in libertà* for breathing life (LIFE again!) into language, which had been worn out by the modern ethos, and for enabling the *Dadaisten* to develop a magical (MAGIC again!) language. Furthermore, Hugo Ball met Else Hadwiger in 1914, and Hadwiger was then close to the poet Johannes R. Bercher (they shared living quarters for a while), who at this time was Germany's foremost expert on Futurism. Hülsenbeck, also thought of Futurism as being close to DADA, and he developed further the Futurist strategy of provocation.

189 Khlebnikov, “Trap for Judges” (February 1913), quoted in Gerald Janecek, *The Look of Russian Literature: Avant-Garde Visual Experiments, 1900–1930* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87. But *zaum*, like Futurism and Dadaism, was influenced by Symbolism. In 1906, the journal of Russian Symbolism, *Золотое руно* (Solotoe runo, Golden Fleece) included a pseudonymously attributed piece, written in the wake of the upheavals of 1905 (which were the inspiration for Sergei Eisenstein’s *Броненосец «Потёмкин»* [Bronenosets Potyomkin, Battleship Potemkin, 1925]), that proposed that the traditional means of art had exhausted themselves, and that new means must be developed, a “visual music and phonic painting without themes.” The ideas of the author of this piece on synaesthetic *Gesamtkunstwerk* anticipate Kandinsky’s ideas about synaesthesia and the *Gesamtkunstwerk* by three years. But they also anticipate the ideas of *zaum*. When we connect the points of influence, a picture of Kandinsky’s role in shaping Dada poetry begins to emerge.

This information about the pseudonymous article in *Zolotoe runo* appears in a fine article by John E. Bowlt, “Esoteric Culture and Russian Society,” in Tuchman, *The Spiritual in Art*, 171–72. I discuss Nikolai Fedorov’s cosmism and its influence on Russian art at some length in *Harmony and Dissent*.

190 The founding members of Hylaea were the brothers David, Vladimir and Nikolai Burliuk, Velimir Khlebnikov, and Benedikt Livshits (likely, next to Khlebnikov, the most advanced of the original group). In 1911, Vladimir Mayakovsky and Aleksei Kruchenykh joined the group.

191 The manifesto was signed by David Burliuk, Kruchenykh, Mayakovsky, and Khlebnikov.

192 D. Burliuk, A. Kruchenykh, V. Mayakovsky, and V. Khlebnikov, “Пощёчина общественному вкусу” (Poshchetchina obshchestvennomu vkusu); reprinted as “Slap in the Face of Public Taste,” in Anna Lawton and Herbert Eagle, eds., *Russian Futurism Through Its Manifestos, 1912–1928*, trans. Anna Lawton and Herbert Eagle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 51. The first collection of Futurist poetry was *Садок судей* (Sadok sudei, A Trap for Judges, 1910); it occasioned the first collaboration of David and Nikolai Burliuk, Elena Guro, Kamenskii, and Khlebnikov. “A Trap for Judges” was followed by the manifesto “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste.” The subtitle of the manifesto by Burliuk and colleagues, “В защиту свободного искусства: Стихи, проза, статьи” (V zashchitu svobodnogo iskusstva: Stikhi, proza, stat’i, In Defense of Free Art: Verse Prose Essays), proclaims the intention of the members of the Hylaea group to overthrow the “classics of the past,” to launch an attack on the “idols of the present.” They declared that poets’ rights henceforth must “be revered.”

193 For some artists interested in the Scythians, this “primitivism” was more important than the radical artistic innovations Hylaea practised: in 1915, the composer Sergei Prokofiev (1891–1953) composed music for a ballet, to be titled *Ала и Лолли* (Ala i Lolli), about the Scythians. Diaghliev showed no interest in the piece, so the composer reworked the composition into a suite, which he titled *Скифская Сьюта* (Skifskaya Suiata, Scythian Suite). It is a piece of program music, in four movements. The first, “The Invocation to Veles and Ala,” is primitivistic music, quite savage and colourful, describing the Scythians’ invocation of the Sun; the second movement, “The Evil God and the Dance of the Pagan Monsters,” depicts the Scythians making a sacrifice to Ala, daughter of Veles, while the Evil God performs a violent dance surrounded by seven monsters; the third movement, “Night,” presents the the Evil God harming Ala and Moon Maidens descending to console her; the fourth movement, “The Glorious Departure of Lolli and the Cortège of the Sun,” depicts Lolli, the hero, coming to save

- Ala and the Sun God assisting him in defeating the Evil God. They are victorious, and the suite ends with a musical picture of the sunrise. It is, clearly, a Gnostic fantasy of primitive thought and culture.
- 194 Words that are commonly identified as having magical powers (such as the word *abracadabra* in most European languages) are surprisingly rare. One is *чур* (*chur*, “Keep away!”), another name for a variety of the herb wormwood, *чэрнобил* (*chernobyl*). One can imagine those who believe in occult powers supposing that the calamity of 1984 was an instance of history taking revenge on blasphemers.
- 195 A. Kruchenykh, excerpt from *взорвал* (*Vzorval*, *Explodity*, 1913), in Lawton and Eagle, *Russian Futurism Through Its Manifestos*, 66.
- 196 The title Bely used in 1922 was actually *Glossaloliya*. Klavdiya Nikolaevna Bugaeva, Bely’s second wife, and Aleksei S. Petrovsky, his friend, also identify the text as “Glossaloliya.”
- 197 Andrei Bely, Introduction to *После разлуки: берлинский песенник* (*Posle razluki: berlinskii pesennik*, *After the Separation: A Berlin Songbook*) (Petersburg: Epokha, 1922), 9, 10.
- 198 Bely, *Glossalolia*, §17; kindly translated for me by Alla Gadassik, a former research assistant, as were the citations from Bely’s poem that follow.
- 199 *Ibid.*, §31.
- 200 *Ibid.*, §24.
- 201 Thomas R. Beyer, Jr., “Andrej Belyj’s *Glossalolia*: A Berlin Glossololia,” *Europa Orientalis*, 14.2 (1995), 14. The article contributed much to my understanding of this difficult work.
- 202 *Ibid.*, §29.
- 203 *Ibid.*, §45.
- 204 Hinton discussed Lobachevsky and higher-dimensional geometries, using analogies that will be familiar to some readers from Edwin A. Abbot’s widely read 1884 book, *Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions*. Hinton pointed out that a point, a line, and plane is each a projection of \mathbf{R}^{d+1} on \mathbf{R}^d : a point is a projection of a line in \mathbf{R}^1 onto \mathbf{R}^0 ; a line is a projection of a plane in \mathbf{R}^2 onto \mathbf{R}^1 ; a plane is a projection of a solid in \mathbf{R}^3 onto \mathbf{R}^2 (or, to put the matter in a different way, a point is an \mathbf{R}^0 section of an \mathbf{R}^1 line; a line is an \mathbf{R}^1 section of an \mathbf{R}^2 plane; a plane is an \mathbf{R}^2 section of an \mathbf{R}^3 solid). This naturally led to speculation about solids being \mathbf{R}^3 sections of \mathbf{R}^4 forms (as a cube is an \mathbf{R}^3 section of \mathbf{R}^4 tesseract). As those who have read *Flatland* will recall, we can imagine that as a cube passes through a two-dimensional space, it forms a square; similarly, as a tesseract passes through a three-dimensional space, it forms a cube.
- These are fascinating ideas, and it is understandable that artists and thinkers took great interest in them. A point that begins to move describes a line; and a line that begins to move describes a plane; and a plane that moves describes a solid. This simple insight was extended in a less mathematical direction: movement requires time, and (as those who have read H.G. Wells’s *The Time Machine*, 1895, will remember) the fourth dimension has often been taken to be time. In \mathbf{R}^4 , time past, time present, and time future all coexist. The sense of a moving present is created as \mathbf{R}^4 forms pass through our \mathbf{R}^3 understanding: we see projections—the shadows, as it were—of these timeless forms fluxing on the screen of our \mathbf{R}^3 cognition. Past and future exist, with shapes that can be understood.
- 205 The enthusiasm survived the Soviet era: shortly after the fall of the Soviet government, a eurythmy studio opened in Moscow.

- 206 Bely's *Glossolalia* consciously developed the connections that Steiner made between movement and speech (and cited Steiner's work on the topic several times).
- 207 Andrei Bely, "Магия слов" (Magiia Slov or Magiya Slov, The Magic of Words), originally published in *символизм* (Simvolizm, Symbolism), Moscow, 1910: 429–30. Anthologized in *Selected Essays of Andrey Bely*, trans. and ed. Stephen Cassedy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 95–96.
- 208 *Ibid.*, 93.
- 209 Burliuk et al., "A Slap in the Face of Public Taste," in Lawton and Eagle, eds., *Russian Futurism Through Its Manifestos, 1912–1928*, 94.
- 210 Annette Michelson, "De Stijl, Its Other Face: Abstraction and Cacaphony [*sic*], or What Was the Matter with Hegel?" *October* 22 (Fall 1982): 15. Part of the quote used an excerpt from a book by A. Kruchenykh, *Les voies nouvelles du mot (langue de l'avenir: mort au symbolisme)*, 1931. Translated from the Russian by Henri Deluy in *Action Poétique* 48 (1971): 42–49.
- 211 Kruchenykh, "Нэв ваис оф тьэ ворд" (Novye puti slova, New Ways of the Word, 1913), in Vladimir Markov, *Манифэсти и программы русских футуристов* (Manifesty i programmy russkikh futuristov [Manifestos and Programs of the Russian Futurists]) (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1967), 65, 72, quoted in Charlotte Douglas, "Beyond Reason: Malevich, Matiushin, and their Circles" (Hannover: Postskriptum-Verlag, 1994); cited in Tuchman, *The Spiritual in Art*, 187.
- 212 Annette Michelson characterizes the form of the primordial evoked in this verse (citing the importance of the sound "ca ca" in the sound poetry of the era) as a "primitive anal eroticism." She states, "We seem to have wandered into a pan-European nursery, resonant with an infantile demotic that inscribes within the empyrean of Hegelian onto-aesthetics the discourse of a primitive anal eroticism. As Schwitters was later to say, 'Dada had to arise and let out the pent-up gases; poop-poop!'" In "De Stijl, Its Other Face," 22.
- 213 Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh used the term "Futurian painter" to refer to themselves and to members of the circle—it was used both to distinguish themselves as avant-gardists from the Futurists and to parody the Futurists' simplistically sanguine set of beliefs regarding the world to come.
- 214 Kruchenykh and Khlebnikov, "The Word as Such," in Lawton and Eagle, eds., *Russian Futurism Through Its Manifestos*, 61.
- 215 Fedorov had sought an alphabet that would serve as a "universal, pan-linguistic word-root language" (*азбука* [azbuka] for a *всэмирнии, панлингвистичэсткки корнэслов* [vsemirnyi, panlingvisticheskii korneslov]).
- 216 See Berenice Glatzer Rosenthal, *The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 237. Rosenthal notes, correctly, that Plato offers a similar phonemic theory in the *Cratylus*, when he notes that the sound "r" often appears in words denoting motion and "l" in words denoting smoothness.
- 217 Understood through this analogy, *zaum's* ideas seem not in the least strange—indeed, Malevich complained that Khlebnikov's version of *zaum* was all too rational. He preferred the approach of Kruchenykh, for whom the transrational state induced by *zaum* poetry resembled the altered state created by yogic and meditative practices.
- 218 Roman Jakobson, "Modern Russian Poetry" (1919), in Edward J. Brown, ed., *Major Soviet Writers: Essays in Criticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 72.
- 219 Benedikt Livshits, *The One and a Half-Eyed Archer: Poetry, Translations, Memoirs* (translation of *Полупораглази стрэлэц: Стихотворэнииа, пэрэводи, воспоминанииа*

[Polutoraglaziyi strelets: Stikhotvoreniia, perevody, vospominaniia]), trans. John E. Bowlit (Newtonville: Oriental Research Partners, 1977), 197.

- 220 The belief in the identity of the spoken word and what it represents (which is generally thought to be mental, not physical), and the alleged errors that arise from this mistake, were principal topics of Jacques Derrida's early philosophical writings. And his remedy? Similar to *zaum*'s: emphasize the graphic properties of written texts, according to them a more privileged place than to spoken speech.
- 221 We must not allow this to obscure that important difference. The *zaum* poets placed more emphasis on the visual (or graphic) characteristics of poetry and less on the performance context (in which the poem is read aloud)—and the latter, obviously, was a key to the performative conception of language that motivated the Futurists to make poetry central to their enormously eclectic performances.
- 222 Another possible connection is Ilya Mikhailovich Zdanevich (1894–1975), a Russian Futurist/Dada poet. Zdanevich participated in 41st literary group, which Kruchenykh founded in 1919 to publish, promote, and give performances of *zaum* poetry. Zdanevich wrote several *dra* (his transrational word for “play”), whose scale is unrivalled in *zaum* literature. Zdanevich published his works in Paris and Germany under the pseudonym of “Iliazd,” and for a time lived as an expatriate in Paris, where he took part in DADA. Much later, in 1949, as an early champion of sound poetry, he brought out one of the first anthologies in the field, *Poésie de mots inconnus*, a collection of Dadaist sound poetry and Russian *zaum* intended to show the derivative nature of Letterist poetry.
- 223 Earlier, Marcel Duchamp had made his *L.H.O.O.Q.* (1919), an image of the Mona Lisa who is changing into a male and sporting a moustache and goatee (her sexual transformation reflects Duchamp's interest in the epicene Rebis, or “double thing” that integrates masculine and feminine energies). Underneath the image, Duchamp inscribed “L.H.O.O.Q.” The implication that “there is a fire below her” alludes to a common alchemical image, that of the dragon (fire) below the fused alchemical King and Queen: in Duchamp's picture, letters referring to heat or fire are below the androgynous image of Mona Lisa with a beard and moustache.

A computer analysis of the image has led to the suggestion that the face in *L.H.O.O.Q.* more closely resembles Duchamp's own face (consider Man Ray's portrait of Marcel Duchamp in drag entitled *Rose Sélavy*, 1921, to assess the plausibility of the suggestion) than it does Mona Lisa's.

- 224 As both examples (“L.H.O.O.Q.” and “Riz au Nez”) indicate, punning played a considerable role in the Dadaists' verbal-visual exchanges—and both expressions became some of the paintings by Duchamp. In *L.H.O.O.Q.*, Mona Lisa's smile anchors the verbal-visual meaning complex: Mona Lisa is smiling because she is experiencing randy feelings. The implication anchors the text (“L.H.O.O.Q.”), for it “fixes” (pun intended) the meaning of a construction that *prima facie* struck us as lacking in significance—it converts what seemed a purely graphic element into a semiotic form.

The visual element plays less of a role in the second example (“Riz au Nez”—*raisonner*). Nonetheless, a related process, passing from enigma to insight—one that provides the once enigmatic text with an anchor—occurs along with it. To say that somebody has rice up his or her nose is not to say much about the person; however, when the point of the pun is recognized, and we realize that expression identifies the experience (sensation) of ratiocination with having an itch in one's nose, the text becomes “fixed,” significant, as that which once seemed simply nonsensical is understood.

- 225 Marcel Duchamp, "Statement at *The Art of Assemblage: A Symposium*," Museum of Modern Art, New York, 19 October 1961. Quoted in Marcel Duchamp, *The Writings of Marcel Duchamp*, ed. Michel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 141.
- 226 Udnie was an exotic dancer of Picabia's acquaintance.
- 227 Sigfried Giedeon remains an excellent source on these changes. See his *Space, Time, and Architecture*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) and especially his *Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).
- 228 Regarding Picabia's relationship with Alfred Jarry and Raymond Roussel, see William A. Camfield, *Francis Picabia: His Life, Art and Times* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 79, 85.
- 229 Paul B. Haviland, Statement, in 291, nos. 7–8 (September–October 1915). Picabia produced a mechanomorphic portrait of Haviland in 1915. The inscription on the work, "Le Saint des Saints. C'est de moi qu'il s'agit dans ce portrait" (The saint of saints. It is with me that this portrait deals), identifies Picabia with Haviland and (through the portrait's mechanomorphic form) relates the artist to the machine. It also identifies the artist's mission with that of the saint and, thus, implies that the machine is holy: the machine is the creator of the new world.
- 230 *Dancer ou danger: impossibilité ou l'impossible*, a painting on glass from 1920. (Man Ray recreated the work as *Danger-Dancer/ILXT* in 1972.) The painting depicts a number of gears, evoking anticipated motion. Over some of these gears is the word "DANCER," with a lipstick smear over the "C," making it look like "G." The painting evokes the fear of the Automatic Woman, the menacing femme-machine. The title suggests that the machine is a failed attempt to represent a Spanish dancer—and that failure itself suggests that it is impossible for mechanical movement to be truly expressive. By highlighting the disanalogy between the cause of mechanical movements and the cause (emotion) of expressive gestures, Ray indicates that human movement is greater in richness. (That the wheels of the mechanical object interlock in such a way as to make it impossible for them to move only underlines the point.) The painting also evokes the feeling that the perfect machine, based in the body, would be menacing; the work reflects a fear of the danger of the female body (the gears convey the fear of the *vagina dentata*). The original painting, or perhaps Man Ray's photo of the original painting, is reproduced in the film *Emak Bakia*.
- 231 This interest is reflected as well in *Jeune homme triste dans un train* (Sad Young Man on a Train, December 1911), *Nu descendant un escalier* (Nude Descending a Staircase, December 1911), and *Le Roi et la Reine entourés de nus vites* (The King and Queen Surrounded by Swift Nudes, May 1912). A valuable source on Duchamp's esoteric interests, but especially his interest in alchemy, is Arturo Schwartz, "The Alchemist Stripped Bare in the Bachelor, Even," in Anne D'Harnoncourt and Kynaston McShine, *Marcel Duchamp* (Greenwich: Museum of Modern Art, 1973), 81–98.
- 232 Some notes contradict the claim that the Bride secretes "love gasoline," for Duchamp wrote, "Contrary to the previous notes, the bride no longer provides gasoline for the cylinder-breasts." See "The Green Box, 2: Laws and General Notes," in Marcel Duchamp, *The Writings of Marcel Duchamp*, 30.
- 233 The term *le pendu femelle* is much more complex. First note that this biological entity—and this is another instance in Duchamp's work of a genital that has become an autonomous biological entity, a being with an independent life—is masculine,

despite the *-elle* ending on the adjective. So this entity is male, just what we would expect of something that hangs. Moreover, the form of *pendu* suggests a past participle, so “hanged female” would probably be a little closer to Duchamp’s meaning. But that misses the masculine implication, so “hung male thing of a female character” would be even closer. But even that is inadequate, for it does not capture the idea implied in the neologism that a biological entity has a feminine nature because he/she is a male who has been hanged and now is dead. Furthermore, the term *femelle* has nasty connotations when not used of an animal (it applies paradigmatically to animals)—typically one might use it to refer to a *femelle en chaleur* or a “bitch in heat.” Regarding the foregoing, see Edward D. Powers’s article “Fasten Your Seatbelts as We Prepare for Our *Nude Descending*,” in *tout-fait* 2 no. 5 (April 2003) (www.toutfait.com/articles.php?id=1723). There is more: the anomalous grammatical form also hints that the feminine nature of this biological entity is primary, so something like “the female [i.e., that which is female], which is a hanged male” would be closer yet.

There is more yet: when we read *le pendu femelle* we might be tempted to elide the expression to *pendule*, which is French for “pendulum.” That gives the sense of something that swings back and forth, with mechanical regularity. The neologism’s peculiar form further invites us to elide the term to *la pendule*, which means clock. Thus, the neologism suggests that this swinging back and forth of the lifeless (hanged) form, with its message of onanism, foreshadows death.

- 234 The characterization of the Bride, as being of the “arbor-type,” is possibly an allusion to the young girl under the trees in Duchamp’s *Young Man and Girl in Spring* (1911). In that painting, the Young Man (the prototype for the Bachelor in *The Large Glass*, and possibly an allusion to Duchamp himself) and the Girl (the prototype for the Bride in *The Large Glass*, and possibly an allusion to Duchamp’s sister Suzanne) are barely differentiated sexually (and so suggest the androgyne); the reference to the Milky Way is possibly an allusion to the great mathematician Henri Poincaré, who once described ideas as ready-mades that come into the mind as though they had fallen from the Milky Way.

The idea that the Bride is of the “arbor-type” is interesting for another reason: in alchemical thought, the tree is a symbol for the desire for cosmic totality (the cosmos in its genesis and its becoming); it is also the mediator between earth and sky.

It is significant that the Bride herself, the *Pendu femelle*, and the Cinematic Blossoming, taken together, bear an unmistakable resemblance to the *alambic charentais traditionnel à chauffe-vin*.

- 235 The “Nine Shots” in the Bride’s domain also allude to the notion of projection: for the Shots, Duchamp took a toy cannon, with a match dipped in paint as its missile (the act of shooting can be described as projecting); he aimed the cannon at a target point, but different conditions and lack of perfect manual control (accidents) resulted in the nine projectiles falling in different places around the target. Drawing lines from the points where the projectiles fell towards the bottom of the upper glass produced a fluted column (a relative, perhaps, of the piston).
- 236 The obstacles serve as a metaphor of the arduousness of the quest for the philosopher’s stone—that is, for the rigours involved in the purification of self—as the quest for wholeness is a *longissima via*, and the passage from the illusory to the real (from the ephemeral to the eternal, or from the profane to the sacred) is fraught with difficulties. Individuation is the fraught experience of the union of opposites.
- 237 The upper portion of *La grande verre* seems to derive from *Mariée*, while the lower portion seems to relate to *Broyeuse de chocolat no. 1*.

- 238 The shattering of the Bachelor's desires into so many "spangles" also alludes to the alchemical notion of the shattering of the self (in the *solve* that precedes the *coagula*). The elemental scattering, which results in unconsciousness, returns this substance to the state of the *prima materia* (the *broyeuse de chocolat* in the eponymous painting has a similar effect); from the *prima materia*, the philosopher's stone will emerge.
- 239 A famous photograph by Man Ray documents the "dust breeding."
- 240 Janis Mink, *Marcel Duchamp 1886–1968: Art as Anti-Art* (Cologne: Taschen, 2000), 81. The chocolate grinder produces dark-coloured edibles. One allusion is clearly scatological/coprophagic. But as a circular form, the emblem of the masturbatory for Duchamp, the chocolate grinder confirms that sense of "Slow life—Vicious circle—Onanism" (*The Writings of Marcel Duchamp*, 56) that is the basis of the machine analogy in this work.
- 241 This interpretation has supported an incest theory, advanced by Arturo Schwartz in *The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), linking Duchamp with his sister Suzanne. Some of the remarks on *même* in this paragraph draw on Mink, *ibid.*, 81–84.
- 242 The work perhaps depicts a central female figure being attacked from all sides by male figures or perhaps the female figure being observed from all sides by male figures. Ulf Linde points out, in his exhibition catalogue *Marcel Duchamp* (Stockholm: Gallerie Buren, 1963), that the drawing resembles an illustration in an alchemical work by Solidonius.
- 243 The next chapter presents Dalí's ideas on eliminating the mental image.
- 244 Duchamp actually went further: his contempt for the olfactory experiences of painting suggests an anxiety best understood in psychoanalytical terms: a fear of sexuality associated with an inability to have an erection.
- 245 Le cinéma devrait, lui aussi, nous donner le vertige, être une sorte de paradis artificiel, promoteur de sensations intenses dépassant le looping the loop de l'avion et le plaisir de l'opium. *Comoedia* 27, November 1924, in Francis Picabia, *Écrits*, vol. 2 (Belfond, Paris 1978), 159.
- 246 Francis Picabia, "Première heure," *Mouvement accélérée*, November 1924. Quoted in his own translation in Steven Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage: The Story of Surrealist Cinema* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 74–75.
- 247 Picabia is also quoted in a text by the director of the Ballets Suédois, Rolf de Maré, "A propos de *Relâche*," *Comoedia* 27, November 1924. The passage I have quoted appears as an excerpt in Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage*, 77.
- 248 Francis Picabia, "Instantanéisme" quoted in Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage*, 86–87.
- 249 Paul Achard, "Picabia m'a dit," *L'action*, 1 January 1925, 4. Quoted in Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage*, 111n37.
- 250 This passage is compiled from reviews of a play by Camille Aymard, "Picabia est un symbole"; Maurice Bouisson, "Relâche-Entr'acte," *Événement*, 15 December 1924; Jane Catulle-Mendes "Relâche," *Presse*, 6 December 1924, quoted in Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage*, 79; and from Giovanna Costantini, "The Unbearable Lightness of Being: *Entr'Acte* as Comedic Interlude," in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ed., *Enjoyment: From Laughter to Delight in Philosophy, Literature, the Fine Arts and Aesthetics. Acta Husserliana* Volume LVI (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 281–92, esp. 283.
- 251 René Clair, *Cinéma d'hier, cinéma d'aujourd'hui*. Originally published in Paris by Éditions Gallimard, 1970. English version, edited and with an introduction by R.C. Dale, and translated by Stanley Appelbaum, "By Way of an Epigraph," in *Cinema*

Yesterday and Today (New York: Dover Publications, 1972); the passage cited appears on pages 11–12. René Clair was a co-maker of *Entr'acte*. Clair's *Cinéma d'hier, cinéma d'aujourd'hui* is an expanded version of the earlier *Réflexion faite* (1951), a collection of his writings on cinema from the 1920s, together with his commentaries on their contents, written in 1950; *Cinéma d'hier, cinéma d'aujourd'hui* extends the principle of the earlier collection, for it includes all of what *Réflexion faite* contains, as well as Clair's thoughts, as of 1970, on its contents. Thus, *Cinéma d'hier, cinéma d'aujourd'hui* presents a discussion between three voices, one representing René Clair in the 1920s, the second in 1950, and the third in 1970.

- 252 Christian-Mar Bosséno, "La place du spectateur," *Vingtième siècle: Revue d'histoire* 46 (avril-juin 1995): 143–54. On page 144, Bosséno proposes a list of questions that the study of spectatorship should address. The list is apposite to our inquiry, for it implies much about how the Dada and Surrealist artists might have experienced the phenomenon of the cinema.

Qui va au cinéma et pourquoi? Comment et dans quelles conditions techniques et matérielles voit-on les films? Quelles sont les conditions et les modalités de réception des oeuvres? À quel moment le public cesse-t-il d'"aller au cinéma" (pour la nouveauté de l'expérience ou le seul plaisir, ou tout simplement parce que le cinéma est un lieu de sociabilité de première importance durant plusieurs décennies) pour "voir des films" (j'entends des films choisis, selon des critères de goût que restent à déterminer, socialement et esthétiquement)? Où passé la frontière entre celui qui "va au cinéma" (le *cinemagoer* comme disent les Anglo-Saxons) et celui pour qui la vision d'un film est un expérience artistique et intellectuel, ou même, dans le cas des "cinéphiles" les plus enragés, un mode de vie et une foi? De quand date le mort du "grand public" et la naissance de micro-audiences spécialisées?

Dada and Surrealist artists, of course, would have been among the most mad cinephiles, for whom the cinema was a way of life and a faith. The quotations I have just presented are a commentary on their articles of faith—and on the cinema itself, a phenomenon that was only just beginning to differentiate itself into distinct forms reflecting spectators' varying social backgrounds.

- 253 Emile Vuillermoz, "Before the Screen: Hermes and Silence" (1918); Marcel L'Herbier, "Hermes and Silence" (1918); and Louis Delluc, "The Crowd" (1918); all in Richard Abel, ed., *French Film Theory and Criticism: A History/Anthology, 1907–1939*, vol. 1: 1907–1929 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 155–59, 147–55, and 159–65, respectively.
- 254 René Clair, *Cinéma d'hier, cinéma d'aujourd'hui*, 9–10.
- 255 It is likely that Vertov's enormous admiration for Clair's first film accounts for the French style of much of *A Man with a Movie Camera's* cinematography.

Transforming its images, especially those of urban scenes, by using a mobile camera is one of the features of the French "Impressionist" cinema. Though neither is an example of pure "Impressionism," Cavalcanti's *Rien que les heures* (Nothing but Time or Nothing but the Hours, 1926) and Kirsanov's *Ménilmontant* (1926) can serve as examples. Vertov makes frequent use of such transformations (and applies them to urban scenes). Like the French "Impressionist" filmmakers, Vertov seems to take delight in the cinema's kinetic properties for their own sake (even his adopted name, Dziga Vertov, which means "spinning top," conveys his Constructivist enthusiasm for movement). I do not know whether Vertov saw Clair's later film, but in *Entr'acte*, shots of trees, apparently moving by themselves, appear as inserts at several points, partly for

- their kinetic effect and partly for their very implausibility. Very similar shots appear, for very similar reasons, in Vertov's *A Man with a Movie Camera*.
- 256 Annette Michelson, "Dr. Crase and Mr. Clair," *October* 11 (Winter 1979): 31–53.
- 257 And, of course, *Entr'acte* was made at a time when the cinema was young enough to be unfamiliar to independent artists, but already old enough to be controlled by commercial interests (which, even by that date, had already turned filmmaking into an industry promoting a narrowing of experience and a narcotizing of consciousness, though not yet one dedicated to a coarsening of sensation).
- 258 René Clair, *Cinéma d'hier, cinéma d'aujourd'hui*, 15–16.
- 259 *Ibid.*, 18.
- 260 Pierre Albert-Birot in René Clair, *ibid.*, 19.
- 261 Fernand Léger in *ibid.*, 20.
- 262 Philippe Soupault in *ibid.*, 20.
- 263 Paul Valéry in *ibid.*, 20.
- 264 René Clair, *ibid.*, 20–21.
- 265 This passage's concern with building on attributes inherent in the cinematic medium explains why some commentators have speculated that Clair is primarily responsible for the film's second part. Steven Kovács, in *From Enchantment to Rage* (page 102), speculates that "it was in the chase scene more than anywhere else that René Clair put his film ideas to the test. For him the cinema was a medium of movement, so it was movement that he pushed to the furthest limits in the chase." Against that view is the fact that Picabia's "scenario" for the film, composed even before he met Clair, calls for a section with "a funeral: hearse drawn by a camel, etc." that is six times longer than the next-longest passage. Francis Picabia, "Francis Picabia's Original Notes for *Entr'acte*," in *À Nous La Liberté and Entr'acte: Films by René Clair* (New York: Classic Film Scripts, 1970), 11. This text is translated from the French *L'avant-scène du cinéma* series' number on Clair (86, November 1968). I believe that Picabia understood well that relishing dynamic form and liberating dynamic effects were entailed by a gestural or perlocutionary aesthetic.
- 266 Francis Picabia, "Programme de *Relâche*," in *La danse* (November 1924); reprinted in Francis Picabia, *Écrits*, vol. 2 (Paris: Belfond, 1978), 167. Quoted in Rudolf E. Kuenzli's introduction to his anthology, *Dada and Surrealist Film* (New York: Willis Locker & Owens, 1987), 5.
- 267 Picabia, "Original Notes for *Entr'acte*," 113. The sole issue of the tellingly titled Dada magazine *Projecteur* (21 May 1920) contained a dark poem "Luna Park" by the journal's editor Céline Arnaud. *Projecteur* proclaimed itself to be a lantern for the blind, and contained an article by Paul Éluard on Charlot.
- 268 The amusement park was Luna Park, an Art Nouveau entertainment complex near Port Maillot that operated from 1907 to 1931.
- 269 Later filmmakers would use the roller-coaster as Clair does here, as a celebration of speed; but no others that I know of had the audacity to use the context of the funeral procession.
- 270 Michel Sanouillet, *Picabia* (Paris: Editions du Temps, 1964). Quoted in Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage*, 83. Sanouillet's book on Picabia was the first monograph published on the artist.
- 271 Man Ray quoted in Jean Adhemar and Julien Cain, *Man Ray, L'exposition de l'oeuvre photographique à la Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris: 1962). The remark is cited in Kovács, "An American in Paris," in *From Enchantment to Rage*, 152n5.

- 272 In fact, Christian Schad, another Dada artist, developed the same technique, which he too named after himself, calling it the Schadograph. Ray and Schnabel apparently made their discoveries independently.
- 273 Man Ray, *Self-Portrait* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 129.
- 274 The difficulties of disintricating the Dadaist and Surrealist elements of Man Ray's first two films (difficulties especially obvious concerning the second, *Emak Bakia*) just lend weight to Sanouillet's assertion that in Paris the movements were not distinct and that Surrealism was simply the French name for DADA.
- 275 Man Ray in "Surréalisme et cinéma," *Études cinématographiques* 38–39, Spring 1965 (Paris: Lettres Modernes, 1965), 43. Translation mine.
- 276 Man Ray, *Self-Portrait*, 259.
- 277 Robert Desnos, "Musique et sous-titres." Quoted in J.-M. Bouhours and de Haas, Patrick, eds., *Man Ray directeur de mauvais movies* (Paris: Centre Georges Pompidou, 1998), 61.
- 278 In standard Euskara, the expression is "Emak bakea!"
- 279 Man Ray, *Self-Portrait*, 269.
- 280 *Ibid.*, 263.
- 281 *Ibid.*, 274.
- 282 Sanouillet's view ought to carry great weight. His work on DADA remains among the finest ever produced. In June 1965 at the Sorbonne, he defended his two State doctoral theses, "Dada à Paris" and "Francis Picabia et 391." When the former appeared as a book, *Dada à Paris* (Paris: Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1965), it became the founding work in the study of DADA. It has been published in Japanese and Russian translations, reprinted several times by different publishers, and reissued in a new edition with many heretofore unpublished documents, by CRNS, in 2005. Researchers continue to turn to it, for the book incorporates information and makes use of documents gleaned from twenty years of personal contact with those of the Dada writers and artists who were still alive in the 1960s and with whom Sanouillet had a personal acquaintance: Breton, Picabia, Tzara, Duchamp, Man Ray, and Ribemont-Dessaignes.

From 1955 to 1970, Sanouillet taught at the University of Toronto. For two or three years, Michel and his wife Ann ran a monthly French newspaper in Toronto, *Les Nouvelles Françaises*, and he had a bookstore, the Librairie Française, on Gerrard Street, whose intersection with Bay Street was then the home to a thriving "bohemian village." He became friends with many Toronto artists. He gave the young Michael Snow a letter of introduction to Marcel Duchamp, which allowed that young man (whose works sometimes displayed Neo-Dada features) to meet the renowned French artist, then living in New York. He reviewed a Neo-Dada exhibition, "Dada at the Isaacs Gallery" (December 1961), that presented the work of new Toronto artists (Dennis Burton, Arthur Coughtry, Greg Curnoe, Richard Gorman, Gordon Rayner, Michael Snow, Joyce Wieland), whose work was conscious of DADA ("The Sign of Dada," *Canadian Art* 19, no. 2 [1962]). Greg Curnoe met him in 1958, and the two exchanged several letters—Curnoe also created two sculptures in homage to him.

Many young artists of the era in Toronto and London, Ontario, including Gordon Rayner and Dennis Burton, took an interest in DADA, and their literary magazine, *Evidence*, ran an interview with Duchamp (Herbert Crehan, "Dada," *Evidence* 3 [Fall 1961]: 36–38). In 1959, Dennis Burton mounted Toronto's first documented Happening, essentially a DADA event, at his Huntley Street studio.

- The interest so many Toronto and London (Ontario) artists had in DADA led some, especially in the London group, to an interest in Surrealism. Paddy O'Brien, who wrote brilliantly on Jack Chambers, a painter greatly influenced by Surrealism, published an article, "Surrealism," in the November–December 1963 issue of *Canadian Art*. She curated "Surrealism in Canadian Painting" (1964) for the London Public Library and Art Museum. She also wrote "Surrealism," *Canadian Art* 20, no. 6 (November–December 1963): 348–53; and *Surrealism in Canadian Painting* (London, ON: London Public Library and Art Museum, 1964). I wrote on Chambers's Surrealism, emphasizing its connection to photography in "Jack Chambers' Surrealism," in Kathryn Elder, ed., *The Films of Jack Chambers* (Toronto: Cinematheque Ontario, 2002), 87–115.
- 283 I should point out that I disagree with this common understanding. Specifics about that claim, and my reasons for disagreeing with it, can be found in my book *Harmony and Dissent*.
- 284 Some of the film's qualities resemble attributes of Richter's Dada experiments.
- 285 Cited in Tomkins, *Marcel Duchamp: A Biography*, 510.
- 286 Some commentators have suggested that it encourages us to see a woman's back as a violin, but surely it is a cello: first, because the form resembles that of a cello more than that of a violin; and second, because a cello is something we put between our legs when we make music with it.
- 287 The eye is a leitmotif in Man Ray's work: consider his portrait of the Marchesa Casati with three pairs of eyes, *Boule sans neige*, and *Objet à détruire*.
- 288 Man Ray, *Self-Portrait*, 270.
- 289 Man Ray, "Emak Bakia," *Close Up* 1, no. 2 (August 1927). Quoted in Bouhours, *Man Ray*, 50.
- 290 Man Ray, "Surréalisme et cinéma," *Études cinématographiques* 38–39 (1er trimestre 1965): 43–47. Quoted in Bouhours, *Man Ray: directeur du mauvais movies*, 166.
- 291 Ernest Fenollosa, "The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry," in *Prose Keys to Modern Poetry*, ed. Karl Shapiro (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 139.
- 292 *Ibid.*, 142. Emphasis in original.
- 293 *Ibid.*, 141–42.
- 294 *Ibid.*, 145.
- 295 Man Ray, "Ruth, Roses and Revolvers," in Bouhours and de Haas, eds., *Man Ray, directeur*, 137.
- 296 J.-M. Bouhours, "Fichez-moi la paix! Essai de reconstitution d'Emak Bakia," in Bouhours and de Haas, eds., *Man Ray: directeur*, 43.
- 297 Man Ray, from "Un film étonnant, L'Étoile de mer par Man Ray," originally published in *Vu* 46 (January 1929): 74; it also appears in Bouhours and de Haas, eds., *Man Ray: directeur*, 158.
- 298 The usual English title is *Object to Be Destroyed*: Man Ray first made a similar piece in 1923 and called it *Objet à détruire*; in 1932, he reworked the piece, substituting a photograph of Lee Millers's eye for the original eye. In 1957, a group of student protesters destroyed the piece. In 1964, Man Ray reconstructed the work and named it *Objet indestructible* (Indestructible Object).
- 299 An extraordinary book, *Buñuel: Die Auge des Jahrhunderts*, which makes Buñuel/Dalí's famous image of the slitting of the eyeball in *Un chien andalou* (1929) central, shows how resonant the image of an eye was in art of the twentieth century.
- 300 Bouhours, "Fichez-moi la paix!," in Bouhours and de Haas, eds., *Man Ray: directeur*, 52.

- 301 Man Ray, quoted in “L’amour de l’art,” published in *9e année* 9 (September 1928): 324–25; it also appears in Bouhours and de Haas, eds., *Man Ray: directeur*, 169.
- 302 Man Ray, from “Surréalisme et cinéma,” originally published in *Études cinématographiques* 38–39 (1965): 43–47; also in Bouhours and de Haas, eds., *Man Ray: directeur*, 166.
- 303 Man Ray, from “Surréalisme et cinéma”; also in Bouhours and de Haas, eds., *Man Ray: directeur*, 157.
- 304 Man Ray, *Self-Portrait*, 270.
- 305 *Ibid.*, 272.
- 306 The shirt collars resemble the form presented in Man Ray’s 1919 photograph *Lampshade*; they reappear, in motion, in *Le retour à la raison*.
- 307 Hans Richter, *Dada: Art and Anti-Art*, trans. David Britt (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 118.
- 308 The First International Dada Fair was an “exhibition and sale” of approximately two hundred “Dada products” mounted between 30 June and 25 August 1920.
- 309 Among other works listed in the catalogue, one was by Ben Hecht, then an American journalist stationed in postwar Berlin; he went on to become a renowned Hollywood screenwriter.
- 310 Wieland Herzfelde, “Introduction to the First International Dada Fair,” originally printed 1920, trans. Brigid Doherty, *October* 105 (Summer 2003): 100–101. I have altered the translation.
- I feel it is imperative to point out that in her introduction to Herzfelde’s argument, Brigid Doherty notes that “the affirmative attitude toward the production of a new kind of art that Herzfelde adopts in his ‘Introduction to the Dada Fair’ represents a position the Berlin Dadaists did not hold for long. In September 1920, Grosz, Hausmann, Heartfield, and Schlichter renounced in their manifesto ‘The Rules of Painting’ the principles of montage on which Herzfelde’s conception of Dadaist pictures rested.” See Raoul Hausmann, Rudolf Schlichter, George Grosz, and John Heartfield, “Die Gesetze der Malerei,” manifesto published posthumously in Cornelia Thater-Schulz, ed., *Hannah Höch: Eine Lebenscollage* (Berlin: Argon, 1989), vol. 1, part 2, 696–98. Note, however, that the difference between Herzfelde on the one side and Hausmann, Schlichter, Grosz, and Heartfield on the other had more to do with whether the *Dadaisten* were striving to recuperate art itself or whether the very idea of art had been so vitiated that it should be jettisoned and something new, wild, and life-affirming should take its place.
- 311 A forthcoming volume in the series of books on the early intellectual reception of the cinema, specifically the Cubists’ and Futurists’ paragonal response to the cinema, treats the topic of transformation of perception that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—that is, with industrialization. The assault on the position that linear perspective had occupied from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries, and the cinema’s role in that assault, are among the principal topics in that volume.
- 312 James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (London: Faber & Faber, 1939; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 143, ll, 25–28.

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SURREALISM AND THE CINEMA

In the previous chapters, we explored developments in mathematics, science, and philosophy that suggested to people that, by applying its own methods to itself, reason had exposed its inadequacies as means for unveiling truths about reality. For centuries, the West had believed that nature's secrets were yielding progressively to reason's rigorous and painstaking methods. By and large, the principles that Bacon had unfolded in the *The Advancement of Learning* (1605) and *The New Organon, or True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature* (1620)—principles concerning the application of reason to empirical findings—seemed to be succeeding in unveiling truths about reality. So successful did such methods seem that, by the Enlightenment, thinkers had come to believe that even aesthetic, moral, and religious truths could be discovered through the rational means that Bacon had extolled.

Then, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reason was exposed as incoherent (or so many believed). By then, mathematics had retreated from its claims to inform us about reality—or even, as in Plato, about a Higher Reality—and adopted the position that it was simply a formal system: the axioms and theorems of mathematics allowed one to rewrite one string of mathematical symbols as another, but no claims for what those

strings implied about reality were to be made. Then the revelation that the basis for the formal structure itself was riven with incongruity shook the intellectual world. Saloman's House, the edifice that Bacon had described in the *New Atlantis* (1627), a model for that very troubled institution, the modern research university, seemed to be crumbling (as our universities almost certainly are).¹ If reason itself was incoherent, its application to empirical findings was pointless.

Reason, it seems, had exposed as internally incoherent and without purchase on external reality. Many welcomed reason's demise. Some believed that another historical irony had emerged: reason had prepared the way for the triumph of imagination that the Romantics had predicted—indeed, many believed that setting aside the rational faculties might allow a noetic process even higher than the imagination to supervene, one that would dissolve all the fixed certainties of the limited bourgeois self and allow a new way of living to emerge. But the idea that mind has no access to truth is difficult to bear, and many sought an alternative, super-rational means to discover truth. Many artists came to believe that noesis—that is, the higher intuition celebrated in spiritual and occult traditions—could serve that function, providing a means for apprehending higher truths. This belief came to be central to the discursive context in which art and knowledge were considered.

In the introduction, and again in the second chapter, I set forth my belief that the bone structure of Dada and Surrealist artists' thoughts on the cinema could be stated in the form of an extravagant inference: the value of art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects, and the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device. Thus, against the received view—which is that artists and thinkers were embarrassed early on by the cinema's lowly provenance and felt awkward about asserting its value—I maintain that there was another strain in the cinema's early reception, one that proclaimed the cinema to be the greatest art, at least for moderns. The discursive context, which ranked the arts according to their potential for producing pneumatic effects, authorized this excited response, for it was clear to many that the cinema was the greatest of the occult machines. In this chapter we will be examining the Surrealists' beliefs about art and about art's relation to the cinema. We will see that Surrealists' beliefs about an alternative noesis did much to shape their ideas about art and cinema, and that their manifestos offered a series of suggestions about how the other arts should be recast to take on attributes of the cinema. They proposed that the other arts would have to "capitulate to the cinema" (to use Werner Herzfelde's marvellous phrase)—that is, they would have to adopt the cinema's methods and borrow its virtues if they were to be worthy of the same attention from moderns as the cinema, which was the top art for a dynamic and urbanized culture. The

cinema in the early decades of the twentieth century was a pivotal force that gave shape to radical forms across the arts.

If the Surrealists' notions about art's pneumatic effects were extravagant, their conception of the cinema was no less so, for they came to understand the cinema in a fashion that was shaped by the discursive context of their era. Their perhaps far-fetched conception of the cinema, and the context that shaped that conception, will be a principal topic of the first half of this chapter. Anticipating the argument of that section, I note that the Dada artists' desire to bypass reason and affect people at a pre-rational or super-rational level led to their interest in media's perlocutionary or performative effects. The Surrealists shared this interest. They came to understand the cinema as (among other things) an occult machine—indeed, the *exemplary* occult machine. They surveyed the cinema's resources that made it so, and what they discovered became the basis for their ideas about how the other arts could be recast to take on its attributes (and perhaps thereby surpass it in value). They discovered, for example, that the cinema image was of a fantastic, and marvellous character. Its extraordinary detail, its protean nature, its shifting viewpoints, and the ease with which it could be juxtaposed with images from a different time, space, or scale gave the cinematic image an affinity with hallucinatory or dream images. The erosion of the epistemological certainties that had developed between the middle of the seventeenth century and the end of the nineteenth impelled thinkers (and artists) to examine consciousness in an effort to found an alternative epistemology. Thus, the operations of consciousness became a topic of considerable importance among thinkers and writers of the early twentieth century. That the forms of cinema correlated to the operations of consciousness was a compelling reason to accord priority to the cinema—to see the cinema as a privileged art form, one whose character was aligned with the issues that history had made urgent.²

Some thinkers took the proposition that the mind had become untethered from reality as giving permission to liberate the imagination (or some other non-rational faculty): If the mind cannot fathom reality, why then should it try? If our beliefs are erroneous, if they are no better than imaginings, why then should we not at least strive to make those ideas as rich, as intense, as vital, as life-enhancing as possible? Are not hallucinations and dreams more intense than the comfortable, hum-drum experiences of the bourgeois mentality? Then cultivate hallucinations and dreams! This became a basis for the Surrealist practices that would allow them to reform the arts: accordingly, they committed themselves to cultivating intense experience by using psychotropics, by wandering the streets of the city until one gets lost in a trance, by experimenting with occult methods (such as the *séance* and *tables-tournantes*), by giving themselves over to automatist possession, and

by recalling dreams so vividly that dreaming would become a part of waking life. Not the least important means for intensifying experience was the cinema. The hallucinatory or oneiric character of the cinematic image allied it with these efforts to intensify experience, to ensure that every moment of life would be felt with the same intensity with which we respond to a marvelous poem. That the cinema was allied with dreams and hallucinations—the very realms in which consciousness operates most intensely—was yet another reason for according the cinema a special privilege.

At the end of the previous chapter, we saw that Man Ray's Dada interests led him to a concern with the operations of consciousness—especially consciousness in its most extreme modes. This, in turn, led him towards examining dreams and hallucinations. As he demonstrated with his *Emak Bakia*, there exists a three-termed homology among dreams or imagination, collage, and the cinema. *Emak Bakia* also points to a continuity between waking life and dream, a continuity that film is constitutionally suited to reveal. The quality that affords film the ability to reveal the continuity between waking life and dream is its fundamentally poetic quality. (The poetic state of mind apprehends reality imaginatively, that is, in a manner akin to dream. And it knows that the dream is the stuff life is made of.) And it is that which gives film a disposition towards the same formal syntax that collage and dream both possess, for film, collage, and dream all operate by the fundamental poetic principle, the principle of parataxis. Across this entire chapter we will pursue this three-termed homology between a consciousness liberated by dreaming or by some other means to become true to its very nature, cinema, and collage. We will also connect the poetic principle on which it depends to Surrealism and show that the principle still applies to the film work of the contemporary American Surrealist Lawrence Jordan.

Surrealism gives special privilege to the poetic image, an image that provokes a sensation of *le merveilleux* (the marvellous). As we will see, the cinematic image, by virtue of its affinity with hallucination and dream images, possesses a special capacity to evoke the feeling of *le merveilleux*.

BEGINNINGS

Between 1916 and 1919, Pierre Albert-Birot (1876–1967), a disciple of Guillaume Apollinaire (1880–1918) and sponsor of Apollinaire's *opéra bouffe Les mamelles de Tirésias* (The Breasts of Tiresias, written in 1903, first staged in a revised form on 24 June 1917), published two issues of his journal on the work, which Apollinaire referred to as a “drame surréaliste.”³ This proto-Surrealist drama offered a theme that would reappear in several Surrealist works, viz., male-female role reversal. The Suffragette-type Thérèse eschews

motherhood in favour of a military career in Zanzibar as a male, General Tiresias. Her husband decides to give birth in her stead and produces 49,049 offspring in a single day. Albert-Birot was a forward-looking editor with a good sense of literature, and his avant-garde review *SIC* (short for *Sons, Idées, Couleurs* [Sounds, Ideas, Colours], but also Latin for “thus”—both meanings were intended) included writings by such established figures as Apollinaire, Max Jacob (1876–1944), and André Salmon (1881–1969). But works by these venerable, progressive writers were not all that *SIC* presented; also included in its contents were writings of younger poets such as Louis Aragon (1897–1982), André Breton (1896–1966), and Philippe Soupault (1897–1990)—in fact, *SIC* was the first to publish any of those three.

From around 1900 until sometime after 1930, Apollinaire was the writer most venerated by the younger members of the Parisian literary avant-garde. About Apollinaire’s death, Louis Aragon recalled, “At the time I was twenty, Guillaume Apollinaire was just about the single heir to the world of clouds, and his words had in our hearts the profound echo that the words of Charles Baudelaire had for other generations.”²⁴ Indeed, it was Apollinaire who coined the term “Surrealism” when he described his own play, *Les mamelles de Tirésias*. Out of the literary review *SIC* there emerged another, *Littérature*, founded by Louis Aragon, André Breton, and Philippe Soupault in early 1919. Those three formed the core of the major group of Surrealist artists; so their founding of *Littérature* should perhaps be considered the first real Surrealist act, although they were not to announce their formal association for another five years. Apollinaire himself acknowledged the paragonal relation between poetry and cinema. In 1917, in “L’Esprit nouveaux et les poètes” (The New Spirit and the Poets), he wrote, “It would be strange, during an epoch when the absolutely most popular art form, cinema, is a picture-book, if the poets did not try to create images for the thoughtful and more sophisticated souls, who will not be content with the filmmaker’s clumsy imagination. The movies will get more sophisticated, and one can foresee the day when the phonograph and the cinema will be the only recording techniques in use, and poets may revel in a liberty hitherto unknown.”

Between 1922 and 1924, several of the artists who would found the Surrealist movement—including André Breton, Paul Éluard, Louis Aragon, Robert Desnos (1900–45), René Crevel (1900–35), and Max Ernst—began exploring the possibilities of writing or drawing in the automatist state, under the influence of drugs or hypnosis, or in hypnagogic or dream states (which the Surrealists became adept at summoning voluntarily). Because they found that they could deliberately induce “sleeping fits” and that in such fits they could produce creative work, they called this period, retrospectively, “la période” (or “l’époque”) “des sommeils” (or “des rêves”). It is said that the poet and

film enthusiast Robert Desnos could produce startling monologues, replete with stunning images, while sleeping or in a state of hypnotic trance.

This was the key idea of Surrealism, a movement whose founding was announced by four events of 1924: André Breton's publication of the *Manifeste du surréalisme* (Manifesto of Surrealism); the founding of the Bureau des recherches surréalistes (Surrealist Research Bureau), with the great poet and creator of theatrical events Antonin Artaud as its first head; the appearance of the first issue of *La révolution surréaliste* (The Surrealist Revolution); and the first issue of *Surréalisme* (Surrealism) by a group separate from, albeit allied with, Breton—a coterie of illustrious young writers and artists, including Pierre Albert-Birot, René Crevel, the Belgian poet and literary critic nicknamed in these years “Proconsul Dada” Paul Dermée (1886–1951), Pierre Reverdy (1889–1960), poet, playwright, translator, and erstwhile Dadaist Yvan Goll (1891–1950), and Orphist painter Robert Delaunay (1885–1941), all of whom were followers of Apollinaire and all of whom set out to explore the new directions of literature and aesthetics opened up by the writer (their admiration explains their naming the movement after Apollinaire's neologism). *Surréalisme* included a “manifesto of surrealism” that declared its principal aim to be the “transposition of reality to a superior (artistic) level.”²⁵

The eagerness with which the circle around Breton formally joined together as a group gives some indication of the gulf separating Surrealism from Dadaism: while the Dadaists' nihilist and anarchic tendencies led them to reject any program for the arts (other than to insist on complete freedom of expression) as well as any leadership, the Surrealists' aesthetic, moral, and metaphysical commitments bred a reformist optimism and a belief that their efforts might enable art to fulfill its transcendental mission. They were more doctrinaire than the Dadaists in their approach to artmaking; and they committed prodigious energies to their work, issuing an enormous volume of paintings, films, and writings (including novels, poems, essays, manifestos, and advertisements for themselves)—so several Surrealist poets rank among the important French poets of the twentieth century. Their doctrinaire inclinations also fuelled a revolutionary spirit that resulted in a sweeping transformation of artistic values. Despite this hopeful spirit, the Surrealists retained certain elements of the negative strain in Dada—particularly DADA's animus against bourgeois art and the social values of family and nation.

Intellectual developments that occurred just before Surrealism's founding helped make dreams interesting to the Surrealists. For one, Schopenhauer had suggested that dreams have a special noetic power. When André Breton wrote that “not one author declares himself with any clarity upon this fun-

damental question: *what happens to time, space, and the causality principle in the dream?*," he was not being entirely candid.⁶ Schopenhauer had not only addressed that question but also provided the terms in which Breton would think of the matter—it was Schopenhauer, after all, who had argued that space, time, and causality were forms the mind imposes on experience. (Kant had argued that in addition to the pure forms of intuition, space, and time, the mind imposes twelve categories [templates] on experience, one of which was causality.) Further, Schopenhauer had argued that certain physical activities of the brain can remove these limitations, allowing for the combination of events from diverse spaces that are not causally connected. Dream dispenses with these categories, because there is no manifold of sensation in dreams. And in some other cases when the brain is closed to external sensations, as it is when we sit in a totally dark, totally silent room, the same mental activity that produces dreams can produce daydreams.⁷

The comment Breton made next should have made clear the source that, for whatever reason, he tried to conceal:

If we think of the extreme importance of the discussion [of the issue of what happens to time, space, and the causality principle in the dream] which has not ceased to set in philosophical opposition the partisans of the doctrine according to which these three terms would correspond to some objective reality and those defending the other doctrine, according to which they would serve to designate only the pure forms of human contemplation, it is upsetting to see that historically not one marker has been put down in this domain.⁸

In his own inimitable, and philosophically vague, fashion, Breton is hinting here that Surrealism will overcome this opposition between objective and subjective form by fusing them in some higher reality.

Some aspects of dreaming that made the phenomenon interesting to the artists of the early twentieth century are also features of film. Thinkers and artists of those decades extolled what they saw as film's *savagery*: its immediacy, its rawness, its direct address to the eye, all of which arise from the film's dynamic properties. Emphasize movement, artists realized, and you can create a flow of images that bypasses the interpretive faculties and affects the body directly. Even the irrationality sometimes associated with those dynamic qualities was believed to have salutary effects, for it undid the deleterious effects of a modern culture that valued reason too highly. Furthermore, dreams, like film images, present themselves to us when we have immobilized ourselves and rendered ourselves passive. Thus, they can seem to speak to us, to address us immediately and forcefully, from another place. They are therefore endowed with a sense of mystery. But the immediacy with which both films and dreams present their revelations is combined with an almost antithetical feature: both sorts of images lack embodiment—they

seem phantasmal, empty, almost spiritualized. The amalgam of forceful realism and lack of material embodiment is a basis for taking film, like dreams, as having a magical character or as being akin to fantasy. The Hungarian philosopher Geogy Lukács (1885–1971), a near contemporary of the Surrealists, commented on the connection between the film image's being a stand-in for an absent other (its being disconnected in its existence from the flow of life and the "presentness" of reality) and the medium's affinity for fantasy:

The lack of this "present" is the essential characteristic of film. Not because films are still unperfected, not because even today their moving forms remain mute, but simply because they are only the acts and movement of people, and not people themselves. This is no deficiency of film, it is its limitation, its *principium stilisationis*. Hence the weirdly lifelike character of film, not only in its technique, but also in the effect of its pictures, identical in character, and, unlike those of the stage, every bit as organic and lively as nature; film brings forth a totally different kind of life; its life becomes—in short—a life of fantasy. Fantasy, however, is not opposed to living life, it is a new aspect of it, a life without present, without destiny, without reasons, without motives, a life that the innermost of our soul neither can nor wants to identify with... The world of film is a life without background and perspective, without distinctions of weight or quality. For only the immediate present endows objects with destiny and gravity, light and levity; film is a life without measure and order, without reality and value; a life without a soul—a life of pure surface appearances.⁹

Like Lukács, the Surrealists understood the possibility that film images are dematerialized forms and therefore resemble the contents of the ideal (mental) realm.

Surrealists also drew from artistic developments in the period that preceded their own. At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, poets began to use forms that intensified poetic images by isolating them; they began using constructions that fractured conventional syntax (the most common result of such asyntax was parataxis). Many of these poets, Symbolists and Decadents foremost among them, had—in their prose writings at least—engaged in a rhetoric that condemned petit-bourgeois society and values; this advocacy lent credence to the proposition that revolutionary form and progressive content had an intrinsic relation (and perhaps were identical with each other). Symbolism's idea that the poetic image elicited knowledge of a higher realm, a realm that could not be known by reason or immediately by the senses, had paramount importance for the Surrealists. From this, the Surrealists drew their ideas of the poetic image: for them, the revolution that would set consciousness free would not be brought about by the spread of rationalism but rather by creating poetic metaphors composed of images that previously had not been linked. The poetic image could engender

vision, and vision—as Breton repeatedly emphasized in “Le Surréalisme et la peinture”—is a savage affair.¹⁰ The Symbolists’ interest in arcana (which Surrealists were to take up later)—in extrasensory perception, in hypnotism, and in mediums, as well as their interest in such metaphysical concepts as the infinite and the void—provided Surrealists with further confirmation of the legitimacy and importance of their pursuit, even though the Symbolists’ proclivity towards cultic involvement disturbed Surrealists more than a little.

Symbolists tended to take flight from concrete reality. However, a counter-tendency is evident in the poetry of the *fin de siècle* and prewar poets, viz., to incorporate banal details of everyday life. Even Charles Baudelaire (1821–67) used imagery that raised the common life, including its sordid side and the underbelly of the metropolis, to the highest intensity, and other poets anticipated the Surrealists in formulating an ecstatic poetic style to convey details of a sordid and ignoble reality. Nonetheless, the straightforward presentation of concrete reality that had not been recontextualized held little interest for them—it was too likely to provoke a routine, conventional response. Paul Cézanne’s (1839–1906) art had already provided a cogent demonstration of the potential in reconstructing ordinary reality (as opposed to rendering quotidian reality exactly).

Intensifying the poetic image remained Surrealism’s primary commitment. Their concern that the poetic image be grounded in reality related to this end: an investment in reality gave the image greater force. The Surrealists wanted none of the pale, vague ephemerality, the waftingly delicate musicality and mannered, debilitating ambiguity that were the staples of some Symbolist verse (think of Paul Verlaine’s “Art poétique” of 1884 to consider what they were opposing). One means of intensifying the poetic image was to use automatist processes. (Originally inspired by the free association technique used in psychoanalysis, automatism was the spontaneous production of words, doodles, or other creative products without self-conscious control or self-censorship. In practising automatic writing, one strives to capture the nature of true, liberated thinking by transferring every passing thought quickly to the sheet of paper, without stopping to consider grammar or sense, much as the analysand strives to make some form of reference to every thought that comes into his/her mind in a psychoanalytic session.)¹¹ Another means of intensifying the poetic image was to allow some (or all) of its features to be determined by chance. Yet another was to imbue the poetic image with features of the dream.¹² Fashioning the poetic image on the model of the dream image allowed Surrealists to combine the anti-naturalist and constructivist features of the modernists’ approach with a commitment to endowing the image with the definiteness and detail of reality (thereby avoiding the pale, fetid dreaminess of Symbolist and Decadent art). It allowed for

the synthesis of the transitory and fleeting into a higher “anti-reality” that did not lack for concreteness, a synthesis like that which Baudelaire had celebrated in *Le peintre de la vie moderne* (The Painter of Modern Life, 1859). This synthesis helped ensure that modernist anti-naturalism did not degenerate into decoration (a possibility of which the Surrealists were aware and that was attacked by the early Surrealist film *Un chien andalou* [An Andalusian Dog, 1929]); at the same time, it opened them to the possibility (which the mimeticism of their near contemporary Giorgio de Chirico’s [1888–1978] *arte metafisico* corroborated) of a visionary art that was not characterized by a wan, ghostly, disembodied, perfumy unreality.

That the Surrealistic image must have sufficient density of detail to allow it to produce an impression of objectivity was one of Salvador Dalí’s (1904–89) key ideas on art. As early as 1926, in a letter to Federico García Lorca (1898–1936), Dalí wrote about “this nightmare of sensing myself falling into *nature*, that is, into the mystery, into what is confused, what cannot be grasped.” Dalí admired the ability of art to transmute vague, nebulous, insubstantial, indefinite, and immeasurable elements into a hard, cold, precise, objective form. It can “concretize what was the most insubstantial and the most miraculous,” he claimed.¹³ Art distills what is confused into an essential crystalline purity. It endows metaphysical entities with physical definiteness, making them something that can be counted. Throughout his life, Dalí was horrified, it seems, by the loss of form—by metamorphosis and anamorphosis. Likewise, he anathematized any ambiguity (e.g., chest hairs growing on developed breasts).

The emphasis on the detailed image led in the end to a division of the Surrealists into two wings, the automatist wing and the veristic wing (a distinction that reflects the difference between two pillars of Surrealist theory, automatism and dreams—the two key concepts enshrined in Surrealist theory from the time of Breton’s “Le surréalisme et la peinture” [Surrealism and Painting, 1926]).¹⁴ To be sure, the two methods share the aspiration to create a metaphoric—a *poetic*—image; but their means are quite different. The distinction is epitomized in the difference between the styles of the automatist Joan Miró (1893–1983) and the verist René Magritte (1898–1967). The automatists interpreted free association (and other automatist practices) as involving a suppression of consciousness that makes more evident the traces the unconscious impresses on thought. They were convinced that academic discipline suppressed free expression: they believed that the way to freedom in painting was to break from depiction (as Joan Miró did, so as to emphasize colour). Hence, the automatist wing of Surrealism leaned towards the use of abstract forms. These artists linked their proclivities towards the *informel* in art with the Dada disposition for scandal, insult, and irreverence towards

the elite—the “informality” of abstract art was a means of continuing the rebellion against the oppressive bourgeois society, which imposed academic norms of form.

The veristic wing of Surrealism, on the other hand, interpreted “automatism” to refer to the practice of allowing thoughts that take their content from the unconscious (such as those that arise in dreams) to surface in as near their original condition as possible, disturbed as little as possible by secondary revision. (This advocacy was based on the belief that the meaning of these images could be deciphered after the fact through analysis.) Such images could link interior realities to the forms of the material world, for the external object could serve, as it does for the paranoiac or the dreamer, as a metaphor for an inner reality. The veristic Surrealists were interested primarily in the mind’s activity of forming the world that we inhabit. As expounded by Dalí’s paranoiac-critical method (a topic we take up in section “Dalí, the Double Image, and Paranoiac-Critical Methods”), the veristic Surrealists believed that Freud had established that the world we experience is a psychic construct, shaped by desires, and that each of us inhabits an individual—a *personal*—reality. They strove to enlarge the free space allowed for that activity—to break out of the habit of forming that world on the model of conventional reality. Thus, in their creative practices, they attempted to re-enact the mind’s construction of reality and to provide a model for a freer construction of lived reality. Creating a hyperreal image became a key goal of their art. Their work presented the strange and wondrous images of dreams and hallucinations with photographic realism. The veristic wing of Surrealism regarded academic discipline somewhat more favourably than did the automatist wing: for them, technique could be used to represent these mysterious images accurately—it could freeze them so that they might be pondered and their meanings unlocked. Because its practitioners often employed Renaissance perspective and other academic conventions, this version of Surrealism was less welcome among the modernists than automatist Surrealism.

Important automatists included Joan Miró, Hans (Jean) Arp, Marcel Duchamp, and André Masson (1896–1987), and it was this wing of Surrealism that would influence Abstract Expressionists such as Jackson Pollock (1912–56), Willem de Kooning (1904–97), Robert Motherwell (1915–91) and, of course, Arshile Gorky (1904–48). Veristic Surrealists included Max Ernst, Salvador Dalí, René Magritte, Paul Delvaux, Remedios Varo (1908–63), Leonora Carrington (1917–2011), Yves Tanguy (1900–55), and Giorgio de Chirico, and it is with this wing that most present-day Surrealists align themselves.

The Futurists helped the Surrealists see another means for intensifying the poetic image. Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) influence on Futurism—specifically, his emphasis on continuity (including the continuity of past, present,

and future, evidenced in the trace of past and future in the present) and his stress on the possibility of the mind's entering (through intuition) into the object it knows—prompted Futurists to try to bring discordant elements into concord, to achieve the synthesis of alien and even contradictory elements; thus, their “words in freedom” brought remote images into an immediate conjunction. The leader of the Futurist movement, F.T. Marinetti, declared in his manifesto *Distruzione della sintassi Immaginazione senza fili—Parole in liberta* (Destruction of Syntax—Imagination without Strings—Words-in-Freedom, 1913) that “as we discover new analogies between distant and apparently contrary things, we will endow them with an even more intimate value.”¹⁵ The Surrealists shared this aspiration.¹⁶

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE OCCULT: THE INTRUSION OF ALIEN FORMS INTO CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POETICS OF THE SURREALIST LITERARY IMAGE

In the first chapters, we traced the developments in philosophy and mathematics that unmade the epistemological certainties that had developed between the middle of the seventeenth century and the end of the nineteenth. We saw there that these developments impelled thinkers (and artists) to examine consciousness in an effort to found an alternative epistemology; thus, the operations of consciousness became a topic of considerable importance among thinkers and writers of the early twentieth century. Furthermore, as I noted above, some thinkers took the proposition that the mind had become untethered from reality as giving permission to liberate the imagination (or some other non-rational, life-affirming faculty): If the mind can't fathom reality, why, then, should it try? If our beliefs are erroneous, if they are no better than imaginings, why, then, should we not at least strive to make those ideas as rich, as intense, as vital, as life-giving as possible?

The Surrealists shared this interest in the consciousness in its most extreme operations. “Are hallucinations and dreams not more intense than the comfortable, hum-drum experiences of the bourgeoisie?” they asked. They answered affirmatively; so they strived to cultivate hallucinations and dreams as means for ensuring that every moment of life would be felt with the same intensity with which we respond to a marvellous poem. At its most intense, when it has not succumbed to the externally imposed logic of reality (and, we shall see presently, of the reality principle), consciousness shows itself as what it is when free to operate according to its most fundamental character (when, that is, it is not disciplined by the reality principle). The mind set free is a mind that experiences the eidetic imagination. But poetic imagery, too, is irrational (or super-rational): the Surrealists knew that a

poem could convey the experience of people who, when seeing the sun rise, do not see simply a round disc of fire, somewhat like a guinea, but experience an innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying “Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God Almighty.” The poetic image embodies the unfettered mind. It reveals the triumph of the imagination—indeed, sometimes, as we will see, it releases a noetic process even higher than the imagination, a negative faculty that liquefies all the fixed certainties of the limited bourgeois self and enables us to make contact with a *sur-réalité*.

The Surrealists were intrigued by such intensification of poetic imagery—and the form of dream, with its disjointed accolage of scenes from everyday life (including the material of the day residue) and extremely intimate details, was therefore attractive to them. That the form of a dream is not like that of a conventional story was one reason why the Surrealists were so hostile to narrative. When André Breton came to write the first *Manifeste du sur-réalisme* (Manifesto of Surrealism) in 1924, the full force of the Surrealists’ attack on the novel had already been unleashed. The novel, as epitomized in the works of Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850) and Émile Zola (1840–1902), reflected the imperatives of logic and description—it was this that led to such false devices as giving precise descriptions to the clothing, bearing, and gait of completely fictional entities. In the world of dreams, where appearance can change from moment to moment, where space is pliable and time has no meaning, the practice of providing an exact concrete setting for every action seems simply risible.

At first, Surrealists sought to endow their literary production with the attributes of dream, by producing them in trances or “sleeping fits.” However, the creative method based on sleeping fits proved to have its dangers. Once the entire group, in a hypnotic trance, attempted a collective suicide. Another time, Robert Desnos chased after Paul Éluard with a butcher knife. This last incident caused André Breton, who by this time had emerged as the movement’s organizing force, to call for an end to these goings-on. To take the place of dreams and mechanical inducements to delirium such as drugs and hypnotism, the group adopted methods of spontaneous creation. Filmgoing itself could be used to induce delirium; in a provocatively titled essay, “Cinema by Other Means” (2010), Pavle Levi notes that sometime after Man Ray completed *Les mystères du château de Dé* (1920), Man Ray, André Breton, and Paul Éluard undertook a never-to-be-completed film project, *Essai de simulation de délire cinématographique* (Attempt at Simulating Cinematographic Delirium). Ideas resembling those of Louis Aragon about the power of the cinema to transport the viewer were to be central to this work.¹⁷

The occult, in both Spiritualist and alchemical forms, provided a ready-to-hand system for psychical transposition to another realm. We overlook,

sometimes, how readily available these systems were. Yet they are crucial to understanding how the discursive context that authorized thinkers to believe that the value of any medium depended on its capacity to produce pneumatic effects, and that the cinema, because it is the most effective occult-influencing device, is the top medium. We turn now to consider this context.

M.E. Warlick notes,

In 1920, *Le Voile d'Isis*, a periodical founded by Papus and Jollivet-Castelot in the 1890s, celebrated its twenty-fifth year. In this anniversary issue, Dr. René Allendy summed up the relevance of occultism in the decade following the First World War.

Today, occultism is no longer what it formerly was for a superficial and skeptical generation. Since the war [which forced human consciousness to face the problem of death], it has become our familiar domain . . . That is to say that everyone wants to pierce the mystery, to lift the veil, to penetrate the Occult. It is why occultism has come to live in the hearts of a great number of people.

Jollivet-Castelot's alchemical experiments sparked lively debate during the 1920s, and other members of his circle, including Papus and Oswald Wirth, continued to write on a variety of hermetic topics into the 1920s and 1930s. The availability of recent publications and treasures for the hermetic bibliophile was unprecedented.¹⁸

Allendy's reference to "a superficial and sceptical generation" is a bit surprising. In fact, in the three decades prior to the Great War, Paris had witnessed a remarkable efflorescence of hermetic activity, and it certainly was not all frivolous (though his point does support our claim that occult ideas were very much alive at the time Surrealists were forming their ideas of consciousness and art). A bookstore owner, Edmond Bailly, had become an important force in an occult revival then taking place: by 1885, Bailly's bookshop at 9 rue de la Chau, Librairie de l'Art Indépendent, had become a focal point for the discussion of esoteric matters and a gathering place for poets, painters, and composers. Among those who gathered at Bailly's shop were Arthur Rimbaud (1854–91), the Symbolist poet Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–98), the composer Ernest Chausson (1855–99), whose later works were deeply influenced by the Symbolist milieu, Claude Debussy (1862–1918), the Symbolist painter of myth Gustave Moreau (1826–98), the Symbolist poet Henri de Régnier (1864–1936), the Symbolist painter Odilon Redon (1840–1916), the Symbolist writer August Villiers de l'Isle-Adam (1838–89, from whose Rosicrucian play, *Axël* [1890], Debussy tried to make an opera), Felicien Rops (1833–98), the occult author Jules Bois (1868–1943), the esoteric author Édouard Shuré (1841–1929), and the Decadent novelist Joris-Karl Huysmans (1848–1907).¹⁹ All of these artists

embraced enthusiastically the belief that art provided intimations of a higher realm; and all maintained that, judged by the higher standard of the intuition that art elicited, the rationalism of their age was wanting. At Bailly's shop, they felt free to discuss their esoteric beliefs. Victor-Émile Michelet (1861–1938), a poet, fervent disciple of Édouard Shure, and a writer on esoteric topics, noted that Debussy would arrive

almost every day in the late afternoon, either alone or with the faithful Erik Satie... Able to express himself freely here, Debussy let himself become thoroughly impregnated with Hermetic philosophy. Besides reading on that subject and conversations with Edmond Bailly, who was a student of both the esoteric side of both Occidental and Oriental music, he became acquainted with the sacred music of the Hindus through frequenting the Sufi Inayat Khan and his two brothers.²⁰

Debussy remained interested in esoteric matters for quite some time. His letters from Rome to Emile Baron in the years 1885 to 1887 provide evidence of this: he asks to be sent copies of Albert Journef's (1863–1923) *Rose + Croix* and Charles Morice's *Le chemin de la croix*. (No records for either can be found.) Debussy associated himself with Joséphin Péladan's (1858–1918) neo-Rosicrucian movement in the early 1890s and in 1892 engaged in collaboration with the esoteric playwright Jules Bois. In 1890, Stéphane Mallarmé wrote to Michelet:

Mon cher Confrère,

Thank you for sending me your study, *de L'ésotérisme dans l'Art*. It interests me quite personally. For I'd find it difficult to conceive anything or to follow it up without covering my paper on geometry that reflects something of the mechanism of my thinking. Occultism is the commentary on the pure signs obeyed by all literature, the immediate projection of the spirit.

Votre très persuadé,

Stéphane Mallarmé²¹

Debussy proposed (though he did not complete) music for Michelet's esoteric play *Le pèlerin d'amour* (trans. 1903). He also served as the thirty-third Grand Master of the then highly secretive Rosicrucian Prieuré de Sion (Ordre de la Rose-Croix-Véritas) from 1885 until his death in 1918.

Parisians' occult interests were stoked by a multitude of publications by esoteric writers such as Papus (Gérard Encausse, 1865–1916), F.-Ch. Barlet (1838–1921), Oswald Wirth (1860–1943), the creator, with de Guaita, of Wirth's tarot, the psychoanalyst R. Allendy (1889–1942; his patients included Antonin Artaud, Anaïs Nin, and René Crevel), Paul Sédir (1871–1926, editor of *L'hyperchimie*, the journal of the Association Alchimique de France),

Stanislas de Guaita (1861–97, first Grand Master of the Ordre Kabbalistique de la Rose Croix, founded in Paris around 1888), and the psychical investigator Eugene Albert de Rochas (1837–1914). The publishing houses Chacornac, Chamuel, Baillière, Editions du Sirène, and Dorbon-Ainé published titles dealing with Rosicrucianism, Cabalism, Theosophy, natural magic, chiromancy, Spiritualism, and the tarot. The leading alchemist was François Jollivet-Castelot (1876–1939), president of the Société Alchimique de France and editor of its journal, *L'hyperchimie*. Jollivet-Castelot's active period as a writer spanned the years 1896 to 1928. In *La science alchimique au XX^{me} siècle* (1904), he presented a historical overview of alchemical techniques, along with an extensive bibliography of French sources. In 1920, he published *La fabrication chimique de l'or*, in which he claimed successes in producing gold from silver. Jollivet-Castelot also published three novels and engaged in a fruitful correspondence with August Strindberg.²² He even founded an organization called the Non-Materialist Communist Union as an alternative to the atheistic Socialist International.

Another important writer on alchemy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was Albert Poisson (1868–1893). Poisson's interest in alchemy began when he was twelve years old. From that age, he began seeking out alchemical texts and manuscripts to purchase, and that interest led him to discover an extensive collection of alchemical manuscripts owned by an impoverished cobbler, Rémi Pierre. His access to these manuscripts resulted in the publication of three important books: *Cinq traités d'alchimie des plus grands philosophes: Paracelse, Albert le Grand, Roger Bacon, R. Lulle, Arn. de Villeneuve* (1890); *Théories et symboles des alchimistes le Grand-Oeuvre, suivi d'un essai sur la bibliographie alchimique du XIXe siècle* (1891); and *Histoire de l'alchimie XIV^{me} siècle: Nicolas Flamel sa vie—ses fondations—ses œuvres* (1893).

The Surrealists' well-known interest in dreams and hallucinations, in the mental state of *voyants* and mediums (one of Breton's early writings, in *Littérature* [1922], was titled "Entrée des médiums"), in psychotic imagery, and in the imagination was partly the result of a wave of enthusiasm for convening spirits that swept first the United States and then Europe following the birth of modern Spiritualism. The era of modern Spiritualism was born on 3 March 1848, when the sisters Catherine (Kate, 1841–92) and Margaret (Maggie, 1836–93) Fox spoke with the spirit of a murdered peddler in a farmhouse in Hydesville, New York, in the "Burned-Over District" around Rochester. Spiritualism attracted an astonishing variety of adherents, who included Sarah Bernhardt (1844–1923); Victor Hugo (1802–55); Elizabeth Barrett Browning (1806–61); Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930); the great mathematician Augustus De Morgan (1806–71); Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913),

a scientist and co-discoverer (with Charles Darwin) of evolution by natural selection; Robert Owen (1771–1859), the father of English socialism; Alphonse Mucha (1860–1939), the Art Nouveau artist; Sir Oliver Lodge (1851–1940), an electromagnetics researcher and pioneer of radiotelegraphy (he was the first person to send a radio message, a year before Marconi); Sir William Crookes (1832–1919), a chemist who studied rare earths and rarefied gases (including the phenomenon of cathode rays); and, remarkably, Victoria, Queen of England, whose interest was fuelled by the loss of her husband, Prince Albert.²³ The movement already had two million followers by 1855; it was not uncommon to find the bourgeoisie of the time sitting in darkened rooms, hands clasped, waiting for mysterious raps and knocks.²⁴ As the Great War ground on, more and more people took part in séances, and their commitment to Spiritualism strengthened: what had often begun as an intriguing amusement became, for many, a matter of deep concern as the mounting war casualties ignited desperate hopes of conjuring up the deceased. So around that time, Spiritualist societies that had formed at the end of the nineteenth century became more organized, and the bereaved more committed.²⁵

By the time he wrote “Le message automatique” (The Automatic Message) in 1933, Breton was inclined to suggest that Freud alone had been responsible for the Surrealists’ ideas about automatic writing.²⁶ He was not being entirely forthcoming: among the influences Breton had acknowledged earlier was Schrenck-Notzing, author of *Materialisations-Phänomene* (Phenomena of Materialization, 1914) and an investigator of ectoplasm (the most famous case he investigated was that of Eva Carrière). Breton had admitted that “in spite of the regrettable fact that so many are unacquainted with the work of F.W.H. Myers [1843–1901], which anteceded that of Freud, I think we owe more than is generally conceded to what William James justly called the *gothic psychology* of F.W.H. Myers.”²⁷ Frederic W. Myers, author of the widely read book *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death* (1903), believed that the phenomenon of the séance could be explained by the findings of abnormal psychology—in particular, by the concept of the subliminal consciousness. Ironically, Spiritualism would later rely on the same concept when reabsorbing Myers’s findings. In 1885 and 1886, Myers published four essays on automatic writing in the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*; these essays were influential assessments of the psychiatric import of automatism. But what is more important, Meyer’s *Human Personality* provided Breton with the model he used when writing “Le message automatique” for working out a more positive notion of automatism than Freud’s writing furnishes.

By 1922, Breton had already read the works of Pierre Janet (1859–1947), F.W.H. Myers, Richet (1850–1935), author of *Traité de métapsychique* (1922), and Theodore Flournoy (1854–1920), author of *From India to the Planet Mars*

(1922).²⁸ All of these thinkers had studied extreme states of consciousness. Regarding the induced hypnotic slumbers that the Surrealists explored in the early years of the movement, André Breton remarked to André Parinaud during an interview with RDF,

Although I'd once been a student of Joseph Babinski—the main detractor of the theses of Charcot and the so-called “Nancy school”—at the time I retained a keen interest, albeit a skeptical one, in some of the psychological literature that was centered on or related to that teaching [that is to say, in the use of hypnosis to treat psychological ailments].²⁹ I'm thinking in particular of F. W. H. Myers's beautiful work, *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death*; or Théodore Flournoy's exciting accounts of the medium Hélène Smith in *From India to the Planet Mars* and elsewhere; or even certain chapters of the *Traité de métapsychique* [Treatise on Metapsychics] by Charles Richet. All of this managed to fit together, to combine with my other ways of seeing, thanks to my enthusiastic admiration for Freud, which has never left me.³⁰

Surrealism, Breton claimed, was a movement that had emerged from the hypnogogic borderland between sleep and waking, where reverie dismantled rational control of the stream of thought. According to Myers, this was the moment of maximum permeability. Let us look briefly at what each of these thinkers contributed to the discursive regime within which Surrealism emerged. This will help us understand their ideal of an art that arises beyond consciousness and allies that art with a higher, beyond-the-self noesis.

In his time, Pierre Janet was the most famous psychologist in the world. He studied hypnotism, somnambulism, and suggestion, all of which interested the Surrealists. He promoted ideas about the role that psychopathologies played in subconscious obsessions and in the dissociation of systems of images and functions that normally constituted consciousness. He explained clearly and systematically that dissociation is the most direct psychological defence against traumatic experiences.

Janet's early investigations, of hallucination and dissociation, led to his first work in psychology, *L'automatisme psychologique* (Psychological Automatism, 1889), in which he developed Myers's ideas about automatism and used that concept to explain the phenomenon of hysteria.³¹ *L'automatisme psychologique* introduced his theory of dissociation and his functional and structural models of mind.³² Taking a resolutely empirical approach (he was influenced by Théodule Ribot, 1836–1916, the French father of psychology as studied in “the positivist spirit”), he described the psychological phenomena he had observed during cases of hysteria (including catalepsy, paralysis, and anaesthesia), bouts of hypnosis, states of possession, “successive existences” (his term for multiple personalities), and séances. All of these phenomena interested the Surrealists.³³ He asserted that the term “psychological

automatism” was fitting as a description of the underlying mental processes these phenomena revealed: the process was automatic in that it was predetermined, and it was psychological in that it was accompanied by consciousness. Examining psychological automatism, he discovered that, in the cases of the symptomology he studied, integrative activity had been significantly diminished, resulting in the development of behaviours whose intent was to preserve and reproduce the past—this distinction between activities directed towards creation and synthesis and activities directed towards preserving and reproducing the past echoes themes from the writing of a likely influence, the philosopher Maine de Biran (1766–1824), and is a key to Janet’s thinking (and exerted a significant influence on subsequent French thought). He also discovered that most patients who displayed psychological automatism experienced persistent unresolved (and, therefore, dissociated) traumatic memories.³⁴ Thus, hysteria and other extreme states showed human activity in its simplest and most rudimentary forms—behaviour that was elementary, since it repeated the past instead of being directed towards creation and integration (as higher forms of behaviour are).³⁵

Later, in the early 1890s, Janet began to work with Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–93), a neurologist at the Salpêtrière hospital, who studied (amongst other neurological phenomena) hypnosis and hysteria—and made extensive use of photography in his studies. In these years, he developed Charcot’s model of hysteria (i.e., dissociation and dissociative disorder, to use the terminology of the time) and hypnosis, and in so doing reintroduced early-nineteenth-century theories of mesmerism. Like Charcot, he reinterpreted old mesmeric ideas such as divided consciousness (dissociation) and rapport in psychological terms.³⁶ This interest resulted in two books: *L’état mental des hystériques: les stigmates mentaux* and *L’état mental des hystériques: les accidents mentaux* (The Mental State of Hystericals: A Study of Mental Stigmata and Mental Accidents, 1892, trans. 1901).³⁷ Janet’s findings had clear implications for the question of whether conscious will is illusory. That question became a key one for the Surrealists, who would develop many stratagems for evading will and consciousness in producing their art. Indeed, the Surrealists celebrated hysteria as a valuable means of expression. Hysteria, Breton and Aragon asserted, was a “more or less irreducible mental state characterized by subversion of the relationships established between the subject and the ethical world, by which the subject feels determined in practice, apart from any systematic delirium... Hysteria is not a pathological phenomenon and can in all respects be considered a supreme vehicle of expression.”³⁸

At the psychiatric hospital, La Salpêtrière, under Charcot, Pierre Janet worked on the therapeutic uses of hypnosis. When Charcot died, his successor, Babinski, a former disciple of Charcot’s, turned against his former

teacher and adopted the Nancy school's view of hypnosis and hysteria (i.e., that both are due merely to suggestion).³⁹ Janet was compelled to leave, and took up a position at the Collège de France, where he attempted to synthesize his work on normal and abnormal psychology into a unified system. He maintained—and this view would have been congenial to the Surrealists—that those who know abnormal psychology should have no difficulty understanding the psychology of normal people. Janet's later work (from 1932 to 1947) was devoted to the study of that topic dear to Jacques Lacan's (1901–1981) heart—paranoid schizophrenia.

In his early work, Janet had discovered a method for uncovering affect-charged memories of traumatic events. Traumatic memories resurfaced in his patients while they were under hypnosis; therefrom, they acquired a better understanding of the origins and nature of their hysteria. The same work led Janet to theorize that trauma was responsible for neurosis. Observation of hysterics had revealed to him the existence of separate centres of consciousness (which he referred to variously as “secondary personalities,” “secondary selves,” “subconscious personalities,” and “new psychological entities”) operating outside ordinary consciousness.⁴⁰ Later, he also investigated multiple personality disorder (now called dissociative identity disorder), including the cases of Léonie, Rose, Lucie, Marie, and Marcelline. Léonie presented herself as at least three different personalities, including a young alter named Nichette (Léonie's affectionate name as a child); Rose suffered from a variety of somnambulistic states—in some she was paralyzed, while in others she could walk; Lucie's alter personalities including one named Adrienne, whom Janet studied using automatic writing and discovered she experienced flashbacks of a childhood trauma. Extensive study, observation, and experiments using hypnosis in the treatment of hysteria led Janet to conclude that dissociation was the underlying mechanism present in the various traumatically induced disorders, which included somatization, conversion hysteria, and borderline personality.

Janet brought the theory of automatism that he had developed on the basis of Myers's original insights to bear on the study of dissociative identity disorder. As he developed his theory of automatism, he began to distinguish between total and partial automatism: in the former, the mind is completely dominated by a reproduction of a past experience (as in somnambulistic states and hysterical crises); in the latter, automatism dominates only a part of the mind (as in systematic anaesthesia, where the touch of an object exerts effects on a second consciousness but is not registered in the personal consciousness). Janet proposed that in both total and partial automatism, subconscious psychological phenomena exist—that is, systems of fixed ideas and functions—that have evaded conscious awareness and control. These dissociated systems

are kept separate from the personal consciousness, though many survive in rudimentary form, without a sense of self (as with catalepsy, in which a single dominating thought and automatic action occupy the mind). In hysterical crises (in which amnesia results from dissociation), the patient may re-enact a traumatic event. This was the case with Marie, as Janet described it. Marie suffered from crises in which she re-experienced over and over the trauma of her first menstruation, which she associated with another trauma, the permanent blindness in one eye from an earlier childhood accident, at the age of six. Janet corrected Marie's cognitive distortions of her first menstruation (at the age of thirteen) and modified the neuropathic symptoms resulting from dissociatively re-experiencing her earlier trauma. Once he had done so, her symptoms disappeared.

Janet observed that dissociated elements and systems tend to combine with other similar phenomena, thereby creating a function that (but for hypnosis) is inaccessible (largely because of the narrowing of the field of consciousness in hysterical patients).⁴¹ More or less subconscious dreams and *idées fixes* can become centres around which many psychological factors (ideas, desires, memories, fantasies) congregate, arranging themselves into a distinct personality, complete with its own life history.⁴² These "successive existences" develop quasi-autonomously: they can even interact with external reality, and in doing so, undergo further development by absorbing and retaining new impressions.

Janet proposed that dissociation occurs when one's capacities for integrating experience are disturbed. Traumatic experiences that result in such disturbances narrow the field of consciousness; this narrowing reduces the number of psychological phenomena that can be simultaneously united in or integrated with a single personal consciousness. These disturbances have the effect of splitting off some of the activities that regulate the personality, resulting in doubling (*dédoublement*)—that is, in a separation and isolation of parts of the mechanism that regulates personality. The dissociated systems (states of consciousness) vary greatly in complexity. At their simplest, a "system" can consist of a simple image, thought, or statement and the feelings or bodily manifestations associated with it that are split off from the dominant personality; at their most complex, they take the form of the different identities of patients experiencing dissociative identity disorder. These alters, as they are termed, have their own identities, life histories, and enduring ways of perceiving, thinking about, and relating to the environment that are distinct from the primary personality's mode of being in the world. The various dissociated systems (dissociated activity clusters, or, when they are more fully developed, dissociated personalities) can then alternate in consciousness and take turns exercising control over bodily activities.

In his later work, Janet would venture that in some patients the dissociated personality solicited by hypnosis is a healthier state of consciousness than his or her primary personality.

A case that attracted considerable attention in the final quarter of the nineteenth century reinforced this interest in multiple personalities. The case was that of Félicité X, studied by Dr. Eugène Azum. (Pierre Janet would report on the case of Félicité X at Harvard Medical School in 1906.)⁴³ Félicité X often lapsed into a cataleptic state; in this condition she displayed a variety of symptoms, including hyperaesthesia and pains that could not be accounted for in organic terms. She exhibited three distinct personalities, each considering herself to be the genuine Félicité and the others to be pretenders. The original Félicité—Félicité as she was from birth to age thirteen—exhibited many physical ailments. The second personality, which began to manifest itself when Félicité was thirteen years old, was free of the headaches and other physical symptoms from which the first suffered. A pain in the temple, followed by two or three minutes of profound sleep, would result in her switching personalities—an event that was reported to happen almost every day at first, though the frequency and the duration of the episodes decreased over time to the point that it happened only every twenty-five to thirty days and lasted only a few hours. The third personality was an impish child, “Sally,” who appeared seldomly and was prone to anxiety attacks and hallucinations.

Another medical practitioner who studied extraordinary mental phenomena was Charles Robert Richet (1850–1935), who in 1913 was awarded the Nobel Prize in physiology for discovering “Richet’s phenomenon,” the anaphylactic reaction (Richet coined the “anaphylaxis” for the response) of a sensitized individual to an antigen. In 1872, as an intern on a female ward, he witnessed an experiment in hypnotherapy and, intrigued by the technique’s therapeutic potentials, he induced over the next two years many hypnotic trances in his patients. He observed that there is a regular course to hypnotic episodes, and from this he concluded (against Babinski) that simulation cannot account for the phenomenon, and that it has an actual physiological basis. This led him to an interest in the interaction of *soma* and *psyche* and to coin the term *metapsychique* for his research.

Richet’s investigation of hypnotic trances probably influenced him to abandon surgery and devote himself to neurology, a field that was quite new at the time and was influenced by emerging ideas on electricity and electromagnetism (and the esoteric notions associated with them). From 1876 to 1882, he worked in the laboratories of Étienne Jules Marey (1830–1904) and Marcellin Berthelot (1827–1907) at the Collège de France. Attracted to aviation through Marey’s experiments on bird flight, he participated in the design and construction of one of the first rotary-wing aircraft to lift a

person off the ground. He also wrote philosophical works, poetry, novels, and drama.

Of a similar speculative temperament was the fourth source Breton mentioned. Theodore Flournoy maintained that for his methods, he deferred to the mesmerist Janet, to Freud's mentor Josef Breuer (1842–1925) and Freud, but “above all [to] the subliminal consciousness of M. Myers, whose theory so much surpasses the level of ordinary scientific conceptions by flying high and at a pace which at times reaches the mysticism of true metaphysics.” He was one of Carl Jung's teachers and had gained notoriety for publishing, in *From India to the Planet Mars: A Study of a Case of Somnambulism with Glossolalia* (1900), his case history of the medium Hélène Smith. Smith conducted séances that involved going into trances, producing passages of automatic writing in Arabic, and speaking in tongues. She claimed that in one of her past lives she had been a Hindu princess, and in another, Marie Antoinette (her present life was repaying karmic debt for her transgressions as Antoinette). She had several secondary personalities, of whom “Leopold”—pompous, dignified, and sensible—was the most highly developed. Smith would go into a trance in which she was controlled by Leopold, who presided over an assembly of spirits and who spoke and wrote through her. One of the spirits she claimed to channel in trances was a contemporary of Marie Antoinette called Alessandro Cagliostro (1743–95); when Cagliostro's spirit emerged, Smith's appearance transformed drastically (her neck swelled into a double chin) and she began speaking in a deep voice.⁴⁴

Smith claimed that if she was in a deep trance, spirits could transport her to Mars. She produced awkward drawings of Martian streets, houses, plants, and landscapes to show what she saw in these visits. Despite the extravagance of these claims, many believed her. Flournoy was somewhat more cautious—he proposed that she exhibited alternating subliminal personalities. He spent five years sitting in on séances, researching Smith's personal history, and trying to corroborate historical information that she produced while in a trance. He concluded that Smith had a vivid imagination, perhaps supplemented by telepathic and psychokinetic abilities. What she claimed was a Martian language was actually French childish babble; a Sanskrit expert declared that 98 per cent of the words could be identified as French. The psychic world was largely unfazed by Flournoy's report and accepted Smith's later claims that she visited Uranus and learned to speak Uranian. Hélène Smith (whose real name was Elise Mueller) appears numerous times in Breton's writing, including *Nadja*, where he likens his infatuation with the wandering woman to Flournoy's fascination with the medium, and has Nadja say, “Hélène, c'est moi.”

From Janet, Babinski, Myers, Richet, and Flournoy, Breton would have learned of the late nineteenth century's interest in four related phenomena:

the *dédoublement* of personality (studied by Janet and Azum); hypnosis (studied by Charcot at Paris's Salpêtrière asylum and by Ambroise Liébeault and Hyppolite Bernheim at Nancy), which raised questions about identity and memory similar to those which dissociation did; hysteria (also studied by Charcot); and trauma as a psychological phenomenon (studied by Charcot, Janet, and Freud). These four concepts were fundamental to the discursive regime of the late nineteenth century. Their grip on Breton's mentality was profound, for he would soon argue (effectively) that "magnetic" or "induced" somnambulism was similar in important respects to the "natural" or "spontaneous" somnambulism to which Félicité was prone.⁴⁵

But among occultists, it was the Spiritualist Allan Kardec (Hippolyte Léon Denizard Rivail, 1804–69) who probably interested the Surrealists most.⁴⁶ Spiritualism had distinctive Anglo-American and French/Latin versions. The Anglo-American version—sometimes called Scientific Spiritualism—was empirical in its outlook, insisting that the Spiritualists' claims could be investigated scientifically. In its English (as opposed to American) manifestation, it formed alliances with vegetarianism, homeopathic medicine, and political conservatism as part of the "alternative lifestyle." Spiritualism had nearly died out in America by 1900, but it survived in England into and beyond the 1920s. The French/Latin version, *Spiritisme* (Spiritism), began in 1855 when Rivail, a high school science teacher and author of high school textbooks, began receiving messages from a spirit who identified himself as Zéfiro, who eventually told Rivail that in a previous incarnation he (Rivail) had been a "Druid" named Allan Kardec.⁴⁷ Kardec, whose ideas even today have a large number of followers in Brazil (and among Brazilians in North American cities), began exploring Spiritualist ideas after hearing about the Fox sisters of Hydesville. As a result of his research, he overcame his initial skepticism and published *Le livre des esprits* (The Spirits' Book, 1857), a work based on his séance psychographs. *Le livre des esprits* offered what was in effect an alternative religion, in that it combined nineteenth-century positive Christian ethics with Hindu teachings on reincarnation. In comparison with Anglo-American Spiritualism, *Spiritisme* was more deeply involved with necromancy.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it attempted to found its religious beliefs (including beliefs about an afterlife) on scientific principles. Kardec insisted that his principles had been discovered by the scientific method: "By its nature, the spiritual revelation has a twofold character: it is at the same time a divine and a scientific revelation."⁴⁹ Kardec elaborated:

Spiritism proceeds in the same way as the positive sciences, by using the experimental method. When facts of a new kind are observed, facts that cannot be explained by known laws, it observes, compares and analyzes them. Reason-

ing then from the effects to the causes, it discovers the laws that govern them. Then it deduces their consequences and seeks for useful applications. *Spiritism proposes no preconceived theory*. Thus it has not presented as a hypothesis either the existence or intervention of spirits, nor the existence of a perispirit, or reincarnation, or any principle of doctrine. It has proven the existence of spirits in the beyond, along with other principles connected to the spiritual life. These are not facts that are revealed after a theory has been formed, to confirm them; but the theory has arisen subsequently, to explain the facts and to summarize them. Thus, it is rigorously correct to say that Spiritism is an experimental science, not the product of imagination. The sciences made no real progress until they adopted the experimental method. This method has hitherto been taken as applicable only to matter, but in truth it is equally applicable to metaphysical things.⁵⁰

When Breton was interviewed by Parinaud for RDF, he spoke about merging the ideas of Janet, Richet, and Flournoy with his enthusiasm for Freud, Parinaud told him, “I have trouble imagining you lapsing into spiritualism, for example.” Breton replied:

Of course not, far from it. We were deeply suspicious of everything that came under the heading of spiritualism, which since the nineteenth century had claimed a large portion of the marvelous for itself. More specifically, we flatly denied the tenets of spiritualism (no possible communication between the living and the dead), all the while maintaining a keen interest in some of the phenomena it had helped bring to light. Despite its absurd and erroneous point of departure, it had detected certain powers of the mind, of singular character and no small importance. To give an idea of our qualified attitude . . . Surrealism . . . highlight[ed] what remained of mediumistic communication once we had freed it from the insane metaphysical implications it otherwise entailed.⁵¹

Breton also allowed that in the earliest phase of Surrealism, the artists participated in activities inspired by the séance:

In an essay entitled “Entrée des médiums” [The Mediums Enter], reprinted in my book *Les Pas perdus* [The Lost Steps], I related how, at the end of 1922, during one of the many evenings that found us gathered in my studio, René Crevel induced us to elicit certain verbal or written manifestations from hypnotic slumber. Following Crevel’s directions, we agreed to adopt the external apparatus of Spiritualism—in other words, we sat in a circle around the table, the tip of each one’s little finger touching the tip of someone else’s so as to form the famous “chain.” In the requisite conditions of silence and darkness, it was in fact not long before Crevel started banging his head against the wooden table-top, and almost immediately he launched into a lengthy oral improvisation.⁵²

For Kardec, a key concept in Spiritism was “subliminal consciousness.” He maintained that the self is subject to disintegration and that split-off segments

of the disintegrated subject can impress themselves on the mind of another, even at a distance—that a part of the self, of the personality, can be detached from one physical organism and ingress upon the soul of another, causing the transfer of thoughts. Thus, a person engaged in a séance can obtain information from minds with which he or she has no personal acquaintance. Spiritism taught that beyond the physical world, which is the habitation of incarnate spirits (i.e., humankind), there is the spiritual world, which is the habitation of disincarnate spirits. Spirits are the intelligent beings of creation, Kardec maintained. As they are first created, they are simple and ignorant, but they evolve through reincarnation (which is always progressive, never regressive), and they reincarnate as many times as necessary to achieve their perfection. Mediumship, then, allowed Spirits to communicate with humans.

Spiritism claimed that humans are Spirits incarnated in a material body. Rather like Theosophists, Spiritists believed that the human constitution is tripartite: physical body, soul, and *perispirit*, a vital atmosphere surrounding (hence “peri”) the spirit. The perispirit is a subtle fluid that unites spirit with material body; in certain persons (mediums), this fluid can leave the body and become its “double.” Furthermore, the perispirit accompanies the soul on its journey after death, and it is through this perispirit that the spirit of the deceased can communicate with the medium (through the medium’s perispirit).⁵³

Among the topics Kardec investigated was involuntary writing—a spirit was supposed to be able to write using a pen mounted above a table in a suspended basket. Kardec even claimed to have discovered that the spirit’s ability to affect matter made it possible for the spirit to create marks on paper without any writing instrument at all (and he claimed to have verified this by placing a piece of paper in a drawer in a locked cabinet, without a pencil or pen in it—when he opened the container, he found that the paper had writing on it). Kardec referred to this as direct writing. In *Le livre des médiums ou guide des médiums et des évocateurs* (The Mediums’ Book, 1861), he wrote, “Of all the spirit phenomena one of the most extraordinary, without doubt, is that of direct writing, demonstrating as it does the power of the occult intelligence by whom it is effected.”⁵⁴ That illiterate people could be the mediums through which direct writing was transmitted, and that philosophically ignorant mediums could convey messages of real spiritual depth, Kardec took as proof that these messages had their source in an agency beyond the medium. He argued that direct writing had evidential value, confirming the truth of his hypothesis:

If the presence of an outside intelligence is morally proved by the nature of the answers given, it is physically proved by the fact of direct writing: that is to [s]ay, writing produced spontaneously, without pen or pencil, without contact, and

in spite of all the precautions taken to render trickery impossible... [T]he spontaneity of the thought expressed, often disappointing our expectation and wandering away from the questions presented, renders it impossible for us to attribute its manifestation to any reflex action on the part of the persons present.⁵⁵

This agency beyond the (fictitious) self, this Other, this agent that (in a somewhat different form) is central to the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, was the focus of André Breton's thought as well. Looking back from 1934 on the genesis of the Surrealist movement, André Breton commented, regarding the automatic writing that he and Philippe Soupault produced,

To you who may be writing them, these elements are, in appearance, *as strange as to anyone else*, and you are yourself naturally distrustful of them. Poetically speaking, they are distinguished chiefly by a very high degree of *immediate absurdity*, the peculiar quality of that absurdity being, on close examination, their yielding to whatever is most admissible and legitimate in the world: divulging of a given number of facts and properties on the whole not less objectionable than the others.⁵⁶

Breton described automatic writing as "thought's dictation."⁵⁷

Kardec anticipated the Surrealists' interest in somnambulism. However, he considered the explanation for the behaviour advanced by most of those intrigued by the phenomenon (*viz.*, that somnambulism is the product of unconscious thought) to be insufficiently radical, because it denied the influence that the Other exerts on the somnambulist. Somnambulism, Kardec maintained,

has had many partisans, and even now has a few... [I]t lays down, as rule, that all intelligent communications have their source in the soul or Spirit of the medium but, in order to explain his power to treat on subjects beyond his knowledge, instead of the supposition of a multiple soul in the medium, it attributes this power to a momentary superexcitement of his mental faculties, a sort of somnambulistic or ecstatic state, which exalts and develops his intelligence. It is impossible to deny that this super excitement really occurs in some cases; but it would only be necessary to see the majority of mediums at work, to be convinced that this theory cannot explain all the phenomena, and that such a state is the exception, and not the rule. Mediums are far from having at all times an inspired or ecstatic air, which, by the way, they could easily assume, if playing a part; and how could we believe in this sort of inspiration, when we see a medium writing like a machine, without having the least consciousness of what he is writing, showing no emotion, paying no attention to what he is doing, often laughing and talking on all manner of subjects, and looking carelessly about him? We can understand a man's being in a state of trance, but we cannot comprehend how trance should make a man write who

does not know how to write, or give communications through the tilting and rapping of tables, or the writing of planchettes and pencils.⁵⁸

Thus, he argued that the medium was inspired from without: some “Other” was operating the medium. Kardec also described somnambulism as preparatory to the decreation of the self, which in turn made way for the ingression of the Other:

Somnambulism may be regarded as a variety of the medianimic faculty, or rather, we should say, that these two orders of phenomena are found very frequently united. The somnambulist acts under the influence of his own spirit; it is his own soul which, in its moments of emancipation, sees, hears, and perceives, beyond the limits of the senses; what he expresses he draws from himself. His ideas are generally more just than in his normal state, and his knowledge is more extended, because his soul is free; in a word, the somnambulic state is a sort of foretaste of the spirit-life. The medium, on the contrary, is the instrument of an intelligence exterior to himself; he is passive; and what he says does not come from himself. . . . But the spirit who communicates through an ordinary medium may do so through a somnambulist; the soul-emancipation of somnambulism often rendering spirit-communication even more easy. Many somnambulists see spirits perfectly, and describe them with as much precision as do seeing mediums; they converse with them, and transmit their thoughts to us; and what they say, when beyond the circle of their personal knowledge, is often suggested to them by spirits.⁵⁹

Kardec offered similar comments regarding mechanical mediums in the act of pneumography (“spirit writing”):

When a spirit acts directly on the medium’s hand, he gives to it an impulsion altogether independent of its owner’s will, causes it to write on uninterruptedly as long as he has any thing so say, and to stop when he has finished.

The most interesting and valuable characteristic of this mode of medianimity is the unconsciousness of the medium in regard to what he is writing, and of which he has often not the remotest idea; this absolute unconsciousness constitutes what are called *passive* or *mechanical mediums*, and is an exceedingly precious faculty, because it excludes all doubt as to what is written being independent of the medium’s mind.⁶⁰

His remarks on the topic of spirit mediums emphasized that the medium is controlled by the Other:

Hearing mediums, who only transmit what is said to them by spirits, are not what is properly called *speaking mediums*, who very frequently hear nothing; the spirit merely acting on their organs of speech, as he acts upon the hand of writing mediums. . . . The speaking medium generally speaks without knowing what he says, and often gives utterance to instructions far above the reach of

his own ideas, knowledge and intelligence. Though he may be perfectly awake, and in his normal state, he rarely remembers what he has said; in short, his voice is only an instrument employed by a spirit, and by means of which a third party can converse with a spirit, as he can do through the agency of a hearing medium.⁶¹

The idea of taking “instructions [from] far above the reach of his own ideas, knowledge and intelligence” was central to Surrealist creative methods.

Another type of medium that Kardec identified was the “inspirational medium,” who resembled the Surrealist artist:

Every one who, either in the normal state or in trance, receives an influx of thoughts that are foreign to the action of his own mind, may be included in the category of *inspirational mediums*. They are, in fact, a variety of the *intuitive medium*, with this difference, that the intervention of an occult power is much less evident in their case; so that, with inspirational mediums, it is even more difficult to distinguish their own thought from that which is suggested, than in the case of the intuitive medium.

The peculiar characteristic of the inspirational medium is *spontaneity*. . . [W]e may include in this category the persons who, without being endowed with superior intelligence, and without any modification of their normal state, have flashes of intellectual lucidity which give them, for the moment, an unusual facility of conception and of expression, and sometimes a presentiment of future events. In what are rightly spoken of as “moments of inspiration,” the flow of ideas is abundant and continuous, our thoughts succeeding one another in an orderly enchaining, through the action of an involuntary, spontaneous, and almost feverish impulsion; it appears to us, at such times, as though some superior intelligence had come to our aid, and our mind seems to have been suddenly relieved of a burden.

All those who are possessed of genius, artists, poets, scientific discoverers, great writers &c., are doubtless spirits of superior advancement, able to comprehend and to conceive great ideas; and it is precisely because of this ability that the spirits who desire the accomplishment of some particular work selects them as their instruments, suggesting to their minds the trains of thought required for their special ends, so that, in a majority of cases, “men of genius” are *mediums without being aware of it*. Many of them, however, have a vague intuition of this extraneous help.⁶²

The Surrealists drew their ideas about “surreality” partly from the heterodox tradition, especially Spiritualism (and its French version, *Spiritisme*). But the vogue for Spiritism (which was becoming passé by the time Breton began toying with its practices) was only one of many factors that encouraged the Surrealists to take an interest in dreams. That interest was also fuelled by their anti-bourgeois desire to rehabilitate what bourgeois society held in

contempt (i.e., anything that lacked value in producing commodities). The conclusion of Salvador Dalí's article "L'âne pourri" (The Stinking Ass or The Rotting Ass, or The Putrefied Donkey, 1930) celebrated the abominable character of the Surrealist image:

The desperate activity of these new images may also contribute, simultaneously with other surrealist activities, to the destruction of reality, and so benefit everything which, through infamous and abominable ideals of all kinds, aesthetic, humanitarian, philosophical, &c., brings us back to the clear springs of masturbation, exhibitionism, crime, and love.

We shall be idealists subscribing to no ideal. The ideal images of surrealism will serve the imminent crisis of consciousness; they will serve Revolution.⁶³

André Breton praised Dalí's article highly, and did so in a manner that revealed just how destructive he hoped Surrealist art would be. Not long after *Un chien andalou* was finished, Surrealism fissured into two camps—one, around Bataille, stressing the body as a template for conceiving reality and, thus, reality's excessive and excremental nature, and the other, around Breton, stressing desire's unrelenting operation and perceived reality's simulacral nature. But before dealing with these quarrels around the radical idea of sur-reality, we must again survey aspects of its history.

DADA AND SURREALISM

The Surrealists, then, believed that they could help liberate redemptive forces and expand freedom's scope by deepening "the crisis of consciousness" in the service of revolution. For Dalí and other Surrealists, this meant confusing dream and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, in salutary ways.⁶⁴ Thus, in 1925, a manifesto issued by the Bureau des recherches surréalistes, and signed by Louis Aragon, André Breton, Paul Éluard, Philippe Soupault, Antonin Artaud, and Max Ernst, among others, declared the following:

1. We have nothing to do with literature. But we are quite capable, when necessary, of making use of it like anyone else.
2. *Surrealism* is not a new means of expression, or an easier one, nor even a metaphysic of poetry.
It is a means of total liberation of the mind *and of all that resembles it*.
3. We are determined to make a Revolution.
4. We have joined the word *surrealism* to the word *revolution* solely to show the disinterested, detached, and even entirely desperate character of this revolution.
5. We make no claim to change the *mores* of mankind, but we intend to show the fragility of thought, and on what shifting foundations, what caverns we have built our trembling houses.
6. We hurl this formal warning to Society: Beware of your deviations and faux pas, we shall not miss a single one.

7. At each turn of its thought, Society will find us waiting.

8. We are specialists in Revolt.

There is no means of action which we are not capable, when necessary, of employing.

9. ... Surrealism is not a poetic form. It is a cry of the mind turning back on itself, and it is determined to break apart its fetters, even if it must be by material hammers!⁶⁵

This fervour arose from a long-formenting spirit of defiance. Street events motivated by the horrors of the Great War had soon outstripped in their vehemence anything that had taken place in *Künstlerkneipe Voltaire*. In his foreword to the second edition (1989) of Robert Motherwell's collection of Dada writings, *The Dada Painters and Poets*, Jack Flamm points out that "an estimated 120,000 French soldiers were killed during that single brief offensive (against the Hindenberg line, 150 miles from Paris) and a serious mutiny ensued. One of the most striking events of that dark time was the procession of a group of infantrymen through a town, baaing like sheep, to protest that they were like lambs being led to the slaughter."⁶⁶

DADA was being overtaken by reality. Even before the formal founding of the Surrealist movement, Breton had stated his disgruntlement with the "anything goes" spirit of Dadaism—with its refusal to sublimate the contradictions inherent in limited points of view and to declare itself as being, from a higher standpoint, for a more embracing vision: "These days we make an idea out of the precipitation of everything into its opposite and the solution of both into a single category, which is itself reconcilable with the initial term, and so on until the mind attains the absolute idea, the reconciliation of every opposition and the unity of every category. If 'Dada' had been that, of course it would not have been so bad... But Dada is quite removed from such considerations."⁶⁷

Unlike the Dadaists, the Surrealists offered a program for the arts and were prescriptive. Of course, there really was no absolute opposition between DADA and Surrealism on this matter: it was the specific proportions of positive and negative components in the Surrealist mixture, and the Surrealists' more worked-out and elaborated conception of the positive thrust of art, that distinguished Surrealist from Dadaist art.⁶⁸ DADA, we have seen, was an attempt to reconnect human being with the life force, to allow for the emergence of the New Human (usually referred to, in this era, as the "New Man" or the "Total Man"). That emergence was understood as the *telos* of the historical process. DADA was to push history towards that outcome. Breton, in declaring that he sought "the precipitation of everything into its opposite and the solution of both into a single category... until the mind attains the absolute idea, the reconciliation of every opposition and the unity

of every category,” was asserting that Surrealism, too, wanted to further the historical dialectic. And as we will see, the Surrealists, too, viewed history as the reconciliation of human be-ing with the Absolute, which they also understood as being akin to the life force—that was one reason why they celebrated chance, for chance is where the life force asserts itself against the strictures of mechanical reason.

DADA had been a protest against a society that had gone mad as a result of reason, systems, planning, money, and—more generally—as a result of its rupture from primordial experience. Capital had its own dynamic—indeed, its own logic (analyzed in Karl Marx’s political economy), in the sense that capital had become the illusory projection of a destructive fantasy system based on the fetishization of commodities. The effect of the logic underlying capital’s illusory dynamic was to alienate human beings from *reality*—in Dadaist terms, from the *life force*. So the Dadaists attacked logic, which had become allied with money (and the Great War had stained money with blood), and they attacked those artists who in seeking material success had become advocates of theological doctrines or philosophic systems and who had fled from life’s realities into ivory towers. Art, or art’s successor, DADA, offered forms of action that, they believed, could reawaken primordial modes of experience and overcome the hegemony of reason. Thus, during his Dadaist years (i.e., until 1922), Breton had admired the philosophical ideas of Henri Bergson, a philosopher of the life force (*élan vital*) who celebrated intuition and the knowledge of the organism, and who critiqued the limits of scientific reason.⁶⁹

By 1922, the emphasis on vital primordial experience that from the beginning had characterized DADA was seen to harbour a contradiction: on the one hand, Dadaists proposed a thoroughgoing nihilism that offered no basis for preferring one activity over any other; but on the other, they celebrated the vitality of primordial awareness over reason’s life-denying detachment. Moreover, Dada actions proved effective in reawakening slumbering modes of awareness, and that effectiveness established that the human mind does not lack redemptive potential (and that reality is not deficient)—the problem is that the human mind is improperly used because it is directed towards inadequate objects.

Surrealism arose from these contradictions within Dadaism. The Surrealists understood that they needed a way of understanding and promoting awareness of those dimensions of reality that could sustain the imagination, foster creativity, and serve a redemptory role more generally. If they wished to show that reality somehow corresponded to the dream-wish (and Breton’s Automatist practices and Salvador Dalí’s paranoiac-critical method give evidence that they did), the real purpose for that effort was to uncover a metaphysical basis for overcoming nihilism.⁷⁰ Above all, they wished to reveal the

imaginative richness—the marvellous, the bizarre, the uncanny—that lay at the heart of reality. Far from being impoverished, reality, because it can be the imagination's collaborator, possesses endless possibilities and infinite richness. The paranoiac-critical method (a topic to which we will turn shortly) asserted vigorously that visible forms have a polyvalent function in which the mind/imagination plays a crucial role; thereby, it affirms the integrity of imagination and reality.

Surrealism was not a movement that railed against the perfidious poverty of reality or the depravity of human nature. Rather, the Surrealists sought a more passionate means of apprehending the sensory world—means that implied a more intimate association between the subject and the object of awareness than quotidian perception allows. They sought this by means that displaced familiar perspectives, that disrupted our conventional relations with objects and destroyed our customary expectations in order to allow the endless possibilities inherent in concrete forms to reveal themselves. In *Totum und Tabu: Einige Übereinstimmungen in Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiken* (Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, 1913), Freud offered a pithy and elegant remark: “In one way the neuroses show a striking and far-reaching correspondence with the great social productions of art, religion, and philosophy, while again they seem like distortions of them. We may say that hysteria is a caricature of an artistic creation, a compulsion neurosis, a caricature of a religion, and a paranoiac delusion a caricature of a philosophical system.”⁷¹

The point of Freud's reference to philosophy was to highlight the paranoiac's concern with detail and argument (cf. Dalí's photographic painting) and with the reconciliation of fantastic material—material produced by internal needs (the drives) and then projected onto available objects/people—within the structure of a highly elaborated system. In the same work, Freud pointed out that

the prototype of all such systems is what we have termed “secondary revision” of the content of dreams. And we must not forget that, at and after the stage at which such systems are constructed, two sets of reasons can be assigned for every physical event that is consciously judged [for every act judged by the consciousness]—one set belonging to the system and the other set real but unconscious [namely the systematic, and the real but unconscious origin].⁷²

The Surrealists' emphasis on freedom—including freedom relating to how to form the world imaginatively—was primary, unconditional, and unrestricted. Accordingly, after they joined the Parti Communiste Français, their demand for total freedom put them at odds with other party members. Moreover, the Surrealists condemned the materialist conception of reality

touted by the advocates of Socialist Realism for being metaphysically naive and morally restricting, and insisted on not limiting themselves to tendentious images.⁷³

Among the Surrealists, it was Antonin Artaud who resisted most fiercely the limitations of approaches that were not rooted in primordial experience. DADA, as we have seen, was instrumental in the genesis of abstract painting, and the artists who made the first Absolute Films, in the early 1920s, were deeply involved in Berlin DADA. So Artaud, surveying the cinematic paths that lay before him, wrote,

Two paths seem to be open to the cinema right now, neither of which, undoubtedly, is the right one.

On the one hand there is pure or absolute cinema, and on the other there is that kind of venial hybrid art which insists on translating into more or less suitable images psychological situations that would be perfectly at home on the stage or in the pages of a book but not on the screen, since they are merely the reflection of a world that depends on another source for its raw material and its meaning.

It is clear that everything we have seen up to now that passes for abstract or pure cinema is very far from meeting what seems to be one of the essential requirements of cinema. For although the mind of man may be able to conceive and accept abstraction, no one can respond to purely geometric lines which possess no significative value in themselves and which are not related to any sensation that the eye of the screen [*sic*] can recognize or classify. No matter how deeply we dig into the mind, we find at the bottom of every emotion, even an intellectual one, an affective sensation of a nervous order. This sensation involves the recognition, perhaps on an elementary level, but at least on a tangible one, of something substantial, of a certain vibration that always recalls states, either known or imagined, that are clothed in one of the myriad forms of real or imagined nature. Thus the meaning of pure cinema would lie in the re-creation of a certain number of forms of this kind, it would lie in a movement and follow a rhythm which is the specific contribution of this art.⁷⁴

Artaud here saw past the distinction between the abstract cinema and the cinema that evokes the contents of the mind as it operates in its most extreme conditions. Mental activity of any sort (sensation, affect, thought) is really vibration; sometimes these vibrations are associated with real or imagined scenes, so one way for a filmmaker to relay these vibrations to an audience is to present them with these associated scenes. Another way is more direct—convey intense vibrations directly in order to produce sympathetic vibrations in the respondent. Art, if it is to be effective, must provoke a vibratory response in those who attend to it.⁷⁵ The intensity of that vibratory response reveals a higher, more vital, pulsional realm beyond that with which we are

ordinarily acquainted; and the truth of that higher realm demolishes all nihilist proclamations (including those that the *Dadaisten* sometimes offered).

Recognizing the limitations of the pure cinema—limitations that annoyed Salvador Dalí and Luis Buñuel (1900–1983) just as much as they did Artaud—as well as of the psychological film (those cinemas that film historians have come to refer to as “Absolute” and “Impressionist,” respectively), Artaud proposed a new path, of a character the Surrealists could endorse.

Between a purely linear visual abstraction (and the play of light and shadow is similar to the play of lines) and the fundamentally psychological film which relates the development of a story that may or may not be dramatic, there is room for an attempt at true cinema, of whose substance or meaning nothing in the films that have been presented to date gives any suggestion.

... We have yet to achieve a film with purely visual situations whose drama would come from a shock designed for the eyes, a shock drawn, so to speak, from the very substance of our vision and not from the psychological circumlocutions of a discursive nature which are merely the visual equivalent of a text. It is not a question of finding in visual language an equivalent for written language, of which the visual language would merely be a bad translation, but rather of revealing the very essence of language and of carrying the action onto a level where all translation would be unnecessary and where this action would operate almost intuitively on the brain.⁷⁶

So it was that the Surrealists pressed the fractured syntax of Cubist collage (that art movement which, despite the realistic aspirations that gave rise to it, first asserted the autonomy of the art object) into the service of creating a documentary of the fantastic. So it was, too, that the jolts produced by Cézanne’s use of *passage* or by Apollinaire’s use of surprise were made objective: *hasard objectif* offered the stunning insight that mind and reality joined in a single, higher process.⁷⁷ Acknowledging the principle of chance resulted in a transformation of everyday experience into a vibrant awareness of hitherto unperceived connections between things, between thoughts and things, and among affects, the imagination, and the world—it resulted, in sum, in the experience of *le merveilleux*. And so it was, too, that Surrealist creative methods disintegrated the boundaries between verbal and visual forms, and created poems that fractured conventional syntax in order to lend intensity to the isolated image, or prose works that possessed an almost hallucinatory visual intensity (consider André Breton’s *Nadja*, 1928).

Un chien andalou realizes Artaud’s goal of creating a hitherto unperceived connection between thought and things. The film is (loosely speaking) a drama designed to shock the eye—it was meant to do just what the opening sequence not only depicted but also enacted, viz., to assault the eye (viewers turned away in disgust, fearing for the globes of jelly that fill their eye sockets).

Violations of the cinema's codes of spatial construction in this scene make it impossible to take the film's "scenes" as mere reflections of a pre-existing world. (I point out many instances of such disruptions in my analysis of the film.) At the same time, the film's construction encourages us to see its scenes as depicting an unfolding story. Thus, the scenes in the film have an ambiguous ontological status: its images have a reality effect that encourages us to take what the images represent as actual, yet when we pay attention to the precise details of the film's construction, we recognize that the film discredits these assumptions. The filmmakers use many devices to trick us and slyly show us that we have been had—so sly are these constructions that almost no one recognizes what they are seeing.

The Surrealists explored the borders of realities—dreams, the unconscious, objective chance, hallucinations brought on by drugs or by mad love, or the convulsions induced by beauty—the places where the poetic image could be said to belong to reality and, paradoxically, to escape from it, released by the imagination.⁷⁸ If Surrealists strove to transpose reality to a superior artistic level (as Breton asserted), or if they made attempts at destroying ordinary reality to make way for a higher, poetic reality (as Dalí declared), if they sought to raise the poetic image to a higher order of existence, they also tried to show that the "surreal" was to be found within the "real." If they sought the means to raise the poetic image to a higher dimension of reality by situating it as close as possible to the unconscious, they knew that the traces of unconsciousness were embedded in dreams or in automatist activities, processes that have a local habitation within the real world. If they sought evidence of the unconscious in the convulsive beauty of the truly poetic image, they also tried to demonstrate that the "sur-real" was to be found within the "real"—their theoretical writings point out incessantly that there is a bridge between the "real" and the "surreal." This is the true meaning of Surrealists' use of *hasard objectif* (objective chance)—*hasards objectifs* are accidental occurrences, events transpiring within material reality itself that, since they disclose something marvellous, exercise a similar power as does any fascinating, purely subjective, hallucinatory image (all truly poetic images are marvellous).

The rise of scientific philosophies in the seventeenth century had separated the material realm from the spiritual/religious domain. Then Nietzsche offered a root-and-branch critique of what supposedly were higher values of Platonic reality:

All those things which mankind has valued with such earnestness heretofore are not even real; they are mere creations of fancy, or more strictly speaking, lies born of the evil instincts of diseased and, in the deepest sense, noxious natures—all the concepts, "God," "soul," "virtue," "sin," "Beyond," "truth," "eternal life" . . . But

the greatness of human nature, its “divinity,” was sought for in them... All questions of politics, of social order, of education, have been falsified, root and branch, owing to the fact that the most noxious men have been taken for great men, and that people were taught to despise the small things, or rather the fundamental things, of life.⁷⁹

A Romantic strain in recent culture developed similar ideas to critique traditional metaphysics (or, to use a more descriptive term, onto-theology). Thinkers associated with that strain maintained that what was conventionally understood to be of higher value, viz., the Platonic domain of the self-same, was simply a projection of human consciousness. Neo-vitalists asserted that what truly possesses greater reality is the life force—and that the life force is adumbrated to us in a life experienced with intensity. This strain brought the Platonic ideas down from the heavens so that they might become the inner be-ing of ordinary reality. In the process, these Forms became dynamic, and organic: they became forces that, though immanent in the material realm, nevertheless could not be apprehended through instrumental reason. Its force and actions strained to remain unconscious; at best, they could be only half-brought into the daytime realm. They constituted the depth of reality—or, to change metaphors, the sur-reality—that Surrealists sought to know. In accepting that this sur-reality inhabits everyday reality, the Surrealists embraced the paradox that the poetic image is located in the very space from which they wish to escape. The real is always present in the surreal, which, therefore, never becomes simply fantastic. Discovering the poetic within the real transforms the real. Accepting and intensifying the poetic nature of reality is a key to Surrealist methods.

HIPPOLYTE TAINÉ, *HASARD OBJECTIF*, THE POETIC IMAGE, AND THE CINEMA

Surrealism arose within a discursive context formed when developments in philosophy and mathematics appeared to have dismissed the Baconian/Enlightenment claims regarding the power of calculative reason to force reality to surrender its secrets. The response of the Surrealists, in common with that of many other advanced thinkers of the time, was to seek an intensification of the poetic faculties so that everyday life could be experienced with the intensity with which we respond to a powerful poem. In part, they sought this intensification by cultivating the imaginative faculties. But the Surrealists also recognized that emphasizing the imagination’s role to the exclusion of all else risked suggesting that the surreality they sought was subjective. Linking Surrealist forms exclusively to the imagination would bind those forms to subjectivity, which was too narrow a space. For the Surrealists, the

poetic image occupies a paradoxical space, one that is both subjective and objective—it is a product of a process of which the objective and subjective realms alike are expressions.

Chance served the Surrealists as a counterbalance for, and foil to, the imagination's subjectivity. The Surrealists emphasized chance's objective character and often alluded to *hasard objectif* (objective chance). Of course, the poetic images the cinema offers, which are often obtained through objective chance, are often not pre-visions: the imagination often plays no role in their making, however much they may resemble dreams or hallucinations. In this sense, they are the result of objective chance, even though their character is an amalgam of subjectivity and objectivity. In this respect, too, the cinema was a privileged art for the Surrealists—indeed, the cinema's character instructed them on possibilities for a new art that would help resolve the antinomies of the spiritual conditions of the age. In this section and in the next two, we examine the Surrealists' notions of chance as well as the methods they developed for incorporating *hasard objectif* into their work.

Understanding the paradoxical location of the poetic image—it is both within and beyond reality—is a key to understanding Surrealist art.⁸⁰ Consider the Surrealists' interest in cultivating chance. Their attitude towards chance was complex, more complex than even the Dadaists' had been. The interest that Surrealists took in objective chance arose from their beliefs regarding the ability of non-voluntary behaviours to instigate processes through which mental images might become free and, consequently, reach hallucinatory intensity:

It was in 1919, in complete solitude and at the approach of sleep, that my attention was arrested by sentences more or less complete, which became perceptible to my mind without my being able to discover (even by very meticulous analysis) any possible previous volitional effort. One evening in particular, as I was about to fall asleep, I became aware of a sentence articulated clearly to a point excluding all possibility of alteration and stripped of all quality of vocal sound; a curious sort of sentence which came to me bearing—in sober truth—not a trace of any relation whatever to any incidents I may at that time have been involved in . . . Instantly the idea came to me to use it as material for poetic construction. I had no sooner invested it with that quality, than it had given place to a succession of all but intermittent sentences which left me no less astonished, but in a state, I would say, of extreme detachment.⁸¹

Tristan Tzara's advice on how to write a poem—that one select a newspaper article, cut it up into single words, place the words in a bag, and draw them out of the bag one at a time, copying them in the order they were drawn—points to Dadaists' stress on the object. The compositional methods they developed were often means to eliminate the subjective component from

artmaking and to emphasize the objective result. Surrealists, by contrast, were less interested in eliminating the subjective component than they were in drawing attention to “the passage from the *subject* to the *object*” (as Breton remarked in his annotations on *Les champs magnétiques*).⁸² The Surrealists’ interest in Freud, their conviction that automatic processes reveal the workings of the unconscious, and their resultant conviction that artworks produced by automatist means tell something about the character of the individual who produced them, led them to believe that automatist processes involve the interplay of subjective and objective factors, in which the workings of the unconscious help guide the effects of *hasard objectif*, exactly because mental and physical activities are the expressions of a deeper processual reality, which they understood on the model of a magnetic field. The Surrealist poetic image arises from the affective identification of the subjective consciousness and the object, as a sur-reality emerges at the locus at which an imaginative excess is superimposed on the real object in such a way as to become indistinguishable from the real object.

Breton developed his particular extension of the idea of the poetic image under the influence of Freud, who had shown that the process he called condensation could give a dream image more than one meaning. But Breton’s ideas on this matter had their roots in what might seem an unlikely source—the writings of Hippolyte Taine (1828–93), a positivist theorist of naturalism who in the 1860s had conducted research on intelligence and consciousness. Taine’s psychological studies led him to reject the reifications of faculty psychology, which he dismissed because of its tendency to assign names to complex psychological processes involving many, often heteroclitic, components: names such as “capacity,” “self,” “reason,” and “memory.” Taine wanted to expose the complex processes underlying those terms and to think of this psychology dialectically rather than in terms of reified categories. All of this induced him to study psychopathology, for pathological mental functioning, he believed, dissociates (and so exposes) the various components of processes that phenomenologically seem simple. He took up physiological psychology—more specifically, studying the role of the nervous system in consciousness. He believed this study would help reveal the mechanisms underpinning those phenomena and thereby expose the complexities of phenomena that presented themselves as phenomenologically simple. Taine’s research led him to conclude that sensation was really just a form of hallucination. Thus, in *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* (History of English Literature, in five volumes, 1863–64), he described a human being as “a nervous machine, governed by a mood, disposed to hallucinations, carried away by unbridled passions, essentially unreasoning, a mixture of poet and animal, having rapture instead of mind, sensibility instead of virtue”; while in *De l’intelligence* (2 vols., 1870), he

suggested that every mental image tends to acquire a hallucinatory intensity that only sometimes is checked by the inhibiting influences of other images.⁸³ The *imago hominis* that Taine drew—that humans beings are given to hallucinations, to being swept away by uncontrolled passions, and that they are fundamentally unreasoning—was close to that of Surrealism.

Taine's contention that hallucination and sensation are psychologically equivalent was only one of several late-nineteenth-century psychological systems that asserted the equality of fantasy and reality. Freud's conception of the primary process proposed something similar, and in his case positing that equivalence challenged the assumption that consciousness is acquainted with the real world. Taine's emphasis on the matter, however, led him to develop a dialectical theory of the relation between the subjective and objective realms; thus, his philosophy took on the cast of a Hegelianism oriented towards the concrete data of psychology.

Taine's larger ideas had important connections with the Surrealists' interests in the dissolution of the self (a topic that their principal psychological theorist, Jacques Lacan, expounded so admirably). The earlier half of the nineteenth century had been gripped by Romantic enthusiasm that, in contrast to the scientific mechanics of the seventeenth century, perceived the world as one in which human being and nature were fused: vegetation and mountains and sky and birds and beasts and humans were perceived to be all alike—all that we see and hear is just as much the result of what we are as it is the result of the objects we are perceiving. The second half of the nineteenth century experienced a sea change: a new mechanism relating humans and nature was proposed, based not on physics (as older versions of mechanisms had always been) but, rather, on biology—specifically, on evolutionary theory.⁸⁴ The theory of evolution demoted human beings from the stature that early Romantics had accorded them as the arbiters of all that exists, to something very small in the sway of much grander forces. Human being, that theory posited, was the product—indeed, the *accidental* product—of forces beyond human nature. Having accepted this, Taine studied how geographical and climatic conditions, along with other factors external to human nature, produced virtue and vice. It was no longer the character of the soul, but rather the operation of nature, that accounted for what we deemed human goodness and human venality to be.

Jean Goudal—no Surrealist, to be sure, but an aesthete of the cinema whom Breton admired—developed a fascinating modernist defence of the cinema as an art based in Taine's ideas. It took the form of an apologia for the Surrealist cinema. Goudal begins his article by laying out the traditional problematic of classical film theory (exemplified by the writings of Béla Belázy,

V.I. Pudovkin, Sergei Eisenstein, Lev Kuleshov, and Rudolf Arnheim), noting the muddle around the question of whether the cinema is art. Adopting the same form of argument as the classical film theorists did, Goudal notes that some people deny the cinema can be an art if it is only a perfected form of photography. He proposed, as the modernists often did, that each of the arts evidences a pattern of evolutionary development, and through that development, it eschews the influences of adjacent media and arrives at forms of construction that are ever more true to its material:

We see each of them in their turn follow the same general pattern.

First, they escape literary contamination (the renunciation of figurative painting, of thematic music); next they renounce the constraint of logic, considered as an intellectual element restricting sensory freedom, in favor of enquiring after their guiding principles in terms of their technique (cubism, musical impressionism).

(You can already foresee the third stage: thirsting for total liberty, artists will thrust aside the last support of technique and claim the right to bring into play, without any modification, the very material forming the basis of their art.)⁸⁵

Goudal continues by offering a remarkable demonstration that the cinema, by its very nature, avoids the difficulties that the Surrealists encountered when they attempted to realize their ideals in other media. The first difficulty is implicit in the effort to unite dream and consciousness on the same plane, as if they belonged to the same reality (albeit a reality more intense than quotidian reality).⁸⁶ The second difficulty relates to the Surrealists' anti-logical ideals, for Surrealism, Goudal points out, concerns the inner processes of thought, whereas language and, by implication, most other media of communication arise from the *public* dimension of thinking, that is, from those aspects of thinking that are common to all humans. Goudal contends that these difficulties are overcome as soon as one applies Surrealist methods to the cinema.⁸⁷

Responding to the first issue—concerning the difficulty that Surrealism encountered when it attempted to treat dream and sensory consciousness (or intensified sensory consciousness) as if they belonged to a single mode—Goudal invokes Taine's ideas. The difficulty of unifying sensory consciousness with dream does not hold for the cinema, Goudal points out, because in the cinema, "the thing seen corresponds exactly to a *conscious hallucination*."⁸⁸ He imagines being in the cinema, notes the temporary depersonalization that removes one from sensing one's own identity when engaged with the flow of images on the screen, and speculates on the identity of the mechanism that allows one to take what one sees on the screen as an intensified reality.⁸⁹ What, he asks, confers such allure on cinematic images?

The answer to this question lies in what Taine used to call the ‘reductive mechanism of images.’ When we are awake the images surging into our imagination have an anaemic, pale colour which by contrast makes the vigour and relief of real images stand out, the ones, that is to say, we get through our senses: and this difference of value is enough to make us distinguish the real from the imagined. When we sleep our senses are idle, or rather their solicitations do not cross the threshold of consciousness and, the reducing contrast no longer existing, the imaginary succession of images monopolises the foreground; as nothing contradicts them we believe in their actual existence.

Awake, we imagine the real and the possible all at once, while in the dream we only imagine the possible.⁹⁰

In film viewing, as in dreaming, a host of material conditions co-operate to destroy what Taine referred to as “the reductive mechanism of images”: the darkness of the cinema auditorium eliminates other images that might rival or overwhelm those which the cinema provides; the impressions from the other senses, especially those which might be engendered by silence, are eliminated (as silence is eliminated by film music). Film images are in many respects analogous to those in dreams: the absence of colour is a simplification analogous to that of dreams; the slightly spastic movements of the (silent film) actors have their analogons in the jerky movements of dreams; and in the cinema, as in dreams, events are self-justifying—the mere fact that something happens is enough to persuade spectators to accept it. Goudal continues:

An actual hallucination is needed... which the other conditions of cinema tend to reinforce, just as, in the dream, moving images *lacking three-dimensionality* follow each other on a single plane artificially delimited by a rectangle which is like a geometrical opening giving on to the psychic kingdom.

... In the cinema, as in the dream, the *fact* is complete master. Abstraction has no rights. No explanation is needed to justify the heroes’ actions. One event follows another, seeking justification in itself alone. They follow each other with such rapidity that we barely have time to call to mind the logical commentary that would explain them, or at least connect them...

The cinema, then, constitutes a conscious hallucination, and utilises this fusion of dream and consciousness which surrealism would like to see realised in the literary domain. These moving images delude us, by leaving us with a confused awareness of our personality and by allowing us to evoke, if necessary, the resources of our memory.⁹¹

Goudal argues that the material conditions of the cinema enable it to fulfill the aesthetic ideal of Surrealism, that is, the integration of dream and reality; for, by its very nature, the cinema is conscious hallucination. This quality of the cinema has in more recent times been recognized by Friedrich A. Kittler: “Film exhibits its figures in such detail that ‘the realistic’ is ‘raised into the realm of the fantastic,’ which sucks up every theme of imaginative

literature.⁹² One of the lessons the cinema taught the Surrealists is that the art that can serve us best is an art that fuses dream with reality on a higher plane, a *sur-réalité*. The cinema is experienced in conditions that allow for this: we enter into the cinema and go into a sort of reverie in which our consciousness absorbs images gleaned from the real. The Surrealists, evidently, experienced the cinema as a medium of enchantment and strove to find means that might endow other media with the virtues of the cinema.

The cinema's material conditions also allow it to avoid the second difficulty that confronts most Surrealist art, that of repudiating logic while working with a language that is *born* of logic. Film, Goudal suggests, avoids this difficulty by being visual in the first instance and by using images to convey its genotext:

In language the foremost factor is always the logical thread. The image is born according to this thread, and contributes to its embellishments, its illumination. In cinema the foremost factor is the image which, on occasion, though not necessarily so, drags the tatters of reason behind it . . .

Just leaf through the dreamed poems Monsieur A. Breton has collected together at the end of his *Manifesto*, under the title of *Soluble Fish* [*Poisson soluble*], and you will see, perhaps, that the surest way of making the public accept them would be to treat them like film scenarios.

The adventures of the crate penetrated by human arms, sliding down hill-sides, bashing against "trees that cast bright blue sunlight on it," then running aground on the first floor of a run-down hotel . . . and the mysterious voyage of the barque which is the poet's tomb following the closing of the cemetery, and the tribulations of the lamp-post, and the chase after the woman who has left her veil with her lover, a source of miracles and inexplicable bliss, so many marvellous tales with enough anacoluthon inevitable to shock the reader, but which, brought to the screen, would perhaps be accepted with delight by the spectator. The latter would see in its teeming lapses of logic no more than thousands of details, comic and strange, all ingenious.⁹³

The notion of *hasard objectif* finds its significance in the context of the Surrealists' belief in "the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality . . . into a kind of absolute reality."⁹⁴ For objective chance appears at moments when the divorce between subjective and objective reality is overcome with no effort on the part of the individual—that a *champs magnétique*, operating beyond reason, draws the two realms together, making the experience a marvel. So Breton writes in *L'amour fou* (Mad Love, 1937) regarding the interpenetration of material and psychic determination as the essence of chance. He adds that he and Éluard had solicited statements from various artists concerning the fortuitous to "emphasize the interdependence of these two causal series (natural and human), the subtle, fleeting, and disquieting links in the present state of knowledge which can throw upon the most faltering of

human steps an intense light.”⁹⁵ At another point, Breton defines chance as “the encounter [*rencontre*] of an external causality and an internal finality.”⁹⁶ And again, “*chance is the form making manifest the exterior necessity which traces its path in the human unconscious.*”⁹⁷ Max Ernst proposed a similar idea of Surrealism when he suggested that he sought a form of experience “where the borders of the so-called inner world and the outer world would overlap more and more.” As Dore Ashton points out, for the Surrealists, as for most other artists of Ernst’s generation, the idea of the inner world had been profoundly influenced by Freud’s psychological theories.⁹⁸ For them, the inner world was not the realm of the soul’s struggle with truth, nor was it, strictly speaking, the site where the person received blessings from the divine. Rather, its place was where personal histories were knit together with dreams, beyond our knowing. It was a realm of terrible mechanisms (whose operations were subject to causal principles) whereby memories of what befell the child long ago were activated by contemporary circumstances to affect the person’s behaviour. Such were the conclusions that Breton drew from medical studies, from his work with Leroy and Babinski, and from reading Freud’s writings, and that Max Ernst drew from his formal studies at the University of Bonn, where he studied philosophy and psychology between 1910 and 1914—Max Ernst’s studies included an introduction to psychiatry, and he even worked in a mental hospital. Bonn was not the sleepy town it is today: before the Great War, it was intellectually alive and had an impressive intelligentsia. Ernst had been introduced to Freud’s theories specifically through a friend, Karl Otten, who had been a student of Freud’s in Vienna.

Breton and Ernst both produced work that straddled the border between fantasy and reality. If anything, Ernst was slightly more true to Surrealism’s original ambitions: while Breton’s own creative work was sometimes more oneiric than factual, Ernst’s was not—he gave visible form to the suspicion that modernity had rendered obsolete the opposition between dream and reality, between the inner and the outer realm. Despite their differences in approach, the art of both men grew out of the implicit conviction that modernity had demolished that old prejudice that reality is what is normal and that unreality is the realm of the demonic. If, as Hal Foster has suggested in *Compulsive Beauty* (1993), Surrealist art enacted the compulsion to repeat that derived from *thanatos*, the conviction that the demonic had taken the form of reality (that what was formerly demonic had become real) was the basis for the Surrealists’ interest in what was broken, damaged, and extreme. Recycling fragments was, for them, a dark art.

Chance appears whenever external determination impresses itself on the unconscious, and when it does, the inner and outer realms become communicating vessels. In such conditions, the fantastic and the real become

one, at which point, as Breton pointed out, “what is admirable about the fantastic is that there is no longer anything fantastic: there is only the real.”⁹⁹ Chance tears the fabric of our quotidian representation of the world and allows another reality (or, what is the same, another *conception* of reality) to surge forth. Whatever is inconceivable without contradiction is not possible, Medieval philosophers used to say. *Le merveilleux* (the marvellous), by contrast, is anything that manifests contradiction. The Surrealists’ interest in the reality of the marvellous resulted from the fact that contradiction exposes the limits of any construction of reality that is based on the absence of contradiction: the reality of the marvellous renders such constructions implausible. Thus, any juxtaposition of incongruous elements that appears real—that is, that does not seem simply fantastic—is to some degree surreal. This conviction is the basis for Breton’s definition of the Surrealist image in the *Manifeste du surréalisme*: “It is, as it were, from the fortuitous juxtaposition of the two terms that a particular light has sprung, *the light of the image*, to which we are infinitely sensitive. The value of the image depends upon the beauty of the spark obtained; it is, consequently, a function of the difference of potential between the two conductors.”¹⁰⁰

However, thought cannot apprehend a contradiction, and since a contradiction cannot be thought, the effect of a contradiction (the marvellous) is to introduce a gap (an *espacement*) in consciousness.¹⁰¹ The marvellous rends the tissue of our consciousness of reality, and through this rupture in our (pre)conceptions, something *unheimlich* (uncanny)—something strange, marvellous, bizarre, or terrifying—reveals itself. As it lays our (pre)conceptions to ruin, it engenders disorientation or *dépaysement*. Because it produces a gap in consciousness, the marvellous has the same effect as the negative hallucination, which is to reveal the operation of *thanatos* (that same agency that is responsible in the first place for the compulsion to repeat). These powers of contradiction made the Surrealists crave incongruity and admire strangely agglutinated forms, especially those whose disorienting powers had been created fortuitously, and their admiration for incongruity accounted for their legendary enthusiasm for the famous image from the comte de Lautrémont’s *Les chants de Maldoror* (The Songs of Maldoror, 1868–69), “beautiful... above all, as the chance meeting on a dissection table of a sewing machine and an umbrella.”¹⁰²

Surrealist collage involved juxtaposing disparate images, which by being wrenched from their context came to resemble disoriented (and disorienting) memories. This endowed the collage with an intense and often strange visual presence by bringing together two distant realities to create a spark between them. (Breton also acknowledged that effect in *Les pas perdus* [The Last Steps, 1924], but more importantly for us, he linked this image of collage, which he claimed would renovate the arts, to the cinema.) Take the image in

Max Ernst's *Une semaine de bonté* of an axe-wielding lion-headed man with a ring in his mouth shackled to a nude woman hung on a wall (or floating in front of the wall), near a large door that is slightly ajar. This image's meaning is not immediately evident; even so, the image asserts itself strongly. The startling conjunctions in Surrealist collage do not have as their exclusive purpose—or even as their *deeper* purpose—to startle the viewer. But they often *are* startling; and the shock induced by the resulting images, as Breton suggests, lends them the intensity of presence even while they offer up new truths through their fortuitous (or at least unexpected) conjunctions. Their higher reality strikes us with the force of the real. These collages often evoke a measure of discomfort, if not outright terror, as they expose the mind's inabilities; yet they are often at the same time rather humorous. (Freud had noted that a humorous effect can be achieved simply by placing a word in an unlikely context.) The Surrealist collagists (Max Ernst especially) carried Freud's insight over to the visual realm.

The real itself harbours contradiction, Breton insisted; that is why standard logic, which is based on the principle of non-contradiction, cannot deliver the whole of reality (or, in fact, much of reality), and why it cannot furnish what Louis Aragon demanded: "harmony in one single order... in which all notions are merged together... religions, magics, poetry, intoxications, and... all life that is lowly."¹⁰³ And if the real includes contradiction, then it too must be marvellous and, it follows, surreal: "All that I love, all that I think and feel inclines me towards a particular philosophy of immanence according to which surreality will reside in reality itself, will be neither superior nor exterior to it. And conversely, because the container shall be also the contained. One might say that it will be a communicating vessel placed between the container and the contained."¹⁰⁴

The Surrealists' belief that the marvellous is simultaneously contradictory and real points to the influence of Hegel. Philosophers before Hegel had identified the absence of contradiction as an arbiter of the possibility of existence, declaring that a concept that contains a contradiction cannot represent any actual existent. Against this, Hegel proposed a logic showing that reality develops through the serial unfolding and resolution of contradictions. As early as 1921, Breton was asserting the need for a similar reform of logic; in his essay on Max Ernst, he affirmed the need to escape "from the principle of identity."¹⁰⁵ A principal tool for provoking a sense of the marvellous was collage. Ernst was *the* key theorist of Surrealist collage. In his famous essay "What Is the Mechanism of Collage?" (1936), he presented his understanding of how (Surrealist) collage operated: when distant realities are conjoined in a single image, the result is elevated to a level that, because its meaning can be apprehended only by non-rational means, appears not to belong to the

realm of the ideal; yet, though it appears to belong to the objective order of existents, the image also foregrounds its status as an imaginary compound of real existents.

Compared to Cubist collage, Surrealist collage extended the range of effects that could be obtained. Dada artists too had been among early adopters of the collage method; however, the practice fit better with the more positive, more constructive tone of the Surrealist movement.¹⁰⁶ In fact, the point at which Max Ernst developed his collage methods correlates with a change in the tone of his oeuvre. His earlier work, like all Dadaist pieces produced between 1917 and 1919, belonged to a phase of extreme disillusionment; however, the texts in *Bulletin D* (one issue, 1919) or *die schammade: Dilettanten erhebt euch!* ([untranslatable]: Dilettantes Arise!, one issue, 1919), while still an all-out attack on established values and against the hypocrisy of the culture, began a change. *die schammade*, produced in collaboration with Johannes Theodor Baargeld, still reflects something of the earlier DADA, but Ernst's work took a more constructive turn as he began working in collage.

The high degree of integration of Ernst's collage works is evident in the links that relate these works into overarching sequences that are both evocative and (at least to a degree) intelligible. A principle (whether conscious or unconscious, there is no point in asking) governs the selection and combination of images. Ernst's narrative collages, however poetic they may be, however strange the elements that constitute them may become, never fail to strive for overall coherence. The assembly retains a certain technical plausibility, presenting something that one might see in a sufficiently poetic world: for example, one depicts a woman with the wings of a bat peering into the door of a boutique, with a snake coiled in the foreground before her. In this regard, Ernst's collage compositions are quite unlike the collages and *papiers collés* of Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque: their collage foregrounds the fact that they combine different sorts of components; accordingly, they draw our attention to the differences between the elements the artists made by hand and the elements they appropriated. Ernst's collages, by contrast, eliminate the differences between the types of elements that the collage incorporates: *all* of the elements are appropriated. The effect of eliminating the differences between types of elements is to attenuate the impression that the composition is the product of the artist's hand. To bolster that impression, Ernst conceals the joints in the work. That is why he often presented his composites only in printed form or in versions later touched up with watercolour, and why he eschewed variations in scale: these would have thrown the origin of the individual elements into relief and undone the coherence of the composite. Concealing the splices resulted in a unified composition that submerged the identity of separate components in the final composite.

There is another feature of Ernst's collage work that helps account for the impression that it is seamless and well integrated. That feature is their complicity with the activities of primary process, and specifically with condensation. In *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten* (Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, 1905), Freud commented on a cartoon that appeared in *Punch*, of a highwayman holding up members of the Balkan Alliance. The cartoon was titled "Kleptoromania." Freud analyzed the title, noting that it was a portmanteau word that combined "kleptomania" with "Rumania." He also gave an example that Brill had drawn from De Quincey—"anecdottage." About this portmanteau neologism, he remarked,

The word *Anecdottage*, though in itself incomprehensible, can be readily analyzed to show its full original sense; and on analysis we find that it is made up of two words, *anecdote* and *dotage*. That is, instead of saying that old persons are apt to fall into dotage and that old persons are fond of telling anecdotes, De Quincey fuses the two words into a neologism, *anecdottage*, and thus simultaneously expresses both ideas. The technique, therefore, lies in the fusion of the two words. Such a fusion of words is called condensation. Condensation is a substitutive formation, i.e., instead of *anecdote* and *dotage* we have *anecdottage*.

Freud went on to give another example, of a short story he had read not long before that contained the word "alcoholidays": here the portmanteau term conveys the idea that holidays are conducive to alcoholic indulgence. In other words, we have here a fused word, which, though strange in appearance, can be easily understood in its proper context. The witticism may be described as condensation with substitution.¹⁰⁷

Ernst created visual equivalents for portmanteau phrases, or for verbal condensation. Take, as a ready example, the bird-headed man who appears in many of his paintings and collages. The figure elides a human body and a bird's head in a sort of portmanteau form that, like the neologisms just presented, initially arrests us because it seems to defy meaning. Then later, as with a joke that we suddenly get, we understand the form at a different level (the bird's head is associated with freedom from the inhibitions imposed by society). Moreover, because Ernst's collages operate on a basic, albeit unconscious, psychic mechanism—that is, through condensation—they seem at once familiar and strange. They seem real because they are organized by the same elementary operations that form rudimentary perception. In *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten*, Freud contended that the pleasure we experience in getting a joke results from the way a joke economizes on energy expenditure: a joke involves the recognition of something familiar within something seemingly strange and unfamiliar. Dealing with anything new or unfamiliar requires psychic energy, he observed. Accordingly, when con-

fronted with something that seems new, unfamiliar, and strange, we call upon a reserve of energy; then the discovery of the familiar within what seemed at first unfamiliar results in that energy becoming superfluous. Discharging that superfluous energy produces pleasure. We can observe the process at work in Ernst's narrative collages, where the pleasure is often erotic—for example, a naked woman with flowing hair that resembles that of Botticelli's Venus appears in a man's living room as though incarnating the man's desire; later, a giant insect appears in the same living room and we are invited to speculate about the character of the gentleman with the cane and top hat. We discover the familiar (the differing natures of sexual desire) in the unfamiliar (the timeless realm of Ernst's collages).

Ernst's collages, then, show the mind/imagination at work organizing objective, external elements to produce a new reality. This interest in highlighting the role of mind in producing reality relates to one of Surrealism's fundamental convictions—the importance of the reconciliation of fantasy and reality, of the inner and outer worlds, and of the recognition that both are expressions of an underlying processual reality. Breton protested against any belief that the mind is not free. He found support for his advocacy in Freud's claim that fantasy plays a role in sensation—that sensation is not a passive registering of data but an activity through which memory and desire shape what we see. Dalí's method of paranoia-criticism (which we will discuss further) extended the Surrealists' means for highlighting the mind's role in shaping perception. The aspect of paranoia that interested Dalí the most and that helped inspire the method was the ability of the unconscious to perceive links among things that rationally are unconnected. In the same year that Lacan's *De la paranoïa dans ses rapports avec le personnalité* (Concerning Paranoia in Relation to Personality, 1932) appeared, Dalí described the paranoiac-critical method as a “spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based upon the interpretive-critical association of delirious phenomena.”¹⁰⁸ He proposed, in short, that paranoia forms spontaneous and irrational associations that are subsequently systematized. As we will see, Dalí developed techniques for eliciting associations with the raw materials that the external senses provide and for melding those associations to those raw materials, thereby systematizing those associations into a form we might take as real. Thus, he asserted that “paranoia uses the external world in order to assert its dominating idea and has the disturbing characteristic of making others accept this idea's reality.”¹⁰⁹ These ideas are actually very close to those ideas of Breton that prepared the ground for the Surrealist movement—that is why Breton hailed Dalí's innovation, declaring that Dalí's paranoiac-critical method was an “instrument of primary importance” and that it “has immediately shown itself capable of being applied equally to painting, poetry, the cinema, the construction of

typical surrealist objects, to fashions, to sculpture, to the history of art, and even, if necessary, to all manner of exegesis.”¹¹⁰

But this description of Ernst’s collage (and, *mutatis mutandis*, much the same could be said for most Surrealist collage) is one-sided. For there is tension in our response to Ernst’s collages. We accept the collage’s total form as having a certain plausibility. Nonetheless, his collages are disconcerting and baffling, and we feel impelled to try to fathom their meaning. We do that by parsing the elements of the composition and by puzzling over how those elements relate one to another. We discover, of course, that the elements are intelligible individually but that their relations are almost inscrutable: what is clear in isolation becomes ambivalent as an element in a composition. The clarity of the individual elements’ meanings impresses their individual identities upon us, but the significance of the composition as a whole, even though it presents a plausible (even if extravagant) verisimilitude, eludes our efforts. The consistency of perspective, scale, and texture of its elements encourages us to take the image as total composite, as a complete whole; yet the clarity of *meaning* of the individual elements impresses upon us their individual, distinct origins and identities. This engenders a metaleptic ecstasy like that of dreams. Cubist collage displayed neither feature.

By four means—dream (usually induced dreams), free association (automatism), the cultivation and elaboration of chance, and intentional simulation of mental abnormality—Breton and the Surrealists proposed to reawaken and revalue potential mental states that modernity’s emphasis on reason had devalued and placed outside the domain of conscious awareness:

We still live under the reign of logic, but the methods of logic are applied nowadays only to the resolution of problems of secondary interest. The absolute rationalism which is still the fashion does not permit consideration of any facts but those strictly relevant to our experience. Logical ends, on the other hand, escape us. Needless to say that even experience has had limits assigned to it. It revolves in a cage from which it becomes more and more difficult to release it. Even experience is dependent on immediate utility, and common sense is its keeper. Under the color of civilization, under the pretext of progress, all that rightly or wrongly may be regarded as fantasy or superstition has been banished from the mind, all uncustomary searching after truth has been proscribed. It is only by what must seem sheer luck that there has recently been brought to light an aspect of mental life—to my belief by far the most important—with which it was supposed that we no longer had any concern. All credit for these discoveries must go to Freud... The imagination is perhaps on the point of reclaiming its rights. If the depths of our minds harbor strange forces capable of increasing those on the surface, or of successfully contending with them, then it is all in our interest to canalize them...¹¹¹

Reason restrains moderns from apprehending *le merveilleux*. Some attributes of the marvellous—its contradictoriness and its intensity—have already been discussed, but that the marvellous is that which exists within contradictory temporal states has not. There are in Breton's writings several references to "l'or du temps" (the gold of time); for example, in the opening paragraph of his "Introduction au discours sur le peu de réalité" (Introduction to the Discourse on the Paucity of Reality), he writes,

"Wireless": There's a word that has all too recently entered our vocabulary, a locution whose rise has been too rapid for it not to contain many of the dreams of our epoch, for it not to reveal to me one of the very few specifically new determinations of our minds. Feeble reference points such as these are what sometimes give me the illusion of attempting a great adventure, of looking to some small degree like a gold prospector: I seek the gold of time.¹¹²

As Jack J. Spector points out, the irony implicit in such references can be grasped only by recognizing that the French for the gold of time, *l'or*, is homonymous with *l'hors* (the outside).¹¹³ The gold of time is outside time—this is tantamount to a declaration of transcendence. It also offers a paradox: the gold of time—presumably its heart, its innermost being—is timeless. What is *beyond* time comes after all *into* time and becomes its gold. This view is consonant with the incarnational metaphysics of Christianity (and likely derives from that metaphysics); it is also similar to ideas offered by Hegel (who did draw on notions of the Incarnation). But the idea is overdetermined, for it also resonates with hermetical notions: time and gold, the base becoming the noble. So art, as the process of discovering the gold of time, is an alchemical process of transmuting the base elements that belong to time into gold, and it accomplishes this transmutation by finding in time something that surpasses time, by finding the universal in the particular, by discovering a still point within movement. Art, then, accomplishes this transformation by uniting dialectical opposites. *L'(h)or(s) du temps*—a gold at once in and beyond reality—this is the essence of the poetic image.

Hegel's belief that being and becoming fail to coincide is a concept that tenseless logic cannot grasp; therefore the static logic of identity must be replaced with the dynamic logic of the union of contraries. In the early 1930s, Dalí moved a new idea into the centre of Surrealist activity. That idea was the "Surrealist object": this object was a material form, but by a sort of Hegelian logic, it would reveal the power of "the Idea." In the December 1931 issue of *Le surréalisme au service de la révolution*, Dalí offered a *catalogue général* of types of Surrealist objects.

Objects of symbolic function (of automatic origin); for example Giacometti's *Suspended Ball*;

- Transubstantiated objects (of affective or emotive origin), examples of which are soft and straw watches;
- Projected objects (of oneiric origin), divided into figurative and physical categories;
- Enveloped objects (diurnal fantasies), such as the sirenion (an obscure keyboard instrument);
- Machine objects (experimental fantasies) that featured the construction of a balancing chair to aid thinking;
- Cast objects (of hypnagogic origin, i.e. during the process of going to sleep); for instance, an “automobile-desk-chair-lampshade.”¹¹⁴

The Surrealist object also has a dialectical status, for it is both a sign and a thing.¹¹⁵ Often its signification results from its context or, more often, from the way it is perceived—from co-operation between the mind and the world. Since the Surrealist object is a sign, it belongs to the realm of meaning, of subjectivity; but *hasard objectif* ensures that it belongs as well to the realm of objective existents.¹¹⁶ Thus, it offers a partial remedy for the Cartesian error that Surrealism set out to combat.

The Surrealists’ manner of reusing pre-existing materials was to have long-lasting influence. For example, the Situationist Guy Debord based his practice on it as he focused the collage method on reworking pre-existing artistic elements. Debord referred to this reuse and transformation of pre-existing elements as *détournement* (literally, “diversion,” in that he turned the pre-existing material to new use), and he expended much thought on how this method brought about a political negation of the pre-existing entity. Debord’s thoughts on the topic of *détournement* emphasize its power to invest these elements with new significance: “The two fundamental laws of detournement are the loss of importance of each detoured [diverted] autonomous element—which may go so far as to lose its original sense completely—and at the same time the organization of another meaningful ensemble that confers on each element its new scope and effect.”¹¹⁷ He realized that the method depended on a double meaning, his conception of which, while not identical, nevertheless bore some resemblance to Dalí and the Surrealists’ conception of the “double image” (an image that can be taken as representing two, or more, scenes—for example, a face or an African village): “Detournement has a peculiar power which obviously stems from the double meaning, from the enrichment of most of the terms by the coexistence within them of their old senses and their new, immediate senses.”¹¹⁸ Debord’s 1978 film *In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni* (which can be translated roughly as *At Night We Go Down into the Gyre and We Are Consumed by Fire*) has an autobiographical dimension. Debord developed this theme by quoting the first two verses from Ariosto’s *Orlando furioso*, pleading:

I, not being the same as all who surround, can only tell, in my turn, “of the ladies, the knights, the arms, the loves, the conversations and the audacious deeds” of a singular epoch. Others are able to orient and measure the course of their past according to their promotion in a career, the acquisition of various kinds of goods, or, sometimes, the accumulation of scientific or aesthetic works responding to a social demand. Not having known of any determination of this sort, I merely see again, in the passage of this disorderly time, elements which actually constituted it for me—or rather the words and faces which resemble them: they are days and nights, towns and their inhabitants, and, at the base of it all, an incessant war.¹¹⁹

We see a map of Europe, then a shot of Debord at age nineteen, then a shot of a map of Paris as it was at the end of the nineteenth century, then a map of Cuba on the desk of U.S. Senator Jesse Helms. The citation from Ariosto creates an ominous tone for what follows: Europe itself seems a site of conflict. Debord seems the outsider whom Ariosto’s narrator claims to be—but the image also suggests that Debord is at the age when he might be called up. The map of Paris in the nineteenth century turns the commentary towards the theme of history. And Jesse Helms carries the conflict forward to the present.

But of course it is not as simple as this suggests. For one thing, an ambiguity complicates the too-simple reading I have just given: What is the meaning of the rhyme of Debord’s image and Helms’s image? Is it that they are like or that they are unlike? Is it that they are at war with each other or that they are complicitous in a common cause? Or is there no point to the rhyme? Furthermore, the images remain discrete, quasi-autonomous elements—mere accumulations of empirical facts, each testifying to its own point of origin. Thus, we respond to the images as double images of a sort—both as independent fragments and as *lexia* in Debord’s discourse.

Debord’s earlier film, *La société du spectacle* (The Society of the Spectacle, 1973), is an adaptation of his renowned 1967 book. As passages from the book are read in voice-over, points in the text are highlighted by direct illustration or by various ironic contrasts, using clips from Russian and Hollywood features (*Battleship Potemkin*, *Ten Days That Shook the World*, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, *Shanghai Gesture*, *Johnny Guitar*, *Mr. Arkadin*, etc.), TV commercials, publicity shots, pornography, and news and documentary footage, both historical and contemporary, including shots of the Spanish Civil War, Hungary during the 1956 Soviet invasion, Watts (L.A.) during the 1965 riots, the 1968 student rebellion in France, and other revolts of the past. (“But what,” we continually ask ourselves, “is the relation here between text and image?”) Intertitles quote from Marx, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Tocqueville. The various elements possess a dual identity, as fragments that represent their point of origin and as elements in Debord’s critique of contemporary life.

THE CINEMA, PHOTOGRAPHY, AND “THE MARVELLOUS”

The interest in consciousness as it operates in extreme states was one consequence of developments in philosophy and mathematics that brought many to believe that reason had been exposed as incapable of revealing the nature of reality. Those developments led people to seek an alternative, a-rational or super-rational means that might reveal the mysteries of a higher reality, a “sur-reality.” The Surrealists associated this a-rational or super-rational noesis with an intensified consciousness—with extreme, elevated states of consciousness. Part of the Surrealist program involved the search for means of inducing such elevated mental states in the hope of provoking epiphanies.

One approach the Surrealists took in their attempts to liberate the imagination involved magnetizing consciousness by induction (here I use the term in the sense it has in electromagnetic theory). But such willed induction was only one way, they maintained. The mind could also be set free by another form of induction, one that involved clearing it of purpose and allowing it to be affected deeply by the accidents of everyday existence. For reality is not fundamentally rational: it is haphazard, and fascinating—literally “fascinating”—conjunctions of events occur frequently by accident. And as we will see, photography and film are especially suited to conveying the marvellous operations of chance, for their images are induced by whatever “magnetic fields” the raw stock is exposed to. That openness to chance is another of film’s privileges: evidence that nature, art, and consciousness are subject to chance is the clearest refutation of claims that determinism is thoroughgoing and that necessity governs all and everything.

Furthermore, by focusing on the imagination’s role to the exclusion of all else, the Surrealists would have risked suggesting that the surreality they sought was subjective. Actually, what they were after was a dialectical synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity. Chance served the Surrealists as the dialectical counterbalance to the imagination’s subjectivity. The poetic images the cinema offers, which are often obtained by objective chance, are not always pre-visions: they frequently resemble dreams or hallucinations, yet the imagination often plays no role in their making. Because their ontological status involves such a combination of objective and subjective factors, they resemble a Surrealist object. That the cinema’s poetic images often are the result of *hasard objectif* was another factor that made the cinema a privileged art for the Surrealists—indeed, the cinema’s character offered them instruction on possibilities for a new art that would help resolve the antinomies of the spiritual conditions of the age.

As that great paean to chance, *Nadja*, makes obvious, the Surrealists’ methods of seizing on chance were many and various. Sometimes they were

as simple as that involved in their customary manner of viewing movies: Surrealists made a practice of dropping in at a movie theatre, ignorant of what was being shown or when the feature had begun, watching the movie until they became bored, then walking to another nearby movie theatre, watching whatever happened to be on offer at the moment they walked in, staying until they were bored, leaving, going to another theatre . . . and so on. (They practised this form of moviegoing first in Nantes, at the time a relatively small town, and then in Paris's Latin Quarter, where movie theatres were close to one another.) In this way, they used chance to construct a movie out of fragments of various films. Breton described the practice and outlined its consequences:

I have never deplored the incontestable baseness of cinematographic production except on an altogether secondary, subordinate level. When I was "at the cinema age" (it should be recognised that this age exists in life—and that it passes) I never began by consulting the amusement pages to find out what film might chance to be the best, nor did I find out the time the film was to begin. I agreed wholeheartedly with Jacques Vaché in appreciating nothing so much as dropping into the cinema when whatever was playing was playing, at any point in the show, and leaving at the first hint of boredom—of surfeit—to rush off to another cinema where we behaved in the same way, and so on (obviously this practice would be too much of a luxury today). I have never known anything more *magnetising*: it goes without saying that more often than not we left our seats without even knowing the title of the film which was of no importance to us anyway. On a Sunday several hours sufficed to exhaust all that Nantes could offer us: the important thing is that one came out "charged" for a few days; as there had been nothing deliberated about our actions qualitative judgments were forbidden.

...

We saw in the cinema then, such as it was, a lyrical substance simply begging to be hauled in *en masse*, with the aid of chance. I think that what we valued most in it, to the point of taking no interest in anything else, was its *power to disorient*.¹²⁰

Disorientation is a state of mind receptive to *le merveilleux*. Breton argued that the cinema's power to disorient enabled it to open one towards the marvellous; hence, the cinema auditorium was virtually a sacred space, one in which a mystery unfolded itself. This made the cinema the top art ("I have never known anything more *magnetising*"; "what we valued most in [the cinema], *to the point of taking no interest in anything else*, was its power to disorient" [emphases mine]). The cinema auditorium was a place dedicated to a modern mystery:

The *marvel*, besides which the merits of a given film count for little, resides in the devolved faculty of the first-comer to abstract himself from his own life when he feels like it, at least in big cities, as soon as he passes through one of the muffled doors that give on to the blackness. From the instant he takes his seat to the moment he slips into the fiction evolving before his eyes, he passes through a critical point as captivating and imperceptible as that uniting waking and sleeping (the book and even the play are incomparably slower in producing this release) . . . What radiation, what waves, perhaps not resisting attempts to map them out, permit this unison? . . . It is a way of going to the cinema the way others go to church and I think that, from a certain angle, quite independently of what is playing, it is there that the only *absolutely modern* mystery is celebrated.¹²¹

Furthermore, he added, the cinema possessed a unique ability to reveal and make concrete the workings of desire:

As to this mystery there is no doubt that the principal contributions made to it are love and desire . . . What is most specific of all the means of the camera is obviously the power to make concrete the forces of love which, despite everything, remain deficient in books, simply because nothing in them can render the seduction or distress of a glance or certain feelings of priceless giddiness. The radical powerlessness of the plastic arts in this domain goes without saying (one imagines that it has not been given to the painter to show us the radiant image of a kiss). The cinema is alone in extending its empire there, and this alone would be enough for its consecration.¹²²

The last three sentences, of course, amount to a celebration of the cinema as the *ottima arte*, the top art. But a misconception has arisen in connection with this claim: because some figures whom we identify primarily as Surrealist painters made films, Surrealist film has often been viewed as a sideline undertaken by men and women whose primary commitment was to other arts. The fact that most Surrealist filmmakers were painters (an exception is Desnos, who was a writer) has led historians to consider the influence that Surrealist painting and writing had on the cinema and to imagine that such treatment exhausts the topic of the cinema's relation to Surrealism. A more crucial question—the influence of the cinema on Surrealism—by and large has gone unaddressed.

The cinema is disposed to chance—indeed, of all the arts, cinema is the one that seems most readily and unavoidably open to influences from beyond the artist's intention. Jean Epstein (1877–1953)—writer, filmmaker, and one-time employee of August Lumière—published his earliest work in 1921 when he was twenty-four years old: *La poésie aujourd'hui, un nouvel état d'intelligence* (Poetry Today: A New State of Intelligence, 1921), an essay on modern literature that (tellingly) included a chapter titled “The Cinema and Literature Today.” His next small book-pamphlet, a tract on poetry,

photography, and film that incorporated advertising placards, photomontages, and texts, was titled *Bonjour cinema* (also 1921, three years before the founding of the Surrealist movement). A major theme of that book was the relation between chance (overcoming intention) and the marvellous. Epstein presciently saw this as the future of art (and Breton and the Surrealists would soon accept his point). The camera, Epstein proposes, is the real film artist—its capacity to modulate time enables it to convey the universal vibration that is at the core of all things, spiritual, emotional, and material. (Epstein's own films made extensive use of slow motion, and may have prompted Breton's reflection, in *Les pas perdus*, that simply speeding up or slowing down an action is sufficient to render it marvellous.) The close-up can also reveal the vibratory wave-forms that pass beneath the skin of the face, Epstein remarks in the chapter on magnification. He also realized that the cinema's nature brought non-intention and the marvellous into an intimate intercourse:

The artist is reduced to pressing a button. And his intentions come to grief on the hazards...

The true poet—Apollinaire has said it well—is not assassinated [by this]. I do not understand why some turn aside when they are stretched towards this new splendour. They complain of impurities. But is the cutting of diamonds so new a thing? I redouble my love. A sense of expectancy grows. Sources of vitality spring up in corners one thought exhausted and sterile. The epidermis reveals a tender luminosity. The cadence of crowd scenes is a song. Take a look. A man walking, any man, a passer-by: today's reality preserved for an eternity by art. A movable embalming...

But the supernatural. The cinema is essentially supernatural. Everything is transformed through the four *photogénies*. Raymond Lulle [the alchemist!] never knew a finer powder for projection and emotion. All volumes are displaced and reach flashpoint. Life recruits atoms, Brownian motion as sensual as the hips of a woman or young man. The hills harden like muscles. The universe is on edge. The philosopher's light. The atmosphere is full of love.¹²³

This sounds much like the Breton of the period of *hasard objectif*, when Hegelian ideas rose to ascendance in the Surrealist movement. It is also a celebration of the cinema as the top art: "The cinema is essentially supernatural." From the time of Epstein to that of André Bazin, then Susan Sontag, and now Michael Richardson, thinkers have been declaring that the cinema is inherently Surrealistic (and most commentators on Surrealism have noted the Surrealists' expansive interests in the cinema). What seems to have been overlooked is that Surrealism was *modelled* on the cinema. The Surrealists were enthralled by the cinema and desired to understand its operations so that the arts they actually practised would take on its attributes. In large measure, that is what the Surrealist program amounted to. With that understanding, the cinema's inherent surrealism should hardly be surprising.

Bolstering film's marvellous character is its phantasmal nature and the fact that the cinematographic image is created by light. The etymological relation between "phantasm" and the Greek words for the imagination (*phantasia*), for that which appears in consciousness (*phantasma*), and for light (*phannos*) would likely have occurred to them, reminding them of intimate connections among the film's phantasmal nature, its light-borne images, and the imagination.¹²⁴ Photography ("light writing") and cinematography are attuned to an impersonal, universal power, Epstein remarks in "Magnification" (from *Bonjour cinema*), the same vital power that turns plants towards the sun. Light is the central subject of many Surrealist poems, paintings, and dreams (including the first dream that Breton presented in *Clair de terre* [Earthlight, 1923]).

This nexus of associated interests led to a shared enthusiasm among Dadaists and Surrealists for the cinema. On page 2 of issue 14 of *Picabia's 391*, Éluard published an encomium to the cinema in the form of a poem: "ÉCOUTEZ, ÉCOUTEZ, ÉCOUTEZ, Vitraux de bel avenir, TOUS VA BIEN DANS TOUS LES CINÉMAS" (LISTEN, LISTEN, LISTEN, Stained glasses of bright future, ALL IS WELL IN ALL CINEMAS). Picabia himself, during his Dada days, composed small pieces on the cinema. In 1919, Raoul Hausmann created, for the first number of *Dada*, a photomontage titled "Synthetisches Cino [*sic*]der Malerei" (Synthetic Kinema of Painting). In 1920—still during the Dada period—Tristan Tzara wrote a poem titled "Cinéma, calendrier du couleur abstrait" (Cinema, Calendar of Abstract Colour), which was published with accompanying illustrations by Hans Arp.

Even before he joined the Surrealist movement, Salvador Dalí was taken with the cinema's potential. Moving to Paris and associating with Surrealists only heightened his interest. For him, as for Jean Epstein, photography and film represented mechanical means for ensuring a connection between the poetic image and the world of brute, external fact—indeed, he used Le Corbusier's assertion that "the strongest of all is the poetry of facts" as an epigraph for his "Poesia de l'util standardizat" (Poetry of Standardized Utility, March 1928). The year before, he had written "La fotografia, pura creació de l'esperit" (Photography: Pure Creation of the Spirit, September 1927). I suspect that photography is the last art that most people would consider the pure creation of the spirit; but the basis of Dalí's assertion was that reality—that is, what the camera can convey—is created through subjective interpretation. That belief lay behind his use of double images and was the kernel of his paranoiac-critical method. Dalí's writings during this period stressed an anti-art animus, and he viewed photography and film as creative media that were not tainted by traditional norms. In the October 1927 issue of *Ciutat*, Dalí published a sort of manifesto titled "Film-Arte Fil Antiartístico" (Art

Film, Anti-Art Thread), reprinted in *Oui*, illustrating it with recent painting of his own, *La miel es más dulce que la sangre* (Honey Is Sweeter Than Blood).¹²⁵

Beware! Many birds are going to fly away.

Like the bird of photography, you don't have to go hunting far afield for the bird of film; it is everywhere, anywhere in the most unsuspected places. The bird of film, however, is of such a subtle and perfect mimeticism that it remains invisible in its flights across naked objectivity. For this reason, discovering it is a matter of high poetic inspiration.

There is not a single hunt more spiritual than the one for this bird whose presence we cannot perceive. No hunt less bloody and more sanguinary; at the same time it is almost a game: the bird is caught, trapped in the dark room and once again liberated by the crystal lens, free of anilines and with chloroformed wings.

If we listen, we will hear the black and white music of these birds' different velocities as they exit through the electric Milky Way of the projector. Then it will be sweet to see how the most dizzying flights are a succession of calms and the most inspired beating of wings, a series of anaesthetized lulls; each new light, a new anaesthesia.

The light of the cinema is both very spiritual and very physical. Cinema seizes unusual objects and beings that are more invisible and ethereal than the apparitions of spiritualist chiffons. Every cinema image is the capture of an unquestionable spirituality.

The tree, the street, the rugby match are transsubstantiated in a disturbing way in film; a vertigo at once gentle and measured leads us to specific sensual transformations.¹²⁶

The passage starts out comparing photography and film and praising film as the superior art. What makes film superior is that it is invisible—we can't see film at work because it shows us the object so accurately (it is "of such a subtle and perfect mimeticism that it remains invisible"). From that point on, his language becomes one of celebration of the cinema, which he presents as the *ottima arte*. What is more, the passage celebrates the cinema, this great new art, for its power to convert base matter into spiritual forms—into spiritual gold: "The tree, the street, the rugby match are transsubstantiated in a disturbing way in film."

Dalí's statement is replete with alchemical imagery. For example, images of birds are common in alchemy: the bird represents the soul, which aspires to fly upwards, free of the restraints of the earthbound body and the earthbound senses. It seeks the heavenly light but in the end must return to the earthly body. Focused on the mechanics of alchemical operations, the soul enters a meditative state: it reaches the near limits of the spiritual world (but rarely beyond), then brings what it has experienced back to the physical world.

In alchemical imagery, birds mediate between the physical and the spiritual worlds (just as Dalí's text has it). Furthermore, he writes of cinema's flickering light as a *coincidentia oppositorum*—it is sweet to see how the most dizzying flights are a succession of calms and inspired beating of wings.

Dalí's text speaks of trapping the bird in a dark room until it is liberated by the crystal lens. Alchemy teaches the need to bury the *materia prima*, after it has been separated into Philosophical Mercury and Philosophical Sulphur, in a dark chamber, to allow putrefaction to occur. In the process, the male and female principles of that *materia prima* are, alchemists say, killed. Though the process is described as killing, it culminates in the appearance of the philosopher's stone, the first step towards a liberated being. In the text just quoted, Dalí writes of the birds being kept in a dark room, only to emerge liberated by crystal lenses—of course, these lenses are not made of glass, but of crystal. This only makes sense, given their role in the alchemical process.

Dalí maintained a deep interest in alchemy. One of his most famous paintings is *The Metamorphosis of Narcissus* (1937), which shows Narcissus sitting in a pool, intent on his reflection in the water. On the right is a stone figure of similar appearance to him, but seen quite differently—as a hand holding up a bulb or egg from which a narcissus flower bursts forth. In the background, in the middle of the painting, between the two hands/figures, are a number of naked figures and, on the horizon, another Narcissus-like figure. The egg is so common an alchemical image that there is a name for it, the *ovum philosophicum*, or philosophical egg. In alchemical iconography, it symbolizes the alchemical vessel, which in turn symbolizes the self, as a vessel into which one must search. During the alchemical process, the subject, sealed in the philosophical egg, undergoes a symbolic death and rebirth. When the philosophical egg is cracked, a substance with occult powers emerges, an elixir that acts as a catalyst to improve any substance with which it comes into contact. This substance is sometimes called the philosopher's stone, which can change lead into gold (the alchemical transformation stands for the process by which an ordinary person is transformed into an enlightened being, a transformation that is the result of the journey within the self).¹²⁷

Dalí's references to alchemy in his writings include mention of the alchemical master Raymond Lully, who, he noted, was like himself a native of Catalonia: "The Catalan philosopher Raymond Lully, an alchemist... inspires me. Like him, I believe in the transmutation of bodies."¹²⁸ Concerning transmutation, Milly Heyd notes regarding *The Metamorphosis of Narcissus* that

Dalí sees himself as having been born in the shadow of his brother's death from meningitis at the age of seven. Named "Salvador" after his brother, Dalí had to live with his brother's shadow, and felt as if he were his double. The first

chapter of the *Unspeakable Confessions* is called “How to Live with Death” and opens with the depiction of Dalí’s own death. The various shadows, the hidden face, and the reflection in the water [in *The Metamorphosis of Narcissus*] are but shadows of the dead brother haunting Dalí wherever he goes, trying to capture and pull him down to the kingdom of Hades.¹²⁹

She goes on to point out the more general truth to which the painting opens us:

In 1936 the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who was closely related to Dalí, developed his ideas about paranoia and shadows reflected in the mirror. In what he calls “the stage of mirror” the child looks at himself in the mirror without realizing that it is *he*. But this image allows him to develop the sense of bodily unity (countering the fantasies of the dismembered body). Yet, this relation between the subject and his mirror-image means death, since the subject identifies with someone which is not his own self. Narcissus’ fascination with his reflection in the water hints at his death. Dalí’s picture also captures the above mentioned tension between the unified personality and the dismembered or disjoined figure.¹³⁰

The alchemical process, as we will have reason to note again, had deep similarities with the process of analysis.¹³¹

Dalí believed that photography and film are, when handled well, anti-art forms, because they are direct and immediate. These attributes of the two media were important to him, and he hankered to create the impression that he painted in a direct and natural manner. For decades, he would expound his belief that his painting was a form of instantaneous photography, done by hand, and presenting an imaginary and irrational reality. In the 1960s, he told an interviewer,

My sole pictorial ambition is to materialize by means of the most imperialist rage of precision the images of concrete irrationality. The world of imagination and the world of concrete irrationality may be as objectively evident, consistent, durable, as persuasively, cognoscitively [*sic*], and communicably thick as the exterior world of phenomenal reality. The important thing, however, is that which one wishes to communicate: the irrational concrete subject. The pictorial means of expression are concentrated on the subject. The illusionism of the most abjectly *arriviste* and irresistible mimetic art, the clever tricks of a paralyzing foreshortening, the most analytically narrative and discredited academicism, can become sublime hierarchies of thought when combined with new exactness of concrete irrationality as the images of concrete irrationality approach the phenomenal Real, the corresponding means of expression approach those of great realist painting—Velasquez and Vermeer de Delft—to paint realistically in accordance with irrational thinking and the unknown imagination. Instantaneous photography, in color and done by hand, of superfine, extravagant, extra-plastic, extra-pictorial, unexplored, deceiving, hypernormal, feeble images

of concrete irrationality—images momentarily unexplainable and irreducible either by systems of logical intuition or by rational mechanisms.¹³²

Dalí, in sum, maintained the primacy of vision, because what is present to vision (especially vision engendered by a detailed image) has been presented to it with an immediacy that compels assent. In this, he was simply extending the Surrealist conception of the poetic image.

Finally, he considered film and photography as able to accommodate a “documentary” approach, for which he conceived a great interest. He hoped that such an approach might serve him as a means of working himself out of the impasse into which, by the latter half of 1928, his painting had led him.¹³³ In “La fotografia, pura creació de l’esperit,” he celebrated the lens’s ability to reveal the (unconscious) poetry of manufactured goods. The lens, he said, “can caress the cold delicacy of white toilets; follow the languid slowness of aquaria; analyse the most subtle articulations of electrical apparatuses with all the unreal precision of its own magic.” He related the virtues of the photographic lens to its ability to make us see objects anew: “We trust in the new types of imagination, born from simple objective transpositions. But the things we are capable of dreaming lack originality. The miracle is produced with the same exactitude that is required of banking and commercial operations... Photographic imagination, your brain waves are faster and more agile than the murky processes of the subconscious!”¹³⁴

Dalí did not mean by this just the commonplace idea that works of art encourage us to adopt a new experiential relation to objects, from which vantage point we can see them in a fresh way. For he contrasted stereotyped seeing not with seeing objects afresh, but with seeing them as “miraculous and marvellous”—and one who experiences an object as marvellous, he declared, understands the role that one’s dispositions and obsessions play in forming the object that one sees (and that bridges the subjective and objective realms). This is the gist of his comment, in the same essay, that it requires only a small pressure from the fingertip to “bring forth from the pure crystalline objectivity a spiritual bird of thirty-six shades of grey.” He reiterated the point: “Knowing how to look is a new system of spiritual surveillance. Knowing how to look is a means of inventing. And no invention has ever been as pure as that created by the anaesthetic look of the naked eye, without eyelashes, of Zeiss...”¹³⁵

Dalí stressed the ability of photography and film to reveal the marvellous—that is, to apprehend surreality. Film and photography show that surreality and reality are not distinguishable. Like Epstein, he noted that the revelation that the marvellous and the real are (or can be) identical can result from as simple a device as a change of scale or even direct transcription.

Indeed, change of scale is a common device for encouraging reality to expose the marvels that lie at its core, for, Dalí pointed out, it “provokes strange resemblances, unimaginable (though existing) analogies.”¹³⁶ He waxed poetic on the ability of enlargement to reveal the marvellous that inhabits reality: “The clear image of an orchid lyrically unites with the photograph of the interior of the mouth of a tiger, in which the sun forms a thousand shadows with the architecture of the larynx. . . . In the large and limpid eye of a cow, a small white post-mechanical landscape is spherically deformed, but remains precise as far as the sky in which float small and luminous clouds.”¹³⁷

In “La fotografia, pura creació de l’esperit,” Dalí also stressed that the photograph is “quicker and more agile in ‘finds’ than the confused processes in the unconscious.”¹³⁸ He was taken not only with the photograph’s ability to apprehend surreality but also with its ability to do so without imagination playing any role. (This image, so like consciousness’s content, comes from the realm beyond the self—in this sense, it confirms Rimbaud’s claim that “Je est un autre.”)¹³⁹ The analogies that photographs reveal, even though they actually exist, are, he asserted, unimaginable. Fantasy in photography, he claimed, is “born of. . . simple objective transcription.”¹⁴⁰ This was a direct attack on Charles Baudelaire’s artistic theory, which had won widespread allegiance. The Renaissance understood the work of art as a transcendent construct that gave body to ideas the mind apprehends through a higher faculty (Platonic reason, associated in the Renaissance with language)—that is why Renaissance art favoured the emblem and the allegory. Later, as Svetlana Alpers shows in *The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century* (1983), as a truly visual culture emerged and knowledge was understood to arise through the senses, an art developed that provides a factual description of material (visible) reality. With Baudelaire a new conception of artmaking appears—the artwork emerges at the point where the outer world of phenomena and the inner world of imagination meet. The artist becomes an initiator into this magical third space. The imagination takes on a new importance, greater than that of reason or the senses.

Then again, Baudelaire was skeptical of photography’s claims to the status of an art. Dalí’s idea that photography gains an advantage through bypassing the imagination is also implicit in his claim that scale itself can render an object marvellous: if a lens can capture a cube of sugar at a scale that bears comparison with the most gigantic structure, the sugar cube can be experienced as marvellous.

In bypassing the imagination, the lens’s transforming power resembles that of another, more renowned Surrealist method, viz., automatism, which moves immediately to the phase of objectification, and does so without the subjective representation being fully elaborated (if at all). The making of

cadavres exquis provides another example of a creative method that bypasses imagination, for in that process, there is no subjective precursor for the resultant image or poem (except insofar as it is reasonable to speak of an objectively ideal composite image, which each of the participants apprehended partially and realized partially). Dalí concluded that the unimaginative lens transforms the object, revealing its marvels, through a miraculous process that constitutes an exact analogy to other Surrealist practices.

But Dalí soon came to doubt that a change of scale was enough to transmute a photographic transcription of reality into a revelation of the marvellous. With this change, photography's role became subsumed in a more general effort to gain "knowledge of reality" (*conocimiento de la realidad*). In an article titled "Realidad y sobrerrealidad" (Reality and Surreality, 1928), Dalí offered a revised understanding of photography's potential—here he asserted that reality is a product of the spirit and that by allowing intellectual processes to usurp the role of the spirit in creating aesthetic systems, moderns had let reality slip away. Works of art created through intellectual processes are unable to move us poetically, he claimed, because lyricism requires that the givens (*datos*) of reality be perceived through our consciousness (our mentality). These *datos* give evidence of a surreality inherent in reality, a surreality that can be probed through automatism and through other means of investigating the subconscious. This philosophy of immanence, to which the paranoiac-critical years saw him increasingly committed, led Dalí to understand that there were patterns of meaning in the objective world that unite phenomena that, absent the apprehension of these patterns, appear utterly diverse. He sought a means to help us see that diverse phenomena belong together in one coherent system, to acquire knowledge of the ontological truths that make ontic truths possible—and he believed that he had discovered this means in documentary (which he understood essentially as an inventory of some domain). Dalí concluded that photography is the best means for creating this detailed typological survey; in "La dada fotogràfica" (The Photographic Data, 1929), he stated that "photography is able to realize the most complete, scrupulous and stirring catalogue ever imagined. From the fine detail of aquariums to the quickest and most fugitive gestures of wild beasts, photography offers us a thousand fragmentary images resulting in a dramatized cognitive totalization."¹⁴¹

PHOTOGRAPHY, THE SURREALIST OBJECT, AND THE *UNHEIMLICH*

A photograph has many of the same attributes as a Surrealist object. The Surrealist object, the marvellous object, is apprehended as an irreducible particularity—as a presence that surpasses representation as a general being.¹⁴²

And because it cannot be reduced to a generality, its presence exceeds language (nouns are general terms). Thus, the Surrealist object's be-ing escapes reason—indeed, it escapes sense and sensibility.

However, the presence of the Surrealist object is equivocal: the object is a spatial object, yet its presence, because it exceeds all concepts, is nowhere. It is both an object in space and an object whose be-ing exceeds spatial location. In its latter aspect, its be-ing resembles that of a representation: like a representation, its be-ing is deferred—in order to apprehend it, a subject must refer the object to a concept or to a sign. This deferral dislodges the object from its spatial immediacy and relocates it in another place, in a scene of absence.

Michael Riffaterre has pointed out that the lexia of Surrealist writing resemble hieroglyphs: “We do not understand them as language or even as isolated symbols. They rather represent a language the key to which has been hid away somewhere.”¹⁴³ The Surrealist text is characterized both by meaning (presence) and by lack of meaning (the key to the text is hidden away, absent). The Surrealist text is a presence haunted by an absence. This dual existence has something of the character of the uncanny, in that it resembles the dual existence of those enigmatic productions, conscious mental images, whose “other scene” is the unconscious.

Furthermore, the representations embodied in a Surrealist object (like representations in consciousness) are generated in much the same way as hallucinations or daydreams are, in a place and by an agency that is unknown (except through its effects). Like that of a hallucination, daydream, or indeed any mental representation, the existence of a Surrealist text or object (but especially an object) is also relative, and this reference to another scene invests the Surrealist object—an object whose presence strikes one with such immediacy—with a paradoxical quality of absence. Thus, the object takes on the character of an image or a second-order reality. The Surrealist object, which at first approach appears to be an immediate presence, turns out to be invested with “absence”—an absence that in fact is characteristic of representations, but in its case relates to a completely unrepresentable lost object. The presence/absence with which the Surrealist object is invested is that of the uncanny, the *Unheimlich*, which, when it returns, disturbs representation (for the *Unheimlich* belongs to the domain of that which merits repression).

The muteness of the Surrealist object—the silence and inertness it suggests—endows it with traces of the present/absent *Unheimlich*. Paul Delvaux's Venus pictures (*La voix publique* [The Public Voice, 1948], *Train de nuit* [The Night Train, 1947], *Venus endormie* [Venus Asleep, 1944], and *Les belles de nuit* [Night Beauties, 1936]), are paradigmatic instances of this: they present inert figures who seem overwhelmed by a visible absence and a palpable menace. Atget's photographs, which the Surrealists discovered and loved, also provoke

a sense of absence-as-presence. They were important to the Surrealists partly for what they reveal about a photograph—that every photograph is a nexus of presence and absence.

Surrealists were not alone in their interest in the paradoxical absent presence (and present absence) of objects that are invested with the lure of the *Unheimlich*. The distance that separates representations (and knowledge) from origins was an important theme of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century thought. Here is one significant piece of evidence for this claim: the Freudian unconscious is a hypothesized absent “Other” that can never be made present. The techniques used in psychoanalysis (free association, dream analysis, the experience of transference) are methods for uncovering evidence of the operations of the unconscious (absence) in the traces that the unconscious leaves in conscious thought (presence). And here is a second piece of evidence: Freud’s account of the formation of the ego (*das Ich*) also depicts the ego as an absent presence, for Freud claimed that the ego constitutes itself by distinguishing itself as a unique and particular object different from other egos. The last object or impossible “real” is its very foundation. Here is a final piece of evidence: Marcel Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu* concerns the means by which memory converts immediate experience into alienated forms characterized by absence. That novel’s hero, by recalling his past, turns absence into a represented—and re-presented—presence.

A fundamental purpose of Surrealism is to bring into question, and indeed to undo, the conviction that reality is stable, fixed, a self-disclosing *donné*. The Surrealists’ fascination with the double image was that it posed this question: Which way of seeing this bimorphic (or polymorphic) representation corresponds to reality? Or, to take Breton’s famous example, does the postcard represent a face or an African village? The true answer is that it represents neither, for like images in consciousness, there is no reality outside the image that it represents. Images are the product of the imagination (generally, of the automated imagination), and all that we are acquainted with are those imaginative products. The methods the Surrealists contrived suggested “the sovereignty of the mind” over reality, or, at least, the mind’s implication in the construction of reality. Donald Kuspit, an art historian / critic whose writings are founded on psychoanalytic principles, draws on the ideas of Michael Balint to formulate some perceptive remarks about the Surrealists’ methods:

Michael Balint’s account of reality testing is useful in understanding just exactly what the Surrealist suspension of it involves and how it results in what might be called a lame duck, bizarre reality, in which objects are composed of incongruous parts, making them “surreal” (all the more so because the parts never form an organic whole). The Surrealist object remains unfinished and ill-formed,

that is, permanently arrested in its formation, and as such, “unsightly.” Reality is, as Dalí might say, diseased, mental illness reified. Reality testing involves four steps, Balint writes: “The first is to decide whether the sensations are coming from within or from without. The second step is to infer from the sensations what it is that causes them. I shall call this step the object formation. Very closely connected with it is the third step, to find the significance of the sensations. The problem to solve is: what does it mean to me that I perceive them? This step could be called the interpretation or finding of the meaning. The fourth step is then to find the correct reaction to the perceived sensations.”¹⁴⁴

How do the Surrealists subvert these steps? First, they equivocate about the source of the sensations, refusing to decide whether they come from within or from without. Secondly, they assume that the sensations appear spontaneously, as though they caused themselves, or have no cause. They are mysteriously given. Such enigmatic sensations can never congeal into a clear and distinct object. It is hard to interpret the resulting aborted object, or rather, one can find whatever meaning one wants in it, since it has no clear meaning of its own, that is, no meaning bound to its integrity or wholeness, for it has none. It is a sum of exciting sensations—rudimentary fragments of sense experience—which do not add up to a whole object. As such, it has no overall meaning or, ultimately, any meaning, for the sensations, unintegrated, seem primordially given, that is, so consummately concrete they preclude symbolization. Finally, there being nothing correct or exact about the Surrealist object—it is inherently incorrect and unintelligible, as its bizarreness indicates—there can be no correct or proper reaction to it: It becomes a stimulating screen—the exciting surface of Leonardo’s wall [which Max Ernst referred to in *Beyond Painting*]—in which every viewer can find his or her own mental landscape. The Surrealist hallucination is a composite of conflicting sensations in a state of suspended reality, which adds to their bizarreness, that is, their sense of unreality.¹⁴⁵

The Surrealist object is an especially perverse (because paradoxical) deployment of the principle, because it offers an object—a seemingly real object—but one that, for the reasons that Kuspit notes, cannot be real, and so the Surrealist object confounds us regarding its ontological status. Furthermore, like the double image and its verbal analogue, the pun (which Surrealists were so fond of) destabilizes meaning—and often lays meaning to ruin.

ERNST’S FROTTAGE AS A HANDMADE TRACE AND AUTOMATIST FORM

In July 1924, Max Ernst left Europe to join Paul and Gala Éluard in Indochina. In October of that year, not long before Ernst’s return, André Breton published the *Manifeste du surréalisme*. That manifesto hardly acknowledged the visual arts—only a footnote made reference to “Seurat, Gustave Moreau, Matisse, . . . Derain, Picasso, . . . Braque, Duchamp, Picabia, Chirico, . . . Klee, Man Ray, Max Ernst, and . . . André Masson”—and it listed only one painter

as belonging to the group: the fantastic percussionist, visual artist, and part-time film actor Georges Malkine (1898–1970), a friend of Robert Desnos.¹⁴⁶ The first proto-Surrealist magazine, *Littérature*, had been founded by Breton, Soupault, and Aragon, who were soon joined by other writers: Tzara, Péret, Éluard, Desnos, Crevel. Breton displayed little concern with developing a Surrealist visual art.

The visual arts had enjoyed a proud place in the Dada movement, so Breton's lack of interest in them must have disappointed Max Ernst, and his chagrin would have been exacerbated when an attack on the *beaux arts* appeared in the movement's new journal, *La révolution surréaliste*. The author was one of the journal's editors, Pierre Naville (1903–83), a leftist sociologist: "Masters, master-crooks, smear your canvases. Everyone knows there is no *surrealist painting*. Neither the marks of a pencil abandoned to the accidents of gesture, nor the image retracing the forms of the dream."¹⁴⁷ These dismissals of Surrealist visual art seem all the more peculiar when one considers that the visual "sign" calls us to make ourselves available to it in ways that the verbal sign does not. In our transactions with visual signs, illumination precedes elucidation and sensibility triumphs over conceptualization. The priority that the non-verbal sign accords intuition is the source of the image's poetic strength: the image can so much more readily have trade with the realm of the unthinkable. Indeed, one can rightly say that until Surrealism embraced the visual arts, it was incomplete.

The situation ameliorated somewhat with the publication of Breton's "Le surréalisme et la peinture" (in two parts in the July 1925 and March 1926 issues of *La révolution surréaliste*). Still, in the second part of the article, Breton extolled, as a genuine parallel to the psychic automatism that the Surrealist writers had adopted, the sort of cursive drawing practised by André Masson, who produced visual forms without any predetermined plan. Breton proceeded to disparage "the other road available to surrealism," which strove for "the stabilizing of dream images in the kind of still-life deception known as *trompe-l'oeil* (and the very word "deception" betrays the weakness of the process)."¹⁴⁸

Ernst's illusionist collages were now being questioned by his fellow Surrealists, and he felt an urge to discover some sort of non-deliberate, improvisatory process more akin to the automatist practices that Desnos, Soupault, Breton, and Péret employed in their writing and that Dalí was celebrating with his writing on photography. Ernst described the moment when he struck upon that method:

On the tenth of August, 1925... finding myself one rainy evening in a seaside inn, I was struck by the obsession that showed to my excited gaze the floor-

boards upon which a thousand scrubbings had deepened the grooves. I decided then to investigate the symbolism of this obsession and, in order to aid my meditative and hallucinatory faculties, I made from the boards a series of drawings by placing on them, at random, sheets of paper which I undertook to rub with black lead. In gazing attentively at the drawings thus obtained, “the dark passages and those of a gently lighted penumbra,” I was surprised by the sudden intensification of my visionary capacities and by the hallucinatory succession of contradictory images superimposed, one upon the other, with the persistence and rapidity characteristic of amorous memories . . .

My curiosity awakened and astonished, I began to experiment indifferently and to question, utilizing the same means, all sorts of materials to be found in my visual field: leaves and their veins, the ragged edges of a bit of linen, the brushstrokes of a “modern” painting, the unwound thread from a spool, etc. There my eyes discovered human heads, animals, a battle that ended with a kiss . . .¹⁴⁹

Ernst believed the process, called *frottage*, to be the “the real equivalent of that which is already known by the term *automatic writing*” since “it is as a spectator that the author assists, indifferent or passionate, at the birth of his work and watches the phases of its development.”¹⁵⁰

Ernst produced his *frottage* pieces by rubbing a pencil over a sheet of paper, under which a textured (natural or man-made) object had been placed. Usually he placed a variety of objects under the paper so that their textures lost their individual identities and were integrated into a single, unified piece.¹⁵¹ In the graphic series *Historie naturelle* (1926), he presented thirty-four works produced in this manner, along with a Dada prose poem by Hans Arp. The work is fundamentally concerned with how slight changes can effect a thoroughgoing transformation: the texture of rough cloth becomes that of the distant space, the texture of a metal surface becomes that of planets in space, tiny forms seem to fill enormous expanses, and mineral forms are superimposed on animal or vegetable forms. Furthermore, in these works, *frottage* combines with figurative forms, detailed reproductions combine with freer forms, and figures with rectilinear outlines combine with figures with curvilinear outlines. This mixing of forms suggests transformation, as the image is transposed from the animal or vegetable world to the geological and then to the mechanical.

The context in which Ernst offered his remarks on *frottage* (from French *frotter*, “to rub”) is important to our thesis concerning artists’ interests in developing new forms in whatever media they worked so that those forms would acquire some of the cinema’s attributes. In 1936, in “Au-delà de la peinture” (Beyond Painting), published in *Cahiers d’art*, Ernst offered an autobiographical account of his discovery and practice of collage; he also developed a theory of collage that linked it to the structure of desire. He

described the generation of sequential images in collage as “se superposant les unes aux autres avec la persistance et la rapidité qui sont le propre des souvenirs amoureux et des visions de demi-sommeil.”¹⁵² He also linked sexual desire to the urge to experiment with new artistic forms, and posited that collage might eventually replace painting. But associating collage with the operations of desire does not support claims for collage’s privilege; after all, Ernst’s sexually charged paintings give equally remarkable evidence of the operations of desire. What truly distinguishes collages from paintings is that collages use a “jumbled” narrative in which various colliding systems of reference are held together in a dynamic matrix of strife and dissent that animates an implausibly veristic image. These features reveal what we might call the complicity of desire with the imaginary real. By the seemingly oxymoronic “imaginary real,” I mean reality as Dalí and the Surrealists understood it—as an imaginative construct that has such a density of detail that we take it for real—or indeed, that it becomes real. These conceptions do apply to the cinema, it is true. The cinema is the paradigm, in the sense that other arts can be reconciled to possessing these features, but the cinema has them by its very nature.

SURREALISM, APOLLINAIRE, AND RECONCILIATION

Surrealism sought to intensify the elements that make up an artwork by bringing them into relationship with other contradictory elements. Some of the Surrealists’ best-known constructions revealing their interest in this sort of intensification involved the juxtaposition of elements to produce startling effects, either because the adjoined elements seemed temporally, spatially, or conceptually incongruous, or were made strange by some other means.

This form of construction highlights the complex condition of Surrealism—a condition that developed from the influences that competed to produce the movement. Guillaume Apollinaire’s poetry is a splendid example of early modernist writing. Like the works of the Cubist painters (the aesthetics of which he helped systematize in *Les peintres cubistes: méditations esthétiques*, 1913), his poetry begins with motifs drawn from the everyday world; and like the Cubist painters, he dissolved the ligatures binding these everyday elements together. In this way, he altered the relation between the structure into which these elements were incorporated and the everyday world from which they were drawn. The overall form was decided less by representational than by formal determinants. Apollinaire acknowledged this feature of Cubist art (and implicitly his own art) in “Au sujet de la peinture moderne” (On the Subject in Modern Painting, 1912):

If painters still observe nature, they no longer imitate it, and they carefully avoid the representation of natural scenes observed directly or reconstituted through study...

Verisimilitude no longer has any importance, for the artist sacrifices everything to the composition of his picture. The subject no longer counts, or if it counts, it counts for very little.

If the aim of painting has remained what it always was—namely to give pleasure to the eye—the works of the new painters require the viewer to find in them a different kind of pleasure from the one he can just as easily find in the spectacle of nature.

An entirely new art is thus being evolved, an art that will be to painting, as painting has hitherto been envisaged, what music is to literature.

It will be pure painting, just as music is pure literature.

In listening to a concert, the music-lover experiences a joy qualitatively different from that he experiences in listening to natural sounds, such as the murmur of a stream, the rushing of a torrent, the whistling of the wind in the forest, or to the harmonies of a human language founded on reason and not on aesthetics.

Similarly, the new painters provide their admirers with artistic sensations due exclusively to the harmony of lights and shades and independent of the subject depicted in the picture.¹⁵³

The Cubists, in painting, and Apollinaire, in writing, were among the first to create works in which non-representational determinants played an important role in deciding the shape of the overall piece. For that reason, the Cubist painters and Apollinaire are viewed as pioneers of modernism.

Apollinaire's leanings towards disjunctive forms led him to incorporate fragments of simultaneous conversations that he had overheard in cafés or elsewhere. The resulting constructions were typical of what McLuhan would later refer to as acoustic space. This dimension of his poetry, which had an enormous influence on the Surrealistic notion of *hasard objectif*, arose in opposition to the Classical spirit, which lay at the heart of some of the principal modernist movements (including Cubism, Constructivism, Neo-Plasticism, Orphism, and Minimalism).¹⁵⁴ The motivation for this form of construction was largely representational: Apollinaire hoped, through this means of construction, to suggest the character of modern life, with its plural sources of sensory stimulation. I have already remarked that this interest led Apollinaire to the realization that cinema was an art that modern art practices should imitate.

The Surrealists had a conflicted relationship with modernism; better, perhaps, would be to say that it was a dialectical relationship with moments of both affirmation and negation. The Surrealists adopted collage construction from the Cubists, but then turned it towards representing the real-as-fantastic

(or the liberation of fantasy). They elicited “surprise” through verbal methods not unlike Apollinaire’s. Also like Apollinaire, they relied on chance, but under the aegis of Dadaism, they transformed these chance operations into procedures for revealing the operations of occult powers.

The modernists must have admired the Surrealists’ forms for the way they dismantled narrative, yet the Surrealists’ explosive means for achieving that end—which often simulated madness—were antithetical to the voluntarism that underlay the modernist program. The Surrealists’ use of ekphrastic constructions highlights their methods’ anti-voluntarist implications (and their dismissal of ideas about pure visuality): in practice, ekphrasis separated the image it produced from the appearance of reality and brought the principles of its construction into evidence, thereby showing how the image linked the real to the fantastic. The sleeping fits that Surrealists induced during the so-called *époque des sommeils* were not an escape from reality. Sleep, rather, provided a bridge between “mundane reality” and the “other reality” to which they sought to give a figure: Surrealists understood the somniloquous acts in the séance rooms of those members of the Surrealist circle (Robert Desnos, René Crevel, Benjamin Péret) who were gifted with an especially prodigious ability to describe fabulous images while in the realm of sleep as transmitting to the quotidian world images from the “other place”—that is, from a more intense order of existence.¹⁵⁵ While Descartes’s famous dream prompted him to doubt the external existence of the objects that perception reveals, and suggested to him the possibility that all sights, sounds, and smells of perception are merely phantasms, Surrealist dreams linked the higher realm of imagination with the mundane world to form an undivided whole, by importing the intense (and actual) phenomema of the sleeping world into the waking world, whose phenomenal vivacity they augmented.

In their efforts to reveal the infinite in the finite, the universal in the particular, the concept in the material, the Surrealists carried out a program for the arts that they derived from the philosophy of Hegel; but it was through the techniques of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis that they strove to realize their program. Hegel and Freud were the two great influences on Surrealism. It is not by chance that both wrote in German: the Surrealists’ defiance of, and even contempt for, French postwar politics predisposed them towards things German. (Thus, Breton would speak of longing for an understanding between France and “the marvelous country of thought and light which in one century gave birth to Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx.”) But of these two, it was without question Freud who had the most powerful influence.¹⁵⁶ In his *Manifeste du surréalisme* of 1924, Breton offered the following definitions of Surrealism:

SURREALISM, *n.* Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express—verbally, by means of the written word, or in any other manner—the actual functioning of thought. Dictated by thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern.¹⁵⁷

ENCYCLOPEDIA. *Philosophy.* Surrealism is based on the belief in the superior reality of certain forms of previously neglected associations, in the omnipotence of dream, in the disinterested play of thought. It tends to ruin once and for all all other psychic mechanisms and to substitute itself for them in solving all principal problems of life.¹⁵⁸

Freud's interest—evidenced in *Totem und Tabu: Einige Übereinstimmung im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker* (Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, 1913)—in the psychic uses that *die Wilden und der Neurotiker* made of the fetish almost certainly influenced the Surrealists, who were devotees of the Musée du Trocadéro, as Paris's ethnographic museum was then called.¹⁵⁹ The idea of the “omnipotence of dream” may well have been influenced by the same text. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud wrote,

I have adopted the term “Omnipotence of Thought” from a highly intelligent man, a former sufferer from compulsion neurosis, who, after being cured through psychoanalytic treatment, was able to demonstrate his efficiency and good sense. He had coined this phrase to designate all those peculiar and uncanny experiences which seemed to pursue him just as they pursue others afflicted with his malady. Thus if he happened to think of a person, he was actually confronted with this person as if he had conjured him up; if he inquired suddenly about the state of health of an acquaintance whom he had long missed he was sure to hear that this acquaintance had just died, so that he could believe that the deceased had drawn his attention to himself by telepathic means; if he uttered a half meant imprecation to a stranger, he could expect to have him die soon thereafter and burden him with the responsibility of his death.¹⁶⁰

Freud goes on to discuss, first, how we come to renounce our belief in the omnipotence of thought, and later, how the capacity for grandiose thinking allows one group of created objects to fuse desire with reality.

Only in one field has the omnipotence of thought been retained in our civilization, namely in art. In art alone it still happens that man, consumed by his wishes, produces something similar to the gratification of these wishes, and this playing, thanks to artistic illusion, calls forth effects as if it were something real. We rightly speak of the magic of art and compare the artist with a magician. But this comparison is perhaps more important than it claims to be. Art, which certainly did not begin as art for art's sake, originally served tendencies which to-day have for the greater part ceased to exist. Among these we may suspect various magic intentions.¹⁶¹

SURREALISM AND THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC

The account we have been formulating of Surrealism proposes that developments in philosophy and mathematics exposed incoherencies at the heart of reason—reason as it was understood, say, in the philosophies of Bacon and Descartes. These supposed inconsistencies influenced an astonishing number of thinkers and artists in the early decades of the twentieth century, and many of these thinkers and artists set out to find alternative forms of understanding that would be free of the inconsistencies that philosophers and mathematicians had exposed. To be sure, there was an earlier model for the critique of Baconian/Cartesian reason, of which these artists and thinkers could avail themselves—one that had the capacity to reconcile subjectivity with objectivity, dream with reality. For the Surrealists, the philosophy of Georg W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) offered a way of overcoming the limitations of earlier philosophies. Indeed, one of Hegel’s principal topics was the limitations of earlier philosophical conceptions of the nature and operation of common logic.

Hegel saw ordinary logic (the logic of identity) as based in *das Verständige* (the Understanding), which operates by separations and distinctions—that is, by setting what a thing is by essence (i.e., what it is by itself and in itself) and distinguishing it from that which it is only through itself in its relation with other things. This separate nature—the thing’s essence, so isolated—is apart from change and development, which arise from the differing contexts in which the object finds itself. Hegel acknowledged that efficient thought and action require this separative operation of *das Verständige*: things in the world do have self-identities, and it would be folly to ignore them. Nonetheless, we come to recognize—and Hegel’s philosophy is intent upon teaching us this fact—that however assiduously we might strive after that separation, it remains an impossible goal to achieve. Hegel criticizes what he sometimes calls “common logic,” sometimes “formal logic,” and sometimes “ordinary logic” for not recognizing the impossibility that any thing can be conceived quite apart from other things, that any content can be understood adequately apart from other contents that oppose or complete it. In reality, one content passes into another, one notion flows into another. The Understanding requires a clear, distinct, unchanging entity—and a notion separate from all others—but that logical flux makes it impossible to achieve that fixity, except perhaps for a limited purpose and in a limited range or span.

What Hegel calls Reason—not what I have been calling calculative reason, but a higher faculty—is needed to overcome the limitations of the Understanding (which is closer to calculative reason). In the introduction to his *Wissenschaft der Logik* (Science of Logic, two volumes, 1812–16), Hegel wrote

that “The understanding determines, and holds the determinations fixed; reason is negative and dialectical, because it resolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positive because it generates the universal and comprehends the particular therein.”¹⁶²

A different logic—a higher, philosophical logic—is required to truly grasp reality. That logic is the way of Reason, and it depends on the dialectic. The dialectic brings the power of the negative to bear on those fixities erected by the Understanding: “Reason is negative and dialectical, because it resolves the determinations of the Understanding into nothing,” Hegel wrote.¹⁶³ Herbert Marcuse commented on the negative in Hegel’s thought:

Hegel repeats over and over that dialectics has this “negative” character . . . In all these uses “negative” has a twofold reference: it indicates, first, the negation of the fixed and static categories of common sense and, secondly, the negative and therefore untrue character of the world designated by these categories. As we have already seen, negativity is manifest in the very process of reality, so that nothing that exists is true in its given form. Every single thing has to evolve new conditions and forms if it is to fulfill its potentialities.¹⁶⁴

The dialectic advances the cause of Reason by showing that the distinctions that the Understanding erects are untenable when considered from a higher standpoint: being cannot be considered apart from non-being, subjectivity cannot be held apart from objectivity. Hegel used the idea of the dialectic to show that the common logic was inadequate—that it was riven by contradictions. He deployed it to challenge the notions proposed by the Understanding; he used that same idea to reveal the inadequacies and inconsistencies of ordinary logic and the Understanding (something close to what I have been calling calculative reason), and also to show how reality can be grasped through a higher logic. The analogy with the situation thinkers felt themselves in after it had been revealed that mathematical reason was fraught with inconsistencies should be clear; as should be the parallel between Hegel’s ideas on Reason and the higher logic (the dialectic), on the one hand, and the twentieth-century thinkers’ interest in identifying an alternative noesis, on the other. It should not be surprising, then, despite Hegel’s emphasis on its rationality, that his dialectic became a model for the Surrealists as they sought a higher way of knowing. Their high estimation of Hegel was bolstered further by Hegel’s emphasis on freedom and by his demonstration that this freedom is attained through negation—that is, through the dialectic’s exposing the inadequacies of ordinary logic.¹⁶⁵

Even the images that Hegel used to contrast Reason (*Vernunft*) and Understanding (*Verstand*)—our analogous terms would be noesis and reason-as-calculation—would have appealed to the Surrealists.¹⁶⁶ A famous image

is found in the preface to the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Phenomenology of Spirit or Phenomenology of Mind, 1804), which, we know, Hegel composed after he had completed the main body of the text, and accordingly has something of the character of a survey-recollection. In paragraph 47 of that preface, he describes the True, which is apprehended by Reason: “The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement, the single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent.”¹⁶⁷

Contrast that with Hegel’s remarks on Kant’s and Fichte’s schemas for understanding, which resemble a “synoptic table . . . a skeleton with tickets stuck all over it” (para. 50). In paragraph 51, he states that the “products of reflection [are] all . . . equally products of the lifeless [U]nderstanding and external cogitation.” He compares the impact of the Understanding on the subject to the “Spirit being flayed and then seeing its skin wrapped around a lifeless knowledge and its conceit” (para. 52). Because the Understanding schematizes knowledge, “a table of contents is all it offers” (para. 53).

The Understanding produces through reflection a world that is, simply, dead. The objects that populate that dead world have been made lifeless by being categorized, labelled. The Understanding grasps the body as anatomically ordered parts (or objects); Reason, Hegel says, enters into the body to apprehend its living principle as a living *subject*.¹⁶⁸

So Hegel responded to Kant. With Kant, Hegel believed, the Understanding had taken the place of Reason. In *Wissenschaft der Logick*, Hegel pointed out that the ancient metaphysicians had believed it was possible to attain true knowledge of things. But now that “reflective Understanding” had taken over philosophy, philosophers no longer believed in that possibility. Hegel set out to confirm what the ancients had believed—that philosophy can know more. To do that, he would have to refute Kant and the empiricists.

The analogy with the situation of thinkers around the time of the Surrealists should be clear: the Baconian tradition in philosophy had limited our knowledge to empirical matters. Speculative reason, the empiricists believed, was a travesty of true thought and led humans into confusion. Thus, the empiricists limited our thought to a small island in a sea whose further reaches were unattainable, just as Kant had done. Hegel set out to refute Kant and the empiricists in order to show that speculative truth was still attainable. According to thinkers in the early twentieth century, empiricist reason had already refuted itself, making way for a higher and more speculative path to truth. Hegel proposed the dialectic as that way, and the Surrealists, noting the parallels between his situation and theirs, accepted as much.

In the early twentieth century, Breton declared what he hoped to achieve through Surrealism: the resolution of two states—dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory—into a kind of absolute reality, a surreality. A century and more before him, Hegel had written about the synthesis of opposites.¹⁶⁹ In *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 1817), he had considered the dialectic to be the principle of movement and change:

We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite... We have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and stable it may deem itself.¹⁷⁰

Hegel went on to say this about the cognitive stage that was higher than what he called the Understanding—the cognitive stage he called Reason: “The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition—the affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition.”¹⁷¹ He analogized Reason and the dialectic—according to his manner of construing those terms—to the synthesis that the mystical represents: “. . . the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the concrete unity of those propositions, which [U]nderstanding [in Hegel’s taxonomy of cognition, a lower order of apprehension] only accepts in their separation and opposition.”¹⁷² And, most apposite to Breton’s characterization of Surrealism, he proclaimed that Reason transcends the distinction between subjective and objective: “The speculative is in its true signification, neither preliminarily nor even definitively, something merely subjective: that, on the contrary, it expressly rises above such oppositions as that between subjective and objective, which the [U]nderstanding cannot get over, and absorbing them in itself, evinces its own concrete and all-embracing nature.”¹⁷³

In the *Second manifeste du surréalisme* (Second Manifesto of Surrealism, 1930), Breton expanded on the idea that Surrealism was a world view founded in the same spirit of reconciliation as taught by Hegel: “Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point in the mind at which life and death, the real and the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as contradictions. Now, search as one may one will never find any other motivating force in the activities of the Surrealists than the hope of finding and fixing this point.”¹⁷⁴

The Surrealists declared that one of their principal goals was to reconcile the ideal and material realms. That the reality we know is an amalgam of subject and object, of knower and known, was a theme that Kant had

introduced into philosophy and that the Jena philosophers had developed, and it had found its culminating expression in Hegel. Hegel agreed with Kant that consciousness of an object necessarily implies consciousness of a subject: to be conscious of an object is to be conscious of oneself perceiving that object. In other words, consciousness involves self-consciousness. Hegel developed this Kantian idea to suggest that self-consciousness is not monadic: it involves not a single subject and an object but other subjects in addition. Our consciousness of ourselves depends on our awareness that we are seen by others and on our awareness of *how* we are seen by others. Self-consciousness, then, depends on our identification with the consciousness of another. Thus, self-consciousness, far from being monadic, is actually a social process—the self-image that self-consciousness requires is obtained by assuming another’s view of the world as our own. Consciousness of self requires consciousness of an other.

Interest in Hegel was not all that common in France at the time of the Surrealists. It is clear that later the phenomenologists and the existentialists became familiar with his thought (in particular, with *Phänomenologie des Geistes*), and this has created the impression in intellectual circles that French intellectuals have had a long-standing interest in Hegel. But, by 1932, Hegel’s great *Wissenschaft der Logik* still had not been translated into French. André Thinion, in an article that opened the third volume of *Le surréalisme au service de la révolution*, remarked that “with the exception of a few professional philosophers, [Surrealists] are alone in claiming derivation from Hegelian thought and in referring constantly their activities to this ideology.”¹⁷⁵

Breton would reveal the origins of his interest in Hegel in one of his 1952 radio interviews with André Parinaud.¹⁷⁶ There, he traced Surrealism’s founding ideas back to his schooldays, and specifically to 1912 (when he was sixteen years old). Parinaud had referred to a passage from the *Second manifeste du surréalisme*, “in which you assign as Surrealism’s motivation to find and fix the point of the mind at which life and death, the real and the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as contradictions,” and invited Breton to comment.¹⁷⁷ Breton replied,

I hardly need stress the “Hegelian” aspect of the idea of surpassing all antinomies. It was undeniably Hegel—and no one else—who put me in the condition necessary to perceive this point, to strain toward it with all my might, and to make this very tension my life’s goal. No doubt there are others whose knowledge of Hegel’s works far surpasses mine: any specialist could teach me a thing or two when it comes to interpreting his writings. Be that as it may, since I came to know Hegel—or even since I had my first inklings of him through the sarcasms with which my philosophy professor, a positivist named André

Cresson, taxed him in around 1912—I have become imbued with his views. To my mind, his method has bankrupted all others. When Hegelian dialectic ceases to function, for me there is no thought, no hope of truth. Only when the floodgates of that dialectic opened in me did I realize that the distance between the *place* where Hegelian thought emerged and the *place* where so-called “traditional” thought rose to the surface was not so great. For me, both of them tended to become a single place...¹⁷⁸

The Surrealists took Hegel’s teaching—that is, that the dialectic applied to the subjective *and* the objective realms, and that the transition from objective to subjective logic occurred with the logician’s self-reflection, resulting in the logician identifying with the objective being-in-and-for-itself (the *Anundfürsichsein*, a term for the Spirit actualized)—to mean that there is essential unity of the internal and external worlds. Surrealists were impressed, too, by the role that Hegel had assigned to concrete existents (that is to say, what Hegel referred to as *die Besonderen*, or sometimes *die Partikular*, and not what is referred to as *konkret*); by Hegel’s conviction that the universal is expressed in particulars; and by his aesthetic proposition that beauty depends on the adequacy of a material being to express something of the Spirit or on the adequacy of the particular to express something of the Universal. Surrealists interpreted that in an anti-Symbolist fashion, to mean that there was no bypassing the real (the *Anundfürsichsein* must be “an sich”); that higher significance was to be found in the forms of the concrete, particular existents; and that this higher significance was to be found in the inner unity that unites contradictory aspects in particular existents (the *Anundfürsichsein* must be both “an sich” and “für sich”). This is the thrust of André Breton’s claim about the “future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a *surreality*, if one may so speak.”¹⁷⁹ The reconciliation of subjective and objective also implied, as Tristan Tzara pointed out, “the conciliation of man in the making with the reality of the exterior world.”¹⁸⁰

Breton had a complex relation to idealism in general, including its Hegelian form.¹⁸¹ For one thing, he decried our continuing to live under the reign of logic, and he proposed that the forces of oneiric illogic and the savagery of the mind’s unconscious contents be mobilized to subvert the process of abstraction on which, he believed, all forms of idealism had long depended. Yet his concept of the “ideal point”—that is, the point at which the objective fuses with the subjective, reality with dreaming—derives from Absolute Idealism, and since that concept remained fundamental to Surrealist art throughout its course, Hegel’s influence remained important (whatever anxieties Hegel’s Idealism had engendered). But the *Manifeste du surréalisme* makes clear that, notwithstanding Breton’s interest in reconciling contrary states, he accorded

the mental realm primacy and granted thought the status of absolute reality. However often Breton proclaimed that the central goal of Surrealism was to discover the “ideal point” that reconciled the opposites of dream and reality, the subjective realm and the objective realm, he nevertheless rhapsodized over Surrealism’s aspiration towards a purity of thought. Thus, he extolled the poet who would rise above the frisson of living dangerously: to be cowed by momentary feelings of danger and possible death would be to succumb to the brutality of reality.¹⁸²

Breton tried to adjust this emphasis. In the *Second manifeste du surréalisme*, he declared that it was necessary to “put an end to idealism properly speaking.”¹⁸³ He even seemed to suggest that Surrealism had risen from the “‘colossal abortion’ of the Hegelian system.”¹⁸⁴ The Moroccan War (1925) had driven the Surrealists towards social engagement. Breton understood that their interests in the dialectic had become increasingly scientific and rational: “Surrealism, in the face of this brutal, revolting, *unthinkable* fact [the Moroccan War] will have to examine its own resources, to determine its *limits*; it will force us to adopt a precise attitude, exterior to itself, in order to confront issues which go beyond its limits. The movement has now entered its rational phase. It has realized that there is a need to bridge the gap that separates absolute idealism from dialectical materialism.”¹⁸⁵

That is, according to Breton, Surrealism understood that it was imperative for Surrealists to advance from a Hegelian to a Marxist view of the dialectic. The first manifesto (1924) had emphasized Hegel, but as the movement developed, the Surrealists drew more and more from Marx’s thought, Breton wanted us to believe. Still, even after the more politically aware second manifesto (1930) was posted, the great philosopher was still being acknowledged as a key source of Surrealist ideas (despite the reservations Surrealists expressed about aspects of his thought). Indeed, Breton by this time was characterizing Surrealism as a development of Hegel’s system in much the same way that Marx’s system had been a development of Hegel’s, in that Marx’s system had taken as its founding principle the method of the dialectic (which, Breton averred, had universal application, including to the realm of consciousness):

Surrealism, although a special part of its function is to examine with a critical eye the notions of reality and unreality, reason and irrationality, reflection and impulse, knowledge and “fatal” ignorance, usefulness and uselessness, is analogous at least in one respect with historical materialism in that it too tends to take as its point of departure the “colossal abortion” of the Hegelian system. It seems impossible to me to assign any limitations... to the exercise of a thought finally made tractable to negation, and to the negation of negation. How could one accept the fact that the dialectical method is valid only when applied to the solution of social problems? The entire aim of Surrealism

is to supply it [the dialectical method] with practical possibilities in no way competitive in the most immediate realm of consciousness. I really fail to see—some narrow-minded revolutionaries notwithstanding—why we should refrain from supporting the Revolution, provided we view the problems of love, dreams, madness, art, and religion from the same angle they do. Now, I have no hesitation in saying that, prior to Surrealism, nothing systematic has been done in this direction, and at the point where we found it *the dialectical method, in its Hegelian form, was inapplicable for us too*. There was, for us too, the necessity to put an end to idealism properly speaking, the creation of the world “Surrealism” would testify to this...¹⁸⁶

Breton and the other Surrealists felt the lure of the Hegelian system, for they proposed to found their art on the reconciliation of opposites, especially that of mind and matter. Having staked that claim, they at first interpreted the Hegelian dialectic in a particular fashion (one not completely faithful to Hegel), as asserting that the imagination has a key role in making reality. (Dalí made the same point when he maintained that the paranoiac-critical method reveals that what we take as objective reality is a systematization of what desire prompts us to apprehend and that, consequently, even documentary reveals the subject.) But Breton came to fear that this approach was leading to an overemphasis on the imagination and not enough on the actuality of the external object: this is what he meant when he pointed out that the Moroccan War had forced the Surrealists “to adopt a precise attitude, exterior to itself, in order to confront issues that go beyond its limits.” “Surrealism attempted to provoke, from the intellectual and moral point of view, *an attack of conscience*, of the most general and serious kind.”¹⁸⁷ He (wrongly) accused the Hegelian system of ignoring the objective given, and he argued that turning towards the materialism of Marx and Engels’ system was a moral necessity.

Breton argued that his sense of the dialectical method, while an expanded one, was not inconsistent with the dialectical method as employed by the members of the French Communist Party (PCF); indeed, if the dialectical method was truly general, as Engels had proposed it was (and as the members of the PCF wanted to believe), then it must be applicable beyond the domain of social problems. The Surrealists proposed to take it as a truly general method, applying even to love, dreams, and madness.

The claim that “Surrealism offers only to provoke, from an intellectual and moral point of view, a *crisis of conscience* of the most general and most profound order” contradicted one key assertion that Breton had offered in the first manifesto, that the Surrealist imagination would proceed “in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern.” In the second, the “intellectual” or, at least, “moral point of view” was paramount.¹⁸⁸

In 1927, Breton joined the PCF; he would remain a member until he was expelled at the end of 1933. In 1929, the Surrealists changed the name of their magazine from *La révolution surréaliste* to *Le surréalisme au service de la révolution*, according primacy to the Marxist revolutionary movement and placing Surrealism at its service.¹⁸⁹ One effect of this political engagement—especially on literature—was a decreased interest in *hasard objectif*, in recording dreams, and in automatic writing, among those Surrealists who had followed Breton into the PCF. Another effect was a renewed concern with literary form, in tandem with a stronger interest in concrete political developments.¹⁹⁰ Of course, this would not last for long: the contradictions in this position soon would set the Surrealists and the PCF apart.

SURREALISM AND THE FREUDIAN DIALECTIC

The Surrealists, in seeking alternative noesis, strove to rise above the limited self—to foster a self that could make contact with the Hegelian Absolute, which, for polemical purposes, they referred to as *sur-réalité*. As we have seen, sometimes all that was required to rise above the limited bourgeois self was a radical intensification of the poetic faculties. More often, though, Surrealists sought more radical means that involved annihilating the limited self. In the sections on “Hippolyte Taine, *Hasard Objectif*, the Poetic Image, and the Cinema,” “The Cinema, Photography, and ‘the Marvellous,’” and “Ernst’s *Frottage* as a Handmade Trace and Automatist Form,” and more generally in dealing with automatism, I examined the ways in which Surrealists attempted to use chance to set aside the limited self so that they might release a higher noetic process experienced as Other to the self, and as capable of making contact with the Absolute. We have seen that chance served the Surrealists as the dialectical counterbalance to the imagination’s subjectivity. A belief in the importance of chance was a factor in the Surrealists’ high estimation of the cinema: the poetic images the cinema offers are often obtained by means akin to magnetism—even though they commonly resemble dreams or hallucinations, the imagination often plays no role in making cinematic images. Cinema images themselves are amalgams of subjectivity and objectivity, for they resemble oneiric images with the detail, stability, and force of the real. Once again, the cinema, by its very nature, served as a model for a device that might undo modernity’s impoverishment—indeed, the cinema’s character offered Surrealists instruction on possibilities for a new art that would help resolve the antinomies of the spiritual conditions of the age. For the Surrealists, the cinema was a marvellously effective occult machine. These ideas connect to Dalí’s higher realism (*sur-realism*), which he sometimes referred to as photographic painting. Dalí deliberated on the issue that had

made Hegelian dialectical synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity so central to the Surrealist program: his “La fotografia, pura creació de l’esperit” and “Poesia de l’útil standarditzat,” which we discussed in a previous section, were likely the culminating statements of the idea that putting aside the limited self and its imaginations opens a path towards the Absolute. For that reason, we consider in the following sections Dalí’s ideas regarding psychoanalysis and the role of the unconscious in overcoming the imagination.

Automatism was one means the Surrealists used to force themselves to set aside the limited self and to release a higher noetic process. The Surrealist understanding of the effects of practising automatism was patterned after Arthur Rimbaud’s famous statement, “Je est un autre” (I is another). We will see that the Surrealists’ understanding of this claim was founded on Janet’s psychology and Freud’s psychoanalysis. Janet and Freud had revealed how unconscious thought processes go on as though autonomously, beyond the control of the individual. Thus, the Freudian unconscious provided a model for that amalgam of subjectivity and objectivity that was so central to Surrealist poetics. In this section and the following four, we examine the Surrealists’ understanding of automatism and the unconscious as means that might free us from the constraints of the limited self and ordinary logic—as a means that, in fusing the subjective with the objective, might open for us a path through the other to the Absolute.

Freud’s writings proposed another dialectic that was central to the Surrealist program. His psychoanalysis had revealed that utterances that seem to us completely nonsensical are actually significant. The utterances he analyzed included dreams, the ravings of schizophrenics, parapraxes (slips of the tongue or the pen), some forms of jokes, and what Freud referred to as the “cheerful nonsense of the *Bierschwefel*” (a ludicrous speech delivered at a beer party) and the *Kneipzeitung* (literally, “tavern newspaper,” seemingly absurd accounts of goings-on at a tavern, recorded when drunk). His writings disclosed sense in nonsense, meaning in the seemingly meaningless. The seemingly insignificant, he showed, can help reveal something of the working of the unconscious. And that made it seem that unreason (madness, or simply primary-process thinking) was a royal road to the Absolute—that unreason was a higher form of Reason—in other words, the noetic process the Surrealists sought. The Surrealists were sometimes lured in by this appeal.

Despite Breton’s strong tendency towards a purified idealization, many Surrealists allowed their interest in the sullied, the rancid, the sordid, and the imbecilic to assert itself. Surrealists concerned themselves with the world of their times as well as with the timeless, with both the real and the ideal, with the coarse as well as the refined. Surrealism was, then, an art of sublation—and that tendency revealed Freud’s influence as well as Hegel’s.

But Breton's famous definition of Surrealism also makes clear that one basis for the Surrealists' interest in automatism was that it had the potential to destroy all other forms of thinking and take their place. Freud's writings suggested to the Surrealists, then, a technique that could bring about what Breton described in *Nadja* as the "the expulsion of man from himself"; that is, it could turn his mental operations over to an agency remote from the self-presence of self-consciousness.¹⁹¹ This expulsion had affinities with Spiritist ideas on the disintegration of the self—affinities that Lacan theorized when he analyzed the conception of the integral self as an illusion brought about by the Imaginary—and on the invasion of an extraneous intelligence (cf. Rimbaud's *autre*).¹⁹²

These affinities with Lacan's psychology were the result of Lacan's and the Surrealists' common interest in Freud. Breton had been a medical student, and in 1916, at the age of twenty, had worked at the neuropsychiatric clinic of the Second Army at Saint-Dizier as an assistant to Dr. Raoul Leroy (1869–1941), who had been an assistant to Charcot. In 1917, he had worked as an intern under the neurologist Joseph Babinski (1857–1932), yet another of Charcot's former students and Charcot's erstwhile *chef de clinique*, at the neurological centre at La Pitié. Later in the same year, he had been a *médecin auxiliaire* at Val-de-Grace (where he met another medical student named Louis Aragon, the future poet and novelist). He had also worked, near the end of the Great War, at the military hospital in Nantes, where he met the writer Jacques Vaché (1895–1919).¹⁹³ Vaché was a colourful figure: among the incidents for which Breton (and other Surrealists) remembered Vaché with near reverence was his appearing at the 1917 opening of Guillaume Apollinaire's *Les mamelles de Tirésias* with a revolver in hand, threatening to shoot at members of the audience.¹⁹⁴ Perhaps Breton was thinking of this incident when he wrote (in the *Second manifeste du surréalisme*) that "the simplest Surrealist act consists of dashing down into the street, pistol in hand and firing blindly, as fast as you can pull the trigger, into the crowd."¹⁹⁵

Breton greatly admired Joseph Babinski. This was largely for his work in hysteria and other neurological disorders (as they were then believed to be), but Breton had more purely literary reasons besides. Fascinated by psychopathology, and stirred by the vehemence of the attacks on his work among the popular press, in February 1921, Breton went to the Théâtre des Deux Masques to see a play titled *Les détraquées* (The Mad Ones), and subsequently returned two or three times.¹⁹⁶ *Les détraquées* is a two-act play whose setting is a private boarding school for girls. When the end of the year comes, the head teacher, Madame de Challens, calls the dance teacher, Mme Solande, to her office. The two women, who are clearly lesbians (and Solande a drug addict), subject a pupil to perverted trials, and in the end kill her.

The film and theatre actor Blanche Derval (1885–1973) played the role of Solande, and Breton was smitten with her (there is speculation she became a lover). He would claim later on that seeing the play had been one of the great events in his life, and he would write about it in *Nadja*, in which the Théâtre des Deux Masques, which, by the time the story takes place had been turned into a cabaret, serves as a lost, impossibly real object. Supposedly, *Les détraquées* had two authors, Palau and Olaf. Palau was Pierre Palau (1885–1966), an actor, playwright, and director. In 1956, in the first issue of his review *Le surréalisme, même*, Breton would reveal that “Olaf” was a pseudonym used by Babinski. Palau had needed advice from a specialist in nervous diseases and had been put in touch with Babinski.

The treatments Breton practised at Val-de-Grace and Nantes included free association and dream interpretation. Both methods were to influence Surrealism’s development. At those hospitals, Breton became acquainted, through the compulsive behaviours of the soldier-patients—which included restagings of the traumas they had undergone, repetitive performances driven by their *délires aigus* (acute delirium that generally involved catatonic excitement), and defensive representations of scenes of death—with the character of mania and its real physical effects. He came to understand that his patients experienced a fantastic reality, which, though psychic, is equivalent in force to the material domain with which everyday life acquaints us. He became aware of a psychic realm that, though it is different in form than the material domain, nonetheless has material effects. What he witnessed fostered his interest in those channels—delirium, compulsion, fantasy, and so on—through which this psychic realm communicates with material reality. Breton came to believe that the poetic image is located in those places where psychic and material reality are in contact, where the subjective realm meets the objective domain, where the imagination joins with the external world.

It was from Freud (and from Hegel) that Breton drew his idea of a form of thinking that fuses subject and object, passion and reason, interiority and objectivity. Breton recalled for André Parinaud that

all the teachings of Freud, who increasingly in that domain had emerged as our intellectual guide, pointed out the mortal danger incurred for man by this split, this schism between the “forces of reason” and deep-seated passions, which seemed destined to remain unaware of each other. Naturally, our only recourse was to counter the exorbitant pretensions of this “reason” that, as we saw it, had usurped the place of true reason; and also to save impulses and desires from the grip of repression, which only made them more harmful.¹⁹⁷

Another of Breton’s descriptions of the time he spent at Nantes confirms Freud’s importance for him:

Preoccupied as I still was at that time with Freud, and familiar with his methods of investigation, which I had practised occasionally upon the sick during the War, I resolved to obtain from myself what one seeks to obtain from patients, namely a monologue poured out as rapidly as possible, over which the subject's critical faculty has no control—the subject himself throwing reticence to the winds—and which as much as possible represents *spoken thought*.¹⁹⁸

The “method of investigation” that Breton was referring to was actually Sigmund Freud's principal therapeutic method, “the talking cure.” Like the Surrealists, the young Freud was intrigued by the possibilities of hypnotism; but he soon came to doubt its worth. To replace it, he developed the technique of free association. Freud's method for introducing his patients to their fundamental obligation is still applied by analysts today: the analysand is to imagine that she (we will say) is embarking on a train trip. As she looks out the window, she is to describe, or name, or somehow refer to, every scene that passes by the window. It is not, however, towards the outside world that she should direct her attention, but rather towards her mind: she should indicate every thought that crops up in her mind. She is to describe, or name, or somehow refer to each idea.

Analysts now know that it takes several years before an analysand can associate freely. In Freud's time, however, even an extended analysis was completed in a few months. So it is not surprising that Surrealists thought they could teach themselves the technique in short order, then use it to produce creative work. This practice of collecting statements generated automatically had the virtue, for Surrealists, of being objective, factual, documentary, and, at the same time, imaginative (imaginative to the hilt, for it freed the imagination). In other words, it was so paradoxical that Surrealists believed it to exemplify the quality of poetry. Through free association, they would attempt to expel humans' self-presence (to paraphrase Breton's description, in his novel *Nadja*, of Surrealism's goal).¹⁹⁹ According to Surrealist psychoanalytic theory, the ego, set over against the world, would no longer have the executive function—rather, the font of creativity would be as if *outside* the individual artist: it would belong to another order—to a *surreality*. Free association would reveal the intrusion of the Other into the subject. In this way, free association would help bridge the gap between subjectivity and objectivity.

To be sure, the Surrealists' understanding of free association was not identical with Freud's. Freud considered the chain of signifiers produced by the analysand during an analytic session to be like a dream, in that it furnished evidence of the operation of desire. However, the analysand never actually displayed “the true functioning of [his or her] thought”—the chain of signifiers produced through free association was determined by unconscious wishes, but the signifiers *concealed* these wishes even while providing evidence of their operations. The analyst, then, should treat the chain of signifiers

produced by an analysand during an analytic session in much the same way that he treated a dream's manifest content (a dream gives expression to wishes that, through the operations of the dreamwork, it also conceals). The analyst should strive to discover the unconscious message (the hidden wish) that the analysand was offering by examining the analysand's behaviour (including her verbal utterances) as a single, integrated performance—for example, he should look for repetitions that revealed the insistence of desire and should strive to construct an interpretation of the sessions that understood the various utterances as substitutions for an intentionally, albeit unconsciously, elided wish. Through practice, analysands might be able to undo an excess of repression; attenuate their censorious tendency to judge their wishes and thoughts too severely; and, by incrementally giving expression to more of the desires than they previously could tolerate, achieve greater freedom of association. Still, they never became directly acquainted with the whole gamut of latent desires behind the expressions they were offering. We could even put this idea by saying that consciousness never staged the *entire* drama of their latent desires (the German word Freud used when discussing this impossibility, *Vorstellung*, is ambiguous: it is used to refer to staged presentations as well as to mental ones).

Surrealists, by contrast, maintained that free association could reveal the “true functioning of thought.” Breton used free association as a means to overcome the censorship that critical and rational intelligence imposes on imaginative thought; that said, the conception of free association on which Surrealists relied was closer to the idea of magnetic attraction, a common one among occultists.²⁰⁰ The unconscious represents a magnetic field that induces, willy-nilly, an effect within us (in the same way that a magnetic field arranges iron filings that come within its domain of influence)—it exerts a tug on us, and so long as we do not resist its lure (through the exercise of critical thought), it will pull us down towards it, to levels at which it has greater and greater effect. Hence, the Surrealists engaged in practices such as inducing trances, succumbing to sleeping fits, provoking dreams (at which poet Robert Desnos became particularly adept), subjecting themselves to hypnotism, cultivating free associations, and submitting to the lure of *l'amour fou*—all techniques (mad love especially) that they believed would draw them ever nearer to the centre of the unconscious field of attraction.

It was from this conception, too, that the Surrealists' notion of *vases communicantes* (communicating vessels) developed. *Vases communicantes* are different domains of reality that—one discovers as the result of a surprise or a shock—interact with one another. The most likely candidates for the different domains are subjective and objective reality or (a more extreme form of the same distinction) dream and reality. Thus, as we have noted, Breton declared in the *Manifeste du surréalisme* that he believed “in the future resolution of

these two states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a *surreality*, if one may so speak.”²⁰¹ He extended this idea in the *Second manifeste du surréalisme* when he wrote that “[there is a certain] mental vantage-point (*point de l’esprit*) from which life and death, the real and the imaginary, past and future, communicable and incommunicable, high and low, will no longer be perceived as contradictories.”²⁰²

In the months following his initial flush of enthusiasm for free association, Breton, along with Philippe Soupault, conducted a literary experiment in which they strived to produce purely automatist texts. The results, published in 1919 in *Littérature* under the title *Les champs magnétiques*, can be considered the first appearance in print of Surrealist work. Just at the time Soupault and Breton were beginning work on *Les champs magnétiques*, Breton became acquainted with Dr. Alphonse Maeder, who was well known for his summaries and overviews of Freud’s thought (as it had developed to that time). But neither Freud (as is usually claimed) nor Maeder had initiated Breton into the idea of automatism. Rather, he was introduced to it through Emmanuel Régis’s *Précis de psychiatrie* (1887). Breton had read Régis’s *Précis* (in its fifth edition) in 1916, around the same time he started working with Leroy. He also read Régis and Hesnard’s *La psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses* (The Psychoanalysis of Neuroses and Psychoses, 1914).²⁰³ Régis and Hesnard presented the idea of free association somewhat differently than Freud: while Freud stressed the importance of the analysand’s free associating in the presence of the analyst, Régis proclaimed its value when practised as a solitary activity. “With the absolute neutrality of an unconcerned outside witness, or if you wish, of a simple recording instrument, the subject should jot down all the thoughts . . . that are crossing his mind.”²⁰⁴ Régis and Hesnard’s influence on Breton is clear where, in the *Manifeste du surréalisme*, Breton defines automatism as presenting “the actual functioning of thought . . . in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern,” and characterizes those who practise automatic writing as “simple receptacles of so many echoes, modest *recording instruments*.”²⁰⁵ In the same manifesto, Breton stated that automatism requires a “passive . . . receptive” state of mind.²⁰⁶ The reference to recording instruments is telling, for by it we see that Breton had embraced the idea that a passive recording instrument could produce literature. The cinema, of course, is a recording instrument, a model for a creative process that lies outside the (conscious) self. If, as the Surrealists believed, the purpose of art was to capture the real essence of thinking, then the cinema was the *ottima arte*.

An even greater influence on proto-Surrealist automatist practices was the academic psychologist Pierre Janet. In 1889, Janet had written a treatise on psychological automatism, *Automatisme psychologique*, that, as we have noted,

treated it as an inferior, involuntary mental process. To defend the interest he and Soupault had conceived for automatist practices and to defend automatism against Janet's negative characterization of it, Breton began exploring mediumistic trances, a type of automatism that was clearly not a symptom of mental illness or a failure of the will to impel consciousness to exercise its creative powers of synthesis. In fact, it was in an article titled "L'Entrée des médiums" (The Mediums Enter, 1922) that Breton first used the term *surréalisme*: "[Surrealism] designates a certain psychic automatism, a near equivalent to a dream state, whose limits today are quite difficult to define."²⁰⁷ At this time, he turned to the writings we have discussed above, those of Frederic Myers and Théodore Flournoy. Breton was receptive to Myers's claim that normal consciousness can be augmented by "metetherial" consciousness, to which we have access only in sleep, hypnosis, and mediumistic automatism. In commenting on messages received mediumistically, Breton wrote that "all who have aspired to define the true human condition have aspired . . . to regain a state of grace. I say automatism alone provides access to it . . . this point where the distinction between subjective and objective ceases to be necessary or useful."²⁰⁸ We have commented on Breton's inability to bring about a truly Hegelian reconciliation of the subjective and objective realms and on the priority he accorded to the ideal. We can now see the basis for this inability: Breton's idea of the reconciliation had more in common with the *coniunctio oppositorum* and other occult ideas about consciousness than with the Hegelian dialectic—and the occult provided the greater share of the ideas that went into the making of the framework for his aesthetic ideas and artistic practice.

When Breton and Soupault came to compare the work they had produced for *Les champs magnétiques*, they were astonished at the vivacity of its imagery and at its intense quality. Both men's texts contained "a considerable assortment of images of a quality such as we should never have been able to obtain in the normal way of writing, a very special sense of the picturesque, and, here and there, a few pieces of out-and-out buffoonery."²⁰⁹ Just as important, Breton and Soupault concluded, were the striking differences between the two bodies of texts that reflected the differences in their characters. This revelation had cardinal importance for the Surrealist movement: the Surrealists stressed that "psychic automatism" revealed the true character of the individual, just as the analysis reveals "the true functioning of [his or her] thought."

Many factors led Surrealist artists to take an interest in dreams and free association. The term "magnetic field" suggests how the Surrealists conceived of thinking and the imagination: metaphorically, it offered the idea that thought is shaped by unseen natural forces (as iron filings are shaped into patterns by the poles of a magnet). This was a new conception of thinking:

most avant-garde artists in the first two decades of the twentieth century had drawn their understanding of the nature of thought from the philosopher Henri Bergson, who had depicted true thinking as nearly corporal, since the paradigm for its character is the knowledge we have of our bodies as we know them through internal awareness. The Surrealists turned to Freud, not Bergson, for their framework for understanding thinking, and accordingly bypassed the corporal turn of Bergson's thinking about thinking.

Breton described free association as "thought's dictation, in the absence of all control exercised by the reason and outside all aesthetic or moral preoccupations."²¹⁰ Nevertheless, he attributed ethical purposes to free association. When René Bélance interviewed him for *Haiti-Journal* on 12 and 13 December 1945, many years after the publication of the *Manifeste du surréalisme*, Breton set out free association's moral implications:

Freud and his disciples had used automatic writing with their patients, in order to obtain a relatively uncontrolled mental production (or at least, less "censored" than a dream narrative, for example, whose fidelity is compromised by memory gaps). In the eyes of psychoanalysts, automatic writing was useful only as a *means* of exploring the unconscious. For them, there was no question of studying the automatic product in and of itself, of subjecting it to the same criteria that apply to the different categories of consciously *elaborated* texts. "Thanks to automatic writing," Maurice Blanchot recently said, referring to its use in Surrealism, "language has enjoyed the highest promotion. It is now merged with human 'thought'; linked to the only true spontaneity, it is human freedom acting and showing itself." The interpretation of dreams, of course, can find only a point of departure or *basis* in the objective notation of dream imagery. But something else benefits from it: human *freedom*, which is revived in the perfect identification of man with his language. Until Surrealism, we had lost the secret of this identification.²¹¹

The proposition that thought can be identified with language is the basis of the ekphrastic constructions that are evident everywhere in Surrealist literature (and film). The belief that humans obtained freedom by dissolving the limited self in the greater field of language is a moral conviction that subtends these ekphrastic constructions.

DALÍ, THE DOUBLE IMAGE, AND PARANOIAC-CRITICAL METHODS

One of the most important contributions to the expansive inventory of Surrealist methods and practices was made by Salvador Dalí, Luis Buñuel's collaborator on *Un chien andalou*. Though he was soon to become uneven in his output (sometimes lapsing into the formulaic kitsch for which he was widely known, and sometimes brilliant), Dalí's contributions to Surrealism, in the

early years of his involvement, were of great importance—especially for one who came to it rather late. Dalí moved to Paris only in 1929, at which time he immediately joined with the Surrealist movement and—at least until Breton excommunicated him—injected a new vitality into the flagging movement with his extreme proposals for a new form of disconnection from the external material world.

Before moving to Paris, Dalí had worked in Madrid and Barcelona. His work was influenced by Futurism, by Giorgio de Chirico's *pittura metafisica*, and by Surrealism. He had also championed the work of Antonio Gaudí (1852–1926), the daring Art Nouveau architect of his hometown, Barcelona. After settling in Paris, Dalí became attracted to the African period of Picasso's Cubist painting. During the time this interest was at its height, he sat down at his desk to compose his thoughts on the matter and began riffling through papers searching for some notes he had prepared. He came across a postcard and saw it, immediately, as a painting of a head by Picasso, done in the "Primitivist" African style that Picasso then favoured; only on closer examination, and after he had turned it rightways around, did it reveal itself as a picture of an African village. But this was no "subjective error," Dalí averred: he claimed that when he showed the postcard to his wife Gala, she too saw the head; that his maid also saw it; and that Breton, when shown the postcard, immediately declared it to be a portrait of the Marquis de Sade.²¹²

This example of the image of the African village that could also be perceived as an African mask would become Dalí's favourite example of what he called a double image: "The way in which it has been possible to obtain a double image is clearly paranoiac. By a double image is meant such a representation of an object that it is also, without the slightest physical or anatomical change, the representation of another entirely different object, the second representation being equally devoid of any deformation or abnormality betraying arrangement."²¹³

Separating the substance of Dalí's claim from his habitually ecstatic expository practices, what he meant by the "double image" was quite simple. Recall those bimorphic images that appear in Wittgenstein's *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* (1921; English translation *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1922)—for example, the one that appears sometimes as a rabbit, sometimes as a duck; or the one that appears sometimes as a vase, sometimes as two faces in profile, puckered up to kiss. Dalí's double image was much like these sorts of bimorphic images. An outstanding example of a double image is Pavel Tchelitchew's *Tree into Hand and Foot* (1939) in New York's Museum of Modern Art. What a double image points up is this: such an image is not, to take that example, "a duck" or "a rabbit"—in reality, it is an arrangement of lines, neutral between the two, and whether the viewer sees a rabbit or a

duck depends on the viewer's interests and obsessions. "Double images" (or bimorphic images) demonstrate the role of the individual subject in shaping what he or she sees; but they also demonstrate that favourite theme of the Surrealists—the paradoxical location of the poetic image, which lies both within and beyond the subject, both within and beyond reality. Antonin Artaud, whose ideas about poetic images paralleled Dalí's idea of the double image in key respects, recognized the cinema's affinity with the double image that spanned the real and imaginative realms, yoking them in a single, undifferentiated reality. His article "Cinéma et réalité" (Cinema and Reality, 1927) makes that abundantly clear.

I have compared the double images of Dalí and Tchelitchev to the bimorphic images discussed by Wittgenstein; that comparison, though, fails to convey one important feature of the double image, viz., its troubling nature. This is a grave omission: for Dalí, double (or multiple) images typically involved forms evoking many associations—forms such as a naked man, a dog, or a bowl of fruit. Our initial response to the image is unconscious and involves making associations that alter its form (Dalí suggests this stage relies on an "anamorphic hysteria")—the altered image is incorporated into a system of associations. Lacan had demonstrated paranoia's systematic character, so Dalí compared this operation with that of paranoia. These unconscious associations determine whether or not we become conscious of the altered image. Some associations we form tend to draw the image into consciousness, while others tend to keep it in the unconscious; further, a sufficiently complex system of associations helps neutralize an image's troubling implications and abets it in entering consciousness, for it allows the image to be incorporated into the intricate objective world we construct. Thus, even here thought's paranoid character is manifested.

Some people become adept at discovering double images:

[A] double image is obtained in virtue of the violence of the paranoiac thought which has cunningly and skilfully used the requisite quantity of pretexts, coincidences, &c., and so taken advantage of them as to exhibit the second image, which then replaces the dominant idea.

...

All this (assuming no other general causes intervene) is certainly enough for me to contend that our images of reality themselves depend upon the degree of our paranoiac faculty, and yet that theoretically a man sufficiently endowed with this faculty may at will see the form of any real object change, exactly as in voluntary hallucination [an earlier creative method of the Surrealists], but with this (destructively) important difference, that the various forms assumed by the object in question are universally open to control and recognition as soon as the paranoiac has merely indicated them.²¹⁴

This last assertion I take to mean that others, too, can recognize both representations in a double image as soon as they are indicated. Dalí characterizes this fact as “destructive” because it undoes one’s faith that reality is objective and so dismantles people’s belief in external reality.

The double image involves an anamorphosis, by which a landscape takes on the shape of a dog’s head, the hull of a ship becomes a mandolin, or a goblet assumes the form of a face. Such conversions reveal the instability of reality—what is more, they reveal that obsession or desire can exchange one entity for another. The double image, accordingly, provokes an eerie sense of correspondence among objects, strange resemblances and heretofore unrecognized analogies. Recognizing that a single form can have a dual identity evokes an atavistic form of thinking that is more rudimentary than ordinary perception, since it has a close relation with primary-process thinking, which also rejects the principle of contradiction.²¹⁵ But such elementary forms of consciousness can also operate by establishing a network of analogies across a painting—or, as happens in *Un chien andalou*, across a series of shots—to convert difference into an unstable, tension-ridden identity. Dalí sensed the importance of a network of analogies early in his career, even before he expounded the idea of the double image. His 1927 essay “Fotografía, pura creació de l’esperit” offers a description (to which we have already made reference): “The clear image of an orchid, lyrically unites with the photograph of the interior of the mouth of a tiger, in which the sun forms a thousand shadows with the architecture of the larynx. . . . In the large and limpid eye of a cow, a small white post-mechanical landscape is spherically deformed but remains precise as far as the sky in which float small and luminous clouds.”²¹⁶

Soon enough (by 1933), Dalí was to introduce another term to help him expound on his idea of the double image. This new coinage was “paranoia-criticism.” Dalí referred to the method he intended as *paranoiac* because it “systematize[d] confusion.” And it had a *critical* character because it was interpretative—one form it interpreted either as a face or as a goblet; another form it interpreted either as the hull of a boat or as a mandolin. Thus, as we have seen, Dalí described the paranoiac-critical method as a “*spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based on the interpretative-critical association of delirious phenomena.*”²¹⁷ Thus, the paranoiac-critical method was essentially similar to the one involved in apprehending/interpreting a double image.²¹⁸

Dalí believed as well that the photographic image can prompt us to revise our notion of the external world; thus, photography and film could help bring into doubt our very belief in fixed, stable external reality. In “Reality and Surreality,” Dalí offered this paragone declaration regarding photography (which, given the content of the argument, we can extend to the cinema). He

began with a statement about the notion of osmosis, of which, at that time, he seems to have been particularly fond, for he used it in several articles:²¹⁹

Nothing is more favorable to the osmoses which occur between reality and sur-reality than photography which, with the new vocabulary it imposes, offers a lesson simultaneously in maximum rigor and maximum liberty. Photographic data are in the process of operating—as much photogenically as by the infinite figurative associations to which they subject our mind—a constant revision of the external world, which each time becomes more and more an object of doubt, and at the same time offer further unusual possibilities for a lack of cohesion.²²⁰

The text can be read as asserting the superiority of photography and, by extension, cinematography. So it should not surprise anyone that Dalí goes on to make disparaging remarks about the other arts.

The idea of paranoia-criticism was Dalí's most important contribution to Surrealist theory. He introduced this creative method (which he variously called the "paranoia method of criticism" or the "paranoiac-critical method") in an essay titled "L'âne pourri" (The Stinking Ass, after an image in *Un chien andalou*).²²¹ Testifying to the importance of Dalí's contribution, Breton stated in a lecture delivered in Brussels in 1934 (just before he expelled Dalí from the Surrealist movement) that "Dalí has endowed surrealism with an instrument of primary importance . . . in particular the paranoiac-critical method, which has immediately shown itself capable of being applied equally well to painting, poetry, the cinema, to the construction of typical surrealist objects, to fashions, to sculpture, to the history of art and even, if necessary, to all manner of exegesis."²²² The paranoiac-critical method involves allowing images that arise from the unconscious to enter consciousness, just as paranoia does.²²³ But the artist can do what the paranoiac cannot do: freeze those images on canvas to give consciousness the opportunity to comprehend their meaning.²²⁴ Dalí offered the paranoiac-critical method as the preferable alternative to automatism, because while the automatist method was passive ("organic" or "biological" in Lacan's terms), the paranoiac-critical method was active: it employed active delusional interpretation to replace the surrender involved in automatism.

Freud himself had contended that the imaginative act of dreaming is essentially a psychotic process. "A dream . . . is a psychosis, with all the absurdities, delusions and illusions of a psychosis. A psychosis of short duration, no doubt harmless, even entrusted with a useful function, introduced with the subject's consent and terminated by an act of his will. Nonetheless it is a psychosis."²²⁵ The Surrealists sought to simulate madness, as the experience of mad people eludes modernity's reduction of experience—Dalí made the simulation of paranoia a method. Breton and Éluard wrote *L'Immaculée conception* (The Immaculate Conception, 1930), which includes a section based

on the simulation of five types of madness, following a method that Breton acknowledged was “in close convergence with paranoiac-critical activity.”²²⁶

The term “paranoia” in Dalí’s “paranoiac-critical method” does not denote exclusively feelings of persecution, as it usually does. For Dalí, a person who seizes on the evidence offered by reality that he or she is being persecuted is displaying just one among many forms of the generalized mental operations of paranoia. It was Eugène Charpentier, in *Les idées morbides et les délires de persécution* (Morbid Ideas and Delusions of Persecution, 1888), who first introduced the term to denote any delusional form of insanity involving morbid ideas of persecution; before him, the word had had a more general meaning, rather as Dalí used it, to refer to a “reasoning madness.”²²⁷ When used in Charpentier’s sense, the syndrome it denotes often exists without there being any hallucinatory symptoms. It is a condition in which the paranoiac interprets images, ideas, or events as being connected—as having either a causal connection or as having a mutual relation to a central fact—when outside observers would not accept the connection. This condition fuels a “delirium of interpretation”; thus, in “literary simulation” (Breton’s term) by Éluard and Breton (from the aforementioned section of *L’Immaculée conception*) titled “Essai de simulation du délire d’interprétation” (Attempted Simulation of the Delirium of Interpretation, 1930), the subject fancies himself a bird and interprets everything he experiences in relation to that identification. A *prière d’insérer* (blurb) for Dalí’s *La femme visible* (1930)—purportedly written by Breton and Éluard but was probably by Dalí himself—declares that “the original aim of *simulating* delirium, systematized or not, will not only have the important advantage of encouraging the appearance of unexpected data and other new types of poetic form, but will also have the important effect of consecrating, in an exemplarily didactic manner, the free categories of thought that culminate in mental alienation.”²²⁸

Dalí’s paranoiac-critical method involved two stages. First the artist succumbed to the delirium of a paranoiac thought process. Then a critical phase was superimposed on this paranoid process (to be sure, in practice the two stages occurred simultaneously), as associations were more actively sought out, using a method similar to the one that Freud employed when seeking the meaning of dreams. Carried out thoroughly, this critical process would elaborate a world view that was all-encompassing and completely coherent, even though based on content produced by a delusional (paranoid) process. This leads to grandiosity. Dalí wrote, “I believe my paranoia is an expression of the absolute structure, the proof of its immanence. My genius consists of being in direct contact with the cosmic soul.”²²⁹

For Dalí, paranoia’s ultimate implication was to “discredit completely the world of reality,” by which he meant that it could discredit all belief that the

objects we are aware of have an existence independent of us.²³⁰ He wrote, “All this . . . is certainly enough for me to contend that our images of reality themselves depend upon the degree of our paranoiac faculty.”²³¹ And further, “The paranoiac mechanism whereby the multiple image is released is what supplies the understanding with the key to the birth and origin of all images.”²³² Paranoia, for Dalí, is a mental state in which the subject can find immediately in the external world confirmation of the truth of his or her own state of mind (of the individual’s obsessions, etc.). In this way, paranoia furnished evidence of the resolution Breton (we know) advocated “of these two states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a *surreality*, if one may so speak.”²³³ This was the confusion Dalí says he desired to produce—and that willed paranoia helped engender. As we noted above, Dalí claimed that “paranoia uses the external world in order to assert its dominating idea and has the disturbing characteristic of making others accept this idea’s reality. The reality of the external world is used for illustration and proof, and so comes to serve the reality of our mind.”²³⁴ Just as someone who is subject to persecution mania is able to draw proof from minute observation of people’s behaviour that she is being persecuted, so a paranoiac (in the more general sense in which Dalí uses the term) is able to discover evidence in reality itself of her reasons for maintaining that (for example) the cosmos is operated by sexual delight, or that grief belongs to the very order of things, or, more generally, that reality confirms and explains her state of mind. Outer and inner reality are at one.

Dalí began “L’âne pourri” with the provocative assertion that a method founded in paranoia would help “systematize confusion and thus to help to discredit completely the world of reality.”²³⁵ By this he evidently meant that a technique could be developed for producing these confusions (and Dalí does adopt Janet’s fundamental distinction and characterizes the paranoiac-critical method as active, whereas automatist methods are passive), that the confusions thereby produced would exchange one object for another, and that these conversions would be taken for reality. As we have noted, Dalí asserted that paranoia uses the external world to assert its dominating idea and brings others to accept this idea’s reality; this was the significance of Gala’s, the maid’s, and André Breton’s mistaking the postcard of an African village for a head painted by Picasso.²³⁶

Doctors agree that the mental processes of paranoiacs are often inconceivably swift and subtle and that, availing themselves of associations and facts so refined as to escape normal people, paranoiacs often reach conclusions which cannot be contradicted or rejected and in any case nearly always defy psychological analysis.²³⁷

Dalí, then, underwrote the Surrealists' conviction that the poetic image has a paradoxical status, that it both belongs to and transcends reality.

In an unrealized (and unpublished) film scenario, Dalí emphasized the systematic character of paranoid thinking:

The paranoid activity offers us the possibility of the systematization of delirium [by which Dalí seems to mean any elaborated interpretation, i.e., any elaborated misprision, of reality]. Paranoid images are due to the delirium of interpretation [all perception is interpretation, and therefore, paranoid in some measure—perception is delirious because it is unending, since we have no access to an uninterpreted objectivity in which to anchor it]. The delirium which, in the dream, is wiped out on waking, really continues into these paranoid images and it is directly communicable to everybody. [Dalí goes on to refer to his painting *Dormeuse, cheval, lion invisibles* (Invisible Sleeper, Horse, Lion) of 1930.] In effect we are going to see how the paranoid delirium can make it so that an odalisque is at once a horse and a lion. The odalisque arrives, she lies down lazily. Notice the beginning of the movement of the horse's tail; it becomes odalisque again and now it is a lion which disappears in the distance."²³⁸

Dalí stressed the organized, systematic character of paranoid thinking that allowed the paranoid imagination to substitute a new reality for the old, familiar one:

Above all, the birth of these new Surrealist images must be considered as the birth of images of demoralization. The particular perspicacity of attention in the paranoid state must be insisted upon; paranoia being recognized, moreover, by all psychologists as a form of mental illness which consists in organizing reality in such a way as to utilize it to control an imaginative construction. The paranoid who believes himself to be poisoned discovers in everything that surrounds him, right up to the most imperceptible and subtle details, preparations for his own death. Recently, through a decidedly paranoid process, I obtained an image of a woman whose position, shadow and morphology, without altering or deforming anything of her real appearance, are also, at the same time, those of a horse.²³⁹

As he continued to apply it in the 1930s, Dalí's paranoia-criticism became an almost academic method. He drew extensively on the classical art repertoire, and even his technique became almost academic in its clarity, meticulousness, and finish (and gradually his painting came to be shaped as much by the masters of Renaissance perspective and colour as by Chirico's poetic hyperrealism). The tragic myth of Jean-François Millet's *L'angélus* (1857) inspired a tumult of fantasies in Dalí, who subjected that same myth to many hallucinatory reinterpretations. Other iconic masterpieces, including Millet's *Les glaneuses* (The Gleaners, 1857) and Arnold Böcklin's *Toteninsel* (Island of the Dead, the second 1880 version), were subjected to the same method of systematic paranoid revision.

DALÍ AGAINST IDEALISM

Dalí offered the double image and paranoia-criticism as advances over artistic methods founded on automatism or dreaming, for these methods increased the quantum of factual, objective content in a work. Dream images or automatist forms risked becoming too subjective: “The dream and automatism would only make sense as preserved idealist evasions, an inoffensive and recreational resource for the comfortable care of the sceptical gaiety of select poets.”²⁴⁰ Dalí found confirmation of the importance of the objective content of the phenomenon he was exploring in the writings of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan: “Lacan’s work perfectly gives an account of the objective and ‘communicable’ hyperacuity of the phenomenon, thanks to which delirium takes on this tangible character, which is impossible to contradict, and which places it at the very antipodes of the stereotypes of automatism and the dream.”²⁴¹ To attenuate his criticism of Breton (whose ideas he attacked here), Dalí added that the phenomenon of paranoia reinforces the dialectical relation between subjectivity and objectivity: “The paranoiac mechanism can only appear to us, from the specifically Surrealist point of view we take, as proof of the dialectical value of that principle of verification through which the element of delirium [subjectivity] passes practically into the tangible domain of action [objectivity].”²⁴² Once again drawing on Pierre Janet’s fundamental distinction between those lower thought processes that reproduce past actions and the higher processes that are creative, Dalí offered paranoia-criticism as a method that could rescue Surrealists from the stereotypicality of dream images or automatist images. The key importance of the double image is that the phenomenon instructed Dalí in the workings of obsession and paranoia: those conditions demonstrate that reality is ambiguous, and that we confuse phenomena (such as eating and lovemaking); that “confusion” in turn explains the “edible” metaphors in Dalí’s writings and the “edible” images in his paintings. Dalí was precise about his use of the mechanism of paranoia: “The only difference between a madman and myself is that I am not mad.” The comment is rich with irony, for it acknowledges that his thinking process and his creative methods *resemble* the actions of a “madman.” His paranoia was only simulated (or willed); it was a creative method, and he could forgo it whenever (or if ever) it no longer served him.²⁴³ Dalí recognized the ability to set the paranoiac hallucination aside as the capacity that allowed the “critical apparatus” to intervene as an agency for enhancing the objectivity of the hallucinatory images, but without interfering in their structure, system, or meaning. That supervision results in fleshing out the details of thought with extraordinary, and reasonable, precision. The elaboration is systematic, since it occurs through the complicity of the mental agency Lacan calls the

“Symbolic” with the mental agency he calls the “Imaginary.”²⁴⁴ This intellectualized development of the hallucinatory image has its correlate in painting in rendering the image in *trompe l’oeil* detail—so much so that it has the effect of giving the hallucinatory or oneiric image a seemingly objective reality (and so of fusing the subject and the object in a higher reality, a “surreality”).²⁴⁵ In fact, what Dalí ultimately means by paranoia is the human drive to produce images that are elaborated in a thoroughly systematic fashion, to produce the reality in which the individual lives. By being comprised in a system, these fantasies take on an objective character.²⁴⁶ Thus,

One day one will have to admit officially that what we baptized reality is an even greater illusion than the world of dreams. To follow my thinking through to its conclusion I would say that what we call dream does not in the least exist as such because our mind is turned down low. Reality is epiphenomenal, a by-product of thought—a consequence of not thinking, a phenomenon induced by amnesia. The true reality is within us, and we project it outside by the systematic use of our paranoia, which is an answer and reaction to the pressure—the negative pressure—of the cosmic emptiness. In all other respects paranoia does not simply express itself by a systematic projection, it is also an enormous breath of life.²⁴⁷

In a special “Intervention surréaliste” number of the Belgian journal *Documents*, Dalí published an article he titled “Provocations philosophiques” (Philosophical Provocations, 1934), in which he rendered some of these ideas more concrete and in a somewhat more didactic form that helped dispel uncertainties about his ideas. In this article, he proposed the following definitions:

Paranoia: Delirium of interpretive association bearing a systematic structure.
Paranoiac-critical activity: spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based upon the interpretive-critical association of delirious phenomena.²⁴⁸

Note that Dalí is claiming that the systematic elaboration of hallucinatory paranoiac processes constitutes reality. He continues:

Painting: Hand-done colour “photography” of “concrete irrationality” and of the imaginative world in general.

From the fact that the systematic elaboration of hallucinatory paranoiac images constitutes reality, we may infer that the systematic elaboration of hand-done colour images constitutes a picture of reality, that is, a photograph—hence Dalí’s assertion that his paintings are “photographs.” Dalí defined sculpture in a similar manner, as the “modelling by hand of ‘concrete irrationality’ and of the imaginative world in general.”²⁴⁹ This enabled him later, in *My Secret Life* (1942), to say that his paintings simply record visions that come to him, with the force of a “luminous materialization and as if my head had been a real motion picture projector,” and to speak of memories that

stand out “with a photographic minuteness of detail” and of mental events that occur with the rapidity which can only be compared to a “reversed and speeded up” projection. Of course, these citations likening the mind to cinema are testimony to what made the cinema such an important art.

He understood that paranoid hallucinations were interesting precisely *because* they can seem like an unordered collage of images (and so seem resistant to rational interpretation)—but because he was not insane, because his higher creative and synthesizing abilities had not been impaired, he could also understand how this apparently meaningless collage could be interpreted. Freud, and Freud’s disciple Lacan, had showed him that. Thus, in his article “Interprétation paranoïaque-critique de l’image obsédante *L’angélus* de Millet” (Paranoiac-Critical Interpretation of the Obsessive Image Millet’s *Angélus*, 1933), published in the first issue of *Minotaure*, he extolled Lacan, claiming that Lacan was the first person to understand and explain paranoid hallucinations as a form of interpretation.²⁵⁰

The key that would unlock the secret meaning of dreams and hallucinations, Lacan believed, could be an invaluable possession for artists. He (with Freud) offered that key to them; artists had only to receive it. Dalí did accept: what he took was Lacan’s endorsement of his conviction that paranoid hallucinations derive from a hermeneutical principle that operates as much under the reality principle as it does under the pleasure principle; and that such hallucinations arise as interpretative deformations of perception—a kind of anamorphosis or mirroring, or a doubling or multiplication (cf. Dalí’s double image)—and, therefore, they possess a structure. Furthermore, Lacan and Dalí both recognized that such deformations more often than not express aggression.

Dalí’s theses about paranoia-criticism concern the coincidence of desire and the object (or what is often the same in the domain of art, viz., the sign). In *L’amour fou*, André Breton tells of visiting a Parisian flea market with Alberto Giacometti in the spring of 1934. The two were searching for they knew not exactly what, but something that would strike them as uncanny, as being at once strange and familiar. Giacometti came across a metal mask that seemed to him rather ominous, while Breton found a large wooden spoon, made by peasants, he conjectured, yet having a daring form.

The mask and the spoon appealed, respectively, to Giacometti and Breton because of the emotions they magnetically elicited. These objects exposed the seekers’ subjective states to themselves: because they had the status of terror or desire become objective, these objects reflected back to their seekers the terror or desire that animated their psyches. So the unconscious knits together the self and the external world, subjectivity and objectivity. The unconscious even seems to belong to a realm alien to the self of self-awareness (this, as we have seen, was the great lesson that automatic writing taught the Surrealists).

We have noted that the belief that humans gained freedom by identifying themselves with language is the fundamental moral conviction subtending the frequent use Surrealists made of ekphrastic constructions. Surrealists argued that the belief in the individual self is a prison-house of delusion. The discovery that the Cartesian self does not generate its thoughts and actions out of itself, through an act of reason, but rather is operated from a domain beyond itself—by relations that are structured like language—was a curiously ecstatic discovery. Rimbaud had announced it decades before in a comment that we have already noted, that appeared in his now famous “Lettre du voyant”: “Je est un autre” (I is an other).²⁵¹ The letter shows he was equally ecstatic about the discovery.

Surrealists’ ideas about the dialectical integration of subject and object were not, however, simply a further expression of the Romantic drive to fuse the seer with the seen through an act of imagination. The Romantics’ idea of the fusion of subject and object privileged the subject and celebrated those moments when we recognize that the world in which we live is a construct of the imagination; accordingly, Romanticism tended towards a form of self-seeking idealism. Romanticism endeavoured to convert the furniture of the imaginative realm (the realm in which the true self finds its being) into predicates of the subject; thus, the poetic constructs of the imagination were believed to display qualities of the self. The Surrealists’ ideas about integrating subject and object had their basis in a much more radical idea about the self, one that had its origin in the implications of Freud’s writings. And the most cogent formulation of these implications was Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory.²⁵² Lacan and Freud (if we read Freud through the lens of history) launched a full-scale assault on the notion of the unified subject as well as on the philosophical belief that consciousness constitutes the centre of the human being. They did so by showing that the subject is operated by agencies beyond the self’s self-presence.²⁵³ Their kenotic conception of the subject exerted considerable influence on the Surrealists.

The unconscious introduces a gap in consciousness. In the famous *Discours de Rome* (Rome Speech, 1953), Lacan would describe the unconscious as “that part of the concrete discourse in so far as it is transindividual, which is not at the disposition of the subject to re-establish the continuity of his conscious discourse.”²⁵⁴

DALÍ, PARANOIA, AND LACAN: A NEW PHASE OF SURREALISM BEGINS

The coincidence between Lacan’s ideas on method in psychoanalysis and Dalí’s paranoiac-critical method was more than fortuitous: the two men’s ideas on method grew out of similar convictions and dispositions. Their coinciding

interests in paranoia brought them together. Lacan read Dalí's "L'âne pourri" in the July 1930 issue of *Le surréalisme au service de la révolution*, and the ideas he found there helped him move beyond the constitutionalist ideas on paranoia that dominated French psychiatry (i.e., the idea that heredity determined whether a person would become paranoid) towards the dynamic ideas that he himself would expound (i.e., paranoia is a mechanism serving a purpose for a particular personality).²⁵⁵

The idea that psychosis was the product of a constitutional tendency towards mental automatism sat uneasily with Lacan, whose early writings on psychosis argued that paranoia, far from being driven by organic processes that produce split-off (alienated) segments of the self, was linked to events in the paranoid's earlier life and in the characteristics of the paranoid's personality. Lacan spent the academic year 1928–29 as a medical student at the Infirmary for the Insane of the Police Prefecture. There he met Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault (1872–1934), who was a student of "erotomania" as well as a self-proclaimed expert on paranoia. Clérambault's approach to mental illness was strictly organicist, and he resisted psychiatric reforms. He was also a devotee of the practice of psychiatric incarceration. During the year he spent at the infirmary, Lacan absorbed Clérambault's views and enthusiastically adopted many of his views of paranoia. In *Écrits* (1966), Lacan would acknowledge Clérambault as his "sole master in psychiatry." He would develop Clérambault's ideas on mental automatism by proposing that the alienated processes (because they are not part of the subject's consciousness) belong to an other/Other. Clérambault's influence on Lacan first became evident in a 1931 article titled "Structures des psychoses paranoïaques" (Structures of Paranoid Psychoses): there Lacan advanced a modified version of Clérambault's theory of paranoia (and advocated for the internment of the insane).²⁵⁶

The first issue of the Surrealist magazine *Minotaure* contains an article by Salvador Dalí, followed immediately by one written by "Dr. Lacan." In his article, Dalí praises Lacan's thesis, stating that "because of it we can for the first time arrive at a complete and homogeneous idea of the subject, quite free of the mechanistic mire in which present-day psychiatry is stuck."²⁵⁷ (Georges Bataille and Boris Souvarine also took note of Lacan's dissertation and discussed it in the review *La critique sociale*.) Dalí remarked further:

Lacan threw a scientific light on a phenomenon that is obscure to most of our contemporaries—the expression: paranoia—and gave it its true significance. Psychiatry, before Lacan, committed a vulgar error on this account by claiming that the systematization of paranoid delirium developed "after the fact" and that this phenomenon was to be considered as a case of "reasoning madness." Lacan showed the contrary to be true: the delirium itself is a systematization.

It is born systematic, an active element determined to orient reality around its line of force. It is the contrary of a dream or an automatism which remains passive in relation to the movingness of life. Paranoiac delirium asserts itself and conquers.²⁵⁸

Dalí (along with René Crevel and, especially, the communist philosopher and novelist Paul Nizan, 1905–40) insisted that psychoanalysis must develop in a more materialist, more ideologically aware direction, one that recognized the role that a repressive society plays in generating psychopathy. In his contribution to *Minotaure* 1, Lacan showed that he had listened to the Surrealists who were his co-factionalists in his struggle to introduce Freudian ideas into French thought and, through his interest in concrete, lived situations, to move beyond Clérambault's organicism. He began to speak of "bourgeois society," "ideological superstructure," and "theoretical revolution."

What Dalí considered especially important about Lacan's thesis was that Lacan understood that personality arises from basic formations and is the primary (social) systematization of instincts constituting the subject. Lacan outlined this position in a second *Minotaure* article, devoted to the crime of the Papin sisters: "The murderous drive that we consider the foundation of paranoia indeed would only be a scarcely satisfying abstraction, if it was not controlled by a series of correlative abnormalities of socialized instincts, and if the actual state of our knowledge about the evolution of the personality did not allow us to consider these instinctual abnormalities as contemporaneous in their genesis."²⁵⁹ Here we see the grounds for Dalí's accusation that the prevailing psychiatric attitude saw paranoia as a systematization of paranoiac delirium developed "after the fact." Lacan argued that the conditions underlying the psychosis arise contemporaneously with abnormalities conditioned by social instincts (and so are not constitutional).

Around the same time as Lacan presented the *Minotaure* article (in November 1931), he, together with the psychoanalysts Jean Lévy-Valensi and Pierre Migault, had ventured to offer the Société médico-psychologique their ideas concerning anomalous writing. Lacan and his collaborators presented the case of Marcelle, a female paranoiac in whom they had taken great interest. Marcelle was a twenty-four-year-old primary schoolteacher who suffered from erotomania. She believed herself to be Jehanne la Pucelle and thought that she had a mission to renew France and to restore the country to its former greatness. Marcelle's attitude towards language was not dissimilar to her attitude towards France: language, too, she believed, had fallen from its original glorious position, so she took up writing in an effort to renew language. "The old forms need shaking up," she declared.

Here is an example of Marcelle's writing:

Paris, May 14, 1931.

To the President of the Republic, Monsieur P. Doumer, at present on vacationing in gingerbread and mintstrel land.

Dear M. President of the assiduous Republic,

I should like to know everything so as to give you the but mouse so of a coward and of a test cannon but it takes me much too long to guess. From the unkind things done to other people one might guess that my five Vals geese are chickwee and you are the bowler hat of the Virgin Mary and test pardon. But we must reduce everything from the Auvergne word list for unless one washes one's hands in a rock spring one will wetwee the dry bed and madelaine is without tradding the tart of all these new-shaved men so as to be the best of her prears of whooch is sweet and the cheek bright. I'd like to have said nasty things about the toalmerchantess without prejudice to plenary life and of free of charge one does some detective work. But one has to astonish people to be the accursed rascal of barbanella and of bedless one does some toalmerchantess.²⁶⁰

Lacan, Migault, and Lévy-Valensi did not offer an interpretation of Marcelle's writings (as Freud did of Leonardo's art); rather, they studied the process by which the writing had been formed (as Freud studied how the dream was shaped by the dream work, in *Die Traumdeutung* [The Interpretation of Dreams, 1900]). They explored the syntactical, semantic, and grammatical abnormalities of the texts. Essentially, their ideas about textual production were like those of the Surrealists and Clérambault: like them, Lacan and his co-authors saw the text as a product of a machinic process—as emerging from “the place (locus) of the Other,” as Lacan would later say.²⁶¹ The syntactical, semantic, and grammatical abnormalities of Marcelle's texts, Lacan, Migault, and Lévy-Valensi claimed, were not the result of a constitutionally determined organic degeneration, but rather effects arising from a process that is best understood through the model of creativity, similar to that which produced Breton's, Éluard's, Péret's, and Desnos's texts:

The life experience of the paranoiac and the world view it engenders may be thought of as a novel form of syntax, which enlists its own peculiar means of comprehension for the purpose of affirming the community of mankind. Understanding this syntax can, I think, provide an invaluable introduction to the symbolic values of art and, more particularly, to the problems of style [one of the persistent themes of Lacan's seminar]—an introduction, in other words, to art's peculiar virtues of conviction and human communion as well as to the paradoxes attendant upon its creation. These problems will always remain beyond the grasp of any form of anthropology that has not yet freed itself from the naive realism of the object [that is to say, with Lacan, as with Surrealists, that has not yet understood the relativity of the object].²⁶²

Lacan shared with the Surrealists a belief that an individual's psychic condition plays a key role in shaping his or her experience. In "Au delà du principe de réalité" (Beyond the Reality Principle, 1936), which he first addressed to the Marienbad conference, he asserts boldly (setting the statement in capital letters, for emphasis), "ALTHOUGH LIMITED TO FACTS ABOUT DESIRE, PSYCHOLOGY BECAME A SCIENCE AFTER FREUD HAD ESTABLISHED THE RELATIVITY OF ITS OBJECT."²⁶³ The topic of this paper is the scientific foundation of psychology; in it, Lacan proposes that psychology becomes truly scientific (not spuriously scientific, like behaviourist psychology) by developing in a non-positivist direction, adopting a different method from that of the traditional sciences.²⁶⁴ His introductory assertion proclaims that humans' sense of reality depends on psychical reality—that reality is not objectively given, but something that results from humans' self-projection into the world.

Surrealists enthusiastically embraced the idea that the paranoiac's life experience is a novel form of syntax. Indeed, the force of Lacan's writing and personality, together with a convergence of the interests of Dalí, Lacan, Crevel, and Breton, meant that Surrealism's second phase (beginning around 1928) would be dominated by the idea of paranoia, as the first phase had been dominated by the ideas of automatism and hysteria. Dalí was a principal force driving this change, which can be understood as a shift from creative methods that rely largely on those mental processes Janet characterized as lower or more elementary to methods that emphasize Janet's higher psychological activities. Dalí would likely have assented to the idea, which Lacan also expounded in "Le problème du style et la conception psychiatrique des formes paranoïaques de l'expérience" (The Problem of Style and the Psychiatric Conception of Paranoiac Forms of Experience, 1933), that the hallucinatory systems of paranoia are "symbolic expressions" with their own "original syntax" that are "on the same level as the inspiration of the greatest artists." Lacan, like his teacher Clérambault, understood paranoia as a distinctive form of cognition (akin, according to Clérambault, at least, to clairvoyance). For his part, Dalí defined paranoia as a "spontaneous method of irrational cognition, which rests on the critical interpretative association of hallucinatory phenomena" and (as we have noted) accorded the critical apparatus only the role of developing and objectifying the initial hallucinatory images, without interfering essentially in their fundamental structure.²⁶⁵ Lacan's emphasis on the systematic character of the syntactic and semantic abnormalities of Marcelle's writing (and, later, that of Marguerite Pantaine and the Papin sisters) accorded entirely with Dalí's understanding of the mechanisms of paranoia.

We have noted that Dalí's paranoiac-critical method involved two stages: in the first, the artist succumbed to the delirium of a paranoiac thought

process; in the second, a critical process was superimposed on this paranoid process. Dalí believed that this method put him in direct contact with the cosmic soul. Though his formulations were not quite so grandiose as Dalí's, Lacan also claimed that human "knowledge" begins in a delusion, a misapprehension or misrecognition, and that a systematizing process fashions an autonomous structure from the contents of such misrecognition. Dalí took Lacan's writing as indicating that his works, based as they were on the method of paranoia-criticism, revealed the basic means by which humans apprehend—or, rather, interpret—reality: such subjective interpretations inhere in the fundamental structures of human cognition.

Lacan's psychoanalytic theories and Dalí's ideas on creative method (specifically, on the paranoiac-critical method) approach each other more nearly on the topic of the image and its role in knowledge than on any other. Lacan's psychoanalytic theory gives central place to the Imaginary. His enormously influential idea of the mirror stage is a key to his understanding of the Imaginary.²⁶⁶ He first presented the idea of *le stade du miroir* in 1936 at the Fourteenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association in Marienbad, only four years after meeting Dalí and only three after Dalí's influence on his ideas became evident.²⁶⁷ The notion of the mirror phase proposes that the ego is an illusory entity, formed partly in defence against the persecutory sense of the body in fragments (*le corps morcelé*, that great theme of Dalí's paintings), a function of misrepresentation that characterizes the ego in all its structures and relations. The young baby has no sense of itself as a whole, Lacan points out; but somewhere between six and eighteen months, the child discovers her image in the mirror and assumes this *double* is herself. However, because the human infant is "prematurely born," the mapping between the image that children see, and assume as themselves, is never an exact, accurate match. The child's recognition of herself is really a *misrecognition*, an alienating identification that introduces a gap or rends a tear in "the Real":

The mirror-image would seem to be the threshold of the visible world, if we go by the mirror disposition which the *imago of one's own body* presents in hallucinations or dreams, whether it concerns its individual features, or even its infirmities, or its object-projections; or if we observe the role of the mirror apparatus in the appearances of the *double*, in which psychical realities, however heterogeneous, are manifested.²⁶⁸

All knowledge partakes of this original misprision, so all knowledge is condemned by its quasi-hallucinatory nature, by its "lack of reality," which, as Lacan himself points out, "the Surrealists, in their restless way, saw as its limitation."²⁶⁹ All knowledge, since it involves perception and thus develops

from the Imaginary register, has paranoiac precursors and therefore partakes of a paranoiac character.

Dalí's ideas about the double image, set out above, have much in common with Lacan's idea about the mirror image. Dalí argued that a double image is obtained by virtue of the violence of the paranoiac image-thoughts, which cunningly and skilfully take advantage of the requisite quantity of pretexts, coincidences, and so on, to make a second image manifest, which then replaces the first. The process Dalí referred to as paranoia reveals that reality is beyond—is *other than*—what it presents itself as. Dalí's conception of paranoia was essentially that our perception of reality reflects our desires, so all our perception is interpretative, and these interpretations reflect the operation of desire, which, because of its insistent and relentless demand, is tantamount to obsession.

LACAN'S THEORIES AND SURREALISTS' CONCEPTION OF THE POETIC IMAGE

Dalí developed a special form of Surrealism, and it is with that version that Lacan's thinking probably has the greatest affinity. But his ideas also have much in common with the founding ideas of Surrealism generally. In fact, Dalí's statements about the nature of the double image are an alternative formulation of the key Surrealist idea that a poetic image has a density and precision that makes it seem real at the same time as it expresses, and acts as a lure for, desire.²⁷⁰ Dalí's ideas about a precisely rendered hallucinatory form that we mistake for the real—that is, those of Dalí's ideas that most nearly approach Lacan's psychoanalytic theories—constitute a version of the Surrealist idea of the poetic image. It behooves us to explore the role of the form of thinking that Dalí called paranoia in the mysterious force of the poetic. We approach the topic through Lacan's writings on paranoia, which have a strong rapport with Dalí's ideas.

Lacan's thesis, written during the years that he was closest to the Surrealist circle, focused on the details of a female psychotic whom he named Aimée. Aimée had produced a body of extremely striking writings, which Surrealists celebrated (treating her as a Holy Fool whose madness produced higher poetic states). Like members of the Surrealist movement, Lacan strove to overthrow the place of conscious reason, questioned the reality of object, proposed that desire is of supreme importance, and possessed a taste for the absurd (Lacan often referred to himself as a comedian and a fool). But the most important connection between Lacan and the Surrealists related to the role they accorded language—specifically, the role of language in the operations of the unconscious.

Lacan developed his demonstration that the subject is beyond himself or herself (i.e., that parts of the subject operate outside of the subject's knowledge and control) in part through the influence of Clérambault and in part by applying linguistic methods to interpreting delusional language (a language that most psychoanalysts consider to be formed by unconscious desire). More precisely, he used methods derived from linguistics (and that are applicable to all linguistic structures) to analyze the mental operations that give rise to the deformations of psychotic speech and writing—even to study the seeming asyntax of writing like Marcelle's. What sanctioned these methods, Lacan believed, was the discovery that the unconscious is structured like a language.²⁷¹ The applicability to the study of the unconscious of methods developed for the study of language Lacan took as showing that the productions of the unconscious can be understood as a discourse that is beyond the conscious control of the subject (and in the production of which the subject is aware of having no role)—a discourse that thus seems to be of an Other.

Lacan began laying emphasis on the “function and field” of language in psychoanalysis when he was still in training as a psychiatrist. That emphasis was evident in a 1931 paper titled “Structure des psychoses paranoïaques” (Structure of Paranoid Psychoses). He asserted that the unconscious can be understood as a language even more vigorously in his doctoral thesis, “De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité” (Paranoid Psychosis and Its Relations to the Personality, 1932), and in early work concerning two maids, the twenty-eight-year-old Christine Papin and the twenty-one-year-old sister Léa. The maids were in the employ of a family in Le Mans that consisted of a lawyer, his wife, and their daughter. The two women were hard characters, given to making hurtful comments. For their part, the two sisters were a bit odd: on their days off, they never went out, but instead remained in their room. But they were good maids.

On 2 February 1933, a stormy night, the two mistresses of the house went out, and while they were out, lightning knocked out the electrical power to the house. When they returned to find the power was out, they reprimanded the maids. Usually when this happened, the Papin sisters simply accepted it, but for some reason they responded differently this time. They waited for the power to come back on, and when it did, each of the sisters grabbed one of their employers and tore her eyes out. Then, taking up all the tools they could find in the maids' area of the house (a hammer, a pewter jug, and a kitchen knife), one after the other, they wielded them against their oppressors, crushing their faces, slashing their clothes to expose their genitals, making deep cuts in the thighs and buttocks of one, and using the blood from the wounds to defile the thighs and buttocks of the other. They ended their mayhem by pouring the blood of one of the victims over the other. When they

had finished, they cleaned up after themselves, washed themselves and all the knives and hammers they had used, and took themselves to bed. Christine and Léa Papin were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to be executed in the town square of Le Mans. Their sentences were commuted to confinement in a mental hospital.

Lacan wrote up the case of the Papin sisters for *Minotaure*. His commentary on the case reveals the genesis of the idea of the transindividual nature of the unconscious: “They plucked out their victims’ eyes as the Bacchantes castrated their victims. The sacrilegious curiosity that has anguished men since the beginning of time moved them in their desire for their victims, in their search in the dead women’s gaping wounds for what Christine, in all innocence, later described to the court as ‘the mystery of life.’”²⁷²

Another case held just as much interest for the young Lacan: a great female actor, of the stature of Sarah Bernhardt or Huguette Duflos, arrived at the stage door. An unknown woman approached her and asked whether she was Madame Z. Nothing here was out of the ordinary. Autograph hounds at the stage door often asked her that very question, and nothing about the woman aroused suspicion: the woman was properly dressed, wore gloves, and carried a handbag, and her coat had a fur collar and fur bands on the sleeves. So the actor replied that she was indeed Madame Z. The unknown woman then pulled a knife from her handbag and attempted to stab the actor; Madame Z grabbed the knife by the blade, and in doing so, severed two tendons in her hand. The assailant was arrested and confined to a mental hospital; she spent six months there, quite delirious, then became calm and was cured. Lacan studied her case, which he called the case of Aimée, and presented his findings in his thesis.

These were the cases on which Lacanian psychoanalysis was founded. Lacan consistently claimed that his thought marked a “return to Freud”; thus, in “Fetishism: The Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real” (1956), Lacan and his co-author Wladimir Branolt asserted that

unless we are to deny the very essence of psychoanalysis, we must make use of language as our guide through the study of the so-called pre-verbal structures. Freud has shown us and taught that symptoms speak in words, that, like dreams, they are constructed in phrases and sentences. In his article of 1927, Freud introduced us to the study of the fetish by indicating that it has to be deciphered...like a symptom or a message. He tells us even in what language it has to be deciphered. This way of presenting the problem is not without significance. From the beginning, such an approach places the problem explicitly in the realm of the search for meaning in language rather than in that of vague analogies in the visual field. (Such as, for example, hollow forms recalling the vagina, furs the pubic hairs, etc.)... The problem is not one of repressed affects;

the affect in itself tells us nothing. The problem concerns the denegation of an idea. With this denegation, we find ourselves in the realm of significance, the only area where the key word “displacement” has significance. . . . Language is thus the symbolic activity *par excellence*; all theories of languages based on a confusion between the word and its referent overlook this essential dimension. Does not Humpty Dumpty remind Alice that he is master of the word, if not of its referent?”²⁷³

Look to the concrete, material signifier, not the signified, Lacan reminded us insistently. For it is a common but erroneous belief that psychoanalysis holds that the unconscious relies exclusively on what Freud called *Dingvorstellungen* (“thing-presentations,” mental representations of concrete, particular objects, formed of the residue of sensations of concrete objects), and that what he called *Wortvorstellungen* (“word-presentations,” mental representations that have the form of names of things or of a hierarchy of increasingly abstract thoughts about objects) are the province of secondary-process thinking.²⁷⁴

Admittedly, this common view has some basis in Freud’s writings. It is central to his topographic model: his thesis that there is a topographical separation between the system *Cs.* (comprising conscious mental activity) and the system *Ucs.* (comprising unconscious activity), and his claim that an idea exists simultaneously in the two places in the mental apparatus, propose something similar to that view.²⁷⁵ In a section of his 1915 article “Das Unbewusste” (The Unconscious) titled “Der Topographische Aspekt” (The Topographical Point of View), Freud wrote,

now the patient has in actual fact the same idea in two forms in different places in his mental apparatus: first, he has the conscious memory of the auditory trace of the idea, conveyed in what we told him [in the course of analytical sessions, in the form of interpretations that point out the source of the analysand’s anxiety, and the repression that is responsible for it]; and secondly, he also has—as we know for certain—the unconscious memory of his experience as it was in its earlier form. Actually there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after the resistances have been overcome, has entered into connection with the unconscious memory-trace. It is only through the making conscious of the latter itself that success is achieved. On superficial consideration this would seem to show that conscious and unconscious ideas are distinct registrations, topographically separated, of the same content. But a moment’s reflection shows that the identity of the information given to the patient with his repressed memory is only apparent. To have heard something and to have experienced something are in their psychological nature two quite different things, even though the content of both is the same.²⁷⁶

In a later section of that article, “Das Agnoszierung des Unbewussten” (The Assessment of the Unconscious), he elaborated on this topographic model by pointing to how representations in the *Cs.* differ from representations in the *Ucs.*:

What we have permissibly called the conscious presentation of the object can now be split up into the presentation of the *word* and the presentation of the *thing*; the latter consists in the cathexis, if not of the direct memory-images of the thing, at least of remoter memory-traces derived from these. We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a conscious and an unconscious presentation. The two are not, as we supposed, different registrations of the same content in different psychical localities, nor yet different functional states of cathexis in the same locality; but the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone. The system *Ucs.* contains the thing-cathexes of the objects, the first and true object-cathexes; the system *Pcs.* [the preconscious] comes about by this thing-presentation being hypercathexed [the term “hypercathexis” designates an additional charge of instinctual energy cathecting any already cathected psychical element] through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it. It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychical organization and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the *Pcs.* Now, too, we are in a position to state precisely what it is that repression denies to the rejected presentation in the transference neuroses: what it denies to the presentation is translation into words which shall remain attached to the object. A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not hypercathexed, remains thereafter in the *Ucs.* in a state of repression.²⁷⁷

Freud, we see, attributed the emergence of the preconscious to a hypercathexis of thing-presentations as a result of their being linked to word-presentations: “A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not hypercathexed, remains thereafter in the *Ucs.* in a state of repression.”²⁷⁸

These ideas relate to Freud’s distinction between two types of mental processes. His ideas on the topic begin with what he took to be obvious: that the mental apparatus receives input from the external world through sensory perceptions and from the internal bodily world through proprioception and the emotions. He points out, in *Die Traumdeutung*, that the mind has two processes for handling these internal and external perceptions and their demands for mental work—the primary and secondary processes. The dreaming mind relies on the more archaic primary process. The primary process handles demands by rapidly recalling memories of sensory/motor experiences that had provided gratification and presenting them to the mind as present experiences, that is, as realities presented through hallucination. It employs visual memory processing, lacks any verbal representation of the perception, desire, or demand that fuels its operation, escapes the demands of rational thought and logic, and does not engage in reality testing (matching the mental image to external reality). The primary process takes the mental representation as reality.

Freud was greatly influenced by evolutionary theory, and he realized that a being that could not distinguish reality and imagination (phantasy) obviously would be an imperilled being. So another form of thinking was necessary for adaptation, and this other form he referred to as the “secondary process.” This form of thinking is oriented towards reality. It works with verbal symbols and engages in reality testing (testing thought against reality). The secondary process makes use of language and puts desires and demands in verbal form—it associates verbal symbols with memories (often, but not necessarily, sensory/motor memories). It works out generalizations, drafts verbal propositions that can then become subjects of logical reasoning, and scans the information reported by the senses for possible satisfactions available in the external world.

The primary process is driven by affects. It is a highly concrete form of thinking, for it allies itself for the most part with visual rather than verbal memory representation. It is extremely laconic, for it relates several different sensory/motor memories of experiences of gratification based on one shared characteristic or affective tone (Freud called this “displacement”) and combines them into one composite image (Freud called this “condensation”)—the result (which disguises the underlying wish) is presented to the dream as if it represents reality (thus, this kind of thinking escapes the strictures of reality testing). Freud asserted that when the primary process treats words and thoughts, it treats them not as symbolic representations with specific meanings but, rather, as concrete objects that can be broken into fragments that are subsequently recombined in new orders; in other words, the primary process treats words like any other concrete entity and often deals with them on the basis of a single characteristic (such as their sound). For example, the word “nun” might substitute for the associated word “none” not because they share a common symbolic meaning but simply because of the sound of the word.

Lacan offers a slightly more concrete description of a similar process in his comments on condensation and metaphor in “L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient, ou la raison depuis Freud” (The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud, read 9 May 1957): “Let us say that modern poetry and the Surrealist school led us to take a major step forward here by showing that any conjunction of two signifiers could just as easily constitute a metaphor, if an additional condition—that of the greatest disparity of the images signified—weren’t required for the production of the poetic spark, in other words for metaphoric creation to occur.”²⁷⁹ Lacan thus avoids any implication that unconscious processes, the processes of condensation and displacement, operate by finding connections among images; rather, he imputes the process to the agency of language itself—language that “thinks”

us—and to the way that one signifier can occlude another, causing a rupture in the signifying chain to which the occluded signifier belongs.

In “Die Metapsychologie der Träume” (The Metaphysics of Dreams), a paper written in 1915, the same year as “The Unconscious,” but published two years later, Freud anticipated aspects of Lacan’s argument.

We have already in *The Interpretation of Dreams* [*Die Traumdeutung*] described the way in which the regression of the preconscious day’s residues takes place in dream-formation. In this process thoughts are transformed into images, mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word-presentations are taken back to the thing-presentations which correspond to them, as if, in general, the process were dominated by considerations of *representability*. . . Only where the word-presentations occurring in the day’s residues are recent and current residues of *perceptions*, and not the expression of *thoughts*, are they themselves treated like thing-presentations, and subjected to the influence of condensation and displacement. . . It is very noteworthy how little the dream-work keeps to the word-presentations; it is always ready to exchange one word for another till it finds the expression which is most handy for plastic representation.²⁸⁰

The most crucial distinction in Freud’s theory of dreams is the one between the manifest dream and the latent dream. The manifest dream is the dream recalled by the dreamer; the latent dream is an unconscious wish that cannot be acknowledged just as it is. The manifest dream gives expression to the latent wish that exerts pressure on the psyche in striving to be satisfied. But the latent wish cannot be expressed in its native form, for it is of such a nature that it cannot be acknowledged without disturbing sleep. In order to protect sleep, the dream disguises the wish by transforming it through archaic mechanisms of thinking—in particular, through condensation, displacement, and substitution. The task of transforming the latent wish into the manifest dream itself Freud calls the “dreamwork.” All other approaches to interpreting dreams

have endeavoured to arrive at an interpretation of dreams from their manifest content or (if no interpretation was attempted) to form a judgement as to their nature on the basis of that same manifest content. We are alone in taking something else into account. We have introduced a new class of psychical material between the manifest content of dreams and the conclusions of our enquiry: namely, their *latent* content, or (as we say) the ‘dream-thoughts’, arrived at by means of our procedure. It is from these dream-thoughts and not from a dream’s manifest content that we disentangle its meaning. We are thus presented with a new task which had no previous existence: the task, that is, of investigating the relations between the manifest content of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts, and of tracing out the processes by which the latter have been changed into the former.²⁸¹

Freud's commentary on the means by which latent dream-thoughts are transformed into manifest dreams explains why dreams are vividly pictorial:

The second species of displacement which occurs in dream-formation is not only of great theoretical interest but is also specially well calculated to explain the appearance of fantastic absurdity in which dreams are disguised. The direction taken by the displacement usually results in a colourless and abstract expression in the dream-thought being exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one. The advantage, and accordingly the purpose, of such a change jumps to the eyes. A thing that is pictorial is, from the point of view of a dream, a thing that is *capable of being represented*: it can be introduced into a situation in which abstract expressions offer the same kind of difficulties to representation in dreams as a political leading article in a newspaper would offer to an illustrator... A dream-thought is unusable so long as it is expressed in an abstract form; but when once it has been transformed into pictorial language, contrasts and identifications of the kind which the dream-work requires, and which it creates if they are not already present, can be established more easily than before between the new form of expression and the remainder of the material underlying the dream.

Or again, shortly later, in *Die Traumdeutung*:

The foregoing discussion has led us at last to the discovery of a third factor whose share in the transformation of the dream-thoughts into the dream-content is not to be underrated: namely, *considerations of representability in the peculiar psychical material of which dreams make use*—for the most part, that is, representability in visual images. Of the various subsidiary thoughts attached to the essential dream-thoughts, those will be preferred which admit of visual representation...²⁸²

The emphasis, surely, is on the role that imagining has on the form of the manifest dream-thought. But there is in Freud's oeuvre a remarkable example of psychoanalytical sleuthing that points to the role that language plays both in consciousness and (more important) in the unconscious.²⁸³ The example that appears in Freud's *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben* (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 1901) begins with the analysis of a situation of a common enough sort—the forgetting of the name of an artist and the remembering, while trying to bring the forgotten name back into consciousness, of other names. The essay in which Freud presents the results of this analysis, “Ein Beitrag zum Vergessen von Eigennamen” (The Forgetting of Proper Names, 1911), is interesting for a number of reasons: it gives splendid evidence of the rigour with which Freud conducted his self-analysis, and it reveals his stunning ability to frame a hypothesis to explain the connections among the data of consciousness.²⁸⁴ It also provides an example of how the concrete, material aspects of language, as well as words' significations, inflect

the unconscious and modify the influence of the unconscious on conscious mental processes.

Specifically, the article concerns Freud's forgetting the name of the artist who painted the magnificent frescoes in the Orvieto Cathedral's Chapel of San Brizio, on the theme of *The Four Last Things* (i.e., Death, Judgment, Hell, and Heaven). I quote at length from Freud's analysis (as Freud's account is so tightly composed that an adequate summary would hardly be any shorter than his own description):

Instead of the name I was looking for—*Signorelli*—the names of two other painters—*Botticelli* and *Boltraffio*—thrust themselves on me, though they were immediately and decisively rejected by my judgement as incorrect... The investigation into the influences and the associative paths by which the reproducing of the name had been displaced in this way from *Signorelli* to *Botticelli* and *Boltraffio* led to the following results:

(a) The reason why the name *Signorelli* was lost is not to be found in anything special about the name itself or in any psychological characteristic of the context into which it was introduced. The name I had forgotten was just as familiar to me as one of the substitute names—*Botticelli*—and much more familiar than the other substitute name—*Boltraffio*—about whose owner I could scarcely produce any information other than that he belonged to the Milanese school. Moreover the context in which the name was forgotten seemed to me harmless and did not enlighten me further. I was driving in the company of a stranger from Ragusa [now Dubrovnik] in Dalmatia to a place in *Herzegovina*: our conversation turned to the subject of travel in Italy, and I asked my companion whether he had ever been to Orvieto and looked at the famous frescoes there, painted by...

(b) Light was only thrown on the forgetting of the name when I recalled the topic we had been discussing directly before, and it was revealed as a case in which a *topic that has just been raised is disturbed by the preceding topic*... We had been talking about the customs of the Turks living in *Bosnia* and *Herzegovina*. I had told him what I had heard from a colleague practising among these people—that they are accustomed to show great confidence in their doctor and great resignation to fate. If one has to inform them that nothing can be done for a sick person, their reply is: "Herr [Sir], what is there to be said? If he could be saved, I know you would have saved him." In these sentences we for the first time meet with the words and names *Bosnia*, *Herzegovina*, and *Herr*, which can be inserted into an associative series between *Signorelli* and *Botticelli-Boltraffio*.

(c) I assume that the series of thoughts about the customs of the Turks in *Bosnia*, etc., acquired the capacity to disturb the next succeeding thought from the fact that I had withdrawn my attention from that series before it was brought to an end. I recall in fact wanting to tell a second anecdote which lay close to the first in my memory. These Turks place a higher value on sexual enjoyment than on anything else, and in the event of sexual disorders they are

plunged in a despair which contrasts strangely with their resignation towards the threat of death. One of my colleague's patients once said to him: "*Herr*, you must know that if *that* comes to an end then life is of no value." I suppressed my account of this characteristic trait . . . But I did more: I also diverted my attention from pursuing thoughts which might have arisen in my mind from the topic of "death and sexuality." On this occasion I was still under the influence of a piece of news which had reached me a few weeks before while I was making a brief stay at *Trafoi*. A patient over whom I had taken a great deal of trouble had put an end to his life on account of an incurable sexual disorder . . . The similarity between 'Trafoi' and 'Boltraffio' forces me to assume that this reminiscence, in spite of my attention being deliberately diverted from it, was brought into operation in me at the time [of the conversation].

(d) It is no longer possible for me to take the forgetting of the name *Signorelli* as a chance event . . . [A] motive . . . influenced me so that I debarred the thoughts connected with them, the thoughts which had led to the news at Trafoi, from becoming conscious in my mind . . . I had *repressed* something. What I wanted to forget was not, it is true, the name of the artist at Orvieto but something else—something, however, which contrived to place itself in an associative connection with his name, so that my act of will missed its target and I forgot *the one thing against my will*, while I wanted to forget *the other thing intentionally*. The disinclination to remember was aimed against one content; the inability to remember emerged in another . . . Moreover the substitute names no longer strike me as so entirely unjustified as they did before the matter was elucidated: by a sort of compromise they remind me just as much of what I wanted to forget as of what I wanted to remember; and they show me that my intention to forget something was neither a complete success nor a complete failure.²⁸⁵

Freud goes on to explain how the unintentional (unwilful) forgetting the one thing—the name of the painter at Orvieto—was the result of forgetting another thing intentionally. He explains that the name he tried without success to remember, that of the painter Signorelli, underwent division into two parts: the last two syllables "elli," and the first two syllables "Signor." The syllables "elli" appear as the final two syllables of one of the substitute names, "Botticelli," while "Signor," translated as "Herr," takes on numerous relations. (Recall Dalí's ideas about images forming associations that hold them down in the unconscious.) It is, Freud says, precisely these overdeterminations that prevent the syllables "Signor" from becoming conscious: by translating "Signor" into "Herr," the term "has acquired a numerous and miscellaneous set of relations to the names contained in the repressed topic, but for this reason it is not available for [conscious] reproduction."²⁸⁶ When "Herr" was substituted for "Signor," the term "Signor" became associated with the connected names "Herzegovina" and "Bosnia." The key to the forgetting of the name "Signorelli"—and Freud argued that the finding could

be generalized to many similar cases—was that it was preceded by a suppression (in the case that Freud analyzed, first, of stopping himself before he told his interlocutor about the trait that Turks in Bosnia exhibit, of supposing that if sexual functioning is impaired, life is no longer worth living), that this prior suppression had engendered a disposition towards repression, and that an external association could be made between the forgotten name and the name of an element previously suppressed—something that likely can be done, Freud suggests, “considering the low standards expected of an association of this kind.”²⁸⁷

Thus, Freud was presented with the problem of remembering the name of the painter of the San Brizio Chapel’s *The Four Last Things*. Before repressing the name “Signorelli,” he had repressed other thoughts: first, he had banished from his thought that in the event of sexual disorders, the Turks of that region are plunged in a despair that contrasts strangely with their resignation towards the threat of death (“*Herr*, you must know that if *that* comes to an end then life is of no value”); and second, he banished the thought of Trafoi and of his patient who killed himself there out of despair over a sexual dysfunction that Freud had been unable to cure. His mind formed associations between the name of the painter and these terms that had been barred from consciousness: the “Her[r]” in Herzegovina became associated with the “Signor” of “Signorelli”; in this way, the repression of the name “Herzegovina” dragged the name “Signorelli” into the zone of repression. However, as Freud pointed out, only the representatives of a drive are subject to repression, not the drive itself; nor is the energy of the drive defused.²⁸⁸ Accordingly, the desire for love (or the desire for desire) and the abhorrence of death (and the lack of desire) still found expression, but only through ways that concealed the connection of the ideas that represented the drive with sex and death.

Since the name “Bosnia” is so closely associated with “Herzegovina” that we commonly say the two names together, as if they were one name, the phoneme “Bo” became available. Since the repressed event happened at Trafoi, the sounds of the name “Trafoi” also became available, and so “Bo” and “Trafoi” were concatenated (and deformed) to form the name “Boltraffio.” Furthermore, the phoneme “Bo” was also linked to a slightly distorted version of the last part of the repressed name of the painter at Orvieto (“Signorelli”), to form the name “Botticelli.”

Freud’s analysis of this event exposes the mental processes that are at work without one’s knowing of them. It also shows that when the repressed item returns to consciousness, it does so in a distorted form—a form whose distortions disguise the ego-dystonic components of what is repressed. One could say that Freud’s analysis shows how “the discourse of the Other” (to

use Lacan's term) disrupts/irrupts into consciousness—how it introduces gaps in conscious representations and activates the contents of consciousness. The system of language plays a key role in determining that “Botticelli” and “Boltraffio” will substitute for “Signorelli”—it does so through the metonymic displacement along the chain of phonemes (and compound phonemes) “Signor-Herr-Bo-Trafoi.” Freud also points out that until Signorelli's name was pointed out to him, he could conjure up a clear image of Signorelli based on the painter's self-portrait in the fresco at Orvieto. As soon as he was told the name, the image faded away, along with the anxiety he had been feeling. The image of Signorelli was therefore a screen memory, for it served to mask the name and, by doing so, to keep the abhorred themes of the fresco from consciousness. A mental image here served as a screen that concealed the repressed linguistic item by substituting another (visual) representation in its place.

Freud's comments on this episode of forgetting expose the role that language played in pulling the painter's name into the unconscious. Even in *Die Traumdeutung*, Freud had shown that dreams use language concretely and subject words to the same processes (condensation, displacement, substitution) to which the primary process subjects concrete images. His analysis of the process that caused him to forget the name “Signorelli” goes even further, for he shows thereby that words may be repressed for reasons quite separate from any symbolic significance they might have—reasons that relate simply to words' sounds (and the relation those sounds have to those of charged words).

This exposition of his reasons for forgetting the name “Signorelli” is probably the most lucid, detailed, rigorously worked out—and certainly the most famous—of Freud's commentaries on the role that language plays in the unconscious (or, to use the Lacanian phrase, on “the insistence of the letter in the unconscious”). But he also analyzed an incident involving his disciple, the psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi, in *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* in a footnote in Chapter 6, titled “Vergessen von Eindrücken and Vorsätzen” (Forgetting of Impressions and Resolutions): “One day, however, he (Ferenczi) was blaming himself for having committed a technical error in a patient's psychoanalysis. That day all his former absent-minded habits reappeared. He stumbled several times as he walked along the street (a representation of his *faux pas* [false step-blunder] in the treatment).”²⁸⁹ Freud interpreted Ferenczi's stumbling as parataxis—the meaning of which arose through its association with the words *faux pas*—literally, a false step. Ferenczi had committed an error in the analysis he was conducting, and his unconscious associated the concept of error with the term *faux pas*; he then interpreted the term literally, which in turn caused him to act out, to make “false steps.”

In Chapter 8 of *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben*, titled “Symptom und Zufallshandlungen” (Erroneously Carried Out Actions), Freud noted similar behaviour of his own:

There is a house where twice every day for six years, at regular hours, I used to wait to be let in outside a door on the second floor. During this long period it has happened to me on two occasions, with a short interval between them that I have gone a floor too high—i.e., I have “*climbed too high*.” On the first occasion I was enjoying an ambitious day-dream in which I was “climbing ever higher and higher.” On this occasion I even failed to hear that the door in question had opened as I put my foot on the first step of the third flight. On the other occasion, I again went too far while I was deep in thought; when I realized it, I turned back and tried to catch hold of the phantasy in which I had been absorbed. I found that I was irritated by a (phantasied [*sic*]) criticism of my writings in which I was reproached with always “going too far.” This I had now replaced by the not very respectful “climbing too high.”²⁹⁰

Thus, Freud proposed that his own parataxis be interpreted through its association with the phrase “going too far.”

Lacan’s recasting of Freudian ideas has much to say about the role of language in unconscious psychological processes. One issue raised tangentially by Freud’s analysis is the insult to narcissistic grandiosity that the use of language entails (and for which the Surrealists attempted to compensate). The names that came into Freud’s consciousness—“Boltraffio,” “Botticelli,” “Bosnia,” “Herzegovina”—all related to “Signorelli” by phonemic condensation and displacement. The terms that came to his mind substituted for the missing term, “Signorelli”: the real object of desire (mastery) had been replaced by those other terms, and the desire itself had been displaced onto them. Lacan characterized such displacement, which always creates a rupture (or opens a gap) in language, as a process through which a lack of being (Lacan refers to it as a *manque d’être*) is installed in the object relation.²⁹¹

Freud was characteristically discreet when he presented the fragment of self-analysis represented by his deciphering his reasons for forgetting the name “Signorelli”; he simply noted that the substitute names that presented themselves were linked to “the repressed topic,” that of “death and sexuality.”²⁹² Freud’s associations around the event led him to the topic of loss of sexual potency, that is, to the idea of something resembling castration. The core idea of Freudian psychoanalysis—the Oedipal relation—connects the idea of castration to the boy’s wish to take his father’s place and sleep with the mother, as well as to the idea of taking the father’s place with violent death (parricide). Such wishes played a role in Freud’s forgetting the name “Signorelli,” though he did not make their role explicit. For the associations

with “*Herr*, what is there to be said?” and to “Herzegovina” reveal that the first part of the name, “Signor,” had been linked to the idea of the imposing male figure—to the father figure. The second part of the name, “elli,” is surely linked to the idea of the Mother (*elle*). So the name “Signorelli” is a sort of portmanteau word, one that fuses the imposing male figure with the first female (the prototype of *elle*); thus, the name implicitly refers to the primal scene. This perhaps disconcerted Freud to a degree, but what he must have found even more disconcerting was the link—through the painter’s name and the eschatological friezes he had made at Orvieto—between the idea of copulation and those of death and destruction, and the link between the primal scene (which motivates the screen memory) and feelings of death, destruction, and impotence—as well as between our sexual impotence and our inability to fend off death. This connection is the deep meaning of the Oedipal desire for the mother and the fear of castration that is its price. Freud’s inability to fend off his patient’s suicide was evidence that he could never serve in the role of the imposing male figure (and could not possess his mother). Lacan’s commentary on *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben* stresses the role that an individual’s willing acceptance of death (an attitude characteristic of the Turks of Bosnia-Herzegovina) played in the drama of forgetting. Lacan exposes this role by asking, “Is it possible not to see emerging from the text itself, and establishing itself, not as a metaphor, but as the reality of the disappearance, of the suppression of the *Unterdrückung*, the passing underneath? The term *Signor, Herr*, passes underneath—the absolute Master, I once said, which is in fact death, has disappeared there.”²⁹³

Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben is only one among several works in which Freud used linguistic structures to comment on unconscious processes. In his *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einem autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)* (Psychoanalytical Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Dementia Paranoides], 1910), he presented a case study (though not of one of his patients). The case concerned Daniel Paul Schreber, a jurist who became presiding judge (the *Senatspräsident*) of the Saxon High Court of Appeals at the age of forty. The position imposed enormous demands on him, for he had to oversee the most consequential cases. Schreber began to experience sleeplessness, anxieties, and obsessive ideas; these were followed, finally, by a nervous collapse. His wife committed him to the Sonnenstein mental asylum, a private psychiatric clinic, under the care of Dr. Paul Emil Flechsig. While in the asylum, Schreber began experiencing hallucinations and delirium; eventually, he became catatonic and incontinent. Professor Flechsig treated Schreber with medications to alleviate his hypertension, with hypnotics, and with hot baths. He also considered performing castration, a procedure he had used on many inmates in an effort

to reduce their obsession with sexual fantasies. When Schreber learned that, he concluded that he had been incarcerated in the asylum because Dr. Flechsig lusted after his wife and was committing soul murder on him.

After six years, Schreber came to believe that he had recovered, and he decided to petition for his release. To support his request, he prepared a thorough narrative account of his illness and recovery. He pleaded his own case before the Royal Court of Dresden and the legal and medical authorities concluded that though the *Senatspräsident* still suffered from hallucinations and harboured delirious beliefs, he was nonetheless competent to manage outside the asylum, so he was allowed out of the mental hospital. In 1903, he published the narrative he had written for the court, as *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nevenkranken*. Five years later, he had another breakdown; he would remain interned in an asylum until his death in 1911.

Schreber's account of his mental illness is fascinating.²⁹⁴ In *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken* (literally, *Memoirs of a Neuropath*, but generally cited as *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*), he explains that his nervous system was prone to overexcitement, so that he experienced minute changes in his envioning circumstances as intense electrical shocks. He felt he was not in control of his body; rather, his body was activated by radiations from the Beyond. Vibrations given off by objects around him, along with cosmic rays and divine rays, impacted constantly on his nervous system, and their effects left him sometimes agitated and sometimes paralyzed (such were their contradictory natures). He felt he was like a puppet agitated by horrible superhuman forces. Voices coming from the outside badgered him. The sounds of bird songs and of branches moved by the wind penetrated his consciousness, and he felt their messages were addressed to him and he should respond. Everything spoke to him, in an Ur-language he referred to as a *Grundsprache*, a language more archaic than German, French, or Polish. This onslaught of the voices of nature, and the imperative he felt to decipher them, tormented him.

Schreber also experienced his body as undergoing metamorphosis. His breasts, thighs, and buttocks were swelling and he was losing his male organs. He was becoming female. It was God who was transforming him, he believed: God was attracted to him. God found his ass irresistible and had begun to sodomize him. So, God must be raunchy and mean, for He (for Schreber, God was male) could not leave him alone. Schreber's delirium led him to believe that he was alone in the world; and that fantasy engendered his belief that he had become pregnant. God's plan for him, he decided, was to use him to populate the world with offspring who would form a new, redeemed race.

Freud wrote an analysis of the Schreber case, using it as a window into the world of the paranoiac. The sexual etiology of paranoia is not obvious. Prominent among the causes of paranoia—especially with males—are social

humiliations and slights. Freud pointed out, however, that the important factor in these social injuries lies in the role that homosexual components of emotional life play in them: at the core of cases of paranoia among males is an emotional conflict over the homosexual wish-phantasy of loving a man.²⁹⁵ For Freud, the clue that paranoia has its origin in repressed homosexuality was Schreber's feeling that he was being transformed into a woman. Great numbers of "female nerves" had already penetrated into his body, and this, Schreber felt, was a precursor to direct impregnation by God; his soul had been murdered so that God could use his body like a whore's. Freud contended that Schreber's second illness had its origin in insuperable conflicts aroused by Schreber's overwhelming erotic desire for Dr. Flechsig. Those desires, Freud held, were a revival of Schreber's childhood sexual emotions towards his father (his reverse Oedipal feelings).

Freud proposed that the distinctive character of paranoia is found in the forms the symptoms assume, and his analysis of these forms indicates a linguistic etiology for the affliction. Schreber's illness had its source in his overwhelming erotic desire for Flechsig, which he was compelled to deny. That desire could be stated in the proposition "I (a man) love him (a man)." Freud proposed that the proposition can be denied in four different ways: by denying the subject, the predicate, or the object, or by rejecting the proposition altogether. Each of these forms of denial leads to a different set of delusional symptoms. One way of denying the proposition (which Freud described as denying the predicate) is to say "I do not *love* him—I *hate* him," and from this comes the justification "I hate him because he persecutes me." This way of denying homosexual feelings results in delusions of maltreatment. Another form of denial is to deny the object. In this form of denial, the man says, first, "I do not love *him*—I love *her*." This proposition is then transformed by projection into the statement "I observe that *she* loves *me*." This is then expanded into the statement "I do not love *him*—I love *her*, because she loves *me*." The symptomatology for this form of denial includes erotomania; thus, men who feel conflicted over homosexual feelings may engage in Don Juanism.

A third form of denying the basic proposition is by contradicting the subject. In this case, the man says, "It is not *I* who loves the man—*she* loves him." This form of denial leads to feelings of jealousy. Another form of denial rejects the proposition as a whole: "I do not love *at all*—I do not love *anyone*." In this case, something must be done with the libido: its energy is turned back upon itself so that the proposition "I do not love *at all*—I do not love *anyone*" serves as a screen for "I love only myself." This form of denial leads to megalomania as the paranoiac regresses into a primary narcissism in which he takes himself as his own sexual object.

Freud's analysis of the symptoms associated with paranoia with homosexuality; this analysis again accords language a role in unconscious processes. Of course, it is true that at times Freud wrote about the primary process as though it engaged only *Dingvorstellungen* (thing-presentations), and it is easy to get the impression that the unconscious is exclusively visual. That is not so. We have seen that Freud sometimes argued that the unconscious operates through language. This dimension of Freud's thought was developed by Lacan (who in 1931–32 translated into French a 1922 essay by Freud ["Über einige neurotische Mechanismen bei Eiferzucht, Paranoia und Homosexualität," Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality], in which Freud restates some of his conclusions regarding the Schreber case—around the same time, he encountered Salvador Dalí's "L'âne pourri"), whose ideas had so much in common with those of the Surrealists; as René Crevel's "Notes en vue d'une psychodialectique" (Notes Toward a Psycho-Dialectic) in *Le surréalisme au service de la révolution* of May 1933 shows, some Surrealists greeted this development as providing the foundation for a new psychoanalysis.

In Appendix 5, I provide a shot list and more detailed analysis of *Un chien andalou*. For now, I turn to comment on a few features of the work that are germane at this point in the exposition of my argument.

UN CHIEN ANDALOU: COMMENTARY

Throughout this book, we have been examining the discursive context that sanctioned an utterly extravagant syllogism that led to celebrating the cinema as the top art: the value of art forms depends on their capacity to produce powerful pneumatic effects; the cinema is the most effective pneumatic device; therefore, the cinema is the top art. We have noted that pneumatic beliefs led the Surrealists to celebrate an ecstatic mode of awareness that fused objectivity and subjectivity, unreason and a higher reason—dialectical amalgams they had learned from Hegel's and Freud's writings. We have seen, too, that the issue of an alternative noesis had been made urgent by the discovery that (calculative) reason was riddled with inconsistencies (it can be shown that if a single pair of contradictory statements can be derived from a system's axioms, then any proposition whatsoever is a theorem in that system). We have also noted the role that the cinema played in providing instruction concerning the pneumatic potential of art to open a way to an alternative noesis that might make contact with the Absolute, with a *sur-réalité*. Other important sources that reveal the Surrealists' ideas about art and the cinema (including their ideas about cinema being an especially potent

occult-influencing device) are the films the Surrealists made. In the next section, I examine two of these films for what they reveal about Surrealists' thoughts about art and the cinema—and, in analyzing them, I hope to develop new insights into Surrealism in general. I have chosen to treat *Un chien andalou* (1929) by Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí and *Las Hurdes: Tierra sin pan* (1933/34) by Luis Buñuel, partly because they will enlarge our understanding of Surrealism. Despite what Breton would have had us believe, Surrealism was anything but a single, consolidated movement organized around a central authority figure. It is much more true to describe the Surrealists as a loosely affiliated group whose members held disparate ideas, which often bore only a family resemblance to one another. Dalí, who was involved in making *Un chien andalou*, and Georges Bataille, whose ideas influenced *Las Hurdes*, were among the dissident Surrealists who at various times found themselves at odds with Breton. Considering their ideas will dispel some measure of the impression presented until now that Surrealism was a consolidated movement with a single view of art and culture.

I have more compelling reasons for choosing these two films. For now, I restrict my comments to the first film we deal with, *Un chien andalou* (I will explain my reasons for dealing with *Las Hurdes* when I come to it). Earlier sections of this chapter stressed the Hegelian-inflected interest in reconciling dream and reality in a higher reality, a *sur-réalité*, and I connected this concern with the Surrealists' noetic aspirations (that go a great distance towards explaining what seems to many of us now to be virtually unfathomable, viz., why competent thinkers from the first decades of the twentieth century would have taken an interest in the wares peddled by various esoteric groups). What is almost never recognized is that in the editing of *Un chien andalou*, Buñuel and Dalí provide an extremely rich example of this fusion of dream with reality that ties the work to the occult themes we have explored. For that work's montage is almost systematically discontinuous (though people hardly take notice of that quality). The story announces itself at its opening as a fairy tale, but the prelude, the section that includes what seems to be an eye being sliced by a razor blade, presents itself with the brutal force of reality, as do most other images in this strange fairy tale / romance. Yet attention to what we are actually shown (attention the film rarely receives, it seems, judging by the critical response to it) reveals that its imagery has the shifting, protean, discontinuous, seemingly haphazard character of a dream or hallucination. Taking a small portion of the examples that the prelude supplies, we are presented with a number of shots that seem to depict a man in front of French doors, opening one of the doors and walking out on the balcony. We take this to present one man in a single location, yet the evidence the shots present actually reveals something quite different. Some of the shots in the scene

present windows, some of them doors (which are very similar to windows, but nonetheless different); moreover, some of the shots present French doors with curtains over them, while others present them without curtains. The man (or *a* man—viewers are inclined to interpret the prelude as presenting a single man) goes out onto the balcony, inhales the smoke from a cigarette, and looks up at the full moon. When he looks down, a woman seems to have materialized on the balcony and is sitting in front of him. He seems to put his fingers around one of the woman's eyes, looks up again, and sees a thin cloud pass across the moon. He then slits the woman's eyeball—or so it seems. If we are attentive, we see something quite different. We notice that in some shots, the man is wearing a plain white shirt, while in others he is wearing a striped shirt. In some shots, the man is standing in front of doors that have curtains over them, in others the man (or *a* man) is in front of doors without curtains. In some shots, the man (or *a* man) is wearing a striped tie, in others the man (or *a* man) is wearing an open-necked shirt. The lighting on the woman's face is inconsistent with the lighting on the balcony. (These are only a few of the inconsistencies between images—and these examples are all drawn from the prelude—similar inconsistencies appear throughout the film.)

The individual images strike us with the force of reality (despite the opening intertitle's claim that the film is a fairy tale). But the sequence of images cannot be brought together to present a continuous time and space—the film's space and time shift continually, as they do in dreams. This work provides a demonstration of film's extraordinary ability to unite what common logic takes to be opposites, dream and reality, in a *sur-réalité*, and in doing so, it suggests much about the reasons for the Surrealists' tremendous enthusiasm for the cinema and why they believed that other arts should be reformulated to take on its attributes.

The film can even be taken as a gentle refutation of possible skepticism about either Surrealism's methods or film's privileged status. Jean Goudal, the novelist, occasional actor, and sometime fellow traveller with the Surrealists, questioned how far Surrealism could go in realizing the synthesis of dream and reality:

If you admit that dream constitutes a superior reality, there will be insurmountable practical problems in attaining and fixing this dream. As soon as consciousness succeeds in rummaging through the unconscious you can no longer speak of the unconscious. On the other hand, if you accord a superior reality to a mystical fusion of the real and the dream, one cannot see by what means one can make two areas, by definition incommunicable, communicate with each other.²⁹⁶

That remark, however, was only procataleptic. Goudal goes on to say that the difficulty of uniting the "conscious and unconscious on the same plane"

is defeated when “the thing seen corresponds exactly to a *conscious hallucination*”—indeed, Goudal claims that cinema alone has the capacity to carry out effectively the Surrealist method:

One fact seems remarkable to us. The objections we have just sketched out [Goudal also commented on the near impossibility of using language, a medium we habitually use for communication, in a completely irrational or anti-logical manner] lose their value as soon as one applies the Surrealist theories to the domain of cinema. (That the theorists of Surrealism have wanted to apply their ideas to literature, that is to say, just where they are most contestable, should not be too surprising since the same pen suits the theorist and the poet.) Applied to the technique of cinema, the correctness and fecundity of the Surrealist thesis is all the more striking.

The objection towards *method* (the difficulty of uniting the conscious and the unconscious on the same plane) does not hold for the cinema, in which the thing seen corresponds exactly to a *conscious hallucination*.²⁹⁷

Un chien andalou shows why the Surrealists deemed the cinema the top art: a film is a conscious hallucination. In its realism, the film resembles a percept; in its illogical relations among its images (which fully reveal themselves only to devoted attention), and in its shifting times and spaces, it resembles a hallucination.

In the last two sections, I emphasized Lacan’s assertion that the unconscious is structured like a language. Another compelling motivation for selecting this film is that its visual forms are shaped by the insistence of the letter/word in the unconscious. In the commentary I present below, I dwell on the verbal genotext that gave rise to the film’s images. I believe that much of the veristic and quasi-veristic visual art the Surrealists produced has a verbal genotext, but the fact that film can so readily imitate the stream of verbal thoughts that course through our minds makes it particularly amenable to being formed in ways that reveal the nature of thought processes.

An Anti-Art Film

Un chien andalou is many things, and one of those things is an attack on the high art of official culture. Among Dalí and Buñuel’s reasons for working in film was that the cinema seemed to belong more to popular culture than to art. Dalí’s enthusiasm for popular culture was reflected in his choice of Pierre Batcheff, a matinée idol of the time (and an aficionado of Surrealism), to be the film’s male lead.²⁹⁸ Also, the film has some of the stylistic features of the American slapstick cinema, and its first screenings were accompanied by two unidentified “Argentinian tangos” that alternate with one another, as well as the “Vorspiel” and “Liebestod” from Wagner’s *Tristan und Isolde* (I comment on the relevance of Wagner’s opera to the film in Appendix 5). As early as

1927, the term “anti-art” was a key item in Dalí’s lexicon. Regarding the use that Dalí makes of the term, Haim Finkelstein points out that

his own protestations notwithstanding, Dalí was not averse to art as such, and the term “anti-art” simply served the useful function of distinguishing authentic art from “fake modernity.” Thus, while denouncing art and artists in general (declaring at the Sitges conference that artists should be considered as an obstacle to civilization), nonetheless in the “Anti-Artistic Manifesto” he could still acclaim diverse artists such as Picasso, Gris, Ozenfant, de Chirico, Miró, Lipchitz, Brancusi, Arp, and so forth.²⁹⁹

Among the fake products of modernity, according to Buñuel and Dalí, was the “Absolute Film” of the sort created by Berlin artists Viking Eggeling, Hans Richter, Walther Ruttmann, and, later, Oskar Fischinger. Dalí and Buñuel shared Breton’s belief that vision is the highest of the sensory modalities—consider their valorization of the visionary faculties and hallucination. This led them to reject the dictum that all the arts aspire to the condition of music—they believed that visual images can attain what music never can. The Absolute Film movement, by contrast, accepted that dictum and associated itself with the effort to bring forth a pure, abstract (transcendent) art as a form of visual music. In his autobiography, Dalí gloats that *Un chien andalou*

produced the effect that I wanted, and it plunged like a dagger into the heart of Paris as I had foretold. Our film ruined in a single evening ten years of pseudo-intellectual postwar advance-guardism.³⁰⁰ That foul thing which is figuratively called abstract art fell at our feet, wounded to the death, never to rise again, after having seen a girl’s eye cut by a razor blade—this is how the film began. There was no longer room in Europe for the little maniacal lozenges of Monsieur Mondrian.³⁰¹

Vision is savage, raw, contaminated, but (unlike ratiocination) undegenerate.³⁰²

Un chien andalou celebrates the raw eroticism of popular music (the tango) and the movies—eroticism, it seems, can redeem the aural. Accordingly, on one level, it operates as a rather strange romance film, the story of a love triangle: the character played by Buñuel himself is the husband, the character played by Simone Mareuil is the wife, and the character played by Batcheff is the lover, who erupts into the woman’s life and wreaks havoc.

The respective contributions that Dalí and Buñuel made to the film are not clear. One contrast between the partners is clear: Dalí had little enough experience in avant-garde circles (he had moved to Paris only a year earlier) and none in filmmaking before embarking on this project, whereas Buñuel had received training at a private film school run by Jean Epstein and had already worked in the film industry (including as an assistant director to Epstein) and had written extensively on the cinema (including on “photogenia,” which for him

meant essentially that quality that makes an image magical, or marvellous, or hallucinatory, the quality that the “Buster Keaton School” or the “American School” have because they are unaffected by a noxious culture and tradition). However, Dalí made the following claims:

It was at about this period that Luis Buñuel one day outlined to me an idea he had for a motion picture that he wanted to make, for which his mother was going to lend him the money. His idea for a film struck me as extremely mediocre. It was avant-garde in an incredibly naive sort of way, and the scenario consisted of the editing of a newspaper which became animated, with the visualization of its news-items, comic strips, etc. At the end one saw the newspaper in question tossed on the sidewalk, and swept out into the gutter by a waiter. This ending, so banal and cheap in its sentimentality, revolted me, and I told him that this film story of his did not have the slightest interest, but that I on the other hand, had just written a very short scenario which had the touch of genius, and which went completely counter to the contemporary cinema.

This was true. The scenario was written. I received a telegram from Buñuel announcing that he was coming to Figueras. He was immediately enthusiastic over my scenario, and we decided to work in collaboration to put it into shape. Together we worked out several secondary ideas, and also the title—it was going to be called *Le [sic] Chien andalou*. Buñuel left, taking with him all the necessary material. He undertook, moreover, to take charge of the directing, the casting, the staging, etc. . . . But some time later I went to Paris myself and was able to keep in close touch with the progress of the film and take part in the directing through conversations we held every evening. Buñuel automatically and without question accepted the slightest of my suggestions; he knew by experience that I was never wrong in such matters.³⁰³

This sounds like a piece of self-promotion of the sort that Dalí often engaged in, so one might be inclined to dismiss his claim. Yet there is evidence that confirms at least some of its details. Years later, in a Mexican journal, *Nuevo Cine*, Buñuel would admit that Dalí had criticized his original idea for *Un chien andalou*; he would also defend his outline for a newspaper film that seemed to resemble the film that Dalí described: “Really the idea of the newspaper film which [Dalí] criticizes so much, is a good one: the stories would include not only the dramatized news items, but would also treat in documentary form the processes of producing a newspaper.”³⁰⁴

Dalí deplored any local, “folkish” popular culture but was enthusiastic about the international popular media that was emerging in his time: it promised to do away with the local indigenous forms, the “racial” character of which Dalí so deplored. So in his early writings, he enthused over the commercial cinema, and over popular performers such as Josephine Baker and Buster Keaton, as well as over sporting events like boxing matches and

automobile races. This new international commercial culture was the product of the exciting world of “modernity,” Dalí believed; thus, in “Poesia de l’útil standarditzat,” he celebrated the “moving beauty of the miraculous mechanical and industrial world, newly born, perfect and pure like a flower.”³⁰⁵ He wrote in derogation of Lorca’s Catalan poems, “Your songs are Granada without tramways, without aeroplanes; an ancient Granada with natural elements, removed from today, simply popular and constant.”³⁰⁶ At Sitges, Dalí argued that old art should be replaced with new art, just as old shoes are replaced by new shoes.

Dalí’s “Manifest groc (manifest antiartístic català)” (Yellow Manifesto [Catalan Anti-Artistic Manifesto]) of 1928 lambasted the reverence for the patina that old art had acquired. He pointed out that the Parthenon had been built not as a ruin but as a new building, without patina, “just like our cars.” Other remarks on what Walter Benjamin (explicitly to counter the Theosophists) called aura were even more extreme:

Patina is the mark of arbitrary, inflated, sad, badly made, unusable, ugly, anti-poetic objects, the waste products of absurd and uncomfortable ages which are unearthed in the midst of all the unhygienic and necrological filth of antiquarians....

Here in the meantime shit is a cult object. What is patina? It is nothing other than the rubbish accumulated by time... Here the patina is worshipped... its yellowish tone, so repugnant, so similar to that which is taken on by street corners frequented by pissing dogs. Our artists adore the patina, they live in the midst of the patina and their productions are born patinated just like their spirit... Our artists are fervent worshippers of “caca.”³⁰⁷

Dalí spoke for a post-machine state of mind: “For us Greece is perpetuated in the numerical perfection of an aeroplane motor, in the anti-artistic anonymous English-made fabric destined for Golf, in the nudes of the American music hall.”³⁰⁸

Dalí was twenty-five and Buñuel twenty-nine when they made *Un chien andalou*: they were young, and film was new. It exemplified the international, commercial culture, which had acquired no patina; furthermore, as a kinetic medium, it represented the dynamic spirit of modernity. For Dalí, in the second half of 1928, film was intimately associated with his notion of sur-reality; and film and photography seemed to him to be the media with the greatest potential for renewing the arts. Their mechanical nature appealed to him as he began to impugn the “physiological calligraphy” produced by automatist Surrealist techniques. In his poetic writings and stories of late 1927 and 1928 (such as “Nadal a Bruselles: Conte antic” [Christmas in Brussels: Ancient Tale], “La meva amiga i la platja” [My Girlfriend and the Beach], and

“Peix perseguit per un raïm” [Fish Pursued by a Grape]), Dalí adopted ways of writing that had cinematic properties, including the frequent shifting of scenes and the use of dynamic forms. For example, he wrote a car chase into “Peix perseguit per un raïm.”³⁰⁹

Buñuel, too, recognized that the cinema possessed subversive potential by reason of its provenance in popular culture. And he knew that this potential was intensified by the special states of mind that film images are capable of producing. Buñuel outlined these effects in “Poésie et cinéma” (Cinema, Instrument of Poetry, 1959), a text he wrote many years after *Un chien andalou* was conceived, but that nonetheless presents ideas with which the younger Buñuel would have agreed: “Because it [the cinema] acts in a direct manner upon the spectator in presenting to him concrete people and objects, because it isolates him by virtue of the silence and darkness from what might be called his ‘psychic habitat,’ the cinema is capable of putting him into a state of ecstasy more effectively than any other mode of human expression. But more effectively than any other, it is capable of brutalizing him.”³¹⁰ The cinema, therefore, is the top art: the other arts should be made as savage as the cinema.

Dalí and Buñuel saw it as their business to critique conservative culture, especially that which had recently taken hold of Spain. In 1921, the Spanish army had suffered an ignominious defeat in Morocco at the Battle of Annual. As a consequence, the military came under scrutiny, and soon afterwards, the Spanish Parliament, the Cortes, announced that the army was being investigated for corruption. The Spanish army rebelled against being subjected to the oversight of the people’s elected representatives. King Alphonso XIII took the army’s side, and on 13 September 1923, he appointed one of the protest’s leaders, the army officer Primo de Rivera, to the post of prime minister. De Rivera dissolved the Spanish Parliament and imposed martial law. Newspapers and journals were strictly censored—and, of course, most journalists responded by rallying around de Rivera’s call for “Country, Religion, Monarchy.” Politicians were portrayed as corrupt, weak, and unpatriotic, while the army was represented as the ideal institution for Spaniards to support. Demonstrations in 1925, prompted mainly by an economic crisis brought on by inflation, forced de Rivera to relax some of his more draconian measures and to replace the military directorate he had appointed with civilians. Spain continued to experience one economic crisis after another, and on 26 January 1930, de Rivera polled the country’s military leaders to determine whether he still had their support. He learned he did not, and on 28 January he resigned and moved to Paris. Six weeks later, he died.

De Rivera’s dictatorship was paternalistic, Catholic, and proto-Fascist, and its religious tone likely amplified Buñuel and Dalí’s anticlerical animus.

In such an environment, the idea of scandal is appealing—one Catalanian weekly, among the first to champion Dalí's art, was named *El Escándalo*. Buñuel and Dalí's interest in scandal, so evident in *Un chien andalou* (and even more so in their subsequent collaboration, *L'âge d'or*, 1930), was intensified by this atmosphere. In that repressive, reactionary, paternalistic ambience, popular culture was viewed as at least mildly shocking—the rhythms of the tango and of jazz music imported from Argentina and black America were viewed as belonging to the night world of clubs in cities' Storyville districts, where sensual proclivities were everywhere and always on display.³¹¹ That new sensibility, associated with the infamy of jazz rhythms and cocktail culture, was American, progressive, modern—the very opposite, many Spaniards thought, of the paternalistic and reactionary Spanish culture.

That night world was understood to have a connection to the cinema. Shortly after *El Escándalo*'s demise, one of its editors, Francesc (sometimes Francisco) Madrid (1900–52), bought out *Sangre en Atarazanas* (Blood in Shipyards, 1926), a collection of pieces dealing with Barcelona's Fifth District underworld. An advertisement in *El Escándalo* in advance of the publication proclaimed that *Sangre* “is a vibrant, passionate, and *cinematographic* report of the lowest depths of Barcelona social life. The dregs, the prostrate, and the seven deadly sins of the Fifth District are reflected.”³¹² The association of cinema with scandal, eroticism, and protest—and more generally with the night world of decidedly non-bourgeois mores and manners—was among the factors that drew Buñuel the writer and Dalí the painter (and photography enthusiast) to the cinema.

By 1929, Dalí and Buñuel had become close friends. Buñuel's taste ran more to narrative (or, at least, realistic) art than Dalí's did (at least during the year or two before the making of *Un chien andalou*). Nonetheless, having read Breton's great diaristic novel-with-photographs, *Nadja*, Dalí had become interested in the possibility of using neutral, documentary materials to reveal the marvellous. Dalí's interest in documentary materials was an outgrowth of his anti-art convictions. Like Walter Benjamin, he conceived of a lyrical form that would be composed of the materials of reality. The traditional realist writer assesses the significance of details on the basis of a psychological profile of the character he or she is creating. But the analysis of dreams has shown that seemingly insignificant details—details the realist writer would never deign to present—have an impact on us. The placement of a match on the floor on the other side of a room from the character, or the presence of a sponge in the room, may have as much lyrical—and surreal—importance as the details of the character's gestures or speech. Documentary, or the realism of the photographic image, is more open to such marvels than the psychological novel.

The Verbal Image

Un chien andalou begins with the title “Il était une fois” (Once upon a time); this helps establish the dream/fantasy atmosphere that is so typical in Surrealism. But the fantasy the film goes on to present is quite different from the fantasies encountered in children’s stories. For one thing, the film opens in an all-too-ordinary manner—with the image of a man going out onto a balcony holding a straight razor. But the scene does not continue in such a quotidian vein: rather, it veers into the realm of the terrible. First, we see the man taking a sliver off his thumb (or his thumbnail) with the straight razor. The act makes us feel horror; but it has a larger significance within the film. French speakers, watching the scene, might say to themselves “il se coupe le pouce” (he cuts his thumb). As Stuart Liebman has shown, the rest of the scene, and indeed much of the film, plays on the various transformations of this phrase and of other genotexts (which we will identify presently): various transformations of the film’s genotexts—phrases formed by inverting the word order or by substituting like-sounding terms for terms that appear in the original genotexts, and puns on the words that constitute these phrases—motivate the film’s actions.³¹³ Take the phrase *couper le pouce*: the first two phonemes of *coupe* (/ku/) are sufficiently similar to those of *queue* (/kø/), meaning “tail” (but also slang for “penis”), to produce an association; *puce* means “slut” and *puceelage* means “hymen.” *Coupe* (“cut”) could refer both to the film’s montage and to the physical cutting of the human body—and both are the major themes in this film. Slicing the eye, which leaves the eye with the liquids pouring out of it, suggests the piercing of the hymen and the transformation of the woman into a slut. Cutting the thumb also suggests castration, that is, the transformation of the man into a woman (or into a girl-child). Furthermore, the notion of the transformation of a man into a woman through castration, and so of interchangeability of the sexes, reappears several times in the film: the image of the man’s hand caught in a door suggests a severing of his penis or the man’s being turned into (at least) an androgyne. The film also includes references to prepubescent states: a man tries to push a boy (an adult who, by castration, has been transformed into a girly-boy) out of the latency stage. When that father figure arrives, he pushes a buzzer, which sets into motion a long, thin object (a cocktail shaker), a gesture that suggests masturbation, and so the phase between the latency stage and early same-sex identification. The character in the role of the son wears a skirt—earlier he was seen dressed as a man, looking out a window and seeing himself wearing a skirt: here his identification is with the female (the mother).

Furthermore, as Liebman points out, the words *coup* and *coupe* are close in sound to the German word *Kuh*, for cow—so the donkeys on the grand piano (see Appendix 5) resemble cows (and it was a cow’s eye that was cut open at the

beginning of the film, though there is no way that a viewer could know this). An expression for murdering the French language is *parler français comme une vache espagnole*—possibly Dalí and Buñuel identified themselves as the *vaches espagnoles*. Also, the French word for cow is *vache*, and *vache* is a slang word referring to a trollop as well as to a police officer. The latter is an appropriate enough association, since the objects/persons the man pulls along with the piano are of the sort that hamper him in the quest to freely express his sexual passions.³¹⁴ Furthermore, the sexual ambiguity of a term that can refer both to a trollop and to a police officer (when the film was made, almost all police officers would have been men) is also significant.

The pair of dead donkeys atop the grand piano are photographed so as to emphasize their teeth. The French word for teeth is *dents*, and the name of the Vermeer painting *De kantwerkste* (The Lacemaker, 1667–70) in French is *La dentellière*. This connection highlights the term *dents*. Why is that notion evoked? Because of the fantasy that animals with large teeth can castrate a boy or a man. That association also opens another dimension of significance to the word *vache* as related to sexual expression: in one of his earliest Surrealist texts, “Une girafe” (A Giraffe, 1933), Buñuel associated the ideas of cow and mother, and of course, the internalized prohibition on sexual relations with the mother is the origin of sexual repression—that prohibition which Lacan referred to as “the Law of the Father,” and the Law of the Father is still a law (it is the very prototype of law, and so of the authority that the police—*vache*—represent).

There is still more: the conjunction of the shot of the cloud passing over the moon with the razor blade passing over the eye is also determined by a complex of factors. First, the conjunction associates the idea of the man being turned into a woman (which explains why, when the thumb is cut, a woman appears on the balcony from nowhere) with the idea of the woman being turned into a slut. Cutting his thumb provides (oddly) the motivation for the man with the razor blade to glance at the moon: as Liebman points out, the dynamic for action lies in the genotext, for a French expression for “glancing [at the moon]” is *donner [la lune] un coup d’œil*—and this *coup d’œil* derives, by way of transformation, from *couper le pouce*. Having cut his thumb, he was determined to glance at the moon. Having glanced (*donné un coup d’œil*) at the moon, he was determined to slice (*couper*) an eye (*l’œil*). So there is a verbal as well as a visual motivation (in the association of formally similar elements) for the action. There is also a psychological motivation: the man’s glancing at the moon suggests that he has become moonstruck—that he has become crazed (as Batcheff does later in the film).

A French expression for “being dreamy” is *être dans la lune*—so when the man looks at the moon, and seems transported, one could say, “Il est

dans la lune.” A series of associations follows from that. He is dreamy. He is off in another place—the French, which states he is “in the moon,” makes that literal. He is in another world. He has lost touch with reality. He is a “lunatic,” that is, we take him as being mad. (The etymology of the word “lunatic” suggests that the mind associates being moonstruck with being mad.) Furthermore, the woman’s materializing from out of nowhere also has a motivation in a transformation of the film’s genotext: to state that the woman has appeared from out of nowhere, one could say, “Elle est tombée de la lune.” What is more, the conjunction of formally similar elements—of the shot of the cloud passing over the moon and the shot of the razor blade drawn across the thumb—results in a violence perpetrated against the viewer, an assault on the viewer through his or her eyes. We have been had: the filmmakers have played a dirty trick on us (or, according to a French expression, they have played *un coup de vache* or *ils ont fait une vacherie*). The viewer has been had—a French expression for “to be had” is *l’avoir dans l’œil*.

Still, violent as it is, the juxtaposition of the cloud crossing the moon and the razor slicing the eye is based on the similarity of the forms on either side of the cut. Thus, the juxtaposition derives from principles of repetition, symmetry, and harmony that were central to abstract art, which was an “avant-garde” interest of Buñuel and Dalí’s time. An important offshoot of the thrust to bring forth a *gegenstandlose Kunst* (objectless art) was the Absolute Film, which was among the earliest forms of (so-called) experimental film. The Absolute Film was created by Berlin artists Viking Eggeling, Hans Richter, and Walther Ruttmann—a work that Ruttmann produced in 1919 was likely the first Absolute Film. A similar movement in Paris went under the banner of *cinéma pur*.

Henri Chomette (1896–1941, René Clair’s brother) coined the term *cinéma pur* to refer to a cinema that maintained modernist aspirations, one that focused on the pure elements of film, such as light, movement, tonality, and rhythm. Chomette’s *Reflets de lumière et de vitesse* (1925) and *Cinq minutes de cinéma pur* (1926); two works of “self-sufficient cinema” by the sometime Surrealist film director Germaine Dulac, *Disque 957* (1929) and *Etude cinégraphique sur une arabesque* (Cinegraphic Study of an Arabesque, 1928); Man Ray’s *Le retour à la raison*, and, to a qualified extent, Fernand Léger and Dudley Murphy’s *Ballet mécanique* (1924) conform largely to the formal definition of *cinéma pur*.

As the list just given indicates, some Dada and Surrealist filmmakers explored pure film. Buñuel and Dalí, on the other hand, were antagonistic. In the preface for a film script he wrote shortly after working on *Un chien andalou*—a preface that served as a theoretical justification for the yet unrealized project—Dalí conveyed his animus against *cinéma pur* and expounded

his reasons for that animus. His attack on abstract film in that piece took the form of a short, critical history of the cinema, chronicling its decline into the abysmal German Absolute Film and its French cousin:

Contrary to current opinion, the cinema is infinitely poorer and more limited as expression of the true functioning of thought, than writing, painting, sculpture and architecture... The cinema is bound... by its very nature to the sensory, base and anecdotal face of phenomena, to abstraction, to rhythmical impressions; in other words, to harmony. And harmony, sublime product of abstraction, is, by definition, at the antipodes of the concrete and, consequently, of poetry.³¹⁵

Years later, Buñuel would give voice to similar antipathy against the “avant-garde” of his time. He told an interviewer, “Historically the film represents a violent reaction against what in those days was called ‘avant-garde,’ which was aimed exclusively at artistic sensibility and the audience’s reason.”³¹⁶

The relation between the cloud crossing over the moon and the razor blade slicing the eye is largely formal, for the two forms are not semantically related. It is characteristic of Surrealist writing that conventional semantic linkages are replaced by alternative connections between signifiers. Michael Riffaterre noted that Surrealist images

substitute a “structural” meaning for lexical meaning. They do not represent real relationships, and the words they bring together are homologous only because they occupy similar positions in their respective sequences. By grammatically joining the terms of a normal metaphor, connectives symbolize the implicit existence of points common to both the tenor and the vehicle... Having become the formal substitute for synonymy, a connective metaphorically couples words that have no semantic relationship.³¹⁷

Breton’s line, that eyes without bodies “can be found... on the far-off meadows red from the blood of blooming herds,” provides a good example of Riffaterre’s point. As he observed, a fundamental device of the Surrealists was to create verbal forms that were syntagmatically well formed, but that, because there were incompatibilities among the elements, failed to cohere on the paradigmatic plane, and consequently lacked reference and meaning (in Meinong’s sense of that term). What meaning can we attach to conjoining “eyes without bodies” with “meadows red with the blood of blooming herds”? What comparison is being made between herds and flowers through the use of the term “blooming”? For that matter, what sense do we make of joining “blooming” with “herds”? These questions have no answers. These juxtapositions seem poetically meaningful—we are inclined to take them as metaphors—but unlike metaphors, the more we ask questions about them, the greater our uncertainty becomes. It is as if we have been brought up against a verbal extravagance that resists interpretation. So it is with the

conjunction of the cloud and the razor blade (and, for that matter, the spacial anomalies we will soon explore): the filmic syntagms that articulate them seem well formed, but nonetheless they are, by reason of the incompatibilities among their elements, blocked from making any concrete extra-textual reference. What is more, they refuse to cede to any interpretative effort. Whatever interpretive arsenal we launch against them in order to break the resistance they offer to interpretation, these formations escape being bound to meaning.

Riffaterre's point is important, but one might note in connection with this claim that the cinema is a medium that operates by placing elements side by side. Creating sequences in which the juxtaposed elements have only formal connections with one another, and lack any semantic connection, is a compositional method that accords with the cinema's nature. In refashioning poetic language so that the conjunctive assumed a predominant role, the Surrealists were actually reformulating poetic language so that it would take on characteristics of the cinema. The conjunction of the cloud and the razor blade, through an obvious violation of the semantic protocols regulating juxtaposition, was a characteristically Surrealist construction. Moreover, there is a splendid irony in Buñuel and Dalí's use of this conjunction: emptying elements of any semantic significance and relating them simply by their formal similarities was the central trope of the Absolute Film. Dalí and Buñuel surely recognized that irony—indeed, a reason Dalí got involved in filmmaking in the first place was to wrest such cinematic constructions (and the deeply poetic possibilities inherent in them) from the practitioners of pure cinema. Just as ironic is how Surrealist the construction actually is: the semantic irregularities of Surrealist art, which in significant measure resist decoding, displace interest from the semantic to the syntactic plane. Efforts at decoding Surrealist art often shift from the level of content to the level of form. But this is just the sort of response the Absolute Film elicits.

The irony thrusts even deeper. Throughout *Un chien andalou*, spatial anomalies proliferate that bring the ontological status of the film's images into doubt. Viewers are inclined to overlook these anomalies and to take the scenes in the film as representing incidents in a drama (however fantastic that drama might be). To take note of the many spatial anomalies in the work requires repudiating that belief. The images cannot be (simply) representations: the incidents cannot be taken to represent even an imaginative reality, because there is no space in which these incidents might take place. But if the images are not representations, what are they? They are elements whose relations to one another are purely formal. Thus, they have the same status that forms have in an Absolute Film (or that forms have in an abstract painting). What, then, distinguishes these forms from those of the Absolute Film—or from the little maniacal lozenges of Monsieur Mondrian? This: they do not pacify

us—rather, they amount to machinic constructions that perpetrate violence against the viewer. Dalí and Buñuel took the essential devices of the Absolute Film (and abstract art) and turned them to a wholly different purpose.

The Surrealist emphasis on association through the formal qualities of image/object and the consequent underplaying of the semantic dimension of the syntagmatic chain indicate once again how important the cinema was to the Surrealists. Because the cinema operates according to a relatively free conjunctive syntax that—in the conventional cinema, at least—is determined almost exclusively by metonymy, it is easy for cinema to lighten the semantic burden of the elements belonging to a syntagmatic chain. That in turn allows syntagmatic principles to play a greater role (compared to that of principles regulating its paradigmatic dimension) in giving a text its coherence. That is, it is easy for the cinema to emphasize the external, visual qualities of objects and to allow representations' appearances to overwhelm semantic significance. The cinema's capacity to juxtapose objects simply because of the rhymes in external appearance or in their movements—and not for the conceptual or propositional meanings of the syntagms formed through juxtapositions—was among the reasons why so many writers of the 1920s produced film scripts as a literary form: a film script can accommodate juxtapositions of formally related elements more easily than, say, a novel. Recognizing that possibility (or something close to it), Benjamin Fondane (1898–1944) proposed to inaugurate the era of unfilmable scenarios—and he acknowledged that the cinema represented for him an all-purpose amplifier for a part of him that poetry repressed.³¹⁸ The number of unproduced Surrealist film scripts is simply staggering: Philippe Soupault's *Poèmes cinématographiques* (Cinematographic Poems) and *Le cœur volé* (The Stolen Heart); Antonin Artaud's *Les dix-huit secondes* (Eighteen Seconds) and *La révolte du boucher* (The Butcher's Revolt), as well as his inadequately realized *La coquille et le clergyman* (The Seashell and the Clergyman, 1926); Robert Desnos's *Minuit à quatorze heures* (Midnight at Two in the Afternoon), *Les mystères de métropolitain* (The Subway Mysteries), *Y a des punaises dans le rôti du porc* (There are Thumbtacks in the Pork Roast); Fontane's own *Paupières mûres, barre fixe* (Mature Eyelids, Horizontal Bar) and *mtasipoj*; Benjamin Péret's *Pulchérie veut un auto* (Pulchery Wants a Car), in addition to his *L'invention du monde* (The Invention of the World), which was realized by Michel Zimbacca and J.-L. Bedouin; Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes's *Le huitième jour de la semaine* (The Eighth Day of the Week); Georges Hugnet's *La loi d'accommodation chez le borgnes* (The Law of Accommodation Among People with One Eye), in addition to his *Le perle* (The Pearl), which was realized by H. d'Ursel; and Francis Picabia's *Sursum corda* (Go Upwards).³¹⁹ Often, the scripts were written not for the screen but rather as testimony to cinema's influence on new

literary forms and to the desire to remake literature so that it might take on features of the cinema. The cinema offered powerful poetic images divorced from the stultifying haute-bourgeois language of literature. And it did so by levelling the semantic difference between elements that are formally similar and by allowing coherence (external resemblance) on the syntagmatic plane to become the principal determinant of a text's unity, displacing all considerations of coherence on the paradigmatic plane.

Dalí and Buñuel's film provides an example of this sort of structure. The actions its shots depict seem irrational, and the connections between shots seem to lack causal motivation. Changes in the backgrounds in the opening scene and in the man's clothing also lack motivation: the man on the balcony is not wearing a tie before he cuts the eye, but after he performs the action, he *is* wearing one (and, moreover, its stripes allude to, or at least rhyme with, the slices in the eye), and the windows behind the man sometimes have curtains on them and sometimes not. The temporal references in the intertitles are also incoherent—the intertitles include “Il était une fois” and, following it, “Huit ans après...” But *when* is eight years after “Once upon a time”? (Of course, this temporal definiteness regarding an imaginary time is something that a great deal of fiction, including cinematic fiction, offers, and that definiteness regarding the realm of fantasy would have interested Surrealists.) Furthermore, the action leaps in time from post- to prepubescent states as the protagonist returns to a time sixteen years earlier, when he was school-aged: his maturational task thus becomes one of leaving books (the childhood realm of the imagination) behind and redirecting his interests towards guns (claiming the phallus, a new instrument of fantasy). The many inconsistencies of the cutting—inconsistencies of the type that we would classify as continuity errors in an ordinary feature film—impress upon the viewer that the filmmakers intended to create a work that mirrors the space of montage, that is to say, the space of the unconscious (which brings objects and events together in an irrational juxtaposition) rather than one that mirrors the qualities of external space.

Themes of death, pain, and sexuality appear in the film. A woman is compared to a statue—she is cold, austere, and idealized; thus, by a mimetic mirroring operation (of the sort that Roger Caillois analyzed), a man who caresses her will die. A hole in the man's hand—the hand has become a rotten, cadaverous part with ants crawling out of it (evoking a sensation of fornication)—represents female genitalia (the agency of castration and a portent of death).³²⁰ A genotext, again pointed out by Stuart Liebman, also gives rise to the image of the ants crawling out of the hand: the French word for “ant” is *fourmi*, and a French colloquialism for having a tingling sensation in one's limbs, what in colloquial English we describe as “pins and needles” (and

less colloquially refer to as “formication”) is *avoir les fourmis*. So we might conjecture that the tingling sensation produced by the ants in the man’s palm prompted him to cut off his hand, or to castrate himself (the woman has the power to make the man’s penis tingle and that prompts him to castrate himself). Furthermore, shortly after we see ants crawling out of the hole in the man’s hand for the first time, we see a crowd milling around the androgyne poking at the severed hand, and the French term for “mill about” is *fourmiller*. And that word might make one think of the famous lines in the poem “Les septes vieillards” by Baudelaire:

Fourmillante cité, cité pleine de rêves,
Où le spectre en plein jour raccroche le passant.³²¹

A city full of dreams seems close enough to the Surrealist vision of Paris—Paris, the phantasmagoric that prompted Walter Benjamin’s Surrealist-inspired reflections. The term *fourmis* also introduces some rhymes on the sound “our,” for example the shot of the sea urchin (*l’oursin*).

An atropos moth (which resembles a female pubis, and which has a death’s head on it) appears on the wall. French does not make a distinction between butterflies and moths (the term *papillon* refers to both), so both are symbols of transformation, of death and rebirth. Surrealists must have responded to the existence of the atropos moth as nature’s comment on the language of forms that the evolutionary process has created: its existence reveals nature’s obsession with transformation and death. By its mythological and intertextual associations, the figure of the atropos moth suggests the changing character of woman and how deadly she is. Buñuel used the image of the atropos moth elsewhere in his work: in “Une girafe,” he writes, “In place of the spot, one finds a large, dark night moth with a death’s head between its wings.”³²² Indeed, the image of the moth/butterfly is a Surrealistic *topos*: Breton often used the image of the butterfly in just this way (and to reinforce images of alchemical transformations).³²³ A photograph of an atropos moth against a window appears in *Minotaure 7* (1935), a special issue on the nocturnal side of nature (*le côté nocturne de la nature*), in an article titled “Le jour est trop court: première nuit d’Young” (The Day Is Too Short: Young’s First Night), accompanying a text by an author identified only as Young. (The author is the Graveyard Poet Edward Young, 1683–1765, and the text is a prose translation of lines 15–35 from “Night the First: On Life, Death, and Immortality” from Young’s *The Complaint: or, Night Thoughts*, 1742—translated into nearly contemporary French prose, the section reads like a Surrealist text and likely is meant to be taken as that, for in the *Manifeste du surréalisme*, Breton proclaimed Young as Surrealist from beginning to end; the same issue included another passage by

“Young,” lines 2400–2430 of “Night the Ninth: The Consolation,” from the “Night-Address to the Deity” section, which again proclaims death as the ultimate reality, but now more in terms of something to be longed for.) Brassai’s image of the atropos moth appears as the first of three images of moths that close the portfolio accompanying Young’s text. The same issue offers the article “Oiseaux de nuit: chouettes et hiboux” (The Birds of Night: Owls [other than horned owls] and Horned Owls), in which the faces of many of the owls resemble the atropos moth’s death’s head, as well as an article on mimeticism in nature by that profound thinker who associated with the playful group around the pataphysical review *Le grand jeu*, Roger Caillois.³²⁴ The latter article, “Mimétisme et psychasthénie légendaire” (Mimetism and Legendary Psychasthenia), includes several photographs of insects, especially praying mantises, appropriate to an issue of paranoid thoughts about death as the fundamental reality.³²⁵

As the cyclist confronts the woman (see Appendix 5), he runs his hand across his face, and in doing so removes his lips. This is partly to enhance his maleness (because lips resemble labia). Wiping the lips off his face also suggests an erasure of sexuality (much of the film places Batcheff’s character in the latency phase of sexual development). The woman is horrified/terrified by his expunging his sexuality, and that makes her want to assert hers, by putting on lipstick (thus emphasizing her labia). In response, the man grows a beard that resembles a pubic beard. In response to that, the woman insists all the more strongly on her own sexual parts, to the point of converting herself into a self-contained androgyne, for she sticks her phallic tongue through her lips (labia) several times as she goes out the door.

As Stuart Liebman pointed out, a genotext produces the film’s closing as well: “to pun” in French is *tirer la langue*, which is literally what the woman does as she goes out the door (she “pulls her tongue”). We surmise that in going out she is setting off to have an affair, because the man lacks the sexual parts that might satisfy her: *elle fait des queues à la barbe de son mari* is a French colloquialism for having an affair (and the man does have a beard, after all). The man she goes off to see could be said to be a *queutard*, a womanizer.

One of the film’s most famous scenes shows the man (played by Batcheff) dragging two priests and a piano, on which are two rotting donkeys. Dalí explains the presence of the donkeys in his essay “L’âne pourri” (The Stinking Ass), written at about the same time *Un chien andalou* was made:

Nothing can prevent me from recognizing the frequent presence of images in the example of the multiple image, even when one of its forms has the appearance of a stinking ass and, more, that ass is actually and horribly putrefied, covered with thousands of flies and ants; and, since in this case no meaning is attachable to the distinct forms of the image apart from the notion of time, nothing

can convince me that this foul putrefaction of the ass is other than the hard and blinding flash of new gems.

Nor can we tell if the three great images—excrement, blood and putrefaction—are not precisely concealing the *wished for* “Treasure Island.”

Being connoisseurs of images, we have long since learned to recognize the image of desire in images of terror, and even the new dawn of the “Golden Age” in the shameful scatological images.³²⁶

The image is marvellous because it is shameful and scatological. Dalí regularly associated the idea of *putrefacció*—even the several appearances of ants in the film relate to the idea of putrefaction—with art weighed down by tradition. Thus, the putrefying asses in this film, like the piano and the priests, weigh the man down—they are impediments from tradition that prevent the man from getting the woman. (Note also the stone tablets hanging near the seminarians: their shapes resemble the tablets that Moses holds in traditional paintings and on which the Decalogue was inscribed. This allusion, too, would suggest the role of the Church in instilling “Thou shalt not” into Andalusians’ consciousness.) Furthermore, the sequence of items that passes across our field of view—cork, melons, priests, nets, pianos, putrefying donkeys—offers a wonderful parody of a religious procession.

As Liebman pointed out, the image of the man pulling the piano also has a genotext, for it puns on the idea of marriage—a French colloquial expression for getting married is *mettre la corde au coeur* (“tie up the heart”), while a piano is called a *piano aux cordes* or a *piano à queue*—Dalí thought of a piano by the latter term, for in 1933 he painted a piece he titled *Source nécrophilique surgissant d’un piano à queue* (Necrophiliac Source Arising from a Grand Piano, 1933). I have just stated this famous image evokes the idea of tradition—it suggests all that is dead and rotting (the hidebound culture of Andalusia prevents the man from realizing his desires). The notion of marriage supplements this idea. The scene actually shows the man straining to go after the woman—what is suggested is that the institution of marriage (whose norms the woman has internalized) prevents the man, by the operation of a mirroring mechanism, from going after her. (Of course, as I noted, the notion of the Law of the Father is also invoked.) The end of the film, with the couple buried in sand, implies what comes of renunciation.

To this point, our commentary has construed the narrative of *Un chien andalou* in rather straightforward terms. But the film’s narration—its *syuzhet*, to use Sklovsky’s technical coinage—is hardly typical. In fact, its presentation is literally disrupted and dismembered. For example, in shots 2 and 4 (see Appendix 5 for shot list and commentary) there are no curtains on the window, while in shots 3 and 5 curtains appear; furthermore, in shot 11 the man is wearing a tie, while in shots 2 to 10 he is not. Sometimes the man in

the prologue wears a striped shirt (establishing a motif that will be repeated in the wrapping paper inside the box that the cyclist carries around his neck and in the striped tie wrapped inside the striped wrapping paper) and sometimes a pure white shirt. Similarly, at shot 30, the female protagonist looks out the window and recoils violently at what she sees—we expect that the following shot (31) will show the cyclist as having passed the window, but instead it shows him several paces from reaching it. In shots 150 to 152, the female protagonist runs out of the room and prevents the cyclist from following her by pulling the door shut (although his arm gets caught in the door). We subsequently see her pushing at the door. (It is as if the door opens both into the room the man is in and into the room the woman is in.) There are a great many such anomalies—I have indicated many of them in the analysis I provide in Appendix 5. What I want to stress here is the parallel between this form of construction and the feature of Surrealist text construction highlighted by Michael Riffaterre (discussed above). Riffaterre pointed out that phrases in Surrealist poems are often syntagmatically well formed but, because of incompatibilities among the elements, fail to cohere on the paradigmatic plane. They are thus blocked from making any extra-textual references. Similarly, the relations among the elements of *Un chien andalou's* *syuzhet* seem well formed, but closer examination reveals incompatibilities among them that result in lack of coherence on the plane of the *fabula*. The *syuzhet*, we discover, follows a purely conjunctive logic.

Viewers think they are watching a work whose spatial system is conventional, so that the actions unfolding in this space make sense as a *fabula*. When we look at the film casually, it seems to depict a series of actions that are not related to one another through the causal dynamics of the characters' motivations. However, closer inspection reveals the space of the work to be radically dismembered, and this brings into doubt the ontological status of the story's events. Hence, the film defies being analyzed by examining the relation of *syuzhet* to *fabula*. The film appears to depict a story, however fantastic that story might be; yet on closer examination, the spatial relations between the shots are so inscrutable as to discredit that idea completely. The work's spatial constructions entail there is no *fabula* for the *syuzhet* to relate to.

Un chien andalou furnishes many examples of constructions that so violate the semantic logic of conventional cinematic form that they make interpretation impossible. However, these constructions are covert: the film seems to be formed according to the conventional metonymic syntax—its spatial configurations seem to conform to a plausible spatial logic. So viewers are deceived—the filmmakers' intricate understanding of how the cinema operates and how its conventions might ever so slyly be undone lulls viewers into accepting these constructions as replicating (rather than dismantling)

the syntax of the conventional cinema. But while the aggression the film perpetrates against its viewers undoubtedly has psychoanalytic roots, and while psychoanalytic meanings undoubtedly contribute to the film's aggressivity, even the conclusion that the film follows a system of representation akin to that of dreams turns out to be complacent.

In the end, the film turns out to be a series of shots that lacks narrative coherence (though it does not lack the ability to evoke a sense of significance). But the spatial anomalies that close analysis reveals serve also to suggest the idea of metamorphosis—another theme of which the Surrealists were very fond. For example, Breton noted that Benjamin Péret's work was based on "a generalized principle of mutation, metamorphosis."³²⁷ Péret's 1945 novel *Histoire naturelle* is perhaps the work of his that focuses most sharply on this theme: in it, we read of oil made of snow turning into a chair under the influence of the sun's warm rays, the chair turning into a venomous lemur, and the lemur becoming a kangaroo (a wonderfully implausible Surrealist beast). Max Ernst, too, produced a splendid *Histoire naturelle* (1926), a series of thirty-four *frottages* that presents a poetic vision of the evolution of the cosmogenic process, including the mysterious beginning of life. For the Surrealists, the very idea of a natural history implied tracing the transformations involved in the evolutionary process; it also evoked parallels among the cosmogenic, the alchemical, and creative (i.e., artistic) processes. Of course, a film—most any film—presents (through montage) a series of changing images. Surrealism, again, is cinematic to the core.

Furthermore, the dismemberment of diegetic space mirrors the motif of dismemberment that is so prominent in the film. Consider the famous violation of the eye in the film's prologue, the severed hand lying on the street that the possibly blind androgyne pokes with a stick, and the threatened severing of the hand as it is squeezed in the door, together with the images of ants crawling out of a hole in the hand and the man wiping his mouth off, only to have it replaced with the hair from the woman's underarm.³²⁸ The motif of the dismembered body was common in Surrealist art (and that prominence doubtless influenced Lacan to posit the infantile experience of the *corps morcelé*). Of course, the Surrealists did not invent this motif, but the *topos* did take on a special importance in Surrealist art. The motif of the slit eye in particular reappears in Georges Bataille's *L'histoire de l'oeil* (The Story of the Eye, 1928), a work that Bataille wrote immediately after the first screening of *Un chien andalou* and that, according to his own testimony, was influenced by Buñuel and Dalí's film. Indeed, Bataille's *L'histoire de l'oeil* interrelates the eye, other body parts, insects, and the sun, as *Un chien andalou* does—more specifically, Bataille relates the eye metaphorically with the sun, a testicle, and an egg.³²⁹ Near the beginning of Bataille's work, a character, Granville, dreams

of eyes that pursue him as they transform into fish and Crampon gives a priest his glass eye as a memento. Later, the eye is pulled out of its socket so that it cannot see; it returns to the body through the vagina and anus of the heroine. The next year, Bataille wrote the essay “La mutilation sacrificielle et l’oreille coupée de Vincent van Gogh” (Sacrificial Mutilation and the Severed Ear of Vincent van Gogh), a work that anticipated Lacanian treatments of the topic of mutilation. Ernst’s work, too, is rife with examples of the *corps morcelé*: *Et les femmes volcaniques relèvent et agitent, d’un air menaçant, la partie postérieure de leur corps* (And Volcanic Women Lift and Shake Their Bodies, Posterior Parts, 1929) is an assemblage of body parts (many of which have undergone transformation). *Schmetterlingssammlung* (Butterfly Collection, ca. 1930–31) trades on the analogy of the hand and insects (a motif in *Un chien andalou* as well), while *Le prince consort* (1931) works with an analogy between the hand and a bird. *Armada v. Duldgedalzen/gen. die dataistische Rosa Bonheur/die rechte hand der zentrale DaDa W/3* (untranslatable—the last part of the inscription means the right hand of DaDa central W/3, ca. 1920) presents a severed (doll’s) hand, not dissimilar to the one in the box clutched by the androgynous figure in *Un chien andalou*. *Die Anatomie als Braut* (Anatomy as Bride, 1921), *santa conversazione* (Sacred Conversation, 1921), *Loplop présent* (Loplop Presents, 1932), and *Loplop présent Loplop* (Loplop Presents Loplop, 1931) all trade in the effects of the phantasy of the body in pieces.³⁵⁰ In 1919–20, Ernst’s work entered a phase in which an assemblage of machine parts evoked the machinic body. Works of this phase include *Helio Alcohodada* (1919–20); many of the plates in *Fiat modes, pereat ars* (Let There Be Fashion, Down with Art, 1919–20), especially *Letzte Kreation durch MODE spaltung* (Last Creation Through a FASHION Quarrel); *Le Mugissement des féroces soldats* (The Roaring of Ferocious Soldiers, 1919–20); *Adieu mon bon pays de MARIE LAURENCIN* (Farewell My Beautiful Land of MARIE LAURENCIN, 1919–20); *Selbstkonstruiertes Maschinchen . . .* (Self-constructed Little Machine . . ., ca. 1920); *Lächeln sie nicht!* (Don’t Smile!, ca. 1920); *Chilispeterlein* (Little Chili Saltpetre, 1920); and *Figure ambiguë* (Ambiguous Figure, ca. 1920). *Jeune chimère* (Young Chimera, 1921) and *Perturbation, ma soeur* (Perturbation, My Sister, ca. 1921) extend this theme into a more harmonious, less mechanical, humanoid synthesis whose features recall that of Synthetic Cubism. *Die Chinesische Nachtigall* (The Chinese Nightingale, 1920) pulls together motives that suggest the transformation of the human form into a bird or into an insect, and the assemblage of the human form out of individual parts. *Physiomythologisches diluvialbild* (Physiomythological Flood Picture, 1920) exchanges human body parts for bird parts and even whole bird forms. Ernst’s *La femme visible* (The Visible Woman, 1925) and Plate 29 from *Histoire naturelle* (Natural History, 1926) are based on the

theme of the eye—*La femme visible* takes Man Ray's photographic close-up of Gala Éluard's eyes and stresses her fixed stare by colouring her eyes with a crayon. (In 1930, Salvador Dalí, after he and Gala became partners, took Ray's image and used it on the cover of a book he titled *La femme visible*, a work that provided the first thoroughly developed presentation of the paranoiac-critical method.)³³¹ *La femme 100 têtes* (The Hundred-Headless Woman, 1929) is replete with images of severed body parts (and of body parts that have a seemingly independent existence). Ernst's *Une semaine de bonté ou Les sept éléments capitaux* (A Week of Kindness or The Seven Deadly Elements) exchanges human body parts for animal parts. Hans Bellmer's dolls also draw on the phantasy of the body in pieces, as does Antonin Artaud's later writing.

SURREALISM'S FISSURES AND LUIS BUÑUEL'S *LAS HURDES: TIERRA SIN PAN*

I have already noted that Surrealism really was not a movement that consolidated itself around a single authority figure (even if Breton would have wanted us to believe it was). It was, rather, a loose affiliation of individual artists whose ideas bore only a family resemblance to one another. In the analysis that follows, I round out the portrait of Surrealism I have been presenting by examining a work whose character was shaped by the dissident Surrealists who congregated around Georges Bataille and the journal *Documents* (fifteen issues were released in 1929 and 1930).

A more important reason for dealing with *Las Hurdes: Tierra Sin Pan* (Las Hurdes: Land without Bread, 1933/34) is that it provides a rigorous example of the rejection of synthesis of the universal and the particular—indeed, of the Ideal and the abject—that under the influence of Hegel became so important in the dominant Surrealist movement. No one among the Surrealists—and perhaps no one outside the Surrealist circle—dealt with the abject with as much bracing rigour as Bataille. The film highlights the diversity, and creative dissensus, in Surrealism, by highlighting the impossibility of reconciling the materially abject to reason (or, as a Hegelian might say, the Rational). This also suggests why the dissident Surrealists could deem the cinema an important—perhaps, even, the *most* important—art: the cinema has an affinity for what is lowly or base, and even for what is revolting or abject (the Bataille-influenced photographs that Eli Lothar, the cinematographer on this project, had published in *Documents* 6 [1929] made photography's proclivity for revolting subject matter perfectly clear). The cinema, because of its reality effect, presents the abject in all its actual, material horror.

When it was made, the form of *Las Hurdes* was strikingly original. It offers itself as a documentary, one whose form is close to that of a travelogue—the second sentence of the narration begins, “In the opinion of geographers and travellers, the region you are going to visit, called Las Hurdes . . .” Yet, though its overall architecture is that of a pedestrian documentary, the portrait it offers of the Las Hurdes region contains much that is fantastic—the sentence just mentioned continues with “is a barren and inhospitable place where man is obliged to struggle constantly in order to survive.” Thus, *Las Hurdes* is an amalgam of the real and the fantastic—though, as we shall see, this “dialectical synthesis” hardly has the quality of an exhilarating step towards the Ideal.

Furthermore, most (though not all) of the film’s fantastic elements actually obtain in the reality the film presents. In this way, *Las Hurdes* presents an amalgam of the real and the fantastic existing *on the same plane*. We might think, rather like the thinker to whom Goudal responded procataleptically, that it would be impossible for the real and the fantastic to coexist on the same plane, but the cinema itself refutes that assertion, as this film demonstrates. Most of the film’s fantastic elements are fantastic precisely for their abject qualities. In the 1930s, the Las Hurdes region was remote, poor, and isolated, as it had been since the twelfth century, after the region was depopulated following the Arab invasion of the eighth century. The general lack of hygiene that Buñuel refers to in the film (and he would be criticized often for making that reference) was a real condition of the Hurdanos’ lives, and that lack of hygiene resulted in the goiter he also alluded to, along with pelagra, parasitic worms, and other nasty diseases, all of which were widespread. Furthermore, as Buñuel suggests, birth defects owing to inbreeding were not uncommon. Sanitary conditions were appalling—visitors to the region reported that the stench emanating from the region’s households was of an overwhelming rankness. Many livestock were infected.

For centuries before Buñuel arrived to make this film, the Las Hurdes region had been enveloped in dark legends. Probably some of these arose because the Catholic Church was weakly represented in Extremadura, and one result of this was that superstition flourished there. So outsiders came to assume that sinister practices and rituals thrived in the area. These dark beliefs about the Hurdanos dated back centuries. The area was said to be inhabited by demons and occult sects, and shepherds were afraid to enter the region for fear of the unknown. Thus, *Las Batuecas del Duque de Alba* (The Duke of Alba’s Batuecas [Valley], ca. 1604), by the Spanish Golden Age (Baroque) playwright Lope de Vega (1562–1635), which is set in Las Hurdes, depicts the area as a haunted place and its inhabitants as dim-witted and savage. Later writers would similarly portray Las Hurdes as an abode of menace.

The version of Surrealism propounded by the circle around Breton was committed to the dialectic of the particular and the universal. For Hegelians

(and for Hegelian-inflected art), the distinctive character of Hegel's logic arose from his belief that "the true is the whole." That is, we understand things truly when we understand them in relation to the whole, the Hegelian Absolute. But how can we bring the stench of Hurdano homes into the whole? Hegel had maintained that all reality is Reason and that whatever is real is rational. But how could the hookworms in the bellies of the Hurdanos, whose faculties were limited by inbreeding, possibly be taken as the expression of Reason? The very thought is preposterous!

So the Surrealists began to divide into two broad camps, and one of the issues separating the two was the dialectic. Those around Breton continued to embrace Hegelian ideas, while those around Bataille rejected them. Buñuel's *Las Hurdes* plays on the tensions between these groups. But even though the dissident faction rejected the dialectic as the path to the Absolute, they did not reject altogether the aspiration to identify an alternative noesis. *Las Hurdes* makes clear that the strange, horrid fascination that the abject exerts on us can also lead to revelation.

***Las Hurdes* and the Documentary**

Surrealism has often been misconceived as a movement whose basic approach was to juxtapose radically incongruous elements. That view has some basis—Lacan's comments about metaphor (discussed earlier) make clear the importance of this sort of radical incongruity. "The Surrealist school led us to take a major step forward," he contended, "by showing that any conjunction of two signifiers could just as easily constitute a metaphor, if an additional condition—that of the greatest disparity of the images signified—weren't required for the production of the poetic spark, in other words for metaphoric creation to occur."³³² As we have seen, much Surrealist art (including Buñuel's previous film, *Un chien andalou*) was founded on a principle of conjunction, which led Surrealists to produce constructions that are syntagmatically well formed but, because of incompatibilities—sometimes radical incompatibilities—among the syntagmatically related elements, fail to cohere on the paradigmatic plane. As a result, we frequently encounter in Surrealist art constructions that involve striking juxtapositions that are referentially unfathomable. Still, though the creation of poetic images by means of radical incongruity is common in Surrealist art, it is not a *defining* feature of Surrealism. Buñuel's *Las Hurdes* does much to highlight the limitations of the too common view of Surrealism by showing that simply recording the anomalousness of reality—its heterogeneity to reason—can be enough to produce poetic images.

Las Hurdes seems, on its face, to be a rather odd travelogue about Andalusia, which at the time was a backward region in Spain. Indeed, many have misconstrued it as a searing social documentary that marks Buñuel's turning away from Surrealism and adopting a more conventional cinematic form, and

just after it was released, the film was reviewed favourably by several journals that leaned towards communism. Because of its documentary character, it hardly seems a Surrealistic work. But it *is* one, and I will soon show that it embodies Surrealism's key concepts (indeed, it serves well as a case study of the key features of Surrealist art) while also throwing into relief what Surrealism drew from the cinema.³³³

Though *Las Hurdes* "coincided with the social concern of the Surrealist movement, which was very intense at that time," Buñuel's interest in the group was already waning when he made the film—indeed, on 6 May 1932, Bunuel wrote a letter to André Breton, officially disaffiliating himself.³³⁴ But he remained as committed as ever to Surrealist ideals. Commenting afterwards on his disaffiliation, he would accuse the group of avarice, alleging that its members had betrayed the movement's quiddity (which he continued to esteem): "The work of Ernst, Magritte, and Dalí is famous, high-priced, and hangs prominently in museums. There's no doubt that surrealism was a cultural and artistic success; but these were precisely the areas of least importance to most surrealists. Their aim was not to establish a glorious place for themselves in the annals of art and literature, but to change the world, to transform life itself."³³⁵ Moreover, he disagreed with "that kind of intellectual aristocracy, with its artistic and moral extremes, which isolated [Surrealists] from the world and limited [Surrealists] to [their] own company."³³⁶ However, *Las Hurdes* showed Buñuel to be a Surrealist at heart; he believed that "filming reality as [he] saw it . . . [was to] faithfully follow the Surrealist spirit" and that reality yields its own surreality by revealing a multiplicity of possible contradictory truths within any given moment.³³⁷

The film's relation to Surrealism grows clearer when we consider Dalí's early enthusiasm for documentary as a Surrealist form—an enthusiasm that led him to an interest in photography and cinematography. Dalí, as we have noted, argued that the change of scale that sometimes occurs when we look through a lens allows photography and cinematography to reveal the marvelous that inhabits the real. The minute documentation of the external world could reveal the fantastic. Dalí proposed to apply this insight to a film: shortly after *Un chien andalou* was shown at the Théâtre Ursalines, he announced plans for a documentary film about the coast around Cadaques that would present "everything from the fishermen's toenails to the crests of the rocks on Cape Creus, including the trembling of the blades of grass and all sorts of submarine algae."³³⁸ He failed to realize the project, but its character would not have been that far from Buñuel's *Las Hurdes*.

Un chien andalou and *La coquille et le clergyman*, made in the era before spoken word accompanied the image, suggest the reasons for Surrealists' interest in the cinematic image. For them, the cinematic image has qualities

of both reality and dreams or hallucinations. It has features of reality because the photographic image reflects it with impressive accuracy; but at the same time, it has features of dream or hallucination, partly because montage and *mise en scène* can accollate diverse elements, as dreams and hallucinations do, and partly because the conditions under which we experience the cinema foster a condition in which our critical or rational faculties are quieted—we relax, immobilized, in front of the cinema screen, while images pass in front of us without any effort on our part (as dream images seemingly do). So the cinematic image is an amalgam of dream and reality, of subjectivity and objectivity—by its constitution, it has the attributes that Breton hoped Surrealist art would have. A decade and more before the inception of the Surrealist movement, as early as 1911, the Unanimist writer (and adversary of all forms of individualism) Jules Romains, in *La foule au cinématographe* (The Crowd at the Cinematograph), wrote that

the group dream now begins. They sleep; their eyes no longer see. They are no longer conscious of their bodies. Instead they are only passing images, a gliding and rustling of dreams. They no longer realize they are in a large square chamber, immobile, in parallel rows as in a ploughed field. A haze of visions which resemble life hovers before them. Things have a different appearance than they do outside. They have changed color, outline and gesture. Creatures seem gigantic and move as if in a hurry. What controls their rhythm is not ordinary time, which occupies most people when they are not dreaming. Here they are quick, capricious, drunken, constantly skipping about; sometimes they attempt enormous leaps when least expected. Their actions have no logical order. Causes produce strange effects like golden eggs.”³³⁹

Issues of objectivity and time were key to the Surrealists’ appraisal of photography. Susan Sontag wrote that the triumph of the medium rests in its ability to execute “the Surrealist mandate [by adopting] . . . an uncompromisingly egalitarian attitude toward subject matter.”³⁴⁰ As a machine that has no conscience, no prejudice, only an indefatigable ability to reproduce, a camera seemingly operates independently from the will; it is an autonomous zone of reproduction. The camera’s indifference to the subject matter creates a fertile space for the unconscious, while its relentless activity destroys the continuity of an object’s existence: in photography, the real becomes fractured, its parts both spatially and temporally displaced, forced into an alternative plane of reality, into the surreal. Thus, Bazin pointed out, the photograph creates “an ideal world in the likeness of the real, with its own temporal destiny.”³⁴¹ Sontag concurred: “What renders a photograph surreal is its irrefutable pathos as a message from time past.”³⁴² Photography, in its essentially contingent nature, “confirms that everything is perishable.”³⁴³

Photography's extraordinary mimetic power imbues the image with the status of what is real—as a result, a photographic image can solicit all the faith that the real object would. The illusion of transparency, as Sontag pointed out, makes photographs appear as “found objects—unpremeditated slices of the world . . . clouds of fantasy and pellets of information.”³⁴⁴ Bazin made an even more profound point: “photography ranks high in the order of surrealist creativity because it produces an image that is a reality of nature, namely, a hallucination that is also a fact.”³⁴⁵ The ontological import of photographic reproduction is the result of a violent fissure between time-bound reality and timeless reproduction; but, paradoxically, the reproduction *is* the object, a double whose temporal destiny has been changed from that of the original by being turned into a copy. Bazin highlighted the relevance of photography's paradoxical status to Surrealism's program, suggesting that the Surrealists “had an inkling of this when they looked to the photographic plate to provide them with their monstrosities and for this reason: the surrealist does not consider his aesthetic purpose and the mechanical effect of the image on our imaginations as things apart. For him, the logical distinction between what is imaginary and what is real tends to disappear. Every image is to be seen as an object and every object as an image.”³⁴⁶

If photography and the silent cinema appealed to the Surrealists as media that conflate the real and the imaginary, the coming of sound only heightened the cinema's appeal for them. Sound enabled them to make evident that their artistic aspirations had their basis in dialectics, for it allowed them to segregate the contradictory elements, mind and world, into separate domains, to construct a variety of antithetical relations between the two domains, and (at least among the Breton group) to sublimate the contradictions between the *relata*. In *Las Hurdes*, Buñuel treated the image as if it represented reality and the sound (narration and music) as if it represented consciousness or feeling—much of the time, it represented official, majoritarian thinking and feeling or the voice of knowledge and power—though, as we will see, there were exceptions to this, and the narrator speaks in a more personal voice. In the many dissonances between image and text, Buñuel in *Las Hurdes* depicted consciousness as being at odds with reality, and as we will see, he offers no sublation of the contradiction.

Dialectical Structure in *Las Hurdes*

In *Las Hurdes*, the principle that produces the film's structure is the principle of contradiction. The Greek-French film critic and contributor to *Le surréalisme, même* Ado (Adonis) Kyrou (1923–85) realized this when he pointed out what he called its “Yes, but . . .” architecture:

That is to say, Buñuel shows an opening scene that is unbearable, then projects a ray of hope, and ends up by destroying that hope. For instance, bread is unknown, *but* from time to time the schoolmaster gives a slice to the children, *but* the parents, who fear anything they don't know, throw the bread away. Again, the peasants are often bitten by snakes, *but* the poison is never fatal, *but* the peasants make the bite fatal by trying to cure it with herbs that infect the wound. Each sequence is based on these three propositions, and the progression into horror reaches extremes that can only lead to revolt.³⁴⁷

Kyrou describes this “yes, but” structure as arising out of some problem. Characteristically, the film presents the viewer with a conundrum, offers a solution to the problem (the “yes” section of the pattern), then shows that the solution is ineffective and that it has failed to stem the Hurdanos’ suffering (the “but” part of the structure). Thus, for example, we are told that by May or June, the Hurdanos’ supply of potatoes is exhausted and the people face starvation (the problem). Still, matters are not so bad, the narrator implies, for in the vicinity there are cherry trees, and the Hurdanos are able to avoid starvation (this is the “yes” part of the structure). However (this is the “but” part of the structure), in May or June, the cherries are still unripe, and eating them makes the Hurdanos ill—in fact, eating the fruit can cause a dysentery so severe that people die from it.

The “yes, but” structure generates contradiction. Contradiction really is key to the film’s structure. However, contradictions in *Las Hurdes* are less often diachronic (as Kyrou would have it) than synchronic: discordant information is offered by the sound and the image. These contradictions propound dialectical relations of a particular sort (I will soon say much more about that). In his later years, Buñuel deliberated on the import of a dialectical structure (though without connecting his comments to *Las Hurdes* specifically):

In accordance with the mission given to the artist by Engels... “The novelist (film maker) will have discharged his duty honestly when, through a faithful description of the authentic social relations, he will destroy the conventional ideas on the nature of these relations, will weaken the optimism of the bourgeoisie [*sic*] world, and will force the reader (spectator) to doubt the perennity of the existing order, even though he may not indicate directly a conclusion or even take sides sensibly.³⁴⁸

The “yes, but” construction conforms to this schema: it first sets out an issue, then (the “yes” clause) offers a conventionally optimistic (moral) response to it, and then (with the “but” clause) destroys it. This rhythm of creating hope and then dashing it has the political purpose of weakening the bourgeoisie’s optimism about the prevailing order: the film encourages viewers to doubt that order’s permanence. Diachronic structures operate similarly.

The realism of the film's images serves the (diachronic) dialectic between sounds and images—and it does so in an interesting fashion. The extreme realism of the images proposes that they are presenting the material conditions of Hurdano life, while the comments the narration offers are of a deliberative nature. The contradiction between the highly mimetic images and the soundtrack that accompanies those images—a soundtrack of extraordinary complexity that weaves together music, inflection patterns, and meaning—creates a tension that raises that rich amalgam to the level of the marvellous. Or so it might seem: the dialectically paired terms, image and sound (reality / the idea), imply the relationship between the two contradictory states, the transmutation of which into a sort of absolute reality—a *surreality*—Breton hoped to achieve. I turn now to show that this view (while akin to the truth) needs to be drastically qualified.

From its beginnings, Surrealism aspired not so much to create a fantastic world of its own as to show that the real and the fantastic are so fused with each other that they cannot be separated. Nonetheless, one must admit that *Las Hurdes* has a different character than *Un chien andalou* or even *L'âge d'or* (1930), another Dalí-Buñuel collaboration, made after *Un chien andalou* but before *Las Hurdes*. Between 1927 and 1933 (and increasingly during that period), Surrealists turned towards a revolutionary conception of the dialectic that approached that of the French Communist Party, with which they associated themselves during this period. Furthermore, in 1932, Buñuel formally withdrew from Surrealist activities, and his Communist commitments and engagement deepened. (Nonetheless, *Las Hurdes* imagery gives it a Surrealistic character, and especially the character of the work by one of the *Documents* Surrealists). *Las Hurdes* was made during the period of accord between the Surrealist movement and the PCF (it was shot in 1933 and completed in 1934). The film marked a shift in the Surrealist conception of the dialectic, and it bears evidence of the controversies of the period in which it was conceived. It is, in fact, tempting to see Buñuel's turn towards dealing with impoverished and disenfranchised humanity as reflecting a sympathy aroused by the Surrealists' new social and political commitments. Certainly, the difference between *Un chien andalou* and *Las Hurdes* seems to reflect a shift from the imaginary construction of reality (understood through Dalí's ideas on paranoid criticism) towards an acknowledgment of objective reality—towards recognizing limits and adopting an attitude that conforms to a reality exterior to oneself.³⁴⁹ The film does offer an encounter with an alien reality whose strangeness is different from that of dreams.³⁵⁰

That perception of the film has some basis. *Las Hurdes* is marked by an increment in rationality and a decrement in the delirious commitment to mad love, which previously had been understood as the principal means of liberation.

Buñuel would consistently state that the lessons Surrealism taught him was that moral vision is important and that humans are not really free. Breton had plainly rejected these ideas in the first Surrealist manifesto, though he would propose them in the second. A moral vision *does*, in fact, turn one towards the real. This much supports the thesis that *Las Hurdes* reflected the new orientation towards reality that the Surrealists had adopted around 1927. But this view is only partly correct, for it does not account for the film in its entirety; nor does it disclose the many layers of irony in its construction.

What is more, that approach conceals a much more troubling revelation that the film has to offer. Consider that famous moment in *Las Hurdes* on which nearly every commentator has remarked. As we have noted, the narrator tells us that the Hurdano diet consists almost entirely of potatoes, their supply of which is exhausted by May or June, and unripe cherries, which induce dysentery in a form that is often fatal. Then, far up a mountain, we see a pair of mountain goats scaling a treacherous cliff. The narrator continues with the theme that the Hurdano life is one of deprivation, by remarking that goat meat is eaten only when an animal happens to slip on a loose stone and fall to its death—something that happens only very rarely. Then, almost as if by an extraordinary *hasard objectif*, that rare occurrence takes place. But—and here is another example of the film’s “yes, but” structure—the impression that the incident occurred by a remarkable—perhaps even miraculous—coincidence is dispelled as soon as the spectators notice (as they almost always do) a puff of smoke at the right edge of the frame. The puff reveals that the goat has, in fact, been shot. The next shot confirms the revelation: Buñuel moves to a reverse angle shot of the goat tumbling down the mountainside. Because no camera had been visible in the previous shot, the thoughtful spectator comes to the disturbing realization that the goat had been carried back up the mountain, to be dropped once again so that the spectator might witness the goat’s tumbling down the mountainside in close-up.

This incident—the goat’s being shot and the restaging of its fall—is replete with meaning. It brings into question the viewer’s belief that the events in the film exemplify the Surrealist ideal of *hasard objectif*. Furthermore, the incident is an act of violence, indeed, of *theatricalized* violence—one that proposes an assault on the moral basis of the Surrealists’ ideas of freedom and truth. (We know from outtakes preserved at the Cinémathèque de Toulouse that Buñuel, likely to reduce costs, rehearsed and reshot most of the scenes in which people appear.) And further yet, *Las Hurdes* is a film about the violence that nature perpetrates against the Hurdano people; thus, in shooting the goat and restaging its fall, Buñuel is alluding to his complicity with that violence and suggesting that making the film is itself one more act of violence against them. One might even see the event, as James F. Lastra does in his fine

article on the film, as a form of confession—that is, as Buñuel’s *mea culpa* for his sacrifice of the Hurdanos to the requirements of making a compelling ethnographic document.³⁵¹

Lastra emphasizes another implication of including the staged event (to my view, its most important implication): the structure of the incident conforms to a rhythm that is absolutely essential to the film, a rhythm of contradiction that renders the reasons for the Hurdano existence absolutely unintelligible. Time and again, the film makes a proposition that renders some aspect of Hurdanian behaviour momentarily intelligible (and that even raises hope about their existence), only to refute that proposition and dash our hope. Thus, the rhythm conforms to what Ado Kyrrou characterizes as a “yes, but” structure; but Lastra offers further precisions about the form of negativity that the rhythmic *gestus* involves.³⁵² That rhythm, of eliciting a principle whereby Hurdano life seems to become intelligible, then discrediting that principle, is a *tactus* that pervades the film: it constitutes the film’s through line.

The rhythm alludes to an unfathomable realm, one that cannot be rationally understood. Its savagery, its baseness, its meanness, its horror are truly excessive, beyond the limits of what reason can grasp. Thus, the film fulfills *Documents*’s hope of mobilizing the forces of oneiric illogic and the savagery of the unconscious to subvert the tendency towards abstraction on which, Georges Bataille believed, idealism of every form depends. It does so by turning dialectical logic, the logic of idealism, against itself. That is the purpose of the film’s “yes, but” structure. Buñuel’s way of subverting dialectical logic is the same as the one that Frantz Fanon proposed, and used, in *Les damnés de la terre* (*The Wretched of the Earth*, 1961): the contradiction between a pair yoked in dialectical antithesis (in his text, self and other) is not sublated in a higher unity.³⁵³ “The two zones are opposed,” wrote Fanon, “but not in the service of a higher unity... They both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible.”³⁵⁴ If no higher unity can be achieved, reason fails in its mediating role: the opposites are simply inscrutable to each other, and the relation between them is fundamentally irrational.

The same conceptual trope that Fanon used in rejecting sunny Hegelian rationality had been employed decades earlier by the renegade Surrealist Georges Bataille. In 1930, the Surrealist movement fissured, the dominant group siding with André Breton, the minority group with Georges Bataille. The issue on which the group split was that of Breton’s idealist (Hegelian) tendencies. Bataille accused Breton’s Surrealism, *inter alia*, of selling out to the art market and of “Icarian reflexes” with respect to all that is base, undesirable, and excremental in society. He bridled against Breton’s tack of trying to escape from all that is base and proposed instead that thinking—*genuine* thinking—must acknowledge and explore all that is lowly, corrupted,

unseemly, base, even sordid. Against Breton's Icarian idealism, Bataille contended that it is impossible to behave "other than as a pig who rummages in manure and mud uprooting everything with his snout."³⁵⁵

Breton sought refuge in the purity of thought: "Let him, in spite of any restrictions, use the avenging arm of the idea against the bestiality of all beings and of all things, and let him one day, vanquished—but *vanquished only if the world is the world*—welcome the discharge of his sad rifles like a salvo fired in salute."³⁵⁶ Breton recoiled from the grubbiness of reality, the cruelty of which he found incomprehensible; he aspired to "uproot thought from an increasingly cruel state of thralldom, to steer it back onto the path of total comprehension, return it to its original purity."³⁵⁷ It was exactly this response, of recoiling from whatever is base to take refuge in a total comprehension, to which Bataille objected; and to counter it, Bataille embraced the "bestiality of all beings and all things." Bataille insisted that reality confronts us with a cruelty that is utterly incomprehensible and that exceeds what reason can grasp—nonetheless, that cruelty must be confronted. He rejected Breton's strategy of recoil:

From one who speaks across the heavens, full of aggressive respect for heaven and its lightning bolts, full of disgust for this too base world that he believes he scorns—scorns more than anyone has ever scorned it before him—after touching Icarian naiveté has betrayed his desire for the miraculous, we can only expect . . . the betrayal of the vulgar interests of the collectivity, which have become simply filth, a pretext to rise with cries of disgust.³⁵⁸

Breton, in response, accused Bataille of being obsessed with the "befouled, senile, rank, sordid, lewd, doddering" aspects of existence, which he himself was bent on transcending by reaching for the Absolute, for what he called "surreality."³⁵⁹ Bataille maintained that the habit of dialectical thinking (and especially of the sort that resolves contradictions between antithetical terms) was deeply ingrained in Breton. The accusation was completely correct. Breton's famous definition of Surrealism that we have already encountered—Surrealism is "the . . . resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a *surreality*"—is evidence that the essential dynamic of Bretonian Surrealism was to sublimate contradictions by homogenizing the antithetical terms.³⁶⁰

***Las Hurdes* and Bataille's Heterology**

Bataille's conviction that the cruelty of reality is unfathomable provides one basis of his heterology, his science of the heterogeneous. In one of its meanings, "heterogeneous" refers to the opposite in an antithetical structure. In another of its meanings, it refers to what is most distant from the objects of

everyday experience; in this sense, its meaning approximates Rudolf Otto's famous expression "the Wholly Other" (*das ganz Andere*). Both meanings are important to Bataille's concept of the heterogeneous, but it is the latter that is perhaps the more important—indeed, Bataille, a profound thinker on matters theological, actually used Otto's phrase on several occasions. In this sense, the term "heterogeneous" names a supreme, non-human Being, a Being whose Be-ing, unlike any other being, derives from nothing—a Being who creates the world. Such a Being provokes a sense of the uncanny; in fact, the uncanny *is* its mode of revelation. The term, understood in this sense, is akin to Martin Heidegger's "ontological difference," which denotes the difference between Be-ing and the be-ing of beings. The Be-ing of the Wholly Other is wholly other to be-ing of beings.

Or, rather, that is the strong meaning of "heterogeneous," the meaning that grounds all the other senses in which Bataille uses the term. For Bataille also used the term in a broader sense, as referring to that which disrupts and disturbs the order of all entities that are commensurate with one another. Science, Bataille pointed out, had established a world the contents of which can be measured and compared one to another. In this way, the laws of science form a world of identity. The regulatory regime thus guarantees a continuity—a homogeneity—between the persons who constitute the social sphere and the products they assimilate, a homogeneity between the possessor and the object possessed. It ensures, that is to say, a general homogeneity of the productive sphere.

Bataille strove to expose a contrary element invested in this general homogeneity. He saw that in social organisms, as in individual organisms, there are two complementary movements: that of appropriation, and that of rejection. The movement of rejection marks the heterogeneous. Bataille set out the following, as in "Le valeur d'usage de D.A.F. de Sade" (The Use Value of D.A.F. de Sade, 1930), concrete examples of heterogeneity:

Sexual activity, whether perverted or not; the behavior of one sex before the other; defecation; urination; death and the cult of cadavers (above all, insofar as it involves the stinking decomposition of bodies); the different taboos; ritual cannibalism; the sacrifice of animal-gods; omophagia [eating raw meat]; the laughter of exclusion; sobbing (which, in general has death as its object); religious ecstasy; the identical attitude towards shit, gods, and cadavers; terror that so often accompanies involuntary defecation; the custom of making women both brilliant and lubricious with makeup, gems, and gleaming jewels; gambling; heedless expenditure and certain fanciful uses of money, etc., together present a common character in that the object of the activity (excrement, shameful parts, cadavers, etc.) is found each time treated as a foreign body (*das ganz Anderes [sic.]*); in other words, it can just as well be expelled follow-

ing a brutal rupture, as reabsorbed through the desire to put one's body and mind entirely in a more or less violent state of expulsion (or projection). The notion of the (heterogeneous) *foreign body* permits one to note the elementary *subjective* identity between types of excrement (sperm, menstrual blood, urine, fecal matter) and everything that can be seen as sacred, divine or marvelous.³⁶¹

When we contemplate the tension between the two positions (that of the dominant faction among the Surrealists, and that of Bataille and those persuaded to his view), we arrive at a startling realization: a Scholasticism of a sort underpins the position of the dominant group. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), the paragon of the Scholastic philosophy, found a means to synthesize reason and revelation, so that nothing disclosed by revelation should ever be discounted by reason. Placing Surrealism in the service of revolution (whether of Marxist or any other form) implied that Surrealism's most radical revelations must be such that they could be reconciled with reason, which the Marxists valorized. Bataille's version of Surrealism was different: the power of the heterogeneous was to destroy identitarian thinking; in his view, the irruption of the heterogeneous into awareness threatened to destroy the propositions that reason teaches. The notional language of a closed world of beings is overwhelmed in the irruption of an awareness at odds with that conditioned by simulacra. The heterogeneous irrupts exactly where language fails: one becomes aware of it when one becomes aware of that which language cannot express. Language establishes identities—for example, of good as profit—and on this plane of identities, one cannot express the simple notion that an expenditure, a loss without compensation, can be a good—to spend not for profit but simply for the sake of loss is something that language cannot convey. It is that failure that prises conceptions open and forces them beyond themselves.

Thus, Bataille critiqued Hegelian Reason—and, indeed, reason in all its forms. His critique took a variety of forms, ranging from some of the most profound philosophical writings to emerge from France between 1930 and 1960 to transgressive literature, poetry, and political essays (e.g., “Front populaire dans la rue” [Popular Front in the Street, 1936], “La structure psychologique du fascisme” [Psychological Structure of Fascism, 1933], and his contribution to the doable number of *Acéphale* [Brainless] titled “Nietzsche et les fascistes” [Nietzsche and the Fascists, 1937]). But Bataille was not a simple anti-Enlightenment thinker: he was less against the Enlightenment and reason and more a thinker engaged in the quest to follow reason to its limits so as to *expose* those limits.

Buñuel's biographer, John Baxter, points out that Buñuel signed the 1930 Surrealist manifesto that excoriated Bataille for his scathing remarks about Breton's idealistic tendencies. Nonetheless, *Las Hurdes* reflects Bataille's vision

and Bataille's criticism of Breton's metaphysics—indeed, the criticisms it offers of Breton's position are so close to those of Bataille that it is hard to believe that the film is not a conscious exercise in Bataillism. *Las Hurdes* figures the dirty, the soiled, and the damaged as sacred, divine, and marvellous—sacred, divine, and marvellous precisely for their being beyond reason. Bataille's heterology was essentially a project to strip away ideological screens or veils, to expose the (bourgeois) hypocrisies that conspire to make palatable a basically meaningless and squalid existence; that is also the tenor of Buñuel's *Las Hurdes*. If Bataille encouraged thinkers to overcome their contempt for the baseness of reality, *Las Hurdes* practised what Bataille had recommended, and it did so by unbridling the cinema's affinity for the revolting and the abject. (Indeed, one would be entitled to speculate, based on the evidence of *L'histoire de l'oeil*, that the cinema may have provided Bataille with a model for an art based on what is lowly and disgusting.)

But that is getting ahead of the argument. We must spend more time with Bataille's ideas to discern precisely how *Las Hurdes* figures the dirty, the soiled, the diseased as sacred, divine, marvellous. The passage from "Le valeur d'usage de D.A.F. de Sade" describes a complex relation between the agency (force/person) that expels the heterogeneous and the element that is being expelled. The expelled element is assigned the role of the Wholly Other—of *das ganz Andere*, to use Otto's term again. Bataille conceived of the relation between the expelled element and the domain from which it is expelled as a constitutive relation: the antithetical terms mutually affect each other. Moreover, he sometimes wrote as though the expelled had a dialectical relation (of a particular sort) to that from which it had been expelled, a relation patterned on moments of negation and synthesis: the expelled element "can just as well be expelled following a brutal rupture [opposition or negation, as in a dialectical relation], as reabsorbed [in the synthesis or interaction between the elements in the dialectical pair]." In these respects, expulsion (a central concept in Bataille's philosophy) might seem to be a dialectical relation in the orthodox, Hegelian sense.

But Bataille was anything but Hegelian (or rather, one should say, Bataille followed Hegel, but followed him subversively), and that difference is one point that Bataille's repeated use of Otto's term *das ganz Andere* highlights: in the relation between heterogeneous elements, the dialectical terms are never reconciled in a higher unity. Hegel's dialectics propose that the antithetical pair oppose each other in respect to some attribute with regard to which they differ—and that implies that some feature or category must be relevant to both (i.e., that the opposing characters must differ from each other in respect to some common feature). In a heterological relation, the terms are entirely different, they are wholly other: the differentiated (the expelled) element

is not other to the agency that expels it in some respect or another—it is *entirely* other. In *L'erotisme* (Eroticism, 1957), Bataille offered the following commentary on the dynamics of the heterogeneous:

We can easily imagine the surprise of one who . . . would discover without being seen [in such a relation, the seer and the seen occupy different—heterogenous—positions] the amorous transports of a woman whose distinctive character would have struck him. He would see a sickness analogous to a dog in heat. As if a bitch in heat had been substituted for the personality of one who received guests with such dignity . . . It is even an understatement to speak of sickness. For the time being, the personality is *dead*. Its death, for the moment, makes way for the bitch, who profits from the silence surrounding *the dead woman's absence*.³⁶²

The voyeur sees the woman's amorous transports as placing her outside the human sphere (ironically, it is her quest for an anthropogenetic *intime*, which turns her into a feral animal)—her humanity altogether abandons her, leaving her just as completely as if she had died. In the emptiness, in the void that her departing humanity leaves, an entirely different species comes forth.

"Heterology" is the term that Bataille gave the effort to understand the heterogeneous. Heterology, to be sure, cannot be a science or a discipline like those with which we are familiar, for the heterogeneous is exactly whatever resists being formed into identities whose natures can be understood through measure and lawful regularity—as such, it is an effort at an alternative way of knowing (an alternative noesis) to supplement those sciences, those methods of reason, that have been exposed as inadequate. The heterogeneous resists all objectivization, for if it could be objectified it could be reduced to measure and identity, just like the phenomena the sciences study. The heterogeneous can no more be made an object of (ordinary) knowledge than the repudiated drives of the unconscious can be made objects of direct acquaintance.³⁶³ Nonetheless, the effort to expose, or to formulate knowledge (of a sort) of, what resists being known is what drove Bataille's work. And so it is with *Las Hurdes*, which is a film impelled by the desire to know what cannot be known, viz., why Hurdanos continue to live the miserable existence they do.

***Las Hurdes* and the Sacred**

But that is getting ahead of the argument again. Before considering the film, we must deliberate on Bataille's reasons for defining the object of heterology through its relation to the sacred.³⁶⁴ The effort to comprehend the relation between the sacred and the profane in a total system of a general economy was characteristic of French sociology of Bataille's era, and that tendency influenced Bataille's thought. To this strain of ideas, Bataille contributed the notion that sacred things have an essentially repugnant character. He argued

that humans are bound to what provokes in them the greatest disgust—and that, to be sure, is another idea that surfaces in *Las Hurdes*, in which Hurdano identity is bound to that which humiliates and degrades them (even if it does not exactly disgust them). If the unfathomable (and therefore irrational) conditions in which the Hurdano people live humiliate and degrade them, they are no less sacred for that—that is the lesson that Bataille could well have taught Buñuel.

The concept of the heterogeneous was central to Bataille's view of art. He asserted that art aspires to embrace the totality and, in doing so, to reconstitute the integrity of the person. But he also accused artworks of being inevitably lame (to use a word that he favoured), weakened by their inability to grasp the whole (and to reconstitute the integral self). Bataille described the effects of art's breaking from the all-encompassing totality that imbued it (so it had once been believed) with its significance:

The servants of science have excluded human destiny from the world of truth, and the servants of art have renounced making a true world out of what an anxious destiny has caused them to bring forth. But for all that it is not easy to escape the necessity of attaining a real, and not a fictive, life. The servants of art can accept for their creations the fugitive existence of shadows; nevertheless they themselves must enter living into the kingdom of truth, money, glory, and social rank. It is thus impossible for them to have anything other than a lame life. They often think that they are possessed by what they represent, but that which has no existence possesses nothing: they are only truly possessed by their careers. Romanticism replaces the gods who possess from the outside with the unfortunate destiny of the poet, but through this he is far from escaping lameness; romanticism has only made misfortune into a new form of career and has made the lies of those it has killed even more tiresome.³⁶⁵

Breton's circle proposed to make their lived world resemble their dreams, but discovered that most efforts towards that end realized only their most dismal dreams. So, as Buñuel implied, they directed themselves towards realizing dreams of career and money. Buñuel, by contrast, accepted the need to renounce the fictive "kingdom of truth, money, glory, and social status." The Hurdanos qualified as a fit subject for a documentary that turned away from such prestige, for they completely lacked it.

Still, we must assess the success of the strategy of turning towards the downcast in order to form a relationship with brute reality. It was, surely, a common Surrealist gesture—and even typical of the Surrealists during the period when they decided to make common cause with the PCF. *Las Hurdes* shows that the strategy was an utter failure: for one thing, the Hurdano life turned out to be too incomprehensible, too fundamentally irrational, so merely observing them did not force a confrontation with a brute reality.

Mere observation provided no conduit to the heterogeneous reality of the Hurdanos' lives (or, for that matter, the lives of all humanity). In this regard, the narrator's evident complacency about advancing untruths suggests that his life had not been upset by a confrontation with the reality of the heterogeneous.

The inaccessibility of truth creates a dilemma for the artist as well as for the philosopher, and that dilemma riddles both Bataille's heterology and Buñuel's filmmaking: to not expose oneself to the Wholly Other condemns one to lame existence, for only the Wholly Other has the power to restore one to total life, that is, to the form of existence one must live if one is to produce authentic art (or philosophy). But one's efforts to achieve some understanding of the heterogeneous are doomed to failure, for the heterogeneous can never be fathomed. Sensing that encounters with what is most extreme and repugnant open one towards the sacred, artists and philosophers often willingly give themselves to the radical demands of the quest to encounter the heterogeneous. Still, however radical one's efforts, the quest is doomed to failure. That fact is germane to *Las Hurdes*'s form: few, surely, fail to notice that the external form of *Las Hurdes* resembles that of a travelogue—a horrific one, to be sure, but nonetheless a travelogue. The tourist is the outsider; the condition of a tourist in relation to the lands he or she passes through is similar to that of the adventurous thinker in relation to the heterogeneous.

This was also the position that the Surrealists occupied vis-à-vis the intellectuals in the PCF. Quite properly, much has been made of what Marx inherited from the Romantics—that was the great revelation that followed from the rediscovery of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844. But even admitting that, as Louis Althusser pointed out time and again, it would be a mistake to diminish Marx's efforts to bring forth a science of history—a science, really, of misery, suffering, and oppression. The intellectual formation of the young Marx included a period as a “Young Hegelian,” and Hegel's influence would remain with him for the rest of his life. Marx saw in Hegel's dialectic of history the foundation of a science of process, and he believed that the dialectic of history would bring forth the communist state as the state in which the rational would become real. Again and again, he argued that reason made it inevitable that the communist state would come forth (even while he denied that his was a philosophy in which Reason, in the form of Mind, played the commanding role).

The intellectuals in the PCF committed themselves to the intellectual labour of discerning the details of that historical (i.e., rational) process. Unlike Marxists, the Surrealists felt that confronting the sacred Other was necessary in order to achieve what was after all the goal of communism, viz., to bring forth the “total person” (or, as it was called in those days, the “total man”). The dissident Surrealists—and especially Bataille—asserted that the

exalted role assigned to science had contributed to making the world destitute and people lame. Bataille especially would side with the revolt against the intellectuals in the name of the “whole person.” That is what distanced him from the dominant Surrealist group as they became more politicized—while they devoted their efforts to formulating an ideological critique of the power of reason and logic in the Occident, Bataille aligned himself more with the accursed share, with the wretched of the earth. Bataille could not put the Surrealism he strove to bring forth into the service of the communist revolution precisely *because* he believed that the revolution he was working for required what the communists avoided, viz., an encounter with the repugnant-as-sacred.

Las Hurdes tries to form itself as an informational film on misery, suffering, and oppression. Buñuel’s film, insofar as it is an effort to identify with the Hurdanos (and it is only partly that, for it also shows itself out of sympathy with them), is a Bataillean film—Bataillean in its interest in the sacred grotesque (the heterogeneous) and in its tragic realization that what is needed to reconstitute the integrity of the human person is unattainable. The film elicits trauma of the exact character Lacan described in his 1964 seminar “The Unconscious and Repetition,” that is, as resulting from a missed encounter with the real. Like Bataille’s heterology, *Las Hurdes* offers an *atheology*: it concerns the divine vacancy, the vacancy of the site that is occupied only by the name of God, the God that should be the guarantor of the integrity of the human person. As all atheology does, Buñuel’s speaks of the vacancy of the self, of the maimed and crippled self—the maimed and crippled selves that are the film’s subjects, but also the maimed self that we can detect in the voice of the narrator. That is the fundamental horror of the film: the narrator (who can be taken as a stand-in for the filmmaker) is as maimed as the figures before the camera. For Bataille, that the self is lame, crippled, and vacant—that the self is *lost*—makes sin possible; indeed, passages from Bataille sometimes leave the impression that the loss of identity is constitutive of sin. Another link between Bataille’s writing and *Las Hurdes* relates Bataille’s portrait of crippled humanity to *Las Hurdes*’s despairing portrait of sin as unredeemable. For the most part, Buñuel is a marvellously charitable filmmaker, but in *Las Hurdes* he is uncharacteristically uncharitable.

The quest for extreme experience—for a shock that would displace one from ordinary reality—remained a paradigmatically Surrealist quest. Walter Benjamin, whose writings reflect the rise of Surrealism and who was sympathetic to Contre-Attaque, the short-lived anti-Popular Front group around Bataille, recognized that experience (that is to say, direct, immediate experience, as opposed to both fantasmic thinking and to thinking that is concerned with theories) connected one with the flow of life itself. It was the

Surrealists' quest for a brutal form of experience connected with the immediate, vital, coarse reality of life that gave the movement its revolutionary force, endowing it with an impetus directed against bourgeois complacency and national pride, against the moral stagnation of Protestantism and Catholicism alike. In the work of such precursors as Rimbaud, Lautréamont, Apollinaire, and Dostoyevsky, Benjamin found evidence of a profane illumination—profane in its direct relation to the experience of the everyday world—through which emerged a cult of evil as a political device to disinfect and inoculate its adherents against all moralizing dilettantism and modern anaesthesia. Louis Aragon, in *Le paysan de Paris* (Paris Peasant, 1926), and Breton in *Nadja*, extended these cultic practices, for the intoxication brought on by their peregrinations around Paris resulted in a radical rejection of the modern and in their fascination with the debris of the past. Incorporating the uncanny into their experience of everyday life marked their separation from modern bourgeois mainstream culture—and from the Hegelian notion of history as the progress of reason. However, as the experience of the 1960s taught, a revolutionary tendency that arises from “intoxication” tends towards social tumult and anarchism.

Benjamin's remarks on shock's revolutionary potential help us account for Buñuel's interest in the Hurdano people: he may have seen the Hurdano existence as belonging to a beastly order, but their animal character did not deny them soteriologic significance. Benjamin saw Surrealist experience as an antidote to metaphysics: Surrealism's fusion of mind and matter dismantled the metaphysics that tradition had handed down. The reader, the thinker, the loiterer, and the *flâneur*, Benjamin avowed, are types of illuminati (as much as are the opium eater, the dreamer, and the ecstatic). Through a remarkable synthesis of the imaginary realm with the real, the reader/thinker/loiterer/*flâneur* merged in the mythology of Surrealism with the opium eater/dreamer/ecstatic—and the product was a revolutionary anarchism of the imagination. The transitional area where this fusion of self and world takes place forms a sort of (to use a Platonic-Kristevan term) *chora*, within which new being (belonging to the sur-real) is generated.³⁶⁶ Delirium of the sort that Baudelaire and Benjamin described may have been Buñuel's response to the squalor of Hurdano existence—a response that countered the socialists' delusory optimism concerning non-bourgeois forms of life. Buñuel's revolutionary tendencies (to say nothing of Bataille's) were no less conflicted—and no less disposed to become a form of revolutionary anarchism grounded in, and seeking, a profane illumination.

Photography had a role in shaping these ideas. Photography, as Benjamin realized, has the power to bypass everyday language and to bring everyday experiences into the magical realm of words, creating a form of esoteric

poetry.³⁶⁷ The snapshot has an affinity for the deserted streets and despised places that cannot be accommodated by bourgeois notions of beauty, spaces that the revolutionary opposition found ideal for that form of poetic experience that Benjamin described as “revolutionary nihilism.” As Benjamin points out in his 1929 essay “Surrealismus: Die letzte Momentaufnahme der europäischen Intelligenz” (Surrealism: The Latest Snapshot of the European Intellectual), revolutionary nihilism had developed out of the cult of evil espoused by Apollinaire, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Lautréamont, and Baudelaire as a political device inoculating the self against moral dilettantism, and it became a doctrine of the Surrealists, who like characters in Dostoyevsky novels sometimes find inspiration in ignoble actions. The photograph has a character similar to that of these writers’ works, for like them, a photograph makes us see reality anew and as something apart from the hierarchies of aesthetics and tradition. The photograph provided a new, technical means to revive the Cabalistic language Benjamin discussed in “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers” (The Task of the Translator, 1921), the language in which the sign, the concept, and the thing are all identical, and to connect (after the fashion of the Surrealists) mind and matter, thought and reality. As a form of poetry, the photograph is set apart from everyday reality, and its significance exposes the workings of an optical unconscious. The photographic process, from making the exposure to developing the latent—one might say “occult”—image, seems akin to the processes the alchemists explored. Its power seems to confirm those theories of language that hermetic thinkers like John Dee (1527–1608 or 1609) and Eliphas Levi (1810–75) offered—theories that reappear in Benjamin’s writings on language and translation. For the photograph has a peculiar ontological bond to reality, a magical relation that binds the signifier to the signified, a relation similar to that which hermetic thinkers attribute to the words of the true language.³⁶⁸

But, Buñuel suggests, not even a confrontation with abject reality (delivered by a photograph) enables lame thought to grasp Be-ing. That lameness—physical, spiritual, metaphysical, and moral—is a principal subject of Buñuel’s film. But, as before, to take up that point right now would be to leap ahead of the story. For we must first consider the implications that Bataille’s heterology had for his anthropology, which will take us to the heart of Buñuel’s film (a film that, when all is said and done, is an exercise in anthropology, and specifically in heterological anthropology). This is not to deny that Buñuel drew from previous anthropological/ethnographic investigations of the people of Las Hurdes: Maurice Legendre’s (1878–1955) anthropological study of Hurdanos (1926) and Miguel de Unamuno’s (1864–1936) travel essay (reproduced in his *Andanzas y visiones españolas* [Spanish Wanderings and Visions, 1922]) were both sources of Buñuel’s film. But the implications of Bataille’s heterological

anthropology resonate in the difference between Buñuel's portrait of the Hurdanos and those of earlier ethnographers. Bataille's heterology is founded on the notions of assimilation and excretion—and his anthropology defines what it is to be a human, *anthropos*, through those same functions. The double process of assimilation and excretion models the role that the transcendent, the divine, the Wholly Other, has in human existence (and conversely, the transcendent provides a model for our understanding of the processes of assimilation and excretion). Thus, introducing a foreign body (Bataille used the term *ganz Andere* for this, too) into another destroys the integrity of that body into which it is introduced by shattering its homogeneity. Immediate knowledge of something different from the body brings to an end the body's integrity, its "sameness." In acquiring knowledge, the body becomes impure, soiled, marked by a difference that cannot be explained—and its character is suddenly turned excretory. An anthropology that has taken the heterogeneous into its core is an anthropology that testifies to the fundamental importance of the functions of assimilation and excretion. The radical acknowledgment of excretion brings that anthropology up against a phenomenon that is unmastered and unmasterable; confronting these phenomena, anthropology becomes a study that speaks of unfathomable loss and irrational expenditure. It becomes an anthropology whose character is "the complete reversal of the philosophical process, which ceases to be the instrument of appropriation, and now serves excretion." Bataille thus understood the heterological as laying the groundwork for a metaphysics of violence, and not just a metaphysics, but in its train a *society* of violence: "it [this reversal] introduces the demand for the violent gratifications implied by social life."³⁶⁹

Las Hurdes depicts "soiled humanity," a society given to violent gratifications that are fundamentally unfathomable but that nonetheless are related to the Hurdanos' status as repudiated, rejected, expelled. Furthermore, Buñuel's film answers the violence of Hurdano existence (of which it provides no dearth of evidence) with a violence of its own, a violence suggested in the scene of the goat tumbling down the mountainside. Lastra comments that the real critical power of the film is "inextricable from its darker side—the dehumanization and repudiation of its subjects. These are the source of its vehemence and its pathos."

Terms such as *repudiate*, *repel*, and *expel* resonate through Lastra's text—but he does not highlight the (indispensable) religious dimension these terms evoke in the Bataillean usage.³⁷⁰ He writes about the scene with the goat: "Just as a scapegoat (animal or human) is often deified before its *expulsion* [consider Bataille on the identity of the divine and the excremental], so too, I argue, the Hurdano people are at some moments elevated to a heroic plane only to be vilified in what follows."³⁷¹ The film does emphasize the sheer

otherness of Hurdano life—that is, the Hurdanos’ status as a group expelled from dominant bourgeois society. It opens by describing Hurdano life as “the most primitive type of human life” and with a reference to the famous university centre of Salamanca “collaps[ing] back into this brutal, elemental state”—its otherness ensured by its being “cut off” from the rest of the world by a ring of high mountains.

The film presents a litany of the miseries of Hurdano existence. We hear first that the urchin schoolchildren are starving (“Until very recently bread was unknown to the Hurdanos... The bread these children are eating was given to them at school. The master usually makes them eat it in front of him for fear that it may be taken away from them by their half-starved parents”). This accusation effectively expels the Hurdanos from membership in “civilized society, in which parents sacrifice for children.” We are told that the urchins wear rags to school (another way of stressing the otherness of Hurdano existence). On arriving “in Martilandrán, we are greeted by the ugly rasp of coughing and are told that most of the inhabitants of this miserable village are sick.” The film’s narrator even describes a Hurdano group as a “choir of idiots.” We are told that the people of Las Hurdes have never seen a plough. The film’s narration and imagery suggest the close proximity of the Hurdanos to animals—doubtless implying ontological as well as geographic proximity. In the entry “Abattoir” (*Documents* 6, 1929), for the journal’s *Le dictionnaire critique* (Critical Dictionary), Bataille links slaughterhouses and religion to tell us what we cannot stand to know—our proximity to animals, our dirty selves, the revelation of which exposes the hypocrisy and dishonesty at the heart of sanitized bourgeois society: “The slaughterhouse relates to religion in the sense that temples of times past... had two purposes, serving simultaneously for prayers and for slaughter... Nowadays the slaughterhouse is cursed and quarantined like a boat with cholera aboard... The victims of this curse are neither the butchers nor the animals, but those fine folk who have reached the point of not being able to stand their own unseemliness.”³⁷²

Emphasizing humans’ proximity to animals was another weapon in the arsenal that Bataille used to attack humans’ idealized self-image. Our animality, which we strive vainly to repudiate and to expel from our self-image, constitutes a heterogeneous element that has invaded our being: “We cling tenaciously to the dissimilarities that set us apart from the animal. Anything that recalls the animality subsisting in us, appalls us unflinchingly and, quite like a prohibition, makes us recoil in horror.”³⁷³

Las Hurdes as an Ethnographic Film

Las Hurdes, as an anthropological/ethnographic film, offers an anthropology with a difference. It is different from the ordinary anthropological/ethno-

graphic film in much the same way that Bataille's heterology differs from orthodox science. Its difference can be attributed to its Surrealism. It is a particular brand of Surrealism that characterizes the film, a brand associated with the communist poet Pierre Unik (1909–45), Louis Aragon, the communist and film historian-to-be Georges Sadoul (1904–67), and, of course, Georges Bataille. Buñuel was explicit about the influence of Surrealism on *Las Hurdes* and about the particular strain of Surrealism that most affected him: "I made *Las Hurdes* because I had a surrealist vision, and because I was interested in human problems. I saw reality in a different way than I'd have seen it before surrealism. I was sure of that, as was Pierre Unik."³⁷⁴ The issues that separated the Surrealism of Bataille's group from that of Breton's came to a head with the World's Colonial Exhibition of 1931, which celebrated the supposed superiority of the world's colonial powers and their assimilation/appropriation of the cultural artifacts of the colonized. Bataille's group protested that religious relics from North Africa, ceremonial masks from Oceania, sculpture from Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Senegal—in fact, all "tribal" objects—were being put on display in such exhibitions much as they were in Dahlem's great ethnographic museum. When displayed in this manner, the entire collection of ethnographic objects was converted into a homogeneous other—an "other" to the norm of European culture. Moreover, such exhibitions and such museums had been created in conscious opposition to the *Wunderkammern* of an earlier age: they represented a determined attempt to move beyond curiosity and towards an empirically based science of human culture and history. So it is no surprise that they did not appeal to Surrealists—or, rather, to all of the Surrealists.

Some of the Surrealists did succumb to the lure of the other, to the spell of "tribal" culture and "primitive" objects, to the allure of the "mysterious East" or "primitive Africa" as Utopian cultures. Louis Aragon, Georges Sadoul, and Pierre Unik were not among them: in response to the exhibition, they published a pamphlet, *Ne visitez pas l'Exposition Coloniale* (Don't Visit the Colonial Exposition, 30 April 1931), in which they condemned what they referred to as the "colonialist banditry" and the heroization of an imperialist "Greater France." Buñuel, in his statement about the Surrealist establishment, argued that the exposition (and its Surrealist supporters) had consigned the Other—an *exoticized* Other—to a degraded condition: "I was beginning not to agree with that kind of intellectual aristocracy, with its moral and artistic extremes, which isolated us from the world and limited us to our own company. Surrealists considered the majority of mankind contemptible or stupid, and thus withdrew from all social participation and responsibility and shunned the work of the others."³⁷⁵ In their protest against the Colonial Exhibition, the stance the dissident Surrealists took was really more consistent

with Surrealism's founding principles than that of the group around Breton.

The Bataille/Aragon/Sadoul/Unik version of Surrealism—the version with which André Masson, Michel Leiris, Antonin Artaud, and Raymond Queneau would later affiliate themselves—challenged Breton's version at the most profound level by alleging that it was dominated by a certain template for thinking.³⁷⁶ They recognized the enormous irony in Breton's adopting the template that he did, for the pattern they alleged dominated Breton's thinking was that of the dialectic (see "Surrealism, Apollinaire, and Reconciliation" for a statement on what Breton actually drew from Hegel, and what he did not take up). Hegel had used the dialectic to demonstrate the identity of the real and the rational—and the claim that the real is rational is hardly something one would expect the Surrealists to align themselves with. The dissident Surrealists recognized the stubborn persistence of dialectical thinking was what had led their erstwhile colleagues to enthuse over the World's Colonial Exhibition. Their explanation for the role the dialectic had played in fostering that enthusiasm went as follows: Breton's group conceived of the relation between colonizer and colonized as a dialectical relation in which the identity of each depended on its relation to an antithetical term, its dialectic other. Bataille and his associates claimed to have a deeper insight in recognizing that in a hierarchy, when one term dominates another (politically, for example—the Master/Slave relation being the classic case), the two terms must be of a common metaphysical type for each to enter into a relation with the other (i.e., that allows Master and Slave to form the anthropogenetic Master/Slave relation in which each term creates the other). Such relations are notorious for generating a cycle in which one of the terms is first elevated from a subordinate position and then reduced again to a subordinate status. Seen this way, Hegel's discussion of the Master/Slave dialectic demonstrates the truth of the Christian conviction that the lowly shall be raised up and the mighty cast down: the Slave, at first in a lowly position through his or her closeness to the material of reality, rises to ascendancy over the Master. Breton's celebration of the colonized displayed the same dynamic: the downtrodden colonized were raised up by becoming objects of colonialist veneration, and the colonizer was cast down into the position of the collector of exotic artifacts, objects whose origin lay in experiences to which the colonizer was not privy. Each will replace the other at the top of the hierarchy over and over again.

Bataille understood that dialectical relations are responsible for producing hierarchies. His antipathy to hierarchies revealed itself in the philosophical anthropology he expounded in "La bouche" (The Mouth, 1930); there, he pointed out that with four-legged creatures, the mouth is identified as the beginning of the body, with the beginning implicitly representing the noble term and the end (the anus) the ignoble. When primates assumed an erect

posture, the mouth ceased to be “the beginning” of the body; and when the mouth lost that position, no hierarchy could be established among the organs: as the mouth lost its priority, all organs became equally base.

Bataille’s thought tilted against the mechanism that produces such hierarchies—that is, against dialectical thinking, which is based on the assumption that the terms in a dialectical relation have a common metaphysical ground. According to Bataille, the “significant other,” the other that constitutes our core, is radically different, radically other.³⁷⁷ Humans and animals are locked in a heterological relation, utterly different from one another and yet necessary to one another’s being. Consider how *Las Hurdes* compares humans to other humans and to animals: one might be tempted to interpret the film as positioning its spectators to feel that the Hurdanos are utterly different from them, since the people of Las Hurdes are so animal-like. Yet all humans are animal in the inner recesses of their being. To embrace that view would be to ignore the extremity—the heterogeneity—of its portrayal of the unfathomability of Hurdano life. What the film suggests is that the Hurdanos are too base, corrupted, sordid to be compared to the bourgeoisie—and that for all that, they are closer to the sacred. The antithetical terms cannot be reconciled—they cannot even be compared and organized into a hierarchy.

Bataille claimed that heterological thinking had a grand role to play in history. The purpose of heterological thought was, above all else, to reduce philosophical systems to ruins: “When one says that heterology scientifically considers questions of heterogeneity, one does not mean that heterology is, in the usual sense of such a formula, the science of the heterogeneous . . . above all, heterology is opposed to any homogeneous representation of the world . . . to any philosophical system.”³⁷⁸

Anthropological investigations of the people of Las Hurdes had long alternated between privileging them and disparaging them. They cast the Hurdanos as the dialectical other to “high” European civilization. But, as so often with dialectical relations, the relation between the antithetical terms turned like a whirligig: the Hurdanos were presented sometimes as noble and sometimes as degraded; sometimes as a paradigm of Spanish identity and sometimes as an infectious toxin on the Spanish body; sometimes as a lofty factor that elevated Spain and that distinguished Spaniards from the common run of European humanity, and sometimes as idiots whose existence was near to that of animals.

The Hurdanos in History

Myths about the region of Las Hurdes had an early start. Lope de Vega’s *Las Batuecas del duque de Alba* depicted Las Hurdes and Batuecas as regions that were quite unknown until close to the time when the book was written. In Lope’s tale, two lovers flee the Duke of Alba; in their turmoil, they chance

upon a valley whose inhabitants lack any culture, wear no clothes, and speak no language: they are altogether benighted and barbarous. Around the time Lope composed his tale, several accounts of the discovery of Las Hurdes and Las Batuecas were composed, and whatever the differences among them, almost all agreed that the inhabitants of this region were savages; many even compared the discovery of Las Hurdes with the discovery of the Aboriginal inhabitants of New Spain.

The inhabitants of Las Hurdes were perceived as different from Europeans. That view would last for several centuries; in fact, as late as in 1901, Luis R. Miguel published a piece in *La Revista de Extremadura*, arguing vehemently against the apparently dominant view that the Hurdanos were “a species distinct from those known to the human race” whose state was one of savagery and barbarism.³⁷⁹ Miguel held out hope that the condition of these people could be improved through education, financial assistance, and social aid, since they merely belonged to a different cultural lineage. The implication was clear: the people of Las Hurdes were the heirs of a different cultural legacy, but essentially human; therefore, they could be brought back into the fold through ameliorationist programs.

Later in 1901, José G. Castro responded to Miguel’s ameliorationist views.³⁸⁰ His description of Hurdano life amounted to a litany of outrages and debilities, many of which were similar to those that Buñuel recorded in his film. For example, he pointed out—using a “yes, but” structure similar to Buñuel’s—that though the region lacked arable land, the Hurdanos had worked to overcome this difficulty by transporting small quantities of alluvial silt on their backs into the region. But this solution accomplished little, since the floods, which occurred almost without fail, carried the soil away, and even when floods did not occur, wild boars consumed the crops. Furthermore, Castro resorted to phrenology to prove that the Hurdanos were subhuman: he pointed out that they had small heads with sloping foreheads and prominent brow ridges, and that their physiognomy was inexpressive, bearing the “peculiar stamp of the imbecile.” He concluded that “all these characteristics . . . correspond to the inferior races and even to animals.”³⁸¹ Lastra is struck by the similarity between Castro’s and Buñuel’s treatment of the Hurdano people. No doubt he is right, but he seems to overlook the possibilities that must have occurred to Buñuel in such a treatment: for Castro, the Hurdanos displayed an otherness that could never be assimilated to a form homogeneous with Spanish life, and perhaps not even with humanity.

Castro had engaged in a form of dehumanization, chronicling the Hurdanos’ (supposed) moral depravity and subhuman mental debility. Theirs was a completely degraded existence, he suggested, mainly because they did not segregate the sexes. The lack of high-mindedness that followed, reinforced

by their wearing ragged clothing that allowed glimpses of their genitals, had resulted in an elevated incidence of pederasty—cogent evidence of their sub-human status. Their existence was truly bestial—grotesque, abject, excessive, excremental, and, in heterological terms, sacred. That (and this is what Lastra overlooks) is what Buñuel would have found intriguing. Castro, of course, did not consider the question of Hurdano existence in heterological terms—he wanted to find a way to bring the region back within the Spanish fold, so he proposed that the only remedy for Las Hurdes was “a complete depopulation of this miserable land.” Buñuel, however, would have recognized the heterological implications of Castro’s presenting the Hurdanos as utterly bestial and the consequent undesirability of that ameliorist strategy.³⁸²

Twenty years later, the conservative anti-communist French Catholic intellectual Maurice Legendre (who had already visited Las Hurdes to examine the French-Spanish shrine of Peña de Francia in Salamanca, and in commenting on it, emphasized that Extremadura-Salamanca had been devastated by wars and repopulated in 1102 by the French) and Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936), the rector-professor of the University of Salamanca, with whom Legendre had been corresponding since 1909, followed Castro’s path into the region. They tried to provide a more human (i.e., less implicitly heterological) portrait of the Hurdanos. Unamuno stated that he found “no evidence of the ridiculous legends of savagery”; he even argued that the region, far from being a shame to Spain, should be considered a source of honour.³⁸³ He found evidence of the essential humanity of the Hurdanos in their stalwart individualism. Though the earth of Las Hurdes was not a nurturing mother, still the Hurdanos had become attached to the land—all the more attached as their conditions became more difficult. They were, Unamuno wrote, “anything *but* savages. No, no, no, it is truly the paradox described by my friend Legendre . . . they are, yes, one of our country’s *honors*.”³⁸⁴ The dialectical whirligig is evident: Castro turns into Unamuno.

Unamuno (whose work was one of the sources for Buñuel’s film) attempted to counter the legends of savagery that had surrounded the Hurdanos, yet in doing so, he created a work marked by traces of the utter and unrecoverable otherness of the Hurdanos, of their extraordinary remove from the ordinary conditions of human life. Like Buñuel (and Legendre), Unamuno noted he had been warned that when going into the High Hurdes, he should take his own food along, since in that area there was “nothing, not even bread.”³⁸⁵ Marañón notes that “many residents” have never tried it, and Legendre notes that bread is an unaffordable luxury for many Hurdanos. Like Buñuel (and Legendre), he remarked that goitres (a disfiguring, bulbous swelling in the neck that in heterological terms transformed humans into something grotesque) were common in the region. And like Buñuel, he noted that the women aged

prematurely and appeared decrepit while still relatively young (i.e., they did not follow the same pattern as, say, Spanish women do, and so hardly seemed to belong to the same species).

Nonetheless, Buñuel's anthropology differed in a fundamental way from both Castro's and Unamuno's. Theirs had been a dialectical anthropology: they saw *Las Hurdes* as a dialectical other existing in the heart of Spain (and, for good or ill, playing a role in establishing Spain's character, as the antithetical term in a dialectical relation is wont to establish the character of the antithetical *relatum*). Also, Castro and Unamuno both attempted, after the fashion of dialectical anthropology, to show how *Las Hurdes* could be reconciled with (read "homogenized with") the rest of Spain. Against dialectical anthropology, Buñuel created a film that did not offer "any homogeneous representation of the world."³⁸⁶ That *Las Hurdes* was supposedly a land without bread—as one of the film's titles has it—suggested that the Hurdanos' distance from "European civilization" was so extreme, and a consequence of such a deep and thoroughgoing abjection, that their lives could not be reduced to a form that had important similarities with our own existence—the discrepancy was just too great, their deprivation too profound. The lack of collectible cultural expressions in the region—whether songs, dances, folklore, or costume—only reinforced suggestions of abjection. Their abjection ensured their otherness, for it thwarted the mechanism by which we might reduce the Hurdanos to sameness. While many travelogues present exotic locations as a paradise onto which we can project our fantasies, Buñuel's film does not do this—as a heterological text, it eschews such mechanisms, for those mechanisms propose to identify the objects of our desires and the actual realities depicted.³⁸⁷

Las Hurdes, then, is a heterological study of the Hurdanos. It is also composed of heterological elements—that is to say, of elements that refuse to be reduced to a homogeneity, of elements that cannot be integrated into a form that reconciles the differences among them. Some of the film's sequences treat the usual topics of ethnographic investigation—for example, they address the physical and cultural geography (landscape and architecture), education, religion, economy and sustenance (agriculture), nutrition and health, morality, and religion. Yet the parts refuse to cohere into a consistent analysis of Hurdano life or even into a seamless artistic whole. A good example of this is the extraordinary sequence that presents a textbook analysis of mosquitoes.³⁸⁸ The character of this sequence—its discursive nature, similar to that of classroom instructional movies—contrasts with the "travelogue scenes" that make up the rest of the film. It seems to break with the texture of other parts of the film. At least, it does until one realizes that other sections of the film are not compellingly integrated with one another: the film is a collection of

disparate scenes related in a manner that resembles the extremely permeable links that join the elements in an impressionistic documentary; but in *Las Hurdes*, the elements are more different from one another than even those of that loose-jointed form.

But the strongest evidence of the heterogeneity of the elements that constitute the film can be found in the disparity of elements that constitute the sound and the image. Thus, we are told that the Hurdanos keep no domesticated animals and eat only potatoes; yet we see pigs in the street. We are told that *Las Hurdes* is a “land without bread”—and to emphasize the rarity of bread, we are told that it is so uncommon that the parents would steal the bread the schoolmaster gives the children if he did not require them to consume it in his presence, and that people make a long trek to Salamanca and return with bread.³⁸⁹ Yet in the film, we see children outside the school eating bread. Image and sound have a heterogeneous relation.

We are presented with an array of pieces of information and misinformation, of fact, fiction, and confabulation, the elements of which do not fuse to present a balanced, objective view of life in this region of Spain. We are presented with irreconcilable statements and depictions of *Las Hurdes*, many of which cast doubt upon others. In this way, *Las Hurdes* repudiates the claim to authoritative representation for which documentary film generally strives. The heterogeneity of the film’s elements mirrors the filmmakers’ inability to consolidate their experience into an overarching view of Hurdano life. All in all, the presentation refuses to consolidate itself to one single, fixed point of view on the Hurdanos and their life. The Hurdanos remain ineluctably other.

Lastra points out that *Las Hurdes* contains a terrible variant of the initiatory scene—a scene that most ethnographic films include, typically to show that “after some suspicion, visitor and native come to accept each other as they demonstrate their peacefulness and generosity.” Here, the variant shows the ethnographic investigators/filmmakers stumbling onto a ceremony that, far from forging links between investigator and subject, further distances them.³⁹⁰ The scene depicts the recent bridegrooms of La Alberca riding, at full gallop, past roosters that hang by their feet and tearing the roosters’ heads off. After their contest, the bridegrooms, in what might be considered a bizarre parody of the sacrament of communion, get drunk on wine.³⁹¹ Lastra comments on the ritual: “Rather than reinforcing a sense of shared humanity, the ceremony suggests that a fundamental aggressivity underlies all relations, particularly those between men and women.”³⁹² Lastra’s comments are perspicacious (though I do not see much justification for interpreting the scene as a gloss on sexual politics); nonetheless, they skirt a fundamental significance of Buñuel’s variant of the initiatory scene. The ordinary function of the initiatory scene, no matter how brutal, like the tattooing scene in Flaherty’s

Moana (1926), in ethnographic films is to reduce the other to the same, as the visitor comes to recognize that ethnographic subject and chronicler share a common humanity. Buñuel wanted to avoid exactly that—he wanted to figure as an Other and to maintain otherness as a terrifying, abject, and sacred phenomenon. Buñuel’s including this transformation of the typical ethnographic film’s initiatory scene makes evident *Las Hurdes*’s character as a heterological document—that character, too, explains the peculiarity of placing the initiatory scene near the beginning of the film rather than at its climax (where it typically appears).

Buñuel substitutes a heterological strategy for that of suggesting our common humanity. As Buñuel / the narrator observes the Hurdanos, he reads as signs of difference what we might expect him to interpret as signs of identity. Thus, when he sees a baby decorated with Christian pendants, we might expect him to recognize that the Hurdanos share a religious background with the rest of Spain (or with “civilized Europe”). This is not what he does. Instead, he describes the pendants as further evidence of Hurdanos’ otherness—they can be compared only “with those worn by the barbaric tribes of Africa and Oceania.”

The filmmakers’ encountering the baby dressed in Christian pendants has another significance. A subtext of the film concerns the Hurdanos’ history. A commonplace of Spanish ethnography of the time was that the Hurdanos were remnants of a Jewish community. Viewers who know this (it is not stated in the narration) can see in the faces of the Hurdanos features they might be disposed to interpret as signs of their Sephardic heritage. (Legendre, in *Las Hurdanos: Étude de géographie humaine*, suggests that the inhabitants were likely the descendants of a conquered people, and that their faces show signs that they were the offspring of Moorish refugees who had joined the shepherds and outlaws indigenous to the region). Their origin inflects how we read their status. We know that their condition is one of a thoroughgoing abjectness: the Jews in Europe at the time (not long before the Spanish Civil War) had a place among the outcasts—they were among the most rejected, the most downtrodden in society. The film keeps insisting on their wretchedness and squalor—and in a heterological text such as this, the abject squalor of the existence of these descendants of Sephardic Jews imbues them with the character of the sacred. Their Jewishness makes their decorating their tiny children with Christian pendants just that much more like the appropriative activities of the “barbaric tribes of Africa and Oceania.” Extreme difference, as great as that of “the barbaric tribes of Africa and Oceania,” marks the Hurdanos, for like those barbaric tribes, they use Christian religious objects either as charms or as mere decoration. Hurdanos are different, outsiders to mainstream culture, yet despite their difference, they have adopted the sym-

bols of the culture within which they live—adopted and *transformed* those symbols, for they no longer possess their former meaning when appropriated by Hurdano culture. Difference can never be obliterated by the forces of homogenization; alterity remains a permanent feature of human existence.

At other points in the film, the narrator implies the Hurdanos' heterogeneous status by pointing out Spain's efforts to assimilate the Hurdanos and to reduce their existence to a form homogeneous with the rest of Spain/Europe. We hear that "these barefooted urchins receive exactly the same education as children all over the world" and that "these children are famished, but they are taught the sum of the angles of a triangle equal two right angles." We hear the narrator's dumbfounded comment when he sees a picture of a well-dressed aristocratic woman in this class of the wretchedly impoverished: "Why is this absurd picture here?" And we hear the most brutally excoriating of all such remarks in the film: "Even these children are taught the golden rule."

In Appendix 6, I provide a shot list and detailed analysis of *Las Hurdes*.

HOW SURREALISM HAS BEEN PASSED DOWN INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE MARVELLOUS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MAX ERNST'S COLLAGE NOVELS AND LAWRENCE JORDAN'S FILMS

The following section deals with a contemporary artist, Lawrence Jordan. Jordan's work is proof that Surrealism is not a spent force and that its thought and methods continue to produce art of tremendous richness. At the centre of Jordan's work is the sensation of what the first Surrealists referred to as *le merveilleux*. He has sought an alternative noesis (or what he would call mystagogia) through drugs (as *Triptych in Four Parts*, 1959, shows), in the esoterism of Robert Duncan and Jess (early San Francisco friends), in Tibetan Buddhism (as *The Sacred Art of Tibet*, 1972, shows), in David Meltzer's and Wallace Berman's esoteric Judaism, and most of all, in Philip Lamantia's Symbolist-influenced Catholic Surrealism (Lamantia proclaimed "Christ [the immanent Christ] IS the marvellous") and Kenneth Rexroth's Buddhist-tinged, pan-erotic, Anglo-Catholic mystic-anarchism—he has explored all this without really committing to any. Jordan's work was directly inspired by Max Ernst's collages. Indeed, Jordan was ushered into the strain of his filmmaking that is the subject of this section when the San Francisco painter and collage artist Jess loaned him copies of Ernst's collage novels (which, at the time, were available only in very limited editions). Jordan was so intrigued by them that he made copies of their pages with a still camera and, while developing the images, came to the realization that he could make the collages move. Thus, he embarked on making *Duo Concertantes* (1964), the work that is the subject of our next film analysis.

Since the connection between Max Ernst's collage novels and Lawrence Jordan's films highlights the continuity of the Surrealist tradition and its contemporary presence, I deal at some length with Ernst's novels. This will reveal the key role that pneumatic interests played in Ernst's collage work (and in his art in general). But the engravings that Ernst incorporated into his collages (their detail and their often factual, everyday content), the method of collage itself (the plates Ernst produced are truly montage constructions), and the sequences of plates in Ernst's collage novels are all reminiscent of the cinema. Once again, this provides us with evidence of a connection between pneumatic interests and the turn to cinematic forms of construction. Jordan, to take this connection to its logical conclusion, decided to actually work with the most potent occult machine available. Our discussion of his films emphasizes his pneumatic interests. It also reveals that he maintains a perlocutionary conception of the cinema (and more generally of art): that the value of an artwork correlates with the effects—the pneumatic effects—it has on us. Examining Ernst's collages and Jordan's films will yield insights into Surrealism in general and the role that occult ideas—including the belief that the cinema was a potent machine that exerted occult influences—had in shaping the core ideas of the Surrealist movement.

All of this highlights that Surrealism became an ongoing force that has endured into the present. Jordan's films include imagery that connects them with the Surrealist interest in alchemy that we explored earlier (Max Ernst was the Surrealist alchemist *par excellence*). In tracking the parallels between Jordan's films and Max Ernst's collage novels, we can discern evidence of the similar interests in occult themes, leading to shared interests in pneumatic effects and to shared forms of construction—the parallels between Ernst and Jordan confirm the truth that form develops form of the intended effect because form *enables* effects.

Lawrence Jordan is a remarkable animator whose works are unlike anything else in the cinema.³⁹³ They are mysterious works, generally based on old steel engravings and nineteenth-century illustrations. Lawrence (then "Larry," a name he retained until sometime in the 1990s) was a student at the same high school as Stan Brakhage and was introduced to filmmaking by Brakhage. He consolidated his grasp of film technique at a Harvard University film club. His earliest films, much influenced by Brakhage's first films, were psychodramas. Not long after embarking on filmmaking, he moved to San Francisco, where he discovered the work of Max Ernst, which inspired him to undertake experiments in two-dimensional and three-dimensional collage animation. His imagery concerns imaginary landscapes populated with wondrous figures and fantastic creatures. These evoke, in the relatively new medium of film, a sense of a bygone era and of places that, though imaginary,

are redolent of a very particular character and mood: they provoke a strong sense of the mysterious. Peculiar conjunctions of forms evoke a dreamlike atmosphere.

Among the artists who influenced Lawrence Jordan was Joseph Cornell, the Surrealist-inspired American artist, with whom he worked in the summer and fall of 1965. An interviewer, Paul Karlstrom, asked Jordan about his relation to Cornell. Jordan responded,

I saw the show he had at the Stable Gallery [ca. 1955] and was just totally turned on to, to his work. I thought it was like an anchor. I thought it was the best work I'd seen in any of the arts and so I was completely devoted. It fit in so much with my own sensibility of delicate magic and the French literature—[Henri] Alain-Fournier [author of *Le grand Meaulnes*, *The Lost Estate*, 1913] and James Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as Young Man* and the child's sensibility and the magic, the power and magic of it, not the sentimentality of it. Childhood is not at all as people write or remember childhood. Childhood is far different, and a few artists have captured it; Cornell is one, Fournier is one and James Joyce is one. And then there... [are] E. Nesbitt [1858–1924, an English writer who turned children's novels from fantasy to real life] and some of the English writers on, on the magic of childhood. And, of course, [poet and student of esoteric tradition, 1919–88] Robert [Duncan] and [painter and collage artist extraordinaire, 1923–2004] Jess [Collins]... had their fingers on that one. Cornell really had it for me of all the artists I... didn't meet very many artists in New York, because we were just totally confined, and New York artists were all tucked away and had their cliques and were much, much more aloof and stand-offish than artists in San Francisco, so I hated it. And as soon as I could afford bus fare, after a summer of intense heat and torture, I got out.

To this, he appended the comment:

I can't say anything good about New York, either artistically or weather-wise. So, yeah, the West Coast artists didn't believe in New York life, they thought it was degenerate to live under those conditions. And so West Coast art actually conscientiously contested the East Coast aesthetic, and was always much more mystical and the film artists were known as the West Coast Film-makers and had a whole show at Cannes Film Festival in 1974 because we were so distinctly anti-East Coast.

PAUL KARLSTROM: What form did that take?

LARRY JORDAN: Mystical interior searching and a positivism [i.e., an affirming attitude], whereas the East Coast was very negative and gritty, and that was supposed to be "real" art. Bullshit. But then you had people like Rothko, who was very mystical and we, we, we respected that and...

The interviewer, Paul Karstrom, pressed Jordan on his connection with Cornell, and that led to the following exchange:

LARRY JORDAN: We're not alike, but I think somewhere buried there is... that connection with the photography, with the mystical French thing, and the child's world. All somewhat idealized.

PAUL KARLSTROM: And a juxtaposition of sometimes unrelated...

LARRY JORDAN: Yeah. See, he's not a true surrealist.

PAUL KARLSTROM: What do you mean?

LARRY JORDAN: And neither am I, but we're very closely related, an offshoot. Surrealism, at least according to Buñuel, was not about making poems or books or paintings, it was about revolution, that is, destroying the bourgeois mind set. And Cornell couldn't take that kind of attack mode and disassociated himself from the surrealists. He didn't like Salvador Dalí, obviously, but he stayed good friends with Duchamp and Max Ernst. And I don't have that attack mode, either. Surrealism does try to get under the skin through sexual strategies, erotic strategies and other strategies. Tries to get under the skin of conservative mind set. I'm not really that interested in doing that and neither is Cornell. Jess [Collins] is, to some extent. [Jess had introduced Jordan to *La femme 100 têtes* and *Une semaine de bonté*, works that would exert a decisive influence on Jordan.] Cornell's work, my work, is not, not very interested in shocking.

Jordan is correct that his work has a more dreaming quality, a delicacy and poignancy akin to that of Alain-Fournier's *Le grand Meaulnes* (and to the delicately dialectical temporality focused on the immediacy of the magical present, but with a *triste* aura of unreality that seems to belong at once to the past and future of Cornell's films and boxes):

PAUL KARLSTROM: But there is the sexual and the erotic as pretty important.

LARRY JORDAN: But not in the way that Buñuel or Dalí used it to disturb, like in *L'âge d'or*, implying that Christ had just raped a woman. You see that, that...

PAUL KARLSTROM: More subtle. You described your approach and Cornell's as really more subtle and "Pacific," shall we say...

LARRY JORDAN: Yeah.

Later, Jordan returned to his relation to Surrealism, offering the following:

But the thing that's most important about surrealism and what I do is that I've been able to discover how the surrealists made conscious concerted efforts to be able to tap the unconscious and they called it "forcing inspiration." And I found methods for doing that as well... I've discovered ways to get in there.

Jordan soon closed that topic by remarking that

everybody claims to be a surrealist. I don't offer that claim, I'm more... if I claim to be anything, I guess I would probably claim to be an alchemist. I don't know anything about alchemy, but I would think that I am one.³⁹⁴

Jordan's comments on the creative process resemble remarks that André Breton offered in *Le surréalisme et la peinture* (Surrealism and Painting, 1928). Breton pointed out there that the *Manifeste du surréalisme* of 1924 had contained several practical recipes that he called "Secrets de l'art magique surréaliste" (Secrets of the Magic of Surrealist Art) and proposed to go further with them—in a section titled "Composition surréaliste écrite ou premier et dernier jet" (Written Surrealist Composition or First and Last Draft), he offered the following prescriptions:

Having settled down in some spot most conducive to the mind's concentration upon itself, order writing material to be brought to you. Let your state of mind be as passive and receptive as possible... Write quickly without any previously chosen subject, quickly enough not to dwell on, and not to be tempted to read over, what you have written. The first sentence will come of itself; and this is self-evidently true, because there is never a moment but some sentence alien to our conscious thought clamors for outward expression. It is rather difficult to speak of the sentence to follow, since it doubtless comes in for a share of our conscious activity and so the other sentences, if it is conceded that the writing of the first sentence must have involved even a minimum of consciousness... But you should particularly distrust the prompting whisper. If through a fault ever so trifling there is a forewarning of silence to come, a fault, let us say, of inattention, break off unhesitatingly the line that has become too lucid. After the word whose origin seems suspect you should place a letter, any letter, *l* for example, always the letter *l*, and restore the arbitrary flux by making that letter the initial of the word to follow.³⁹⁵

Jordan has adopted the same method:

The basic act in my work is of freeing the objects from the chains of convention and connotation. The whole thing is symbolic of the surrealist philosophy, which, by definition, is inexplicable. The enigma is quite sacred to the surrealists like myself who are openly arrogant about symbolism and allegorical inanities. My "characters" don't portray anything in particular, but they still have ties with the mechanics of this world... I believe strongly in the process of free association in combining images, and in constructing them... If one is patient, and sits there with ego subdued, the images come to life on their own.³⁹⁶

Indeed, presenting objects/images (as autonomous, freed from any particular consciousness or imposed meaning) has two key effects: it increases the image's reality quotient and it renders the correspondences between elements at once more palpable and more mysterious. (This was a lesson Baudelaire's poetry taught the Surrealists, and it was passed on to Jordan.) Jordan returned to the topic of method somewhat later, and the comments he made as a gloss of the remarks above are illuminating. Of his students, he remarked that

if they just started with one image and trust that they—out of image one will be a suggested image number two and they can go to that and trust the two link up, and what comes out of image number two, well image number three does, and it keeps moving from one to another, and trust that those images will tell a tale when they get on the screen . . . The reason I do that is because I believe that's my entree into the unconscious. Free association is a way of getting past the rational mind into the unconscious, and if I freely associate—if I use some free-association images, I can bypass this. I mistrust too much ego and too much will in putting images together. It comes out surface, surface meaning surface message, it doesn't come out with a deeper meaning that the unconscious has. It doesn't come out with the continuity that the unconscious has. It's all this planned stuff, planning, planning, planning; will, will, will; force it into shape. I mistrust that a lot, so if you trust that setup image number one, image number two will be suggested by that and go for that suggestion. You have—again, you have to trust it. If you get in—don't use this process if you're an equivocator. If you always have to be thinking, "Oh, that's not a very good second image," "Oh, I could do something better," for instance, you better not use this associative process. It won't work for you. But if you do trust it, you're in the surrealist mode and it will work.

. . . I found this out when I did the long 90-minute animation called *Sophie's Place* where I held strictly to free-association image. When I finished one image, I had to do the next. The first image suggested itself next. I couldn't evaluate it and say, "Oh, I could do something better." And I found that coming right out of the unconscious like that, I had more continuity than any film I'd ever done before. And it wasn't only the continuity; the intricacy and the harmonies and the relationships were as close as I could get to what Bach did with music coming . . .

In this interview, Jordan straightforwardly asserted a proposition on which this book is founded, by stating that

human beings conduct their lives from much stronger sources than the rational mind. Modern psychology is pretty aware that there's a difference between the rational mind and another stronger, powerful, larger mind, more powerful and archaic from which our drives come, and that's what impels our lives. And, yes, we'd better get in touch with that undercurrent of our lives or we'll just exist on a material crash course to distraction.³⁹⁷

And while, as we have seen, Jordan eschewed the more provocative tendencies of Surrealism, he did adopt the Surrealist notion that art can serve revolution. In the interview with Paul Karlstrom, he remarked, concerning the vanguard arts in San Francisco in the early 1960s, that "we were like the surrealists trying to blow the bourgeois mind. That was the idea of the artistic revolution, if there was one. But most people weren't giving that too much energy. Mostly just exploring the mystical recesses of our own being."³⁹⁸

In 1952, Breton was interviewed by André Parinaud for RDF. In the sixth interview, he declared that the purpose of Surrealism was to return to consciousness the wonderment of childhood.³⁹⁹ Jordan's films certainly evoke that wonderment. But it is not Breton with whom Jordan has the greatest affinity, nor has the Surrealists' influence on Jordan been purely methodological. Max Ernst, another participant in the movement (until Breton expelled him), who worked with Buñuel and Dalí on *L'âge d'or*, has had the strongest impact on Jordan. I now turn to explore this influence.

In this book, I have stressed the role that the avant-garde has assumed in harbouring religious and spiritual traditions that a social order committed to reason has disparaged. Lawrence Jordan has made the same point:

Artists are... avant-garde thinkers... [They] actually perform a function of keeping spiritual matters alive in a way that religion doesn't quite do, religion being... circumscribed by ideology. Christian religion, for instance, cannot deal with witches and magicians and dragons; therefore, the fairy tale, European fairy tale, had to deal with that function of the psyche. Artists deal with functions of the psyche that politicians can't deal with, religious leaders can't deal with, and other institutions can't deal with...

COLLAGE AS A PNEUMATIC DEVICE: THROUGH ERNST TO JORDAN

As we have noted, collage was of key importance to the Surrealists (as it was to the *Dadaisten*). Surrealism's goal of joining "two distant realities" on the same plane and their interest in works that proceed by conjunction gave Surrealist art a proclivity towards collage; one can reasonably speak of Surrealist poetry and Surrealist painting as possessing some attributes of collage. But the Surrealists also produced collage in the strictest sense of the word.

Max Ernst was Surrealism's pre-eminent theorist of collage, as well as one of the greatest (if not *the* greatest) practitioners of Surrealist assemblies. Their originality stunned the first Dadaists and Surrealists who saw them—Breton, in "Le surréalisme et la peinture," testifies to the shock and admiration he and Aragon felt when, in 1921 in Paris, they unpacked the crates in which Ernst had shipped some early collages. (Moreover, that enthusiasm, we learn, had much to do with Breton's being at an age when he had just fallen in love with the cinema.) Ernst described collage as a mechanism for creating a new reality by juxtaposing unrelated objects:

A ready-made reality whose naïve destination has the air of having been fixed, once and for all (a canoe), finding itself in the presence of another and hardly less absurd reality (a vacuum cleaner), in a place where both of them must feel displaced (a forest), will, by this very fact, escape to its naïve destination and

to its identity; it will pass from its false absolute, through a series of relative values, into a new absolute value, true and poetic: canoe and vacuum cleaner will make love. The mechanism of collage, it seems to me, is revealed by this very simple example. The complete transmutation, by a pure act, as that of love, will make itself known naturally *every time the conditions are rendered favorable by the given facts: the coupling of two realities, irreconcilable in appearance, upon a plane which apparently does not suit them . . .*⁴⁰⁰

During and immediately after the Great War, Ernst produced works that assembled found images and that often involved repetition of one or more source images. As he continued to work in this manner, the imagery found in nineteenth-century wood engravings came to fascinate him more, partly because of their links with his childhood and partly because of their graphic character (i.e., engravings are pictures that have no half-tones: any point in the image will either be part of a black line or part of the white paper surface). He favoured the police gazettes of the time, *romans-feuilletons* (especially illustrated versions of great novels), and the mass-market periodical *La Nature*. John Russell informs us:

A review which he liked enormously, for instance, was *La Nature*, which lived by exploiting two related phenomena: the development of wood engraving and the demand for popular education. *La Nature* abounded in engravings of an instructive sort: painstaking, literal, earnest and a shade naive. Equally gratifying to one who regarded human relations with a highly personal commingling of recklessness and irony, were the illustrated novels and stories which formed part of *Le Journal du Dimanche* and other periodicals. Some of these were “good” novels by Zola, Maupassant, and others; some were the merest pulp. The illustrations, in either case, were models of whole-hearted commitment.⁴⁰¹

Sources for *Une semaine de bonté* specifically include Jules Mary, *Les damnées de Paris* (1883), and perhaps a volume of engravings by Gustave Doré purchased in Milan.

Ernst tended to favour scenes that illustrated fiction or that fictionalized the standard problems—scientific or psychological—of a given period. Ernst reports that he used to leaf through *La Nature* and other such publications and clip those images that struck a responsive chord in him. He described this process as a combination of “acharnement et méthode” (violence and method).⁴⁰² Having selected the images that could elicit a state akin to delirium, he treated these images in a number of ways: he would select from a number of images the elements that appealed to him, cut them out, and then paste them together to create a range of effects. There is, of course, a playful aspect to this process (just as there is a humorous aspect to these collages). In an interview with A. Jouffroy, Ernst remarked, “[Mes] collages aussi sont des jeux d’enfant” (My collages are also child’s games).⁴⁰³

Over time, Ernst developed means for linking images in a narrative sequence. *La femme 100 têtes* (The Hundred–Headless Woman, though the title also sounds like the French *la femme sans tête*, or “the woman with no head,” 1929) and *Rêve d’une petite fille qui voulut entrer au Carmel* (A Little Girl Dreams of Taking the Veil, 1930) were the first works he created that employed these means, somewhat influenced by *romans-feuilletons* (French serial novels, especially popular in the nineteenth century, that used wood engravings as illustrations). Ernst produced *La femme 100 têtes* while staying at a farm in Ardèche; he had taken with him a collection of nineteenth- and twentieth-century magazines and journals he had found while browsing among the bookstalls along the Seine and whose woodcut illustrations had fascinated him for years. While in Ardèche he contracted an illness that required he remain in bed for several weeks; it was while he was abed that he conceived this visual novel. In making this work, Ernst worked out the general form that his collage novels would take. Recognizable figures recur through the work (or sections of the work); emphasis is placed on situations that arouse ethical dilemmas (and often suggest moral and physical vulnerability); while most illustrations suggest a crisis of some sort, no simple cause-and-effect progression can be traced, and no clear climax and dénouement can be identified. Generally, the scenes seem to occupy an indeterminate time: watch-dials have lost their function, and figures from one historical age appear in a different historical setting. The combinations of forms often suggest the obsessions hidden within ordinary people (that ordinariness is one of the implications of the factual nature of the original engravings he used)—thus, to take an example from the later *Une semaine de bonté* (A Week of Kindness), a naked woman with flowing hair that resembles that of Botticelli’s Venus appears in a living room, as if incarnating the man’s desire (an instance of the imagination producing reality). Moreover, Ernst plays on (i.e., with and against) standard iconography: bizarre creatures drop into Parisian locales or fly up staircases in versions of the Fall of Icarus and the Ascension of Christ. Substitutions of one character for another, of one background for another, abound.

Une semaine de bonté, a later collage novel by Ernst, appeared in five parts during 1934. The title makes an obvious allusion to the creation story in Genesis (Ernst had intended to release the work as seven individual chapbooks).⁴⁰⁴ It is an astonishing feat: Ernst’s meticulous manner of assembling the work allowed the novel’s central characters to be sustained over many plates; it also enabled him to create from found materials a coherent, if highly eccentric, story, not unlike the novels of Allain and Souvestre (the Fantômas novels so admired by René Magritte and many filmmakers, including Alain Resnais)—except for the extraordinarily fantastic nature of Ernst’s narrative.

The appeal of the Fantômas novels and of the films based on them was the appeal of the uncanny, of a sense of a demon-haunted Paris, where crimes of the worst sort were being perpetrated by a secret band of highly placed officials and where ordinary citizens were exposed to constant menace. The uncanny appeal of the Fantômas novels and films is that of paranoid reality—that a sense of the uncanny was so widespread helps explain why, around 1928, Surrealism entered a second phase, one during which paranoia (and the synthesizing mental processes on which it depends) displaced hysteria and automatism as the mode of consciousness that its artworks most often sought to imitate. The world depicted in *Une semaine de bonté*, especially at the beginning, seems anything but kind: torture, murder, catastrophe, and the depredations of power are the dominant themes of the collages that make up the work. The brutality of the images alludes to the political situation of the time. (At the end, the work arrives at a poetic vision of the liberatory possibilities of fantasy and erotic voluptuousness.)

The brilliance of *Une semaine de bonté* was the result of Ernst having developed a syntax to control the selection and combination of found materials. Collage was an important method for him because it allowed him to use popular materials, which for him was an anti-art gesture; but despite the anti-art animus that helped inspire them, and despite their independence of slavish imitations of nature, these works evince a remarkable stylistic unity—so much so that in them the counter-art spirit becomes channelled into a remarkably novel aesthetic system. The stylistic syntax that Ernst created allowed him to link individual works into a coherent sequence—and that was an achievement to which Jordan's films are much indebted. Ernst's individual collages often recounted a narrative, and the collage *series* he produced were even more narrative. In narrativizing the collage form, and in working with found objects, Ernst carried the technique even closer to film, a medium that had helped shape the collage aesthetic. Jordan has since closed the circles, returning collage to film.⁴⁰⁵

Though the work, with its separate chapters, each with its specific cast of characters and certain recurring types, references the narrative form of illustrated novels, it does so only to deconstruct the narrative: the book's 182 collages present no consistent protagonist and no coherent plot. (In this respect, the work provides another example of a Surrealistic work that is syntagmatically well formed but, because of semantic incongruities among its elements, does not cohere on the paradigmatic plane.) The repetition of a set of elements throughout the book reinforces the dreamlike character of the work. We will see that the novel presents an allegory of the alchemical process of psychic development. That both alchemy and psychoanalysis had self-realization as their purpose and that both were predicted on the belief

that the true self evolves through a series of phases (which both systems describe in remarkably similar fashion) was a commonplace in Surrealist circles. So, the allegory that *Une semaine de bonté* offers can also be taken as an allegory of the therapeutic process of psychoanalysis: the patterns of repetition in *Une semaine de bonté* reflect the rhythms of an analytic session and the analytic process itself. In the course of an analysis, the analysand returns time and again to certain images, phrases, and events that relate to the core trauma that has brought the analysand to analysis. Each repetition presents an opportunity for insight, which may be seized upon or passed over. The repetitions in *Une semaine de bonté* are similar in this respect.

Furthermore, there is a mythic quality to Ernst's imagery. Sigmund Freud wrote in "Der Dichter und das Phantasieren" (Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming, 1908) that myths are the "distorted vestiges of the wishful phantasies of whole nations—the *secular dreams* of youthful humanity."⁴⁰⁶ Freud's interest in myth permeated the psychoanalytic movement. Carl Jung, for example, with whose work Ernst was acquainted, took up the idea and read J.G. Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (a massive study of magic and religion compiled between ca. 1885 and 1916, and a book in which Ernst, too, took great interest). Jung embraced Frazer's claim that myth was the means by which "primitive" people experienced the world—for Jung, however, it was not just "primitive" people who experience the world in mythic terms, but all humanity, as the operations of the collective unconscious are shaped by mythic archetypes.⁴⁰⁷ Another member of Freud's inner circle, Karl Abraham, published *Traum und Mythos: Eine Studie Zur Völkerpsychologie* (Dream and Myth: A Study of Folk Psychology) in 1907. In 1909, Otto Rank brought out *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden: Versuch einer psychologischen Mythdeutung* (The Myth of the Birth of the Hero: An Essay in the Psychological Interpretation of Myth). Rank began by noting the striking similarities among the myths and sagas of widely scattered peoples. The best explanation for these resemblances, he argued, was that they exhibit "universal... traits of the human psyche."⁴⁰⁸ The belief that Freud's *Traumdeutung* could explain the common content of dreams, myths, folk tales, and legends was widely shared among Freud's followers.

Of course, the most startling of all of Freud's claims about the shared features of dream, myth, and literature concerned Oedipal desire. Ernst's paintings and collages return frequently to the issue of Oedipal desire. The *exemple* of the "Mercredi" *cahier* in *Une semaine de bonté* is "Oedipe," and its *élément* is blood. A collage from that chapter that clearly alludes to Oedipal desire depicts two bird-headed figures, one larger than another but in nearly identical postures (father and son), above whom is a window, out of which appears a hand holding a knife (castration anxiety).

The syntax governing the selection and combination of constitutive units in Ernst's collages is based on a few key principles (that Lawrence Jordan's films also respect). The first concerns plausibility. Their strangeness notwithstanding, the scenes of Ernst's collage novels have a plausibility that results from their remarkable coherence and from the integration of their parts (Ernst had always leaned towards the veristic wing of Surrealism). This quality of coherence and plausibility is like that of dreams, in which the images the mind formulates strike one with the force of reality. The effect has everything to do with that impression of the marvellous that the dream engenders through its combination of a strengthening of primary-process thinking (and here the regressive symbolism of the imagery plays an important role) and secondary revision (which provides for the images' plausibility). The secondary revision ensures not only the coherence of the constitutive units of the collage but also the erasure of all evidence of the hand of the artist: Picasso's use of *papier collé* affirmed the constructed nature of the object; so did Braque's; but Max Ernst's use of collage techniques reduces the visible evidence of the difference between the artist's construction and the source material, in such a way that the total image is taken as a unitary form that cannot be resolved into finer elements. Ernst's constructions in his engraving collages seem real because their discursiveness is attenuated by their figural thrust, and because their discursive aspects are recondit. Moreover, the links between the various components belong to the realm of phantasy, not reality, even while the scene itself remains entirely plausible. The desire to enhance the image's reality effect explains why the scale of the different components is consistent: differences in scale would have accorded certain constitutive units so much more importance than others, and that would have made the construction of the image evident. That evidence would have reduced the power of the image to produce the effect of reality.

Reducing evidence of the artist's involvement in producing the imagery helps conceal the arbitrary links among different constitutive units of the image (links that we nonetheless know to be arbitrary, because we recognize the diversity of the images' sources). Furthermore, the reality effect of the individual images' diegetic unity allows them to be subsumed in a fantastic narrative that nonetheless seems to intersect with life.

The same consideration led Ernst to frame the principle that the materials he used in his engraving collages would be as neutral, as quotidian, as run-of-the-mill as possible.⁴⁰⁹ Nearly all, if not all, of the wood engravings that he used to create the collages for *Une semaine de bonté* were illustrations drawn from late-nineteenth-century popular French novels, especially from the serial novel, a not very highbrow literary form. The illustrations were realistic but generally not artistically advanced. For the most part, these novels

treated hatred and jealousy (especially among the very wealthy and the very poor), love that becomes criminal, love that tortures the parties involved and whose cost, for one of the parties, is death by execution. By selecting forms from run-of-the-mill engravings, Ernst avoided components whose inherent characteristics would be especially interesting—components that would have an interest that might overwhelm other constitutive units in the collage.

These two principles—that the engraving collage must have a plausibility founded on the erasure of the evidence of its construction, and that its constitutive units must have roughly equal importance—co-operate to elicit an unfocused perception (I use that term in the sense used by the psychoanalyst and art theorist Anton Ehrenzweig). Because Ernst has not organized the various constitutive units in a hierarchical gestalt, we see his pictures as totalities and consider the relation of all the parts to all the others simultaneously. The seamlessness of the image (which contrasts with Ernst's earlier photomontages and with the already established tradition of Dada and Surrealist collage, in which an incongruous visual surface is paramount)—a seamlessness that renders the image's construction essentially indistinguishable (apart from the extravagance of its content) from that of conventional illustrations in populist novels (a genre to which these collages give the impression of belonging)—prevents us from segmenting it into independently intelligible lexemes. This activates a perceptual process in which each constitutive unit is referred to every other constitutive unit *and* to the totality for its significance; and this, as Ehrenzweig shows, stimulates primary-process thinking.⁴¹⁰ The mysteriousness of the links among the various constitutive units of the image, and the enigmatic nature of the totality, further reinforce this tendency: the apparent seamlessness does not altogether conceal that these collages do not really belong to the category of populist illustrations of conventional stories, that the visual surface of the works is riven with elisions that are not wholly sutured and with fissures that induce the mind to operate according to a dream logic. The sense of mystery that Ernst's collages evoke is also characteristic of Lawrence Jordan's films.

Ernst's two best-known collage novels, *La femme 100 têtes* and *Une semaine de bonté*, were deeply influenced by hermetic, alchemical, and Gnostic ideas. Indeed, alchemical imagery appears throughout Ernst's oeuvre. Time and again, his works present amalgams of male and female forms resonant of the common alchemical symbol of perfection, the "Androgyne."⁴¹¹ But it is not just Ernst's imagery that has alchemical significance; his methods have it as well. Indeed, the conception of totality that underlies the principles that determine the formal unity of Ernst's collages has alchemical affiliations. Alchemical signs are notoriously general and plurisemic; they have this characteristic because the alchemical metaphysics suggests a "great wholeness" that

comprises all aspects of reality functioning concomitantly, with all penetrating one another and each illuminating all the others. That is exactly the way that Ernst's collages (and Jordan's films) achieve their unity. André Breton, Paul Éluard, Louis Aragon, Robert Desnos, René Crevel, and Hans Arp all credited Ernst with magical powers of transformation. By the 1930s, it was commonplace to testify to Ernst's artistic importance as an alchemist-magician. In his autobiographical writings, which appeared in *Cahiers d'art* in 1937 and in *View* in 1942, Ernst proclaimed his indebtedness to hermetic traditions: noting that Cologne (his hometown) was an important place in the history of occultism, he averred that alchemy constituted a model for his working methods.⁴¹²

Of course, Ernst was not alone among the Surrealists in his interest in alchemy—many Surrealists shared that interest, and their curiosity for the subject reflected a more general enthusiasm among late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century thinkers. Many books on all matters relating to the occult, including alchemy, began to appear at the end of the nineteenth century, a wave that continued well into the 1920s. Albert Poisson (1860–93), a practising alchemist, published *Théories et symboles des alchimistes* in 1891; that work contained many illustrations from rare manuscripts, along with surprisingly clear explanations of the symbolism involved. Poisson was a well-respected theorist in the circle of François Jollivet-Castelot, an associate of Papas and Stanislas de Guita and Marc Haven (1868–1926), a student of the tarot and the Cabala, and a historian of the occult. His books (which, besides *Théories et symboles* and the aforementioned *Cinq traités d'alchimie des plus grands philosophes* [1890], include *Histoire de l'alchimie du XIV^{me} siècle* [History of Alchemy in the Fourteenth Century, 1893] and *Nicolas Flamel, histoire de l'alchimie* [Nicolas Flamel, History of Alchemy, 1893]) contain some of the first discussions in French of rare alchemical manuscripts.

The Viennese psychologist and psychoanalyst Herbert Silberer (1882–1923), a member of Freud's inner circle, published *Probleme der Mystik und Ihrer Symbolik* (Problems of Mysticism and Its Symbolism, or Hidden Symbolism of Alchemy and the Occult Arts, 1914), which examines the links among modern psychology, mysticism, and esoteric traditions (particularly Western Christian traditions such as hermeticism, alchemy, Rosicrucianism, and Freemasonry). *Probleme der Mystik und Ihrer Symbolik* recounts the legendary origins of alchemy, analyzes alchemical symbolism, and expounds on the relationship between alchemy and psychology (especially C.G. Jung's theory of introversion, the descent of the individual into the soul/psyche, from which psychic and spiritual treasures could be drawn). Freud roundly dismissed Silberer's book and soon dismissed Silberer from his inner circle; as a consequence, Silberer became despondent and committed suicide.

Silberer treated the alchemist's quest as essentially a psychological effort, one that symbolically expresses the effort to achieve self-knowledge and moral perfection. In this, his work was influenced by the writings of Ethan A. Hitchcock (1798–1870), who had been a major general in the Union Army during the American Civil War—he (Hitchcock) was also a student of alchemy's relation to psychology and philosophy. Silberer credited Hitchcock's writings (*Remarks upon Alchemy and Alchemists* [1857] and *Swedenbourg: A Hermetic Philosophy*, [1858])—which argue that the alchemists were actually religious philosophers writing in symbolism—for opening the way for him to understand the psychological content of alchemical texts and alchemical imagery. Silberer's actual starting point in *Probleme der Mystik und Ihrer Symbolik* was a Rosicrucian text, the "Parabola Allegory," an allegory of unknown authorship (but sometimes attributed to the German alchemist Henricus Madathanus) dating from the latter part of that century. The "Parabola Allegory," which shares similarities with *The Chymical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreutz*, uses alchemical imagery in presenting its tale: it tells of the journey of initiation of an unknown narrator who, after many trials, enters the Rose Garden and bears witness to the dissolution and reconstitution of a pair of royal lovers into a King and Queen. Like *The Chymical Wedding*, the "Parabola Allegory" has oneiric qualities. Silberer first interprets it along Freudian lines, using methods derived from Freud's *Traumdeutung*. But then (doubtless to Freud's chagrin) he points out the limitations of that approach and goes on to interpret the narrative along alchemical/mystical lines, showing that the Freudian interpretation can be supplemented by placing the story in the context of the mystery traditions of the world's religions (alchemy, hermeticism, Rosicrucianism, kundalini yoga, and other mystical traditions and texts, such as the Bhagavad Gita and the writings of the English mystic Jane Leade, 1624–1704, a visionary pantheist whose writings influenced Emanuel Swedenbourg, and, of course, William Blake) and by reading it as an allegory of the *Unio Mystica*. Indeed, Silberer sought to join Freudian ideas with mystical thinking to forge a "Royal Art" that, as in the mystical traditions of the world, could effect the spiritual transmutation of the soul.⁴¹³

The "Parabola Allegory" begins with a group of philosophers ("old men with beards as grey as ice") encouraging the story's protagonist to embark on a quest journey, during which he must kill a ferocious lion.⁴¹⁴ The protagonist succeeds in doing so by reducing him to blood and bones: "We have come to the fight with the lion, which takes place in a den. The wanderer kills the lion and takes out of him red blood and white bones, therefore red and white. Red and white enter later as roses, then as man and woman."⁴¹⁵ Silberer explains that the lion represents the *prima materia* and that the lion's blood and bones—which are associated with red and white, respectively—represent the masculine and

feminine principles (“Philosophical Sulphur” and “Philosophical Mercury”) that must be separated in order for the alchemical quest to proceed. Citing Marcellian Berthelot (1827–1907), the historian of chemistry (and of alchemy, as chemistry’s precursor) and translator of many Greek and Arabic alchemical manuscripts, Silberer continues: “The dragon is the guardian of the temple. Sacrifice it, flay it, separate the flesh from the bones and you will find what you seek.”⁴¹⁶

C.G. Jung developed ideas that accorded with those that Silberer propounded when he interpreted alchemy as an allegory of humans’ quest for wholeness and spiritual development. Breton and Ernst were both interested in psychoanalysis (both met Freud), and it is likely that they became aware of Silberer’s and Jung’s theses. François Jollivet-Castelot, the founder of the Société Alchimique in France, published three alchemical novels during the 1920s, all of which had salvation through love (a favourite topic among the Surrealists) as their theme. In 1926, Fulcanelli (a pseudonym for an early-twentieth-century esoterist whose true identity remains unknown) produced *Le mystère des cathédrales et l’interprétation esotérique des symboles hermétiques du Grand-Oeuvre* (The Mystery of the Cathedrals and the Esoteric Interpretation of the Hermetic Symbols of the Great Work), a guidebook to alchemical symbolism in the sculpture and architecture of Paris, in which he used linguistic associations as his guide for interpreting those symbols.⁴¹⁷ The book, printed in a luxury edition of only three hundred copies, had an impact on Parisian intellectual circles quite out of proportion to its print run. The stir it caused can be understood when we consider how Parisians would have responded to its central claim, which is that alchemy’s great secret is hidden in plain sight, displayed on the walls of Paris’s own cathedral, Notre Dame de Paris. Fulcanelli’s main point was that the key to unravelling the secret lies in understanding the “phonetic law” of the “spoken Cabala,” or the “Language of the Birds,” which he seems to have believed was an *ur*-language taught by both Jesus and the ancients, and which is also alluded to in the great Sufi text by Farid ud-Din Attar (sometimes known as Attar the Chemist) titled “The Conference of the Birds.”⁴¹⁸ The Language of the Birds, Fulcanelli maintained, is still the natural language of outsiders, the outlaws and heretics on the fringes of society. The punning, multilingual wordplay of the Language of the Birds can be used to reveal meaningful associations among ideas.⁴¹⁹ “What unsuspected marvels we should find, if we knew how to dissect words, to strip them of their barks and liberate the spirit, the divine light, which is within,” Fulcanelli wrote.⁴²⁰ He maintained that the Language of the Birds is also the “green language” of the Freemasons who had built the Gothic cathedrals. (“All the Initiates expressed themselves in cant,” Fulcanelli stated.) The “art cot,” or the “art of light,” had been derived from the

Language of the Birds. Fulcanelli also claimed that Rabelais's carnivalesque story series *Gargantua and Pantagruel* is "a novel in cant," that is, that it is written in the secret language (Rabelais was fond of learned neologisms and wordplay, and the plot is unbelievably convoluted). Fulcanelli noted the similarity between "Gothic" and "goetic" (from Greek *γοητεία* for "sorcery," referring to a practice that included the invocation of angels or the evocation of demons), suggesting that Gothic art was a magic art.⁴²¹ He argued that the decorative sculpture and stained glass of Notre Dame offer seditious notes in stone, inscribed by Masonic initiates. These messages affect those who look at the carvings because the surfeit of imagery and the associations the carvings evoke overpower the intellect and encourage intuitive modes of thought. Fulcanelli's key idea was that hermetic philosophers use complex wordplay as verbal magic that, owing to the identity of language and reality, have the power to transform reality. That claim became central to Surrealism. Furthermore, the influence of the readership of Fulcanelli's *Le mystère des cathédrales* resulted in French (and especially Parisian) progressives developing a taste for obscure sayings—the complex verbal constructions of the Surrealists resemble a type of saying then in vogue. Like the texts that Fulcanelli commented on, Surrealist writing sometimes strived to elude interpretation. "The approval of the public is to be avoided like the plague," Breton wrote. "It is absolutely essential to keep the public from *entering*... I ASK FOR THE PROFOUND, THE VERITABLE OCCULTATION OF SURREALISM."⁴²²

Occultist E.A. Grillo de Givry's 1929 work, *Le musée des sorciers, mages et alchimistes* (Anthology of Sorcery, Magic, and Alchemy) presents a compendium of hermetic and esoteric information, and shows that alchemical symbolism is present in paintings by Hieronymus Bosch (1450–1516), Pieter Bruegel the Elder (ca. 1525–64), Lucas Cranach the Elder (1472–1553), and Hans Baldung Grien (1481–1545). The atmosphere that promoted an interest in the occult and made such revelations possible contributed to the Surrealists' interest in using in their work sexual metaphors and symbols such as dragons, kings, queens, and the *soror mystica* (mystical sister)—images that were commonly employed to stand for alchemical procedures, materials, and results. That same imagery can be found in Ernst's collages and in Lawrence Jordan's films.

Another important nineteenth-century writer on alchemy whose works had wide influence was the French baron Frédéric Portal (1804–76). Portal's *Des couleurs symboliques: dans l'antiquité, le moyen-âge et les temps modernes* (An Essay on Symbolic Colours: In Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and Modern Times, 1857) was widely read—indeed, it was an important source for Fulcanelli.⁴²³ Portal's colour theory contributed to the vogue among the Symbolists (including Baudelaire and Rimbaud) for ideas about *audition colorée* and

spiritual *correspondances*. *Des couleurs symboliques* offers a potted history of religion and civilization. Portal argues that earlier religions had been more material: early humans attached their spiritual ideas to objects and thought in symbols, and early writing used the language of symbols. Moderns had become adept at more abstract ways of thinking, but evidence of the old, symbolic way of thinking is all around us: in the cathedral paintings and sculptures and in Egyptian hieroglyphics, Buddhist art, Persian manuscripts, and Apocrypha. Thus, the underlying way of thinking and the old symbolic language could be recovered if we took the time to learn the sacred semiology that surrounds us. Portal's intent was to teach the meaning of the language of colours—Sergei Eisenstein would cite him as an authority on that topic.⁴²⁴ Portal's language of colour comprised three levels: *la langue divine*, *la langue sacrée*, and *la langue profane*. His work attempts to teach us to ascend that ladder, and to this end, *Des couleurs symboliques* lays out the esoteric tradition's codification of colour symbolism.

Among the Surrealists, Robert Desnos had a special interest in alchemy. In 1929, in *Documents*, he published an article on the fourteenth-century alchemist Nicholas Flamel (1330–1418), who is best known for his work on the philosopher's stone (according to legend, he was the only alchemist to actually produce it).⁴²⁵ In this work, he recounts the legend of Flamel and reproduced three of the illustrations from the Bibliothèque Nationale's copy of *L'Abraham juif*.⁴²⁶ He cites *Le musée des sorciers, mages et alchimistes* by Grillot de Givry as a source for his discussion of alchemical symbolism. That work describes the Marais neighbourhood, which Desnos imagined sharing with Flamel:

You have to have lived in this neighborhood of Paris to recognize the sulfurous odor of magic spells that rises from its streets and its muddy rivulets. For ten years—from early childhood to adolescence—I lived in the house at the corner of the Rue Saint-Martin and the Rue des Lombards. From the upper balcony, every year before Easter, I could see strange men cover over the glassed cupolas of the chapels of the Saint-Merry [sic.] church with a green fabric which made them look like inflated billiard tables. The multiple odors of the hardware shops on the Rue des Lombards, where racy shadows appear suddenly at night, are still mixed in my memory with the ineffable perfume exhaled by the coffee-grilling shop. I used to play in the square of the St-Jacques Tower, and I've watched three dragons come down from its cornice, as well as Saint Jacques, with his smallpox scars.⁴²⁷ I passed Aubry-le-Boucher Street the very day when Liabeuf was writing his name in red capital letters in the memory of men: in smoky taverns, dark men still sit elbow to elbow at the white wood tables.⁴²⁸ When I was learning to read, with *Les Misérables* [The author of *Les Misérables* lived in the precinct], it was the neighborhood itself I was learning to spell and I sought traces of the famous riot along the walls of the Rue du Cloître-Saint-Merry and of the Rue des Juges-Consuls.⁴²⁹

He avers that in the Marais, where the present collides with the past, he had been visited by ghosts from the Medieval era. “Yes,” he asserts, “ghosts exist,” and he had made their acquaintance even before he learned their names by studying local history:

And so it is in this magical landscape towards which we have traveled along the lines of this article, the reader, myself, my fountain pen, and my imagination—one following the other, single file, along the magical landscape of the Square of the Innocents, where we arrive towards four o’clock in the morning, when the streetlights render even more dazzling the colors of the pyramids of turnips and carrots, where the *white* and the *red* are set against the greenest *green* and splendid *black* asphalt.⁴³⁰

Desnos’s text thus connects the winding streets of Paris’s Medieval quarter with the sinuous line of his unfolding text—and both with the alchemist Flamel. Desnos was seeking to transform alchemically a familiar, everyday site into a strange and magical place so that the two could coexist. In this way, the Surrealist *flâneur* became an alchemist, and the alchemist became a Surrealist *flâneur*—their identities were reinforced (as Desnos described) by their walking tours of Parisian alchemical sites (tours prompted by Fulcanelli’s *Le mystère des cathédrales*).

Flânerie itself has a deeper connection to the occult than is usually understood (so completely flat has the common conception of the activity become). In *Conversations* (1993), Breton recalled the walks he took with his friend Louis Aragon:

I can still recall the extraordinary walking companion he was. The areas of Paris I visited with him, even the most nondescript, were enhanced several notches by a magic, romantic fantasizing that was never caught short for long, and that burst forth at a bend in the street or before a shop window... No one was ever a more able detector of the unusual in all its forms; no one was ever more inclined toward such *intoxicating reveries* on a kind of hidden life of the city.⁴³¹

Flânerie, clearly, is a means for transforming experience—for turning even the nondescript into an intoxicating magic device. The Surrealist practice of *flânerie* arose from a belief in the value of submitting oneself to chance, of turning one’s being over to an inconsistent, errant principle, which would penetrate one’s inner being and intoxicate it (and this process for fusing self and world can be taken to be the sur-real itself). Baudelaire’s *Le spleen de Paris* (Paris Spleen, 1864) had taught the Surrealists that

what men call love is a very small, restricted, feeble thing compared to this ineffable orgy, this divine prostitution of the soul giving itself entire, all its poetry and all its charity, to the unexpected as it comes along, to the stranger as he passes.

It is a good thing sometimes to teach the fortunate of this world, if only to humble for an instant their foolish pride, that there are higher joys than theirs, finer and more uncircumscribed. The founders of colonies, shepherds of peoples, missionary priests exiled to the ends of the earth, doubtless know something of this mysterious drunkenness; and in the midst of the vast family created by their genius, they must often laugh at those who pity them because of the troubled fortunes and chaste lives.⁴³²

Of course, this sur-real principle revealed a mobile and kenotic gaze that gives the self over to the world (or allows the world to penetrate the self), a gaze that is humble insofar as it is at the mercy of chance, that finds its fulfillment in photography and, more optimally yet, in the cinema.

Breton's *Second manifeste du surréalisme* appeared in December 1929, a few months after Desnos's article. There Breton discussed two of the same illustrations Desnos had reproduced from Flamel's manuscript. Breton's and Desnos's nearly contemporaneous references to Flamel and *Abraham juif* indicate that by the late 1920s, alchemy had become a topic of discussion in Surrealist circles, and that Breton and Desnos saw alchemy in a similar manner. Breton described Nicolas Flamel's illustration "Massacre of the Innocents," in which a king waves a sword over the children he has murdered, while their blood pours into a large urn in which the Sun and the Moon are bathing. However, he did not explain the symbolism, even though it is a key to alchemical iconography (and to Surrealist practice): in the first stage of alchemical practice, the *prima materia* (primal material) is symbolically "killed" and its two components, the Sun and the Moon, are separated. These two basic principles are then washed to remove all impurities. Breton asserted that the second illustration, a battle scene between the gods Mercury and Saturn, is *the* Surrealist picture.

The Surrealists maintained that alchemical practices were deeply similar to their own. Both sought to transform consciousness so as to bring about a psychic unity. Breton at least realized that Surrealism and alchemy not only have common aims but also use similar methods: both draw analogies between seemingly distant elements or objects; both use fantastic images, and both strive to bring about the unity of opposites (the *coincidentia oppositorum*).⁴³³ Surrealists shared in the alchemists' quest for the *aurea apprehensio* (the golden awareness)—indeed, the quest for the philosopher's stone is really a figure symbolizing the quest for the *aurea apprehensio*, the redeeming knowledge. One name for the philosopher's stone is "Rebis," that is to say the "res-bis," the double thing, the mythical androgyne, in which the male and female principles exalt each other, being in a state of "conflictual equilibrium."⁴³⁴ In the Rebis, the *anima* and the *animus* are aspects of the same being, whose existence is characterized by conflict or antagonism or, as Engels would have expressed it, by "the inclusion of diversity within identity."⁴³⁵ Thus,

while psychologists discuss the conflict as the process of individuation, alchemists discuss the process through which integration is achieved: according to alchemy, one becomes a completed person by overcoming the conflicting male-female duality within the integrated personality of the reconstituted “Gnostic Anthropos,” that is, the original androgyne.

Alchemy seeks the gnosis that opens the way towards total liberation. Breton also proposed that the expansion of consciousness is the route to the liberation Surrealism sought: “More awareness’—this is, in all truth, the watchword par excellence that we like to remember from Marx... More awareness of the social always, but more awareness of the psychological,” for “Every error in the interpretation of man gives rise to an error in the interpretation of the universe: it is, consequently, an obstacle to its transformation.”⁴³⁶ The alchemist is a dreamer who knows what he wants: to transform the world in order to change life, and hence liberate man to transform the world. Breton proposed a similar view—he closed his address to the Convention of Revolutionary Writers in Paris in 1935 by stating, “‘Transform the world,’ Marx said; ‘change life,’ Rimbaud said. Those two watchwords are one for us.”⁴³⁷ Breton even understood that the way to change life is to complete the work of bringing forth the androgyne in oneself: “It is essential, here more than anywhere else, to undertake the reconstruction of the primordial Androgyne that all traditions tell us of, and its supremely desirable, and tangible, incarnation within ourselves.”⁴³⁸ Moreover, the androgyne, the Rebis, is for alchemists what *l’amour fou* was for the Surrealist: the Rebis is the result of the incestuous “chymical nuptials” between Mercury (the female, lunar principle) and Sulphur (the male, solar principle), so through this chemical marriage, what was divided on a lower level reappears, united, on a higher one. In the alchemical marriage, the brother-sister pair serve as a synecdoche for all opposites and their unity (the *coincidentia oppositorum*). Their incestuous union symbolizes the return to a primordial unity, and this is why the *artifex*, the alchemical researcher, who seeks to realize this union is often helped by his *soror mystica*.

Ernst commented amusingly on the source of the occult interests in “Some Data on the Youth of M.E. as told by himself”:

(1906) First contact with occult, magic and witchcraft powers. One of his best friends, a most intelligent and affectionate pink cockatoo, died in the night of January the 5th. It was an awful shock to Max when he found the corpse in the morning and when, at the same moment, his father announced to him the birth of sister Loni. The *perturbation* of the youth was so enormous that he fainted. In his imagination he connected both events and charged the baby with extinction of the bird’s life. A series of mystical crises, fits of hysteria, exaltations and depressions followed. A dangerous confusion between birds

and humans became encrusted in his mind and asserted itself in his drawings and paintings. The obsession haunted him until he erected the *Bird's Memory Monument* in 1927, and even later Max identified himself voluntarily with *Loplop, the Superior of the Birds*. This phantom remained inseparable from another one called *Perturbation ma soeur, la femme 100 têtes*.

(1906–14) Excursions in the world of marvels, chimeras, phantoms, poets, monsters, philosophers, birds, women, lunatics, magi, trees, eroticism, stones, insects, mountains, poisons, mathematics and so on. A book that he wrote at this time was never published. His father found and burned it. The title of the book was “Divers’ Manual” [which we know from other sources to have concerned, *inter alia*, the occult, which he considered through the lens of Max Stirner].⁴³⁹

The story is charming, but we should not allow its charm to obscure the fact that the passage testifies to an abiding interest in transformation, in the cycle of life and death, in the exchange of the spiritual for the animal (and, by implication, the animal for the spiritual)—all great themes of the alchemical occult. What is more, it highlights (through the different names with which Max identified Ernst’s belief) the value of shifting, multiple, labile identities: a stable, fixed identity hinders the free play of imagination.⁴⁴⁰ The very title of *La femme 100 têtes* is a pun that relates Ernst’s (and the Surrealists’) quest for multiple identities: the woman that eponymous title refers to both has one hundred heads and is without a head: she has many identities, and so has none. She represented, for Ernst, the essence of womanhood, and, accordingly, of creativity, for the creative person is constantly changing and has no fixed identity. Hers is a mythic being.

Both *La femme 100 têtes* (1929) and *Une semaine de bonté* (1934) give evidence of having been influenced by alchemical and, more generally, by Gnostic ideas. The 147 collages of *La femme 100 têtes* are organized into nine chapters, paralleling the nine months of pregnancy. The theme of the novel is the engendering of the Young Prince from the perfect union of male and female, the King and the Queen, the Sun and the Moon. Thus, *Loplop* and *La Femme 100 Têtes* repeatedly regenerate the world after its cataclysmic destruction. The book recounts a Gnostic tale of anthropogenesis: in the first plate, a figure descends from a heavenly egg, while two groups of figures strain at ropes attached to the egg (Ernst skilfully substituted an egg where the original woodcut had a hot-air balloon); the plate is titled “Crime ou miracle: un homme complète,” and we are invited to consider whether the action depicted (the nude male figure, taken from William Blake, emerging from an egg and plunging to earth) is a crime or a miracle—though the mythic nature of the event and the figure’s celestial origins give greater weight to the latter interpretation. When the figure descends to earth, he discovers scientists trying unsuccessfully to produce life with machines (in the three collages

collectively titled *L'immaculée conception* [The Immaculate Conception]); the trope suggests the life force that belongs to a realm other than the material world studied by science. (That this figure from heaven is later identified with a lone sleeping baby falling out of the dark sky emphasizes his vulnerability, as an innocent in the material world.) These three collages present dark interiors, with men in long coats conducting unsuccessful experiments in generating life. The first collage (“*L'immaculée conception manquée*”) shows a woman sitting on a bed next to which stands a man, who is about to throw a switch on a machine with a disc connected to an out-of-scale bottle (an alembic)—this is the first failed attempt at conception. Ernst supplemented the image with a small rabbit hopping onto a chair and the head and torso of a baby with a hand clamped over its eyes. The second image (“*La même pour la deuxième...*”) presents an out-of-scale woman in Classic garb kneeling on an oversized platform: because of her size, her head is cut off: she is a *femme sans tête*. At the centre left, a man in a frock coat topples over from the weight of a nude male. The third failed conception (“*...et la troisième fois manquée*”) shows two men transmitting electrical charges into a large box, from which protrude a woman's legs: they are trying to create life from electromagnetic energy. On the fourth attempt, they succeed.

Accordingly, the first chapter concerns the woman's “immaculate conception.” The scientists try to impregnate her three times before they succeed, and her impregnation sets the stage for a *Bildungsroman* of childhood, maturation, adult aggressivity, old age, and death. The next three collages are collectively titled “*Le paysage change trois fois*”: the landscape shifts from a jungle (in the first collage) to a harbour and village (the second collage) and a town (the third). In each successive collage, people are more prominent than in the previous, and in each, the figures engage in activities that suggest sexuality (continuing the theme of conception and gestation). We see, in the first, two pairs of female hands shaking a bottle; in the second, a plant form that resembles a large mollusc (or labia); and in the third, a hand holding a pocket pistol. Subsequent chapters record the hero's birth, early childhood, fantasies of adult life, interactions with divinities (gods and goddesses), success, and, following a number of cataclysmic events, death. The final chapter repeats the themes of the earlier chapters. The final image, because it is the same as the image with which the tale began, reinforces the cyclic character of human existence.

The chapter is filled with marvellous transformations. The figure that descended from the heavens in the first image is later identified with a bird-headed human, probably to suggest the character's wish to take flight to the heavens and return home. (Furthermore, birds are ubiquitous symbols in alchemy, for they were often associated with the vapours or gases created during

alchemical processes, with black birds signifying poisonous vapours, and white birds, pure air.) A bird, Ernst's chosen identification, evokes an important association for German speakers: *Vögel*, from *Vogel*, is the slang word for sexual intercourse. This colloquial usage of the word, and the use of birds in paintings that carry a sexual meaning, goes back at least as far as the Renaissance.⁴⁴¹

The bird-headed figure in the chapter later carries a meal to street lights (in the plate captioned "Dans le bassin de Paris, Loplop, le supérieur des oiseaux, apporte aux réverbères la nourriture nocturne"), to indicate that street lights are earthly forms corresponding to the stars, which belong to the realm from which the figure in the opening drawing emerged. The woman of the title finally conceives (in the last collage of the opening section, titled "L'immaculée conception") by lying in a suggestive pose in front of phallic-shaped pipe organs (thus suggesting that mystery and music, not science, are allied to the procreative force).

La femme 100 têtes trades in the heterodox idea that male and female as we ordinarily know them are separated aspects of a single completed being, the alchemical rebis in which the two principles (body and spirit, moon and sun, female and male) are at one, in a complete whole. The bird-headed human (Loplop), a male figure, and the woman of the title represent aspects of the novel's protagonist. The quest the novel recounts is to reconcile these aspects in a conjunction that will bring forth the protagonist's higher self, his Young Prince. The bird-headed human (Loplop) is a male figure, and he and the woman of the title are simply aspects of a single being. This complementarity/identity of the two sexes is reinforced with the plate titled "L'agneau demi-fécond dilate son abdomen à volonté et devient agnelle" (The half-fertile ram dilates its abdomen at will and becomes a ewe) and (as Evan Mauer points out) by having the male and female figures adopt similar poses in different collages, which encourages the reader/viewer to fashion a subliminal identity for the two. "L'agneau demi-fécond..." throws into relief a central theme of the work, which is the shifting of gender identity (in this work, between Loplop, the male bird, and La Femme, the hundred-headless woman).⁴⁴² "L'agneau demi-fécond..." also provides another variant on the theme of fertility: the animal balancing an egg on its nose is set against a large city (whose size extends the theme of an enlarging population as articulated in the plates that collectively constitute "Le paysage change trois fois").

The title "L'immaculée conception" alludes to the Christian Immaculate Conception. But as a whole, *La femme 100 têtes* is syncretic (as was much of European alchemy) in that it fused pagan and Christian features. Several of the collages in *La femme 100 têtes* use traditional alchemical symbols: as M.E. Warlick notes, the plate captioned "Les forgerons gris, noirs ou volcaniques, tournoieront dans l'air au-dessus des forges et..." (Grey, black, or volcanic blacksmiths will whirl in the air over forges and...) shows blacksmiths

forging a bird, the traditional symbol of the volatile properties of matter; a serpent beneath the forge is the traditional image of the fixity of earth and primal matter (a chaotic primal that initiates the alchemical quest).⁴⁴³ The bird in this case also stands for the Young Prince, the novel's sought-after object.

Many of the collages include androgynous figures or epicene activities that involve some sexual ambiguity, to advance further the theme of the interchangeability of the sexes; they also serve as precursors for the Young Prince. The collage captioned "Se nourrissant souvent de rêves liquides et tout à fait semblables à des feuilles endormis, voici mes sept soeurs ensemble" (Here all together are my seven sisters, often living on liquid dreams and perfectly resembling sleeping leaves) depicts seven women in a bed; floating above them are a phallic-shaped funnel and a cylinder, while an enigmatic quasi-mechanized human-cum-fantasy beast hovers by the bedside (an androgynous figure, composed by combining two "face" cards from the standard deck—the queen of clubs and knave of diamonds). The seven sisters refer to the astronomical "seven sisters," to the stars in the constellation Pleiades, and to the seven planets of earlier astronomic theory (a reference is reinforced by a model solar system in the lower-left corner of the image), which oversee the seven alchemical metals, progressing from lead to gold.

All in all, *La femme 100 têtes* leaves the impression that Loplop and La Femme are aspects of the protagonist and that the quest story in the novel is to achieve their conjunction and to bring forth the seeker's higher being, his Young Prince.⁴⁴⁴ As in traditional alchemical tales, in this novel the protagonists set out on a journey during which they witness symbolic operations of killing, separating, washing, purifying, and integrating male and female principles. Also as in traditional alchemical tales, the male and female characters are transformed after many trials and near catastrophe.

But it is *Une semaine de bonté, ou Les sept éléments capitaux* that has had the greatest impact on Jordan's work. Unlike the two previous collage novels, *La femme 100 têtes* and *Rêve d'une petite fille qui voulut entrer au Carmel*, this one does not employ captions to make the narrative more definite: it conveys its story purely visually. Ernst created the work in 1933, the year the Nazis came to power in Germany, and as a German national living in France, he must have felt vulnerable. (This feeling would have been exacerbated by the Nazis' condemnation of his work as degenerate and by the ritual demonstrations of strength that they were mounting in Ernst's homeland.) The book's dark tone reflects this: Ernst assembled the collages in a mere three weeks, while visiting friends in Italy, and current events in Italy must have contributed to the sense of menace and catastrophe that pervades the book. Its subtitle, "Les sept éléments capitaux," plays on the phrase *les sept péchés capitaux*, the seven deadly sins, and indeed, one way of translating the subtitle

is “the seven deadly elements.” The title suggests, then, that basic constituents of reality threaten death. Like many contemporary Surrealist works, *Une semaine de bonté* incorporates themes of violence and the struggle of the individual for freedom—freedom from being imposed on by family, the government, the military, or the Church.

There is a psychoanalytic explanation for the violence these collages depict. Freud proposed two main purposes for making jokes: to give scope to the desire to express hostility and to release sexual desires, in situations in which direct expression of these emotions would be unacceptable. In *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten*, he wrote that

though as children we are still endowed with a powerful inherited disposition to hostility, we are later taught by a higher personal civilization that it is an unworthy thing to use abusive language; and even where fighting has in itself remained permissible, the number of things which may not be employed as methods of fighting has extraordinarily increased. Since we have been obliged to renounce the expression of hostility by deeds—held back by the passionless third person, in whose interest it is that personal security shall be preserved—we have, just as in the case of sexual aggressiveness, developed a new technique of invective, which aims at enlisting this third person against our enemy. By making our enemy small, inferior, despicable or comic, we achieve in a round-about way the enjoyment of overcoming him—to which the third person, who has made no efforts, bears witness by his laughter.

We are now prepared to realize the part played by jokes in hostile aggressiveness. A joke will allow us to exploit something ridiculous in our enemy which we could not, on account of obstacles in the way, bring forward openly or consciously; once again, then, the joke *will evade restrictions and open sources of pleasure that have become inaccessible*...⁴⁴⁵

Freud needn't have restricted himself to commenting on jokes alone: one could say much the same things about artworks generally. Surrealist art is often directed towards the expression of sexual urges and hostile impulses that have been subjected to ever-tightening restrictions. Surrealist works serve as means for liberating desire. There are many examples of this in *Une semaine de bonté*: we see forms breaking through barriers (e.g., the hand holding scissors coming through the window above a bird-headed man from the “Mercredi” *cahier*) as if to suggest that something hidden—something repressed—has emerged. In this regard, too, Ernst's book is offering parallels to the psychoanalytic process.

Une semaine de bonté is divided in parts relating not only to the seven days of creation set out in Genesis but also to the days of the week and the *éléments* relating to the days. Ernst associates each day of the week with a particular *élément*; each of the *éléments* is associated with a particular *exemple*

(example), or main character; each example—each exemplary tale—is introduced by an epigraph; and each *cahier* (book) is introduced by a title page that designates the *élément*, or ruling element, of the *cahier* as well as the *exemple* (principal character). Moreover, in its original edition (printed by Georges Duval and published in Paris by Editions Jeanne Bucher, in a run of 828 sets), the first *cahier*, “Dimanche,” appeared (“achevé d’imprimeur”) on 15 April in a purple (paper) cover; the second, “Lundi,” appeared on 16 April in a green cover; the third, “Mardi,” appeared on 2 July in a red cover; the fourth, “Mercredi,” appeared also on 2 July in a royal blue cover; and the fifth, completing the *semaine*, appeared on 1 December in a yellow (standing for gold?) cover.

A deeply insightful article on alchemical imagery in *Une semaine de bonté*, by M.E. Warlick, pointed out some of the symbolism of the number 7 in the alchemical tradition.⁴⁴⁶ The alchemical process symbolically duplicates the creation of the world because God, using the matter of primal chaos, created the perfection of the world in seven days. A number of significant alchemical manuscripts are divided into seven chapters, including the *Chymical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreuz* by Johan Valentin Andrea (it is not certain who actually composed this work), in which the seven chapters are designated as days of the week. The number 7 is significant, too, because there are seven metals involved in the process, beginning with lead and ending with gold. These metals are ruled by the seven “planets” known to the ancient world: gold corresponds to the Sun, silver to the Moon, mercury to the planet Mercury, lead to Saturn, tin to Jupiter, iron to Mars, and copper to Venus.

Cahier 1, for “Dimanche” (Sunday), which has mud (*la boue*) as its central *élément* and “le lion de Belfort” (the Lion of Belfort) as its *exemple*, starts with an epigraph from Alfred Jarry’s 1899 novel *L’amour absolu* (Absolute Love): “L’hermine est un animal très sale. Elle est en soi-même un drap de lit précieux, mais comme elle n’a pas de paire de rechange, elle fait sa lessive avec sa langue.”⁴⁴⁷ Regarding its content (reference), this quotation introduces the ermine, which appears in subsequent collages. Considered formally, the statement suggests that the work might best be approached through paralogism, non sequiturs, and paradox—that is, through the primary-process thinking that true poetry engages. The ermine invites associations of royalty, but the quotation relates the ermine to sexual “tongue-play,” an association that the reference to bedsheets reinforces. Finally, as an authority figure, the Lion of Belfort also represents the superego. He blandishes a woman (who represents the *anima*) to fall into vice, castigates her, and then kills her. He then guillotines a man (who represents the *animus*). The *cahier* offers an analogue of the alchemical process of personal transformation as well as of the psychoanalytical process.

Le Lion de Belfort is the name of a colossal patriotic statue (23 metres long and 17 metres high) sculpted by Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi (who also sculpted *Liberty Enlightening the World*, a.k.a. the Statue of Liberty), erected in Belfort, a town in eastern France, after the Franco-Prussian war. Thus it signifies nationalist militarism. But the lion is also the traditional alchemical symbol for primal matter, which must be discovered in order for one to pursue the Great Work. One of the collages in this *cahier* (page 25) shows a central composite figure with a lion's head, a male's arm (in a suit jacket's sleeve), and a woman's body (while to the right of the image, a lioness perches on a mirror—the lioness serves as the female counterpart to the male lion of the central androgynous figure); on a sheet on the floor, a serpent—another traditional symbol for primal matter—is wound up with itself.

Cahier 2, “Lundi” (Monday), has water as its *élément* (or ruling element), “l'eau” (water) as its *exemple*, and a passage from Péret's “Endormi” as its epigraph: “**D**—Que voyez-vous? **R**—l'eau—**D**—De quelle couleur est cette eau? **R**—De l'eau.”⁴⁴⁸

Cahier 3, “Mardi” (Tuesday), has fire as its *élément*, “Le Cour du Dragon” (The Court of the Dragon) as its *exemple*, and two epigraphs, one from a real curiosity, le comte de Permission's (a pseudonym of Bernard Bluet d'Arbères, 1566–1606) magico-erotic book from 1600, *Visions* (“Je voyais que la marquise de Verneuil tenait une chienne chaude. Il vint deux personnages qui étaient d'une même apparence; l'un portait un collier d'or et l'autre avait la gorge toute remplie de salive, autrement dit le crachat, et ils voulaient avoir tous les deux la chienne. Celui qui voulait mettre le collier d'or à la chienne, se faisait mordre par elle; et quand la chienne eut reçu le collier, elle devint demoiselle, et quand elle eut posé le collier, elle redevint chienne. Le personnage qui avait le crachat à la gorge lui crachat dessus et la chienne le suivit et se rendit à lui”), and one from Tristan Tzara's *Où boivent les loups* (Where the Wolves Drink, 1932—“Entrez dit-il et la lumière se fit personne n'avait frappé”).⁴⁴⁹

Cahier 4, “Mercredi” (Wednesday), has blood as its *élément* (though air figures just as prominently), “Oedipe” (Oedipus) as its *exemple* (though birds are just as prominent), and two epigraphs, one from *Complainte de Peyrebeille* (Peyrebeille's Lament, a tale of three people who murdered, over the course of twenty years, a number of lodgers at an inn—“Grand Dieu, la terre préservez de jamais porter de tels monstres. Aucune histoire n'a jamais prouvé qu'il y en eut jamais de la sorte. Par le soin de l'autorité, nul n'y sera plus exposé”) and one from Paul Éluard's *La capitale de la douleur* (Capital of Pain, 1926—“On le nomme aussi MAMAN par erreur”).⁴⁵⁰

Cahier 5 comprises three days, *jeudi*, *vendredi*, and *samedi* (Thursday, Friday, and Saturday). “Jeudi” has blackness as its *élément* and two *exemples*, “Le rire du coq” (The Rooster's Laughter) and “L'Île de Pâques” (Easter Island). “Le

rire du coq” has two epigraphs, both from Marcel Schwob, the first from his *L'anarchie* (Anarchy, 1896—“Ceux d’entre eux qui sont gais tournent parfois leur derrière vers le ciel et jettent leurs excréments à la figure des autres hommes; puis ils se frappent légèrement le ventre”) and the second from his *Le rire* (or *Paradox sur le rire* [Paradox on Laughter], 1893—“Le rire est probablement destiné à disparaître”).⁴⁵¹ “L’île de Pâques” has a quotation from Hans Arp as its epigraph, “Les pierres sont remplies d’entrailles. Bravo. Bravo.”⁴⁵² Friday’s *élément* is light; its *exemple* is “L’intérieur de la vue” (The Interior of Sight), and it has as its epigraph a text from O. Decroly and R. Buyse’s *Les pratique des tests mentaux* (The Practice of Mental Tests, 1928): “Si trois est plus grand que 6, faites un cercle autour de la croix, et si l’eau éteint le feu, tracez une ligne du sceau à la bougie, en passant au-dessus du couteau, puis faites une croix sur l’échelle.”⁴⁵³ Saturday’s *élément* is the unknown, though, to be sure, it is an unknown associated with dreams; its *exemple* is “La clé des chants” (The Key to Songs), and its epigraph is “.,” from *Was-ist-das* (from “M. de l’Argentière” in *Champavert, contes immoraux* [Champavert: Immoral Tales, 1883]) by another extravagant and eccentric bohemian and forerunner of Surrealism, Petrus Borel (1809–59).⁴⁵⁴

Since we can associate dreams with air, the progression through the week moves through the four alchemical elements: earth, water, fire, and air; that progression suggests that the tale the novel tells is of a quest—admittedly a failed quest—for purification (the goal of alchemical practice). The novel also emphasizes blood, blackness, and sight—since Ernst links sight to sexuality, these factors allude to the mysteries of the flesh. What is more, sanguinity (literally, “concerning the blood”) and melancholy (literally, “blackness”) are two of the four alchemists’ humours (the other two are choleric and phlegmatic). As Warlick points out, even the division of the work into five (as well as seven parts) has alchemical significance: the alchemists refer (in addition to the four basic elements) to a fifth, a pure and intangible suspension called “aether.” This suspension results when all the elements are in balance and purity is achieved. The book repeatedly calls upon the hope that the violence it depicts—the violence that it forecasts Europe will soon have to face—will only be a stage in human development, a stage that purges us of evil, and that in the course of time, this interval of violence will truly become a week of kindness.

The division of *Une semaine de bonté* reflects the alchemist’s conception of the seven stages of growth towards spiritual knowledge. The first stage in the seven-stage taxonomy is called “calcination.” Chemically, calcination involves heating a substance in a crucible or over an open flame until it is reduced to ashes (this stage is also referred to as melanosis—a term that can also refer to the phase beginning with calcination and lasting through putrefaction);

in arcane chemistry, it is a process of reducing the *prima materia* to ash. Psychologically, this is the destruction of the ego: calcination occurs through a natural humbling process as we are assailed by life's trials and tribulations. Calcination is a metaphor for the process of burning away the more superficial layers of the false self to reveal the deeper layers of a person's essence. It consumes what the self no longer needs and indeed what has become harmful; and these are beliefs and ways of being that the ego has constructed. Calcination is an initiation into the arduous and emotionally wrenching task of surrendering illusion, especially the illusion of the false self, to make way for the true self. Alchemy conceives of this process as terrifying (just as being consumed by fire is). In calcination, one experiences the ego's resistance to change, which produces the desire to maintain a familiar and (seemingly) safe way of being, for in this stage, all that one holds dear is threatened. Calcination can induce feelings of despair, hopelessness, or defeat as our egos are shocked and we become disillusioned and deflated—as we come to feel that we have been thrown into the abyss, torn to shreds, or burned to ashes. These dark feelings are taken as an opportunity for learning: these reactions demonstrate for us that the ego controls our lives, making us cling to patterns of life that provide security (but at the cost of insight). The ego creates the illusion that there exists a fixed boundary between the self and the world. Through calcination, the ego is “reduced to ashes”: its hold over us is released, and we realize that our being is in the sway of forces larger than those we had earlier understood to belong to the self. The imagery appropriate to this stage is obvious: fire, bellows, furnaces (athanors), ashes—and they do form the imagery of the work's first part. Max Ernst's great *Une semaine de bonté* is an allegory of the stages of alchemical development; and just as each of the novel's chapters is associated with an *élément*, a colour, and a precept, each stage in the alchemist's conception of the spiritual process is associated with an *élément*, a colour, a precept, a planet, and a metal, and these provide the work's leitmotifs. Calcination's precept is “Its father is the Sun,” that its element is fire, that its colour is black (or, sometimes magenta), that its planet is Saturn, and that its metal is lead. Alchemical art makes use of all these motifs.

The second stage of alchemical transformation is “dissolution.” In Roman mythology, Jupiter was the son of Saturn, so the planet Jupiter presides over the next stage. Chemically, dissolution is the dissolving of the ashes from calcination in water. Psychologically, this stage represents a further breaking down of the illusion of the ego through immersion in the unconscious, non-rational, feminine, or rejected part of the mind. The ego (in alchemical thought, the rational part of the mind) stops trying to control events, and this allows psychological material that has been buried deeply to surface. During this stage, one experiences being dissolved into the waters of emotion. The

floodgates are opened, and the purifying waters rush over us, generating new energy. Sometimes that energy sweeps over us in waves of bliss; sometimes it floods us with grief, tears, crying, sobbing. Feelings of being totally lost and of fearing the unknown follow upon the ego's deflation in the calcination stage: when the ego is made to relinquish its rigid control over our lives, more fragile aspects of our being are exposed, and we experience, temporarily, the fear that the illusion of the ego was constructed to conceal—fear of the unknown, of emotion, of revealing our underlying selves, of being who we truly are. The ego provides a false sense of security by leading us to believe that if we reveal our true being, we will expose ourselves to harm (to being rejected, criticized, denied, repudiated, and annihilated). It shuts us off from the world: in the stage of dissolution, we allow ourselves to drown in emotion as a way of re-entering the realm of natural emotions.⁴⁵⁵ The central metaphor of alchemy has the ashes produced by calcination being dissolved in water (emotion), further refining the soul's raw materials. Our egos, having been shocked, deflated, and burned to ashes, are then washed clean and plunged into the gift of emotions. In undergoing dissolution, we allow emotions that we repressed out of fear of others' reactions to them to be expressed. When rejected, emotions become dark and ponderous; aspects of ourselves manifest themselves and induce fear both in ourselves and in others. In this phase we are re-exposed to feelings, including the negative feelings that the ego repudiates, so that they might be reintegrated into our being and thereby progress towards being made whole. Alchemists claim that the dissolution's precept is "Its mother is the Moon," its element is water, its colour is light blue or grey (since this stage represents a partial purification of blackness), its planet is Jupiter, and its metal is tin.

The third stage is "separation." In Roman mythology, Mars was the son of Jupiter and his sister/wife Juno, so the planet Mars presides over the next stage. Chemically, separation involves filtering those components produced by dissolution and then discarding all unworthy material. During the separation phase, the emotions we experienced in the dissolution phase are examined by the intellect so that we may sort out what is important and what is not. Having discovered what is important and what is harmful, we can let go of the latter. We also unloose the restraints we impose on our true nature and let the true self shine through. So, in the stage of separation, we distance ourselves from what we have come to understand is not healthful for us, from what had propped up the illusions of the ego. It requires a great deal of deep inner work to let go of what has been harming us (though when we accepted the ego's isolating us from the world, we believed it sheltered us from harm). Because this stage involves the intellect reflecting on the emotion, it is often represented by the dance of male and female. In letting go of the negative

factors in which the self had invested and in separating the base from the worthy, one rediscovers one's essence and reclaims dream, the visionary gold previously rejected by the masculine, rational part of the mind. Nonetheless, it is, for the most part, a conscious process in which we review material we previously overlooked or were embarrassed by (including shadowy material that society teaches us to hide) and decide what to reject and what to integrate into our emerging, refined personality. The imagery of this stage involves alembics, stills, the process of distillation, and of the cutting of a cord. Separation's precept is "The Wind carries it in its belly," its element is air, its colour is orange-red (like the light of dawn), its planet is Mars, and its metal is iron.

The fourth stage is "conjunction." In Roman mythology, Venus was born when the testicles of Saturn, cut off by his son Jupiter, fell into the sea, so the planet Venus presides over this next stage. A key alchemical slogan is "Solve et coagula" (Divide and unite). This stage begins the process of uniting what had been divided in the first three stages. Chemically, it involves recombining the factors that remain, after separation, into a new substance. Psychologically, it results in uniting the masculine and feminine sides of the personality into a new way of being. Alchemists refer to this new way of being as the "lesser stone"; having achieved this state, the adept is able to discern what must be done to achieve the union with the "Overself" that produces lasting enlightenment. Conjunction results in a new way of relating to ourselves, to others, and to the world. Self and world are united in the *heiros gamos*, the sacred marriage; and that union brings us to feel our Soul's essence. Having been humbled during the stages of calcination, dissolution, and separation, and having been brought to one's knees before the Soul's majesty, we can experience its glory (its connection to all that is). The imagery the alchemists use for this stage is that of the epicene Rebis. Conjunction's precept is "The Earth is its nurse," its element is earth, its colour is green or citrine (copper, of course, can show either colour), its planet is Venus, and its metal is copper.

The fifth stage alchemists call "putrefaction/fermentation." Here we experience once again the sacred fires. Just when we believe that we have at last attained delight, we are tossed again into an intense, purifying fire. This fire provides the warmth that starts the fermenting/putrefying process. One experiences depression again as the ego is destroyed (putrefies); one allows the past (the old self) to die, to rot (so *solve* again becomes the active process). But this time, one appreciates this destructive process: one recognizes that it disconnects one from the past and thereby creates the conditions for change. Thus, after putrefaction has prepared the material by decaying it, fermentation converts the material to a higher form and new life infuses decaying matter. Chemically, fermentation is the growth of a ferment, bacteria, in organic solutions, such as occurs in the fermenting of milk to produce curds and cheese or in the fermenting of grapes to make wine. This milk is some-

times given the name Latrona, the mother of the Moon and the Sun, because in this stage the milk is washed and, thereby, becomes white, the colour of the Moon. Psychologically, the fermentation process is initiated by spiritual power from Above that reanimates and enlightens the alchemist. Fermentation is brought about by prayer, deep meditation, and dissolution of the ego. It is a living inspiration from something totally beyond the individual. From the blackness of putrefaction comes the yellow of ferment, which appears like a golden substance flowing out of the baser elements. Its arrival is heralded by a display of brilliant colours called the “Cauda Pavonis” (or Peacock’s Tail, probably chosen for the many colourful and brilliant eyes in the peacock’s tail, which alchemists sometimes identify with the god Argus’s eyes)—the Cauda Pavonis’s appearance indicates that one has entered the astral sphere (or has become aware of the etheric forces of which one was formerly unconscious). The imagery associated with the phase is of darkness (to stand for putrefaction) and, later, brilliant colours (to stand for fermentation); that imagery also depicts the processes of putrefaction and fermentation themselves, without symbolization. Fermentation’s precept is “Separate the Earth from Fire, the subtle from the gross, gently and with great Ingenuity,” its substance is sulphur, its colour is white or, less often, turquoise, its planet is the Moon (in Roman mythology, the Moon is symbolized by the hunter-goddess Diana, the daughter of Jupiter and Latona, and twin sister of Apollo, the god associated with the Sun, or Solar Consciousness), and its metal is mercury.

The sixth stage alchemists call “distillation.” Chemically, distillation is the process that produces brandy from wine: it is the boiling and condensation of the fermented solution to increase its strength and purity. Psychologically, distillation is the purification of the psyche through sublimation—that is, through meditative practices and introspective techniques that raise consciousness to a higher level, freed of unruly emotion and cut off even from one’s personal identity. In this stage, our individual consciousness evaporates entirely and we merge with the unconsciousness of all being. As one’s consciousness is raised to a higher level, one’s being is purged of all taint from the inflated ego; the purification and intensification that occurs through distillation ensures that one is prepared for the next and final stage of the alchemical process. Imagery for this stage often includes the alembic and birds, symbolizing the factors in the self that evaporate in the distillation process. Distillation’s precept is “It rises from Earth to Heaven and descends again to Earth, thereby combining within Itself the powers of both the Above and the Below,” its substance is mercury, its colour is deep blue, its planet is Mercury, and its metal is silver.

The seventh stage is “coagulation.” Chemically, coagulation is the precipitation or sublimation of the purified ferment from distillation. Psychologically, coagulation is marked by the experience of a second body, a body of

golden coalesced light (the *corpus glorificationis*), a body that is the vehicle of the highest states of consciousness. The process generates what alchemists variously refer to as the astral body or the greater (or philosopher's) stone. This magical stone or astral body allows alchemists to exist on all levels of reality. Among the imagery that indicates this stage is that of the golden body, the *corpus glorificationis*. Coagulation's precept is "Thus will you obtain the Glory of the Whole Universe. All Obscurity will be clear to you. This is the greatest Force of all powers, because it overcomes every Subtle thing and penetrates every Solid thing." Coagulation's substance is salt, its colour is violet, its planet is the Sun (alchemists did think of the Sun as a planet), and its metal is mercury.

Alchemy is the search for the *aurea apprehensio*, the "golden understanding," of the alchemists' world and of the greater world of which it is a part; this *apprehensio* is vouchsafed to the alchemist in the course of his or her search for the philosopher's stone. Thus, alchemy aims at the total knowledge that produces total liberation. Alchemy teaches that the highest wisdom consists in humans coming to themselves—if alchemy delves into the mysteries of nature, that exploration serves the end of self-knowledge. The importance of searchers' delving into the deep mysteries of nature is that by searching in nature we discover the universal processes that are also within us; by this process, alchemists come to know what they have in themselves, so that the divine power within them will allow them to heal themselves and thereby transmute their own souls. All alchemical stories, no matter how elaborate, have essentially the same bone structure: the alchemist identifies a *materia prima* (base or primal matter), separates it violently into its constituent properties—the active, male, solar, sulphurous principle and the passive, female, lunar, mercurial principle—and first allows them to putrefy (or blacken), then purifies (or whitens) them through ablution, then reunites (or reddens) them through conjunction. The benefit to alchemists of performing these actions is threefold: first, on the physical plane, they learn about metallurgy; second, on the psychological plane, they purify themselves of their lower passions and, by reconciling different, even contrary, aspects of the self, acquire the *aurea apprehensio* (the golden awareness); third, on the spiritual plane, they acquire insight into the divine order of harmonious integration.⁴⁵⁶

Admittedly, *Une semaine de bonté* depicts the outward world of evil, but the import of the depiction is to teach humans what they have inside themselves, to prepare them to heal themselves. Likely the principal appeal of alchemy for the Surrealists was that it provided a path of self-examination. Growing out of DADA, Surrealism wanted to heal the world; but like the alchemists, the Surrealists discovered that in order to heal the world, the self must first be healed, and in order to heal the self, its condition must first be

known. Moreover, like the alchemists, the Surrealists discovered that healing would occur through the unification of opposites, that is, through a dynamic synthesis by means of which opposites would no longer be juxtaposed as segregated units, but interconnected in such a way that they might generate endless possibilities.

The Surrealist Collage Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*—“Dimanche” (Calcination)

The work opens with a maelstrom of violence, natural disasters, and death—appropriately, the *élément* in “Dimanche” is “La boue,” that is, primeval mud (*der Urschlam*). The incidents this *cahier* depicts concern seduction, torture, and death—what the male culture of power does to the female. The hybrid of a human (a man) with a lion’s head is the central figure of this *cahier*. The figure, festooned as he is with metals (even a *sacré coeur*), is evidently a symbol of power who incarnates military and thus public authority. But such parahuman therianthropes almost always provoke a *frisson* of the uncanny, for they suggest the violent, savage nature of the human beast. They also activate a primitive dynamic, of ways of thinking manifested in the earliest art we know. Cave paintings and early rock drawings often depict such therianthropes, probably to suggest the animal identification that shamans experienced through transport.⁴⁵⁷

As early as 1966, André Pieyre de Mandriargues elucidated Ernst’s late landscapes by analyzing their allusions to the four alchemical elements (earth, air, fire, water) and to the three terrestrial kingdoms (mineral, vegetable, animal).⁴⁵⁸ Like other works Ernst produced, *Une semaine de bonté* trades in alchemical iconography: the novel incorporates references to marriage, sexual fusion, death, and destruction, which, as metaphors, are alchemy’s stock-in-trade. Furthermore, the animals that appear most prominently in the book’s narrative—the lion, the bird, and the dragon—all have a place in the imagery of alchemy. The dragon, according to the alchemical image lexicon, represents both the unrefined primal matter from which the King and Queen arise and the fire that heats the crucible or retort. Alchemical illustrations symbolize the uniting of opposites by the figure of the androgyne, while transmutation is symbolized by the hybridizing of animal, bird, or plant forms (consider the first of the plates in the “Premier poème visible”) with humans. Images of both the androgyne and the parahuman appear in the novel (as well as in other works by Ernst). One example (page 9) that appears early in the first *cahier*, “Dimanche,” shows a figure in the upper left with raised arms, responding in terror to a young boy’s falling off a bridge. As Warlick notes, in the original illustration the figure with raised arms was a woman, but Ernst inserted a male lion’s head over the woman’s face (thus making a composite

beast-human and male-female form) and he placed a lioness to the right of the figure with raised arms, to hint at that being's dual masculine and feminine character. The lion symbolizes primal matter, primitiveness, and turbulence, so this being's dual (male-and-female) character represents primal matter's binary constitution, of Philosophical Sulphur and Philosophical Mercury. Ernst also transformed the tumbling boy into a girl by adding a long, flowing hairdo: the androgyne's fall off the bridge parallels the descent of the hero into the underworld, which many alchemical tales use as a figure of the quest hero's search for primal matter.⁴⁵⁹

Ernst called the lion-headed figure that appears in the novel's first *cahier* "Le Lion de Belfort"; the name refers to a military officer, Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, who defended the French town of Belfort against Prussian attackers. Denfert-Rochereau is the subject of a patriotic sculpture by Frédéric-Auguste Bartholdi, a colossal commemorative statue titled *Le Lion de Belfort* (The Lion of Belfort, so called because it depicts the hero as a tired, wounded but valiant lion lying on its side).⁴⁶⁰ This use of an animal figure to represent a person's spirit is a common trope in alchemical literature. Another notable predecessor for Ernst's animal-human composites was the French artist J.J. Grandville (pseudonym of Jean Ignace Isidore Gérard, 1803–47), whom Surrealists much admired.⁴⁶¹ The Lion of Belfort is the first of many therianthropic figures that appear in *Une semaine de bonté*—the work was made in the same productive period in Ernst's life that produced *Couple zoomorphe en gestation* (Gestating Zoomorphic Couple, 1933) as well as *La foresta imbalsamata* (The Embalmed Forest, 1933). Col. Denfert-Rochereau staved off an attack by the Prussian army, which had superior force, before running out of resources. Thus, he (and the Battle of Belfort) represented the French nation's pride in its capacity to stand against German militarism, a key threat of the time. This historical association explains the first collage (page 3), which shows a lion-headed man wearing a uniform decorated with symbols of valour—he looks over his shoulder at an image of Napoleon (whose image represents the whole of Europe in conflict). The next pair of collages (pages 4 and 5) present lion-headed men of approximately the same size and images of nude women (who, as Mauer points out, represent voluptuous spirits). Following scenes present chases (reminiscent of melodramas) and develop further the *cahier's* themes of seduction, torture, and death. In this, *Une semaine de bonté* resembles silent films—this is evidence that the form of this visual novel has been influenced by the cinema.

As the *exemple* of this *cahier* is the Lion of Belfort, the lion-headed male who appears in most of these collages, engaged in a variety of activities. Warlick (following Poisson) points out how a lion and a man symbolize the element earth. This helps explain why the designated *élément* for "Dimanche"

is mud. Mud is treated as the *prima materia* and, since the lion-headed man is associated with the earth, the Lion de Belfort also represents both primal matter and the masculine principle of Philosophical Sulphur.

A collage depicting a man proudly wearing an oversized sunflower on his chest likely has other significances that supplement those of its iconology of androgyny. Though his pockets are empty, his stance suggests that he is an authority figure, and certainly the two men looking at him are dressed in boyish fashion. Other visual artworks by Ernst include suns, for the sun traditionally has been a father symbol (Freud, writing about Schreber, described a nexus of Sun/God/Father). In 1927, Ernst painted his *Vision Provoked by the Words: "The Immovable Father,"* which has a large sun in the background. Besides showing the transformation of the male into the golden sun of an integrated being, the image could suggest the mixture of adoration and terror that characterizes the Oedipal moment in the boy-child's life.

The chapter comes to a climax as the lion seduces the woman (pages 25 to 28), a coupling that produces the violence and dismemberment that follows (pages 29 to 34), mayhem that includes the woman's murder and the guillotining of her murderer. Their deaths allude to the alchemical belief that the masculine and feminine properties of primal matter must be discovered, destroyed, and buried in order for the process of putrefaction to begin. Warlick points out that the process of separating the two principles and eliminating their existence as separate units is referred to as "stripping the lion to its bones and blood." She remarks that blood refers to

the white and red colors, which represent, respectively, the feminine and masculine properties of the primal material. This phase of the work is indicated in Flamel's illustration of the "Massacre of the Innocents" described by Breton. The young children were slain and their blood was poured into a vessel. Similarly, torture and death are seen in the final collages of the first chapter. Two collages [pp. 30–31] depict women being tortured by lion-men. In the collages that follow, a woman is shot at close range [p. 32] and, in a two-part sequence, a man is guillotined [pp. 33–34]. In the next collage [p. 35], a lion racing through a cemetery with two skulls indicates the death of the two main characters. The violence and death found in the first chapter can be interpreted as the separation and destruction of the male and female properties of primal matter.⁴⁶²

Though she does not note the fact, Warlick's description of this sequence has a remarkably cinematic quality: the collage on page 32, of the woman being shot at close range, could almost be used as a movie advertisement.

The first section of *Une semaine de bonté* involves the identification of the *materia prima* and its preparation for the process of putrefaction. The primal matter must be buried for the process of putrefaction to begin. Thus, another name for the alchemical vessel is the philosophical sepulchre. The

fourteenth collage (page 16) in “Dimanche” (“Le Lion de Belfort”) shows a lion-headed man and a woman presiding over a body in a casket that is stored under a billiard table. (The billiard-table sarcophagus reappears in this *cahier*’s penultimate collage.) Above hang a number of large bells—seven, to be exact, representing, as Warlick suggests, the seven perfect tones, which in esoteric thought are correlated with the seven planets (or what the ancients thought to be the seven planets: Sun, Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn) and the seven metals. The seven planets are also correlated with the days of the week (another association that would have brought them to Ernst’s attention for his *Une semaine de bonté*), with Greek musical modes, and with relative degrees in the major scale. The correlations are as follows (the list does not follow the same order as the stages in the Great Work):

| Relative degree in scale | Musical mode | Planet | Day of the week |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|------------------------|
| I | Lydisti (Lydian) | Venus | Friday |
| II | Phrygisti (Phrygian) | Sun | Sunday |
| III | Dôristi (Dorian) | Mars | Tuesday |
| IV | Hypolydisti (Hypolydian) | Jupiter | Thursday |
| V | Hypophrygisti (Hypophrygian) | Saturn | Saturday |
| VI | Hypodôristi (Hypodorian) | Moon | Monday |
| VII | Mixolydisti (Mixolydian) | Mercury | Wednesday |

Moreover, a tradition derived from Empedocles viewed the four elements (*στοιχεα*, or *stoikheia*, though Empedocles referred to them as *ρίζαι*, *rhizai* or roots, or even as *ρίζματα*, *rhizômata* or root clumps) as being *δυνάμεις* (*dunamis*, powers) or qualities: earth is dry and cool; water is cool and moist; air is moist and warm; fire is warm and dry. That same tradition generally depicted the relations among the elements as laid out on the square of opposites known as the element square. The idea that elements are arranged in pairs of opposites, with opposing qualities, led to the idea in Greek music theory of elemental sequences, with what they called “progressive sequences,” that is, sequences leading from one quality or power to its opposite. These progressions were described as being from male to female, from female to male, from lower to upper, or from upper to lower. (Greek musical theory also proposed the notion of cyclical progressions, in which one quality or power led to its opposite and then returned. The cyclical progressions were described as being from male to female to male, from female to male to female, from upper to lower to upper, or from lower to upper to lower.)

Returning to the theme of putrefaction, the association of the bells and sarcophagus suggests the transformations that *materia prima* undergoes as it

lies buried and the idea of a cosmic order that guides these transformations. Warlick points out an allusion to the seven planet-ruled metals of the *materia prima* in one of “Dimanche”’s collages (page 21): a lion-man seated in a café wears a large ring, which bears the symbols of the planets.

In this *cahier*, as elsewhere in *Une semaine de bonté*, violence follows intercourse: the pattern is familiar from alchemical teachings, according to which conjunction is followed by putrefaction. The violence that appears in *Une semaine de bonté* is really the violence of separation of the opposites that have just fused. *Une semaine de bonté* betrays a desperation to discover something positive in the violence that Ernst saw coming—and so, like Ernst’s exuberant (but menacing) *Garden Inhabited by Chimeras* (1936) and Dorothea Tanning’s luxuriant *Sunflower Landscape* (1943), it invokes the wildness of the zealous energies of renewal, which will bring chaos but also, in time, a new order. Ernst refused to believe that life culminated in a fixed point—life is transformation. Accordingly, the Lion of Belfort, who presents himself as having a fixed identity—as the defender of French glory, French valour, and French propriety—acts in bad faith, as he takes on many disguises (lawyer, doctor, tradesman, seducer) and is treated sarcastically. Pictures of past heroes, official buildings, uniforms, and medals testify to the glory of the French military and the French establishment. But eventually, mud—Sunday’s *élément*—reduces all to the same oozing reality, and innocence and guilt, freedom and imprisonment, become indistinguishable.

The shifting identity of the novel’s principal characters has an important effect on our experience of the narrative. The (largely alchemical) reading that I have been developing drastically misrepresents the novel: it creates the impression of a greater narrative coherence than is justified by the phenomenological effect of examining the plates and contemplating their meanings and their relations to one another. It is true that the guillotining of the lion in “Le Lion de Belfort,” and the suicides in subsequent sections (“l’Oedipe” or “Le rire du coq”) seem to suggest a climactic moment around which the organization of a narrative traditionally takes form. But that suggestion elicits false hopes: an examination of the sequence of plates in these and any other sections does not give a strong sense of narrative coherence, partly because the narrative hardly begins traditionally with the impression of an ordered world whose coherence is subsequently disrupted: on the contrary, the tales in the individual sections begin *in medias res*. More important yet, the individual episodes do not accumulate momentum, building towards a final, grand climax. The frustration of the desire for a narrative order is a principal source of tension in the novel. Narrative tension in a traditionally structured novel serves to impel the reader/spectator through a dramatic work; any scene leads us forward—on to the next. Consequently, the reader is not inclined to linger over a particular scene in a dramatic work. The sense of time that *Une semaine*

de bonté creates is completely different: we experience an arrested moment and are transported to the timelessness of dreams. Thus, in its temporal character, too, *Une semaine de bonté* draws on an oneiric logic.

Warlick summarizes the first *cahier* thus:

The collages of the first chapter introduce the main characters and suggest the initial operations of the alchemical work. Whatever their various disguises throughout the novel, the main characters are male and female figures that represent the masculine and feminine archetypes of the alchemical process. In this chapter, they appear as a lion-man and a woman. Two early, consecutive collages serve to introduce these two characters. The first of these depicts a lion whose head has been superimposed on a man's body. His chest is formed of a huge sunflower. In the androgynous figure from Grillot de Givry flowers of the sun signify the male principle perfected into gold. In Ernst's collage, the man beneath his disguise displays empty pockets, a sign that the alchemical work is just beginning. The next collage shows a woman fleeing from the lion. A lily crowns her head. Lilies, like white roses, represent the white phase of the work and the feminine property of philosophic mercury. [Warlick notes that flowers generally represent the various colours of the work and, accordingly, the stages in which these colours appear.] To suggest the eventual refinement of the feminine principle into silver, Ernst added a set of crossed silver spoons at the lower left of the collage.⁴⁶³

The alchemist-seeker must first find the *materia prima*. The effort to find the primal material is usually presented as a journey, and since the prime matter is associated with the element earth (often symbolized by mud), and since the alchemist seeks to “kill” the *materia prima* when he has found it, in order to stimulate the natural regenerative force that constantly creates and manifests life, the journey often takes the alchemist-seeker underground. A number of the collages from the first *cahier* suggest a katabasis—for example, one of them depicts a figure struggling in an underground cavern.

The last two collages in this *cahier* show lions in stately repose as if they are waiting for the phase of putrefaction to end. The second of these collages also has a banner, on which are inscribed the words “Laudate pueri dominum.” The words come from the Vulgate, Psalm 113. Here is the Vulgate text of that Psalm, along with a rough translation:

*Laudate pueri Dominum,
laudate nomen Domini.
Sit nomen Domini benedictum,
ex hoc nunc, et usque in saeculum.
A solis ortus usque ad occasum*

laudabile nomen Domini.

Praise the Lord, you His servants,
praise the name of the Lord.
May the name of the Lord be blessed
from this time onward forever.
From the rising of the sun until its
setting,
the name of the Lord is praiseworthy.

| | |
|---|--|
| <i>Excelsus super omnes gentes Dominus, et super coelos gloria ejus.</i> | The Lord is on high above all nations and his glory is over the heavens. |
| <i>Quis sicut Dominus Deus noster, qui in altis habitat et humilia respicit in coelo et in terra,</i> | Who is like the Lord our God, who lives on high and regards the lowly in heaven and on earth; |
| <i>suscitans a terra inopem,</i> | raising up the destitute man from the earth |
| <i>et de stercore erigens pauperem,</i> | and lifting up the poor man from the mire, |
| <i>ut collocet eum cum principibus</i> | that he may be seated with the princes |
| <i>cum principibus</i> | with the princes |
| <i>populi sui,</i> | of his people; |
| <i>qui habitare facit sterilem in domo</i> | who makes a barren woman a house to live in, |
| <i>matrem filiorum laetantem.</i> | the happy mother of children. |

The hymn conveys the glory of the divine, who can raise the lowly and make barren women fertile. We would construe this as offering an affirmation of the strength and dignity of those who possess the secret gnosis. Furthermore, the effort to raise the poor man from the muck so that he might take a place with the princes of his people is the alchemical task.

The Surrealist Collage Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*—“Lundi” (Dissolution)

The second *cahier*, “Lundi,” also evokes darkness and chaos: we see parlours, bedrooms, and city streets flooded with water. The violence, however, has broadened: no longer is it people, or a class of people, that are responsible for the violence, but all nature. Water brings down bridges, it floods the streets of Paris, it invades bedrooms and apartments, it washes away human beings in its currents. The flooded streets, of course, suggest the biblical Flood. Like fire, water suggests transformation: curtains and sheets are changed into ripples, waves, streams. A massive bed in the crowded living room seems at first to be admirably solid—a safe harbour in a flood; but it eventually becomes the sad, threatened refuge in a flood that sweeps everything away. The stability of the everyday world is undermined, for water appears in an unending variety of violations of our expectations: a rainstorm preceding the deluge stands for sexual aggression, water running into a bathtub increases its drowning powers, and ordinary rain manages to fall horizontally. The theme of transformation is also associated with an oneiric motif that develops in this *cahier*. For example, in one image (page 51), a Sleeping Beauty figure (here Woman is Queen) lies on a bed that somewhat resembles a bier (funereal drapes hang

in the background), and her sleep is watched over by a well-dressed middle-aged man. In a subsequent scene, she, or a figure that resembles her, will be dragged away, later to be washed up near a mausoleum (page 64). Some of the transformations have an infantilely oneiric quality—for example, a lady's gown is so voluminous that it becomes an ocean, while she playfully toys with a watch chain that has become an anchor.

Water is a dream-motif conveying sexual anxiety. The anxiety is heightened by depictions of shipwrecks and of collapsed bridges that spill railway trains and armies into the water below. In the first image (page 41), we see a woman and a train falling from a collapsing bridge into the water below (two shattered Doric columns, seemingly from a Greek portico, stand by the water's edge); in the second (page 42), we see the huge nude body of a woman in front of a collapsing urban bridge that spills an army into the water below. The sexual import of the *cahier* is made clear by the inclusion of a pair of images (pages 44 and 45) that incorporate seashells to symbolize the female genitals. The "Lundi" *cahier* concerns the process of purification (which starts with "putrefaction"): after primal matter is destroyed, it undergoes a series of washings that remove the impurities dredged out in the preceding violence—the images of water (waves, storms at sea, waterfalls, etc.) suggest this ablution. (Alchemists construe the biblical account of the Flood as an example of the process they call dissolution.) So water appears in every plate in this *cahier*. Women are the principal subjects in this chapter, since in alchemical iconography, they represent two elements: water as well as Philosophical Mercury. As in the first chapter, the men and women symbolize the male and female archetypes of the *materia prima*; but in this chapter the emphasis has shifted to the woman (for the chapter concerns ablution).

Warlick explains the alchemical significance of a plate that occurs early in this chapter (page 43):⁴⁶⁴

a woman stands upon the waves that wash a hanged man. An object bobs before them, and, although it is attached to a sunken pole, its rounded shape is clearly reminiscent of the alchemical vessel. The hanged man floating in the water represents the washing process enacted upon the "dead" primal matter, in this instance, its male aspect. In this collage and in several others in this chapter, Ernst included figures bound with ropes. This suggests the process of fixation, those alchemical operations enacted to control the volatile properties of the primal matter.⁴⁶⁵

The woman's relative scale increases over the five plates after the first. The actions these collages present include another episode of drowning and rescue, but they primarily emphasize the female's erotic power. Throughout this section, the woman is presented as menacing: One image presents a woman

in a short, low-cut undergarment, with a waterfall in the background. Her left hand holds a long rod (representing the phallus) over her crotch, while her face is covered by a seashell, a symbol for the female genitalia discussed in Freud's 1905 work "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria ('Dora')." Evan Mauer points out that Ernst had studied that essay, in which Freud dealt with dreams of water as symbolic expressions of sexual feelings resulting from masturbation, sexual temptation, and the act of copulation (in which the man gives the woman a liquid). Similar sorts of feelings emerge in this *cahier*: in one collage (page 51), a man with folded arms (so that his hands grasp the beard at his chin) stares at the woman in bed. We imagine that the feelings of the man by the bed would be similar to the attraction that Dora's father felt for Frau K. as well as to the attraction that Herr K. felt for Dora, while the feeling of the woman in the bed would be (through the operation of the mirroring process of exactly the sort Caillois analyzed) similar to the attraction Dora felt for Herr K. and (especially) for her father.⁴⁶⁶ This plate provides an image of fear similar to that which Dora faced—and we might associate that fear with her anxiety over wetness resulting from masturbation. Alchemy connects the female principle with wetness, and several of Ernst's works connect water and menace: *L'Europe après la pluie I* and *II* (Europe After the Rain I [1933] and II [1940–42]) present funereal scenes of putrefaction and ablution, and he makes that connection again here.⁴⁶⁷ In "Lundi" (whose *exemple* is water), we see men lashed to rafts or clutching someone to avoid going down into watery depths—so the use of imagery of water and floods in this section of the work is overdetermined.

Alchemy, as we have noted, teaches that the reconciliation of opposites is achieved through a three-stage process. The first stage, *calcinatio* or *melanosis* (calcination or blackening, the fire operation), dealt with in the first *cahier*, "Dimanche," involves the complete loss of identity and a state of unconsciousness, agnosia. A hallucinatory dispersal of the intellectual faculties and the death of the body (matter) is necessary in order to eliminate the coarse, unconscious factors from the *materia prima*. "Lundi" represents the second stage in the process, which leads to the reconciliation of psychic antagonisms or, more generally, of opposites. This second stage, known as *leukosis* or *albedo* (whitening), involves a sifting and washing (a process referred to by the term *ablutio* or *baptismo*, the water operation, or the wet way) of the scattered parts of the adept's self and the reforming of the self at a higher level—this washing is what is alluded to by the water imagery in this section of the novel.⁴⁶⁸ The reunification of the shifted parts results in the *unio mentalis* (self-integration) and the emergence of the Young Prince (or Alchemical King).

Warlick points out the alchemical significance of a plate (page 64) that appears late in the chapter.⁴⁶⁹ The action in this collage takes place in a graveyard:

A mysterious woman emerges from a sepulcher, while a man leans over to help a sleeping woman who seems to have just washed up from the waves. This collage serves as a parallel to the collage from the previous chapter in which the lion-man races through a cemetery. But, whereas that collage indicated the death of the primal matter, this one indicates that the stage of ablution is complete. In the final collage of this chapter, a fully conscious young woman tosses a white ball in a parlor. Like white lilies, white roses, bones, milk, and swans, a white ball represents the white phase of the work and the purification of the feminine principle.⁴⁷⁰

Thus, the first two *cahiers* conform to the traditional evolutionary pattern that alchemical literature provides: the first *cahier* presents violence, death, and the second, resting; the first chapter presents putrefaction, the second, ablution; the first *cahier* presents blackness, the second, whiteness.

The Surrealist Collage Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*—“Mardi” (Separation)

The *ablutio* stage is preparatory to the stage of the silvering of the still-moonlit sky, before the sun brings the red of dawn. That final stage, *iosis* or *rubedo* (reddening), achieved by heating the primal couple in the alchemical vessel, effects the union of the King and the Queen: the initiate-King, brought forth in the *unio mentalis*, joins with the Queen in the original *unus mundus*, the originary *res simplex*, the cosmic unity that preceded all division.

“The Court of the Dragon,” the third *cahier*’s exemplary tale, concerns a fire-breathing monster that represents both passion and mutability.⁴⁷¹ In nearly every collage in this *cahier*, small dragons, bats, or serpents appear (like dragons, which they resemble, serpents represent the prime matter) or wings sprout from figures’ back, and, in many, people prepare for secret trysts.⁴⁷² The actual Cour du Dragon was a passageway that ran off the rue du Dragon, in a block between St-Germain-des-Prés and St-Sulpice, so the title serves as testimony to the Surrealists’ interest in discovering the marvellous in their own everyday world. However, only four of “Mardi”’s collages take place in this location—the others are set in enclosed salons (and, in an evidently self-reflexive gesture, Ernst inserted into frames on their walls pictures reminiscent of J.J. Grandville). Warlick points out that the Cour du Dragon and the salons symbolize the enclosed space of the alchemical vessel.

The “Court of the Dragon” section opens with a courtyard scene (page 71) during which the torridness of “courting” ignites a fire (Tuesday’s *élément*). This suggests the alchemical *coniunctio*, which occurs by heating the vessel containing the Philosophical Sulphur and Philosophical Mercury until they reunite. The Cour du Dragon first appears in the third collage (page 73) and is identified by a sign. In that plate, a man in a Turkish outfit and with a serpentine tail asks the concierge for entry. The tail is a sign that the man is developing

an animal character (another of Ernst's therianthropic, misologic allusions) and that many bolder transformations will follow. In front of the portal to the Cour du Dragon is a dark, headless woman.

Ernst's collages resemble the *Wunderkammern* that Surrealists so admired, and no section of *Une semaine de bonté* makes these similarities more obvious than the third.⁴⁷³ Ernst created the effect of a *Wunderkammer* in part by staging the events recounted in the interior of a house (or of several houses), which enabled him to include pictures on the walls. These pictures often comment on the characters and events that the plate depicts, and often the figures in the paintings are the same figures we see in the story. Many of the pictures foretell events to come or recollect events that have already happened.

A key implication of the "Cour du Dragon" section relates to a topic that Roger Caillois's writings brought to the attention of the Surrealist circle: desire has the ability to transform both the desirer and the objects of the desirer's attention. Figures in this section of the work undergo frequent change: shape-shifting is a pervasive motif. Or, rather, we surmise that shape-shifting is a persistent motif—Ernst leaves the matter open to doubt, and these doubts raise questions regarding identity. In plate 1 (page 71), there is a woman in a black coat; in plate 4 (page 74), a woman in a black coat (are these the same figure?) has wings; in plate 9 (page 79), a woman in a black dress appears in the same area of the image and performs a similar gesture, though now it is one of supplication; in plate 17 (page 87), a woman with different hair and a different black dress appears in the identical posture of supplication (has she undergone a shape-shift?); in plate 18 (page 88), a man now has wings, while the woman that appeared earlier in the black dress now performs the gesture of supplication before him; in plate 19 (page 88), a woman appears with a different set of wings; in plate 20 (page 89), there is a woman without wings, but in the same dress we saw in plate 9; in plate 21 (page 90), she has wings; and in plate 22 (page 91), the man has wings. The monster, which appears in almost every plate, assumes a great variety of forms. Sometimes the woman appears menacing: in plate 4 (page 74), she peers in the partly opened door; in plate 6 (page 76), the winged woman bends over the exposed neck of a young child, who is held down by a bearded Turk (Mauer suggests this is an allusion to Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, 1817, a tale of morbid eroticism in which the vampire killer has the ability to change from man to bat to wolf, or even a heavy mist); in plate 10 (page 80), a distraught woman with vampire wings is associated with a dragon; in plate 20 (page 90), she seems to levitate; in plate 24 (page 94), she focuses her attention on a paramour, with destructive results; and in plate 30 (page 100), she serves a potion (a poison?) to a bare-breasted woman in bed. The man with a bird's head and the *Femme 100 Têtes* (or a *Femme 100 Têtes*-like figure) appear throughout, seemingly exchanging roles.

This *cahier* proposes an opposition between women with vampire wings and women with angel wings (a version of the phantasy opposition between the woman as mother and the woman as whore): in plate 22 (page 92), the woman appears with angel wings; in plate 23 (page 93), the paramour appears with vampire wings; and in plate 24 (page 94), the woman appears with vampire wings; in plate 34, another woman (who resembles a traditional German image of a strong woman) appears with angel wings. This structured opposition suggests the two types are aspects of a single being (“woman”).

Ernst was a *pictor doctus*, a learned painter. The winged figures of this section of *Une semaine de bonté* are reminiscent of the winged hermaphrodite in Albrecht Dürer’s engraving *Melancholia I* (1514). Based on the engraving’s title, most viewers take the work to be an image of melancholy. It’s actually much more complex—the angel personifies a subphase (*Citrinitas*) of the fourth stage of the Great Work. Citrinitas is seated in the alchemist’s laboratory; a crucible sitting in flaming coals is partly hidden behind a huge philosopher’s stone (used in the metallic Great Work) in the shape of a polyhedron; and a smaller egg sits at Citrinitas’s feet. (The egg is another of Ernst’s favourite images, for it can symbolize both the philosopher’s stone and the alembic vessel. It appears as well in his *L’intérieur de la vue: l’oeuf* [At the Interior of Sight: The Egg], 1929.) Behind Citrinitas rises a seven-runged ladder representing seven alchemical metals that are associated with planetary gods. (As noted earlier, the number 7 had special importance for the alchemists; Ernst’s *Une semaine de bonté* is, obviously, based on the number 7.) Also pictured are numerous tools of the alchemist: tongs, a hammer, compass, bellows, and scales.

The dragons, serpents, and lizards that appear throughout this section symbolize primal matter, and dragons also represent both the spiritual principle and the transforming alchemical fire (*feu*, this section’s *élément*, also represented by smoking revolvers and candles). According to alchemists, lizards and serpents—cousins of dragons (and many of the animal forms in the “Cour du Dragon” section resemble lizards and serpents)—have healing powers. In the “Mardi” section, the male and female protagonists quarrel and plead with one another and finally are united with kisses and embraces: this is the phase of conjunction, of *rubedo*, of the perfection of Sulphur and Mercury, the chemical wedding (or “chymical nuptials”) in which the primal couple is fused by heating the chemical vessel.⁴⁷⁴ “Mardi” incorporates many allusions to weddings and couplings.

Warlick identifies a plate (page 112) that marks the end of the phase of *coniunctio*—the culmination of the “chymical nuptials”:

a young woman, a turbaned man, and a small dragon gather around a pool of blood. In alchemical imagery, this stage was represented by something red,

including red roses, a pelican picking its breast, or, as in [an] emblem from Poisson, by a unicorn and a rose bush. As a white ball stood for the completion of ablution in the last chapter, the pool of blood here represents the completion of rubification, or conjunction.⁴⁷⁵

Thus, the first three sections of *Une semaine de bonté* represent the three initial stages of the alchemical process: the black phase (death and putrefaction), the white phase (purification and ablution), and the red phase (conjunction). Fulcanelli, the master alchemist, wrote about the oriflamme, in the three pendants of which are

the triple *colours of the Work* [which] are described in all the classical works. The three colours succeed one another in an invariable order, going from *black*, through *white* to *red*... But since nature does not proceed by a leap, there are many intermediate stages between these three principal ones... These coloured phases, referring specifically to the coction phase in the Great Work, have always served as a symbolical prototype. A precise meaning, and sometimes quite a lengthy one, was attributed to each of them in order that they might be used as a veil, behind which certain concrete truths might be given.⁴⁷⁶

The Surrealist Collage Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*—“Mercredi” (Conjunction)

The fourth *cahier* of Ernst’s novel, “Mercredi,” begins a new stage of transformation. The *élément* of “Mercredi” is blood; its exemplary tale concerns Oedipus. One epigraph for this section, from Éluard, reads, “It is also called MAMMA by mistake”; the citation evokes the idea of Oedipus’s illicit desire. The other epigraph is from a *complainte*, a type of popular ballad that often commemorated a notorious crime or catastrophe. *Complaintes* were printed on broadsheets and chanted by street singers who hawked the sheets—in this respect, they are the equivalents in verse of the illustrations that Ernst was using in *Une semaine de bonté*. The extract reads, “Great God, save the earth from ever bearing such monsters. No history has proved that there were any such. Through the efforts of the authorities, no one will be exposed to them any longer.” The epigraph makes reference to a monster—and a monster is what one becomes if one violates the incest taboo. So the epigraph also makes reference to authorities, to the social embodiment of Lacan’s Law of the Father (which is essentially the prohibition against incest). This allusion to authority and taboo provides the motivation for Ernst’s introducing the Sphinx, from the Oedipus tale. This section also includes an engraving of a bird-headed figure composed of a female torso (clad in a woman’s jacket, with the front opened to expose her breasts) atop a male’s legs (clad in men’s trousers that fit remarkably well with the woman’s jacket). The figure represents the androgyne and the bird’s head symbolizes intuitive knowledge (which in

alchemical thought arises out of the fusion of the male and female principles). Many of the collages include balloons (as Warlick notes), and that inclusion, along with the number of bird-headed figures in this section (Loplop, the totemic bird-headed man, is the central figure in this story), suggests that the air is the “hidden element” for this *cahier*. Warlick also points out that in an emblem from Poisson, “birds represent the element air and the various operations of the work. Specifically, they refer to the gases that rise and fall within the alchemical vessel.” Max Ernst (who read Poisson) follows suit, and “Mercredi” uses similar symbolism.⁴⁷⁷ This *cahier* also contains many images of prisons and bars (pages 124, 125, 128, and 131), signifying the alchemical vessel itself, from which the vapours escape.

The book is a fascinating reworking of the Oedipus myth: the bird-headed man, Loplop, represents both the son and the father (a very telling identity). Several of the plates depict Loplop as shut out of the woman’s chambers and seeking, or forcing, entry. There is also a plate that shows a naked woman’s foot being stabbed by a bird-headed man (page 141). (Oedipus’s parents, forewarned that their boy would sleep with his mother, wounded his feet before exposing him on Mount Cithaeron; shepherds discovered the foundling and took him to the court of the childless King Polybus and Queen Merope of Corinth, who adopted the lad, naming him “Oedipus,” which means “swollen foot.” In the plate in *Une semaine de bonté*, the dynamic is reversed through the psychic mechanism of identification with the aggressor, which mixes illicit desire with the impulse of revenge against the one who prompted the desire; thus, Oedipus wounds the foot of the woman, the Mother, with whom he imagines having slept.) “Mercredi” also reuses the device of wall pictures commenting on the action occurring in the rooms where they are hung: the phallic-shaped animal in plate 11 (page 127) and the equally phallic form in plate 13 (page 129) are examples.

The theme of Oedipal violence draws the various plates in this *cahier* into a unity. The story includes images of Loplop (page 120), with giant buttocks, shooting a man (whom we may interpret as the father); the taking of a female captive (pages 128 and 139), suggesting taking the forbidden woman; knives (pages 123, 135, 141, and 143), suggesting castration; the Sphinx (page 137); and aggression against the female (pages 121, 124, 129, 141, 142, and 143).⁴⁷⁸ Ernst associates the bird-human amalgam with violence; in 1937, a few years after producing *Une semaine de bonté*, in *L’ange de foyer* (Angel of Hearth and Home), he used the bird as a symbol of a destructive force. The Oedipus tale Ernst created for the fourth *cahier* contains a measure of violence and confrontation similar to what we saw in the first book.

In the collage depicting the bird-headed androgyne (page 118), there is a candle on the floor, which suggests heating the vessel that volatilizes the

liquids, converting them to gas (causing “the birds to fly”). The androgyne symbolizes the union (*coniunctio*) of the primal couple, a suggestion reinforced by the insect imagery in this *cahier*. In the lower left-hand corner of this plate is a small moth. In the section on “The Verbal Image,” I referred to Caillois’s “Mimétisme et psychasthénie légendaire,” an article on the theme of nature’s ability to use desire to transform the desirer and the object of desire into reflections of one another, which in its first appearance was accompanied by images of insects. There I also remarked on the Surrealist association of moths with the night world and death. Ernst draws on these notions. In this context, the moth (a changeable being) suggests the connection between amatory and murderous desire (a fitting suggestion for a section dealing with Oedipal feelings) and love’s capacity to turn either the lover or the loved one into a murderer. But even that mirroring operation is a sort of *coniunctio*, as Wagner’s *Tristan und Isolde* shows.

As with other *cahiers*, some of the facing plates in “Mercredi” (i.e., left and right) comment on each other. The relation between plates 14 (page 131) and 15 (page 132) is especially telling. Plate 14 presents a woman with the head of a bird being dropped from a window (suggesting the Surrealists’ interest in hysteria), while plate 15 shows a man with a bird’s head (placed in about the same area of the picture) jumping in the air as if flying away from a nude woman on the ground. The implied narrative has the woman falling from the window (succumbing to temptation); in response, the man rises as if either feeling exhilarated by sexual delight or escaping from the fallen nude figure. The ideas of falling and flying allude to the alchemical processes of precipitation and volatilization. Freud also discussed dreams of falling as motivated by anxiety and dreams of flight as motivated by erotic exhilaration.

The Surrealist Collage Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*—“Jeudi” (Putrefaction/Fermentation)

The final volume of *Une semaine de bonté*, *cahier* 5, contains the chapters “Jeudi,” “Vendredi,” and “Samedi” (the first four *cahiers* were released separately and had not sold as well as was expected). The first chapter, “Jeudi,” has two parts. Both have the same *élément*, blackness, but each has its own *exemple*: the first, “Le rire du coq” (The Rooster’s Laugh), and the second, “L’Île de Pâques” (Easter Island). The first exemplary tale has a rooster as its main character (a rooster or a rooster-headed being appears in every collage). The rooster, or cock, is a symbol for France. (The cock became a symbol for France through a Latin pun: *gallus* is the Roman word for cock and also for a Gaul.) For the Greeks, the cock was a herald of resurrection and was associated with the divine messenger Hermes; accordingly, in alchemy it is associated with the element mercury. In alchemical iconography, the chicken

is a symbol for the alchemist himself, for the alchemist's careful control over the process of heating the alembic is compared to a hen incubating her egg. (The alchemical vessel is sometimes referred to as the "chicken coop," the "House of the Chick," or the "philosophic egg"—the egg harbours the chicken just as the alchemical vessel harbours the philosopher's stone.)

This section is one of extraordinary violence, even by the standards of Surrealist art: nearly every one of the plates depicts birds (or bird-headed figures) perpetrating some form of violence against female figures. One image from this section (page 150) shows a woman lying on a bed and a large rooster, scalpel in hand, standing over her. Several collages in this section recall images from "Dimanche," which concerned the separation and symbolic killing of the antithetical principles of Philosophical Sulphur and Philosophical Mercury. Warlick interprets the parallels between the two *cahiers*: she observes that "Le rire du coq" contains a collage (page 151) with a coffin in which a young woman has been buried and notes that "this parallels the collage in the first chapter in which a man was buried under a billiard table."⁴⁷⁹ The resemblances between the two chapters help us understand that this section concerns a similar process: the process of putrefaction has begun once again. This explains why the *élément* for this section is blackness.

Clearly, the rooster's laugh, to which the section's title refers, is the crowing of the violent bird figures over humanity: the final image of the section shows the birds raising the French flag over a Paris rooftop (Notre Dame appears in the background), while in the foreground is a nude Femme 100 Têtes, whom—given the executions that appear in the previous two plates—we can take as having been executed (raising the French flag we can take to be a reference to the Terror). The suggested violence alludes to alchemists' beliefs about the role of violence in creating the philosopher's stone: violence is required to create the conditions for the philosopher's stone to emerge, for the appearance of the philosopher's stone symbolizes the death of the old humanity and the emergence of the new.

The second section of "Jeudi" suggests the appearance of the philosopher's stone. This section has "L'Île de Pâques" (Easter Island) as its *exemple*. It opens with an ambiguous figure that could be the exterior of an organism that has swallowed human organisms, or that could be the maw of death (or of Moloch), thus giving a new meaning to the quote from Hans Arp that serves as this section's epigraph: "Les pierres sont remplies d'entrailles. Bravo. Bravo." (The stones are full of entrails. Bravo. Bravo.) The following nine plates present male figures whose faces have taken on the appearance of the colossal *moai* on Easter Island—stone-headed male figures appear in every collage in this section, except the first. Many of the males in this section are slightly transformed versions of evil men we have seen earlier in the book, now with heads changed into the stone effigies of Easter Island.

These figures' "L'Île de Pâques" heads resemble the bird heads of *Une semaine de bonté*'s therianthropic figures (the bird-headed priests of Polynesia were an important source for Ernst's images of Loplop); further, the mask heads seem to be almost separate from the bodies to which they are attached. The narrative this section offers is a troubling reworking of the story of a Parisian would-be boulevardier preparing to get himself out and about the city, and then venturing out and mingling with half-dressed or undressed women. In preparing to go out, he examines his grotesque half-*moai*, half-leonine head in the mirror (the naked woman peering in the window may suggest the would-be boulevardier feels that the mask creates a *doppelgänger*, who will be an object of fascination for the women he will encounter). Meanwhile, a giant praying mantis sits on his chest of drawers and examines him.⁴⁸⁰ Then he is shown creating chaos in a woman's bedroom (the havoc is an effect of the protagonist's unquiet spiritual condition). He gets involved in a threesome with a courtesan/prostitute and a young man (in this scene, the boulevardier has a phallic serpent wrapped around his waist), goes for a walk through rain-soaked streets (hinting at a continuity between his inner world and the outer world), heads to a brothel, where he tries to obliterate his despair with drink and merrymaking, violently accosts a woman in a carriage (in a room that lies mostly in obscurity), encounters two half-naked women from the margins of society, with whom he performs what appears to be a tribal dance. As in other sections of the book, the tale recounted is of lust leading to violence.

Finally, dejected, he collapses into a dark enclosure. In the last image of the section, he is shown crouching, wearing an African mask (which now suggests death). The male is left to die in a dark cell while the female—a variant of the *Femme 100 tête*'s lover—hovers over his escape ladder, pointing an accusatory finger at him. The genders have come to mirror one another.

This episode refuses the traditional narrative satisfaction of re-establishing a new order after an original state of order has been disturbed. The tale begins *in medias res*, with the old moral order already turned upside down, but it does not progress towards the creation of a new moral order (this is typical of the tales that *Une semaine de bonté* recounts). Still, despite the contestation of narrative convention, a core of meaning is clear: the stone heads represent the philosopher's stone; according to alchemical lore, the conjunction of the primal couple leads to the appearance of the philosopher's stone, marking the end of the red (*rubedo*) phase of the process (even though the Easter Island tale belongs to the "Jeudi" chapter of the fifth volume, a chapter whose *élément* is blackness).

Thus, in the alchemical allegory that *Une semaine de bonté* offers, "Mercredi" represents the *rubedo* phase of the alchemical process, and the "Jeudi" chapter represents the actions that must occur after the *rubedo* stage, to purify

matter. The use of insects and crustaceans in this chapter connects it with the “Mercredi” chapter, in which Ernst had used insects to indicate transformations of the *materia prima*. The second plate (page 168) of the “Île du Pâques” series depicts a praying mantis calmly eating its prey. The praying mantis is stable Surrealist iconography, because of its mating ritual, in which the female devours the male.⁴⁸¹ Thus, the image of the praying mantis here helps prepare us for the sexual violence to come.

Warlick notes that in one collage (page 171) from “L’Île du Pâques,” a stone man is orchestrating the couple’s embrace:

He holds the torch as if he had just lit the candle beneath them. He points to the pile of eggs, which are being layed by the huge grasshopper at the top of the image. These eggs may refer to the alchemical vessel, known as the philosopher’s egg, or to the operation of multiplication, by which the stone’s power is increased. More specifically, it indicates the power of the stone to fertilize the union of the primal couple. The philosopher’s stone, which is the purest of substances, transmutes the matter into gold.⁴⁸²

The first part of “Jeudi” represents the heating of the philosophic egg, while the second part represents the appearance of the philosopher’s stone.

The Surrealist Collage Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*—“Vendredi” (Distillation)

“Vendredi” has a different quality than the other sections. For one thing, this chapter has three sections, which Ernst titles “Premier poème visible” (First Visible Poem), “Deuxième poème visible” (Second Visible Poem), and “Troisième poème visible” (Third Visible Poem).⁴⁸³ The *élément* for each of the sections is the same—light—and they share the same *exemple*, “The Interior of Sight.” Ernst’s view of the interior mechanism of vision and collage have deep similarities, as both are occult (alchemical) processes: he believed that artists’ visionary powers allowed them to perceive the fundamental harmonies that result from reconciling opposites in vision. This reconciliation of opposites is the interior—the *subconscious*—structure of vision and collage (Lawrence Jordan will extend this homology to comprise film). The structure of the three poems embodies the structure of vision, for they consist of short collage sequences—of six, four, and two plates, respectively—that illustrate different aspects of visionary experience. (The thoughts on vision expounded in this section were probably influenced by Rimbaud’s “Lettre du voyant” of 1871, a text Ernst referred to in his writing on *frottage*.) The “Premier poème visible” is introduced with an epigraph from Paul Éluard (from *Comme deux gouttes d’eau* [Like Two Drops of Water, 1933]): “And I object to the love of ready-made images in places of images to be made.” There can be no doubt that, at one level at least, this is an ironic comment (for Ernst made *Une semaine de bonté* from existing images); but at another level, it is sincere.

For the poems reveal vision, in its true (interior) being, to be creative and transformative. The first of the plates (page 181) is a composite botanical/anthropomorphic form constituted from human bones and plant forms (in alchemical iconography, the hybridization of plant and human forms symbolizes transmutation); two other plates of the “Premier poème visible” (pages 182 and 186) offer examples of the hybridization of the vegetable, mineral, and animal kingdoms, so they, too symbolize transformation. Furthermore, these hybridizations convey a deep truth about the interior (unconscious) mechanism of vision—they propose that vision is affected by the unconscious process of condensation (thus, these hybridizations imply a similarity between psychoanalysis and alchemy). Four of the twelve collages (pages 181, 182, 186, and 192) in the three visible poems are in a sparer style than the other plates in *Une semaine de bonté*—they are reminiscent of Ernst’s imagery from the 1920s and resemble somewhat the last two plates in the “Lion of Belfort” section. The spareness of their imagery and their schematized architecture evoke the mystery of the visionary process.

The “Deuxième poème visible” is introduced with the phrase “a man and a woman absolutely white,” from Breton’s *Le revolver aux cheveux blancs* (The Revolver with White Hair, 1932)—an allusion to the stage of *albedo*. This poem has a taxonomic structure: the four plates allude, respectively, to water (hand rests on pages that float on water), air (there are airborne winged monsters), earth (gigantic stone statues are bound to the earth), and fire (there is a plate of fire behind a phallic bird/tower of shoes). There is also a (complex) relation between the four plates of the second visible poem and the four states in the alchemical cycle of purification (outlined above). The first step we noted was called *coniunctio* (conjunction) and concerns the uniting of opposites (exemplified in the four alchemical qualities, hot and cold, wet and dry). The cosmogenesis alluded to in the first plate of the “Second Visible Poem” (the collage shows an illuminated face high above water, suggesting the Spirit of God presiding over the deep) indicates this is the beginning of a cycle; the paper over water suggests the conjunction of wet and dry (one of the conjunctions that produces life). The second step is called “coagulation” (or, sometimes, “child’s play”), and its goal is to balance the four alchemical elements: earth, air, fire, and water. In the second plate, birds represent air and a shoe the earth, and their conjunction suggests their unity; and generally, the sky and the earth are in balance in this plate. Coagulation leads to the third process, known as “putrefaction,” and that process disturbs the balance that has just been established among the different principles and leads to the elements’ separating from one another. The arid quality of the image and the ossification of the forms suggest putrefaction—the effect of the loss of balance. The last step is known as “purification”—the shoe becoming the bird represents the transformation through which the purification occurs.

The “Troisième poème visible,” which is not introduced with an epigraph, consists of two spare collages that are reminiscent of the “Premier poème visible.” The two collages in this section employ familiar Surrealist symbols for male and female sexual parts: the severed hand and a dismembered eye. In this poem, the male and female characters have been reduced to their essences by purification—thus, this poem suggests the final perfection of the masculine and feminine principles. In the first collage, seven pairs of hands (representing touch and physical communion), receding in a diagonal towards the upper-right corner, shake hands; to the left there is a single egg (representing, directly, the philosophic egg, and indirectly, through the symbolism of the philosophic egg, the potential for new life) in a cup (symbolizing the alchemical vessel). In the context of these plates concerning vision, the similarity between the egg and the eye suggests (through the Surrealist logic of analogy) a connection between them: the egg gives birth to new life and the eye to vision. In the second, seven eyes (representing sight and non-physical communion) view three eyes across a path that leads diagonally towards the middle left of the image, while on the pathway are three piles of eggs or, perhaps, stones (the ambiguity is likely deliberate, in that the forms can be taken as symbolizing either the philosophical egg or the philosopher’s stone). Above the eye nearest the picture plane (on the image’s left-hand side) is a flower (perhaps a hand) holding a decorated egg (an egg that is reaching the time when it will bring forth new life). The two collages work together, suggesting the coincidence of sight and touch and the efforts of the senses to purify the philosopher’s stone.

The seven pairs of hands in the first collage represent the joining of male and female. They and the seven eyes on the right of the second collage also allude to seven metals on which the alchemical process works, while the three eyes on its left allude to the three levels of being: material, human, divine. Concerning the last allusion, Warlick points out that

the material level involves the practical processes of the work resulting in the unification of sulfur and mercury and the production of silver and gold. The human level is that of the alchemist, who achieves moral perfection by engaging in the work. The third level is the divine; by duplicating the process of creation, the alchemist is able to perceive divine order. From the third eye on the left of Ernst’s collage a small globe protrudes. Like Athena rising from the head of Zeus, it signifies the wisdom born of engaging in the work. It should be noted that the two collages of this section are composed of severed hands and dislocated eyes, two well-known Surrealist symbols for male and female sexuality.⁴⁸⁴

The alchemist who imitates the work of the divine is likely the subject of the first plate in the “Deuxième poème visible” section (page 189): the hands indicate the practical level on which the alchemist must operate; the book

indicates the knowledge that unlocks the mysteries, and the radiant head suggests that this knowledge endows the alchemics with nearly divine features. So this collage, too, suggests the three levels of being.

The Surrealist Collage Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*—“Samedi” (Coagulation)

The seventh part of *Une semaine de bonté*, “Samedi,” represents the erotic climax of the work. This *cahier* has ten plates, all of which have a woman as the central figure and all of which make extensive use of dream symbols. In this section, the Young Prince appears, arising out of the death of the King. It begins (page 199) with a nude bird-woman holding in front of her a bevelled circular object (rather like a shield, but protecting her nether parts), the entire surface of which is filled with a complex design of interlocking circles and spirals suggesting vibration (to suggest the sexual act, and so *coniunctio*, as well as the shaking of the elements to remix them). Her face is covered by what could be either two shells or a set of wasp wings (or an amalgam of the two, but in either case, they are a symbol of the female genitals), and by a squid, a male form. The nude woman is another variant of the *Femme 100 Têtes*.⁴⁸⁵ The bird-woman is another hybridization of bird and human form, suggesting the fusion of opposites (since the female is associated with earth and birds with air). Furthermore, the bird’s head seems menacing while the nude body suggests sensuality and gentleness—this amalgam of danger and tenderness is another conjunction of opposites. The interlocking circles on the shield-like form also suggest a complex mathematical process, and so invite Pythagorean associations, including the idea of perfection. The rest of the section tells of an intercourse that shakes up the young woman’s world but leads ultimately to an exaltation. To depict this, Ernst had recourse to Charcot’s studies of hysterical women, for they depict postures of transport. Thus, Ernst equates alchemy’s highest goal, the mystical experience of Divine Love, with the quest for sexual ecstasy.

The dream the book presents begins with the second collage (page 200), showing a woman in a night shirt stretched across a bed tipped to vertical and an oversized spine on her front, weighing her down. The next collage (page 201) shows a naked boy with a bolt for a penis, who touches the arm of the woman in the night shirt. Both are wrapped by a billowing sheet: the boy being in bed with the woman highlights the Oedipal theme of the section. The seven collages that follow present variations on the woman floating or falling. These collages can be grouped into two sets. The first set depicts the woman in postures reminiscent of Charcot’s hysterics, gesticulating wildly and subjected to some menace. The second set offers more voluptuous images of women with billowing gowns and hair, floating with sensuous pleasure

outside the windows of balconies—they have taken flight, like birds. The final collage shows a woman (placed at the centre of the collage) falling down a staircase (or floating over it): to the left of her there is a bird, and floating just above the staircase is an enigmatic object. For the most part, the book presents an *imago mundi* close to that of the Gnostics. The earthly realm is one of conflict, aggression, and violence, one whose material nature entails evil and mortality. Humans are made aggressive by erotic passion: that is what each of the exemplary tales teaches. Like *La femme 100 têtes*, *Une semaine de bonté* reveals the darkness lurking beneath the surface of orderly bourgeois life—sexuality, deviance, violence, and fear. Still, the book tries to put that violence in context and to present it as a stage in psychological development. The exaltation of the floating female form, in the last of the book's plates, conveys an extraordinary sense of release, of freedom achieved—for however short a time. Erotic ecstasy is still ecstasy, and it renews life.

LAWRENCE JORDAN: SURREALISM AND ALCHEMY

Lawrence Jordan acknowledges the influence of Ernst's collage novels. A set of images that recur in Jordan's work have their origins in Ernst's *La femme 100 têtes*: fully developed human figures are born from eggs (an image that appears in the first plate, titled "Crime ou miracle: un homme complète" [Crime or Miracle: A Complete Man]); Classical figures float through the air; and spheres and discs resemble suns.

A feature of Ernst's collage novels that Jordan undoubtedly took note of (for his works possess a similar quality) is their evocation of a mental state in which the external world coincides with the internal world. Ernst's novel, like Jordan's film, provokes a heightening of consciousness by plumbing the depths of reality in which magical transformations occur that are unauthorized by the laws of everyday reality. In Jordan's films, as in Ernst's paintings and collages, we witness an alternative reality—one that belongs to a dimension outside that of normal reality—taking shape in the creative process. This metaphysical idea often takes spatial form: Haim Finkelstein has shown that Ernst creates a paradoxical space that emphasizes both surface and depth. In *The Screen in Surrealist Art and Thought* (2007), he writes of a "screen paradigm" on which Surrealist art was often based and argues that in Surrealist thought, the screen is treated as a limen, that is, as a threshold between conventional physical reality and an imaginatively embellished reality. Finkelstein's book demonstrates that the Surrealists treated "the notion of the 'screen' as a spatial paradigm with far-reaching conceptual ramifications," one that "subsumes a chain of representations, beginning

with the conceptualization of the actual cinema screen, and continuing with the screen as a surface that constitutes a plane of projection, reflection, and seeing-through.⁴⁸⁶ He points out that this paradigm led to “cinematic collage” that treated “perceived reality as a façade with apertures . . . opening onto interior spaces.”⁴⁸⁷ The comment could be applied both to Ernst’s work and to Jordan’s.

Jordan has testified to the influence of esoteric ideas on his work: “I don’t know about alchemy academically, but I am a practicing alchemist in my own way.” Lest anyone think he uses the term in a generic sense, to refer to artists who trade in any sort of transformations, I give his description of *Winter Light*, a photographed (rather than animated) film he made in 1982:

Winter Light, filmed in the dawn hours of California winter, explores the endless permutations of light and illumination as representatives of the Demeter–Persephone myth of withdrawal of life through the winter months.

Vivaldi’s winter concerto. Powerful, cold, a zinging of frost. Pale fog of violet hue rolling in masses over the hills of Sonoma. The dawn hours, the colors, the animals, and the long, lingering deceptive arising of the Divine Son (Sun) through beige and purple reflections on the mist-covered pond. (An entry to the Underworld, where Geryon descended.) Impressionistic, paletted. Opaques and translucencies responding. The veil of the ancient goddess (Demeter) whose daughter had been stolen here. The land of Hades (Pluto), his cold domain, from whence She brings back life on her return (with Her daughter) to the upper world—spring as we know it. I laid out a carefully and elaborately thought-out system of light qualities and movements to represent (in wholly natural images) the retelling of this myth, which is the heart of the Eleusinian mysteries of old. There, the daughter’s name is Persephone or Kore.⁴⁸⁸

Here is his description of *Sophie’s Place*, a feature-length animated work of 1984, and in my view, likely Jordan’s greatest work:

A culmination of five years’ work. Full hand-painted cut-out animation. Totally unplanned, unrehearsed development of scenes under the camera, yet with more “continuity” than any of my previous animations, while meditating on some phase of my life. I call it an “alchemical autobiography.” The film begins in a paradisiacal garden. It then proceeds to the interior of the Mosque of St. Sophia. More and more the film develops into episodes centering around one form or another of Sophia, an early Greek and Gnostic embodiment of spiritual wisdom. She is seen emanating light waves and symbolic objects. (But I must emphasize that I do not know the exact significance of any of the symbols in the film any more than I know the meaning of my dreams, nor do I know the meaning of the episodes. I hope that they—the symbols and the episodes—set off poetic associations in the viewer. I mean them to be entirely open to the viewer’s own interpretation.)

In an interview, Jordan expanded on how he believes symbols operate in art:

A symbol by definition can't be explained away; it just sits there and continues to radiate significance to the unconscious. And so, yes, they are symbolic, but some people misunderstand what a symbol is; think that a symbol stands for something else. That's not what a symbol is. A symbol just is there. And it evokes—the idea is that a symbol will evoke whatever the viewer is predisposed to have evoked by that symbol. That's the power of it. And that's what I want the films and the boxes to do—to interact with the predispositions and the psychological filters of the viewer and come alive to that viewer only at the moment of viewing, and not to transfer some idea that I have in my mind to the viewer. I'm not interested in doing that. I'm interested in the viewer interacting with the piece or with the film.⁴⁸⁹

Jordan's emphasis on having produced this great work without planning relates to the alchemical idea that we need to empty our selves so that we can be filled with an other.

Here is his note (written in the third person) for another film, *Enid's Idyll* (2004), made twenty-two years after *Winter Light*. This one is an animated film, but like the earlier film it concerns death and resurrection:

Jordan has used 46 engraved [Gustav] Doré illustrations to *Idylls of the King* as settings for his extravagantly romantic saga. As Enid, the protagonist, is seen in a vast array of scenes from deep forests to castle keeps, her champion is sometimes with her, sometimes away fighting archetypal foes. She dies, and through the magic of Gustav Mahler's resurrection symphony, lives again [...] Main themes of love, death, and resurrection.

Similarly, Jordan describes a more recent film, *The Miracle of Don Cristobal* (2008), as “an alchemical drama.”

In one of a series of interviews that Paul Karlstrom conducted with Jordan, for the Smithsonian Institute, between 19 December 1995 and 30 July 1996, Jordan outlined the occult influences he was exposed to when he first moved to San Francisco, hoping to become an artist-filmmaker:

I spent a lot of time at that time with Philip Lamantia. He lived at his mother's house way out on Mission and didn't have a car. And I would, we would stay around North Beach until late at night and I would drive him out there. And he would talk endlessly, and he knew all kinds of stuff about occult, surreal things, and the first time I heard the word “Beat” used was Philip using it as a kind of shortened version of beatific or beatitude. You know, there was a home-grown religious movement as was part of this resurgence.⁴⁹⁰

Philip Lamantia (1927–2005) was a San Francisco poet. During the Second World War, he met André Breton, who was then living in exile in the United States. Breton admitted Lamantia into the ranks of the Surrealists—the only

American poet to whom he accorded that honour. Lamantia was fifteen years old at the time. He later composed “Poem for André Breton,” which described his meeting Breton almost exclusively in terms of the aura he saw around the legendary Surrealist leader.⁴⁹¹

In an interview with poet David Meltzer, Lamantia described his discovery of Surrealism:

I was turned on to Surrealism through a great Dalí retrospective at the San Francisco Museum of Art... followed by an equally marvelous exhibition of Miró. Within weeks I had read everything available on Surrealism that I could get from the public library. There wasn't much: David Gascoyne, the premier British Surrealist poet—whose *Short Survey of Surrealism* was superb—Julien Levy's *Surrealism*, Georges Lemaître's *From Cubism to Surrealism in French Literature* (he was teaching at Stanford), and finally, the discovery of the luxurious New York Surrealist review, *WV*—two issues edited by Breton and friends—which I found in the tiny but ample no-loan library at the museum. In almost no time I had a dozen poems ready for publication and sent some to *View: A Magazine of the Arts*, which was edited, in New York, by the only important American poet who was plausibly Surrealist, Charles Henri Ford. In Spring 1943 my poems were featured on one of *View*'s large-format pages. [*WV* championed veristic Surrealism, while *View* championed automatism, largely under the aegis of the painter and art theorist Wolfgang Paalen, 1905–59, the central idea of whose art theory, that of pre-figuration, has a resemblance to J.F. Lyotard's idea of *figure*, though Paalen's idea lays emphasis on the impulse's spatio-temporal nature and its autopoetic and therefore fated character.] On the cover was a photograph by Man Ray... It was just after this that I discovered *WV*'s whereabouts and sent other poems there to André Breton. He wrote, accepting three poems and requesting a letter from me “clarifying” my relation to Surrealism. Acceptance by the man I fervently believed the most important poet and mind of the century led to my decision to quit school and take off for New York. I arrived in April 1944 in Manhattan...⁴⁹²

In its December 1943 issue (at page 141), the magazine announced that View Editions would be bringing out “First Poems by Philip Lamantia with a cover by Max Ernst.” In Manhattan, Lamantia met Charles Henri Ford and the circle of writers around Ford who were inspired by Surrealism. His first meeting with Breton occurred at the offices of *View* (where Lamantia also met Jackson Mac Low)—Breton, who was about to publish *Young Cherry Trees Secured against Hares* with *View*, happened to visit the office when Lamantia was there speaking to Ford. *View* was a relatively well-financed magazine, and Ford had offered Lamantia a job reviewing unsolicited manuscripts. Lamantia's last meeting with Breton took place in the “fall of 1944”—Breton had spent the late summer and early fall (from 20 August to 20 October, the months just after D-Day) in St-Agathe, near Percé Rock on Quebec's

Gaspé Peninsula, composing *Arcanum 17*, and in all likelihood the encounter Lamantia recalled occurred in November. Breton had embraced an ecstatic spiritual gynephilia, a sort of Platonic passion for Sophia (Lamantia, Duncan, and Jordan would all adopt that as a general spiritual outlook, and one result of that is that their oeuvres are tinged with Symbolism). *Arcanum 17* is named after the seventeenth card of the Major Arcana (the tarot), the star card, the card of renewal. The graphic of the 17th Arcanum depicts a beautiful nude woman resting on a body of water and holding in her two outstretched hands two vials, one of gold and one of silver. The woman is the unveiled Isis, the Divine Mother, who appears in all her splendour, revealed and unclothed before the divine sight of the initiate. Isis in Egyptian religion corresponds to Aphrodite in Greek religion, and Aphrodite the Greeks associated with the morning star, which they called Phosphorus, or “light bringer.”⁴⁹³ The Latin for “light bringer” is Lucifer. The American Gnostic Association glosses the 17th Arcanum of the tarot thus:

The hieroglyphic of this Arcanum is the Radiant Star and the Eternal Youth. In this Arcanum there appears a naked woman who is spreading the sap of universal life over the earth which is coming out of two jars, one made of gold and the other made of silver. If we carefully study the esoteric content of this Arcanum, we will discover the Perfect Alchemy. We need to work with the gold and with the silver, with the Sun and with the Moon in order to incarnate the Star, this Star has eight points.

Breton’s interest in renewal of love and hope had personal as well as social and philosophical (esoteric) reasons: he had just fallen in love with Elisa Bindhoff, after his second wife, Jacqueline Lamba, had abandoned him, taking with her his beloved daughter.

Arcanum 17’s themes were archetypes, goddesses, concern for nature, and mysticism. It was wartime, and Breton asked what had brought the world to the terrible violence being inflicted on such a large portion of the world and why love could not prevail. Breton accused logic, morality, and time of all being partly responsible. But the principal culprit, Breton affirmed, was masculine superiority. “This crisis is so severe that I, myself, see only one solution: the time has come to value the ideas of woman at the expense of those of man, whose bankruptcy is coming to pass fairly tumultuously today.” Percé Rock, crumbling in slow motion, reminded him that nature, though impermanent, renews herself continually and that even death is only for a while. We shall see that Lawrence Jordan, too, would come to adopt a feminine/feminist viewpoint, spiritually rooted in the Persephone myth but elaborated in alchemical terms.

During this period, Lamantia also met Salvador Dalí, Joan Miró, and Max Ernst, who impressed on him the awareness that Surrealism was not a matter of aesthetics. Along the way, he also encountered, likely through Paalen's article "Dynaton" ([1949] meaning possibility), the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art 1951 *Dynaton* exhibition, or Paalen and Robert Motherwell's journal *DYN*, devoted largely to the ideas of the Austro-Mexican post-Surrealist (and inventor of *fumage*) Wolfgang Paalen; and in commenting on his own ideas about poetry, he frequently made reference to Paalen's idea of surconsciousness (a noetic or pneumatic awareness antithetical to scientific reason as it is commonly understood). Lamantia returned to San Francisco, where he served as a conduit for Surrealist ideas, passing them on to the next generation (including Lawrence Jordan). Among Lamantia's interests were esoteric ideas generally and alchemy specifically. He has referred to himself as the "Bishop of Alchemia" and has written, "your lips touch alchemic gold torn from the femur bone / of poetry."⁴⁹⁴ And, in another example,

white gone into gold green gone into gold
black gone into gold green gone into gold⁴⁹⁵

The allusions to the alchemical process, to the phases of *albedo* and *negredo*, and to the *aurea apprehensio*, and to a body of golden coalesced light (the *corpus glorificationis*)—a body that is the vehicle of the highest states of consciousness—are obvious. The poem says much about the very rich ideas Lamantia likely discussed with the young Lawrence Jordan.

During his apprenticeship years, Jordan also met Duncan (who, like Philip Lamantia, was a hermetically inclined member of the circle around the poet Kenneth Rexroth) and Duncan's partner Jess (Collins). Duncan, Lamantia, and the yoga-inspired San Francisco filmmaker Jordan Belson all published in *Contour* quarterly.⁴⁹⁶ Both Jess and Robert Duncan were dedicated students of the esoteric tradition.⁴⁹⁷ Lamantia, Duncan, and Jess form a top-notch graduate faculty for an apprenticing artist learning about the Western esoteric tradition. Jordan has done much to acknowledge their tutelage. For example, in 1961 he made, with Jess's collaboration, a six-minute film, *The 40 and 1 Nights (or Jess's Didactic Nickelodeon)*, consisting of forty-one of Jess's collages presented in rapid succession, each accompanied by a fragment of music and sounds (such as James Joyce reading) chosen by the collagist. (The film's title suggests much about the endurance of the conception of the cinema this book has explored.)

In Appendix 7, I provide a list of sequences and a more detailed analysis of *Duo Concertantes*. For now, I comment on a few features of the work especially germane to the thesis of this book.

LAWRENCE JORDAN'S *DUO CONCERTANTES*: COMMENTARY

Part One: The Centennial Exposition

SECTION I: INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR (SEQUENCES 1–5)

The film begins with a pan down an advertisement, a poster with the quality of late-nineteenth-century engravings, announcing the Centennial Exposition at the Gaiety Theatre (introductory shot 2). Like Ernst, Jordan relies on engravings, which he admires for their sharpness. This sharpness is a consequence of their graphic character (i.e., engravings are pictures that have no half-tones: any point in the image will either be part of a black line or part of the white paper surface).

The opening image establishes several points. It evokes a sense of a time past and suggests that we are about to see something that occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century (hence the poster announces “Centennial Exposition”). The film itself shares in the evocation of the past: the first shot of the section presents a scratched sequence of the Roman numeral “I” flickering on the screen, a simple and seemingly primitive technique, yet one that seems direct and immediate (as though paradoxically belonging to the time of viewing). Despite that insistence on the maker’s intervention, the scene has the plausibility of an Ernst collage—we are entering into a reality that seems almost real yet is not quite real; and we are being asked to share in a phenomenon from the past, through a medium that had only just come into existence at the time of the event being depicted.

Most important of all, the hall resembles somewhat the one depicted in *The Amphitheatre of Eternal Wisdom*, from Hanau, Germany, 1604; that work was made by the seventeenth-century Theosophist, Cabalist, and hermetic mystic Heinrich Khunrath. It depicts a formal alchemical laboratory, and it shows two alchemists, one in an oratory, the other in an alchemical laboratory: the illustration is an allegory of the search for understanding, a quest that the male reader in Jordan’s film engages in as well.

Max Ernst understood the mechanism of collage as the coupling of two realities, irreconcilable in appearance, on a plane that apparently does not suit them. The interplay between the real and the unreal is the central theme in this film. Unlikely juxtapositions produce a new reality that, though evidently unreal, nonetheless has a degree of plausibility—the film evokes a sensation of the unreal transforming into a reality that we can accept.

Several of the illustrations that Jordan used in his collage come from engravings by Louis Poyet (1846–1913, and especially from Poyet’s renowned illustrations for Arthur Good’s [1853–1928] *100 Amazing Magic Tricks*, a three-volume bestseller that was first published in France at the beginning of the twentieth century and went into 130 editions). The book is not a guide to

illusions or *trompe l'oeil* tricks; rather, it is about the use of magnetism and other natural phenomena in fascinating experiments (e.g., it shows how to use surface tension to float magnetized needles, and how to make a simple compass). Still, that Jordan would draw on a famous work on magic for some of his illustrations is more than a little telling. *100 Amazing Magic Tricks* is drawn from a more extensive collaboration between Arthur Good and Poyet that popularized the marvels of science. The larger collection, titled *La science amusante*, by Arthur Good (who in this case assumed the pseudonym “Tom Tit”), was published in three volumes in 1890, 1892, and 1893; it collected material that originally appeared in the magazine *L'Illustration*. Poyet's classic engravings for this *L'Illustration* series were often reproduced, for example, in *Beeton's Boy's Own Magazine*; *The Boy's Own Paper*; and *Kolumbus-Eier* (1890, 1976), which appeared in an English translation as *Columbus' Egg* (1978).⁴⁹⁸

Duo Concertantes presents us with incongruent images and sequences (collages) that create a new reality that maintains a fringe of unreality about it—it is an unreal reality (a fusion of imagination and reality) that the logic of the film makes compelling as a counter-reality. An introductory shot shows a nineteenth-century poster that invites us to participate in a Centennial Exhibition. The next shot is of the exterior of a large building that could be the site of the event. The following is of an interior in which the architectural details are consistent with the building of the previous shot (exterior and interior shots are established by the nineteenth-century Victorian engravings that remain in the background, like three-dimensional stage sets).

Several events take place within this interior. In sequence 2 (see Appendix 7), a woman stands in the background examining an exhibit or display case. The head and shoulders of a man glide across the foreground of the frame. He is peering into a pamphlet or program, and in the pages of the pamphlet, we can see an illustration of a birdcage. The gentleman turns the page of the book, which suggests the opening of the illustrated birdcage. Through this act of opening the illustrated cage, an imaginary interior environment is revealed that contains marvels waiting to be revealed.

The interior world of the book is associated with the interior environment of the birdcage—as in alchemical writing, the bird represents freedom, the birdcage, the trapped being that could be set free, and the book, secret learning that could set the bird / the self free. (We have noted that birds were ubiquitous symbols in alchemy, for they were associated with the vapours or gases created during alchemical processes—black birds signifying poisonous vapours, white birds, pure air.) The emphasis on interiors in this section suggests the alchemist's interior quest: the interior spaces are analogues of the alchemical vessel, which in turn symbolized the self, as a vessel within which one must search. During the alchemical process, the subject, confined

to primal space, undergoes symbolic death and rebirth. The subject emerges from that space as a new mystical being with the power to transform any substance that he or she came in contact with—this emergence is known as the appearance of the philosopher's stone.

The next scene (sequence 3) is of an outdoor forest with immobile birds. A hand reminiscent of the man's hand in the preceding scene enters the frame with a bird sitting on its pointer finger. The bird flies off as if the man has released it from its cage (in alchemical iconography, the birdcage often symbolizes as well the alembic, from which escape the vapours, symbolizing the purified spirit).⁴⁹⁹ The man we saw a moment earlier in the building's interior reappears—now the birdcage is more clearly visible and we see a bird inside it. As the man looks up, the camera pans up a building that turns out to be a windmill (though it is inside the building), and several birds fly into the scene. Some of the birds settle on top of this huge structure, though where they settle is ambiguous: we cannot decide if, as the position of the windmill implies, they are inside or if they have escaped into a world that is exterior to their own enclosed world (primal space). As the man looks up, as well as observing the birds' flight, he enters the world of his imagination, a world that straddles the line demarcating the boundary separating interior and exterior reality—it is a world where windmills can be inside a building, and a birdcage can be part of a book, a world where the unreal appears as the real. It is a realm where the imagination prevails. Jordan would have learned from Robert Duncan that moderns have invested their faith in a truth that is patently made up. (In this book, we have explored the consequences of the development that led many to conclude reason had lost its grip on reality. I noted that one response was to proclaim that the imagination furnishes a higher truth.)

There is a counter-reality, an unreality rendered with as much detail and precision as pictures of reality give (and so imbued with the power of reality), a realm in which a man's hand turning a page in a book can produce an imaginary environment or result in one's being transported to a forest (or, rather, his hand can be magically transported to a forest and appear there with a bird perched on a finger). The bird that was perched on the man's finger flies off and the man returns to the interior of the building with the bird in a birdcage. Jordan has commented on such spatial and temporal anomalies, explaining that sequences like this (and most sequences in his work) are the product of free association. Here he speaks of a collage he made in the 1990s that was not done for a film, but what he says applies to scenes like those described above. The collage, he tells us,

started with the background—that 17th Century couple should not be there and they are inserted there, and so anachronism is set up first, then some-

thing slightly humorous and certainly unexpected and bizarre, the toucan, comes in through the portal and that can happen in a theater of the mind. Anything can happen. I mean having set up the anachronism, anything can now happen. All bets are off in terms of what we assume the world has to be. All preconceptions are annihilated. Anything can now happen; therefore, anything I want or anything that's suggested to my mind can happen and that's limited only by the material that I have around me cut out. In comes the toucan. Out comes the yellow light bulb. They're interacting with each other. Is the woman looking across at the toucan or is she staring into space or is she just...⁵⁰⁰

In fashioning a form that seems always to be striving to become a coherent whole but is constantly thwarted by its dissenting elements, Jordan's *Duo Concertantes* resembles Ernst's *Une semaine de bonté*. For how would one describe the narrative of the latter work? The chapter titles establish the expectation of the orderly, chronological unfolding of events. However, seemingly random events thwart that expectation and upset any notion we might form about the social or political status of the chapter's characters—and, for that matter, any sense of diegetic time (as the scenes often incorporate so many anachronistic elements). In the course of the narrative, ordinary events become strange as extraordinary wonders intrude on daily events: hybrid creatures appear; rooms become filled with reptiles, snakes, and dragons; men levitate; monsters and women float up to the ceiling. Suddenly we arrive at a new section that presents visible poetry rather than narrative. The visible poetry seems to represent a transformative episode, for in the final section, the reader encounters women, apparently in a trance or hallucinating (their consciousness has been altered), and finally floating free (liberated).

A synopsis of *Duo Concertantes* would be similarly abstract.

SECTION II: LYRICAL BALL (SEQUENCE 6–12)

Experimental animation approaches the *essence* of music, without intruding into the territory of music. The reason is simple: they both happen in time, and they are essentially both nonrational, conforming to inner laws...⁵⁰¹

Max Ernst's collages often incorporate images of balls and balloons to suggest the freedom the true self craves: balloons, like birds, suggest the element air and the volatization of spirits. Jordan's collages use similar imagery, for similar ends. Indeed, a ball's movement provides the through line for much of the section—the movement seems natural (and its elegant fluidity commands our attention), but the contexts into which the ball moves are highly fanciful. So the movement seems at once to be realistic and unrealistic. The

“narrative” recounted by these scenes follows an associative logic: one motion leads to another that leads to yet another—their connection is made plausible only by the naturalism of the ball’s movement, its seeming *vraisemblance*. It doesn’t matter that the ball bounces down stacks of chairs (as if they were stairs) and travels across display cases as if generating its own momentum; nor does it matter that a plate magically turns into a bucket or oversized cup and then back into a plate again (this pair of transformations is repeated several times); nor that the ball then changes size, becoming as large as the people surrounding it, and floats up and down (with a motion reminiscent of the bounce), and finally see-saws from side to side on a tube. What captures our imagination and sustains our belief in the authenticity of the scene is the strong rhythmic grace of the ball’s movement: it falls, flies, floats, bounces, sways with different rhythms, creating the musical form that Jordan describes above. We become fascinated by the musicality of the ball’s movements, which assume a lyrical reality, and we ignore the rupture with reality this involves. (I have attempted to chart these musical movements in the tables in Appendix 7.) This lyricism encourages us to accept as real the unreality configured by the extravagant juxtapositions in this scene.

As in a final jest, two swaying flowers, mimicking the motions of the wavering sphere, end the sequence. Table 1 provides a score of the ball’s movement, indicating the musical qualities of the film that Jordan alludes to. Its various movements depicted in this visual chart demonstrate the variety of rhythms that the form contains and indicate how one leads to the next. (Generally, the tables chart the film’s dynamic organization, which engender a feeling of time passing—we will soon see that Jordan’s films also elicit another form of temporal experience, that of a replete and enduring now.)

The fact that the actions link together so smoothly raises the matter of narrative. Paul Karlstrom asked Jordan about his use of narrative in his films and his boxes.

PAUL KARLSTROM: ... In the boxes themselves there are elements that would be seen very much or possibly as narratives. That is to say that there would be the appearance of stories. In fact, your boxes, I must say, the part that is delightful about them is there are these stories that you can’t really recognize what they say, but they are stories. And then you think of some element like the toucans or whatever they are—those very beautiful—you like those birds and their beaks and their feathers. And I’m not trying to pin you down, but these are the questions that people would say—why is it that Jordan keeps sticking these wonderful birds? Sometimes they move. How do you answer that to yourself?

LARRY JORDAN: Right. That’s a really good question. Yeah—the narrative element. One story, one anecdote here we can permit ourselves?

PAUL KARLSTROM: Absolutely.

LARRY JORDAN: I had done a five-minute collage animation film called *Masquerade*. I concentrated very hard on animating to the music, Vivaldi, *Largo*. The background is a winter scene. Evidently there had been a masquerade ball, and now we have two duelists in the snow, one dying. It was obvious that there was a story in the background, but I wasn't concentrating on making a story. I was concentrating on making the movement go with the music. And after the film had been out and about for a year, Channel 13 in New York, a PBS station, contacted me and they wanted to include this on a program of narrative films. And my jaw dropped, and I went and I looked at the film, and right there in front of my eyes is the whole narrative, but I didn't consciously make it. So the narratives that come out of the film are more like tales than a story—a tale like a fairy tale that comes out as long as I'm kinda unconscious about it. I'm very deeply into stories: *A Thousand and One Nights*, fairy tales, psychological. I'm quite interested in depth psychology. Maria Louise Von Franz's writing on fairy tales, and I've got the complete set of Oz books, etc.

PAUL KARLSTROM: They're right up there above you on the bookshelf.

LARRY JORDAN: Yeah. So stories are just probably so natural in my mind that I'm not even thinking about them. And if they come out in the boxes, that's fine. Where I have trouble and what I have to watch out against is self-conscious stories and self-conscious humor. I'm always delighted if something funny happens in one of the animation films or one of the boxes. But if I try to make it funny, it's dreadful. So, if it happens, that's fine. But I've got to keep in a realm of letting these things take shape without—that's what I teach my students not to force the issue, not to consciously, willfully make material try to conform to some idea in the mind. Nobody ever said that what we have in our conscious mind is so great. Yeah, so narrative elements do appear because I'm so—I read classic literature all the time. I'm reading *Pickwick Papers* right now. One tumbling little story after another, and my head's just full of them. But I'm not trying to invent visual stories. They just occur. And that's about where I want it.⁵⁰²

Jordan returned to the point in a second interview (with the same interviewer), conducted almost six months later.

This is as good a time as any to get clear on “story” and narrative. Narratives are eternal verities. Stories are told before written language, told around the primitive campfire, stories about animals and heroes, instructing the children on how to deal with life. Narratives told how to handle life and they still are just exactly that, true stories, tell how the character that we're interested in handles life. That's story; that's narrative. Now, narrative as we generally use the word, is from the story teller, completely worked out in the mind of the story teller, transferred as directly as possible according to skills of the story teller into the mind of the listener, whole and intact, the idea complete. In my work, the story is interactive. I put up narrative elements, elements of narrative that are out of place, that shouldn't be where they appear, and the viewer has to tell

him or herself the real or complete meaning of the story. This is a new kind of presenting narrative à la surrealism, and that's what I do.⁵⁰³

SECTION III: TRANSCENDENT BALL (SEQUENCES 13–27)

The shots in this section suggest rising actions. As this section begins, we no longer follow a score that takes us into a lyrical world of fascinating motion, but instead enter a world where gravity no longer holds things down—a transcendent world of levitations, in which medicine bottles are released from gravity (unlike the ball's bouncing, arcing, and rolling movements, which do conform to familiar physical laws). Sequence 13 shows medicine bottles rotating around a chemistry stand, mimicking the circular motions of a ball in a round container. Floating balloons (sequence 14), flying eagles that grasp these drifting balloons (sequence 15 and 16), and a flickering ball that resembles an asteroid and that finally explodes into stars and soaring butterflies (sequence 17) all suggest a movement upwards into a transcendent realm. The section's finale depicts explosions that cause butterflies, birds, and flickering balls to erupt out of a circular border (sequence 18). We have entered the realm of celestial forms, where the reality is far removed from that of our everyday lives, but which Jordan implies is just as real: "The imagery in my animated films has always concerned unknown continents and landscapes of the mind. Some call this a real place."⁵⁰⁴

This transcendent place could very well be our own inner divinity, a "higher" realm to which Jordan's images of levitation transport us. Sequence 19 shows two humanlike figures clasping a flickering (mystical) ball, as if the ball were lifting them (and us) to a higher plane. Spheres, hot-air balloons, and butterfly wings continue to float upwards. This section culminates with the moon absorbing these floating objects into its landscape (sequence 26). The moon's unearthly landscape, far removed from our own, is an image of an alternative reality. Table 2 shows the ascending images, with the explosion of stars, butterflies, and balls rising to a heavenly apex and finally bringing us to the moon.

At some point while watching the film, then, viewers will realize that this film offers no consistent diegetic time (no illusion of a consistent time in which all the film's events unfold). When that insight occurs will differ among different viewers and on different occasions. But that recognition will dawn upon each viewer—and generally somewhere around this point. The recognition is accompanied by release of tension: until we arrive at that insight, we long to order the events the film depicts into a coherent progression, and we feel at least a measure of frustration that we cannot. The dawning of that understanding releases that tension, and we are able to settle into a different and more gracious experience of time, one in which the cinematic time and the time of perception coincide.

P. Adams Sitney noted acutely that the release of tension, and this settling into a more gracious experience of time, is experienced as a “healing moment,” in which cinematic time and time of perception coincide. I suggest that we can think of the “healing moment” to which Sitney refers as a moment in which distance and negativity evaporate and leave one experiencing in a direct, lucid fashion.⁵⁰⁵ The breakthrough moment happens (as Sitney notes) when we recognize that the time in which the represented events occur is identical with the time when we see them; this recognition elicits a sense of integration, of wholeness (our experience is no longer divided between diegetic time and viewing time), of release, of delight, of the overcoming of any negative moment in experience, of complete presence.⁵⁰⁶

Paul Karlstrom queried Jordan about Sitney’s insightful comment. Jordan’s response confirms my paragone thesis. Regarding cinematic time (the time in which the represented events unfold), Jordan remarked,

[The character of cinematic time marks] a revolution in art . . . It’s not the time of novels. You might read a novel in three hours if you’re a fast reader at one sitting, or you might read it [in] three weeks if you take it piece by piece, in, you know, a leisurely fashion. So the narrative written form is not cinematic time because you go into the cinema; you pay your money. You go in and unless the movie is just completely outrageous and it bores you to tears, you don’t leave. You see the work all in one gulp, and that’s revolutionary, but it relates to the theater, okay. Theater is similar, but cinema has much more capacity to change from location to location, from mode to mode. Cinematic time is definitely a product of the modern world.⁵⁰⁷

SECTION IV: EVANESCENCE (SEQUENCES 28–33)

Where Ernst slammed together radically incongruous images from . . . found material and thereby released the terrors of monstrosities and the sensual depths of inconceivable landscapes, Jordan has chosen to refine their delicacy and to push his images almost to the point of evanescence—a limit represented in several collages by the reductive metaphor of a film within a collage-film flickering with pure imageless light.⁵⁰⁸

The theme switches briefly from the idea of transcendence that dominated in the previous section, though we are still invited to enter a fantasy land where “the man on the moon” makes an appearance in the craterlike landscape of sequence 27. This short section elaborates the theme of ephemerality (offering flickering lights and flying objects as examples of evanescence). Seemingly incongruous, or at least extravagant, juxtapositions proliferate, and these seem to stress the emptiness, the vanity, at the core of things. The reality of their forms seems secondary: thus, we see a ball with bird’s wings that turns into a flickering ball of light, from which stars flow out in all directions (sequence 28),

as freedom (the bird) becomes a transcendent reality (flickering light). Yet we accept such unreality, because the movements themselves seem plausible. The unreality of the imagery continues to suggest the transcendent world of section III—in sequence 31 we see butterflies, moths, and birds (all symbols of the spirit's freedom) fluttering around a bearded man (reminiscent of the man on the moon?); in sequence 32, a young girl with bird wings, then a young boy with butterfly wings, gliding across the moon; in sequence 33, a Greek statue of male figures, illuminated by a flickering ball of light, turning around and around again against the night sky.

SECTION V: THE MOON THROUGH A LENS (SEQUENCES 34–41)

The moon has been the central image in these last few sections and continues to be so in this section. Here Jordan suggests that the protagonist explores the moon's landscape through visual instruments (an allusion to the cinematic apparatus and its capacity to enhance our vision and, representing the impaired self in search of the gnosis, to transport us to distant places). A bandaged head (seen in previous sequences) looks through a telescope while the moon reacts to the presence of the man with the telescope (sequence 34). The following sequence shows the moon rotating and getting bigger, and we assume that the bandaged head directs the movement of the moon through the telescope. A man manipulating a projector (here cinematic projection is associated with the higher reality, light—it is a machine that performs the emanationist metaphysics of neo-Platonic philosophy) also seems to influence the moon's rotations, while the familiar evanescent flickering ball emits light for the projector (sequence 36). The moon merges real and unreal attributes. It seems far away (it is seen through the telescope), but it is a projection from our own minds (the projector—the cinema, light, and mind are thus identified). Thus, it assumes a lively, distant charm.

SECTION VI: METAMORPHOSIS (SEQUENCES 42–55)

Projected and flickering light, flying butterflies, and birds remain central to this section, stressing the theme of transcendence and evanescence. There is another motif in this section, one that dominates the rest of the film: objects get trapped (in base matter) and are released many times—often they are released when they change their forms. A young boy appears to be playing with the flickering ball/light (sequence 42), a couple of hemispheric lids enter the frame and close around the ball. The lids open up, releasing the ball, but now it doesn't flicker (sequence 43). The flickering ball has changed its essence: instead of issuing pulsating light (signifying that it possesses some magical quality), it now has only the quotidian qualities of a bouncing ball. Sequence 44 also shows a flickering ball being trapped within these hemispheric lids (cf.

the alchemist's athanor), but this time a flower (something marvellous and beautiful) emerges when the lids reopen. We infer that the lids can degrade or enhance the object they enclose, that they can turn an object into something quotidian or something of astonishing beauty. The lids' womblike shape suggests that its form gives birth to the flower and so suggests its erotic and generative power (thus identifying eros with the alchemical process by which *coniunctio* brings forth the new person, the Young Prince). A projector in the following sequence (45) then casts a beam of light (similar to that which the projector cast onto the moon in the previous section) onto this flower. When the ball is released from this enclosure, its appearance has changed. Hence, we associate the flickering ball's confinement within these hemispheric lids with death and transfiguration (certain of its qualities are extinguished and others made manifest).

The section suggests a continuous creative cycle, with objects going from one metamorphosis to another (much as do butterflies, which appear often in this film). The section evokes a sense of incessant flux, movement, and change: it equates artistic creation with transformation and spiritual evolution. But—what is most germane to the thesis of this book—the section shows that Jordan conceives of the cinema's power as eventually alchemical. The cinema is an occult-influencing device, through which the high mind enters us, for Mind is borne by light.

Part Two: Patricia Gives Birth to a Dream by the Doorway

INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR REVISITED

Sequence 1

Patricia stands at a doorway looking out towards a lake. This image remains static throughout the segment, while a variety of activities occur in Patricia's field of vision. The forms that appear in front of Patricia develop the same themes that the first part of the film dealt with: juxtapositions of incongruent elements create new realities; objects appear to levitate—to fly, flutter, or float into the sky (alluding to the alchemical process of separation, which operates through differentially volatilizing different elements of the spirit); evanescent light and flickering objects hint at another reality, of light rather than form; and forms metamorphose into other forms.

Sitney points out, acutely, that

the background picture of *Patricia* returns us to the moment when the American avant-garde film found its first image of interiority, that is to the image of Maya Deren pressing her hands against the window in *Meshes of the Afternoon* (1943) to gaze inwardly upon a double of herself chasing the black-robed mirror-faced figure. The doorway in which Patricia stands is both the port of

exchange and the barrier between the inner and outer worlds, as Maya Deren's window and before her Mallarmé's *fenêtre* had been.⁵⁰⁹

Patricia remains a fixed presence throughout the section. At several points in the piece, a screen appears and then disappears. Forms appear on the screen, and the procession of these appearances suggests the streaming of objects through time. These objects' reality is as phantasmal as cinematic images (and suggests that the cinematic objects, dreams, and quotidian world all have the same reality quotient: objects fall out of the screen as though they are too solid and real); still others enter the screen from the "exterior" landscape (suggesting fusion of imagination and reality, but also posing the question whether on-screen or off-screen space is more imaginary).

This short piece involves intricate interactions among various "realities." We have our viewpoint, looking into the film from our outer, "real" world. Patricia looks out her doorway, from her "real" world—another external vantage point—onto the landscape. The world she looks at is made up of various "imaginary" forms, including a screen that is populated with imaginary objects, projections of her psyche. But we also watch a screen that is populated with wondrous forms that we can easily take to be projections of our own fantasies (though are they really Jordan's automatic fantasies that come from what reality?). The real and the unreal mingle here, just as they did throughout Part One.

Sequence 2

An elephant (half the size of the woman) comes into the frame at the top left, holding a flower with its trunk, lowered in some sort of suspension device; midway in its descent, the elephant is released from the suspension device, but continues (its motion unaffected) to move down and exits the frame at the bottom, while the device remains hanging from the top of the screen, disappearing when the elephant has left the frame.

The following scenes involve small objects that appear within the woman's view of the sky and lake.

Sequence 3

A hand with its index finger extended enters the frame from behind the left side of the doorway—it points at the sky, where a white female statue with missing arms appears (its base against the surface of the lake). The hand moves out of the frame, and a kernel enters the frame at the top right and releases a seed/ball (larger than the head of the statue), which falls to the surface of the lake. Two figures jump out before the kernel leaves the frame to the left of the doorway.

Jordan's use of the *mise-en-abîme* structure (with views looking at Patricia looking at the scene that itself contains screened images) invites us to identify with Patricia. But the second sequence introduces a tension into this identi-

cation. We cannot see where the elephant in sequence 2 comes from, or where it goes (and the elephant's appearance and disappearance impresses upon us the artificial, the unreal, the fantastic character of all that we see in this part of the film). Yet, if we were to put ourselves in Patricia's position, we might be able to see where the elephant came from and where it went. This discrepancy draws our attention to the difference in the reality quotient between our view and Patricia's—the space beyond the door is continuous with her reality but not with ours (and that difference suggests that one's perspective will decide what one takes as reality and as unreality).

Sequence 4

A square screen appears in the out-of-doors; on it we see (an image of) an elephant walking through water—the elephant has large butterfly wings (the size of the elephant ears) that extend from where the eyes would be, and they move up and down.

Sequence 11

A lion with bird wings comes in from the right on the surface of the lake; the hand appears on the top left pointing down, then disappears; a screen appears on a stand where the wheel had been—on the screen is a picture of a man attempting to approach a wild cat (tiger, jaguar, etc.); the screen and lion disappear.

Sequence 13

A square screen appears on top of the stand centred in the out-of-doors; the picture on the screen is of two birds on a branch; their wings flutter periodically, then the screen begins to flicker and a new picture appears, of a boy with his hands in his pockets standing in front of two large (slightly longer than the boy) serpent-like fish lying on the ground; a small egg (of similar size to the boy's head) with butterfly wings appears in the picture at the bottom, and then moves away (leaving the screen at the top right); the kernel enters from the top right and releases the seed/ball into the picture on the screen, then moves back out; the seed/ball falls to the ground and a large full-grown poppy pops up (it is slightly larger than the boy) and begins to sway from side to side; the screen flickers and a new picture appears, a wasp in front of a flower, its wings fluttering; the screen flickers and a new picture appears, a penguin standing next to a beehive—bees/wasps fly around in and out of the picture (some disappearing when leaving the boundary of the picture); the screen flickers and a new projected image appears, of machinery of some sort, with two wheels towards the top of its sides, that falls into the water behind Patricia—ripples emerge, expanding from the right; a sketch of a woman's profile appears on the screen; the screen disappears.

I have noted that the egg, the *ovum philosophicum*, or philosophical egg, is a common alchemical image. In alchemical iconography, it symbolizes the alchemical vessel, which in turn symbolizes the self. During the alchemical

process, the subject, hermetically sealed in the egg, would go through a symbolic death and rebirth. The seed represents the One, which alchemists call the Alkahest, from which proceed Mercury, Sulphur, and Salt, from which proceed the Many.

The ambiguity that we had to face earlier, in trying to assess whether to take frame boundaries as marking the end of one reality and the beginning of another, is raised again by the appearance of the screen in sequences 4 and 13. In sequence 4, the butterfly wings that cover the elephant's eyes extend beyond the screen's boundaries as if interacting with the external landscape. In sequence 13, we are no longer just looking into the screen, and we have to accept that objects enter the screen from the outside (from the environment of the lake) and leave the screen to go back into (or re-enter) this unseen external environment. Butterflies fly out of the top of the screen; kernels drop seeds into the screen as though the space of the image were continuous with that of the environment (suggesting the continuity of imagination and reality). In the previous sequences (2 and 3), the space on the screen did not extend beyond the frame boundaries, but in sequences 4 and 13, the space around the screen seems to be continuous with the space within the frame.

All the elements in sequence 11 are contained within the screen. In its case, though, there is no movement on the screen, only a prolonged stillness uncharacteristic of moving images. For this reason, we question the role of the screen in this section—it certainly does not function as a surface onto which self-contained moving pictures (pictures that have a reality quotient different from that which objects in the circumambient world have) are projected; it is more like a medium in which memory forms become momentarily real.

In sequence 13, some of the wasps that fly out of the screen seem to pass through the doorway in which Patricia is standing. The screen represents Patricia's imagination; now forms conceived in her imagination invade her personal space (the inside of the house where she is situated).

NOTES

- 1 Older academics will understand that the universities that now direct their labour, channelling it into one life-denying enterprise or another, have not even a smidgeon of resemblance to the ideal of the university to which they decided to devote their lives; others as well will recognize that the neo-liberal, entrepreneurial university has trivialized thinking.
- 2 The philosophy of Husserl can serve as an example of the project of founding a new epistemology based on evidence internal to the "data" of consciousness.
- 3 *Les mamelles de Tirésias* was published in a monthly literary review titled *SIC* as "Les mamelles de Tirésias. Drame surréaliste en deux actes et un prologue. Avec la Musique de Germaine Albert-Birot et Sept Dessins Hors Texte de Serge Ferat." As that note

- indicates, the text of the play was eight pages of music notes and seven *hors-texte* plates by the Russian-French painter Serge Ferat (Sergei Nikolayevich Iastrebov). Serge Ferat was the half-brother of Baroness Hélène d'Oettingen, who had also designed the costumes for the play in 1917.
- 4 Louis Aragon, quoted in Steven Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage: The Story of Surrealist Cinema* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 23.
 - 5 *Ibid.*, 25.
 - 6 André Breton, *Communicating Vessels* (originally published as *Les vases communicantes*, 1932), trans. Mary Ann Caws and Geoffrey T. Harris (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 9.
 - 7 See Arthur Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 1:229, 234, 273.
 - 8 Breton, *Communicating Vessels*, 9.
 - 9 Georg (György) Lukács, "Zu einer Aesthetik des Kinos," *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 10 September 1913. This excerpt appears in Standish Lawder, *The Cubist Cinema* (New York: NYU Press, 1975), 27. The translation is Lawder's. Lukács's ideas of the emptiness of the film image anticipate Debord's ideas on the society of the spectacle and Baudrillard's ideas about the precession of the simulacrum.
 - 10 Breton's "Le surréalisme et la peinture" appeared in *La révolution surréaliste* 1 (July 1925).
 - 11 Breton developed the technique of automatic writing in the early 1920s. Very soon after, André Masson developed a similar technique: he allowed his pen to wander, without any harbouring conscious thoughts of composition or subject matter. The "first drafts" of Masson's automatic drawings were usually executed in a trancelike state; these suggested associations to him, which he sometimes used later to enhance the image (i.e., to endow it with the density required of a poetic image). Masson made these additions to the image in the same rapid spirit as the initial drawing, and he also made sure the image was ambiguous enough to have multiple readings—that is, he made additions that guaranteed the image was sufficiently "poetic."
 - 12 By the end of the 1920s, Breton's interest in automatism had waned, and he focused on endowing his images with the properties of dreams. He demanded that other Surrealists follow him in this, and he and André Masson parted ways.
 - 13 Salvador Dalí, from a letter to Federico García Lorca, in Haim Finkelstein, ed. and trans., *The Collected Writings of Salvador Dalí* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14.
 - 14 The importance of these two poles of Surrealist practice was established by the 1966 exhibition at New York's Museum of Modern Art, *Dada, Surrealism, and Their Heritage*, curated by William Rubin, as an effort to produce a conspectus of those movements that could serve as a foundation for a concise critical framework for them. See William Rubin, "Toward a Critical Framework," *Artforum* 5, no. 1 (September 1966). Breton's "Le surréalisme et la peinture" appeared in *La révolution surréaliste* 1 (July 1925).
 - 15 F.T. Marinetti, "Destruction of Syntax—Imagination without Strings—Words-in-Freedom 1913," in Umbro Apollonio, ed., *Futurist Manifestos*, trans. Robert Brain, R.W. Flint, J.C. Higgitt, and Carolline Tisdall (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 100.
 - 16 This is a modern way of experiencing: speed forges all existents into a unity—even pure contraries are unified, as all is subsumed in the Absolute of velocity. The Surrealists were not so deeply committed to modern experience as the Futurists: theirs was a more ambivalent, conflicted view; nevertheless, their interest in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel helped make the Futurist idea of the unification of opposites in the Absolute appealing, and it had considerable influence on them.

- 17 Pavle Levi, "Cinema by Other Means" *October* 131 (Winter 2010): 51–68 at 51. Levi also points out that Man Ray backed away from the ideas that led him into the cinema. In the mid-1930s, he wrote that

a book, a painting, a sculpture, a drawing, a photograph, and any concrete object are always at one's disposition, to be appreciated or ignored, whereas a spectacle before an assemblage insists on the general attention, limited to the period of presentation... I prefer the permanent immobility of a static work which allows me to make my deductions at my leisure, without being distracted by attending circumstances. And so, the last few years before the war, in between my professional photographic activities, I concentrated on painting, drawing, and the making of Surrealist objects—a substitute for sculpture—which figured in magazines and exhibitions sponsored by the group (Man Ray, *Self Portrait* [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963], 286–87).

Here Ray was renouncing the idea that the cinema was the paragon of the arts and that all other media were in danger of being reduced to its epigones.

This might be seen as a "counter-example" to the central thesis of this book (and the other books in the series to which it belongs)—that the cinema served in late modernity as a model guiding artists involved in various vanguard movements for how other media should be recast. I do not think it should be taken in that way: I construe it as a statement by an artist who recognized the appeal of adopting the cinema as the top art and of creating forms in various media that have cinematic attributes, but who also recognized the potential problems with that approach.

- 18 M.E. Warlick, *Max Ernst and Alchemy: A Magician in Search of Myth* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 29. Warlick cites the quoted section in this passage as drawn from René Allendy, "L'occultisme nouveau," *Le Voile d'Isis*, 14th sér. (1920), 3.

Regarding Warlick's claim that earlier writers continued to publish into the 1920s and 1930s, she notes, "Papus [Gérard Encausse] died during the war, but several books originally published in the 1880s and 1890s were reprinted throughout the first quarter of the century, such as *Traité élémentaire de science occulte* (Paris: Chacornac, 1906 and A. Michel, 1926). See also Marie-Sophie André and Christophe Beaufile, *Papus biographie: La Belle Epoque de l'occultisme* (Paris: Berg, 1995). Oswald Wirth lived until 1943 and continued to publish hermetic books, including *Le tarot des imagiers du Moyen Age* (Paris: E. Nourry, 1927) and *Le symbolisme hermétique dans ses rapports avec l'alchimie et la Francmaçonnerie* (Paris: Dervy-Livres, 1930)" (ibid., 228n54).

Regarding the unprecedented availability of material for the occult bibliophile, Warlick notes, "In preparation for *An Encyclopedic Outline of Masonic, Hermetic, Quab-balistic and Rosicrucian Symbolical Philosophy* (San Francisco: H.S. Crocker, 1928), Manly Hall began collecting hermetic books in 1922, having great success in London at the Marks Bookstore and then at the firm of Dorbon-ainé in Paris. The 1930 edition of Dorbon-ainé's catalog *Bibliotheca Esoterica* listed more than six thousand works. Hall's alchemical collection, gathered over sixty years, was presented in *Alchemy: A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Manly P. Hall Collection of Books and Manuscripts* (Los Angeles: Philosophical Research Society, 1986), xiii" (ibid., 228n55).

- 19 Bailly took over the bookstore from Edouard Dujardin, editor of *La revue indépendante* and *La revue Wagnérienne*. Paul Verlaine frequented the bookshop in Dujardin's day.
- 20 Victor-Émile Michelet, *Les compagnons de la hiérophanie, souvenirs du mouvement hermétiste à la fin du xix^e siècle* (Paris: Dorbon-Ainé, 1937), 73, 75.
- 21 Ibid., 67.

- 22 A description and analysis of August Strindberg's efforts at transmuting other metals into gold (efforts he reported on in *L'hyperchimique*) can be found in George B. Kauffmann, "August Strindberg, Goldmaker," http://www.goldbulletin.org/assets/file/goldbulletin/downloads/Kauffman_2_21.pdf.
- 23 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's involvement in Spiritualism was especially important, at least in the English-speaking world. He published *The History of Spiritualism* in 1926 and remained a committed follower for the rest of his life. Sir Arthur lost a son in the Great War and shortly afterwards embraced Spiritualism.
- 24 The girls are said to have discovered that if they clapped, the revenant would respond with rapping sounds. The girls and the spirit of the departed learned, thus, to communicate: one pattern of raps meant yes and another pattern meant no—they even had patterns for each letter of the alphabet. The spirit communicated that he had been murdered by former residents and that if their basement was excavated, they would find his body. The basement was excavated; human teeth, hair, and bones were discovered, and the press had a field day. The girls' older sister soon put them in touch with a press agent and business manager named Eliab W. Capron, who had them communicating with the spirit of Benjamin Franklin during public exhibitions. Capron helped the Fox sisters turn their communications with spectres into public spectacles, in that he helped them discover that spirits were also capable of telekinesis—of relocating furniture and levitating tables. Capron's first series of public presentations of the Fox sisters took place with the assistance of George Willets, at the Corinthian Hall in Rochester, over four days (Wednesday the 14th through Saturday the 17th) in November 1849. Capron provided a spoken introduction to the presentations that located the phenomenon at the intersection of two lines of development: the first line, of scientific discovery, involved Capron's claim that the discovery of a new means of "telegraphic dispatches" from the spirit land" was comparable to "the substantial discoveries and inventions" of Galileo, Newton, and Fulton; the second line grew out of the heritage of the marvellous, of wonders, reflected in the biblical accounts of miracles. The event was the subject of a lengthy write-up in the *Rochester Daily Democrat*, 16 November 1849 ("A Ghost!," 2col3), which ascribed the term "telegraphic dispatches" to Capron. It was also covered in the *Rochester Daily American*, 20 November 1849 ("Mysterious Knocking," 2col5). Brief notices, two or three sentences in length, also appeared in the *Daily American*, 15 November 1849 ("Mysterious Knocking, Again," 2col3); the *Daily American*, 16 November 1849 ("And Still It Raps," 2col3); and the *Daily American*, 17 November 1849 ("Knock! Knock!! Knock!!!," 2col3). The presentations were well advertised: one notice, headlined "WONDERFUL PHENOMENA, AT CORINTHIAN HALL" (capitals in original) appeared in the *Rochester Daily Advertiser*, 14 November 1849 (2col5) and in the *Rochester Daily Democrat* of the same day (2col7). Despite the advertising, the attendance likely fell short of expectations, for from the ad in the *Daily Democrat* of 16 November (2col8) and the one in the *Daily Advertiser* of 17 November, as well as from the "Mysterious Knocking" notice in the *Daily American* of 20 November, we learn that the price of admission for the last two days was cut in half (reduced from the 25 cents of the first two days to 12½ cents).

Two weeks after he first gave it, Capron's commentary was printed in the *New York Daily Tribune* (Eliab W. Capron and George Willets, "Singular Revelations: Communications with Spirits in Western New York," *Daily Tribune*, 29 November 1849, 2cols1–2) and reprinted in the *Tribune's* national edition, the *New York Weekly Tribune* (both edited by Horace Greeley). Six weeks later, in January 1850, Capron, along with

Henry D. Barron, published a short book on the Fox sisters, *Singular Revelations: Explanation and History of the Mysterious Communion with Spirits* (Auburn: Finn and Rockewell, Printers). That book was prominently reviewed in both the *Daily Tribune* and the *Weekly Tribune*.

Four months later, the sisters set out on their first tour, with presentations in Albany, Troy, and New York City. In time, P.T. Barnum got a piece of the action. After a slow start, fascination with the phenomenon spread, and soon it began to manifest itself in other families. In 1852, the first American Spiritualists, Mrs. Hayden and Mrs. Roberts, presented themselves. Soon, Mrs. Hayden travelled to England and séances were being held in Strasbourg, Bourges, and Paris.

That modern Spiritualism had its origins in the “Burned-Over District,” along the Erie Canal, south of Rochester, New York, is not very surprising. The region was deeply affected by The Second Great Awakening, has originated many movements in American religion, and has been fertile ground for breeding spiritual ideas of all varieties. The region was given its nickname because wave after wave of religious passion—first Joseph Smith’s church of the Latter Day Saints, then Shakerism and the Adventism of William Miller—swept over the region; the region was also the home of the Oneida Society, which practiced group marriage. But there is another factor that may have played a role in making Rochester receptive to ideas about communication with the dead: in the years from 1846 to 1848, Henry O’Reilly, a former postmaster and newspaper publisher, stimulated tremendous enthusiasm for a visionary plan—financing the westward expansion of a novel communications technology, the telegraph. Rochester’s citizens poured their resources into the project, and by 1855, the corporation they had helped finance reorganized after it had crushed all its rivals; its name was Western Union. Western Union’s counterpart on the Atlantic coast was centred in New York City (and one of its leading supporters was Horace Greeley); that corporation was the forerunner of AT&T. The age did connect telegraphy and spiritual telegraphy.

- 25 Spiritualism had almost vanished from the United States at this time. Perhaps this helps account for the hostile reception that Surrealism had in the United States. The July 1937 issue of *The Commonweal* declared Surrealism a passing threat that would soon be laughed out of existence. That same month, *Harper’s* ran a veritable tirade against DADA and the frightful imps who slavishly followed it in its disorder. The September 1937 issue of *The Nation* ran an attack on Herbert Read, by no less a critic than Meyer Shapiro, that lambasted the Surrealists for rankness and destructiveness (Shapiro did provide an accurate summary of some of Surrealism’s leading ideas). Jean Charlot presented a peculiar essay in *The American Scholar* for April 1938 that, on the one hand, implied Surrealism was mostly a commercially motivated hoax and, on the other hand, acknowledged its spiritual value.
- 26 Though he does mention Scrutator’s 1910 *Occult Review* article on “Automatic Drawing.”
- 27 In André Breton, *What Is Surrealism? Selected Writings*, ed. Franklin Rosemont (London: Pluto Press, 1978), 100.
- 28 His interest in these writers persisted. In “Le message automatique,” *Minotaure* 3–4 (1933): 55–65, Breton again referred to the “psychologie gothique” of F.W.H. Myers, noting that he had studied it before encountering Freud. He then went on to say that he (actually “we”) profited by following the wonderful psychology of Th. Flournoy. The article also reprinted examples of Hélène Smith’s Martian writing (from Flournoy’s *Des Indes à la planète Mars: étude sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie*, 1900), her ultramartian signs (from Flournoy’s *Nouvelles observations sur un cas de somnambulisme*

avec glossolalie, 1901), and her Uranian writing (also from *Nouvelles observations*). Breton also referred to the work of Charcot and Dr. von Schrenk-Notzing.

- 29 Against Charcot and Janet, who maintained that hysteria depends upon a predisposition towards dissociation, the Nancy school, and Babinski (at least after he broke with his form teacher Charcot), maintained that hypersuggestibility is the principal characteristic of hysteria.

The Nancy school, which was affiliated with the University of Nancy, was made up of four very different men. The eldest was Ambroise-Auguste Liébeault (1823–1904), essentially a country doctor who had been influenced by reading the works of the Scottish surgeon James Braid (1795–1860); he had a deep interest in the traditional and, by then, nearly obsolete practice of mesmerism. He forsook conventional medicine to do hypnotherapy almost exclusively, and he was soon attracting very large public healing sessions. Liébeault was joined by Hyppolite Bernheim (1840–1919), who became the actual leader of the school. Bernheim was the author of a number of well-regarded treatises on hypnotism. Jules Liégeois, a lawyer, and Étienne Beaunis, a forensic expert, were the other two members; they studied the legal implications of hypnosis and suggestion.

The key theme of Bernheim's writings was that induced hypnosis was not a physical act or process but rather a psychic phenomenon, usually initiated by a verbal suggestion. The Nancy school focused on the rapport between the hypnotist and the hypnotized. That rapport (whether or not it was instrumental in producing hypnosis) was definitely erotic; but this feature the Nancy school ignored.

Sigmund Freud visited Bernheim and the Nancy school in 1889 and witnessed their work with experimental subjects.

- 30 André Breton, *Conversations: The Autobiography of Surrealism: with André Parinaud and others*, trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Paragon House, 1993), 60.

Breton expressed less admiration for Freud elsewhere, though his reasons for disparaging Freud are utterly disreputable. In *La révolution surréaliste* 11 (March 1928), André Breton and Louis Aragon published a joint manifesto praising the "Invention of Hysteria" and celebrating the phenomenon as "the greatest poetic discovery of the latter part of the century." That piece lauds Charcot for turning the amphitheatre of La Salpêtrière into a performance space where female patients mounted displays for a fashionable crowd. Freud is criticized for his conservatism in regard to something they find admirable: that La Salpêtrière's interns regularly slept with their beautiful hysterical patients. "Does Freud, who owes so much to Charcot, remember the time when, according to the survivors' account, the interns of La Salpêtrière refused to separate their professional duty and their taste for love, and when night fell, the patients would either visit them outside or they would meet the patients in their beds?" Foreshadowing Lacan's notion of feminine *jouissance* of the 1970s, Breton and Aragon identified hysteria with mystical and erotic ecstasy.

Charles Richet was a physiologist and "psychical researcher," and besides him as psychical researchers, there were in the France of his time Joseph Maxwell, Camille Flammarion, Eugène Rochas, Paul Joire, Emile Boirac, Gustav Geley, and Eugène Gabriel Delanne founded the *Revue scientifique et morale du spiritisme*. The first attempt at organized psychical research was conducted by La Société de Psychologie Physiologique (founded in 1855) and its results were presented in its journal, *La revue des sciences psychiques*.

The *Annales des sciences psychiques* was founded in 1890, with Richet and a Dr. Puel as directors. In 1904, the Institut Général Psychologique was established in Paris to pursue

psychical research; its first presidents were Professor Duclaux (Pasteur's successor at the prestigious Institut Pasteur) and M. d'Arsonval (member of the Académie Française). Following the intervention of Czar Nicholas, the French government authorized a lottery for the benefit of the institute, and it raised 800,000 francs.

Reflecting the interest in Spiritualism and other occult phenomena after the Great War, an Institut Métapsychique was founded in 1918 by Jean Meyer (a wealthy industrialist and benefactor of causes relating to parascience and parapsiritality: besides the Institut Métapsychique, he endowed La Maison des Spirits to propagate Spiritualism), with Charles Richet and Camille Flammarion on its executive committee. In 1920, *Annales des Sciences Psychiques* was replaced by *La revue métapsychique*, the official organ of the Institut Métapsychique.

The most famous work of the Institut Métapsychique was investigating the case of Eva Carrière (discussed in the text). Another famous case it investigated was that of the Austrian Rudi Schneider (1908–57), one of four brothers reputed to be capable of producing mediumistic phenomena. The medium produced an invisible substance that—though it could not be seen—could intercept an infrared ray, interrupting a photo-electric circuit in the specially designed apparatus of which it was a part, which would trigger a camera to expose a photographic plate. During trials, the device was activated and investigators found that Schneider had no role in setting it off. Eugène Osty (1874–1938), the head of the institute in the 1930s when these experiments took place, concluded that the motion the apparatus recorded was the telekinetically aroused stirrings of ectoplasmic substance. Eugène and his son Marcel published a pamphlet on the case, *Les pouvoirs inconnus de l'esprit sur la matière: premières étapes d'une recherche* (Unknown Power of the Spirit Over Matter) (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932). The terms in which Osty explained what was observed are germane to our study, for it related occult phenomena to electromagnetism. "Considered as a whole, the human body is a tank and a transformer of surrounding energy," Osty wrote. The ectoplasm that appeared during these sessions was produced from Schneider's hyperexcited central nervous system.

- 31 Published Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889; new edition: Paris: Société Pierre Janet, 1973. While it developed aspects of his earlier work, *L'automatisme psychologique* also represented something of a departure in Janet's work. Earlier work he had done concerned dissociation—that is, centres of consciousness dissociated from primary consciousness. With *L'automatisme psychologique*, automatism became his primary principle for the explanation of hysteria.
- 32 Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889; new edition: Paris: Société Pierre Janet, 1973.
- 33 Janet studied the automatic behaviour of mediums in order to gauge the extent to which the subconscious interacts with the conscious during a trance.
- 34 One of the remarkable philosophical implications of the psychological model that Janet presented in *L'automatisme psychologique* is that it dismissed the traditional view of mind, which made sharp distinctions among intellect, affect, and will. Janet proposed that wherever feeling or sensation is found (at the very lowest levels of psychic life), movement also exists. All consciousness (including sensation) requires activity, and ideation is driven by a force that seeks to develop into action. In this, Janet developed a French psychological tradition, evident in the writings of the psychologist and philosopher Maine de Biran (1766–1824) and Taine (both writers the Surrealists read), that there is a conscious component to all human activity.
- 35 In this work, I have been arguing that avant-garde art movements of the early twentieth century were committed to achieving a wider scope for primal forms of consciousness.

- 36 Charcot's experiments with hypnotism, which began in 1878, owe a great deal to Dr. Broca's use of hypnotism in surgery. (See Paul Richer and Georges Gilles de la Tourette's entry for "hypnotism" in the *Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences médicales*, 4th series, 15 [1889]: 70.) In 1882, Charcot was appointed to a position created especially for him at La Salpêtrière hospital; that same year, he delivered a lecture at the Académie des sciences during which he advocated making magnetism—which he referred to by the name "hypnotism"—a respectable therapy.

In fact, the term "hysteria" was applied to a broad range of disorders that are now categorized as dissociation, somatization, conversion, borderline personality, and post-traumatic stress disorders.

- 37 Published Paris: Rueff & Cie., 1893 and 1894, respectively. Pierre Janet produced an expanded second edition of *L'état mental des hystériques* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911; reprint: Marseille: Lafitte Reprints, 1983) in two parts. Both parts were published in English translation: *The Mental State of Hystericals* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1901; reprint: Washington: University Publications of America, 1977). In distinguishing between the stigmata and the accidents of hysteria, Janet was following a tradition of symptomatology: stigmata are the essential constitutive symptoms of an illness (they are as persistent as the illness itself), while accidents are acute, transient symptoms, which occur intermittently and are experienced as painful. Part One concludes with a proposition that Lacan would have found appealing—that hysteria is a failure to bring the different principles of mental functioning into a unity, and that failure results in past experiences assuming an expanded role. All one needs to do to generate Lacan's notion of *Spaltung* (*referente*, splitting) from this is to strike on the evidence that the unity effected through maturation is merely illusory and that humans' natural condition is closer to that of hysteria or dissociation.

Part Two was made up of articles Janet had published between 1898 and 1910. An especially important paper was "L'amnésie et la dissociation des souvenirs par l'émotion" (Amnesia and Dissociation of Memories by Emotion, 1904), which presented a case history, of Irène—Janet referred to this study several times in his later work. Irène, a twenty-year-old, suffered extreme trauma when her mother, whom she had taken care of, died. She became amnesiac for the event of her mother's death and for the three months preceding it. Unable to work, she developed severe abulia (a degeneration of the will that manifests itself in indolence, indecision, and inability to act) and lost interest in her circle of acquaintances. She frequently experienced delirious episodes in which she dramatically relived the events of the hours close to her mother's death. Irène was compelled to repeat the event that caused her such trauma. She could not accept life without her mother, and she denied her death. She had become attached to her trauma.

Janet treated Irène successfully by helping her recover her memories. Irène had to learn to translate her traumatic memories into a narrative account of the event and its effects on her. When she succeeded in constructing this narrative, she understood and could accept her mother's death. With this, her profound abulia disappeared.

Janet dealt at length with *idées fixes*. He had discovered that some patients benefit therapeutically from the act of recounting (in the hypnotic *and* waking states) their *idées fixes*. Other, more severely disturbed patients clung more tenaciously to their *idées fixes*; with these patients, Janet discovered, he had to break down the entire system of images, feelings, and actions that had accumulated around the *idée fixe*, and substitute neutral or positive content for the traumatic phenomena.

Janet believed that curing a case of hysteria requires the dissolution of the patient's *idées fixes*, but that doing so, by itself, is often insufficient to cure the afflicted individual. His early writings propose that patients need help in accommodating greater levels of tension within their personality. Patients whose mental functioning remained at a low level could be overwhelmed by new emotions, and that could easily produce new fixed ideas and hysteria (i.e., dissociation). Janet outlined a number of techniques for raising a patient's mental level.

- 38 Aragon and Breton, "Le cinquantenaire de l'hystérie" (The Fiftieth Anniversary of Hysteria), *La révolution surréaliste XI* (1928): 22.
- 39 Suggestion is the process whereby the patients persuade themselves they suffer from some malady and then develop its symptoms. A tenet of Babinski's later work was that to cure an illness, one reversed the process that had brought it on. So, Babinski believed, if hysteria was brought on by persuasion, it could be cured by persuasion. Indeed, Babinski, as he moved away from Charcot's views and towards those of Bernheim and the Nancy school, came to define hysteria as a psychological condition in which a person is prone to suggestion and can be cured through persuasion. He suggested abandoning the woefully unclear term "hysteria" and replacing it with "pithiatism" (meaning curable by persuasion). Babinski's efforts at persuasion were often rather crude and included the application of faradic electricity: so his methods became known as the "traitement brusque." Babinski also accepted the claim put forward by the Nancy school that hypnosis is a normal phenomenon produced by suggestion (and not an effect of magnetism or hysteria).

Needless to say, the phenomenon of suggestibility interested the Surrealists greatly.

- 40 Janet also characterized the processes involved as "elementary forms of consciousness." As I remarked (note 35), I have been arguing that primal forms of consciousness were the domain of the avant-garde artists of the early twentieth century. One purpose for tracing this history is to help destroy the notion of the single, stable, enduring self and to highlight the importance of the idea of the plural self, with shifting identifications and changing natures. This idea of the labile, plural self has occult precursors.
- 41 The concept of the narrowing of consciousness refers to the reduction of the number of psychological (or primary) phenomena that can be simultaneously united and integrated in a single personal consciousness. Janet proposed that some phenomena register in conscious awareness while others are relegated to a subconscious area (but still have physical effects). Janet believed that a narrowing of the field of consciousness was one of the two basic characteristics of hysteria; the other was dissociation.
- 42 The French tradition of psychopathology, of which Janet was an early representative, influenced Lacan's exposition of a French Freud.
- 43 Pierre Janet, "Une Félida artificielle," *Revue philosophique* 69, no. 1 (1910): 329–57, 483–529.
- 44 Cagliostro: Count Alessandro di Cagliostro (1743–95), alias for Giuseppe (sometimes Joseph) Balsamo, the founder of the Egyptian Rite of Freemasonry, a magician, thaumaturge, fortune teller, alchemist, clairvoyant, and frequent visitor to the courts of Europe.
- 45 The ideas of animal magnetism continued to exert considerable influence in France as elsewhere. Helena Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled* cites baron Étienne-Félix d'Henin de Cuvillier's *Annales du magnétisme animal* (1814–16), marquis du Puységur's *Magnétisme animal considéré dans ses rapports avec diverses branches de la physique* (1804–7), and Baron Jean Dupotet de Sennevoy's *Cours de magnétisme en sept leçons, deuxième édition, augmentée du rapport sur les expériences magnétiques faites par la Commission*

de l'academie royale de médecine en 1831 (1840). She was particularly intrigued by the work of Dupotet and Regazzoni. Dupotet and Regazzoni were also responsible for a continuing interest in animal magnetism in France.

Antoine Regazzoni was an Italian magnetizer who delighted audiences with displays of turgescence, catalepsy, and anaesthesia. In May 1856, in Paris, he blindfolded strangers and demonstrated how they were blocked by an imaginary “Cabalistic” line he had drawn across the floor. In another case, a blindfolded girl was made to fall, as if struck by lightning, by the magnetic fluid emitted by Regazzoni’s will. Arthur Schopenhauer discussed Regazzoni’s (and Dupotet’s) work in “Über den Willen in der Natur” (On the Will in Nature, 1836, which can be found in translation in *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and on the Will in Nature: Two Essays*). Schopenhauer took an interest in this work because he believed that mesmerism’s demonstrations of the power of the “Universal Fluid” confirmed aspects of his theory of Will.

Dupotet had participated in mesmerist experiments in 1820 as a medical student in Paris. Later he worked at the Salpêtrière, lectured in France, and practised mesmerist healing in London from 1837 to 1845. In his *Introduction to the Study of Animal Magnetism* (1838), he distinguished three schools in the theory and practice of animal magnetism: the followers of Mesmer, who thought in terms of the transference of vital energy; the Platonist school of Lyon, which expounded the role the soul plays in the phenomenon; and Puysegur’s school at Strasbourg, which took a more empirical approach. Dupotet was the publisher of the *Journal de magnétisme*, which through its course compiled a very comprehensive survey of animal magnetism.

In the 1880s, Paris was home to several *magnétiseurs de foire* (fairground magnetizers), of whom the best known is probably the Belgian Donato (né Alfred d’Hont, 1840–1900), author of a (posthumously published) manual in hypnotism and magnetism, *Cours pratique d’hypnotisme et de magnétisme* (1911, which included a preface by Dr. Gérard Encause, a.k.a. *mage* Papus). With Papus, Donato co-edited the journals *Le magnétisme*, *Revue générale des sciences physio-psychologiques*, and *La vie mystérieuse*. Throughout the 1880s, he was widely known in Paris, though his popularity peaked in late 1881 and early 1882, when he presented at several prestigious venues: Dr. Charles Richet attended one performance and was greatly impressed by Donato’s powers. However, these *magnétiseurs’* displays, whether mounted by Donato or by other well-known practitioners, were generally popularist sideshows that made a spectacle of barking men, or of people whose bodies became so rigid that they could lie between two chairs with only their head and feet supported, or of women who were made so insensate that they did not react to pinpricks. Donato did not believe in magnetic fluids, nor in the transmission of thoughts. He believed, rather, that hypnotism was produced by verbal or gestural suggestion and that the skill of the hypnotist played a crucial role. Thus, Donato supported the hypothesis of Blenheim and the Nancy school. On Donato (and on the more general topic of nineteenth-century Paris’s interest in animal magnetism), see Michael R. Finn, *Hysteria, Hypnotism, the Spirits, and Pornography: Fin-de-Siècle Cultural Discourses in the Decadent Rachilde* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009). Finn’s discussion of Donato appears on pages 100–102.

The idea of animal magnetism had uncontested influence on medical ideas about hypnosis, both those of the Parisian school of Charcot and those of the Nancy school of Auguste Ambrose Liebeault (1823–1904), Hippolyte Bernheim (1840–1919), and, later, Joseph Babinski (1857–1932). They also influenced the ideas of Louis-Alphonse Cahagnet, who in 1848 published the first volume of what turned out to be a three-volume

work, *Magnétisme: arcanes de la vie future dévoilé* (The Celestial Telegraph). The work summarized experiments performed by eight somnambulists (as well as spirit communications from thirty-six spirit entities, some of whose deaths occurred only recently, and some of whom died over two hundred years earlier). The work purports to present communications that, collectively, give a detailed description of spirit spheres and the afterlife. Cahagnet also published *Magnétisme: encyclopédie magnétique spiritualiste* (Magnetism: Magnetic Spiritualist Encyclopedia, 1861), *Sanctuaire au spiritualisme* (The Sanctuary of Spiritualism: A Study of the Human Soul and of Its Relations with the Universe Through Somnambulism and Ecstasy, 1851), and *Thérapeutique du magnétisme et du somnambulisme appropriée aux maladies les plus communes* (1883). *Sanctuaire au spiritualisme* adopted the common neo-Platonic doctrine that a particular human being is a microcosm of the cosmos and maintained that hashish could give one insight into that analogy. At the time, the works were praised for their high evidentiary standards.

- 46 The perennially appealing Swedenborg movement (Swedenborg, anticipating Breton, referred to certain subjects who could attract messages from the spirit world as “magnetized”) prepared the way for *Spiritisme*, as did the ideas of “animal magnetism” as taught in Germany (in, for example, J.H. Jung’s [a.k.a. Jung-Stellung, 1740–1817] *Theorie die Geisterkunde*, 1808).

The notion that individuals who could attract spiritual messages from the ether were magnetized was remarkably common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, reporting in early 1881 on the Spiritist actions of Miss Pelagueya, stated that “the young lady seems to have concentrated in her extremities a phenomenal abundance of magnetic aura; thanks to which she communicates instantaneously to the objects surrounding her hitherto unheard and unseen phenomenal motions” (H.P. Blavatsky, *Collected Writings*, vol. III: 1881–1882 [Wheaton: Theosophical Publishing House, 1968], 97). It also reported that Miss Pelagueya joined St. Petersburg’s *grand monde* in a séance, and subjected each of the participants to a violent electric shock. Around the same time, an article in the *Catholic Mirror*, discussing a boy from St. Paul, Minnesota, remarked that his left hand had become

a wonderfully strong magnet. Metal articles of light weight attach themselves to his hand so that considerable force is required to remove them. Knives, pins, needles, buttons, etc., enough to cover his hand, will thus attach themselves so firmly that they cannot be shaken off. Still more, the attraction is so strong that a common coalscuttle can be lifted by it, and heavier implements have been lifted by stronger persons taking hold of his arm. With heavy articles, however, the boy complains of sharp pains darting along his arm. In a lesser degree his left hand and the whole left side of his body exerts the same power, but it is not at all manifest on his right side. (Ibid., 98)

Blavatsky remarked that Baron von Reichenbach, in *Untersuchen über die Dynamide, des Magnetismus, der Elektrizität, der Wärme, des Lichtes, in ihren Bizehungen zur Lebenskraft* (Researches on Magnetism, Electricity, Heat, Light, Crystallization, and Chemical Attraction, in their relations to the Vital Force, 1850), had pointed out that physiologists had long observed, especially among hospital patients, that a significant portion of people—but especially those afflicted by chorea (St. Vitus Dance)—could feel the influence of a magnet when it was passed over their body. She claimed he had proven that

the body of man is filled with an aura, “dynamide,” “fluid,” vapour, influence, or whatever we may choose to call it; that it is alike in both sexes, that it is specially given off at the head, hands, and feet; that, like the aura from the magnet, it is polar; that the whole left side is positive, and imparts a sensation of warmth to a sensitive [person] to whom we may apply our left hand, while the whole right side of the body is negative, and imparts a feeling of coolness. In some individuals this vital magnetic (or, as [Reichenbach] calls it, Odylic) force is intensely strong. (Ibid., 99)

- 47 There was a competing Spiritualist movement in France, led by Z.J. Piérart (d. 1878), editor of *La revue spiritualiste* (founded in 1858), a journal that often engaged Kardec's *La revue spirite* in debate. The principal issue between them was reincarnation: Piérart's doctrines conformed more closely to traditional Spiritualism, so he maintained that one undergoes only one mortal birth, while Kardec taught reincarnation. A peculiar item in Piérart's doctrine was a form of psychic vampirism: he maintained that vampires were the astral bodies of deceased persons that vampirized the living to keep their interred physical bodies vital. By the end of the 1860s, Kardec's review had overwhelmed Piérart's, which suspended publication. The extent of the interest in Spiritualism in France is indicated by the number of periodicals devoted to the subject. In 1864, ten Spiritualist journals were being published in France: besides those of Piérart and Kardec there were *L'Avenir* (Paris), *La médium évangelique* (Toulouse), *L'Écho d'Outre tombe* (Marseille), *La vérité* (Lyons), and four in Bordeaux, which, in 1865, were merged into *L'Union spirite bordelaise*. All but *La revue spiritualiste* represented the school of Kardec.
- 48 “Kardecismo,” as it is usually called there (though sometimes it is referred to simply as “Espiritismo”), persists in Brazil, and in fact it remains quite strong there. In a 1971 survey (the most recent I know), only 11 per cent of the respondents identified themselves as Spiritists; however, 68 per cent said they believed Spiritism to be valid, 49 per cent had visited a Spiritist centre, 27 per cent had felt the influence of spirits in their lives, and 15 per cent claimed to have communicated with discarnates (see Guy Lyon Playfair, *The Unknown Power*, orig. title *The Flying Cow* [London: Granada, 1977], 14). Kardec Spiritist centres (there are now some 6,500 in Brazil) have become, effectively, part of the social assistance network: they serve as one-stop alternative health care centres, community gathering places, and counselling centres for personal evolution. The relatively small Brazilian community in the city where I live, Toronto, has four Kardecist circles. Most Brazilian Spiritists acknowledge the importance of a form of automatic writing known as psycho-graphs (i.e. “soul-writings”). These writings, some quite extended (even on occasion to book-length) are written by mediums while they are in communication with holy spirits. One author of psychographs was Francisco Candido Xavier (“Chico Xavier,” 1910–2002); Xavier wrote 409 psychographs in a trance via automatic writing. His books sold over 25 million copies in Brazil, and his appearances on TV talk shows in the late 1960s and early 1970s helped spread interest in Kardecist Spiritism to the point that it became a major force in Brazil (and has remained so). His automatic writing may lack the hallucinatory intensity of Surrealist writing and resemble run-of-the-mill New Age texts, but in October 1979, a judge in the city of Goiânia, Goiás, presiding over the trial of José Divino Nunes, who had been accused of murder, decided that a psychographed letter which the deceased dictated to Xavier constituted legitimate evidence, and in 2012, viewers of a popular Brazilian television station voted Xavier the greatest Brazilian of all time.

- 49 Allan Kardec, "Caractère de la révélation spirite," in *La genèse, les miracles et les prédictions* (Paris: Union spirite française et francophone, 1868), para. 13, 10 (translation mine).
- 50 "Comme moyen d'élaboration, le Spiritisme procède exactement de la même manière que les sciences positives, c'est-à-dire qu'il applique la méthode expérimentale. Des faits d'un ordre nouveau se présentent qui ne peuvent s'expliquer par les lois connues; il les observe, les compare, les analyse, et, des effets remontant aux causes, il arrive à la loi qui les régit; puis il en déduit les conséquences et en cherche les applications utiles. *Il n'établit aucune théorie préconçue*; ainsi, il n'a posé comme hypothèses, ni l'existence et l'intervention des Esprits, ni le périsprit, ni la réincarnation, ni aucun des principes de la doctrine; il a conclu à l'existence des Esprits lorsque cette existence est ressortie avec évidence de l'observation des faits; et ainsi des autres principes. Ce ne sont point les faits qui sont venus après coup confirmer la théorie, mais la théorie qui est venue subséquentement expliquer et résumer les faits. Il est donc rigoureusement exact de dire que le Spiritisme est une science d'observations, et non le produit de l'imagination. Les sciences n'ont fait de progrès sérieux que depuis que leur étude est basée sur la méthode expérimentale; mais jusqu'à ce jour on a cru que cette méthode n'était applicable qu'à la matière, tandis qu'elle l'est également aux choses métaphysiques." Kardec, *La genèse*, chapitre 1, § 14.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 64.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 66.
- 53 Spiritualists insist that hypotheses of communication from disembodied spirits must be invoked, as the hypothesis of telepathy is inadequate to explain the higher knowledge a perispirit, freed from the body's limitations, can convey.
- 54 Allan Kardec, *The Mediums' Book: Being the Sequel to "The Spirits' Book,"* trans. Anna Blackwell (Rio de Janeiro: Federação Espírita Brasileira, 1986), 17.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 38.
- 56 Breton, *What Is Surrealism?* This excerpt appears in Herschel B. Chipp, ed., *Theories of Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 412.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 412.
- 58 Kardec, *The Mediums' Book*, 39–40.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 183–84.
- 60 *Ibid.*, 190.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 179.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 192–93.
- 63 Salvador Dalí, "The Stinking Ass," trans. J. Bronowski, *This Quarter* 5, no. 1 (September 1932): 49–54; reprinted in Lucy Lippard, *Surrealists on Art* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 97–100. I have taken this from the reprint in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, eds., *Art in Theory 1900–1990* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwood, 1992), 481.
- 64 This raises the issue of the generally left affiliations of the Surrealists (who at one time enrolled en masse in the PCF, but who departed almost as abruptly as they joined) and the challenge they faced in reconciling their Marxist leanings with their Spiritualist enthusiasms. For example, Friedrich Engels referred contemptuously to "ghost-rappers, ghost-rapping shakers." Engels, "Die Internationale in Amerika," originally published in the German social democratic paper *Der Volksstaat* (17 July 1872); reprinted in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, vol. 18 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962), 97–103 (the quotation cited appears on page 99). Engels connected the American interest in Spiritualism to repression:

Though the Americans... have not taken over from European medieval institutions, they did take over lots of medieval tradition, religion, English common (feudal) law, superstition, spiritualism, in short, all nonsense, that was not directly harmful to business, and now is very useful to dull the masses. ("Letter to Friedrich Adolph Sorge in Hoboken" [London, 29 November 1886]; reprinted in Marx and Engels, *Werke*, vol. 36. [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1967], 579)

- The Surrealists never really reconciled these conflicting tendencies; their successors, the Situationists, did somewhat better by emphasizing (partly as a result of the influence of Henri Lefebvre) the chapter in *Das Kapital* dedicated to the fetishism of commodities.
- 65 Louis Aragon et al., "Declaration of the Bureau des recherches surréalistes," trans. Richard Howard, in Maurice Nadeau, *The History of Surrealism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); reprinted in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory 1900–1990*, 439.
- 66 Robert Motherwell, ed., *The Dada Painters and Poets*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1989), xiii.
- 67 André Breton, "Lachez tout!" *Littérature* no. 2 (1922), in *The Lost Steps*, trans. Mark Polizzotti (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 77.
- 68 DADA, too, involved an amalgam of destructive and constructive drives; but the Surrealists—who were ex-Dadaists, by and large—downplayed that fact when they founded their new movement.
- 69 Consequently, Bergson's ideas had been taken up by many enthusiasts of things occult. A very fine book on the reception of Henri Bergson's ideas is R.C. Grogan, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France 1900–1914* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1988).
- 70 The metaphysics they looked for was akin to that of liberatory strains of Christianity. If they attacked conventional religion, it was because it failed to protect the experiences necessary for salvation from corrupting despair over the powers of human consciousness.
- 71 Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, ed. and trans. James Strachey, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 13 (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1955), 73.
- 72 *Ibid.*, 81–82. The text enclosed in square brackets is from A.A. Brill's translation of this text. Another remark that Freud makes in that section encapsulates the Surrealists' theory of perception:

The projection outwards of internal perceptions is a primitive mechanism, to which, for instance, our sense perceptions are subject, and which therefore normally plays a very large part in determining the form taken by our external world. Under conditions whose nature has not been sufficiently established internal perceptions of emotional and intellectual processes can be projected outward in the same way as sense perceptions; they are thus employed for building up the external world. (81)

- 73 Moreover, Bataille came to critique Breton's growing Hegelian tendencies.
- 74 Antonin Artaud, "Cinema and Reality," in Artaud, *Selected Writings*, ed. Susan Sontag (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 150.
- 75 These remarks are apposite to Brakhage's films: Brakhage elicits such a response sometimes through purely abstract forms, sometimes through mimetic images—though, to be sure, what these images imitate has little to do with their aesthetically relevant content, which is their potential to induce a sympathetic vibratory response.
- 76 Artaud, *Selected Writings*, 150–51. I am certain that Stan Brakhage, despite his general dislike of the works, ideas, and advocacy of the poet and theatre-maker, would concur

- with Artaud's assertion (ibid., 151) that art reveals the very essence of language by "carrying the action onto a level where all translation would be unnecessary and where this action would operate almost intuitively on the human brain," and that the effect of incorporating discursive forms into an artwork is to reduce the artwork's physical-corporeal effect.
- 77 The term *passage* denotes any of the ways of linking an object in a painting to the background or adjacent object: it is an art of transition, a way that encourages the eye to move from one form to another without feeling any rupture or discontinuity. For example, the same colour or tone may be used for the object and the background so that an actual continuation of the object occurs into the background or vice versa. *Passage* alleviates spatial disparities. In traditional painting, *passage* softens discrepancies between strong forms and the surrounding space (or ground). Cézanne, whose paintings involved perspectival disparities between objects and between objects and ground, used *passage* more extensively than the Old Masters did, but for the same purpose. Analytic Cubist painters used spatial anomalies more extensively even than Cézanne had, to the point that their paintings came to display a systematic multi-dimensional "warping." They relied on *passage* to integrate the space of the painting's surface.
- 78 A psychoanalytic understanding of the location of the Surrealist artwork can be worked out using the ideas of the English psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott.
- 79 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Why I Am So Clever," §10, in *Ecce Homo*, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (New York: Dover Publications, 2004), 52.
- 80 In the section on "Surrealism and the Hegelian Dialectic," we shall see that the dialectical unity of the Absolute and the (quotidian) material object is a central theme of Hegel's philosophy. It is not unlikely that the Surrealists' notion that the poetic image has a paradoxical location, both within and beyond reality, drew impetus from their interest in Hegel's philosophy.
- 81 André Breton, *What Is Surrealism?*, trans. David Gascoyne. (As Breton acknowledges, the text also appears in the 1924 *Manifeste du surréalisme*.) The passage cited is reprinted (in Gascoyne's translation) in Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*, 410–11.
- 82 André Breton, *Oeuvres complètes*, I:1129. Quoted in Jack J. Spector, *Surrealist Art and Writing 1919/1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 38.
- 83 Hippolyte Taine, *History of English Literature*, trans. H. van Laun (London: Chatto & Windus, 1883), II:123. I have altered van Laun's translation.
- 84 The best analysis of the impact these ideas had on human spirituality (and the best critique of that influence) is George Grant's brilliant *Time as History*, Massey Lectures, 9th Series (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1969).
- 85 Jean Goudal, "Surrealism and Cinema," *La revue hebdomadaire*, February 1925; reprinted in Alain et Odette Virmaux, *Les surréalistes et le cinéma* (Paris: Seghers, 1976), 305–17; the article also appears, translated by Paul Hammond, in *The Shadow and Its Shadow: Surrealist Writing on Cinema* (London: British Film Institute, 1978), 49–56. The excerpt quoted appears on page 49.
- 86 André Breton, *Manifesto of Surrealism*, in *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, trans. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 14.
- 87 Goudal, "Surrealism and Cinema," in Hammond, *The Shadow and Its Shadow*, 51.
- 88 Ibid., 51.
- 89 Breton similarly asked what confers its natural allure on a dream.

Monsieur A. Breton, wanting to establish the superiority of the dream, writes: "The mind of the man who dreams is fully satisfied by whatever happens to it. The agonising

question of possibility arises no more.” And, he asks, “what reason, what reason better than another confers this natural allure on the dream, makes me welcome unreservedly a host of episodes the strangeness of which strikes me as I write?” (87)

90 Goudal, in Hammond, *The Shadow and Its Shadow*, 51.

91 *Ibid.*, 52–53. Emphasis as in source.

In this part of the argument, in a parenthetical comment, Goudal also argues, as certain classical film theorists (for example, Rudolf Arnheim) did, against further technical developments that might enable the medium to represent reality with great fidelity—though in Goudal’s case, the undergirdings for his argument were provided by Taine, not (as they were for Arnheim) by Immanuel Kant and the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century neo-Kantians:

Summary considerations, no doubt, but ones that allow us to make short work of certain illusions about the advisability of adding “improvements” like colour, relief or some kind of sound synchronisation. The cinema has found its true technique in black and white film—forget three-dimensionality and sound. To try to “perfect” it, in the sense of bringing it closer to reality, would only run counter to and slow down its genuine development.

92 Friedrich A. Kittler, *Discourse Networks, 1800/1900* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 246.

93 Goudal, in Hammond, *The Shadow and Its Shadow*, 53–54.

94 André Breton, *Manifesto of Surrealism*, in *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 14.

95 André Breton, *Mad Love*, trans. Mary Ann Caws (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 24.

96 *Ibid.*, 21.

97 *Ibid.*, 23. Italicization follows the original.

98 Dore Ashton, *A Reading of Modern Art* (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1989), 83.

99 André Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 15.

100 *Ibid.*, 37.

101 It is because *le merveilleux* (the marvellous) is anything that manifests contradiction that the Surrealists could offer ruins and mannequins as examples of *le merveilleux*. A ruin conflates the natural and the artificial, construction and destruction, intention and accident, the designs of humankind and the operations of time. A ruin turns the purpose of a structure against itself, and what remains is the accumulation of so many coincidences and so much chance as to be indecipherable. A mannequin, similarly, conflates the human and inhuman, created being and constructed entity, natural form and intentional structure, the animate and the inanimate. In short, because they are beings whose essence harbours contradictions, they provoke a confusion that invites the *unheimlich*.

102 “Il est beau...sur tous, comme la recontre fortuite sur une table de dissection d’une machine à coudre et d’un parapluie!” comte de Lautréamont, *Les Chants de Maldoror: suivi de lettres, poésies I et II*, ed. Daniel Oster (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 1977), 199.

103 Aragon, quoted in André Breton, “What Is Surrealism?” The passage cited is reprinted in Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*, 414.

104 Breton, “What Is Surrealism?,” in Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*, 415.

105 André Breton, originally from a preface to the catalogue of a 1920 Paris exhibition of works by Max Ernst; the preface is reprinted in Breton, *What Is Surrealism? Selected Writings, Book Two*, ed. Franklin Rosemont (New York: Monad Press, 1978), 8.

- 106 The Cubists anticipated the Surrealists in using the mechanism of collage, though they used it to different ends than the Dada or Surrealist artists did.
- 107 Sigmund Freud, *Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 22–23.
- 108 Salvador Dalí, “Conquest of the Irrational” (1938), in Dalí, *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí*, trans. Haakon M. Chevalier (London: Vision Press, 1948), 418.
- 109 Dalí, “The Stinking Ass,” in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory: 1900–1990*, 479.
- 110 André Breton, cited in David Gascoyne, *A Short Survey of Surrealism* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1935), 97.
- 111 André Breton, “What Is Surrealism?,” in Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*, 413–14. Emphasis as in that version.
- 112 André Breton, “Introduction to the Discourse on the Paucity of Reality,” in André Breton, *Break of Day*, trans. Mark Polizzotti and Mary Ann Caws (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 3. Translation of *Point du jour* (Paris: Gallimard, 1934).
- 113 Spector, *Surrealist Art and Writing 1919/39*, 78.
- 114 Salvador Dalí, “Objets surréalistes,” *Le surréalisme au service de la révolution* 1, no. 3 (December 1931): 16–17 at 16.
- 115 Worldly objects have a similarly ambiguous status in Lurianic Cabalism. The similarities between ideas in Lurianic Cabalism and alchemy’s notions are a topic both fascinating and instructive (offering insights into the Surrealist metaphysic), but one that I cannot go into in this already ample volume.
- 116 That was the means by which the Surrealist object was usually discovered, by chance—which is to say that it came to be through being discovered. We can say of the Surrealist object what we can say of Winnicott’s transitional object: that its discovery and its creation are one.
- 117 Guy Debord, “Détournement as Negation and Prelude,” originally published in *International Situationiste* 3 (Paris: 1959) and reprinted in Paul Taylor, ed., *Post-Pop Art* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989); the passage quoted appears on page 7. Situationism grew out of Letterism, which developed from postwar Surrealist groups (primarily in Paris and Brussels). I believe there is ample evidence of a connection between the Dadaists’ and Surrealists’ use of collage and Debord’s use of *détournement*, and that I am quite justified in introducing these few comments on Debord’s cinema here. However, I would not want to be interpreted as attempting to reduce Situationism (or Debord’s films) to Surrealism (or, for that matter, to DADA). Debord believed that Surrealism’s opposition between irrationism and logic has assumed an inflated importance and that its emphasis on love was overblown. He declared, “Surrealism today is thoroughly reactionary and boring” (see “Contribution to the Debate ‘Is Surrealism Dead or Alive?’,” in Tom McDonough, ed., *Guy Debord and the Situationist International* [Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2002], 67–68, esp. 68). That was in 1958. In 1954, when Situationism was still to emerge from Letterism, he offered a more nuanced view: critiquing the Surrealists for issuing a protest against the Letterists for having expelled André-Franck (essentially for having spiritual rather than religious interests), Debord wrote, “these laughable figures [the Surrealists who issued the protest] are content with denouncing—as if it were a sufficient argument—our rupture with their own views of the world, which are, when all is said and done, all too similar” (“The Great Sleep and Its Clients,” in McDonough, 23).
- 118 *Ibid.*, 7.
- 119 Guy Debord, “In Girum Imus Nocte,” in *Oeuvres cinématographiques complètes (1952–1978)* (Paris: Éditions Champ Libre, 1978), 187–278 at 217–18. I only touch upon

- Debord's films here—and they merit expansive treatment. Thomas Y. Levin offers a quite comprehensive commentary on Debord's films in "Dismantling the Spectacle: The Cinema of Guy Debord," in Tom McDonough, ed., *Guy Debord and the Situationist International*, 321–453.
- 120 André Breton, "As in a Wood," originally published in *L'âge du cinéma* 4–5 (August–November 1951): 26–30; the piece is reprinted in a translation by Paul Hammond in Hammond, *The Shadow and Its Shadow*; the passage cited appears on pages 42–43. Emphases in source cited.
- 121 *Ibid.*, 43. Emphasis in source cited. I have altered the translation slightly.
- 122 *Ibid.*, 43–44.
- 123 Jean Epstein, "Les Sens I (1921)," *Écrits sur le cinéma (1921–1953): Édition chronologique en deux volumes*, I:1927–1947 (Paris: Seghers, 1947), 91–93. Translation mine. An alternative translation can be found in Jean Epstein, "The Senses 7 (b)," in Richard Abel, *French Film Theory and Criticism* 7, 241–46, esp. 245. For those familiar with the leading ideas of alchemy, Epstein connects directly *photogénie* to that practice: "This is why the cinema is psychic. It offers us a *quintessence*, a product *twice distilled*. My eye presents me with an idea of a form; the film stock also contains an idea of a form, an idea established independently of my awareness, a latent, *secret but marvellous idea*" (Abel, 244). Emphases mine.
- 124 On this topic, one might recall the Surrealists' enthusiasm for the serial *Fantômas*.
- 125 The article, translated from Catalan to Castilian, appeared as well in *Gaceta Literaria* 24 (15 December 1927), with the same title, "Film-Art Fil, Antiartístico." It appears as "Art Films, Anti-Artistic Spool," in *Oui: The Paranoid-Critical Revolution, Writings 1927–1933*, ed. Robert Descharnes, trans. Yvonne Shafrir (Boston: Exact Change, 1998), 23–27.
- This work appeared at a key moment in Dalí's life: in an immediately preceding phase, Dalí had been intimately involved with Federico García Lorca and his poetry. His interaction with Lorca gave him the confidence to set aside his more conventional artistic practices and to follow where his progressive ideas were leading him. From here on, his work turned decisively in the direction of Surrealism. By 1929, after he had produced a number of works that entered into an exchange with the work of Max Ernst, Arp, Tanguy, and Miró, Dalí's visual language finally came into its own.
- 126 Dalí, "Art Films, Anti-Artistic Spool," 23.
- 127 Milly Heyd explicates, with remarkable precision, the alchemical symbolism in *The Metamorphosis of Narcissus* in "Dalí's *Metamorphosis of Narcissus* Reconsidered," *Artibus et Historiae* 5, no. 10 (1984): 121–31.
- 128 Salvador Dalí, *Les aveux inavouables de Salvador Dalí*. Récit Présenté par André Parinaud, as *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí: As Told to André Parinaud*, trans. Harold Salemsen (London: Quartet Books, 1977), 147.
- 129 Heyd, "Dalí's *Metamorphosis of Narcissus* Reconsidered," 128.
- 130 *Ibid.*
- 131 Dalí's interest in Lull persisted. In 1954, he painted *Crucifixion (Corpus Hypercubus)*. Dalí described it as a work of "metaphysical, transcendent cubism" and went on to say,

It is based entirely on the Treatise on Cubic Form by Juan de Herrera, Philip II's architect, builder of the Escorial Palace; it is a treatise inspired by Ars Magna of the Catalan philosopher and alchemist, Raymond Lull. The cross is formed by an octahedral hypercube. The number nine is identifiable and becomes especially consubstantial with the body of Christ. The extremely noble figure of Gala is the perfect union of the development of the hypercubic octahedron on the human level of the cube. She is depicted

in front of the Bay of Port Lligat. The most noble beings were painted by Velazquez and Zurbaran; I only approach nobility while painting Gala, and nobility can only be inspired by the human being.

- 132 Alain Bosquet, *Conversations with Dalí*, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1969), 113–14.
- 133 So in 1928, he embarked on making *Un chien andalou*.
- 134 Salvador Dalí, originally in “La fotografia, pura creació de l’esperit,” *L’Amic de les arts* 18 (1927): 90–91; reprinted, in translation, as “Photography: Pure Creation of the Mind,” in *Oui: The Paranoid-Critical Revolution*, 12–13. Note the association of photography and brain waves.
- 135 Dalí, “La fotografia, pura creació de l’esperit,” 90–91; also cited in Haim Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí’s Art and Writing, 1927–1942: The Metamorphosis of Narcissus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 70–71.
- 136 *Ibid.*, 71.
- 137 *Ibid.* Finkelstein points out that this paragraph anticipates the idea of the double-image that Dalí would expound two years later. That Dalí’s reflections on photography were the source for his notion of the double image is a fact one should take into account when considering the role that photography and cinematography had in the arts of the twentieth century. The idea that these media reveal the marvellous that belongs to reality helps account for the conjunction of interests in photography and Surrealist art in the writings of Walter Benjamin.
- 138 Dalí, “La fotografia, pura creació de l’esperit.” For “finds” Dalí uses the word “troualles,” cognate with the French “trouvaille,” a word the Surrealists often used.
- 139 “Je est un autre” (I is another) is a famous statement by Arthur Rimbaud, first announced in his letter to Georges Izambard, dated 13 May 1871. The letter can be found in translation in any number of editions of Rimbaud’s complete works.
- 140 Dalí, “La fotografia, pura creació de l’esperit.”
- 141 Quoted in Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí’s Art and Writing*, 73.
- 142 Compare this with the remark by the Canadian painter Jack Chambers (1931–78), “the object appears in the splendour of its essential namelessness.” In “Perceptualism, Painting and Cinema” (*Art and Artists*, Dec. 1972), Chambers notes,

The mind is alerted into a state of receptive passivity that somehow releases a higher or ‘composite’ sense into play. The consciousness thus neutralized is then able to perceive the Invisible Body ‘behind’ the world. The Invisible Body is energy and is a more vital reality than the material attenuation of it . . . our sensory world. Perceptualism [Chambers’s philosophy and method of painting] transmits Reality within reality through the energy concentration with the paintings it shapes. (31–32)

In his most complete statement of his religio-aesthetic thought, *Red and Green* (Toronto: Nancy Poole Gallery, 1978), Chambers relates the experience of the Invisible Body to a love that surpasses rational understanding, and so ends up offering a Christian Surrealism akin to Philip Lamantia’s, in which the Invisible Body (Chambers’s sur-reality) is the energy of love, which brings all beings into be-ing, through which beings it theophantically discloses itself as *le merveilleux*.

- 143 Michael Riffaterre, *La production du texte* (Paris: Seuil, 1979), 249.
- 144 Here Kuspit cites Michael Balint, “Contributions to Reality Testing” (1942), in *Problems of Human Pleasure and Behavior* (London: Maresfield Library, 1987), 165–66.

- 145 Donald Kuspit, *A Critical History of 20th-Century Art*, Chapter 3, Part 2, “Subjectivity and Society: The Third Decade,” <http://www.artnet.com/magazine/features/kuspit/kuspit4-25-06.asp>.
- 146 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 26.
- 147 Pierre Naville, “Beaux-Arts,” *La révolution surréaliste* 3 (April 1925); cited in Rosalind Krauss and Jane Livingston, *L’amour fou* (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985), 19.
- 148 André Breton, “Surrealism and Painting” (1928), in Breton, *Surrealism and Painting*, trans. Simon Watson Taylor (London: Macdonald, 1972), 70.
- 149 Max Ernst, “Beyond Painting,” in Robert Motherwell, ed., *Beyond Painting and Other Writings by the Artist and his Friends*, trans. Dorothea Tanning (New York: Wittenborn, Schultz, 1948), 7.
- 150 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 151 Ernst developed another effect, adapted for oil and canvas, that he called *grattage*. He used a family of related techniques to produce it, but they all involved using a rough instrument to scrape paint from a canvas—sometimes Ernst would place a painted canvas on a textured surface and scrape off some layers of paint, leaving the impression of both the scraping tool and the textured surface beneath the abraded area. In *Loplop, le supérieur des oiseaux* (1928), Loplop’s magnificent robe shows scraped textures that resemble woodgrain, produced by *grattage*.
- 152 In English, and in a slightly more extended excerpt: “I was surprised by the sudden intensification of my visionary capacities and by the hallucinatory succession of contradictory images superimposed, one upon the other, with the persistence and rapidity characteristic of amorous memories.” See “Beyond Painting,” 7.
- 153 Guillaume Apollinaire, “On the Subject in Modern Painting,” originally published in *Les soirées de Paris*, February 1912; republished with English translation in Leroy C. Breunig, ed., *Apollinaire on Art*, trans. Susan Suleiman (New York: Viking Press, 1972); reprinted in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory 1900–1990*, 179–80.
- 154 Apollinaire acknowledges as much when, in the essay just cited, he proclaims that “today’s art is austere, and even the most prudish senator could find nothing to criticize in it. Indeed, it is well known that one of the reasons cubism has enjoyed such success in elegant society is precisely this austerity.” See Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory 1900–1990*, 180.
- 155 Mesmer’s best-known disciple, Armand-Marie-Jacques de Chastenet, marquis de Puységur (1751–1825), while examining one of his family’s servants, a twenty-three-year-old named Victor Race, observed a type of sleeping trance that had not been observed earlier by Mesmerist practitioners. He noted that orders could be given to Race in this state of “calm crisis,” which he would later act on, but without remembering. Further, the marquis remarked on the state’s healing effect.

He presented public demonstrations of the phenomenon, making something of a spectacle of the strange behaviours of the hypnotized subjects, their hallucinations, and their ecstasies. Like his well-known fellow magnetizers, abbé José Custódio de Faria (1746–1819) and baron du Potet (Jules Dupotet Denis, 1796–1881), the marquis de Puységur claimed that the consciousness of a person in a *sommeil magnétique* (now called a hypnotic trance) is in an elevated state, that their faculties are more acute than those of people in an ordinary waking state, and that this elevated consciousness is the result of withdrawing the mind from the senses that are directed towards the external and redirecting attention towards the mind itself. This concentration on the internal world allows one to become an ecstatic.

- Theories of animal magnetism, and specifically of *sommeil magnétique*, would become topics of interest when, in the early twentieth century, a strain of thinking that was critical of modernity's having reduced experience to its nadir sought more intuitive and instinctive modes of experience and went in quest of delirium. On 22 March 1930, at a conference in Barcelona, Salvador Dalí would make reference to *sommeil hypnotique*, describing the methods that the Surrealists had used to that point (automatic writing, the chronicling of dreams, and hypnotic slumber) as essentially passive, while—in making this claim, he contradicted the opinion of the psychiatry of his time—a hallucinatory crisis could be produced voluntarily. The conference was reported on in *Helix* 10 (1930): 4–6.
- 156 André Breton, “Du temps que les surréalistes avaient raison,” in Maurice Nadeau, *Documents surréalistes* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1948), 311. Quoted in Anna Balakian, *Surrealism: The Road to the Absolute* (New York: Noonday Press, 1959), 103. Another book by Balakian, *The Literary Origins of Surrealism: A New Mysticism in French Poetry* (New York: NYU Press, 1947), contains an extended discussion of the influence of German literature on Surrealism.
- 157 The idea that altered states of consciousness put one outside the orbit of moral concerns has a rich history in the nineteenth century. It was debated by the very investigators of hysteria whom Breton mentioned to André Parinaud. The debate focused on “criminal hypnotism”—that is, on whether people might commit crimes under post-hypnotic suggestion. This was yet another point of contention that separated Hippolyte Bernheim and his Nancy school colleagues from members of the Salpêtrière school. Among the principals in this debate was Georges Gilles de la Tourette, Charcot's most faithful disciple. Tourette originally maintained that criminal hypnotism was a real phenomenon: he had hypnotized Blanche Wittmann, probably Charcot's favourite hysteria patient (she appears, in a very sensuous pose, fainted into Babinski's arms, in a famous painting by André Brouillet, depicting one of Charcot's Tuesday afternoon sessions) and had successfully imprinted on her mind the idea that a writer present, Jules Claretie, had killed an intern and that she should poison him. However, Charcot rejected the possibility of criminal hypnotism, and soon all the members of the Salpêtrière group, including Tourette, accepted this view. Bernheim, on the other hand, maintained there were real-life examples of murders suggested under hypnosis. This debate brought Joseph Babinski to reject Charcot's view that hypnosis was an organic condition and to adopt the view of the Nancy school (that it was the result of suggestion).
- The Surrealists likely felt intrigued by these dark possibilities. A fascinating article on the topic is Julien Bogousslavsky, Olivier Walusinski, and Denis Veyrunes, “Crime, Hysteria, and Belle Époque Hypnotism: The Path Traced by Jean-Martin Charcot and Georges Gilles de la Tourette,” *European Neurology* 62 (2009): 193–99.
- Lacan's account of “le crime des soeurs Papin,” “Motifs du Crime Paranoïaque” (*Minotaure* 3–4 [1933]: 25–28) also arose from an interest in crime and compulsion.
- 158 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 26.
- 159 André Breton turned a wall of his studio into a Surrealist *Wunderkammer*, chock-a-block with ethnographic objects (masks, etc.), Surrealist paintings, found objects, and sundry personal mementoes. Fetish objects were prominently displayed. That expression of the Surrealists' interest in ethnographic art is widely known. But the interest goes much deeper. Elza Adamowicz's *Surrealist Collage in Text and Image: Dissecting the Exquisite Corpse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) points out that a number of exhibitions assembled, in the manner of a collage, Surrealist art and eth-

- nographic objects. In *Tableaux de Man Ray et objets d'îles* (Galerie Surréaliste, 1926), paintings by Man Ray were exhibited juxtaposed with works from Oceania, including New Guinea and New Ireland masks that Breton lent. *Yves Tanguy et objets d'Amérique* (Galerie Surréaliste, 1927) juxtaposed Tanguy's paintings with ethnographic objects from the personal collections of Paul Éluard and André Breton.
- 160 I have relied on the Brill translation here: Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 2000), 150–51; this passage can be found in *The Standard Edition*, vol. 13:101.
- 161 *Ibid.*, 58.
- 162 G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969), 28. (Translation of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logick*, originally in two volumes, Nürnberg, 1812 and 1816.)
- 163 *Ibid.*, 28.
- 164 Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, [1941]1960), 123.
- 165 Some twenty years after the Surrealists discovered Hegel, Herbert Marcuse wrote about the Idealist philosopher in a way that bears an astonishing resemblance to that in which the Surrealists took his work. In *Reason and Revolution* (1941), Marcuse showed himself to be decidedly more optimistic about the possibility of overthrowing capitalism than his colleagues in Frankfurt's Institut für Sozialforschung, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno (consider their *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1947). Marcuse did not share Horkheimer and Adorno's sense that capitalism had matured into a closed system, able—partly through the pacifying effects of the culture industry—to neutralize any impetus for change and thereby guarantee its own survival. Marcuse saw reason to hope that the “substratum of the outcasts and outsiders” who were not enslaved by society would initiate a social revolution to overthrow capitalism. (Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1968], 200). While Horkheimer and Adorno grew more conservative in their later years, Marcuse continued to identify himself as Marxist, anti-capitalist, and pro-revolution to the end of his life. In his later American works—*Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (1955); *One-Dimensional Man* (1964); *Negations* (1968); *An Essay on Liberation* (1969); *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (1972); and (especially) *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (1978)—Marcuse developed a political philosophy on the ideas of Marx and Freud whose central image was that of a liberated, peaceful, hedonic human being—and Surrealism's goal was to bring forth such people. Marcuse's fundamental criticism of capitalism was similar to that of the Surrealists, viz., it is dehumanizing and does not afford humans the possibility for realizing their full potential. Also like the Surrealists, Marcuse associated this denial with the ahedonia that capitalism's repressive mechanism had engendered, and like the Surrealists, he continued to insist that the repression of sensuality was not entirely the result of reconciling the biological drives to inevitable social conditions—rather, a large quantum of repression, surplus repression, was used to ensure capitalist domination over the human. But popular culture, as a means used by capitalists to dominate the masses, was in Marcuse's view (as in mine) one of the agencies that promoted this surplus repression. It did so by substituting for art—which, by providing the example of the harmonization of sensuousness with reason, served as a model for the attainment of free pleasure and so of a freed human being—the dehumanizing, opposite forms resulting from “repressive desublimation,” evidenced in the marketing of erotic pleasure separated from the image of the fully developed human being. Marcuse envisioned

a world in which, through the overturning of capitalism, people would be allowed to exist in a state of natural freedom and self-gratification. Were such a state brought into being, work itself would become a source of pleasure. For Marcuse, modern art's harmony of sensuousness and reason gave him grounds for hoping that the human disposition for freedom and pleasure would survive intact—in that respect, too, his thought resembled the Surrealists'. Marcuse even believed that the counterculturists of the 1960s—the “outcasts and outsiders” of their time, just as the Surrealists had been in their own—might become a catalyst for revolution.

- 166 Alert readers will have noted, perhaps, that I have consistently associated the term *noesis* with the esoteric tradition—and that might lead them to question the appropriateness of drawing a parallel between what Hegel calls *Vernunft* and what I have been referring to as *noesis*. I am quite aware that my view on the matter is hardly the received one; however, I am also not certain that it is inappropriate to suggest that heterodox themes appear in Hegel's philosophy. For me, the great book on that topic is Cyril O'Regan's magisterial *The Heterodox Hegel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). O'Regan argues that Hegel's philosophy is organized around his theology and that Hegel's theology (and philosophy) borrowed freely from Meister Eckhardt and Jacob Böhme, among other Gnostic Christians. Hegel's presentation of his ideas on Speculative Reason often sounds remarkably like an ordered collection of utterances of Eckhardt and Böhme.
- 167 I have relied on Miller's translation here. It obscures Hegel's sense, especially around the phrase “yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out.” What Hegel actually wrote was, “und weil jedes, indem es sich absondert, ebenso unmittelbar [sich] auflöst.” Katharine Loevy clarifies the meaning. She first points out that

for Hegel, the nature of reproduction as trans-individual is to be a process by which living things come to be passively and from out of material continuity with other living things, but likewise, in coming to be living things immediately take over their being actively. As Hegel writes, “Life in the universal fluid medium, a *passive* separating-out of shapes becomes, just by so doing, a movement of those shapes” (*Phenomenology* 107/141). This is to say that while living things are not the cause of their own coming to be, they are nevertheless beings that are actively self-moving and self-relating.

To survive as the being that it is, the living thing must oppose its immediate and undifferentiated absorption into Life, and this must take place even though the living thing remains in any case internal to Life as one of Life's moments. According to Hegel, then, the living thing “comes forward in antithesis to the *universal* substance, disowns this fluent continuity with it and asserts that it is not dissolved in this universal element.” (*Phenomenology* 107/141)

For Hegel, she notes, “life emerges as a phenomenon with a dynamic but stable shape. As self-directing and self-relating ‘differences’ internal to Life living things inadvertently engage with one another through the processes of reproduction and consumption so as to produce the image of Life's self-repose.” Life is stable because the events that are its reality are not eventful.

She then relates Hegel's observation that truth is a Bacchanalian revel to this idea:

Hegel thus uses the terms *Absonderung* [here, “collapse”] and *Auflösung* [here, “dropping out”] in his description of the Bacchanalian revel—terms that he also uses in his description of living things in their separating from and dissolving back into the fluidity and continuity of Life. This line could alternatively be read as saying “and because each, as it separates itself, likewise immediately dissolves itself” or, more loosely, “and

because each, as it detaches, is likewise immediately reabsorbed,” or again “and because each, as it comes into being as itself, likewise immediately becomes fluid with the general movement . . .

Thus the Bacchanalian revel is a self-repose that, like Life, emerges out of the restless movement and perpetual coming to be and passing away of its internal differences.

- Hegel’s point, then, is that just as “[r]evelers are reabsorbed as quickly as they drop out because they collapse from drunkenness, [so] finite ideas are reabsorbed as soon as they come forward because their grounding epistemologies ‘collapse,’ or are surpassed, by other ideas.” Truth is the whole of this drunken revel, from which limited ideas separate themselves and then are reabsorbed. See Katharine Loevy, “Confronting Natural Death in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*,” *PhaenEx: Journal of Existential and Phenomenology Theory of Culture / Théorie et culture existentialistes et phénoménologiques* 5, no. 1 (2010): 59–91; the passages cited appear on 63–64, 66, 68, and 70.
- 168 In making this assertion, Hegel anticipated Henri Bergson’s distinction between reason (what we have been calling calculative reason) and intuition.
- 169 This famous remark by Breton can be found in his *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 14.
- 170 G.W.F. Hegel, “Logic Defined and Divided: Dialectic and Scepticism,” in *The Logic of Hegel: Translated from The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, 2nd ed., trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 150.
- 171 *Ibid.*, 152.
- 172 *Ibid.*, 154.
- 173 *Ibid.*, 153–54.
- 174 Andre Breton, *Second Manifesto of Surrealism* (1930), in Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, trans. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane (University of Michigan, 1969), 123–24.
- 175 André Thinion, from *Le surréalisme au service de la révolution*. Quoted in Balakian, *Surrealism: The Road to the Absolute*, 105. The article concerns the interest Lenin’s notebooks reveal in key Hegelian concepts.
- 176 Interviews that, it should be admitted, present a somewhat revisionist history of the Surrealist movement.
- 177 Breton, *Conversations*, 117–18.
- 178 *Ibid.*, 118.
- 179 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 14.
- 180 Tristan Tzara, quoted in Balakian, *Surrealism: The Road to the Absolute*, 105.
- 181 Georges Bataille’s critique of Breton’s idealist (Hegelian) tendencies, and the 1930 manifesto that a number of prominent Surrealists signed, condemning Bataille for his remarks, are signs of this complexity. The recent revival of interest in Surrealism, exemplified in Rosalind Krauss’s writings, has been generally more sympathetic to Bataille’s position than were those of earlier scholars, who were generally aligned with Breton’s faction. See Krauss, “Corpus Delicti,” in Krauss and Livingston, *L’amour fou*, 55–100.
- 182 *Ibid.*; quoted in Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage*, 187.
- 183 *Ibid.*, 141.
- 184 *Ibid.*, 140.
- 185 “L’activité surréaliste, en présence de ce fait brutal, révoltant, *impensable*, va être amenée à s’interroger sur ses ressources propres à en déterminer les *limites*; elle va nous forcer à adopter une attitude précise, expéiure à elle-même, pour continuer à faire face à ce qui excède ces limites. Cette activité est entrée à ce moment dans sa phase *raisonnante*. Elle éprouve tout à coup le besoin de franchir le fossé qui sépare l’idéalisme absolu

- du matérialisme dialectique.” André Breton, *Qu'est-ce que le surréalisme?*, ed. René Henriquez (Bruxelles: Les Presses de l'Imprimerie Typ'art, 1934), 12. Translation mine.
- 186 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 140–41.
- 187 *Ibid.*, 123.
- 188 *Ibid.*, 26.
- 189 Of course, this was an ideal most honoured in its breach. Recognizing the limitations of the PCF's focus on the proletariat's gaining control of the means of production—a foundational principle that led the party to suspect intellectual and artistic efforts that were not directed towards the masses—Breton stated, “There is no one amongst us who does not wish the passage of power from the hands of the bourgeois to the hands of the proletariat. In the meantime, it is no less necessary, according to us, that the experiences of interior life be carried on, and that, of course, without exterior control, even Marxist.” André Breton, “Légitime défense,” *La révolution surréaliste* 8 (1 December 1, 1926); quoted in Kovács, *From Enchantment to Rage*, 237.
- 190 Dalí's continuing interest in documentary and in photography as a medium that mediates between the subject and material reality would ensure that in time Breton would expel Dalí from the movement; that expulsion, however, might simply testify to Dalí's continuing fidelity to the original Surrealist spirit. It is interesting to consider in this connection Dalí's interest in Breton's *Nadja*. Probably most readers had a feeling that *Nadja* was based on a real person, but in 1995 Mark Polizotti revealed, in *Revolution of the Mind: The Life of André Breton*, that the real-life subject of the book was Léona Camille Ghislaine D. (Polizotti was unable to discover her last name), a truly tragic figure who had a baby as a teenager, spent most of her life in asylums, and died in 1941 of typhus, compounded by the effects of malnutrition. Breton visited Léona in the asylum not once.
- 191 André Breton, *Nadja*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Grove Press, 1960), 24. The Western philosophical tradition has celebrated self-consciousness, and the self-presence it produces, as being of the essence of human being. Accordingly, the revelation that human actions are operated by an agency remote from self-presence constituted a destructive assault on the Western philosophical tradition—that revelation discredited the claim that human thought (human self-awareness) is the motor of our actions.
- 192 Psychoanalysis itself has suffered from being an outcast among the sciences, so it is not surprising that it has been led into considering repudiated bodies of “knowledge,” and especially those concerning phenomena the explanations for which belong in the psychic realm. Consider, in this connection, Carl Gustav Jung's interest in occult, esoteric, and mystical experience, and the enthusiasm with which his ideas have been taken up by those who claim an interest in such phenomena.

It would not be extravagant to suggest that Lacanian psychoanalysis was an effort at discerning the real psychic mechanisms behind these perennially appealing, but often troubling and discredited, phenomena. The idea that human thought and human action are operated by an agency remote from the self of self-awareness and self-presence is one of the coils that drove Jacques Lacan's thinking (and that of the other Surrealists). That is why Lacan often refers to the unconscious as “the Other” (or, as he more frequently does, as “the locus of the Other”).

Lacan can be considered an ally of the Surrealist movement (or, perhaps more accurately, as a Surrealist fellow traveller): he was a contributor to the Surrealist magazine *Minotaure*—among his contributions was an article on the murderous Papin sisters, a case that sparked much interest among the Surrealists and that formed the nucleus

of Jean Genet's play *Les bonnes* (The Maids, 1947). He was a friend of such Surrealists as Paul Éluard, and he took general interest in the Surrealists' literary productions. He also formed a close friendship with Georges Bataille when the two began attending Alexandre Kojève's lectures on Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* at the École des Hautes Études in 1933 (the same year Lacan published in *Minotaure*).

Lacan seems to have proposed different viewpoints on paranoid speech (one of the principal subjects of his *Minotaure* piece on the Papin sisters) to his colleagues in the medical community and to his Surrealist friends. About the writing of Marcelle (whose case is mentioned in the main text), a schoolteacher who had gone mad and who claimed to be "inspired," he said to the Société médico-psychologique that "nothing is, broadly speaking, less inspired than this writing, which is felt to be inspired." To his Surrealist friends, he declared that the writing carried "an eminent intentional meaning and [possessed] a very great ability to communicate tension." He even declared that her writing was a creation that was not inferior in inspiration to the writings of the greatest artists. See Catherine Clément, *The Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan*, trans. Authur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 73, 56–57.

193 Of Jacques Vaché's influence, Breton was to write,

In literature I have fallen in love by turns with Rimbaud, Jarry, Apollinaire, Nouveau, and Lautréamont, but it is to Jacques Vaché that I am most indebted... I know I will never belong to anyone else with such abandon. If not for him, I might have become a poet. He overcame in me the conspiracy of dark forces that makes one believe he can have anything as absurd as a vocation.

See Breton, *The Lost Steps*, trans. Mark Polizzotti (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 2.

194 Two months after the Armistice, Vaché committed suicide by taking an overdose of opium.

195 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 125.

196 See M. Antle, *Cultures de la surréalisme: les représentations de l'autre* (Paris: Acoria, 2001).

197 Breton, *Conversations*, 81.

198 Breton, "What Is Surrealism?" This passage, as Breton acknowledged, appeared earlier in his *Manifeste du surréalisme*. The passage cited is reprinted in Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*, 411. Emphasis as in that version. This passage also appeared in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory 1900–1990*, 437.

199 Breton, *Nadja*, 24. Further, *Nadja* can be taken as an allegory of transference.

200 Hence the title *Champs magnétiques*.

201 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 14. Communicating vessels are a philosophical toy that demonstrates that when two or more columns containing the same liquid are linked at the bottom by a tube filled with the same liquid, the height of the liquid in the columns will become the same if liquid is added or removed from one—and will do so even when the columns have different shapes or (within limits) diameters. Often the connecting tube is hidden, so the columns seem to magically communicate their states to one another. Breton likely thought of the connecting tube as a metaphor for an occult force.

202 Maurice Nadeau, "Love and Laughter: Surrealism Reappraised," in *The History of Surrealism*, trans. Richard Howard (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), 22.

203 In 1921, while he was at Saint-Dizier, Breton read Régis and Hesnard's *La psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1914) and learned of Freud's ideas. The

first part of *La psychanalyse* is a précis of Freud's thought to the time, the second part is an account of the reception of Freud's ideas, and the third is a set of commentaries, by Angélo Louis Marie Hesnard (following Régis's death), of Freudian psychoanalysis. While the book celebrated Freud's system as one of the most important scientific developments in psychology, it also asserted that Freud's work was simply an extension of Janet's and Charcot's, and that in transforming Janet's "psychological analysis" into "psychoanalysis," Freud had contributed little that was original. That work criticized the causal importance Freud attached both to sexuality and to symbolism. Freud had grave reservations about the work. In "On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement" (1914), he wrote that "Régis and Hesnard (Bordeaux) have recently attempted to disperse the prejudices of their countrymen against the new ideas by an exhaustive presentation, which, however, is not always understanding and takes special exception to symbolism." He continued to reproach Hesnard for several years for his inadequate presentation of Freudian ideas.

Roudinesco, in her history of psychoanalysis in France, assesses André Breton's psychiatric formation, noting that Breton's "theoretical training had a strong French cast," and that he was

a classical psychiatrist, an admirer of [the dreamy Romantic poet Gérard] Nerval [1808–55] and Hegel, but also of Taine and [novelist, antisemite, and Symbolist avant-le-lettre] Barrès [1862–1923]. He read Kraepelin [Emil Kraepelin, 1856–1926, a German psychiatrist who maintained that biological and genetic factors were implicated in mental illnesses] before Freud, and studied Babinski's neurology before knowing of the psychoanalytic method. And although he did not consider Janet an intellectual master, his training owed a lot to the kind of diffuse influence of Janet's thought that presided over the introduction of Freudianism in France.

She comments on the effects of viewing Freud through the lens of French psychology: "Breton's conception of the unconscious was not part of the same field of knowledge as Freud's. For the poet the unconscious was not a structure organized topographically into agencies and instances, but a psychical site conforming to those automatisms described by psychologists, magnetizers, spiritualists, and occultists." See Élisabeth Roudinesco, *Jacques Lacan & Co: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925–1985*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 22. This seems to me quite just.

Régis and Hesnard's *La psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses* remained for over twenty years the only extended presentation of Freudianism in France: it was reprinted in 1922 and 1929. In 1922, Breton began reading Freud's own works—translations that had just come out of the *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis [1910, French trans., 1916]) and *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben* (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life [1901, French trans. 1922]).

204 Régis, *Précis de psychiatrie*, 5th ed. (Paris: Doin, 1914), 40.

205 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 26; 27–28.

206 *Ibid.*, 29.

207 "L'entrée des médiums" was first published in *Littérature* 6 (1 November 1922) and reprinted in *Les pas perdus* (Paris: Gallimard, 1924), 123–14.

208 Breton, "Le message automatique," 65.

209 Breton, "Qu'est-ce que le surréalisme?" (What Is Surrealism?, 1934), in Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*, 412.

210 *Ibid.*; emphasis mine.

- 211 Breton, *Conversations*, 194–95.
- 212 In 1935, Dalí would create a painting, *Visage paranoïaque—la Carte-postale transformée* (*Paranoiac Visage—The Postcard Transformed*).
- 213 The stipulation Dalí makes at the end of this statement highlights that the secondary image, a correlative of the person's subjective state, is truly objective.
- 214 Dalí, "The Stinking Ass," in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory 1900–1990*, 479–80.
- 215 That bimorphic images elicit a more primitive form of thinking, akin to what Anton Ehrenzweig calls "scanning vision," accounts for our fascination with them.
- 216 Cited in Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí's Art and Writing*, 71.
- 217 Dalí, "Conquest of the Irrational," in *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí*, 418.
- 218 Hanjo Berressem perspicaciously compares Dalí's comments about the double image to Lacan's remarks on metaphor. "The creative spark of the metaphor does not spring from the presentation of two *images*, that is, two signifiers equally actualized. It flashes between two signifiers one of which has taken the place of the other in the signifying chain."
- Though he leaves the insight undeveloped, Berressem goes on to offer this astute comment about the relations among visual thinking, verbal thinking, and the unconscious: "It is this flashing effect that is also operative in Dalí's double images, and *this structure might be a link between the realms of the word and the image*" (emphasis mine). Hanjo Berressem, "Dalí and Lacan: Painting the Imaginary Landscapes," in *Lacan, Politics, Aesthetics*, ed. Willy Apollon and Richard Feldstein (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 277. This is exactly right.
- 219 Among Dalí's other references to this philosophy of immanence are this one: "Miró's paintings lead us, by way of automatism and surreality, to appreciate and to establish (in an approximate way) reality itself, thus corroborating the thought of André Breton, for whom surreality could be contained within reality and *vice versa*." Dalí, "Joan Miró," *L'Amic de les arts* 26 (30 June 1928), trans. in *Oui: The Paranoid-Critical Revolution*, 53. In "Review of Antiartistic Tendencies," he proposed that the "detailed documentary" (Dalí's actual term was closer to the "documentary of minutiae") "proves, once and for all, for the constant osmosis between reality and surreality," Dalí, *L'Amic de les Arts* 31 (31 March 1929), 76. In "New Limits of Paintings," he offered an extraordinary quotation from André Breton: "Everything that I love, everything that I think and feel inclines me towards a particular philosophy of immanence, from which it emerges that surreality be contained within reality itself and be neither superior nor exterior to it." Dalí, *L'Amic de les arts* 22 (29 February 1928), 24 (30 April 1928), and 25 (31 May 1928), trans. *Oui*, 39. Breton's wonderful comment in the original is "Tout ce que j'aime, tout ce que je pense et ressens, m'incline à une philosophie particulière de l'immanence d'après laquelle la surréalité serait contenue dans la réalité même, et ne lui serait ni supérieure ni extérieure." Breton, "Le surréalisme et la peinture," 46. This passage Dalí alluded to time and again.
- 220 Salvador Dalí, "Realidad y Sobrerrealidad," *La Gaceta literaria* 44 (15 October 1948).
- 221 The essay appeared in the first issue of *Le surréalisme au service de la Révolution* and subsequently in his book *La femme visible* (*The Visible Woman*, 1930), his tribute to his wife, Gala, the former wife of the great poet Paul Éluard. In this essay, he did not use the term "paranoia-criticism" in its entirety—he used only the first part.
- 222 André Breton, cited in Gascoyne, *A Short Survey of Surrealism*, 97.
- 223 Of course, some thoughts and images are filtered out as they cross the threshold between the unconscious and the conscious, and those that are allowed to enter consciousness are transformed in the process.

- 224 Later on, Dalí expanded the process into an oneiric-critical method, in which the artist pays attention to his dreams, freezes them through art, and analyzes them.
- 225 Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1969), 29.
- 226 The five sections are “Essai de simulation de la débilité mentale,” “Essai de simulation de la manie aiguë,” “Essai de la simulation de la paralysie générale,” “Essai de la simulation du délire d’interprétation,” and “Essai de la simulation de la démence précoce” (Attempted Simulation of Mental Deficiency, Attempted Simulation of Acute Mania, Attempted Simulation of General Paralysis, Attempted Simulation of the Delirium of Interpretation, Attempted Simulation of Dementia Praecox). The text in the final section was especially interesting because the writing collapses into asyntax, but not only for that—it loses intelligibility even at the level of reference.
- Breton’s testimony that *L’immaculée conception* was written following the method of paranoia-criticism appears in his *Conversations*, 125. Breton noted during this interview that his and Éluard’s purpose in that book was “the critical and systematic objectification of delirious associations and interpretations” and that “a large amount of space [was] devoted, in the book, to the verbal simulation of various ‘forms of certifiable madness.’ We began with the totality of symptoms that allow one to catalogue mental illness—for example, for acute mania, ‘flight of ideas,’ volubility, euphoria, erotomania, and so on.” Then, this being Breton, he had to explain how he and Éluard had outdone Dalí: “At the same time, what fundamentally distinguishes such an undertaking from Dalí’s is that our overriding intentions go much further. In the preamble I wrote to the chapter called main ‘The Possessions,’ you can easily see that our main concern was to reduce the antinomy between reason and unreason—which was one of Surrealism’s permanent ambitions” (ibid). It is worth recalling, in order to remain mindful of the proximity of these ideas to the Surrealists’ conception of the cinema, that in the early 1920s Man Ray, André Breton, and Paul Éluard discussed a never-to-be-realized film project, *Essai de simulation de délire cinématographique*.
- 227 Dalí was obviously familiar with that more comprehending meaning; he did, however, assert that paranoia should not be so described. See André Parinaud, *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí* (London: Quartet Books, 1977), 141 (and quoted below).
- 228 Salvador Dalí, *La femme visible* (Paris: Éditions Surréalistes, 1930). This blurb is reproduced in *L’immaculée conception* (Paris: Éditions Surréalistes, 1930), 163; and in André Breton, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), I:1027–28.
- 229 Salvador Dalí, *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí*, 143.
- 230 Dalí, “The Stinking Ass”; the passage cited appears in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory*, 479.
- 231 Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory*, 480.
- 232 Ibid., 480.
- 233 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 14.
- 234 Dalí, “The Stinking Ass,” in Harrison and Wood, *Art in Theory*, 479.
- 235 Ibid.
- 236 Ibid.
- 237 Ibid.
- 238 Dawn Ades, *Dalí*, rev. ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1995), 124.
- 239 Salvador Dalí, “The Moral Position of Surrealism.” The article was originally the text of a speech Dalí delivered at the Ateneo Barcelones on 22 March 1930. First published in *Helix* 10 (April 1930); trans. Dalí, *Oui: The Paranoid-Critical Revolution*, 110–14; the passage cited appears on page 112.

- 240 “[L]e rêve et l’automatisme ne prendraient sens que de confites évasions idéalistes, ressource récréative et inoffensive pour le confortable soin de la gaieté sceptique des poètes selects.” Salvador Dalí, “Nouvelles considérations générales sur le mécanisme du phénomène paranoïaque du point de vue surréaliste,” in *Oui: méthode paranoïaque-critique et autres textes* (Paris: Denoël-Gonthier, 1972), 37.
- 241 “L’ouvrage de Lacan rend parfaitement compte de l’hyperacuité objective et ‘communicable’ du phénomène, grâce à laquelle le délire prend ce caractère tangible et impossible à contredire qui le place aux antipodes mêmes de la stéréotypie de l’automatisme et du rêve.” Dalí, “Nouvelles considérations générales,” 35. Among secondary sources that provide insight into Dalí’s relation to Lacan are these: Berressem, “Dalí and Lacan”; Soraya Tlatli, *Le psychiatre et ses poètes: essai sur le jeune Lacan* (Paris: Tchou, 2000); and the *Revue des sciences humaines* 252 (2001), *Lire Dalí*, ed. Frédérique Joseph-Lowery.
- 242 “Le mécanisme paranoïaque ne peut nous apparaître, du point de vue spécifiquement surréaliste auquel nous nous plaçons, que comme la preuve de la valeur dialectique de ce principe de vérification, par lequel passe pratiquement dans le domaine tangible de l’action l’élément même du délire...” Dalí, “Nouvelles considérations générales,” 37.
- 243 Salvador Dalí, *Diary of a Genius*, trans. Richard Howard (London: Picador, 1964), 21.
- 244 It might be noted that Lacan likewise defines “the Real” (by which, admittedly, he means something different from what Dalí means by “the objective” or “reality”) as a domain of the hallucinatory and the phantasmal.
- 245 Dalí refers to such paranoid images as “double images” partly because they have this liminal existence, mediating between subjectivity and objectivity.
- 246 He likely was influenced, either directly or indirectly, by Freud’s analysis of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber’s memoirs, an analysis that reveals the systematic character of Schreber’s fantasies.
- 247 I have translated this from the German. I found the translation difficult to do, and so I give the original.
- Eines Tages wird man zugeben müssen, dass das, was wir Wirklichkeit getauft haben, eine noch größere Illusion ist als die Welt des Traums. Um meinen Gedanken zu Ende zu führen, möchte ich sagen, dass das, was wir Traum nennen, als solches gar nicht existiert, denn unser Geist ist auf Sparflamme eingestellt; die Wirklichkeit ist eine Begleiterscheinung des Denkens—eine Folge des Nichtdenkens, eine durch Gedächtnisschwund hervorgerufene Erscheinung. Die wahre Wirklichkeit ist in uns, und wir projizieren sie nach außen durch die systematische Auswertung unserer Paranoia, die eine Antwort und Reaktion auf den Druck—oder Unterdruck der kosmischen Leere ist [...] Im übrigen drückt sich die Paranoia nicht nur durch eine systematische Projektion aus, sie ist auch ein gewaltiger Lebenshauch. (Dalí, *So wird man Dalí*, trans. André Parinaud [Wien-München: MTV Molden-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1973], 158–59)
- 248 Salvador Dalí, “The Conquest of the Irrational” (1938), in *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí*, trans. Haakon M. Chevalier (London: Vision Press, 1948), 418. Emphasis conforms to the original.
- 249 “modelling by hand,” quoted in Breton, “What Is Surrealism?,” 416; “a motion picture projector,” quoted in *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí*, 46; “photographic minuteness,” *ibid.*, 57; “reversed and speeded up,” *ibid.*, 57.
- 250 Salvador Dalí, “Interprétation Paranoïaque-critique de l’Image obsédante *L’angélus* [the original used quotation marks] de Millet—Prologue: Nouvelle considerations générales sur le mécanisme du phénomène paranoïaque du point de vue surréaliste,”

Minotaure 1 (June 1933), 65–67. Jacques Lacan had a piece in the same issue, on paranoia: “Le problème du style et la conception psychiatrique des formes paranoïaques de l’expérience,” 68–69. In 1938, Dalí wrote *Le mythe tragique de L’angélus de Millet: interprétation paranoïaque critique* (The Tragic Myth of Millet’s *Angélus*,” published 1963). Dalí was fascinated (and troubled) by that artwork’s originality. (To be sure, Dalí’s own splendidly dramatic account of his effulgent recognition of the reason for the power of Millet’s painting is embellished, in a way that conceals an even richer truth: by 1911 or 1912, the eleven- or twelve-year-old Dalí had already produced a drawing of a graveyard scene, the composition of which is reminiscent of Millet’s *L’angélus*. Dalí’s reason for dramatizing the suddenness of his recognition links his fascination with *L’angélus* with his paranoiac-critical interests.) The enormous popularity of Jean-François Millet’s *L’angélus* (The Angelus, 1857), a Barbizon work on a religious theme, was among the phenomena that provided Dalí with the occasion to think about hallucination as interpretation, for all kinds of copies were made (one hung in the office of his father, a notary, and one in the corridor of his public school, so that the young Salvador could look out the classroom door and see it). Its ubiquity ensured it would become the stuff of dreams. The image of the man and woman praying became an “obsessive idea” for Dalí: the painting is named after the sound of the bell, a phenomenon that we can hear but cannot see—and Dalí was interested in all sorts of invisible (including unconscious) phenomena. He used this image in numerous oil paintings, drawings, and prints. The image’s objectively obsessive presence (if I may be permitted to coin that term) was also the starting point for the wildly speculative hypothesis *Le mythe tragique de l’angélus de Millet*, in support of which he gathered a fascinating collection of reproductions of the popular painting in advertisements and jokes, and on postcards and assorted objects.

Dalí claimed his fascination with the work began in June 1932, when, without premonition or any conscious association that might have provided the basis of an explanation, he had a lucid vision of Millet’s *L’angélus*—a clear vision in colour that appeared almost instantaneously and that displaced all other images. The vision devastated him for a time, but it also convinced him that Millet’s *L’angélus* was the most bewildering, enigmatic, compact picture, the richest in unconscious associations, that had ever been painted. It also launched an obsession with the painting that lasted more than five decades and that led Dalí to write, first, “Interprétation Paranoïaque-critique de l’Image obsédante *L’angélus* de Millet” and, later, the other paranoiac-critical interpretation we referred to above, *Le mythe tragique*. In the latter work, Dalí drew on Freudian case studies to develop a method of formulating new interpretations of the familiar work to explain the painting’s extraordinary popularity; his explanation combined transcendent and abject themes. Through free association, he arrived at the idea that the subject of *L’angélus* is actually sexual repression (and not the reverence for evening prayer that is traditionally suggested as its subject). In Dalí’s radical reinterpretation, the female peasant is a *femme fatale* (for this idea, he drew on the nineteenth-century Symbolist tradition). He proposed that in Millet’s work, the male peasant’s hat covers an erection that he is hiding from his partner. Dalí’s explanation for this is classically Freudian (in its Oedipal thrust): Dalí claims that the man conceals his erection because his partner is like a praying mantis—and if she notices the man’s arousal, she will mate with him and then eat him (a theme he dealt with also in *Cannibalisme de la mante religieuse de Lautréamont*, 1934).

In addition to the well-known symbolic eroticism of mystical ecstasies to which the posture of the woman in *L'Angelus* corresponds, you will agree with me that the position of the hands brought up together under the chin and leaving exposed especially the legs and the belly, is a common posture . . . This posture entails in my opinion very distinct exhibitionistic, expectant, and aggressive factors. In fact, we are dealing with a typical posture of expectation. It is an immobility that is a prelude to imminent violence. It is also the classical springing posture of animals, and it is one that is common to kangaroos and boxers; and above all, it is the one dramatically illustrated by the praying mantis (spectral posture). (Salvador Dalí, *The Collected Writings*, ed. and trans. Haim Finkelstein [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 290–91)

On Dalí's interpretation, Millet's painting is a meditation on a man's sexual fears that interweaves themes of sex and death. Dalí shared his fascination with the praying mantis with other Surrealists. In his renowned article, "Le Mante Religieuse" (1934), Roger Caillois writes that

André Breton, for example, raised praying mantises in Castellane for two years in succession, and Paul Éluard, whom I questioned on the presence in his home of a magnificent collection of mantises, admits to seeing the ideal sexual relationship in their love-making habits . . . The case of Dalí is even more applicable because of the impressive, comprehensive document on the relationship between love and homophagy that goes to make up his paranoiac-critical study of Millet's *Angelus*; he was forced to bring in the fearsome insect that in fact unites these two savage desires. (In *The Necessity of the Mind: An Analytic Study of the Mechanisms of Overdetermination in Automatic and Lyrical Thinking and of the Development of Affective Themes in the Individual Consciousness*, trans. Michael Syrotinski [Venice, CA: Lapis Press, 1990], 79–80)

But Caillois's list of Surrealists fascinated by the praying mantis is not exhaustive (nor is mine): an important omission is André Masson. William Presley points out that "André Masson was the artist who most consistently exploited the image of the praying mantis." Presley, "The Praying Mantis in Surrealist Art," in *The Art Bulletin* 55, no. 4 (1973): 607. His *Summer Divertissement* (1934) has mantids scattered across the canvas; and his *Insect's Betrothal* (1934) shows praying mantises about to perform that act that produced so much anxiety for Salvador Dalí.

Dalí's *Méditation sur la harpe* (Meditation on the Harp, 1932–34) is one of several works dealing with the *Angélus* theme. In it, Dalí recasts several aspects of Millet's painting to make qualities of his hallucinatory obsession with it explicit. The man and wife in Dalí's reworked version are gigantic (in comparison with the landscape), and the woman is unclothed, to emphasize her desire. To the foreground, Dalí had added a kneeling Death-like figure, dressed in tattered black clothing, to suggest infanticide and to connect the themes of sex and death. (Dalí harboured the conviction that Millet's couple were at a private funeral, burying their dead son—no doubt the idea of the death of a child haunted Dalí: the name Salvador had been given to an older brother who died of meningitis in infancy; when the painter-to-be was born, the name was passed on to him, and he doubtless felt that he was inhabited by the spirit of his dead brother and sentenced to the same fate of early death.) The Death-like figure has an elongated skull and a distorted body—the anamorphosis indicates hallucination. His left foot is bony (to evoke death) and grotesquely enlarged (in an allusion to Oedipus). His right elbow is similarly extended, into the form of crustacean's claw. According to Dalí, his suspicion was confirmed in 1963, when curators at the Louvre X-rayed

Millet's painting and found a small box at the feet of the couple—Dalí insisted this box is a coffin, and the presence of a coffin suggested that Millet had originally painted a peasant couple standing over a casket containing their dead son. He also proposed that Millet painted over it at the advice of a friend. Thus, according to Dalí, the inclusion of the Death-like figure in this painting foreshadowed the remarkable discovery about Millet's popular work that curators would later make. Hence, we might speculate that the kneeling figure in tattered clothing stands in for the artist.

Dalí's own paintings often incorporated figures modelled after Millet's *Angélus* or allusions to that painting: *Gala et l'angélus de Millet précédant l'arrivée imminente des anamorphoses conique* (Gala and the Angelus of Millet Immediately Preceding the Arrival of the Conic Anamorphoses, 1933), in which a reproduction of Millet's *Angélus* appears over the doorway; *L'angélus architectonique de Millet* (The Architectonic Angelus of Millet, 1933); *Portrait de Gala* (Portrait of Gala, 1933), in which there is a town/steeple in the background, modelled after the town and distant church in Millet's original; *Atavisme du crépuscule* (Atavism at Twilight, 1933–34); *Vestiges ataviques après la pluie* (Atavistic Traces after the Rain, 1934); *Le spectre de l'angélus* (The Spectre of the Angelus, ca. 1934); *Cour ouest de l'île des morts—Obsession reconstitutive d'après Böcklin* (West Side of the Isle of the Dead—Reconstructed Compulsive Image After Böcklin, 1934); *Hommage à Millet—Dessin dédié à Cécile amicalement* (Homage to Millet—For Cécile, in Friendship, 1934); *Reminiscence archéologique de l'angélus de Millet* (Archaeological Reminiscence of Millet's Angelus, 1933–35); *L'angélus de Gala* (1935), a double portrait of Gala, featuring a grim-faced Gala sitting on a wheelbarrow (there is a wheelbarrow in the Millet original, and Dalí's paranoiac-critical investigation of the painting convinced him that the wheelbarrow had transported the child's corpse) and a painting modelled on Millet's *Angélus* on the wall behind Gala; *Couple aux têtes pleines de nuages* (A Couple with Their Heads Full of Clouds, 1936), which contains a town that resembles that in the background of Millet's *L'angélus*; and *Hommage à Millet—étude pour la gare de Perpignan* (Homage to Millet—Study for the Perpignan Station, 1965). The wheelbarrow (from Millet's painting) reappears in *Les brouettes (panthéon formé par des brouettes en contorsion)* (The Wheelbarrows [Cupola Consisting of Twisted Carts], 1951).

- 251 Arthur Rimbaud, "Letter to Paul Demeny, 15 mai 1871," in Arthur Rimbaud, *Oeuvre-vie: édition du centenaire* établie par Alain Borer avec la collaboration d'Andrée Montègre (Paris: Arléa, 1991) 186–92; the phrase "Car Je est un autre" appears on page 187.
- 252 It should be noted that Lacan's theories were not worked out until some time after the Surrealist movement was founded.
- 253 Lacan extended this line of argument into a demonstration that subjectivity is constituted by relations among various terms, and that there is no substantial subject apart from these relations.

This line of argument, rich as it is (and I do believe that it is rich with implications), lies for the most part beyond the scope of our inquiry. One aspect of Lacan's later theory has clear relevance to our topic, however, and that is Lacan's conception of the subject as a discontinuity in the real. In the writings and lectures of his middle period, Lacan refers to human being as a *coupure* (cut), a *faille* (fault), a *fente* or *refente* (slit), or a *béance* (gap). Among Lacan's many reasons for referring to the subject in this way is that, as Freud proposed in his topographical model of mind (see below), each idea in consciousness (or discourse) has a dual representation, in the system Ucs. as well as the system Cs, though not every element of the system Ucs. has a corresponding representative in the system Cs. (or Pcs., "preconscious"). An element of the system Ucs.

that has no corresponding representative in the system Cs. or Pcs. will introduce a gap into consciousness, as Freud showed in his analysis of what led him to forget the name of the painter Signorelli (an analysis discussed immediately below). Moreover, Freud suggested, cathexes have their origin in the system Ucs. that are responsible for the energies that bring the contents of the system Cs. into consciousness in the first place.

Lacan interpreted these two facts about the intersystemic relations between the Ucs. and the Cs. as providing evidence that the contents of consciousness come from the region beyond consciousness, that we (the subject of self-awareness and self-presence) do not so much think our thoughts as our thoughts are forged by an agency beyond self-awareness and self-presence. As a non-presence, this agency is as though a nothing—a cut or fault or slit or gap in the “Real,” a gap that, as Freud’s example of forgetting the name “Signorelli” evidences, can introduce a further gap in consciousness by cathecting elements that must be repressed.

254 Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” in *Lacan, Écrits: A Selection*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 37.

255 In writing his thesis, on the case of Aimée (i.e., the case of Marguerite Pantaine), Lacan proposed that paranoia’s dynamic functions serve a personality and that the operations of paranoia must be understood in the context of the dynamics of the personality—Lacan’s thesis, after all, was titled *De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité*. There, and for the rest of his life, Lacan expounded the conviction that the etiology of paranoia (and of all psychosis) must take into account the entire concrete history of the psychotic’s relation to the world, even when the course of psychosis is influenced by organic conditions.

Through his teacher, Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault, the head of the Special Infirmary (for mental cases) of the Paris Préfecture de Police, Lacan was exposed to the idea that psychosis is not really constitutional (i.e., hereditary) but the result of the mental automatism syndrome. Clérambault pointed out that the onset of a psychosis is usually sudden and the syndrome itself fully formed, as if coming from the outside; moreover, it involves ideation that surpasses the patient’s intention. These characteristic features (among others) are evidence that automatism has a key role (even if it originates in organic dysfunction). Clérambault even tried to formulate a taxonomy of psychoses, classifying them according to their basis in the common element of automatism. Lacan used these ideas in formulating his thoughts on the Other and the Real.

Furthermore, Clérambault used his idea of a mental automatism syndrome to distinguish between the hallucinatory psychoses (those states of mind that Salvador Dalí was so taken with) and passional delusions. Among the passional delusions, Clérambault classified the illusion of being loved, of the sort that is called “erotomania.” Clérambault suggested that the basis of erotomania is an immense sexual vanity and that the resulting illusion is almost always narrativized in the same manner: some person, A, thinks that though she harbours chaste desires for another person, that person, B, is really deeply in love with her; as a result, A fantasizes that B follows her (A) around, makes passes at her, and arranges matters so that B agrees to meet her at some time or place—but, of course, B fails to show up. When the two do meet, something calamitous occurs, and the individual finds her/himself in the Special Infirmary of the Paris Préfecture de Police. It is a story worthy of the Surrealists; not so different from the one Breton tells in *Nadja*.

Clérambault’s account of erotomania reveals a way of thinking that is close to the Surrealists’: Clérambault understood erotomania as a way of representing reality that made sense—that had its own logic. In this, he agreed with the Surrealists, asserting

- that madness opened onto a special sort of truth, that delirium was not entirely different from reason, that reality and fantasy are not entirely disjoined.
- 256 Shortly after Lacan's article was published, Clérambault broke into a meeting of the Medico-Psychological Society in a rage, tossed a copy of the article in Lacan's face and accused him of plagiarism. Clérambault's attack was unwarranted: for one thing, Lacan had cited his work, going so far as paying homage to Clérambault's influence on his general outlook. Noting his debt to Clérambault for a particular point he made in the article, he wrote that it was "borrowed from the oral teaching of our master M.G. de Clérambault to whom we are indebted for the entirety of our method and material, and to whom, to avoid plagiarism, we would be obliged to pay homage for every one of our terms." Furthermore, Lacan took Clérambault's ideas in a different direction than Clérambault himself. This incident is described in Roudinesco, *Jacques Lacan & Co.*, 108–9.
- 257 Salvador Dalí, quoted in Élisabeth Roudinesco, *Jacques Lacan*, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 60.
- 258 Dalí, *The Unspeakable Confessions of Salvador Dalí*, 140–41.
- 259 Jacques Lacan, "Motifs du crime paranoïque: le crime des sœurs Papin" *Minotaure* 3–4 (1933–34): 25–28 at 27. English translation: Jon Anderson, "Motifs of Paranoid Crime: The Crime of the Papin Sister," *Critical Texts* 5, no. 3 (1988): 4–6.
- 260 This text is quoted in Roudinesco, *Jacques Lacan*, 26.
- 261 It was, after all, precisely to allow the Other to manifest itself that Breton, Éluard, Desnos, and Soupault endeavoured to induce sleeping fits and trances, and to contact spirits.
- 262 Jacques Lacan, "Le problème du style et la conception psychiatrique des formes paranoïaques de l'expérience," *Minotaure* 1 (June 1933): 69.
- 263 Jacques Lacan, "Au delà du 'Principe de réalité,'" *L'Évolution psychiatrique* 3 (1936): 67–86.
- 264 The paper appeared just after Lacan had become associated formally with the psychoanalytic movement; and in arguing as he does in "Beyond the Reality Principle," Lacan was providing the basis on which the claims for the scientific status of psychoanalysis could be understood. Psychoanalysis certainly cannot be understood as a science according to traditional criteria—most claims about its principal object, the unconscious, cannot be empirically verified. Yet, Lacan argues, the foundational status of the principal psychoanalytic claims, the rigour of psychoanalysts' working methods, and above all, the distinctiveness of the object of inquiry (psychical reality) justify its claim to being a science. (Lacan asserts that metaphysics can, in much the same way, be understood as a science.)
- 265 Salvador Dalí, *Gesammelte Schriften* (München: Rogner and Bernhard, 1974), 273. Quoted in Berressem, "Dalí and Lacan," 276.
- 266 The classic statement of the idea is in "Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je, tel qu'elle nous est révélée dans l'expérience psychiatrique" (The mirror stage as forming the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience), presented at the XVI^e Congrès international de psychanalyse, Zürich, 17 July 1949. The paper can be found in Jacques Lacan, *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 93–100. English translation: "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience," trans. Alan Sheridan in *Écrits: A Selection* (London: Tavistock, 1977), 1–7.
- 267 In Lacan, "Le problème du style." "This brief paper extends the theses of 'Schizographie' (1931) by arguing that the paranoid experience and the world view it generates constitute 'an original syntax.' A certain similarity can be detected between its thesis

- and the theory of critical paranoia elaborated by Salvador Dalí at this time.” See David Macey, *Lacan in Contexts* (London: Verso, 1988), 213.
- 268 Lacan, “The mirror stage as formative . . .” 3. To emphasize the relation between Lacan’s idea of the ego as Imaginary—as an illusory, quasi-hallucinatory *imago*—and Salvador Dalí’s notion of the double image (which desire transforms into the representation of something in addition to its primary signified), I stress Lacan’s phrase “we observe the role of the mirror apparatus in the appearances of the *double*, in which psychical realities, however heterogeneous, are manifested.”
- 269 Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, 4.
- 270 Therefore, in experiencing a poetic image, the subject and the object are fused.
- 271 Freud proceeded in similar fashion in Chapter 7 of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in which he shows that such mechanisms as condensation and displacement—mechanisms essential to language—play an unconscious role in the dream work.
- 272 Jacques Lacan, “De la psychose paranoïque,” in Lacan, *Premiers écrits sur le paranoïa* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 398. The quotation appears, translated, in Catherine Clément, *The Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 72.
- 273 Jacques Lacan and Vladimir Granoff, “Fetishism: The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real,” in Sandor Lorand and Michael Balint, eds., *Perversions: Psychodynamics and Therapy* (New York: Gramericy, 1966), 266–69.
- 274 Freud’s term is *Vorstellung*, literally, something set before (the mind); in *The Standard Edition*, it is often translated as “representation.” For object (or thing) representations, Freud sometimes used (especially in his early writings) *Objektvorstellungen* and sometimes *Sachvorstellungen*.
- 275 Freud used three models for mental functioning—the dynamic, the economic, and the topographic. A topographic map is one that shows the elevation of various regions. Freud used the metaphor of topographic relations to model different systems (as he called them) of the mind. The model proposes that there are three systems arranged on a vertical axis, running from surface to depth. Mental contents, the thoughts and feelings we have, are said to belong to the system Cs. (consciousness). Freud used the term “preconscious” in his topographical model to refer to thoughts that are not conscious but that are accessible to consciousness (they can become conscious if attention is focused on them but are temporarily not in consciousness); moreover, while the preconscious can be affected by primary-process thinking, it generally operates as the conscious system does (using secondary-process thinking). The “deepest” level of content—content that attention cannot bring into consciousness—belongs to the system Ucs. (unconscious).
- 276 Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious” (1915), in the Penguin Freud Library, ed. Angela Richards, vol. 11: *On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis*, 178.
- 277 *Ibid.*, 206–7. Strachey, in his translation of *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, used the term “cathexis” to translate Freud’s word *Besetzung*, which means, roughly, “occupation” (for example, of a territory by an army) or “investment.” Freud used the term metaphorically, to mean attention, interest, or the emotional investment in an object.

Freud distinguished between primary-process and secondary-process thinking. The first is a primitive form of mentation that operates by recathecting a memory trace of some need-satisfying activity. The hungry infant, for example, may recathect the iconic memory trace of being fed, and the reawakened image will provide temporary satisfaction. Because the mental representation serves primary-process thinking

in much the same way as does the real activity (both the actual experience of being fed and the reanimated iconic memory trace of the actual event satisfy the desire, at least temporarily), this form of thinking does not distinguish between reality and fantasy. Furthermore, because the past event can always be re-presented—brought back with the same significance to primary-process thinking—primary process knows nothing of the distinction between past and present. As a form of thinking based solely on immediately presenting the object to consciousness, it knows only affirmation, not negation.

278 Ibid., 201–2.

279 Jacques Lacan, “L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient,” in Lacan, *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 264; English version, Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Heloïse Fink and Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 148.

280 Freud, “The Metapsychology of Dreams,” in the Penguin Freud Library, vol. 11:235–36. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (ibid., 403–13), Freud gives a series of examples of how dream work treats *Wortvorstellungen* (word-presentations) as *Dingvorstellungen* (thing-presentations), subjecting them to such transformations as condensation and displacement.

Freud used the term “day’s residue” (or “day residue”) to refer to the innocuous material from the dreamer’s everyday life, of recent occurrence (usually from the day previous of the actual dreaming) that contributes to the dream. Events, impressions, thoughts, feelings from the day (or the several days) before the dream, that usually seem utterly unimportant, acquire significance through being connected with unconscious, infantile drives.

281 Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Penguin Freud Library, vol. 4, trans. James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), 381.

282 Ibid., IV:454–55, 459.

283 Nor is this example unique in Freud’s oeuvre—and indeed, Freud generalized about the role that verbal transformations play in transforming the dream thought into the manifest dream. The passage on representability from which I have just quoted was preceded by these remarks:

Analyses show us, however, that another sort [of displacement] exists and that it reveals itself in a change in the *verbal expression* of the thoughts concerned. In both cases there is a displacement along a chain of associations; but a process of such a kind can occur in various psychical spheres, and the outcome of the displacement may in one case be that one element is replaced by another, while the outcome in another case may be that a single element has its *verbal form* replaced by another. (Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Penguin Freud Library, vol. 4:454)

Moreover, the chapter “Vergessen von Eigennamen” (The Forgetting of Proper Names), which presents Freud’s commentary on forgetting the name “Signorelli,” is followed in *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben* (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life) by “Vergessen von fremdsprachigen Worten” (The Forgetting of Foreign Words), in which Freud comments on a conversation wherein a young man of an academic background was regretting that his generation was doomed to atrophy, and—to give poetic expression to his sentiments—began to quote Virgil’s famous line from Dido’s lament (addressed to a future Hannibal), “Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor” (Let someone arise from my bones as an avenger, *Aeneid*, IV: 265), but mangled it into “Exoriare ex nostris ossibus ultor.” Freud’s comments on that instance of forgetting are, if anything, even more fascinating (to me) than those which he offers on the Signorelli incident (and I have found, in my limited experience, a better teaching example). But here I have cited the classic example.

- 284 Thus, the case provides a good example for showing that Freud's use of hypotheses is not far different from the use that physicists make of hypotheses about, for example, quantum forces (such as strange and charm), inasmuch as their use conforms to rules for the conduct of science such as saving appearances and seeking parsimonious explanations.
- 285 Freud, "Forgetting of Proper Names," Penguin Freud Library, vol. 5: *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), trans. Alan Tyson, ed. James Strachey, assisted by Angela Richard and Alan Tyson, 38–41.
- 286 Ibid.
- 287 Ibid.
- 288 Freud writes, "I am in fact of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can never become an object of consciousness—only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea." Freud, "The Unconscious: Unconscious Feelings," Penguin Freud Library, vol. 11: *On Metapsychology*, 179.
- 289 Sigmund Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), Penguin Freud Library, vol. 5, 209n12.
- 290 Ibid., V:218. The passage presents, in practical, down-to-earth terms, the character of the thought processes that an actual analysis mobilizes.
- 291 Freud describes "der Mangel an Sein" (lack of being) in "Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens" (Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, 1911).
- 292 Sigmund Freud, "Forgetting of Proper Names," in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), 38–41.
- 293 Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 27. Lacan's interpretation of the material regarding the forgetting of the name "Signorelli" that Freud had educed in his self-analysis relating to his forgetting the name "Signorelli" is pure Lacanianism; indeed, the theme of the willing acceptance of death has a prominent role in Lacan's own writing. For example, that theme organizes the third part of the *Discours de Rome*, the section on "Interpretation and Temporality." This is another connection between Dalí and Lacan.
- 294 It has inspired several great artworks, including Harry Smith's *No. 12* (also known as the *Heaven and Earth Magic Feature*, made 1955–62), a work that displays Smith's enormous erudition in psychoanalytic theory.
- 295 Freud's comments on the Schreber case can be found in Sigmund Freud, "Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of Paranoia," in *The Standard Edition*, vol. 12 (1958):62–63. For the original text, see "Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia paranoides)" (1911), in *Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion*, in *Sigmund Freud: Studienausgabe VII* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1973), 133–203.
- 296 Jean Goudal, "Surréalisme et cinéma," in *Revue hebdomadaire* 34, no. 8 (21 February 1925): 343; in English in Paul Hammond, ed., *The Shadow and Its Shadow*, 85–86.
- 297 Ibid., 86.
- 298 Buñuel had met Pierre Batcheff and Albert Dubergen (both of whom appear in *Un chien andalou*) while he was working as an assistant director on Henri Etiévant and Mario Nalpas's film *La sirène des tropiques* (The Siren of the Tropics, 1928), in which Josephine Baker made her film debut. Batcheff was very well known at the time the film was made: in the two preceding years (1927–28), he had made nine features. In a

popular poll, taken for the French magazine *Pour vous*, Batcheff was the only French star among a list of mostly English and American actors in contention for the most desirable romantic lead. At the time, between the two world wars, the style for romantic leads tended towards the delicate and androgynous.

Batcheff's deep interest—and peripheral involvement—in Surrealist activities is often overlooked. He was a close friend of Jacques Prévert, and even before playing this role in *Un chien andalou*, he participated in a collectively made experimental film, *Paris-Express* (or *Souvenirs de Paris*, 1928), produced by Marcel Duhamel and Pierre Prévert, in which Jacques Prévert played a major role. And in 1930, just after playing in the Buñuel-and-Dalí film, Batcheff, who had become dissatisfied with the unimaginative and undemanding roles he was playing (and was likely troubled by negative reviews his most recent films had received), and the cinematic Surrealist extraordinaire Jacques Brunius (1906–67) approached Jacques Prévert about writing a scenario for a film that would be worthy of Batcheff's talent. Batcheff and Prévert got on so well that Jacques and his wife Simone moved into Batcheff's flat. Brunius has suggested that the scenario Prévert prepared was based on one of the unpublished scenarios he had composed during his official membership in the Surrealist group. Prévert titled the scenario *Emile-Emile*. It was, apparently, a work filled with black humour. Brunius provides this résumé:

It was the story of a young sculptor who, not having enough money to finish making the tail of his masterpiece—a life-size elephant in bread crumbs—has to go and beg his bread in the street. It is the tale of all that happens up until his death, when he is struck down by a storm and his ashes are sucked up in an electric vacuum-cleaner. (Quoted in Claire Blakeway, *Jacques Prévert: Popular French Theatre and Cinema* [Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1990], 46–47)

Brunius considered the script of Prévert's best works—it would have made a great Surrealist film. Unfortunately, it was not realized, as Batcheff committed suicide on 12 April 1932. However, another (more commercial) script by Batcheff was realized posthumously, after being rewritten by Paul Maret. The film adopted the title of Batcheff's scenario *Amour... Amour...*, and was produced in 1932, with Robert Bibal as its director.

299 Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí's Art and Writings, 1927–1942*, 66.

300 Robert Desnos offered a similarly anti-art polemic that, like Dalí's, was directed against what he thought to be the false experimental film. He began a scathing work of film criticism titled "Cinema d'avant-garde" (*Avant-Garde Cinema, Documents* [Dec. 1929]: 385–87) with a sarcastic remark: "Thanks to the persistent influence of Oscar Wilde and the aesthetes of 1890, an influence to which we owe, among others, the interventions of Monsieur Jean Cocteau, a mistaken kind of thinking has created much inauspicious confusion in the cinema." Although Desnos had already been expelled from the Surrealist group by the time he composed "Avant-Garde Film," his praise in the same text for Buñuel and Dalí's *Un chien andalou* makes clear that the Surrealist film was not what he had in mind when he wrote this diatribe. He had in mind the soft, dreamy, impressionistic film favoured by the French avant-garde of the time.

He argued that "an exaggerated respect for art and a mystique of expression has led a whole group of producers, actors, and spectators to the creation of a so-called avant-garde cinema, remarkable for the rapidity with which its productions become obsolete, for its absence of human emotion, and for the risks it obliges all cinema to

- run.” In defining his target more specifically (and by exclusion), he would add, “Don’t get me wrong. When René Clair and Picabia made *Entr’acte*, Man Ray *L’étoile de mer*, and Buñuel his admirable *Un chien andalou*, there was no thought of creating a work of art or a new aesthetic but only of obeying profound, original impulses, consequently necessitating a new form.” In concluding his essay, he would declare that the avant-garde in cinema, as in literature and theatre, is “a fiction”; but then, seeming to reverse his position, he would state, “In fact there is no more avant-garde cinema than the French cinema in its entirety... The question is, avant-garde of what?” Robert Desnos, “Avant-Garde Cinema,” in *French Film Theory and Criticism*, vol. I: 1907–1929, ed. Richard Abel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 429–32. The remark could be construed as claiming that the cinema (as an institution) is leading the arts into the future—a claim that supports the thesis of this book.
- 301 Dalí, *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí*, 212.
- 302 Dalí did paint two abstracts in 1928, one titled *Composition abstraite* and the other untitled; however, these resemble the work of Miró more than that of Mondrian. That he could accept abstraction of that sort makes the stakes clear: for Buñuel and Dalí, as for Breton, the Surrealist image induces an immediate psychic response, a taint inhospitable to reflection and close to automatism. So long as the image can engender such a response, be it abstract, oneiric, or something else entirely, it is acceptable to the Surrealists.
- 303 Dalí, *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí*, 205–6.
- 304 Francisco Aranda, *Luis Buñuel: A Critical Biography*, trans. and ed. David Robinson (London: Secker & Warburg, 1975), 59.
- 305 Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí’s Art and Writings*, 67.
- 306 Ibid.
- 307 Ibid. and “The Catalan Anti-Artistic Manifesto”—sometimes known as the “Groc Manifesto” or the “Yellow Manifesto,” which originally appeared in volume 2 (April 1928) of *Gallo* (a journal from Granada in which the poet and playwright Federico García Lorca played a major role); the passage quoted appears in Dalí, *Oui*, 51.
- 308 Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí’s Art and Writing 1927–1942*, 67.
- 309 On the topic of the Dalí’s interests in recasting writing so that it would take on characteristics of the cinema, see Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí’s Art and Writing 1927–1942*, 85–89.
- 310 Luis Buñuel, “Cinema, Instrument of Poetry,” reprinted in J. Aranda, *Luis Buñuel*, 273–74; originally printed as “Poésie et cinéma,” *Cinema* 59, no. 37 (June 1959): 70–74. Buñuel’s interest in inducing states of transport dates from his early years: as a student he was already a skilled hypnotist.
- 311 To provide some context for the idea, I note that Josephine Baker and *La revue nègre* first performed in Paris at the Théâtre Champs Elysées in 1925. Eros’s affinity for rhythm was a topic many pondered.
- 312 *Sangre* “se trata de un reportaje vibrante, apasionado y cinematográfico de los bajos fondos de Barcelona. La vida social, las gentes de mal vivir, las horizontales y los siete pecados capitales del Distrito V, quedan reflejados.” From an advertisement for *Sangre en Atarazans* that appeared in *El Escándalo* on 13 May 1926. The text in citation appears in Robert A. Davidson’s wonderful study, *Jazz Age Barcelona* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 51–52. I have introduced the emphasis on “cinematográfico.” Madrid’s claim that the book had a cinematographic quality was likely grounded in the impression the book leaves with the reader of proximity to what is lowly, unclean, diseased, corrupted, and malformed. One thinks of the stress that admirer of Surrealism, Walter Benjamin,

laid on the sense of proximity that the cinematic image evokes. Another cinematic feature of the work is its reliance (especially in its opening sections) on ellipses and the abrupt juxtaposition of different spaces. The work also celebrates the erotics of rhythmic-dynamic form. Dancing, Madrid asserts,

Es la piedra de toque de nuestra civilización; es el alma y la vida; la argolla y el libro nuestra actualidad. El negro que binca arrancando del saxofón las notas últimas del Charleston recién llegado; el banjo que ayuda la trasladarnos a la selva virgen a través de un cock-tail de veinte licores y de un solo color. (*Sangre en Ataranzas* [Barcelona-Madrid: Ediciones de La Flecha, 1926], 173)

[Dancing] is the touchstone of our civilization; it is the soul and life; the link and record of presentness. The black man that jumps, tearing from his saxophone the latest notes of the recently arrived Charleston; the banjo that helps carry us to the virgin jungle by way of a cocktail made from twenty liquors but one colour. (Davidson: 64; I have altered the translation slightly)

Clearly, the cinema has established the character of the art appropriate to an age of living on the edge.

- 313 Stuart Liebman, “*Un Chien andalou*: The Talking Cure,” in *Dada and Surrealist Film*, ed. Rudolf E. Kuenzli (New York: Willis Locker and Owens, 1987), 143–58.
- 314 Buñuel actually used a cow to allude to restraints on sexual passions—a cow appears on a bed in *L’âge d’or* (and in the later film, its being there constitutes an obstacle to sexual union).

The door remains closed for a moment, then opens as the young woman comes into the room. An enormous cow is lying on the bed at the other end of the room . . . Shot of the cow lying on the bed, placidly as in a cowshed, as though she was quite accustomed to lying there. The young woman comes into the shot and orders the cow off the bed, as she would do with a dog . . . Long shot of the door as the cow goes out of the room. The young woman closes the door after her. (The tinkle of the bell around the cow’s neck can still be heard in the room after the cow has left.)

See Luis Buñuel, *L’Âge d’Or and Un Chien Andalou: Films by Luis Buñuel*, trans. Mari-
anne Alexandre (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), 36.

- 315 Salvador Dalí, “Abrégé d’une histoire critique du cinéma” (1932, an introduction to the unrealized scenario for *Babaouo*), cited in Finkelstein, *Salvador Dalí’s Art and Writings 1927–1942*, 117.
- 316 Buñuel continued his remarks on *Un chien andalou* by explaining what he meant by saying that the film was an attack on “the audience’s reason”: “In *Un chien andalou* the filmmaker for the first time takes up a position on the poetic-moral plane . . . His object is to provoke instinctive reactions of revulsion and attraction in the spectator. Nothing in the film symbolizes anything.” Luis Buñuel, interview in Frank Stauffacher, ed., *Art in Cinema* (San Francisco: San Francisco Museum of Art, 1947), 52. *Un chien andalou* attacks the audience’s reason, because it does not cohere either on the plane of narrative or on the plane of symbolism.
- 317 Michael Riffaterre, *Text Production*, trans. Terese Lyons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 208.
- 318 Fondane’s ideas on the cinema as the exemplary medium (the *ottima arte*) are of key importance. These ideas, and his “Trois Scenarii—Ciné-poèmes” (1928), are discussed in Peter Christensen, “Benjamin Fondane’s ‘Scenarii intournables,’” in Rudolf E.

- Kuenzli, ed., *Dada and Surrealist Film*, 72–85. The Surrealist Scenario text is discussed in Richard Abel, “Exploring the Discursive Field of the Surrealist Film Scenario Text,” in Kuenzli, *Dada and Surrealist Film*, 58–71.
- 319 In *The Screen in Surrealist Art and Thought*, Haim Finkelstein selects a passage from the end of Desnos’s *Pénalités de l’enfer ou Nouvelles Hébrides* (Paris: Maeght, 1974) to demonstrate the narrator’s fascination with a blank, luminous screen in an empty cinema: in the passage, that interest lures the narrator towards the screen until he is able to peer through two small openings and see the bodies of two acquaintances gored on church spires. Finkelstein uses the example to show how a spatial conception based on the screen became an organizing metaphor for Surrealist art, but it could just as well be used as testimony to the power of the cinema and to the longing to recreate the conditions of the cinema in other arts. Finkelstein, *The Screen in Surrealist Art and Thought* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
- 320 As already noted, that image also symbolizes masturbation and death.
- 321 Charles Baudelaire, *Les fleurs du mal*; reprinted in Claude Pichois, ed., *Baudelaire: Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 87.
- 322 Ado Kyrou, *Luis Buñuel: An Introduction*, trans. Adrienne Foulke (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 136.
- 323 The French word for “butterfly” is *papillon*; for “moth,” the French often use *papillon de nuit*.
- 324 Roger Caillois, “Mimétisme et psychasthénie légendaire,” *Minotaure* 7: 5–10. *Minotaure* 5 had run an earlier article by Caillois, “La mante religieuse. De la Biologie à la Psychanalyse”: 23–26. Caillois later incorporated the earlier article into a book. See Roger Caillois, “La mante religieuse,” in *The Necessity of the Mind: An Analytic Study of the Mechanisms of Overdetermination in Automatic and Lyrical Thinking and of the Development of Affective Themes in the Individual Consciousness*, trans. Michael Syrotinski (Venice: Lapis Press, 1990). The following quotations encapsulate the article’s thesis, which helps explain this obsessive theme in Surrealist art and literature (and provides the basis for an account of entomological imagery in the films of Luis Buñuel):

It is not surprising that the great similarity between humanity’s organic structure and biological development, combined with the identical external conditions of its physical world, should have considerable resonances in its psychic world, tending to produce within it a minimum number of similar reactions and consequently spawning within every mind the same affective tendencies and primordial passional conflicts... (85)

and

So it would not be impossible for the fear of castration to be a specific instance of the male’s fear of being devoured by the female during or after copulation: a very precise representation of this is provided objectively by the nuptial habits of the mantids, so great is the symmetry, or better still, the continuity, between nature and human consciousness. (78–79)

Caillois’s essay draws attention to the connection between *mimétisme* and our primordial condition. The Surrealists admired the *mimétisme* of the mantis because it represented a complete merger, an impulse to become nothing and to unite with the other. This desire to become nothing issues from the desire (akin to *thanatos*) to return to our primordial condition of non-awareness. We long to be deindividuated (*désindividualiser*). That which can return us to a boundaryless state of ego loss Caillois

refers to as the “devouring force.” Taken as a spiritual state, this zone of undifferentiation is the alchemical *materia prima*, the original matter out of which the philosopher’s stone must eventually be fashioned.

“La mante religieuse” has recently been retranslated and published in Claudine Frank, ed., *The Edge of Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader*, trans. Claudine Frank and Camille Naish (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

- 325 The philosopher, psychoanalyst, and art critic Donald Kuspit writes about one important Surrealist work that evokes the praying mantis.

[Giacometti’s] anti-woman attitude becomes explicit in perhaps his most sensational Surrealist work, *Woman with Her Throat Cut* (1932). The spoon body has now been cut open, as though on an anatomy table . . . with some of its parts strewn around, if still attached to one another, and the throat manneristically elongated, the cut becoming a kind of crease in a series of ridges. The figure, which resembles a kind of praying mantis . . . has all but lost its sexual identity (a semblance of breasts remain), suggesting that it has been emotionally as well as physically eviscerated in Giacometti’s fantasy. But this act of hatred and revenge is also ingeniously abstract: It is a tension of curves and angles, condensations and elongations, that show Giacometti struggling for epigrammatic brevity with no loss of emotional complexity and mystery.

From Kuspit, *A Critical History of 20th-Century Art*, Chapter 3, Part 2, “Subjectivity and Society: The Third Decade,” <http://www.artnet.com/magazine/features/kuspit/kuspit4-25-06.asp>.

- 326 Dalí, “The Stinking Ass,” 480.
- 327 André Breton, *Anthologie de l’humour noir* (Paris: Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1966), 506.
- 328 In fact, the image of the severed hand/arm occurs in other Surrealist works and in works affiliated to Surrealism: Philippe Soupault’s *Poèmes et poésies* contains the line “You probably have to cut them [the hands] off to stop loving them.” Philippe Soupault, *Poèmes et poésies (1917–1973)* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1973), 134–35. And, in a more commercial/narrative film, *L’Atalante* (1934), by Jean Vigo (who earlier had made an extraordinary Surrealist documentary, *À propos de Nice*, 1930), a peculiar old seaman keeps a severed hand preserved in spirits in a jar.
- 329 The Bataille novel implies a critique of the ocular basis of modern reason.
- 330 Loplop is a totemic figure who appears with some regularity in Ernst’s work of the period 1928–32, particularly in works that make the fear of the *corps morcelé* primary. I think that Samantha Kavky (*Art History* 28, no. 3 [2005]: 357–85) gets the significance of the figure exactly right: she shows that as a totemic figure, Loplop emerges from the Oedipal conflict, which (as is well known) is central to Ernst’s work. (In the course of establishing this, Kavky gives a strong reading of *La femme 100 têtes*.) She goes on to show that Ernst’s constructed totem signifies rejection of the constraints of the tradition of art (as well as of individual mastery), thus freeing him to establish a new identity within the Surrealist brotherhood and to embrace Surrealist automatist practices.
- 331 One cannot but wonder if Dalí was not asserting that he was now in possession of Gala’s eyes (and so spirit/love).
- 332 Lacan, “L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient,” 264; English version, Lacan, *Écrits*, 148.
- 333 Indeed, I believe that Buñuel never abandoned Surrealism: his feature films of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s are just as Surrealist as *L’âge d’or*.
- 334 Luis Buñuel, with José de la Colina and Tomás Pérez Turrent, *Objects of Desire: Conversations with Luis Buñuel*, ed. and trans. Paul Lenti (New York: Marsilio, 1992), 34.

- 335 Luis Buñuel, *My Last Sigh*, trans. Abigail Israel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 123.
- 336 Luis Buñuel, *An Unspeakable Betrayal: Selected Writings of Luis Buñuel*, trans. Garrett White (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 253.
- 337 Buñuel et al., *Objects of Desire*, 35.
- 338 Salvador Dalí, “Documentary—Paris 1929—VI,” in Salvador Dalí, *Oui: The Paranoid-Critical Revolution Writings*, 107.
- 339 Jules Romains in *La foule au cinématographe, puissances de Paris* (Paris: Eugène Figuière, 1911), 118–20; a section in which this passage appears was reprinted in translation in Richard Abel, *French Film Theory and Criticism: A History/Anthology 1907–1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 53. Abel helpfully notes that Romains was a major French poet, novelist, dramatist, and essayist who advocated a Unanimist turn in literature, an intuitive depiction of the collective consciousness of modern life.
- 340 Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1977), 78.
- 341 André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” in *What Is Cinema?* vol. 1, ed. and trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 10.
- 342 Sontag, *On Photography*, 54.
- 343 *Ibid.*, 80.
- 344 *Ibid.*, 69.
- 345 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 16.
- 346 *Ibid.*, 15–16.
- 347 Kyrrou, *Luis Buñuel*, 43–45.
- 348 Quoted from Emilio Garcia Riera, “The External Rebellion of Luis Buñuel,” *Film Culture* 21 (Summer 1960): 57.
- 349 Steven Kovács argues that the appearance of *L’âge d’or* marks the shift to Surrealism’s communist phase. Certainly, *L’âge d’or* is a more overtly political film than *Un chien andalou*. But *L’âge d’or* also exhibits many attributes of delirium, of a systematic deformation of reality. The point of my analysis of *Las Hurdes* is to assess the claim that its dialectical structure can be explained as a shift from absolute idealism to dialectical materialism. (I doubt its truth.)
- 350 Vivian Sobchack offers an interpretation along these lines in “Synthetic Vision: The Dialectical Imperative of Luis Buñuel’s *Las Hurdes*,” in Jeanette Sloniowski and Barry Keith Grant, eds., *Documenting the Documentary: Close Readings of Documentary Film and Video* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998), 70–82. Needless to say, I read *Las Hurdes* very differently.
- 351 James F. Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here? Ethnography/Equivocation/Buñuel,” *October* 89 (Summer 1999): 52.
- 352 Kyrrou, *Luis Buñuel*, 43.
- 353 In making self and other the key dialectical pair, Fanon followed Kojève’s discussion of that paradigmatic idealist text, Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.
- 354 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1977), 38–39.
- 355 Georges Bataille, “La ‘vieille troupe’ et le préfixe sur dans les mots ‘surhomme’ et ‘surréalistes’” (1930); translated as “The ‘Old Mole’ and the Prefix *Sur* in the Words *Surhomme* (*Superman*) and *Surrealist*,” in Bataille, *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927–1939*, ed. and trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 40; and on Dalí’s famous painting “Le ‘jeu lugubre,’” (The “Lugubrious Game”), originally published in *Documents* 7: 297–302; reprinted in *Visions of Excess*, 24.
- 356 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 187.

- 357 Ibid., 124.
- 358 Bataille, “The ‘Old Mole’ and the Prefix *Sur*,” 42.
- 359 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 184.
- 360 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 14.
- 361 Bataille, *Visions of Excess*, 94.
- 362 Bataille, *L'érotisme* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 117. Translation mine.
- 363 Indeed Freud’s idea of the unconscious has many similarities with Bataille’s concept of the heterogeneous and likely served Bataille as a partial model for his conception.
- 364 Bataille shared this interest with Michel Leiris, a writer affiliated with the Surrealist movement until the schisms of 1929, when he became part of the group of dissident Surrealists who gathered around Bataille and *Documents*. Leiris was a co-editor, with Bataille, of the review and a regular contributor. Later, Leiris, along with Bataille and others, formed the College of Sociology (1937–39), the goal of which was to study forms of the sacred in everyday life. They understood that this study would counter the effects of the Enlightenment and capitalist rationalization of the world. Leiris continued to associate with Bataille until the latter’s death in 1962.
- 365 Bataille, “L’apprenti sorcier,” *Nouvelle revue française* 298 (July 1938); translated as “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” in *Visions of Excess*, 225.
- 366 The analogous features of the “sur-real” and the *χώρα* (chora) are striking—and equally telling are the sharp differences between the two. Note first that the images Plato uses in the *Timaeus* to indicate *χώρα*’s importance—nurse, mother, and especially gold—are consistent with Breton’s views on the sur-real and on the feminine as initiating the quester into the sur-real (if it seems odd to attribute that view to Breton, consider *Nadja*, 1928, written near the beginning of his career, and *Arcana 17*, 1945, written almost two decades later). Furthermore, in Plato’s philosophy, the *χώρα* is “something” that is not “some thing,” something that is other than things of ordinary reality and beyond determinate being. The Dadaists and Surrealists also sought that which is beyond being named, and could be invoked only by extreme means—and when it is invoked, it lays language, representation, and meaning to ruin. Moreover, Plato conceived of the *χώρα* as a receptacle of becoming/proto-space that has a role in generating that which is determinate but is not itself determinate. Likewise, the Surrealists thought of the sur-real as an *ἐνέργεια* (energeia) that brings beings into the light of actuality (cf. Plato’s use, at *Timaeus* 50c, of the term *φαίνεται* [phanetai] to speak of the effect of *χώρα*’s bringing beings into be-ing—and etymologically *φαίνεται* means being brought forth into the light). The Surrealists, however, proposed (sometimes) that this *ἐνέργεια* manifests its creativity through chance. Their proposals on that topic often suggest that chance might even be thought of as the *δημιουργός* (demiourgos), the artisan god who, operating within the space of the *χώρα*—and with what Plato calls the *ἔχνοσ* (ikhnos, trace or footprint) of earth, air, fire, and water—fashions the determinate (*Timaeus* 53b). Though the basic template, of an indeterminate element generating determinate forms, is the same for both Plato and the Surrealists, there is this very important difference: for the Surrealists, but not for Plato, what generates determinate form is beyond rational understanding, for it is *tout autre* (*ganz Anderes*). The Surrealists believed that the sur-real can be apprehended only through a poetic afflatus, while Plato maintained that *χώρα* is vouchsafed to us through a higher reason—and it might be noted in that connection that Plato’s presentation of *χώρα* occurs within the context of a myth (we must not take *χώρα* as a *topos*, either in its original meaning of place nor in its present-day meaning), and Plato turns to myth with dealing with subjects that resist being presented in ordinary, everyday language.

There is a very telling change here, from the Greek belief that beings belong to an order that can be apprehended through reason to the Surrealist's belief (that moderns generally share) that beings belong to an order that (since it arises through chance) defies reason. The difference between Plato and the Surrealists is especially evident in Plato's remarks on the *δημιουργός* (demiourgos) at *Timaeus* 53b. What exactly he says is worth attending to:

the various elements had different places before they were arranged so as to form the universe. At first, they were all without reason and measure. But when the world began to get into order, fire and water and earth and air had only certain faint traces of themselves, and were altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of God; this, I say, was their nature at that time, and God fashioned them by form and number. Let it be consistently maintained by us in all that we say that God made them as far as possible the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair and good. (Benjamin Jowett translation)

This difference between Plato's idea and Surrealists' more modern idea of the genetrix is important; nonetheless, its significance is perhaps attenuated somewhat by the Surrealists' conception of chance as an expression of a (generally beneficent) processual reality, which they termed *sur-réalité*.

That said, the idea that sur-real as being resistant to reason, form, and number led to the dissident Surrealist Georges Bataille's notion that Reality is fundamentally amorphous, or *informe*. So one is startled to realize that a deconstructive reading of Plato's text, highlighting the contradictions (or unresolved antithetical elements) in the text, generates a view of reality very close to Bataille's. For what Plato's text (at *Timaeus* 50c) suggests is that the *χώρα* is an *informe* that is at once receptive and (in its rhythmic motility) productive—he says it is “moved or shaped by those things that enter it, through them it appears [*φαίνεται*, *phanetai*] different at different times.” Of course, Plato tries to restrict *χώρα*'s protean qualities to mere appearance, and to suggest that the *δημιουργός*, operating at a different level, is beyond appearance. Still, the fact the *χώρα* is beings' genetrix (the *χώρα* is at once receptive and productive), and the fact that the *χώρα* has no fixed nature (and so is *informe*), releases a deconstructive dynamic that eventually manifests itself in later conceptions of reality.

- 367 Benjamin was much influenced by Cabalism and alchemy—a fact that his more hard-line Marxist interpreters have been hard-pressed to take into account.
- 368 In opposition to the Saussurian idea that the semiotic relation (so far as concerns language) is generally arbitrary.
- 369 Bataille, “The Use Value of D.A.F. De Sade,” in *Visions of Excess*, 97.
- 370 Lastra also interprets the film as marking Buñuel's disgruntlement with Surrealism. I do not believe that it does, nor do I believe that the fundamental ideas of Bataille's heterology lie beyond the periphery of Surrealism. Both Buñuel and Bataille, in my view, remained Surrealists in spirit after the movement fragmented, Buñuel right through the 1970s—*Cet obscur objet du désir* (1977) is every bit as Surrealist as *Un chien andalou*.
- 371 Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 52. Emphasis mine.
- 372 See D. Hollier, *Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille*, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), xii–xiii.
- 373 Georges Bataille, *Lascaux, ou La naissance de l'art* (1955); translated as *Lascaux or the Birth of Art* (Geneva: Skira, 1955), 116.
- 374 André Bazin and Jacques Doniol-Valcroze, “Entretien avec Luis Buñuel,” *Cahiers du cinéma* 36 (June 1954): 4 (translation mine).

- 375 Aranda, *Luis Buñuel*, 88. Lastra takes this remark to indicate that Buñuel was withdrawing from Surrealism (Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 54). I disagree, for I consider that the remark conveys that Buñuel had moved away from Breton’s Surrealism and was advancing increasingly towards the Surrealism of the Bataille/Aragon/Sadoul/Unik camp. In my view, Buñuel never abjured Surrealist practices, though he did disaffiliate himself from the group of artists André Breton convened. Responsibility compels me to point out that Buñuel’s letter to Breton declaring his reasons for withdrawing explained that he felt Surrealism and Communism were incompatible and “given the current state of things,” he had to choose Communism. Paul Hammond comments on the letter in his article “Buñuel Bows Out,” in *Rouge* 3 (2004) at www.rouge.com.au/3/banuel.html.
- 376 This group congregated around the lavishly produced arts review *Documents* (1929–30).
- 377 This accounts for the need for heterology to come forward, perhaps not as a science like the existing sciences, but nevertheless as science in the most profound sense of that word.
- 378 Bataille, “The Use Value of D.A.F. de Sade,” 97.
- 379 Luis R. Miguel, “Las Jurdes,” *La Revista de Extremadura* 27 (September 1901): 423. The translated version is given in Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 63.
- 380 José G. Castro, “Las Jurdes,” *La Revista de Extremadura* 29 (November 1901): 509–10. Key points from Castro’s article are presented in Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 63–64.
- 381 Quoted in Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 64.
- 382 Castro, “Las Jurdes,” 514. Quoted in Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 64.

Lastra, however, goes on to present an explanation that in my view misses the radical (and, some would say, troubling) character of Buñuel’s documentary:

Here are two basic tropes available at this time to Buñuel when trying to offer a picture of the Hurdanos; either they are beasts unworthy of Spanish or even human identity [Castro’s view], or they are the very emblems of Spanish dignity and character. The latter option, chosen by Unamuno and Legendre, is obviously the less pernicious of the two. As I have shown, however, Buñuel veers in the direction of Castro, ameliorating his film’s unsettling depiction of the Hurdanos only with a harsh, explicit condemnation of their social and political conditions. (65)

The radicality of Buñuel’s work is that he refused the choice: both alternatives fail to recognize that Hurdanos are wholly other and that in their utter otherness they possess attributes of the sacred. Indeed, they actually *are* sacred, and that status is evident in the fact that their existence can make us shudder, can make us tremble with holy terror. What is wondrous about them is that their existence has been degraded beneath that of the human, so far beneath its status that they have taken on attributes of the divine. Because they possess attributes of the divine, their existence is fundamentally inscrutable.

Lastra avoids this very radical—and very, very troubling—insight by invoking a feeble concept of equivocation: Buñuel did not really commit to the position he proposed—he depicted the Hurdanos as subhuman, and so adopted the rhetoric of the Fascists (the film, of course, appeared just at the moment when the Spanish Fascists were accumulating power). But he did not really mean that—he adopted the rhetoric only to undercut it (which, Lastra suggests, he did by explicitly condemning the social and political conditions in which the Hurdanos lived).

It might be enormously comforting to neutralize the inhumanity that Buñuel attributed to the Hurdanos. But Buñuel was much closer to the Fascist position than Lastra wants to acknowledge. Buñuel did portray the Hurdanos as inhumanly abject—so inhumanly abject that they have the characteristics of the sacred. Far from refusing to exalt the Hurdanos (a tendency that played into the hands of reactionary nationalists), Buñuel went to the furthest extreme of exaltation, actually according them the status of the sacrificed (that is, as Bataille pointed out, they are “made holy”). Buñuel’s documentary reveals that no choice between dehumanizing and exalting was demanded—the Hurdanos are exalted precisely *through* their dehumanization. That is the wonder—the marvel—of their inscrutable existence.

383 Miguel de Unamuno, “Las Hurdes,” in *Andanzas y Visiones Españolas* (Madrid: Renacimiento, 1922), 110. Quoted in Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 64.

384 Unamuno, *Andanzas y Visiones Españolas*, 116. Quoted in Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 65.

Buñuel once found himself confronted by a proponent of Unamuno’s view. At the Madrid première of *Las Hurdes*, several officials from the Spanish Republic protested strongly the film’s depiction of Las Hurdes, claiming that it was an insult to Spain. One of these officials, a Dr. Gregorio Marañón—who knew Buñuel and who had been his physician during Buñuel’s years at La Residencia de estudiantes—was especially offended by the passage depicting a rite in which recent bridegrooms participate, a rite that included decapitating roosters. Marañón pointed out, in protest against the film’s depiction of Las Hurdes, that La Alberca “has the most beautiful dances in the world, and its folk dress in magnificent 17th century costumes.” Buñuel responded that the remark was evidence of a recrudescence of a malignant and reactionary nationalism: “To say the Alberca has the most beautiful dances in the world! That’s like claiming your country has the most beautiful women and the bravest men in the world!” Lastra cited Buñuel’s remark at page 58; he had drawn it from José de la Colina and Thomas Pérez Turrent, *Luis Buñuel, prohibido asomarse al interior* (Mexico: Joaquín Mortiz/Planeta, 1986), 37–38.

Lastra uses the story to support his claim that “Buñuel’s chief task was to avoid the recuperations of nationalism and Surrealism, but still to give an accurate account of Hurdano life.” I do not for a minute believe that Buñuel wanted to put a distance between himself and Surrealism—we have seen that he told André Bazin and Jacques Doniol Valcroze, “J’ai fait *Las Hurdes* parce que j’avais une vision surréaliste, et parce que je m’intéressais au problème de l’homme. Je voyais la réalité d’une autre façon que je l’aurais vue avant le surréalisme. J’étais sûr de cela, et Pierre Unik aussi.” (Despite this, Lastra states repeatedly that *Las Hurdes* reflects Buñuel’s dissatisfaction with Surrealism and that at the point of making *Las Hurdes*, he was about to break with the movement.) Nor do I believe that Buñuel wanted to create an accurate account of Hurdano life. If nothing else, the film’s testimony to its own falsity should be enough to have that claim thrown out of court. The film implies that Hurdano life is utterly unfathomable, a completely inscrutable other.

385 Miguel de Unamuno, “Las Hurdes,” in *Andanzas y Visiones Españolas*, 112 (“... allí no hay nada. ¡Ni pan!”) Quoted in Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 65.

386 To use that phrase from Bataille. The phrase “representation homogène du monde” appears in Georges Bataille, “Le valeur usage de D.A.F. Sade,” in *Oeuvres complètes*, tome II: *Écrits posthumes, 1922–1940* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 6. Concerning the English

- version, the phrase “homogenous representations of the world” appears in “The Use Value of D.A.F. Sade,” in *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927–1939*, trans. Alan Stoekl (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 97. Anomalies of this sort offer further examples of constructions that are syntagmatically well formed but whose elements, because of incompatibilities among them, cannot be brought to cohere on the paradigmatic plane. Such constructions bring into question the film’s status as a document.
- 387 Lastra asserts that “*Las Hurdes* presumes the possibility of a scientific ‘human geography’ in order to criticize its underlying assumptions, not in order to offer a superior alternative.” Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 62. But Buñuel does offer a superior alternative, viz., a heterological study.
- 388 Insects appear often in Buñuel’s films, for insects offer a paradigmatic instance of heterological beings. While at the Residencia, Buñuel studied at the Museum of Natural History under Ignacio Bolívar (1850–1944), who founded the discipline of entomology in Spain and, by the time Buñuel was a young man, had achieved renown. To the end of his days, J.H. Fabre’s (1823–1915) *Souvenirs entomologiques* remained among his favourite books—*Souvenirs entomologiques* (1879–2909) is a ten-volume collection of writings on insects and arachnids, for lay people as well as for specialists, that gives evidence, within a quasi-anecdotal and self-reflexive format, of Fabre’s remarkable powers of close observation and his flair for description.
- 389 We are also told that the sick are given bread soaked in goat’s milk as a special “treat,” to fortify them.
- 390 In the print I analyze, the narrator describes the rite (in French) as “strange and barbaric,” (Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 60). Lastra meticulously points out differences in what various versions of the soundtrack state.
- 391 Here, as in communion, wine is a symbolic representation of the blood of a sacrificial victim.
- 392 Lastra, “Why Is This Absurd Picture Here?,” 61.
- 393 Up to *Enid’s Idyll* (2004), Lawrence Jordan used in his film credits the name “Larry Jordan”; he had begun calling himself “Lawrence” in the 1990s.
- 394 A transcript of this interview can be found online at <http://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/oralhistories/transcripts/jordan95.htm>. The Smithsonian Institute stipulates the following as a citation: “This transcript is in the public domain and may be used without permission. Quotes and excerpts must be cited as follows: Oral history interview with Larry Jordan, 1995 Dec. 19–1996 July 30, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution.”
- 395 André Breton, “Surrealism and Painting” (1928); the essay appears in an English translation by David Gascoyne in Breton, *What Is Surrealism?*; it has been reprinted in Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*; the passage cited appears on page 413 of Chipp’s book.
- 396 From a written interview with Lawrence (Larry) Jordan, conducted by Robert Russett and printed in Robert Russett and Cecile Starr, *Experimental Animation: An Illustrated Anthology* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1976), 156–57.
- 397 Oral history interview with Larry Jordan; see note 394.
- 398 Ibid.
- 499 Breton, *Conversations*, 63.
- 400 Chipp, *Theories of Modern Art*, 427.
- 401 John Russell, *Max Ernst: Life and Work* (New York: H.N. Abrams, 1967), 188. On the matter of Ernst’s use of illustrations from *La Nature*, see Charlotte Stokes, “The

- Scientific Methods of Max Ernst: His Use of Scientific Subjects from *La Nature*,” *Art Bulletin* 62, no. 3 (September 1980): 453–65.
- 402 Ernst, “Au-delà de la peinture,” in Max Ernst, *Écritures* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 235–69. An English translation of the article, trans. Dorothea Tanning, appears in Herbert, *Modern Artists on Art*, 246. I have used Tanning’s translation of the phrase, which appears on page 130.
- 403 In Max Ernst, “Ma peinture et mes procédés sont des jeux d’enfant,” *Arts* 765 (6–12, January 1960).
- 404 It was also an allusion to the *Semaine de la Bonté*, a charitable association, founded in 1927, to promote social welfare. In that year, an abundance of posters appeared in Paris, soliciting donations from one and all. Thus, the title of the work is a found object that has undergone a minor alteration.
- 405 Hans Richter and Max Ernst recognized that film would allow them to carry further the project that *Une semaine de bonté* represents: scenes in the “Lundi” *cahier*, especially those of the woman sleeping in a magnificent bed while a flood swirls about it, prompted Richter to propose to Ernst that he prepare a film script. In 1946, he filmed *Desire* (Ernst acted in the film); in 1947, he released it as the first part of the anthology film *Dreams That Money Can Buy*, whose musical direction was provided (without credit) by the Canadian composer and arts administrator Louis Applebaum. Each film in the anthology, which was produced by Peggy Guggenheim and Kenneth Macpherson, recounts an episode in the story of Joe, a poor young poet with a knack for eliciting dreams from the subconscious of strangers. Down on his luck, Joe decides to capitalize on his gift, becoming a seller of the inner eye. The contributors, most of them ex-Dadaists or ex-Surrealists, each provided one fictional dream to the work. Ernst was the director/writer for “Desire”; Fernand Léger, the director/writer for “The Girl with the Pre-fabricated Heart”; Man Ray, the director/writer for “Ruth, Roses, and Revolvers”; Marcel Duchamp, the writer for “Discs”; Alexander Calder, the director/writer for “Ballet” and writer for “Circus”; and Richter, the director/writer for “Narcissus.”
- The iconography of Ernst’s portion (“Desire”) is familiar to anyone who is well acquainted with his work. The standard description of *Desire*—it has now appeared (uncredited) on a DVD release—reads “[The film] presents a dream in which leaves fall to the ground beside a red curtain. A woman in white reclines on a red-curtained four-poster bed [this image responds to Richter’s suggestion]. A small golden ball rises and falls from her mouth as she breathes. She swallows the ball, smiles, and falls asleep. Bars appear by her bed, and a man watches from behind them as she dreams of nightingales with calves’ hooves. It appears that the man is part of her dream; he telephones her to ask, in voice-over, for details. She tells him, also in voice-over, that ‘they talked about love and pleasure.’ Her telephone falls to the floor and exudes a misty smoke that envelops her bed.”
- 406 Sigmund Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming” (1908), in *The Standard Edition*, vol. 9 (1959): 141–53; the passage cited appears on page 152.
- 407 Some psychoanalytic theorists who did not accept Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious nonetheless embraced Freud’s idea that the psychic development of an individual repeats the development of the race.
- 408 Otto Rank, *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden: Versuch einer psychologischen Mythendeutung* (1909); translated as *The Birth of the Hero: An Essay in the Psychological Interpretation of Myth* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 8.

- 409 One might recall Ernst's revealing that it was on the occasion of flipping through "the catalogue of a teaching aids company . . . that the absurdity of the collection confused the eye and mind, producing hallucinations and lending the objects depicted new and rapidly changing meanings." Ernst, "Biographical Notes: Tissue of Truth, Tissue of Lies," in Werner Spies ed., *Max Ernst* (exhibition catalogue, Tate Gallery, London, 1991), 290; as quoted in William Camfield, *Max Ernst: Dada and the Dawn of Surrealism* (Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1993), 82. It also needs to be said that when making *Une semaine de bonté*, Ernst took a somewhat less synthetic approach than he did to making *Une femme 100 têtes*. He generally used a single engraving (from *Nature* or elsewhere) and made a few substitutions or additions (say, exchanging an animal's face for a human's or adding a serpent's tail). Warlick is generally very good at identifying the base engravings and substitutions.
- 410 Anton Ehrenzweig's writings guided me towards this conclusion.
- 411 The androgyne plays a very prominent role in Buñuel/Dalí's *Un chien andalou*.
- 412 In "Some Data on the Youth of M.E. as told by himself," Max Ernst is recorded as stating,
- The geographical, political and climatic conditions of Cologne may be propitious to create fertile conflicts in a sensible child's brain. There is the cross-point of the most important European culture-tendencies, early Mediterranean influence, western rationalism, eastern inclination to occultism, northern mythology, Prussian categorical imperative, ideals of the French Revolution and so on. In Max Ernst's work one can recognize a continuous powerful drama of those contradictory tendencies. Maybe one day some elements of a new mythology will spring out of this drama. (In Motherwell, ed., *Beyond Painting and Other Writings by the Artist and his Friends* [New York: Wittenborn, 1948], 26–27; I have altered the translation slightly)
- 413 He also commented on an alchemical text that had been published at Altona around 1785–90: "Geheime Figuren der Rosenkreuzer aus dem 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert" (Secret Rosicrucian Figures from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries).
- 414 Herbert Silberer, *Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik* (Vienna: Heller, 1914); English edition: *Problems of Mysticism and Its Symbolism*, trans. Smith Ely Jelliffe (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2007), 2.
- 415 *Ibid.*, 127.
- 416 *Ibid.*, 126.
- 417 In 1929, the Surrealists published an article laying out a walking tour of alchemical sites, based on Fulcanelli's information.
- 418 In de Tasse's French translation of this work, to which Fulcanelli makes reference, the word "conference" in the title is translated as "language." De Tasse also explained the deeper meaning of the simple fable by identifying the complex verbal games the work contains and unfolding their deeper meanings. Fulcanelli uses the same method to decode the alchemical meaning of the cathedrals.
- 419 One thinks of Freud's unfolding, meaningful, often multilingual associations of ideas in "On the Forgetting of Proper Names" and "On the Forgetting of Foreign Phrases."
- 420 Fulcanelli, Master Alchemist [*sic*], *Le mystère des cathedrales* [*sic*, in French]: *Esoteric Interpretation of the Hermetic Symbols of The Great Work*, trans. Mary Sworder (London: Neville Spearman, 1971), 41–44.
- 421 Kenneth Anger's great film *Invocation of My Demon Brother* (1969) presents a goetic rite.
- 422 Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 177–78.
- 423 Sergei Eisenstein quotes extensively from *Des couleurs symbolique* in "Color and Meaning" in *The Film Sense*.

- 424 See Sergei Eisenstein, "Vertical Montage," in *Sergei Eisenstein: Selected Works*, vol. 2: *Towards a Theory of Montage*, ed. by Michael Glenny and Richard Taylor (London: British Film Institute, 1991), 356–59.
- 425 Robert Desnos, "Le mystère d'Abraham juif," *Documents* 5 (1929): 233–39.
- 426 Breton mentions Nicolas Flamel in "Lettre aux voyantes," *La révolution surréaliste* 5 (15 October 1925), 20–22; Flamel and the philosopher's stone are mentioned on page 20. Harry Potter readers will recall that a Flamel worked with the Headmaster of the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, Prof. Albus Dumbledore, on such alchemical matters as changing lead into gold. In *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone*, he is said to be 665 years old, and that would put his birthday back into the fourteenth century.
- 427 The Tour Saint-Jacques is all that remains of the church Saint-Jacques-la-Boucherie, named after the many butchers in the area who worked in the nearby Les Halles. It is a very ornate Gothic structure. Flamel is buried under its floor.
- 428 When Desnos was ten years old, he happened to pass by the rue Aubry-le-boucher just as Jean-Jacques Liabeuf was arrested. Liabeuf, a shoemaker, was an anarchist, a sort of prototype for members of the later punk movement: he wore armbands, two on each arm (one over the elbow, the other over the wrist), fitted out with pointed iron spikes. One policeman died shortly afterwards of wounds inflicted during the arrest—Liabeuf was accused of having stabbed him eight times with a knife with a twenty-inch blade (another policeman was seriously injured, and three more suffered wounds, crimes of which Liabeuf was also accused). Liabeuf was later guillotined, despite massive protests by anarchists—and his public execution caused rioting to break out.
- A radical journalist, Gustav Hervé, was sentenced to prison for four years for violating French laws regulating the press, after having written that Liabeuf's actions possessed "a certain beauty, a certain grandeur." Over thirty years later, in 1944, Desnos wrote a poem in argot, "Rue Aubry-le-boucher (en démolition)," in memory of Liabeuf. Desnos and the Surrealists might have gone some distance with Hervé, in admiring the grim beauty of Liabeuf's exploits and his demand for complete freedom, unfettered by any moral considerations that his actions implied.
- 429 Robert Desnos, *Oeuvres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), 456. Translated in Katherine Conley, *Robert Desnos, Surrealism, and the Marvelous in Everyday Life* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 8.

The famous riots to which Desnos refers were Republican uprisings against the July Monarchy. The Republican demonstrations began with a funeral procession for Jean Maximilien Lamarque, a general and deputy in the French legislature who advocated the restoration of a republican form of government (he was a great parliamentary orator and had shown great sympathy towards the working class). He died on 2 June 1832; his funeral (on 5 June) coincided with public dissatisfaction arising from a cholera epidemic (by the time the epidemic subsided, twenty thousand Parisians had died of the disease) and an economic crisis that resulted in widespread unemployment and high bread prices. The huge procession mourning Lamarque marched from Faubourg Saint-Martin to a bridge over the Seine. Violence broke out during speeches, and as the demonstrators (mostly students) attempted to carry the coffin to the Pantheon, barricades were thrown up in their way. The insurrection then broke out, spreading through Paris's central districts. Troops led by General Mouton were brought into Paris. The anti-Monarchists were gradually encircled and confined by the National Guard and 25,000 soldiers. By the evening of 5 June, the revolt had been corralled within the

- Fourth Arrondissement (the district about which Desnos wrote). The forces acting for the Legitimists kept pushing the Republicans into more confined areas, and on 6 June, using artillery and bayonet, they wiped out the last vestiges of resistance in the cloister of the church of Saint-Merci. Eight hundred lives were taken. The barricading of the rue du Cloître Saint-Merci inspired Victor Hugo in his *Les misérables*.
- 430 Regarding the allusion to St. Innocent—among the books attributed to Flamel is one whose English title is *His Exposition of the Hieroglyphicall Figures which he caused to be painted upon an Arch in St. Innocents Church-yard in Paris*.
- 431 Breton, *Conversations*, 27; emphasis mine.
- 432 Charles Baudelaire, “Crowds,” trans. Louise Varèse, in *Paris Spleen* (New York: New Directions, 1970), 20–21; original in “Les foules” in *Le spleen de Paris: Petits poèmes en prose* (1869).
- 433 This was one of the grounds for Breton and Bataille’s disagreement.
- 434 To get a sense of the importance of alchemy to early twentieth-century art, consider how central the idea of “dynamic equilibrium” was. On which, see Elder, *Harmony and Dissent: Film and Vanguard Art Movements in the Early Twentieth Century* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), where I point out that the idea of the dynamic equilibrium often was understood as a version of the alchemical notion of conflictual equilibrium.
- 435 Friedrich Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1946), 183.
- 436 For “more awareness . . .,” André Breton, “Political Position of Surrealism” (1953), in *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 229; for “all errors . . .,” Breton, “Position politique de l’art d’aujourd’hui” (1935), in *Les manifestes du surréalisme*, 268; translated as “Political Position of Today’s Art,” in *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 225.
- 437 André Breton, “Discours au congrès des écrivains” (1935); translated as “Speech to the Congress of Writers,” in *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 241.
- 438 André Breton, “Prolegomena to a Third Surrealist Manifesto or Not” (1942), in *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, 301, 302.
- 439 Ernst, “Some Data on the Youth of M.E.,” in *Beyond Painting and Other Writings*, 28–29.
- 440 It is significant that the German word *vogelfrei* (literally, bird-free) is a colloquialism denoting a bandit or someone with a price on his head: Nietzsche uses the term in that sense in “Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei” (Songs of Prince Vogelfrei) in his *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1887). Of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Ernst remarked that it is “a book which speaks to the future. The whole of surrealism is in it, if you know how to read.” Uwe M. Schneede, *Max Ernst*, trans. R.W. Last (New York: Praeger, 1973), 44.
- The thought associations that link Wandervogel to Loplop are rich and complex. One of these associations likens the wanderer to a wild bird, free of, and a threat to, society’s regimentation. Another, as was just noted, concerns the artist or thinker as being like the criminal—outside of and opposed to civilization: madmen, bandits, and artists are all akin to birds.
- Ernst shared in some of the Wandervogel movement’s ideals: at the age of fifteen he set out to wander over the Rhineland, Alsace, the Palatinate, Westphalia, and Holland. Furthermore, Ernst often treats birds as anti-social wild figures and as authors of evil (though that “evil” sometimes takes the form of violence, a necessary precursor for alchemical transformation and the appearance of the Androgyne).
- 441 Freud offers even more associations with figures that combine bird and human forms. In *Die Traumdeutung*, Freud gives this account of a dream:

... in it I saw my beloved mother, with a peculiarly peaceful, sleeping expression on her features, being carried into the room by two (or three) people with birds' beaks, and laid upon the bed... The strangely draped and unnaturally tall figures with birds' beaks were derived from the illustrations to Philippon's Bible. I fancy they must have been gods with falcons' heads from an ancient Egyptian funerary relief. (*The Interpretation of Dreams*, trans. James Strachey [New York: Avon Books, 1965], 622)

Freud goes on to remark further on the dream's connection with death, noting that his mother's expression "was copied from the view I had had of my grandfather a few days before his death as he lay snoring in a coma" (*ibid.*, 623).

Nonetheless, his overriding belief was that the dream had sexual significance. He remarks on the sexual associations of the word *Vögelin*, associations explained to him by one of his childhood playmates named Philipp. Consequently, Freud traced the anxiety the dream elicited "to an obscure and evidently sexual craving that had found appropriate expression in the visual content of the dream" (*ibid.*).

Freud's remarks could serve as a gloss on the collage from the "Oedipe" sequence in *Une semaine de bonté* that depicts the well-dressed male watching over a woman sleeping in a room with funeral curtains—the atavistic character of the human/bird figures in the dream Freud analyzed, its funerary qualities, and its sexual implications are shared with Ernst's collage. In thinking about what this collage might owe to Freud, one should not miss the fact that collage generally, which condenses meanings by preserving that of the source units while endowing them with new, and even contradictory, meanings, owes much to Freud and his analysis of dreams.

442 Furthermore, the heavenly ram was a druidical symbol of the equality of the sexes and of fertility; and the relation between the cycles of human life and the cycles of nature. See Evan M. Mauer, "Images of Dream and Desire: The Prints and Collage Novels of Max Ernst," in Robert Rainwater, ed., *Max Ernst: Beyond Surrealism* (New York: New York Public Library and Oxford University Press, 1986), 66. Mauer also offers valuable comments on the novel's theme of shifting sexual identity.

443 Primal matter is base matter, matter without form (*informe*) that contains everything necessary for the completion of the work. It is a substance connected to the earth that must be found before the work can begin, a sort of chaos. From primal matter, the Young Prince (or the philosopher's stone) is formed, out of the conjunction of the King (gold or Philosophical Sulphur or the solar principle) and the Queen (silver or Philosophical Mercury or the lunar principle).

The Young Prince emerges through the process of conciliation of oppositions. He is the Rebis (the double thing) of alchemical literature, for individuation comes partly through overcoming the male-female duality at a higher level of integration. The Rebis appears through the "chymical nuptials" of the solar and lunar principles.

Lunar and solar images, and images of the Young Prince, appear throughout Jordan's film.

444 There is another significance of Loplop, too crucial to go unnoted. Loplop also represents a split-off agency of the artist (that students love to refer to as "inspiration") that conceives ideas and, seemingly, transmits them to the artist unbidden. In what could almost be a gloss on the phrase "Loplop présente" that he used for the title of several works of the 1929–32, Ernst wrote, "In 1930, after having composed with violence and method my story, *La Femme 100 Têtes*, I was visited nearly every day by the *Superior of the Birds* named *Loplop*, my private phantom, attached to my person. He presented

- me with a *heart in a cage, the sea in a cage, two petals, three leaves, a flower and a young girl*" (in "Beyond Painting," in Motherwell, *Beyond Painting*, 9). Images of these gifts appear in Jordan's films.
- 445 Freud, *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, 147.
- 446 M.E. Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel: *Une semaine de bonté*," *Art Journal* 46, no. 1, *Mysticism and Occultism in Modern Art* (Spring 1987): 61–73 at 64. Warlick treats other works by Ernst, as well as their historical and theoretical framework, in *Max Ernst and Alchemy: A Magician in Search of Myth* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), which is indispensable.
- 447 The ermine is a very dirty animal. In itself it is a precious bedsheet, but as it has no change of linen, it does its laundry with its tongue.
- 448 "What do you see? R—Water—D—What colour is this water? R—The colour of water."
- 449 From the comte de Permission's *Visions*: "I saw that the Marquise de Verneuil was holding a bitch in heat. Two people arrived who resembled each other; one was carrying a gold collar and the other had his throat filled with saliva, also called spittle, and both wanted to have the bitch. The man who wanted to put the gold collar on the bitch was bitten by it: and when the bitch had received the collar, it became a young lady, and when she had put aside the collar, she became a bitch again. The person who had spat spittle in his throat spat it onto her and the bitch followed him and yielded to him." From Tristan Tzara's *Où boivent les loups*: "Enter he said and there was light no one had knocked."
- 450 *Complainte de Peyrebeille*: "Great God, save the earth from ever bearing such monsters. No history has proved that there ever were any such. Through the efforts of the authorities, no one will be exposed to them any longer." Paul Éluard's *Exemples*: "It is also called MAMMA by mistake."
- 451 Marcel Schwob's *L'anarchie*: "Those among them who are merry sometimes turn their behinds towards the sky and cast their excrement in the face of other men: then they strike their own bellies lightly." Marcel Schwob's *Le rire*: "Laughter is probably destined to disappear."
- 452 "The stones are full of entrails. Bravo. Bravo." Entrails were used in ancient rituals of divination. So these stones afford wisdom.
- 453 "If 3 is greater than 6, describe a circle around the cross, and if the water extinguishes the fire, draw a line from the bucket to the candle, passing above the knife, then draw a cross on the ladder."
- 454 The dream begins in the second collage of the series, which depicts a woman in a nightgown forced against a vertical bed by an oversized phallic spine, and continues with the image of a small naked boy with a mechanical penis kneeling with the woman on the bed, followed by a number of pairs of images that depict women suspended in the air while passing by a bed, women with long hair waiting outside the windows of a building, and a woman falling down a staircase.
- 455 Common alchemical images for this stage in psychic evolution are floods and drowning. Ernst uses these stock images in Plates 29, 37, 73, 76, 80, and 96–101 of *La femme 100 têtes* and throughout "Lundi" in *Une semaine de bonté*.
- 456 On this topic, see Silberer, *Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik*, 71.
- 457 In *Man, God, and Magic* (New York: Putnam, 1961), the Latvian ethnologist Ivar Lissner conjectures that cave paintings of parahumans (beings with human and non-human animal features) were not physical representations of mythical beings, but the shamans themselves, in higher than human form, transfigured by higher knowledge they have

- received and in the process of acquiring the mental and spiritual attributes of various beasts. An exhilarating book on that topic (and more) is David Lewis-Williams, *The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004).
- 458 The use of the blood as an element might suggest the animal kingdom, and even though they are not formally acknowledged as elements in Ernst's taxonomy for *Une semaine de bonté*, the use of the stone faces (and the epigram from Arp, "Les pierres sont remplies d'entrailles. Bravo. Bravo") in the "Île du Pâques" section might allude to the mineral kingdom, and the botanical image that begins the "Premier poème visible" might allude to the vegetable kingdom.
- 459 See Warlick, *Max Ernst and Alchemy*, 121–22. We have already seen that the Young Prince of alchemical lore has androgynous features.
- 460 Bartholdi sculpted *Liberty Enlightening the World* (more commonly known as the "Statue of Liberty"). It has come to light that Bartholdi was a Freemason who gave the statue to America because of its Freemason leaders, and that the statue actually represents Isis. As something of an adept, Ernst may have been able to recognize this.
- 461 Grandville is best known for *Les métamorphoses du jour* (1829), a series of seventy scenes depicting human–animal crossbreeds, that offered a biting satire of the society of the times. Grandville later produced *Les Fleurs Animées* (1847), whose plates were absurdist combinations of plants and humans.
- 462 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 65. Warlick cites Silberer, *Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik* (in Jelliffe, pages 69 and 127–30) as her authority for stating that alchemists treated white and red as feminine and masculine colours. She also cites *Max Ernst, Oeuvre Katalog: Werke 1929–1938* (Cologne: Dumont Buchverlag, 1975), cat. nos. 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1938 as being "the collages that follow."
- 463 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 64–65; Warlick identifies the two plates mentioned as Werner Spies, *Max Ernst, Oeuvre Katalog: Werke 1929–1938*, cat. nos. 1907, 1908.
- 464 Warlick identifies the plate as Spies, *ibid.*, cat. no. 1941.
- 465 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 66.
- 466 The feelings of the woman in the bed would be especially like those of Dora for her father, as Dora's father dominated his family and the man with his hand on his beard seems domineering.
- 467 The paintings likely make allusions to the Flood and to what remains after it. In Ernst's iconography, what remains is not a cleansed world with a dove winging over it, but a world in ruin—perhaps it is struggling to come back, but we have little hope for its success.
- 468 The process of distillation is often used as a metaphor for the alchemical process. The volatilization of the spirits (and the separation of the original mixture into the different alcoholic components—compare Duchamp's having the Bachelors' desire pass with *élan* through the sieve)—corresponds to the stage of calcination, while collecting the *coeur* of the distillate (a process that clarifies and whitens the spirit) corresponds to the phase of *albedo*.
- 469 Warlick identifies the collage as Spies, *Max Ernst, Oeuvre Katalog: Werke 1929–1938*, cat. no. 1962; the final collage, alluded to in the cited passage that follows, is Spies, *ibid.*, cat. no. 1965.
- 470 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 66.
- 471 Thus Jan van Eyck's painting *St. Jerome in His Study* (1442) contains an apothecary jar with the word "Tyriaca" inscribed on it—Tyriaca was a medicine that alchemists prepared from the ashes or meat of serpents.

- 472 Ernst's interest in dragons may have been reinforced by circumstances in which the artist found himself while working on his collage novel: Ernst's Italian hosts had an old painting of St. George and the Dragon over their mantel that Ernst disliked. He produced a replacement for it while in Italy.
- 473 Lawrence Jordan's films have even more in common with the *Wunderkammer*. Joseph Cornell's boxes resemble the cabinet of wonders even more strongly, and Jordan worked as an assistant to Cornell for a period (Jordan, too, is a maker of boxes). Cornell is likely as great an influence on this aspect of Jordan's work (their character as *Wunderkammer*). Ernst would have provided Jordan with compelling examples of treating the task of making a collage out of engravings as though it were the process of assembling a collection of wonders, many of which are "relics" charged with personal meanings—and these examples gave rise to the method Jordan used in his most important films.
- 474 Max Ernst was almost certainly acquainted with the *Die Chymisches Hochzeit Christiani Rosenkreutz*, likely in a 1913 German reprint. He titled a *frottage* of 1925 *Noces Chymiques*, and in 1947–48 he produced a painting of the same name.
- 475 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 67. Warlick identifies the collage as Spies, *Max Ernst, Oeuvre Katalog*, cat. no. 2007.
- 476 Fulcanelli, *Le Mystère des cathédrales*, 84–85. Fulcanelli's book, which was very widely read, sets out the meaning of black, white, and red in the three levels of language (*la langue divine, la langue sacrée, and la langue profane*), and what he says has relevance to Ernst's work.
- 477 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 67–68.
- 478 The shooting is depicted in plate 4, which also includes a dragon form, making a reference back to the previous *cahier*. Taking the woman captive is depicted in plates 12 and 23. The knives appear in plates 7 and 24. The Sphinx appears in plate 21. Plates 23 to 26 present images of aggression against the female.
- 479 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 69.
- 480 Ernst used the image of the praying mantis elsewhere. The original program for the American première of Dalí and Buñuel's *L'âge d'or*, in March 1932, had a drawing by Ernst of a praying mantis on its cover. *Human Figure* (1931) also features mantid-like forms.
- 481 William L. Pressly's 1973 essay, "The Praying Mantis in Surrealist Art," surveys the appearance of the insect in the works of Picasso, Dalí, Masson, Ernst, Breton, Caillois, and others. See Pressly, "The Praying Mantis in Surrealist Art," in *The Art Bulletin* 55, no. 4: 600–15. Dawn Ades's *Dalí* offers excellent commentary on Dalí's interest in praying mantids. See Ades, *Dalí* (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1982 and 1995), 140–49. For another discussion of the Surrealists' use of the praying mantis, see Steven Harris, *Surrealist Art and Thought in the 1930s: Art, Politics, and the Psyche* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 211–18.
- 482 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 69–70.
- 483 In 1947, Ernst and Paul Éluard published further *poèmes visibles*.
- 484 Warlick, "Max Ernst's Alchemical Novel," 70–71.
- 485 *The Femme 100 Têtes* participates in the work's shape-shifting theme.
- 486 Haim Finkelstein, *The Screen in Surrealist Art and Thought* (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 4.
- 487 Haim Finkelstein, *The Screen in Surrealist Art and Thought*, 66.
- 488 (text altered slightly) American (and Canadian) experimental films made since the 1950s are often distributed by one or both American filmmakers' co-operatives: the New York Filmmaker's Cooperative and the Canyon Cinema Cooperative. Both were

- established as genuine co-operatives, and Canyon Cinema still operates according to the principles of co-operatives. The filmmakers represented decide how their films will be listed in the organizations' catalogues. This generally entails that the filmmakers prepare program notes (or catalogue entries) for their films—and they are often written in the third person. Jordan's catalogue entries can be found at <http://www.canyoncinema.com/catalog/filmmaker/?i=170>.
- 489 Oral history interview with Larry Jordan, 19 December 1995–30 July 1996, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution.
- 490 Ibid.
- 491 Stan Brakhage was a friend of Philip Lamantia. Brakhage and I lived far apart, but we would organize opportunities to see each other once or twice a year. When we met after a time of not seeing each other in the flesh, Stan would always describe the aura he saw around me.
- 492 David Meltzer in *San Francisco Beat: Talking with the Poets* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2001), 134–35.
- 493 These associations also appear in Ezra Pound's *Cantos*.
- 494 Re. "Bishop of Alchemia," see Philip Lamantia, "Opus Magnum," in *Destroyed Works: Poems* (San Francisco: Aurhahn Press, 1962), unpaginated—Lamantia casts himself as Bishop to Breton's Pope; Re. "alchemic gold," see "I Touch You" in *The Blood of Air* (San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, 1970), 4.
- 495 Philip Lamantia, "Till the End of Time," in *Destroyed Works*, unpaginated.
- 496 Jess Collins (1923–2004) trained in chemistry and worked on the production of plutonium for the Manhattan Project. His dismay over the coming of the "Atomic Age" (i.e., the era when politics was dominated by the threat of annihilation by nuclear means of life on the planet) prompted him to leave science and take up art. He produced many extraordinary paintings and collages, which generally have alchemical themes and express a fascination with the male body.
- 497 Several years ago, Don Snyder and the Innis Film Society invited Lawrence Jordan to Toronto for a lecture and screening. At the lecture, Jordan mentioned that Robert Duncan had been a major influence on him. I knew of that influence, of course, from conversations we had had over the years as well as from Brakhage's accounts of Duncan's influence in San Francisco on the new poetry that developed there and on its experimental film scene. Nevertheless, I used the opportunity to press him, with questions, on the character of that influence. He stressed not Duncan's esoteric interests, but what he taught by example—that artmaking arises from one's domestic circumstances, and that artists must concern themselves with the circumstances in which they live. The profundity of the comments eluded me until I read the transcript of a conversation between the literature professor Michael Davidson and the Australian poet and editor John Trantor, in *Jacket* magazine:

DAVIDSON: And Duncan wanted—essentially, for all of his own contentiousness, he liked a domestic scene. He lived with Jess from the fifties on, he had a household which very few of the other poets in San Francisco did, a household that was centred around rituals of eating, art making, conversation, book reading. And it was a marvellous little world that he created. He would go out into the city, and often dramatically into the city, and participate. And then would always come back home. And that was part of his poetics, too. The idea, the ethos of the hearth, and the family and the poems and the stories told around the fire. And that was not just a myth, he literally lived in that world. They read to each other, music was played, art was displayed, people came over and

sat at table. And for young poets, that was a very exciting thing, to be invited into this world. Because it had something of a family feel to it, without having the authoritarian and oedipal problems of the nuclear family.

TRANTOR: Yes, but also without children, and the view of the future that they can give you. I'm wondering how much his poetry was a substitution for not having had kids of his own. Do you think there's anything in it?

DAVIDSON: Oh, I think that's absolutely right. In fact, in his early days, Duncan really cultivated a childhood, and there were a number of people who supported him in that. James Broughton, Madelaine Gleason, and to some extent early Spicer, Robin Blaser, when they were living in Berkeley in the forties, had almost a kind of childhood-centred poetry, a lot of it based on nursery rhymes, a lot of it based on fairy tales telling. And cultivating the child as a kind of value, much in the way that the Lake Poets and Romantic poets did. (Davidson, "Robert Duncan: A Metaphysical Quotient," <http://www.jacketmagazine.com/26/dunc-tran-davi-1989.html>)

Of course, Jordan's films, too, are really childhood-centred films, with qualities of fairy tales and fantasy books for children. (Needless to say, Max Ernst's works, which so often focus on the family romance, share those qualities.)

Lawrence Jordan made another comment on the special qualities of Robert Duncan and Jess's household that, in the context of this book's argument concerning the way the cinema was taken up, is really quite revealing. He stated, "it's a magical kingdom and it needs to be protected from all the wayward vibrations that come and go" (lawrencejordan.com/Bio/LawrenceJordan.pdf). The idea that the higher reality has the nature of vibration has certainly maintained its hold.

498 L. Poyet's other work was of a similar nature: he did some of the illustrations for Gaston Tissandier, *Les récréations scientifiques ou L'Enseignement par les jeux* (Paris: 1880). Tissandier was the editor of *La nature*; Poyet's illustrations for some of Tissandier's articles were often reprinted.

499 The making of brandy or other distilled spirits illustrates the process at work: a liquid is heated until it boils; then the resultant hot vapours are captured and cooled, and as the vapours condense, the liquid that results is collected; the process separates mixtures based on differences in their volatilities in a boiling liquid. In distilling spirits, one boils the fermented liquid (wine, in the case of brandy, mash, in the case of whisky), then captures the different parts that have been separated by the difference in their boiling points. The different components are called the foreshots, the heads, the spirit runs or hearts, and the tails. It is the heart (or spirit run) that becomes the brandy, or scotch, or bourbon, because the boiling point of ethyl alcohol is 78.3°C while the boiling point of water is 100°C. The head contains mostly alcohol, the heart a mixture, and the tail mostly water. Sometimes the heart is returned to the pot or still, and the distillation process is repeated (cognac and scotch usually go through the process twice, and Irish whisky three times).

The alcohol content is raised by the process (we could say that the intensity of the liquor is raised). The pot or still used to intensify the fermented liquid is called an alembic. The spiritual analogue should be clear.

500 Oral history interview with Larry Jordan, 19 December 1995–30 July 1996, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution. A transcript of this interview can be found online at <http://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/oralhistories/transcripts/jordan95.htm>.

501 Russett and Starr, *Experimental Animation*, 159.

502 Oral history interview with Larry Jordan; see above.

- 503 Ibid.
- 504 Ibid., 155.
- 505 P. Adams Sitney, *Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde 1943–1978* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 329. Sitney notes, “These film-makers of the the fifties and sixties were perhaps the first to explore the fundamental disparity between the nostalgia of the photographic image and the ‘nowness’ of projected film.” He goes on to discuss the “healing moment” that can bridge that gap.
- 506 The type for this sort of experience is the Pauline notion of the conversion of *chronos* into *kairos* (here used not in the sense of an extent of time, but of the end time, when time is no more, as in Daniel 2:21, 7:12, 12:6–7; Wisdom 8:8; Mark 13:32; Corinthians I 4:5; Revelations 1:3). The *locus classicus* of the Christian idea of *kairos* (used in this sense) is Thessalonians 1:2—“For yourselves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night . . .” and 1:6—“Therefore let us not sleep, as do others; but let us watch and be sober.”
- A posthumously published, unfinished work of Jean-François Lyotard, *La confession d’Augustin* (1998), a resounding work that fuses Lyotard’s voice to St. Augustine’s, makes the crucial point that this idea of sacred time was made central to modern philosophy by Husserl’s ideas of the “living present.” This reality (which belongs to the subject) constitutes time, but is itself atemporal and infinite (it is also an absent Be-ing, like God, who will never arrive), for it is always in the living present that one thinks of time’s passing. The comments are just, and they illuminate the connection between the phenomenological dimension of Jordan’s work and Sitney’s claim that Jordan’s film’s treat time, or at least a particular modality of temporal experience, as a healing experience.
- 507 Oral history interview with Larry Jordan; see above.
- 508 Sitney, *Visionary Film*, 325. One reason I have included this remark is that it should serve the reader as a salutary reminder of the differences between Lawrence Jordan’s work and that of Max Ernst—differences that might be obscured by my treatment of Jordan’s films. Jordan’s remarks about the difference between the work of the European Surrealist and his own work—and, generally, the work of American artists whose works drew on the Surrealist tradition—should be heeded.
- 509 Ibid.

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IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

In *Harmony and Dissent: Film and Avant-garde Art Movements in the Early Twentieth Century*, a companion to this volume, I examined the intellectual reception of the cinema and the influence the cinema had on avant-garde art movements in the early twentieth century. There I made the claim that the common view concerning the early reception of the cinema, a view so common that it has achieved near hegemony—that nearly all early writers on film were troubled by the cinema’s origins in the vaudeville peep show and the circus sideshow, fearing that its vulgarity made it an unsuitable companion for the great high arts—was incorrect. Some philosophers and art theorists, in writings of impressive rigour, did propound that view of the cinema. However, as I argued in *Harmony and Dissent* (and in this one), there was another strain, largely unrecognized, that embraced the new medium as the *ottima arte*, the “top art,” that most truly exemplified modern, largely urban, life. I demonstrated that point by focusing sharply on the responses to the birth of the cinema recorded in writings on aesthetics and art theory from the first decades of the twentieth century and on the art movements most closely associated with those writings. In *Harmony and Dissent*, I dealt with the conception of *gegenstandlose Kunst*, or object-

less (abstract) art, and with various left art movements in Soviet Russia. In connection with those developments, I also commented on the rise of the discursive paradigm that embraced the idea that art's value was associated with its pneumatic effects.

In this volume, I have focused more sharply on a knowledge paradigm founded on the concept of *pneuma*. I have commented on the developments in philosophy and mathematics that led many thinkers to conclude that reason (as understood in the Baconian tradition, which posits that reason's fundamental character is to discern regularities in the occurrences of empirical phenomena and to develop mathematical formulas that reflect those regularities) had exposed its own inadequacies. I noted that there was a range of responses to that widely accepted conclusion. One response was to celebrate the freedom of imagination entailed by the collapse of reason. In much the same way that many mathematicians abandoned their efforts to connect mathematics with reality and proclaimed that mathematics was simply a formal system (one that authorizes the task of rewriting one string of uninterpreted symbols into another form), many thinkers proclaimed that thought itself had been released from the duty of disclosing reality. Ideas, instead, should be judged for their ability to stimulate us, to intensify the throb and pulse of life.

As appealing as that view was, many thinkers found it ultimately unsatisfying. The idea that we are fated to understand nothing of the conditions in which we live our lives was too gloomy to accept. So they attempted to find another way to knowledge, in many cases a noesis akin to the one described in many spiritual, religious, and occult texts.

Having set out the character of the discursive context that led to the celebration of alternative forms of knowledge, I examined the effects that these belief systems had on ideas about art. I showed that the doubts that were so widely felt in the first decades of the twentieth century concerning the value of reason led to the belief that art was essentially performative or (as I prefer) perlocutionary—that it operates in a way that bypasses reason to affect us materially, viscerally, bodily.

This book has examined two art movements that clearly were affected by the supposed collapse of reason. Both embraced the view that ideas should be judged for their ability to stimulate us, to intensify the throb and pulse of life; both ultimately accepted the appeal of claims for the importance of an alternative noesis that could reveal the character of a pneumatic reality. Much of this book has been devoted to analyzing the views of the Dada and Surrealist artists regarding this alternative noesis and the debt they owed various occult groups for them.

The early twentieth century also experienced radical doubts about the nature and reliability of perception. Those doubts created an interest in secur-

ing knowledge that would not be subject to inconsistencies and unreliability. In the volume that will follow this one, devoted to Cubist and Futurist aesthetics, I will be tracing the art world's response to radical doubts about perception.

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HOW REASON LOST ITS PURCHASE ON REALITY

Euclid's geometry begins with basic terms (that Euclid supposed were given through geometric intuition but later geometers took as stipulative definitions) and a number of axioms and postulates, the truth of which Euclid supposed was self-evident (though some later geometers disagreed with this). The fundamental terms of plane geometry were "point" (which Euclid described as a position without magnitude) and "line" (which Euclid described as a length without breadth). The postulates were the following:

- P1. A straight line can be drawn from any point to any other point.
- P2. Any straight line can be extended continuously in a straight line.
- P3. Given any point and any distance, a circle can be drawn with that point as its centre and that distance as its radius.
- P4. All right angles are equal to one another.
- P5. If a straight line crosses two other straight lines so that the sum of the two interior angles on one side of it is less than two right angles, then the two straight lines, if extended far enough, cross on that same side.

In addition, there were five axioms. The axioms were unproved principles that concerned general principles of reason that had a broader compass than the subject matter of geometry—they were principles of this sort: all things

equal to a given thing are equal to one another. (Later mathematicians were to drop the distinction between postulates, which in Euclid's time were seen as self-evident statements about the possibility of a geometric construction, and axioms, which were thought to express an essential property.)

In 1795, the Scottish mathematician John Playfair (1748–1819) recast Euclid's system, and his version of it, originally intended to help his students, became widely used. Its five postulates were:

- P1. Every line is a collection of points.
- P2. There exist at least two points.
- P3. If p and q are points, then there exists one, and only one, line containing p and q .
- P4. If L is a line, then there exists a point not on L .
- P5. If L is a line, and p is a point not on L , then there exists one and only one line containing p that is parallel to L .

Notice that the fifth postulate—the famous parallel postulate—seems different from the others. We read, “Every line is a collection of points,” and we straightaway give the proposition our assent. Likewise, we read, “If L is a line, then there exists a point not on L ,” and form a picture in our minds of a line on a surface (planar or not), and of all the points on the surface but not on L , and again, unhesitatingly assent to it. But with the fifth axiom or postulate, our response is different. We read, “Given a line L and a point p not on L , there is a unique line through p that is parallel to L (i.e., that does not intersect L no matter how far in either direction L and the line through p are extended).” The truth of this proposition seems somehow less intuitive than that of the other postulates.¹ We imagine a surface with a line on it, and a point outside the line, and we try to picture what the postulate is telling us—until we finally settle on a picture of the plane surface and at last give the proposition our assent (though perhaps we worry about what would happen if we were to picture the surface as that of a sphere). What we go through when we try to understand the fifth postulate is qualitatively different from what we experience when we read, and give our assent to, the other postulates.

That the truth of the fifth postulate is not as intuitive as that of the other postulates came to haunt the nineteenth-century geometers. In an effort to dispense with this problem, some set out to show that this axiom was dependent on the other four—that because it could be derived from the other four, it could be removed from the list of axioms or postulates, along with all the problems its status as an axiom posed.² Attempts to establish by direct proof (a proof that shows what rules of inference have to be applied, and in what order, to derive the parallel postulate from the other four) all failed—any supposed proof they devised either turned out to contain some

flaw or assumed some postulate just as intricate as the parallel postulate. So geometers attempted to establish, by indirect proof, that the fifth postulate was dependent on the other four. That is to say, to prove that the fifth postulate could be derived from the other four, they endeavoured to show that assuming the fifth postulate is false would lead to a contradiction—they tried, in short, to derive a contradiction from taking the negation of the parallel postulate together with the other four postulates. This is the route that Girolamo Saccheri (1667–1773) and Johann Lambert (1728–77) took, and nineteenth-century geometers followed them.

Allow me to reiterate: to show, by indirect proof, that the fifth postulate depended on the other four, geometers started by assuming the negation of Playfair’s parallel postulate and attempted to derive a contradiction from that assumption; if a contradiction ensued from assuming that the first four postulates are true, and that the negation of the fifth postulate is also true (let us call this negation of Playfair’s fifth postulate “the revised fifth postulate”), then the first four postulates must imply that the revised fifth postulate is false. Stated otherwise, the discovery that a contradiction follows on assuming a revised fifth postulate would imply that the revised fifth postulate is false, or that the negation of the negation of Playfair’s parallel postulate is true. That is, it would imply Playfair’s fifth postulate. Having established this, one would have shown that the five postulates are not independent, and that the first four imply the fifth. One would have shown that the fifth postulate, the parallel postulate, could be accorded the status of a theorem.

Note, however, that there are different ways to form the negation of the parallel postulate: the claim that there is one, and only one, line through a point outside a given line that is parallel to the given line can be denied by asserting that there are no lines through a point outside a given line parallel to the given line; or it can be denied by asserting that more than one line can be drawn through a point outside a given line parallel to that line. Nikolai Lobachevski (1802–56) and János Bolyai (1802–60), independently, investigated the results of assuming the first four postulates together with the proposition that through a point not on a given line, more than one line can always be drawn parallel to a given line.³ Later in the nineteenth century, G.F.B. Riemann (1826–66) examined the consequences of assuming that through a point not on a given straight line (a straight line being the shortest distance between two points), no straight line can be drawn parallel to the given straight line.⁴

Different geometric systems developed from these different assumptions. The characteristics of these different systems are as follows:

In Euclidean geometry, two distinct lines intersect in at most one point.

In Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry, two distinct lines intersect in at most one point.

In Riemannian geometry, two distinct lines intersect in one or two points (depending upon whether we assume that space is defined by a single elliptic or a double elliptic).

In Euclidean geometry, given a line L and a point P not on the line L , there exists one and only one line through P parallel to L .

In Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry, given a line L and a point P not on the line L , there exist at least two lines through P parallel to L .

In Riemannian geometry, given a line L and a point P not on the line L , there exists no line through P parallel to L .

In Euclidean geometry, parallel lines are equidistant from one another.

In Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry, parallel lines are never equidistant.

In Riemannian geometry parallel lines do not exist.

In Euclidean geometry, two distinct lines perpendicular to the same line are parallel to one another.

In Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry, two distinct lines perpendicular to the same line are parallel to one another.

In Riemannian geometry, two distinct lines perpendicular to the same line intersect.

In Euclidean geometry, a line is separated into two parts by a point.

In Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry, a line is separated into two parts by a point.

In Riemannian geometry, a line is not separated into two parts by a point.

In Euclidean geometry, the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles.

In Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry, the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is less than two right angles.

In Riemannian geometry, the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is greater than two right angles.

In Euclidean geometry, two triangles with corresponding angles are similar.

In Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry, two triangles with corresponding angles are congruent.

In Riemannian geometry, two triangles with corresponding angles are congruent.

What these geometers were searching for was a contradiction in one of these systems. However, no contradiction turned up! Instead, these geometries turned out to be fully consistent systems and to offer a description of a possible space (though not the space that Euclid's geometry described, which conformed to our spatial intuitions). Euclidean, Riemannian, and Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry turned out to be consistent geometric systems—though whether they described any reality at all was an open question. These geometric systems provide no way of deciding whether space as described by Euclid's geometry, or space as described by Bolyai's geometry, or space as described by Riemann's geometry makes up the space of the everyday world; nonetheless, they are consistent deductive systems.

NOTES

- 1 One of the first ways geometers attempted to deal with the issue was to substitute simpler, more intuitive propositions of equivalent power (i.e., propositions that would allow the same set of theorems to be deduced). Geometers discovered that any of these propositions could be substituted for the fifth postulate:

- 1) If two straight lines lying in a plane are met by another line, and if the sum of the internal angles on one side is less than two right angles, then the straight lines will meet if extended sufficiently on the side on which the sum of the angles is less than two right angles.
- 2) If a straight line intersects one of two parallels, it will intersect the other.
- 3) Straight lines parallel to the same straight line are parallel to each other.
- 4) Two straight lines that intersect one another cannot be parallel to the same straight line.

From any of these propositions, together with the other four postulates, the same set of theorems as Euclid derived can be deduced (or, what is the same, from any of these propositions, along with the other four postulates, the original fifth postulate can be inferred). But none of these propositions has the same intuitive force as the other four postulates.

- 2 Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777–1832), the nineteenth century's greatest mathematician, and possibly the greatest mathematician since Isaac Newton, led the way; but in keeping with that very practical, down-to-earth manner that was a hallmark of Gauss's approach to mathematics, he proposed to take, in the first instance, an empirical approach—having empirical confirmation of the fifth axiom, he could go on to establish the truth by formal means. (And, if the axiom be untrue, he would not waste energy attempting to demonstrate the truth of a proposition that in fact was false.) Thus, Gauss attempted to show that interior angles of a very large triangle added to 180 degrees, knowing that any deviation from this measure would be magnified by the size of the triangle. Gauss was able to determine, up to the limits of mensural tools and methods, that the sum of the angles was 180 degrees. However, he was not able to discover any formal proof of the axiom.
- 3 This is equivalent to assuming (1) that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is always less than two right angles, and (2) that the ratio between the circumference and

the diameter of a circle is always greater than π , and the amount by which it is greater increases as the area of the circle increases.

- 4 Actually, Riemann's geometry did not assume that the first four axioms and that particular negation of the fifth are all true—nor did he base his system exactly on Playfair's revision of the Euclidean original (and there were a number of competing axiomatizations of the Euclidean system—versions by Hilbert and E.V. Huntington, for example.) Riemann's own system assumed that not every line—in fact, no line—can be extended to any arbitrary length, and that through any point exterior to a given straight line, no line can be drawn parallel to the given line. This is equivalent to assuming (1) that space is finite, and (2) that the sum of the angles of a triangle is always greater than two right angles, the excess being proportional to the area of the triangle. (In this geometry, the ratio between the circumference of a circle and the diameter is always less than π , and decreases as the area of the circle increases.)

INFINITY CONFOUNDS REASON

The number of integers is infinite. Beyond the integers, there are the rational numbers, numbers that can be represented in the form of one integer divided by another. How many rational numbers are there? One might think that because the rational numbers are dense (between any two given rational numbers there is always another rational number) while the integers are spread out along the number line, the infinity of the set of rational numbers would be much larger than the infinity of the set of integers.

Cantor discovered that this conjecture is false. Even though the rational numbers are crowded onto the number line (they are “dense”) while the integers are spread apart, there are no more rational numbers than there are integers. Cantor did this by proving there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the integers and the rational numbers—that is, that for every rational number there is a matching integer. This counterintuitive finding was reminiscent of one made decades earlier, by Bernhard Bolzano—namely, that there are the same number of real numbers between 0 and 1 as there are between 0 and a large finite number. Bolzano proved this by looking at a function, e.g., $y = 100x$. This function carries values from its domain (represented here by the term x) to its range (represented here by the term y). We can restrict the domain of the function, so that the function acts on x values between, e.g.,

0 and 1. What that function does is to map values between 0 and 1 onto the range 0 to 100: for every real number between 0 and 1, there exists one and only one value between 0 and 100. Thus, there is one-to-one correspondence between the real numbers lying between 0 and 1 and the real numbers lying between 0 and 100. Therefore, there are no more real numbers between 0 and 100 than there are between 0 and 1.

This result seems downright weird. But Cantor discovered many more peculiar results. To denote the lowest order of infinity, the infinity of the integers and of the rational numbers, Cantor used the symbol \aleph_0 . In the course of his work, Cantor recognized the following strange laws of his arithmetic of infinities:

$$\aleph_0 + 1 = \aleph_0$$

That is, if, to the transfinite number representing the count of the infinitely many integers, we add one, we still get that infinite number. This result can be generalized:

$$\aleph_0 + n = \aleph_0$$

The result was not entirely novel. As early as 1638, when under house arrest, Galileo Galilei had come to an astonishing recognition about real numbers. In his rejoinder to the clergy that had condemned him, his *Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove scienze attenenti all meccanica ed i moviment locali* (Dialogues concerning two new sciences, including centres of gravity and force of percussion), Galileo noted that since the integers and their squares could be put into a one-to-one correspondence, there are as many square integers as integers. Therefore, the series 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81, 100... must have as many members as the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10... Nonetheless, that an infinite set (the integers) can have the same number of members as a proper subset of itself (square numbers) seems strange, and it is not true of sets with finite numbers of members.

Another example points out the strangeness: there are as many even numbers as there are integers, since the even numbers (2, 4, 6...) can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the integers (1, 2, 3...). That $\aleph_0 + 1 = \aleph_0$ and, more generally, that a proper subset of an infinite set has the same number of members as does the infinite set itself is the basis for an illustrative story that David Hilbert used to tell, a story that suggests the surprise he felt at the discovery. The Hotel Hilbert is a hotel with infinitely many rooms. You arrive at the hotel, only to be told by the manager there is no vacancy. "All your infinitely many rooms are full!" you exclaim. "Yes," the manager says, "not one room is vacant." "May I propose this," you say to the manager, "move the person in room 1 to room 2. Move the person in room 2 to room 3. Move the person in room 3 to room 4. Since you have infinitely many rooms, you'll have enough rooms to accommodate everyone. And I'll take room 1."

In fact, Hotel Hilbert, even when it is full, could not only house you, but an infinite number of your friends as well. If you arrived with an infinite number of friends, you could ask the manager to move the person in room 1 to room 2, the person in room 2 to room 4, the person in room 3 to room 6, and then there would be an infinite number of spaces in the odd-number rooms for you and all your friends.

The last story illustrates another finding of Cantor's arithmetic of infinities:

$$\aleph_0 + \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$$

Another way to say that is:

$$2 \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$$

And that can be generalized:

$$n\aleph_0 = \aleph_0$$

Also:

$$\aleph_0 \cdot \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$$

These are all counterintuitive findings. The arithmetic of infinities is strange indeed!

Another set of strange findings that Cantor turned up in his analysis of infinity concerned the relative number of points in a line, a plane, and a cube. One would imagine that a line would contain fewer points than a square, a square fewer points than a cube, and so on. However, Cantor developed a proof to show that the line, the square, and the cube all contain the same number of points. Consider first the line and the square. Suppose we have a line of length 1 and a 1-by-1 square. Every point on the square can be represented by a pair of coordinates, with each of the coordinates represented by a number between 0 and 1 and with an arbitrary number of digits. Thus, the coordinate pair, a pair of real numbers, could be represented as $(a_0a_1a_2a_3a_4a_5a_6a_7a_8a_9, \dots, b_0b_1b_2b_3b_4b_5b_6b_7b_8b_9, \dots)$ with a_n and b_n each representing a digit. However, we can take the digits representing these two real numbers and rearrange them into the form $a_0b_0a_1b_1a_2b_2a_3b_3a_4b_4a_5b_5, \dots$. But $a_0b_0a_1b_1a_2b_2a_3b_3a_4b_4a_5b_5, \dots$ is also a real number. Thus, we can construct a single real number that corresponds to every coordinate pair; that is to say, we can compose a single real number that corresponds to every coordinate pair. The coordinate pairs can be brought into one-to-one correspondence with the real numbers, and so they are no more numerous than the reals. Furthermore, the number $a_0b_0a_1b_1a_2b_2a_3b_3a_4b_4a_5b_5, \dots$ corresponds to a point on the real number line, while the coordinate pair $(a_0a_1a_2a_3a_4a_5a_6a_7a_8a_9, \dots, b_0b_1b_2b_3b_4b_5b_6b_7b_8b_9, \dots)$ represents a point on the Cartesian plane. Hence, the points on the Cartesian plane can be put into one-to-one correspondence with points on the real number line and, accordingly, are no more numerous than the points on the real number line. The example can be generalized to show

that the number of points in a cube or in a tesseract are no more numerous than points on the real number line. The result so astonished Cantor that on 29 June 1877, he wrote a letter to Dedekind, telling him of the finding: “Je le vois, mais je ne le crois pas” (I see it, but I don’t believe it).

One could forgive the non-mathematicians who heard about these results for deciding that mathematics had gone mad. Lay people were not alone. Such mathematicians as Leopold Kronecker and Jan Brouwer condemned non-finitist proofs (proofs that could not be completed in a non-finite number of steps) and so the assumption, common in non-constructivist proofs, that an actual infinity exists.¹ Kronecker was so militant on the issue that he fought Cantor at every turn, blocking him from appointments at good universities (Kronecker had a privileged position at the University of Berlin) and attempting to prevent publication of Cantor’s theories, which became so central to mathematics in the twentieth century.

Cantor, against very real adversities, tried to continue with his work. One of the next questions he took up was that of the number of real numbers. Cantor approached this question through the notion of the power set. The power set of a set is the set of all subsets of the original set. Thus, for example, the power set of $\{1,2,3\}$ includes: $\{\}$, that is, the empty set (the empty set is a member of every set), the members taken one at a time, $\{1\}$, $\{2\}$, $\{3\}$; the members taken two at a time, $\{1,2\}$, $\{1,3\}$, and $\{2,3\}$; and the entire set, $\{1,2,3\}$. Thus, the power set of a set of three elements has eight elements.

We note that $8 = 2^3$; in fact, generally the number of elements in a power set of n elements is 2^n . The formula has the form it does because, when counting the number of subsets of a given set, as we move from k to $k + 1$ elements by picking an element z , we notice that there are as many subsets of $k + 1$ elements that include z as there are subsets that do not. Cantor recognized that the power set of the set of all integers formed the set of all real numbers, since every integer can be included, or not be included, in each of the infinite positions of a decimal number. Accordingly, c , the number of real numbers (the count of the continuum) equals 2^{\aleph_0} , and this also represents the number of points on the real number line.

The process of forming power sets of these infinite sets can be continued indefinitely, so we could have a power set of the set of real numbers. Cantor used \aleph_0 to refer to the number of integers. So we might use \aleph_1 to refer to the power set of \aleph_0 , that is, to the number of real numbers. But we could also form a power set of \aleph_1 , and we could call that \aleph_2 ; and we could form the power set of that, and call the result \aleph_3 . There is no number with which the process must terminate. So we have a series of infinities, $\aleph_0, \aleph_1, \aleph_2, \aleph_3 \dots$. The value of \aleph_1 is 2^{\aleph_0} , the value of \aleph_2 is 2^{\aleph_1} , the value of \aleph_3 is 2^{\aleph_2} , etc. But an interesting question arises about this series: Are there any infinite numbers between the terms of

this series? For example, is there an infinite number between \aleph_1 , the number of real numbers, and \aleph_2 , the power set of \aleph_1 ? Or is there any infinite number between \aleph_0 , the number of integers, and \aleph_1 , the power set of \aleph_0 ?²

This last question, whether the number of real numbers, $c = \aleph_1 = 2^{\aleph_0}$, is the smallest infinite number after \aleph_0 , became a famous mathematical problem in the later part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. The problem became known as the continuum problem (and the hypothesis that 2^{\aleph_0} is the smallest infinite number larger than \aleph_0 became known as the continuum hypothesis), and it preoccupied Cantor during the 1880s. Cantor wrote letter after letter to his friend Gösta Mittag-Leffler, first describing how he had proved that the continuum hypothesis was true, then another retracting his discovery, then another stating that he had proved the hypothesis false and that he proved there are infinitely many \aleph s between \aleph_0 and \aleph_1 . The pattern continued for years, until at the peak of his efforts at solving the problem (and immediately after withdrawing a paper on the continuum problem from *Acta Mathematica*), Cantor had a serious breakdown and was admitted to Halle's *Nervenlinik*. Over the years, he suffered many more nervous breakdowns, often after periods of intensive work on the continuum hypothesis.

Bertrand Russell had applied Cantor's set theoretic ideas in *Principia Mathematica*; so Cantor sent Russell letters attempting to introduce himself. The text was written every which way, from left to right, from top to bottom, from right to left. Russell reproduced one of them in his autobiography, with the remark that "after reading the following letter, no one will be surprised to learn that [Cantor] spent a large part of his life in a lunatic asylum."³ Cantor had gazed on infinity and had lost his mind.

The outrageously brilliant (and eccentric) logician and mathematician Kurt Gödel also tried to prove the continuum hypothesis. He was able to prove that the continuum hypothesis was consistent with the axioms of set theory. He considered the possibility that the continuum hypothesis could be disproved—one might do this by showing that the negation of the hypothesis is also consistent with the axioms of set theory. However, Gödel could find no such proof. The problem of proving the continuum hypothesis tormented him relentlessly. Working on it, he began to show symptoms of paranoia. Heating systems, he believed, were spewing poison gas. He believed his food was poisoned and would not eat until his wife had tried it—and even then would often not eat. His death certificate stated that he died of "malnutrition and inanition" brought about by "personality disturbance"—that is, he starved himself to death because he had gone mad. His work on the continuum hypothesis broke him: after much futile effort, Gödel, like Cantor, began to pour his efforts into bizarre pursuits. (Cantor spent years of labour trying to prove that Francis Bacon was the author of Shakespeare's plays, while Gödel

spent much time on trying to prove that Leibniz had drawn his philosophy from sources he did not acknowledge.) One might be inclined to conclude that the dream of reason had rendered both delusional.

In the end, it turned out that Cantor was unable to prove his continuum hypothesis precisely because it is unprovable. In 1963, Paul Cohen showed what Gödel had been unable to show, that the continuum hypothesis is independent of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms for set theory. Kurt Gödel had shown that no contradiction would result if the continuum hypothesis were added as a theorem to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory; in 1963, using the mathematical technique of forcing he had developed (a technique familiar to students of the philosopher Alain Badiou), Paul J. Cohen showed that no contradiction would result if the negation of that hypothesis were added. Together, the findings showed the hypothesis is undecidable (see Appendix 3). One might say that (mathematical) reason cannot resolve the enigma posed by the continuum hypothesis. Reason's inability to prove the continuum hypothesis was another episode that exposed that faculty's limitations. It, too, contributed to forcing the thinkers in the world's *Abendland* to abandon the hope that reason might give us answers to the ultimate questions (such as the nature of infinity). Cantor, Russell, Gödel, Lobachevsky, Bolyai, and Riemann all had a part in making the limitations of reason obvious.

NOTES

- 1 To show that two infinite sets have the same size, Cantor proposed putting the elements of the two sets in one-to-one correspondence: match the first element of the first set with the first element of the second set; match the second element of the first set with the second element of the second set, and so on. Cantor's method gives us a rule to apply to show that two sets have the same size; but to apply the rule and determine whether one infinite set is larger than another, we would have to complete an infinite number of steps. This is the sort of procedure that Brouwer opposed. Mathematicians often say that Cantor's procedure is "non-constructive" for it does not actually require constructing the one-to-one correspondence between the two sets—in fact, that construction cannot be completed.
- 2 The general form of the problem, whether the next transfinite number after \aleph^n is 2^{\aleph^n} , was formulated by Felix Hausdorff and is usually referred to as the generalized continuum problem (and the hypothesis is generally referred to as the generalized continuum hypothesis).
- 3 Bertrand Russell, *Autobiography*, vol. 1 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), 217.

AN ACCOUNT OF GÖDEL'S PROOF FOR POETS, PAINTERS, AND ART HISTORIANS

A mathematical system is said to be complete if and only if all true statements in the system can be derived, using the accepted rewriting procedures, from the elementary propositions that found the system; a system is said to be consistent if no contradictions can be derived. There are infinite possibilities for selecting the axioms and rules of inference for a formal system; yet none of them can generate all the truths about the natural numbers. To show this, Gödel took Hilbert's point that every formalization of a branch of mathematics is itself a mathematical object that can be manipulated using mathematical means (i.e., following standardized rewriting procedures). Gödel's proofs depended on representing a formal system that purports to encompass arithmetic within arithmetic itself by assigning to any statement about numbers or the relationships between numbers a unique number (which has come to be called its Gödel number). Thus, he set about constructing a set of natural numbers that would mirror all statements about relationships between the natural numbers.

We ask, "Would it be possible to formulate paradoxes such as Russell's in a formal system?" (see "Logic and paradox" in the main text). If you wish to

reconstruct the classical Liar's Paradox, then you must build a formula **Q** that asserts that "the formal system, **S**, proves $\sim\mathbf{Q}$ "—that is, that asserts that **S** proves not-**Q** (for ' \sim ' is the logical symbol for negation). How can one possibly make a formula assert its own properties? How can one make a formula talk about formulas (for self-reference is required if Russell's paradox, and other equivalent paradoxes, are to arise)? Normally, formulas of the first-order arithmetic offer assertions about natural numbers, not about propositions. Gödel's method for making arithmetic formulas to refer to propositions was based on this simple but brilliant insight: to force the formulas to talk about themselves, Gödel introduced a numerical coding of formulas such that by manipulating the numerals themselves, one produces statements about mathematical statements.

Gödel did this by assigning values to each of the logical connectives of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. For example, we might, using the assignments that Nagel and Newman used in their famous layperson's account of Gödel's proof, represent ' \sim ' (the logician's symbol for 'not') by the number 1, '**V**' (i.e., the logician's symbol for 'or') by the number 2, '**D**' (the symbol for 'implies') by the number 3, '**∃**' (i.e., the existential quantifier 'there exists a') by the number 4, '=' ('equals') by the number 5, '**0**' by the number 6, '**s**' (for 'the immediate successor of' some number, the importance of which, in Whitehead and Russell's calculus, can be traced to Giuseppe Peano) by 7, '(' (i.e., 'open parenthesis') by the number 8, ')' (i.e., 'closed parenthesis') by the number 9, and ',' (i.e., comma) by the number 10. Arithmetical statements also include variables—of several types, in fact: numerical variables (i.e., variables that can take on numerical values), sentential variables (i.e., logical expressions or formulas) and predicate variables (i.e., variables that attribute properties to numbers or numerical expressions, e.g., $\mathbf{P}(x)$, where **P** can be 'is prime' or 'is odd' or 'is even').¹ If for any number **n**, whenever $\mathbf{P}(n)$ is true $\mathbf{P}(n!)$ is also true, then every number has property **P**. Numerical variables we represent by prime numbers that are greater than 10 (for the *Principia Mathematica* used ten logical signs); thus, **x** and **y** in a statement that contains two numerical variables might be assigned the numbers 11 and 13, respectively.

(I am glossing over issues relating to the representation of variables—interested readers can consult Nagel and Newman's *Gödel's Proof*.) A statement like $(\exists x)(x = sy)$ would then be represented by 8 (the number we assign to the open parenthesis sign), 4 (for the existential qualifier), 11 (the number we have assigned '**x**'), 9 (the number we assign to close parenthesis statement), 8, 11, 5 (the number we assign to the sign '**7**'), 13, 9. This set of numerals, the series enclosed by '[' and ']', represents the given formula. But we would prefer to represent the string by a single, unique number. How can this be done in such a way that we can be certain that each string is assigned a unique value?

Gödel's solution was brilliant. Every logical sign that occurred in the string would be represented by a prime number that was determined by the position of the sign in the string; that prime number would be raised to a power that would be determined by the character of the logical sign, and finally, the values for all characters in the string would be multiplied together. Take our example, $(\exists x)(x = sy)$: it consists of ten logical signs: '(', '∃', 'x', ')', etc. The first ten prime numbers, in order, are 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, and 29, so those values are the bases for the factors that will constitute the string's Gödel number. Of course, the products of those bases themselves would not produce a unique result—every string of ten signs would produce the same result. Gödel's way around this problem was to raise each of those bases to the power of the Gödel number we have assigned to that particular sign: the number assigned to the open parenthesis sign, the first sign in our example string, is 8, so the first factor will be 2^8 . Note that only strings that begin with an open parenthesis sign will have value 2^8 as the first value, and since all our factors are prime, no subsequent factor in our product can be a value that has 2 raised to any power whatsoever as one of its factors (that is, they cannot take values that can be factored into any power of 2)—so that factor will appear only in strings that have an open parenthesis sign in the first position. The second sign in our string, the sign for the existential quantifier '∃', has the value 4, so the factor that represents an '∃' in the second position will be 3^4 . Again note that 3^4 will be a factor only of Gödel numbers that represent strings that have '∃' in the second position, and since all the other factors that form the string's Gödel number are prime numbers, they cannot take values that can be factored into any power of 3. Thus, only a string that has '(' as the first logical sign and '∃' as the second logical sign can have the eighth power of 2 and the fourth power of 3 as factors. The third factor will be 5^{11} , since the third sign is 'x,' to which we assigned the value 11, the first prime above 10. So the process continues, yielding finally $2^8 \times 3^4 \times 5^{11} \times 7^9 \times 11^8 \times 13^{11} \times 17^5 \times 19^7 \times 23^{13} \times 29^9$ as the string's Gödel number, a unique value determined simply by the position and character of each of the signs in the string. Because all the factors are primes raised to some power, any string that has the same value would have to be made up of the same factors, and so that string could only be made of the same signs in the same sequence; that is, it would have to be the same string. Hence, Gödel numbers mirror the possible expressions in our system, for there is a unique Gödel number for every well-formed string; and for any given Gödel number, there is a unique string associated with it.² What is more, the string associated with a given Gödel number can be recovered by factoring the Gödel number into primes.³

Thus, Gödel devised a means for assigning a unique number to represent every possible string that can be formed in the system; so using this procedure,

every possible proposition about the natural numbers can itself be expressed as a number. Thereby, he made it possible to use arithmetic means to reflect on the truths that arithmetic states. More exactly, Gödel developed a meta-mathematical system for numerically representing the structure of arithmetic expressions that allows every such expression to be mapped into arithmetical functions of integers (i.e., functions that take integer values and return an integer value) and every expression about relations between formulas to be mapped into arithmetic relations between integers (a proposition that one value is greater than, the same as, or less than another). Thus, the logical relations between meta-mathematical statements between formulas can be studied by arithmetic means, by computations on factors.

Among the logical relations among formulas is that of entailment: a sequence of formulas, \mathbf{x}' , forms a demonstration of \mathbf{z}' if \mathbf{z}' follows from \mathbf{x}' by the rules of inference. Or since we can represent a sequence of formulas, and the conclusion, each with a unique Gödel number, the sequence of formulas with the unique Gödel number \mathbf{x} (computed by “and-ing” together the sequence of formulas and determining the Gödel number of the result) provides a demonstration of the formula with the Gödel number \mathbf{z} . We express that relation with the formula $\mathbf{Dem}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z})$. In the same way, the meta-mathematical statement that the series of formulas with the Gödel number \mathbf{x} does not demonstrate the formula with the Gödel number \mathbf{z} can be rendered $\sim\mathbf{Dem}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}')$. This notation ($\mathbf{Dem}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$) became especially important because of the manner in which Gödel redefined truth for his system: a formula was said to be true if it could be shown to arise through rewriting the fundamental tenets of the system according to the established rewriting procedures (the rules of inference).

The problem of showing that the system is inconsistent is equivalent to showing that contradictory propositions can be derived from the system’s fundamental tenets using valid rules of inference; conversely, the problem of showing that a system is consistent is equivalent to showing that contradictory propositions cannot be derived. What is more, to show that contradictory propositions cannot be derived from the tenets of the system, it is sufficient to show that there exists a well-formed formula (any well-formed formula) that cannot be derived from fundamental tenets of the system—for, as we have already noted, from an inconsistent set of premises, all propositions follow.

We are almost at the point at which we understand how Gödel proved that arithmetic is consistent—consistent, but not complete. We need just one more piece of meta-mathematical notation to do so. Suppose we have the formula $(\exists \mathbf{x})(\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{sy})$. We give \mathbf{y} the Gödel number 16 and we say that this formula has the Gödel number \mathbf{m} and \mathbf{y} has the Gödel number 16. Now we can take the formula $(\exists \mathbf{x})(\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{sy})$ and substitute for the variable \mathbf{y} the value of \mathbf{m} , and get $(\exists \mathbf{x})(\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{sm})$. We can state what we have done a bit differently:

for the variable in the formula $(\exists x)(x = sy)$ with the Gödel number of 16, we substitute the numeral m . (Those two ways of stating what we have done are equivalent, because the Gödel number for y is 16.) Let's examine the resulting formula, $(\exists x)(x = sm)$. It is obviously an arithmetic function stating a relationship between two numbers, m and 16. Like any relation, this formula can be assigned a Gödel number. The task of calculating the Gödel number for that formula is intricate: we have to take the original function, $(\exists x)(x = sy)$, and calculate its Gödel number; then we have to substitute that value for m in the function $(\exists x)(x = sm)$, and calculate the Gödel number of the result. Analogous calculations with more intricate formulas could become tedious—but for our purposes they are unnecessary. For it turns out that all we need is an unambiguous way of referring to it. That is, we need a way of referring to the Gödel number that is obtained from some formula by substituting for the variable with the Gödel number 16, the numeral for m . (This mathematical description obviously involves a relation between the numbers m and 16, and so can be expressed within the arithmetical calculus; and that means that the expression can be assigned a Gödel number.) We shall use the expression $\text{sub}(y, 16, y)$ to say “the Gödel number of the formula that results when we take a formula whose Gödel number is y and substitute the expression with the Gödel number of 16 for y .”

I digress to show the elegance of this way of thinking. Note that substituting m for y in $(\exists x)(x = sy)$ involves recursion. For example, regarding the formula $\text{sub}(y, 16, y)$, we have stipulated that y is a variable (and since $\text{sub}(y, 16, y)$ is a meta-mathematical formula, we can say that 16 is a variable, the expression whose Gödel number is 16); thus, when we do the substitution, y becomes the expression (the variable) whose Gödel number is 16. So if we adopted $\text{GN}(\text{expr})$ to mean “the Gödel number of the expression,” and $\text{GN}'(16)$ to mean the expression whose Gödel number is 16, then we could rewrite $(\exists x)(x = sy)$ as $(\exists x)(x = s\text{GN}'(16))$. Earlier, we substituted m for 16, and got $(\exists x)(x = sm)$. How could we rewrite this, using the function GN' ? What we need is the expression whose Gödel number is m . Well, the expression whose Gödel number is m is $(\exists x)(x = sy)$; thus $m = \text{GN}'((\exists x)(x = sy))$ —so $(\exists x)(x = sm)$ can be written $(\exists x)(x = s\text{GN}'((\exists x)(x = sy)))$.

To return to the main line of exposition, note that the formula $\text{sub}(y, 16, y)$ means the Gödel number of the formula that is obtained from the formula with Gödel number y by substituting the variable (expression) with Gödel number 16 for the variable (expression) in y . When we assign a specific integer to y , the expression $\text{sub}(y, 16, y)$ represents a definite integer (a specific Gödel number), which represents a particular formula.

The tactic we now follow is to build, for the system S , the Gödel number for the formula G_S that asserts “I am not provable in S ” and then to show that indeed G_S cannot be proved in S —that is, that G_S is a true formula

(and, as a formula of Peano's arithmetic, it talks about properties of natural numbers). One can prove that $\mathbf{G_S}$ is a true formula (i.e., that $\mathbf{G_S}$ cannot be proved in \mathbf{S}) only by postulating that \mathbf{S} is consistent. In fact, if $\mathbf{G_S}$ is proved true, then the consistency of \mathbf{S} is also established (for the unprovability of at least one formula means that \mathbf{S} is consistent).

The outline of Gödel's proof begins with the formula $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, z)$. This expression means, "For every x , the Gödel number for a sequence of propositions constituting a proof z , x is not the Gödel number of a proof of the formula whose Gödel number is z ." Putting the point less formally, the expression says, "Given the Gödel number of any possible proof, it is not the Gödel number of a proof of the formula whose Gödel number is z ." This is tantamount to saying, "The formula with Gödel number z is not demonstrable." Actually, for his famous proof, Kurt Gödel considered a special case of this formula. Let us begin with the expression

$$(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(y, 16, y))$$

Stated informally, that proposition says, "The formula whose Gödel number is $\mathbf{sub}(y, 16, y)$ (that is to say, whose Gödel number is obtained from the expression whose Gödel number is y by substituting the numeral for y for the expression whose Gödel number is 16) is not demonstrable." That expression is itself a formula of the arithmetical calculus, and so it has a Gödel number of its own; let us call its Gödel number n . With this number, n , we can form another expression from $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(y, 16, y))$ by substituting the numeral for n for the variable whose Gödel number is 16 (that is to say, for y):

$$(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$$

Now we ask, "What is the Gödel number of that expression?" It is, obviously, $\mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n)$ —that function returns the Gödel number that results when we substitute n for y in an expression whose Gödel number is n . But the expression whose Gödel number is n is the expression $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(y, 16, y))$. So $\mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n)$ is the Gödel number of the expression that results when we substitute n for y in the expression $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(y, 16, y))$, that is, $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$. So, conversely, $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$ must have the Gödel number $\mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n)$.

Now the expression $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$ is the statement within the arithmetical calculus that reflects the meta-mathematical statement "The expression whose Gödel number is $\mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n)$ is not demonstrable." Like the paradoxes that we have examined, this statement is self-referential: we can take this arithmetical expression as saying that the expression whose Gödel number is $\mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n)$, that is, the expression $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$ itself, is not demonstrable.

From this point, Kurt Gödel was able to proceed with such impressive elegance and simplicity that the proof was soon to be recognized as one of the twentieth century's key achievements. He proved the formula using a proof of the sort that mathematicians call an indirect proof. That is, he assumed the contrary, that the expression is demonstrable, and went on to generate a contradiction. Assume that the proposition is true. If it is, then, by assumption, we can state,

$$1) (x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$$

But we have also assumed that the proposition is demonstrable. How do we state this in the arithmetical calculus? Well, to say that the proposition is demonstrable is to say that there exists an x , where x is a series of expressions that constitutes the proof of the formula whose Gödel number is $\mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n)$. Or, expressing the same idea using a double negative, to say that the proposition is demonstrable is to say that it is not the case that, for all x 's, x is not a proof of the expression whose Gödel number is $\mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n)$. And how do we write that in our notation?

$$2) \sim(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$$

Propositions 1) and 2) are contradictory: proposition 2) is simply the negation of proposition 1). So assuming that the proposition is demonstrable leads to a contradiction: in effect, if the formula is demonstrable, then it is not demonstrable, and if the formula is not demonstrable, then it is demonstrable (for if the formal contradictory of a proposition is demonstrable, then that proposition is demonstrable as well). But we noted above that if a system can generate a contradiction, then the axioms of the systems are not consistent; accordingly, we can say that if the axioms are consistent, then neither the formula nor its negation can be derived. That is to say, if the axioms are consistent, then we cannot, by deductive means, determine whether the formula or its negation is true. That is to say, if the axioms are consistent, the formula is undecidable.

Although the formula is undecidable (provided that the axioms are consistent), it can be shown by meta-mathematical reasoning to be true. Given that the axioms are consistent, then we have already established the meta-mathematical proposition "The formula $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$ is not demonstrable." But that meta-mathematical proposition is represented within arithmetic by the expression $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$ itself. But the mapping of meta-mathematical propositions to arithmetical formulas is such that true propositions map to true expressions. Thus, the formula $(x) \sim \mathbf{Dem}(x, \mathbf{sub}(n, 16, n))$ is true, though it is not demonstrable.

An axiomatic system is said to be complete if all true formulas expressible within the system can be formally derived from the axioms; on the other

hand, an axiomatic system is said to be incomplete if there are true formulas that can be expressed within the system but that cannot be formally derived from the axioms of the system. The meta-mathematical proposition just established, “The formula $(x) \sim \text{Dem}(x, \text{sub}(n, 16, n))$ is not demonstrable if the axioms of the arithmetic calculus are consistent, but it is true,” implies the proposition “If the axioms of the arithmetic calculus are consistent, then arithmetic is incomplete.” However, if the proposition “the axioms of the arithmetic calculus are consistent” were true, then the proposition “arithmetic is incomplete” would be demonstrable. But the proposition “arithmetic is incomplete” is just the formula $(x) \sim \text{Dem}(x, \text{sub}(n, 16, n))$, and we have already shown that $(x) \sim \text{Dem}(x, \text{sub}(n, 16, n))$ is not demonstrable. Therefore, the proposition “arithmetic is complete” is not demonstrable. This establishes that we cannot establish the consistency of arithmetic through meta-mathematical reasoning that can be represented within arithmetic itself.

This is a skeleton presentation of Gödel’s great discovery. Readers who are intrigued by this way of thinking and wish to follow up on the topic, but lack the mathematical training to cope with technical presentations, can consult *Gödel’s Proof* (1958), by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, on which this oversimplified précis was modelled. Nagel and Newman was the first layperson’s guide to this stunning achievement, and reading it in their youth helped set many mathematicians and computer scientists on their career path, and it continues to have that effect today.

NOTES

- 1 Giuseppe Peano (1858–1932) was an Italian mathematician who offered a postulate system from which the entire arithmetic of the natural numbers could be derived. The primitives of this system were “0,” “number,” and “successor,” which all reappear in the Whitehead-Russell calculus. (By the successor of a natural number, n , often referred to as n' , is meant the natural number immediately following n in the natural order.) Peano’s system has the following five postulates:
 - P1. 0 is a natural number.
 - P2. The successor of any natural number is a natural number.
 - P3. No two natural numbers have the same immediate successor.
 - P4. 0 is not the immediate successor of any natural number.
 - P5. [the principle of mathematical induction] If P is a property such that 0 has property P , and if, whenever P is true of a natural number, it also holds true of the immediate successor of that number, then P is true of all natural numbers.
- 2 That is, there is a bijective mapping between well-formed strings and Gödel numbers.
- 3 A basic theorem of arithmetic establishes that any product of primes has a unique factorization.

***EMAK BAKIA*: A SHOT ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY**

- 1 The title “Emak-Bakia” [*sic*] in stylized Art Deco characters. The image is still. (“Emak Bakia” is said to mean “leave me alone” in Basque. It is also the name of a house near Biarritz where Man Ray stayed when he began the film.)
- 2 The title is now deformed, as though projected onto a rubber sheet that undergoes compression and stretching, all the while rotating.

Man Ray had a close friendship with an American filmmaker named Dudley Murphy (1897–1968) who spent several years in Paris. They worked together in 1923–24, and by late in 1923 they were very close (close enough that each could film the other making love to his respective partner—Man Ray with Kiki and Dudley Murphy with his wife Katharine Hawley Murphy). By the time that *Emak Bakia* was shot, Murphy had returned to America—nonetheless, his penchant for rubbersheet effects (he was responsible for some similar effects in *Ballet mécanique* [1924], on which Man Ray collaborated) likely influenced this (and other similar images).

Emak Bakia makes extensive use of rotating, spiralling, and gyrating forms. In this regard, it resembles *Anémic cinéma*, the film Man Ray did with Marcel Duchamp—Ray started work on *Anémic cinéma* before undertaking *Emak Bakia* (and for a while, work on the projects overlapped). The rotating forms *Emak Bakia* includes can be seen as part of Ray’s ongoing conversation with Duchamp.

- 3 A dissolve from the dark title “Emak-Bakia” to the lighter title “cinépoème.” Both titles are deformed, as though projected onto a rubber sheet, becoming compressed and stretching, and all the while rotating.

Note: In claiming that the film is a sort of poem, Man Ray asserts both that film concerns the realm of mystery and that its structure is that of paratactically associated concrete images.

- 4 A dissolve from the lighter title, “cinépoème,” to the darker title, “de/ Man Ray/Paris 1926.” The titles are deformed, as though projected onto a rubber sheet, and swirl about.
- 5 Close-up side view of a man (Man Ray) beside a mirror, looking through a movie camera: an image of an eye appears in one of the lenses, then the image fades to black.

Note: By starting the film with an image of the filmmaker, Man Ray asserts his authorship and suggests that what we will see is a product of the filmmaker’s imagination—including the eye in many of the shots also serves to proclaim the film’s visionary character. The image of the filmmaker also suggests that the preceding images present the contents of the filmmaker’s mind, which retrospectively confers on the preceding images the status of subjective forms. However, most any viewer likely recognizes that the preceding sequence was a collage—an assemblage of concrete materials turned into light (by the photogram/Rayograph process). Thus, the preceding sequence takes on an ambiguous status, as being both objective (material) and subjective.

When we see the image of Man Ray at work filming, we might ask ourselves what else, besides himself, he might be filming—and the answer that suggests itself is that he was filming the preceding shots. The confounding of the inner and outer worlds that is such an important theme of the film starts right here, at the film’s beginning. But the preceding (and immediately succeeding) images hardly seem to have the character that one expects of a cinematographic shot, for they do not depict a “real” scene.

- 6 A photogram (or Rayogram) that creates a salt-and-pepper effect—irregular small white areas appear at sundry places against a black background

(and do not stay in the position from one frame to the next). The film begins resolutely flat, affirming the cinema's true character. Man Ray's early writing concerned flatness and the new art.

This shot and the next four are from *Le retour à la raison*. This incorporation highlights the work's collage character.

- 7 The camera pans across a field of daisies, giving the impression they are rotating.
- 8 Photogram of pins, graphic image of white lines on black background, moving in various directions. Man Ray described this animation of pins and tacks as an epileptic dance. Photography meets cinema meets dance.
- 9 A circular shape appears among the lines (that of a push-pin).
- 10 The lines disappear, the circular shape seems to jump and jerk on its own, while a pointed black line within it rotates erratically.
- 11 Blurred white spots (out-of-focus lights) become brighter and turn in various directions, then fade into the black background.

This is the first example of light imagery that will have so important a role in the film. This theme predominates until shot 34.

- 12 The white spots (out-of-focus lights) fade to black; then a long white spot appears in the top-right corner, thickens as it moves towards the centre, and becomes smaller as it descends in the bottom-left corner (it, too, rotates).
- 13 A large white shape moves from the lower-right corner towards the upper-left corner and translucent flare spots appear as the shape fades to black; flares move vertically and fade to black.
- 14 Irregular spots appear at the corners; a spot dominates as it moves towards the bottom centre and descends towards the middle-right side.
- 15 A small, faint spot appears in the lower-left corner.
- 16 Irregular (seemingly smudged) white spots appear from various directions and then disappear (exiting in different directions).
- 17 A (seemingly) smudged spot becomes larger and brighter as it moves from the upper-right corner and becomes smaller as it descends towards the left.

At this point, Man Ray repeats the foregoing sequence: shots 18 to 22 reprise shots 13 to 17; shots 23 to 27 repeat them for a second time; shots 28 and 29 begin a third repetition.

- 18 Shot 13 repeats.
- 19 Shot 14 repeats.
- 20 Shot 15 repeats.
- 21 Shot 16 repeats.
- 22 Shot 17 repeats.
- 23 Shot 13 repeats.
- 24 Shot 14 repeats.
- 25 Shot 15 repeats.
- 26 Shot 16 repeats.
- 27 Shot 17 repeats.
- 28 Shot 13 repeats.
- 29 Shot 14 repeats.
- 30 Words appear over a small area at the centre of the frame—they enter at the right, move towards the left and, letter by letter, disappear as they reach a point near the left of the screen. The text reads, “. . . ain au milieu du Bassin de Neptune au cours de deux grandes Fête . . . enne avec Marcel dovét . . . Le Journal annonce . . . Paris . . . Un” (the words appear and seem to rotate as they do in a billboard; the letters are made up of small lights).

The previous sequence of images, which emphasized the movement of light, were abstract light images (as is the image that follows this). This image, on the other hand, is representational—though it is also a “light image.” This combination of abstract and representational forms provides another example of the film’s incorporating diversity. Furthermore, because the abstract shots have a similar dynamic to that of the internal world while the representational images suggest external reality, this conjunction of abstract and representational forms fuses the inner and outer worlds. The continuity of the inner and outer worlds, one of the principal themes of Surrealism but also intrinsic to DADA’s epistemology, is a key to this film.

This sign also serves to introduce a transition to the next set of sequences, which were filmed at Arthur and Rose Wheeler’s house (which they named “Emak Bakia”). Man Ray’s sojourn there was a *grand fête*; the sequences were shot close to the ocean, that is, near Neptune’s pond (le bassin de Neptune).

Finally, the text is presented in a highly elliptical manner that dreams and poetry share.

- 31 A part of a circular form appears in the top part of the frame and rotates as it descends (the form appears to have been created by rotating an object in front of a light source). Rotating within the circular form is a panel with reflecting sides.

This is the first of the shots (referred to in the body of the text) that were done by setting a prism among an array of mirrors. The next two shots were done similarly. Shots 31 to 33 are each relatively extended. Their contents resemble closely shots we see in *cinéma pur* films (for example, Henri Chomette's *Cinq minutes de cinéma pur*, 1926).

A recording of Django Reinhardt and a jazz ensemble accompanied these images.

- 32 Abstract forms twist, expand, and contract against a black background; a rippled form dominates the images. The effect suggests that the shot might have been done by bending a mylar-like material this way and that, in front of a light. The passage is a sort of homage to *cinéma pur*.
- 33 A close-up of a closed eye; as the eye opens, circular shapes appear to the right and left sides of the eye; the eye blinks continuously as the circular shapes become brighter, and it becomes clear that the image is an eye superimposed over the front of a vehicle and that the circular shapes are headlights.

Shot 33 introduces a new sequence. But it elicits expectations that go unfulfilled: we are inclined to believe that the eye's opening signifies awakening, of one's attention being turned away from the inner world and towards the outer world, so we expect that the following sequence will present the real world. However, this conjecture is not born out.

Although Man Ray and Fernand Léger did not really get on personally, Man Ray did admire *Ballet mécanique*—indeed, he had a role in its making. Like this film, *Ballet mécanique* choreographed inanimate objects. Léger and Murphy's film also incorporates images of eyes (those of Kiki of Montparnasse) opening and closing, and these images of eyes may be a tribute to Léger's film.

- 34 The shot starts out with a blurred image of a circular form; the camera moves towards the object, and the movement brings it into focus: it is a headlight. The headlight moves down the frame as the camera gets closer to the object (or the object gets closer to the camera). An eye is superimposed over the headlight.

Another light image—this time realistic, and belonging in a specific context we could almost characterize as diegetic; it is nonetheless a light image. This shot also associates the eye and light.

- 35 A shot from in front of the car, at an angle (a three-quarters view). A person sits behind the wheel. The camera moves in on the driver, a woman who is wearing goggles and a skull-fitting hat. At first the frame cuts off at the headlights and the front wheel, then, as the camera (or the car) continues to move, more and more of the car goes out of frame—the camera homes in on the person. The camera (or car) continues to move until the driver exits the frame.
- 36 A three-quarters view of an automobile wheel occupies the right part of the frame; the car moves, creating a diagonal that cuts across the frame from the lower-right corner to the upper-left corner.

The sequence (shots 34–38) is built around circular forms. This is a principle of construction that is associated with *cinéma pur*, but this sequence's images (unlike those in shots 31–33) are not abstract constructions; they are improvised and representational.

- 37 The frame is mostly black with white in the upper-right corner; the black portion (which at the end of the shot is revealed to be the back of a vehicle driving away from the camera) moves down, and the white area at the top of the screen becomes larger, until it shows a tree-lined road; the black portion becomes smaller and smaller, and more trees appear.
- 38 Another three-quarters view of the car with a corner of its windshield in the lower-left corner of the frame—it travels along a tree-lined road; the camera jerks around, showing part of the steering wheel and the driver.
- 39 Sheep race across the screen (the “narrative” implies there is a pig among them, but it is not shown). The camera pans quickly, catching the legs of two men among the sheep, ending with a view of a dirt road.
- 40 A view of a road, the horizon, and a house; a car comes up the road, towards the camera—a shadow fills the frame as the car gets closer and drives over the camera.
- 41 A view from above of a pig lying on the ground—the frame's edge bisects the pig.

This shot and the next three suggest a collision. Note that this shot is the first in which we see a pig. In shot 39, we saw sheep racing across the screen, but now there is a pig on the ground.

- 42 The camera pans over a blurred landscape.
- 43 The pig struggles to raise itself; its front legs get some traction and the pig pulls itself up.

- 44 The camera moves (somewhat jerkily) across the trees and sky. The image is somewhat out of focus; as the movement accelerates, the object matter becomes less recognizable.

The sequence suggests that the car has collided with the animal. Man Ray explained, “One of the most interesting shots I made was while being driven by Rose Wheeler in her Mercedes racing car; I was using my hand camera while she was driving eighty or ninety miles an hour, being pretty badly shaken up, when we came upon a herd of sheep on the road. She braked to within a few feet of the animals. This gave me an idea—why not show a collision? I stepped out of the car, followed the herd while winding up the camera and set it in movement, then threw it thirty feet up in the air, catching it again. The risk I was taking gave me a thrill that most movie makers must know.”¹

The shots of things/animals moving in front of the static camera have a distinctly different character from the moving-camera footage (shot from the inside of a car moving at an impressive speed). The contrast marks the beginning of a passage of the film that can be taken either as eliciting a dramatic response or as evoking the effect of the figural (here I use the term in Lyotard’s sense). The motion of the shot taken from inside the moving car matches that of the next shot, the herd; since the vector of movement is preserved in the two shots, one can read the juxtaposition as suggesting that the car collides with an animal, and the effect is of a dramatic shock. On the other hand, this narrative linkage is indeterminate: the vantage point of the second shot is not what one would expect if the narrative relation was what the juxtaposition was intended to imply, and the use of the vector of motion to suggest a processual link is clearly an artifice; moreover, the felled animal turns out to be a pig, when we saw only sheep in the preceding shots. Consequently, there is tension implicit in our response to the passage: on the one hand, we strive to impose narrative closure on the relation between the two shots (our efforts at imposing narrative closure are highlighted by the obvious artificiality of using a continued vector of motion to suggest the collision), while features of the imagery thwart that attempt. The tension between these two aspects of our response evokes the violence of attempting to impose closure on processes—of resorting to reason’s commanding trope, that of understanding process through narrative. This characteristic of the film reflects its Dada provenance.

- 45 The screen is divided in two, top and bottom: the bottom part is ground (this part of the image recedes from the picture plane), while the top part is a shelf-like, or step-like, form (it is an entrance/exit from a train); feet appear on the right part of the step and land onto the ground. We see the

woman (actually, only the woman's legs) walk across the frame, towards the left, and exit.

- 46 The legs of another woman, who walks across the screen, towards the left, and leaves the frame.

The first image of the woman's legs is somewhat transparent (the image is a superimposition and gives evidence of Man Ray's interest in working with the attributes of the photographic/cinematographic medium), and each successive pair of legs in the following sequence is a little more transparent than the previous—each is more of a “light image.”

- 47 The legs of another woman, who walks across the screen, towards the left, and leaves the frame. The image of each new pair of legs is a little more transparent than the previous.

- 48 The legs of yet another woman, who walks across the screen, towards the left, and leaves the frame. Again, the new pair of legs is a little more transparent than the previous.

- 49 The legs of another woman, who walks across the screen, towards the left, and leaves the frame.

- 50 Ghostlike images (a superimposition) of various women's legs follow one after the other. The cinema creates a choreography.

If the effect of the superimpositions in the last four shots has been subtle, here the medium and the device is brought to the fore, making even more insistently the point that Man Ray was interested in working with the characteristics of the photographic/cinematographic medium.

- 51 Legs of a woman who is dancing a Charleston on a sidewalk. The cinema records and intensifies a choreographic gesture.

By this point, the sequence of images has become so unrealistic that we have repudiated the conjecture that shot 33 encouraged us to formulate—that this sequence represents actual events.

- 52 Midriff of a seated man, in a suit, strumming a banjo.

Emak Bakia was made with the expectation of having musical accompaniment—Man Ray believed that music would enhance the film's visual rhythms. For the first screening of the film, at the Théâtre de Vieux Colombier, Man Ray alternated recordings by Django Reinhardt with a live accompaniment provided by an ensemble, including a pianist and a violinist, that played popular French tunes and tangos when the recordings were being changed.

It is likely that Reinhardt's guitar playing almost kept sync with the image of the man playing the banjo—that is, it is likely the image (of a man playing banjo and of a woman dancing) and the sound were brought together at this point (though with the delightful anomaly that the banjo would seem to be producing guitar sounds). The sequence (shots 51–59), whose dynamics are motivated by the accumulating superimpositions of ghostly legs (in shot 50), is rather extended and repetitious, to reinforce this connection with the earlier sequence (and to emphasize the passage's rhythmic construction and, by extension, that film is visual music).

- 53 Legs of a woman dancing on the sidewalk.
- 54 Shot 52 continues—the shot shows the midriff of a man in a formal business suit—he is seated and plays a banjo.
- 55 Shot 51, 53 continues: legs of a woman dancing on the sidewalk.
- 56 Shot 52, 54 continues: showing the midriff of a man in a formal business suit, seated and playing a banjo.
- 57 Shot 51, 53, 55 continues: legs of a woman dancing on the sidewalk.
- 58 Shot 52, 54, 56 continues: showing the midriff of a man in a formal business suit, seated and playing a banjo.
- 59 Shot 51, 53, 55, 57 continues: legs of a woman dancing on the sidewalk.
- 60 A woman, seen from behind, enters a room; she walks away from the camera (of course, she seems to become smaller in the process); finally, she turns a corner and disappears.
- 61 This image begins blurry and becomes clear; it is a three-quarters view, from the waist up, of a woman sitting at a dresser (this character is played by Jacques Rigaut in drag). She holds up a handheld mirror as she brushes her hair, then she puts the mirror down.
- 62 A similar three-quarters view of the woman (Rigaut in drag), now wearing a different garment; she applies lipstick while staring directly above the dresser, then puts the lipstick down on the top of the dresser.
- 63 A similar three-quarters view of the woman (Rigaut in drag); she picks up a necklace from the top of the dresser and puts it around her neck, then she loops it around again; she then gets up and moves away from the camera, leaving the room at the left side of the frame.
- 64 Image of the base and lower part of two pillars, one on the left and one on the right side of the frame; the rest of the frame is filled with white sky.

- 65 Same scene: a shadow moves in from the left side—as it moves away from the camera, the back of a woman comes into sight; she walks up to the pillars, then turns slightly, away from viewers.
- 66 The camera pans to the left, across a landscape, to a cliff; tilts down to a beach below, then to the right across the beach, then up a hill—the camera then moves in a circle.
- 67 The camera tilts up, so the shoreline enters at the top of the screen and moves downward—as a result, water occupies more and more of the frame. When nearly the whole of the frame is filled with water, the camera begins to pan across it. The water seems turbulent.
- 68 The camera, mounted askew, pans to the body of water—the shoreline enters diagonally from the right. The camera continues to pan over the water as a wave rolls in.
- 69 Similar to shot 67, but the horizon line descends only as far as the middle of the frame, then moves back up.

The repetition makes evident that this passage is, among other things, an exercise in organizing movement.

- 70 This shot starts much the same way as shots 67 and 69 did. However, it develops differently: the camera tilts up over the water as a wave passes by, tilts up again, bringing the horizon into view while a third wave passes by.

This shot further emphasizes that this sequence is, among other things, an exercise in organizing movement.

- 71 The camera pans across sand to a man lying on the beach—he is dressed in black shorts or trunks and a light-toned shirt that is folded over to expose the stomach—only one arm (extended from the body) is within the camera's view, and a plaid cloth covers his neck and head; the man begins to raise his knees.
- 72 A close-up view, from the side, of legs (with knees raised) against a bright light: the figure slides his feet back and forth across sand.
- 73 The sun is reflected in rippling water; the camera pans and tilts upwards, rotating slightly counterclockwise, bringing waves and the horizon into view. The camera continues to rotate, moving the horizon out of view, and tilting the waves so that they seem to be vertical forms that move across the screen towards the left; the camera continues to rotate, moving the rippling forms up and out of the frame at the upper-left corner: the shoreline enters the frame diagonally at the lower-left corner, and then

leaves the frame as the image/camera assumes its normal orientation. Water and waves in the lower part of the frame move diagonally up the right side of the frame, and the horizon line and wave forms leave the screen at the right.

About this shot, Man Ray wrote, “the sea revolving so that it became sky and the sky sea.”²² The shots emphasize the sunlight on the water—they become revolving light forms—organized light dynamics.

74 A blurred image: two illuminated (light) forms appear against a dark grey area with black, bush-like forms at the sides; black fish shapes cross the grey area; the image distorts as the grey portion becomes brighter (an optically created rippling effect begins), and the grey area becomes wavy and expands and contracts. Several fish swim through the grey area, from the right to the left of the frame. The bright area expands to fill the frame while continuing to undulate. More fish cross the frame, in different directions. The distortions eliminate any sense of depth, so the fish shapes sometimes seem to merge with one another—furthermore, they sometimes seem dark and sometimes translucent.

75 There is a small bright area in the upper left (almost like a peek-hole)—through it we see an object against a black background; the area widens out into the whole frame; we see a tall Cubist sculpture, made up of various shapes, at the frame’s left edge and the sculpture’s shadow.

The sculpture’s form evokes a feeling of mystery. The work anticipates the photographs of mathematical objects that Man Ray would make in 1936—these are images of objects, housed at the Institut Poincaré, that a physicist had created in the 1880s to correctly render algebraic formulas. Ray presented some of his photographs of mathematical objects in a 1936 issue of *Cahiers d’art*, and his photographs were accompanied by an essay on mathematics and abstract art by Christian Zervos. He went on to create a series of paintings based on these photographs (and, more generally, on the mysterious mathematical objects he had seen at the Institut Poincaré).

Ray’s photographs and paintings of mathematical objects were quickly acknowledged as genuinely Surrealist. The Surrealist group exhibited several mathematical objects in their May 1936 show “Exposition Surréaliste d’Objets” at the Galerie Charles Ratton in Paris. The mathematical objects generated much discussion and commentary, including in *Cahiers d’art*. In his “Crise de l’objet” (Crisis of the Object, 1936), André Breton writes, “The laboratories of mathematical institutions throughout the world already display side by side objects constructed according to both Euclidean and non-Euclidean principles, equally mystifying in appearance to the layman,

but which nevertheless bear a fascinating and equivocal relationship to each other in space as we generally conceive it.”³ (Note Breton’s characterization of mathematical models as “mystifying to the layman”—it is their seeming mysteriousness that led Surrealists to embrace these models as Surrealistic.) Ray presented his photographs at the 1936 International Surrealist Exhibition at the New Burlington Galleries in London, which took place from 11 June through 4 July 1936, with attendance of fifteen hundred people per day. The front cover of the exhibition catalogue is a collage by Max Ernst featuring a statue with a reptilian head holding, and standing near, mathematical models. Ray’s photographs of mathematical objects were also presented at the 1936–37 exhibition at New York’s Museum of Modern Art, “Fantastic Art, Dada, and Surrealism,” a major exhibition.⁴

The mysterious quality of this shot relates to the abstract, mathematical form of the object photographed. For this object (and the cinematographic image derived from it) seems to have a form determined by rational principles, but those principles cannot be discerned. Consider the analogy to a structuring device Ray uses in this film. Ray offers many hints that the film has a discursive meaning: for example, an intertitle will appear soon (“*La raison de cette extravagance*”) that will promise to reveal the principle or principles that give this film its form. Of course, that promise is not kept; nor is the suggestion that this lucid, rational form will throw the film’s discursive meaning into high relief (as we long for it to do); by making this promise and failing to keep it, Ray highlights the film’s figural character.

- 76 The Cubist construction seen in the previous shot doubles (through an effect like that produced by double exposure) as it rotates—the sculpture merges with a secondary image of itself, then another similar image appears, merged with the first. (The third image, however, has a darker background than the others and there is no shadow to its left.) The first image disappears—while the objects in the second image continue rotating.
- 77 A sort of animated Cubist construction: a Cubist-styled painting takes up most of the frame; in the lower part of the frame, there is a shelf on which a sphere sits to the right side of a flat, rectangular shape; the sphere moves across the rectangular shape; a cube appears to the left of the rectangular shape, while the sphere moves so that it is on top of the rectangular shape; the sphere moves laterally, positioning itself beside the cube. A pyramid appears on top of the rectangle; an elongated octagon appears to the left of the cone. A cylinder appears to the right of the cone; a long hexahedron (a three-dimensional rectangle) appears beside the cylinder. A cone appears behind the triangle and the cylinder, its peak

jutting up from behind the objects. Another pyramid appears on top of the cube, a second octagon appears on top of the first, a cone appears on top of the cylinder, and another small cone with a triangular bar through its peak appears on top of the long cube. A cube appears, pierced by the peak of the first cone.

These are stricter examples of mathematical forms; however, they are simpler forms that lack the mystery of the more complex mathematical objects we have just seen. Likely, Man Ray used these forms to allude to another form of collage quite different from the Dada collages that he made, and to indicate how artists (like the Cubists) composed engaging objects by assembling simple forms (the cylinder, the sphere, and the cone).

78 An abstract form, suggesting a drawing: a number of curved lines cross a curved, dotted line. At the right side is a shadowy form, seen from the side. A figure moves across the frame, following a path described by the curved lines, and we realize that these lines resemble plots tracing movement on Marey's chronophotographs.

Marey's work had dual aspects: it was technical work (so it exemplifies reason), yet was received as revealing, and so celebrating, dynamic form. Man Ray likely delighted in that dichotomy, as his own mathematical works involved a similar duality (indeed, the backdrop is a type for Man Ray's late mathematical work, his *Homme d'affaires* [Businessman], of 1921).

79 Various shapes in a still-life composition—the composition is made up of the following: elongated hexahedrons pierced by circular bars, cones and pyramids pierced by smaller triangular bars, and dice—one die sits on top of one elongated hexahedron and the other atop the other elongated hexahedron. The dominant element is a large shape resembling the top part of a violin fingerboard with a spiral-like shape on its top, near the centre of the frame. The shapes rotate in one direction, then in the opposite direction; some of the shapes spin their way out of the frame, leaving the dice and the spiral shape (which continue twisting back and forth); the dice break in half, and the halves, nearer the frame edge, spin (in opposite directions) out of the frame; the two remaining halves join and spin towards the bottom and then out of the frame, while the spiral shape continues to twist.

Like shot 77, this image alludes to the principle that the Cubists took over from Cézanne, of treating nature by means of the cylinder, the sphere and the cone. The form that resembles the top part of the violin fingerboard was the basis for an object that Man Ray produced in 1926, also called *Emak Bakia*.

- 80 Words rotate (as on a billboard ticker) in the centre of the frame: “...CHAQUE SOIR A ‘MAGIC-CITY...’”
- 81 The frame is black with small spots of light; the image twists and turns, deforming the geometry of its contents. A lighter grey area appears; some of the spots become brighter and larger, then start to contract and expand. The image continues to twist and turn. A circular black torus-shaped object appears (we cannot identify what it is) with white spots (lights) around it and becomes more abstract as the image contracts.

Emak Bakia integrates representational and abstract images: the cinema is a capacious and protean medium, its forms and content determined as much by external and varying factors as by intrinsic and unvarying features.

- 82 A blurred image—spots (presumably highlights of a rotating object shot through some distorting medium) spin and move against a black background; the image becomes more complex as white forms fill the frame (it seems that the camera has been moved to present a different angle of the object); the rotating object seems to be made up of two tori, joined by rods that form a sort of hourglass shape.
- 83 The lower-left corner of the frame is illuminated; the rest is dark. The illuminated area moves out of the frame, then a blurry grey area moves across the frame in the same direction, revealing, as it moves, Kiki’s face, photographed so as to form a diagonal composition—Kiki’s eyes are closed and her chin points towards the lower-left corner of the frame. The image becomes brighter, Kiki opens her eyes, tilts her head up slightly, and moves her lips.

Once again, the beginning of a new sequence is announced with an image of eyes opening. This suggests that we should take the following sequence to be real. However, the character of the images that follow requires us to repudiate that conjecture.

- 84 A blurry, curved line (curved almost into a circle) starts out from the top left, curves around the centre, and leaves the frame in the lower left; another line starts at the centre right, passes through the first curve and ends near the centre of the frame; a third line, fainter than the other two, starts on the opposite side of the first curved line and intertwines with it. The first curved line rotates, expands, then returns to its original size.
- 85 A soft-focus image; jewel-like reflections turn in circles against a dark ground. The image brightens; light reflects from a spinning crystal-like form (a cube with flattened corners) set against a dark ground—the back-

ground is blurry, but it is evident that it is composed of rotating forms that refract light. The crystal turns into a glass cube—light reflects from it as it rotates. The image becomes extremely blurry, with out-of-focus spots of light moving erratically. This shot is a light image.

- 86 Kiki's face, photographed to form a composition of diagonals—Kiki opens her eyes, then blinks as she smiles.

Once again, an image of eyes opening marks the beginning of a new sequence, as light reflections give way to images of flowers; and once again, we conjecture that the film will take a turn towards realism. However, the images in the following section are no more realistic than are others in the film. Ray thus extends the theme of the confounding of dreaming and waking states, of image and reality.

- 87 An unusual flower, with many long, slightly curved, spike-like petals, stands at the centre of the frame, against a black background. The image becomes slightly brighter.
- 88 A close-up of a woman's face, with eyes closed. Her hands are laid on top of each other below her chin; she wears a ring with a rectangular black jewel on her ring finger. The woman opens her eyes and moves her lips (so they expand and contract horizontally).

Ray amplifies the theme of eyes opening and closing. The woman is Alice Prin—Kiki of Montparnasse, Man Ray's lover at the time.

- 89 The distorted image of the torus-shaped object reappears, with the object continuing to turn. The composition is more complex than before: the object fills more of the screen (as though the camera has moved closer to it); circular bands of lights striate the image; the form twists and turns, expands and contracts, and tones alternate (at first, white portions dominate, then black portions dominate); the image becomes even more blurred, and the remaining spots move out of the frame.
- 90 A long bright horizontal patch and several irregular large black forms are set against a dark grey background; these forms rotate, expand, and contract—the illuminated portion sometimes stretches across the entire frame.
- 91 Blurry reflections from a spinning object. The camera assumes different viewpoints on the "hourglass" form—light bounces here and there off the form, with longer shapes reflected from torus-shaped objects at the ends of the rods. The imagery is more abstract than in shot 82 (the camera appears to have moved closer to the object, so the shapes are larger and

therefore receive less illumination). The frame becomes predominantly black, with large dark spots moving about erratically.

- 92 A blurred, striated abstract form rotates—the dominant tones alternate: at first white forms dominate and, later, black forms. Reflections (including the circular bands) move erratically, an abstract choreography.
- 93 Most of the frame is black—a few elongated spots of light (reflections) move rapidly and erratically.
- 94 An intertitle—white letters on a black ground—reads, “La raison de cette extravagance.”

The real reason for making *Emak Bakia*, Man Ray wrote, was to invent light forms and movements—and they cannot be explained.

- 95 A low-angle shot of a car driving down a street; it moves from the upper-left corner, on a diagonal—a sidewalk and the shadow of a building appear in the upper-right corner. The car fills the frame as it moves closer; after a slight delay, the camera follows the car. The car stops near enough to the camera that it fills most of the frame, though in the upper part of the frame we see a stretch of road. There are two people in the car, one in the driver’s seat and the other in the back, in the rumble seat; the man in the rumble seat opens the car door and gets out of the car (stepping into the bottom part of the frame).

Since this shot follows the intertitle, we surmise that the action depicted (the man getting out of the car) will somehow lead to dispelling our confusion and let us know the reason for the extravagant character of the film.

- 96 Interior looking out through a window (or, perhaps, a door) with two crosses on it: we see part of the car at the side of road (one wheel, part of a door, and car window are visible), part of the wall of the building across the street (the wall has small windows and posters on it). The man, Jacques Rigaut, gets out of the car, turns towards the camera, and looks up.

Having Jacques Rigaut play the character of the man who brings reason to this extravagance is a bit of an in-joke: two of Rigaut’s principal interests were drugs and suicide.

- 97 The front of a building, viewed from street level. The building stretches across the frame, though at the right side we can see some sky; a figure (actually, part of a head) enters the frame at the bottom left and moves across the frame, exiting at the top of it.

This shot is taken with the camera turned ninety degrees, so that the base of the building runs up the left-hand side of the screen. The building’s façade

is geometric and ornamented, so the image is abstracted to a degree as its formal/geometric qualities are emphasized and, due to the disorientation the affine transformation creates, its representational features are sharply attenuated. Thus, the shot extends the investigation of the close relation of (the compatibility between) representation and abstraction in a new direction.

- 98 Shot 96 continues: Rigaut walks towards the camera—as he reaches out to open a door, the camera moves in closer, turning him, as he reaches out to open a door, into a silhouette form that blends with dark areas beyond the window.
- 99 The camera looks down at a box sitting on a counter and Rigaut standing near the counter, seen from behind (we see only the person's legs); Rigaut's hands open up the box, which is filled with long, curved white objects (shirt collars); his hands pick one up and separate it into layers, allowing one of them to drop; his hand then moves out of frame.

Rigaut's third principal interest was clothing: he was the dandy of DADA. But pulling the shirt collars apart suggests doing violence to the neck, and so suicide.

- 100 A close-up of one of the layers that had separated, as it falls and lands on the floor.
- 101 Shot 99 continues: Rigaut's hands pick up another of the long objects (shirt collars) and separate it into two layers; then they let both layers drop.
- 102 Similar to shot 100: one of the layers lands next to the first, another piece falls, joining the growing pile.
- 103 A number of these long, curved pieces, bunched together on the floor; one piece joins the heap, then the action reverses (the shot is run backwards), so that the pieces that had fallen into the pile rise back up, leaving the space empty. The shirt collars dance, another of the film's allusions to choreography. (Here a recording of Strauss's "Merry Widow Waltz" begins to play.)
- 104 Shot 101 continues: Rigaut's hands are no longer visible (only his legs can be seen). The camera tilts up, allowing us to see the man from the chest down: he is wearing a suit—he stands to the left of the bed, a picture next to him. In the background and farther to the right, there is a curtain. The man raises his hand towards his collar and rips it off his shirt, extends his arm (so it leaves the frame), and turns to the left—while this is happening (as he pulls at his collar), a second man in a black suit and hat enters through a door behind the curtain.

105 A tall, vertical white object, bent into a fold and pinched at the top, rotates—the object protrudes beyond the bottom of the frame.

This presents a choreography of inanimate objects.

106 Close-up of the spinning object, emphasizing its curved shape. Another choreography of inanimate objects.

107 A form composed of several white lines spreads from the upper-left corner down, curving at the bottom right; the form rotates.

108 An abstract construction consisting of long, irregular white forms twists across the black screen. One of these forms is more horizontal, the other more vertical; the two intersect at points (forming a shape that resembles a “T”); the form twists and turns its way out of the screen. When the elements of the “T” form reappear, the parts have separated. This joining, exiting the frame, and re-entering separately repeats several times. Then the shapes become gradually larger and more representational—they begin to look like reflections of upside down windows with shadow figures walking by.

Yet another choreographing of the inanimate. The point, of course, is that (organized) dynamic forms can affect us directly, viscerally, non-rationally.

109 White lines, broken at points (black gaps appear), wend throughout the frame.

110 Many spinning lines.

An abstract choreography.

111 The reflections of three curved lines, with a peaked form protruding from each, move about within a large black shape, around which irregular white lines rotate—the large black shape fills the middle part of the frame (the black shape blends in with the black background and its contours become visible as the white lines move around it).

112 An irregular white form wends its way across a black background; there are moments when it appears to be a reflection of a window and the shadow form of a hand.

113 An out-of-focus image of Kiki’s face, head perhaps resting on some object we don’t see (or perhaps just tilted to the right). Kiki is wearing earrings and a necklace; her shoulders and head move forward towards the camera and in the process come into focus. We realize her eyes are closed and that her eyelids have pupils painted on them; as she lifts her eyelids, she

lowers her head in the frame (so that her chin protrudes past the bottom of the frame); she opens her eyes and smiles; she then reverses her actions, closing her eyes and tilting her head back to its original position.

Ray plays on the theme of eyes opening and closing. The images he uses resemble those appearing in *Ballet mécanique*. The eyes painted on the eyelids imply that she sees whether awake or asleep—thus, they suggest the fusion of dream and reality. There are many doublings in the film (including both a male and a female Jacques Rigaut).

114 Close-up of Kiki's face against a black background—the face has eyes painted on it and is presented upside down. The image distorts (twists and turns) as she opens her eyes and closes them; the screen fades to black.

115 A black screen, white letter “F” is uncovered in the centre, then the letter “I.” (On the print I analyzed, “N” does not appear.)

NOTES

- 1 Man Ray, *Self-Portrait* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 270.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 André Breton, *Surrealism and Painting*, trans. S. Taylor (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 279.
- 4 Ernst took up this enthusiasm for mathematical objects, producing several other collages and paintings of fantastic mathematical models, including *The Feast of the Gods* (1948), *Chemical Nuptials* (1948), and *Young Man Intrigued by the Flight of a Non-Euclidean Fly* (1942–47).

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UN CHIEN ANDALOU: A SHOT ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

Credits: white Art Deco letters against black:

UN CHIEN ANDALOU
Mise en scène de Louis BUNUEL
d'après un scénario de
Salvador Dalí
et *Louis [sic] Buñuel*
avec *Simone MAREUIL* et *Pierre BATCHEFF*
“Prise de vues: Duverger.”

Un chien andalou opened in Paris in June 1929. At the première, Buñuel stood beside a record player and alternated tango music with passages from Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde*: the “Vorspiel” and “Liebestod.” Wagner's opera had created a sensation in Paris when he presented sections of it in 1860. Its structure of exquisitely delayed resolutions seems to speak of longing.

Both Buñuel and Dalí were deeply interested in Wagner's work. Extracts from the composer's music (including Isolde's “Liebestod”) appear on the soundtrack to Buñuel and Dalí's *L'âge d'or*, and Buñuel again used a recording

of “Liebestod” to accompany the obsessive final scene of *Abismos de Pasión: Cumbres Borrascosas* (literally, Depths of Passion: Wuthering Heights, though the film is generally called Wuthering Heights in English, 1954).

Dalí was involved in the production of a ballet, *Tristan le fou* (Mad Tristan), for Marquis George de Cuevas’s newly formed Ballet International. The ballet premiered at the Metropolitan Opera’s theatre on 15 December 1944—the choreography was by Léonide Massine (1896–1979), while Dalí wrote the scenario for the ballet and did a number of very large paintings, on unstretched canvas, to serve as backdrops for the action. Preparatory sketches and paintings still exist, as well as at least one of the giant canvases, which was presented in Montreal, Canada, as the background for a circus act, in November 2012, the first time it had been shown in public since 1944. That canvas was also called *Tristan le fou*; also in 1944, he turned a painted sketch for the canvas *Tristan le fou* into a sculpture. In 1970, Dalí illustrated André Mary’s (1879–1962) book *Le merveilleuse histoire de Tristan et Iseult* (The Marvellous History of Tristan and Isolde, originally published in 1941) with twenty-one colour etchings.

Dalí’s obsessions are famous, and it seems he was obsessed with Isolde as a menacing insect. The *Tristan le fou* curtain offers an Isolde who somewhat resembles a praying mantis, and plates for André Mary’s *Tristan et Iseult* (including “Iseult et Branguine” and “Tristan le fou”) depict her in a similar manner. In 1972, Dalí produced a lithograph, *Tristan and Isolde Cup of Love*, with a chalice (in the opera, Isolde orders her servant to produce a potion to kill both Tristan and herself, but the servant serves them a love potion) with part of the bowl cut away to expose struggling/copulating insect-like figures. That association brings to mind Caillois’s writing on the force in the animal world that seeks to copulate even at the cost of death (this can be poetically interpreted as a merging in death)—insects appear many times in *Un chien andalou*, and their appearance is usually associated with menace, aggression, or humiliation.

There are many specific connections between *Un chien andalou* and *Tristan und Isolde* (especially its second act) that seem to have gone unrecognized. The story of *Tristan und Isolde* is based on two interlocking Oedipal triangles: Tristan, Morold, and Isolde, and Tristan, King Marke of Cornwall, and Isolde. In both triangles, Tristan is at the vertex that represents the excluded or illicit member of the triangular relation, and the drama of the opera depends largely on Tristan’s and Isolde’s quest to defy convention and to give themselves completely to love (however scorned that love may be). Oedipal imagery appears in *Un chien andalou* and its story (such as it is) also concerns an Oedipal triangle—the would-be lover is presented as a boy who seeks to have sex with a woman (a wife) whose eye (at least in fantasy) was

mutilated. Further, Isolde's simultaneous attraction to and fury with Tristan has resonances in the relation between Mareuil and Batcheff. What is more, the very premise of the film is that if one is for love, one wants to see Mareuil and Batcheff consummate their love, despite the violence with which Batcheff erupts into Mareuil's life. But the love that Wagner advocates (and the audience generally accepts) would have Isolde transcend through love Tristan's outrages against her (first in killing her husband, Morold, then, in an act of savagery that also has resonances in *Un chien andalou*, dispatching his severed head to her, and finally in rejecting her and offering her to the King).

Isolde is a sorceress. Following that clue and taking Mareuil as a sorceress as well produces an interesting reading of the film: she would then be understood as causing the cyclist's accident (shot 27), presumably so she could fulfill her carnal longings. Her resurrecting Batcheff (shots 49–51, esp. 51) would be understood as a magical act (the "Liebestod" section appears in both a purely orchestral version and as a solo, and in the latter form it is Isolde's final aria, in which she tells of her vision of a resurrected Tristan). She would also be taken as responsible for her husband's and her entering the kingdom of death at the end of the film—she magically transported them there, so their love might be eternal—the 1944 painting *Mad Tristan* (and even more so a 1944 preparatory sketch) has two principal characters, whose poses and location in the frame resemble remarkably closely those of the man and woman at the end of *Un chien andalou*.

Tristan und Isolde is one of the great love stories of Western culture. It is arguably a revolutionary work, because the love it celebrates is an all-consuming passion that shatters the conventions of court life and the bonds of friendship and loyalty—a love that completely dissolves the lovers' narrow selves and their self-interest ("Tristan is Isolde and Isolde is Tristan. Even in death they will have a love without fear, nameless, endless, without any more suffering and separation," the libretto says at one of the grand moments when Wagner expresses with such complete authority his wondrous, haunted Schopenhauerian metaphysics of love). The Surrealists would have been enchanted by this *amour fou* that eschews conventional morality in order to fulfill itself completely.

There is an even deeper similarity with *Un chien andalou*: the opera depicts love as something that flourishes most fully in the realm of death (that is part of the meaning of *Un chien andalou*'s love-and-death theme). Tristan and Isolde consummate their passion under the canopy of night (one might think of the contents of *Minotaur 7*), and they come to understand that love belongs to the domain of darkness: Isolde tells Tristan that it was daylight that caused him to behave conventionally and to give her to the King, but a potion they both took—both believing it would cause their deaths (a servant switched

portions, giving them one that would induce love, not death)—released them from this delusion. They are now in the realm of darkness, night, and at least semi-death. The lovers conclude that death will be the total, ego-dissolving experience they crave, and that their eternal love for one another will not be extinguished, for love seeks to dissolve the self—indeed, death will allow their love its most complete, abiding, enduring expression. Isolde sings, “I wished to flee into Night, to take you with me, where my heart would bid me end all deception, where the vain premonition of treachery might be dispelled, there to pledge to you eternal love, to consecrate you to Death in company with myself,” and “In the billowing torrent, in the resonating sound, in the wafting Universe of the World-Breath drown—be engulfed, unconscious—supreme delight!” They resolve to die together.

Wagner pondered the connections between love, death, and delusion. Half a century later, Freud would elucidate those connections, using ideas about the Oedipal phase. A post-Freudian *Tristan und Isolde*, accordingly, would be a celebration of love and an acknowledgement of love’s intimacy with death, but it would understand that relation in psychoanalytic terms. *Un chien andalou* comes close to being such a work: tracing the connections between *Tristan und Isolde* and *Un chien andalou* allows one to see that the film is also a work that proposes that love (understood psychoanalytically) involves paraphilias and aggression, even the desire to murder. It would show that love thrives in a dark realm—yet the experience of such dark love dispels illusions about desire’s nature. The scandalous reputation that Wagner’s *Tristan und Isolde* acquired after its first performances was probably one that the Surrealists might have coveted, for they would have understood that a similar fate would befall any work that told the truth about love.

The evening the film was first shown, Buñuel carried stones in his pockets, as preparation to defend himself in the event that the audience rebelled. However, the film was popular enough with audiences that it immediately had an eight-month run, though the distributor’s corrupt accounting practices meant that neither Buñuel nor Dalí recouped their initial investment. Buñuel was no doubt saddened by the financial reverses, but he was also disheartened by the positive reception. He tried to adopt the long view on the latter disappointment: “What can I do about the people who adore all that is new, even when it goes against their deepest convictions, or about the insincere, corrupt press, and the inane herd that saw beauty or poetry in something which was basically no more than a desperate impassioned call for murder?”¹

I have chosen, in my commentary on the film, sometimes to refer to “the cyclist” as Pierre Batcheff, and sometimes simply as the cyclist; and likewise, I refer to “the woman” sometimes as Simone Mareuil and sometimes simply as the woman. I do so partly to avoid repeating the terms “the cyclist” and

“the woman” an annoying number of times. But I do so also because I believe the Surrealists were interested in the way that characters in a narrative film are experienced as amalgams of fiction and reality: when we watch *Runaway Bride*, we respond to Julia Roberts as a character in fiction, whose defining attribute is a propensity to escape at the last minute the duties of marriage; we also respond to the flesh-and-blood Julia Roberts. Likewise, we see Pierre Batcheff both as a figure in the narrative, the somewhat androgynous cyclist, and as a flesh-and-blood human being playing the role of the cyclist (and French audiences of the time would have been even more inclined to see the matinee idol as the real person playing a role). Batcheff’s acting highlights that effect: he is at once in his role as the amorous cyclist and distanced from it. The relation between the two figures implied in his acting style (one engaged, one distant) is homologous with the relation between the paranoid-critical artist’s two selves (or roles)—the mad artist and the critical artist. The Surrealists were interested in the impact of cinema’s reality effect on the phenomenology of film viewing, for they realized that when we watch a narrative film, we are observing real humans involved in playing out deep passions and engaging in extravagant actions—thinking of “the cyclist” fondling “the woman’s” buttocks is not the same as thinking of Pierre Batcheff fondling Simone Mareuil’s buttocks: to think of real humans acting so extravagantly is to realize that the strange, the marvellous, and the bizarre can, and does, inhabit the everyday world. Moreover, the exchange between the engaged and the distanced Pierre Batcheff allows *Un chien andalou* to import content elicited by intertextual references to other films Batcheff played in. Collectively these intertextual referents highlight the (supposedly) real man who brought with him his androgynous self / acting style to all his films—in all his films, he is a weird Young Prince and an instantiation of the androgynous male ideal of the postwar years in France.

Finally, as I noted above, *Un chien andalou* is also a romance film—a very strange romance film, but a romance film nonetheless. It is the story of a love triangle: the characters played by Buñuel and Robert Homnard (the man at the film’s end) are the husband, the character played by Simone Mareuil is the wife, and Pierre Batcheff plays the role of the lover who erupts into the woman’s life and wreaks havoc. Accordingly, I sometimes refer to Batcheff as the lover, Mareuil as the wife, and Buñuel and Homnard as the husband.

As I remarked in the section in Chapter 3 with the heading “The Verbal Image,” there are many instances in *Un chien andalou* of shot articulations seeming to present a coherent diegesis, though closer inspection reveals they produce inconsistencies in the diegetic construction. These inconsistencies are one of the foci of my analysis: I have indicated most of these shot articulations in comments that I have placed between parentheses.

- 1 White letters against black: “Il était une fois . . .”
- 2 A man’s hand, in close-up. He wears a wristwatch on his left wrist; with his left hand, he grasps a strop attached to a doorknob; the other hand holds a straight razor, which he sharpens by rubbing it on the strop.

The shot is a good example of the cinema’s reliance on metonymy: viewers infer that the man faces the doorway. But the shot also offers an implicit critique of this comfortable inferential process, for most viewers fail to notice how implausible having a strop attached to a door handle is—to say nothing of it being attached to the handle of an open door that would not serve to anchor it.

(There are no curtains on the window in this shot. In subsequent shots, curtains will appear).

(The man wears a plain white shirt. This will change.)

- 3 The head and shoulders of a man (ruggedly handsome—almost in the manner of a street tough—it is actually Luis Buñuel himself) occupies the left half of the frame; a cigarette hangs from his lips, smoke rising from the cigarette and from his mouth. He looks down.

The man wears a collarless striped shirt that cuts down in a “V” around the neck; slight movements of his body indicate he is still sharpening the straight-razor.

Considered on the narrative plane, this is our introduction to the character of the husband. The home seems conventional, bourgeois.

(There is an open window in the background and the curtains over it billow. This shot looks as though is as an indoor scene. It would be a peculiar room if the French doors and a window had the spatial relation that the juxtaposition of shots 2 and 3 actually figures.)

(The man is now wearing a textured white shirt.)

Similar discontinuities to those just cited appear in the film (and some of them are noted in the following commentary, in parentheses as above). These have several significances: in the first place, the film evolves out of anxieties around castration, that is to say, out of a fantasy of dismemberment (the word *couper* is the source of many of the film’s puns). The theme of cutting, or dismemberment, relates to the film’s motif of androgyny.

Furthermore, these discontinuities turn a seemingly realistic space into a space with an imaginary content and form. Thus, they suggest that continuity between the realms of the real and the imaginary that was the basis of Surrealism (and especially of Dalí’s conception of the documentary). It reveals that the mind (i.e., desire) has a role in structuring reality, and that reality and desire cannot be disintricated.²

Furthermore, they embody Dalí's ideas of the paranoiac-critical method. Paranoia's ultimate importance, for Dalí, is that it can "discredit completely the world of reality," by which he meant that paranoia can discredit all beliefs that the objects we know have an existence independent of us.³ "Paranoia," he declared, "uses the external world in order to assert its dominating idea and has the disturbing characteristic of making others accept this idea's reality. The reality of the external world is used for illustration and proof, and so comes to serve the reality of our mind."⁴ What the peculiar conjunctions (whose peculiarity so easily can go unnoticed) do is encourage the audience to accept a fantastic construction/idea as reality.

- 4 Shot 2 continues—a close-up of the man, the husband, who stands in front of French doors (facing them), sharpening a straight razor. The man raises his left hand slightly, and with this gesture neatly detaches the strop from the door handle and at the same time folds it so that it disappears beneath his hand. He then grasps the straight razor's handle with his right hand and pivots it (turning it to a vertical position while the blade remains horizontal). He holds up his left thumb and slides the blade across it with his right hand, slicing into its tip. (This seems to be a bizarre means of checking that the razor is sharp.)

Viewers are likely to overlook the implausibility of the elegant gesture by which the man, with one neat move, removes the strop from the doorknob and tucks it under his hand: it is difficult to imagine how the strop might have been attached to the doorknob securely enough to hold up against the force of the razor being pressed against it but detached from the doorknob so easily. The implausibility of the gesture suggests a critique of the inferential process that subtends the viewing experience: viewers continually arrive at unwarranted conclusions about what they see—and as a result, they are often deceived.

(As in shot 2, there are no curtains over the French doors.)

(He is wearing a plain white shirt.)

- 5 Shot 5—similar to shot 3: the head and shoulders of the husband, still smoking. He reacts (it seems) to his thumb being sliced, by pulling a face (his upper lip rises slightly).

(There is no evidence in shots 4 and 5 that the thumb that was cut belongs to the man we see smoking. In fact, the tonalities of the shots are quite different, and the spatial relation between the French doors shown in shots 2 and 4 and the window shown in shots 3 and 5 is quite unlikely. But the movement dynamics across these shots and the fact that the man we see in shots 3 and 5 has a razor in his hand prompt us to make that connection, even though textual

evidence brings that inference into doubt. Thus, the filmmakers are suggesting again how easily viewers are deceived by encouraging them to engage in unwarranted inferential processes grounded in naturalistic assumptions.)

- 6 The man stands on the left side of the frame beside the French doors (we see his body from just above his knees to near the top of his head); a glow from behind the door illuminates the man; he exhales, examines the blade, then opens the French doors and walks out.

(These French doors have curtains over them. We are inclined to think that shots 5 and 6 have a metonymic relation—that shot 6 is a wider view of the space that shot 5 presents in closer view. Moreover, because shot 6 also has French doors in it, as do shots 2 and 4, and because we take shot 6 to be a wider view of the same scene as we see in shots 3 and 5, we are likely to mistake the windows in shots 3 and 5 as a door. However, the textual evidence controverts this position: the French doors in shot 6 look quite different from the window of shots 3 and 5, and different again from the French doors in shots 2 and 4: the French doors in shot 6 have curtains over them, while the French doors in shots 2 and 4 do not).

- 7 The man—the husband in the narrative—goes through an open door and onto the balcony. There are French doors behind him; a plant on the right and a ledge across the lower part of the frame cover the bottom half of his body. He stands on the balcony, staring, taps the handle of the knife against his hand, then stretches out his arms and leans against the ledge.

(The man is wearing a plain white shirt.)

- 8 A close-up of the husband's head. A bright light illuminates the side of his face and his shoulder; he tilts his head to look up, opens his mouth slightly, and inhales (with the cigarette still dangling from his lips).

(The man is wearing a striped shirt.)

(There are no curtains on the window.)

- 9 A glowing white full moon on the left side against a dark sky; a faint mist moves across the sky, from the right and towards the moon.
- 10 Shot 8 continues (head and shoulders of the husband). He stares up as though in thought, puffing on his cigarette.
- 11 A woman's face fills the frame. On the left side is a man's torso (he is wearing a tie); a man's left hand appears (on the right side of the screen)—he puts his thumb and index finger above and below the woman's right eye and pulls it wide open; his right hand, holding a straight razor, enters (from the left) the bottom half of the screen. With his right hand, the man

(it seems) slices the woman's eye. (The man's right hand and arm conceal some of this action.)

Again, the film's metonymic system and the illusion of a continuous dynamic (the man in this scene has a razor in his hands, as did the man/men in shots 1 to 10) prompt us to take this as a close-up of the scene depicted in shot 10. However, textual evidence suggests this is not true.

In the narrative system the film presents, this is our introduction to the character of the wife.

(The husband with the razor is now wearing a striped tie. The man/men we have seen to this point was/were wearing open-collared shirts—one of them textured, the other plain.)

- 12 Shot 9 continues (full moon), a thin cloud moves across the moon, bisecting it.
- 13 Large close-up of a blade slicing into an eye: the blade moves across the frame and leaves the frame at the left; a transparent ooze is excreted from the cut.

In the film's narrative system, this image suggests the husband's deflowering his wife. Thus, the film actually starts with an image that suggests love's violence—love might be violent, but it is intense (unlike the life that follows, which the next scene suggests).

The image of the eye being slit had deep meaning for the filmmakers. The stories of its conception are contradictory. Buñuel recounts in his autobiography that it occurred to him in a dream: "When I arrived to spend a few days at Dalí's house in Figueras, I told him about a dream I'd had in which a long tapering cloud sliced the moon in half, like a razor blade slice through an eye."⁵ Georges Bataille reports that Buñuel gave him a different account of its origin: "Buñuel himself told me that this episode was the invention of Dalí, to whom it was suggested directly by a real vision of a long and narrow cloud slicing the moon's surface."⁶ Dalí had used the image of a blade slicing an eye earlier: in a story of 1927, "Mon ami et la plage," he wrote, "My friend loves... the tenderness of gentle cuts of a scalpel on the curve of her pupils."⁷ That remark suggests that drawing the razor over the eye has erotic implications, and those implications explain the connection of the razor with the soft wisps of the clouds caressing the moon—the interplay here between hard and soft (with its interrelated implications regarding sexuality and the *informe*) is not uncommon in Dalí's work.

There is also a prehistory to the image. J. Francisco Aranda traces the image back to a poem by Juan Larrea.⁸ Buñuel probably knew of a similar

motif in a utopian novel by Ramón Gómez de la Serna, *Cinelandia* ([1923] Buñuel was familiar with Gómez's work—he hoped to film *Caprichos*, a script by Gómez that the writer had based on six of his novellas and even thought of having him collaborate on *Un chien andalou's* script)—*Cinelandia*, yet another work that testifies to the cinema's influence on literature, contains passages that relate movie imagery, wounds (excising a birthmark is compared to ripping out an eye), and the moon.

The scene has a further implication: it affects us physically, as directly and corporeally as reports delivered through the sense of touch. In 1930–31, Salvador Dalí produced a splendid drawing, *Le cinéma tactile* (Tactile Cinema), which offers a fantasy about a synaesthetic cinema—the film being projected would elicit tactile as well as visual and auditory experiences (Dalí is known to have been interested at the time in the possibility of a transmodal cinema). The work shows a man in what is supposed to be a movie theatre, though it more closely resembles the two rows nearest to the movie screen in older-style jumbo jets that still had projection screens. On the screen is the torso of a woman with partly uncovered hairy breasts, while in the seat backs, just where the trays on aeroplane seats are, is a board with cloth covered with hair, so the men in the seats can have the sensation of caressing the woman's breasts. The projected image also shows a man's hand, about to plunge a dagger into the woman's breasts.

Finally, Buñuel was fascinated by Sergei Eisenstein's *Bronenosets Potemkin* (Battleship Potemkin, 1925), in which a woman's eye is savaged by a sabre; Buñuel and Dalí here go a step further than the Soviet master in shock (the topic that Benjamin associated with Surrealism). Eisenstein acknowledged their daring: on seeing the film in Switzerland in August 1929, he declared that it revealed “the extent of the disintegration of bourgeois consciousness.”

I commented in the main body of the text on the conjunction of the formally similar shots, the cloud and moon and the razor and eye, as an attack on abstract art and the Absolute Film. It is interesting in this regard that Carl Einstein, a lyrical poet, experimental prose writer, and left-wing art theorist formerly associated with the Dada group in Berlin (although he maintained an ongoing commitment to Cubism) published in the counter-Surrealist journal *Documents 6* a review of an exhibition of abstracts, “L'exposition de l'art abstrait à Zurich” (An Exhibition of Abstract Art in Zurich), in which he chided abstract art's quest for the “empty cocktails of the absolute” and even went so far as to reference the moral absolutism of “the theory police” (*les flics théoriques*), who “balance the account of forms,” thereby producing standardized and hygienic works and eliminating all subversive surprise. These tableaux, he alleges, offer an ersatz of architecture—they are doctrinaire collective works that, considering what is necessary, are absolutely

superficial. In Appendix 6, we will follow up on the resonance of these ideas in Buñuel's next film.

14 White letters against black: "Huit ans après."

Within the film's narrative system, the image of the eye being slit suggested the husband's deflowering his wife. It is now eight years later—we might conjecture that the marriage has grown routine and that the wife is eager that passion be reintroduced into her life.

(The film started with "Il était une fois," and now we have "Huit ans après." When is eight years after "Once upon a time"? This is a juxtaposition of real and imaginary time.)

- 15 A city scene: up an empty street, a person (a man, it seems) on a bicycle moves in from the lower right—we see the cyclist from behind, riding away from the camera; there are large buildings on either side of the street; white panels of fabric skirt out at the shoulders and the waist of the rider. The outfit he wears over his suit resembles a fantasy French maid's outfit.

In the film's narrative system, this shot represents the introduction of the character of the lover.

- 16 Forty-five-degree-angle view down a street; Batcheff, the cyclist (still wearing the French maid's outfit over his suit), rides up the street into the frame, from right to left; in the background is a large building.
- 17 Close-up of Batcheff, the lover in the film's narrative system, from the front: he wears a suit and tie with ruffled white fabric panels along the shoulders and around the waist, and a white hat with flaps at the sides, which flap as he rides; a black-and-white striped box hangs at his chest.
- 18 The camera travels down a street, devoid of traffic, with large buildings along its sides—ahead, we see another street that intersects this one; the camera moves forward (it is as though we see through the cyclist's eyes).

(The cyclist travels right to left across the street. This is contrary to what we expect, since the previous scene appears to be from the point of view of the cyclist.)

- 19 Shot 17 continues (close-up frontal view of the cyclist); he seems anxious. (There are inconsistencies in the background of the various shots of the cyclist.)
- 20 Shot 18 continues (empty street, camera moves forward); in the distance, towards the end of the street, there are people on the sidewalk.

- 21 View of the cyclist, Pierre Batcheff, from behind: his body is momentarily superimposed over the street; a series of superimpositions of street scenes and the cyclist, seen from behind, in close-up and in full-length shots. Another cyclist crosses a street from right to left.

The scenes of Batcheff riding through the streets of Paris, approaching Mareuil's home, are somewhat prolonged. This becomes understandable once one considers the film's narrative: there is suspense around the lover being inducted into the life of a woman eager for passion.

The scenes of the cyclist in a skirt likely allude to a text that García Lorca had written called *El paseo de Buster Keaton* (Buster Keaton's Stroll, written in 1925, shortly after the tormented *Poeta en Nueva York* [Poet in New York], and published in Lorca's magazine *Gallo* in April 1928).⁹ *El paseo* is an excellent example of a Surrealist work inspired by the cinema—though it has been referred to as a film script and as a play, it is neither. Rather, it is a literary work whose construction relies heavily on the character of the cinema (but is unconstrained by the practical considerations that bind the cinema and can play more freely than the cinema can with sorts of metamorphoses that film itself had introduced). It is an unfilmable, unstageable literary work whose principal characteristics are thoroughly paragonal. However, it languished, largely forgotten (it is not included in the *Obras completas* [complete works] published by Losada in Buenos Aires), until it appeared in the small collection of *Tres Farsas* (Coleccion Teatro de Bolsillo, Mexico City, 1959); it is included in *Obras Completas II*: 277–80. That work presented a very feminine Buster Keaton, who falls off his bicycle:

Adam and Eve would run in terror if they saw a glass of water, but on the other hand they would stroke Keaton's bicycle.

KEATON: Ah love, love!

Buster Keaton falls off. The bicycle runs away from him. It goes like a madman, half a millimeter off the ground.

KEATON: (picking himself up): I've nothing to say. What was I saying?

A VOICE: You're crazy.

KEATON: O.K.

He walks on. His sad infinite eyes, like those of a new-born beast of burden, are dreaming of lilies, angels, and silk sashes. His eyes are like the bottom of a glass, like a mad child's. Very ugly. Very beautiful. An ostrich's eyes. Human eyes in the exact balance of melancholy. In the distance, Philadelphia can be seen. The inhabitants of this city know the old poem of the Singer sewing machine and how it circulates among the hothouse roses, yet they never understand the subtle poetic difference

between a cup of hot tea and a cup of cold tea. Philadelphia shines in the distance.

KEATON: This is a garden.

An American woman with celluloid eyes comes through the grass.

KEATON: Good evening.

Buster Keaton smiles, and looks at the woman's shoes in close-up. What shoes! We ought never to have introduced those shoes! It took the hides of three crocodiles to make them.

KEATON: I wish—

WOMAN: Do you have a sword decorated with myrtle leaves?

Buster Keaton lets his shoulders droop and raises his right foot.

WOMAN: Do you have a ring with a poisoned stone?

Buster Keaton slowly closes his eyes and raises his left foot.¹⁰

While at the Residencia, Dalí, Buñuel, and Lorca saw Buster Keaton's films and were impressed by them—Dalí especially (Lorca's opinion was more conflicted). In the article "San Sebastián," published in *L'Amie de les arts* in July 1927, Dalí extols Keaton's impressive acting style, lauding it for being cleansing and sanitizing (in contrast to Chaplin's *putrefacto* acting). Both Dalí and Batcheff resemble Keaton, which makes for an interesting threesome—in fact, this liaison can be extended to a foursome, by including Lorca. In 1925, Dalí produced a collage, *El Casamiento de Buster Keaton* (The Marriage of Buster Keaton), which he posted to Lorca early in 1926. It is worth pointing out that when Lorca saw *Un chien andalou*, he thought it was a spoof on him, and was irate. (Lorca was a homosexual and the effeminate, skirt-wearing cyclist may make an unfortunately nasty reference to him.)¹¹

- 22 Close-up view of Batcheff, the cyclist, riding towards the camera; it begins with full body and the cyclist comes closer; the frame cuts off the head and part of his legs.
- 23 Close-up of the striped box fills the frame; we see a detail of a keyhole in the lid of the box.
- 24 A full view of a room with a woman (Simone Mareuil, the wife in the film's narrative) reading; she sits in a chair next to a table with a chair on the other side; at the far side of the room, there is a bed with a chair to the right and a large window with curtains held open to the sides. There are two chairs, one on either side of the window, and a door on the window's right side. Mareuil has her back to the bed and is sitting in front of the door.

(This is the same woman we saw earlier having her eyes slit; it is now eight years later and, miraculously, her eyes are intact.)

25 A close-up frontal view of the woman (Mareuil) reading. She appears to be the same woman as the one whom we saw earlier, in the patterned dress and necklace, whose eye was sliced. She is looking down at her book and suddenly lifts her head up—she is wide-eyed, as though alarmed by hearing a strange noise; she occupies the left part of the frame, with the door behind her; there are shelves on the right in the background.

Mareuil seems to be having difficulty concentrating: within the film's narrative, that difficulty suggests the wife has become bored and is eager that passion be reintroduced into her life.

(An example of the spatial anomalies that we have traced occurs here, too: there is a door behind her and a dressing table with mirrors to the left of the door. This is contrary to what we expect from shot 24.)

26 Side view of the cyclist on the street, moving from the left in front of a large building.

27 Shot 25 continues. Close frontal view of Mareuil, staring in amazement: without looking down, she slams the book closed and throws it to the side. The woman, the wife in the film's narrative, is startled, runs to the window to look out, and sees the cyclist riding towards her home and then falling off the bicycle. She becomes startled before the cyclist falls—it is not a result of her hearing some clamour outside her home. Thus, shots 25 to 27 reverse the usual relations of cause and effect (and this could be considered a dismemberment of time and causality, analogous to the dismemberment of space that we have been tracing. This reversal of the cause-and-effect relation suggests that the woman may have psychic powers (telepathy, clairvoyance, etc.) or may be a sorceress.

28 Close-up of the book that Mareuil had tossed aside, open to a page with a reproduction of Vermeer's *Le kantwerkster* (The Lacemaker, 1669–71).

The Surrealists took a great interest in Vermeer's painting. The script of the film describes shots 25 to 27 in this way: A girl "is reading a book attentively. Suddenly she shudders, listens curiously, and throws her book on a nearby sofa. The book stays open. On one of the pages is seen a reproduction of Vermeer's *Le kantwerkster*. The young girl is convinced that something is going on: she gets up, turns halfway from the camera, and walks rapidly to the window."¹²

An exhibition of Johannes Vermeer's work in 1921, at the Musée Jeu de Paume, ignited interest in the Dutch painter that proved remarkably long-lasting. Art journals and popular magazines carried numerous articles on the artist. Fernand Léger reports that Vermeer's painting motivated him

to incorporate quotidian themes and everyday objects in his work. Marcel Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu* (1913–27) includes several pages on Vermeer. In fact, on going to visit the exhibition, Proust had a crisis episode like that which befell Freud in Rome: "On the stairs of his home, seized by a terrifying giddiness, [Proust] swayed and paused, then pressed on. At the Jeu de Paume, Vaudoyer had to take his arm and steer his tottering steps to *View of Delft*."¹³ Later, in *La prisonnière* (The Captive, 1923), Proust incorporated his experience into his description of the death of Bergotte. Just before expiring, Bergotte (a very successful novelist with whom Proust evidently identified) leaves his sickbed to visit an exhibition of Dutch painting. He deliberates on *View of Delft*, fixing on a bit of yellow wall lit by the sun: "He fixed his gaze, like a child intent on a yellow butterfly he wishes to capture, on the precious pieces of wall." Bergotte became dizzy and "fell onto a round sofa . . . Another stroke seized him, he rolled off the sofa onto the floor, at which point all the visitors and attendants came running. He was dead."¹⁴ *Gezicht op Delft* (View of Delft, ca. 1660–61) was his dying experience. (Proust too attended an exhibition of Vermeer's paintings, at the Trocadéro, just before his death—he came home and revised his description of Bergotte's death.)

The Surrealists generally shared in the widespread enthusiasm for Vermeer, and among the Surrealists, Dalí was especially intrigued by both the painter and the Vermeer phenomenon. Dalí was especially fascinated by Vermeer's *De kantwerkster*, an interest chronicled in Robert Descharnes's film *L'histoire prodigieuse de la dentellière et du rhinocéros* (The Marvellous Adventures of the Lacemaker and the Rhinoceros, 1954). Dalí once again surrealistically connected Vermeer's *De kantwerkster* and a rhinoceros in a sculpture he did soon after the film had been shot—*Rinoceronte vestido con puntillas* is, extraordinarily, almost a reprise of a 1515 etching by Albrecht Dürer, *Rhinoceros*, which in proto-Surrealist fashion crosses the real and the imaginary. A reproduction of *De kantwerkster* hung in Dalí's parents' home. During the 1930s, Dalí painted a number of works in which allusions to Vermeer and to his paintings are central—these include *Paysage avec éléments énigmatiques* (Enigmatic Elements, 1934), *Le spectre de Vermeer de Delft* (The Phantom of Vermeer of Delft, 1934), and *Le spectre de Vermeer de Delft pouvant être utilisé comme table* (The Phantom of Vermeer of Delft That Can Be Used as a Table, 1934—a work modelled on Vermeer's *De Schilder-konst* [The Allegory of Painting or The Artist in His Studio]). Dalí reworked Vermeer's *Brieflezende vrouw in het blauw* (Woman in Blue Reading a Letter, ca. 1663–64) for his *L'image disparaît* (The Image Disappears, 1938)—in that work, the woman's head is a triple image, depicting as well a man's eye and an oyster shell.

"Light-ideas," one of Dalí's polemical defences of his notion of paranoia-critique, contains an especially important reference to Vermeer's *Vrouw*

met paresnoer (Woman with a Pearl Necklace, 1664): there, Dalí states that the pearl

is none other than the very ghost of the skull, a skull which, at the end of its seething, aphrodisiacal decay, becomes round, clean and hairless, like the crystallized residue of this entire swampy, nourishing, magnificent, glutinous, obscure and greenish OYSTER OF DEATH... The pearl is elevated to the highest position in the loftiest hierarchy of objective myth by Vermeer of Delft. It is an obsessive motif in the indefatigably complex, highly lucid and immemorial thinking of this painter who possessed “the luminous sense of death”... Vermeer is the authentic painter of ghosts. The woman trying on her pearl necklace before the mirror is the most authentically ghostly canvas to have ever been painted.¹⁵

That is a strange comment to make about a figure with such a solid form as the woman depicted in *Brieflezende vrouw in het blauw*—or it seems so until we deliberate on the importance Vermeer accords the ebony-framed mirror (a traditional *vanitas* image) into which the woman stares.

Dalí’s paintings of the 1920s and early 1930s typically presented a number of elements of disparate appearances, and the painter treated these elements realistically, in a manner that emphasized individually the character of each: he rendered them with the precision of colour photography, by making an exact copy of each from a document, a photograph, or the actual object. Vermeer’s precision especially impressed Dalí—Vermeer’s work is often described as “photographic,” and it is renowned for its inner luminosity and rich, exact detail. Dalí’s work is similarly precise and exact. Dalí pressed techniques that he drew from Vermeer into the service of painting, to increase the reality effect of his rendering. He often combined forms, produced with techniques he drew from Vermeer, with blurred shapes, created with techniques drawn from the Symbolist Eugène Carrière (1849–1906). Once he had rendered his protagonists with sufficient precision to endow them with individual character and emotional autonomy, he created the impression of communication between them by depicting them in a space—most often a landscape—that included all of them. Thus, he brought together in the common space of the canvas objects that bore no relation to one another or to any embracing environment—the effect is that of juxtaposing incongruous objects in a space alien to them all (the Surrealist-influenced Canadian painter Jack Chambers would later use similar constructions). Dalí tells us this spatial obsession derives from the atmosphere of Cadaqués: the light there, due to the colour of the sky and the sea, seems to suspend the course of time and allow the mind (through the eye) to glide easily from point to point.

In 1954, Dalí collaborated with Robert Descharnes on the aforementioned film on the theme of metamorphosis, *L’histoire prodigieuse de la dentellière*

et du rhinocéros (The Marvellous Adventures of the Lacemaker and the Rhinoceros). The film, which was never completed, was to include a scene of Dalí in the Louvre copying Vermeer's *De kantwerkster*. In 1955, he painted *The Lacemaker* (*Copy of the painting by Vermeer van Delft*), as well as another, vastly more radical transformation of the same original, *Peinture paranoïaque-critique de la Dentellière de Vermeer* (Paranoiac-Critical Painting of Vermeer's *Lacemaker*); and in 1956, he glued a reproduction of the painting to a piece of toned paper—he explained the occasion: “On 17 December 1955, Dalí went to the Sorbonne in Paris in a white Rolls-Royce filled with cauliflowers, there to lecture on ‘Phenomenological Aspects of the Paranoiac-Critical Methods’ to an enthusiastic audience. He used the document illustrated here [the picture] to explain that Vermeer’s ‘Lacemaker’ attains the highest degree of biological dynamism thanks to the rhinoceros horns of which (in Dalí’s opinion) the painting consists.” On the piece of paper, he wrote (in a wonderful mixture of idiolectic French and Spanish):

COMUNICATION SORBONE A PARIS: DECUVERTE DALIENE DENTELIERE WERMER MAXIMUM DE DINAMISME BIOLOGIQUE PARCEQUE IL ET FORME PAR LES CURBES LES PLUS VIOLENTES QUI EXISTEN CELLES DE LA SPIRALE LOGARITMIQUE—DE MEME QUE LA CORNE DE RINOCEROS QUI ET LA “COURBE LOGARITMIQUE LA PLUS PUISANTE, ET LES CURBES DU CHUFLEUR QUI SON LES PLUS EXPLOXIVES QUI EXISTEN.” (Communication from the Sorbonne to Paris: A Dalian Discovery: Vermeer’s *Lacemaker* [exhibits] the maximum of biological dynamism because it is formed by the two most violent curves that exist, those of the logarithmic spiral—since the rhinoceros’s horn is the most potent of logarithmic curves and the curves of a cauliflower are the most explosive in existence.)¹⁶

In the entry for 18 December 1955 in *Diary of a Genius*, Dalí tells us that a rhinoceros’s horn is the only naturally occurring curve that is perfectly logarithmic. He then states that he had recently dissected the rear end of a rhinoceros and made an amazing discovery (the evidence of which he presented to the people attending his lecture in the form of a slide): that the form of a rhinoceros’s rear end is nothing but a folded-up sunflower—the petals of a sunflower also form a logarithmic spiral, so a rhinoceros has a perfect logarithmic spiral on its nose and also in its behind. Dalí then went on to propose a series of equivalents: Mist (the distribution of water droplets) = *Lacemaker* = Rhinoceros horn = Subatomic particles (whose movements follow logarithmic trajectories) = Distribution of petals of a sunflower = Florets in a cauliflower = Granularity of a sea urchin (both Vermeer’s *De kantwerkster* and a sea urchin appear in *Un chien andalou*).

In May 1955, Dalí painted a paranoiac-critical version of Vermeer's *De kantwerkster* in the rhinoceros enclosure at Vincennes zoo. In 1955, he also produced his *Bust rhinocérontique de la Dentellière de Vermeer* (Rhinocerototic Bust of Vermeer's *Lacemaker*); *Portait rhinocérontique de la Dentellière de Vermeer* (Rhinocerototic Portrait of Vermeer's *Lacemaker*), the painting that Descharnes's film, *L'histoire prodigieuse de la Dentellière et du rhinocéros*, recorded him executing; and (in keeping with the geometric theme of the communication from the Sorbonne) *Figures rhinocérontiques* (Rhinocerototic Figures), *Cornes blues* (Blue Horns: Design for a Scarf), and *Sans titre (Histoire prodigieuse de la Dentellière de Vermeer)* (Untitled [The Amazing Adventure of Vermeer's *Lacemaker*]). In 1956, he worked with the photographer Philippe Halsman, to produce a double portrait of a rhinoceros head in profile on the right and a black-robed and hatted Salvador Dalí, dressed and posed to resemble the rhinoceros. In 1959, he had a photograph made of himself and his wife Gala bathing with a reproduction of *The Lacemaker*.

Buñuel and Dalí's interest in Vermeer—which focused on the themes of death and transfiguration—suggests that the image of *The Lacemaker* in *Un chien andalou* is to be taken as a foreboding image. The shots of Mareuil throwing the book down, as though she has been startled by something, followed by one presenting what she sees through a window (viz., the cyclist riding down the street and then falling off his bicycle) seem to reverse causality: we might have expected her to have first heard the bicycle crashing to the ground and then to have rushed to the window. But we can explain the order of the shots if, instead of seeing Mareuil's tossing down the book as a consequence of her being startled by the sensation of the cyclist's falling off his bicycle, we take that action as foretelling—and perhaps even causing (as a sorceress)—the cyclist's death: that is, as suggesting Mareuil's obsession with this death-haunted painter has caused the cyclist to fall off his bicycle and die.¹⁷ So here, as in the slitting of the eye/vagina, love and death fuse, and (given that Mareuil is looking for relief from the tedium of her conventional, routinized life), the fusion of death and sex is understood as having the possibility of making life once again (as it was at the beginning of the marriage) poetic.

- 29 Mareuil, the wife in the film's narrative, stands up and walks out of the frame at the right.
- 30 The wife walks into the frame on the right and moves towards the left (the direction is changed from the previous shot); she passes the door (in an earlier scene, the door was to the right of the window); the camera follows as she walks up to the window and grasps the curtain with one hand as she leans towards it. Then suddenly she removes her hand and leans back with her mouth open, astonished by what she has seen.

(There are inconsistencies with her direction and the position of the door.)

(The wife is wearing the same patterned dress and necklace as the woman whose eye was sliced earlier.)

- 31 A high-angle shot of the bicyclist riding down the street; the sidewalk forms a diagonal line towards the bottom of the frame; the camera moves with the cyclist as he passes a street lamp.

(The cyclist would have passed the window already if Mareuil had seen him as passing by, as shot 30 suggests. But in this shot, he is several paces up the street. It is as though we have leapt back in time.)

- 32 Mareuil appears vexed: she leans to look out the window, again removes her hand and leans back in distress; she opens her mouth wide to make a quick remark (possibly “O, mon Dieu!”)

- 33 High-angle shot of Batcheff, the cyclist, riding down the street. The bike veers towards the curb and topples over—the rider falls with the bike, sprawling across the road and over the curb; he lies towards the bottom of the frame.

(The cyclist enters this scene from off-screen, from farther up the street—i.e., from where shot 32 suggests he should be.)

The bicyclist simply collapses when he reaches Mareuil’s house. The suggestion of sexual exhaustion is unmistakable: perhaps he has been enervated by the ferocity of Mareuil’s desire—and if he has, that would make her an angel of death (and perhaps a sorceress). That helps explain the fact that Mareuil’s excitement anticipates the cyclist’s falling over.

(The temporal anomaly here, while explicable, parallels the spatial anomalies observed in shot 31.)

- 34 Mareuil, deep in thought (apparently undecided about what to do), takes a few steps away from the window, her hands clenched; annoyed, she mutters something as she moves back towards the window and leans out to have a look.

The wife’s hesitation suggests she is contemplating something—we can conjecture that she has realized this could be an opportunity to take a lover.

- 35 Batcheff (the cyclist) lying on the street, viewed from above. He is on the opposite side of the street than he was in shot 33; he lies with his head towards the top of the frame, and, though pinned beneath the bike, he squirms.

(The cyclist's position differs from that in shot 32. The angle from which the shot is taken implies that he is being viewed from the opposite side of the street, contradicting the notion that we are seeing the incident from the woman's point of view.)

- 36 Mareuil leans towards the window and looks out, annoyed; she clenches her fist and makes some remarks.

We might surmise that Mareuil has qualms about having an affair. The change in her expression from shot 34 indicates the work tracks the dynamics of semi-consciousness. (Film is well suited to this role.)

- 37 Wider view. The bed is on the left, and Mareuil turns from the window and walks away towards the left; the camera follows her as she moves to a door near the bed, opens it, and walks out.

(The door was originally to the right of the window [shots 24, 30].)

(This shot confirms there are two doors in the room, opposite to each other [cf. shots 24, 25, and 30]. We have been encouraged to assume there is only one, and certain inconsistencies arise from that assumption.)

- 38 Close-up of Pierre Batcheff (the cyclist), in the same posture he was before the bicycle toppled over, not underneath it: his hands still grip the handles. He has fallen so that his head leans against the edge of the sidewalk; his eyes blink but his body is completely still.

(The bicyclist is now quite still, while in shot 35 he was still, squirming).

- 39 A hallway leading to a door (at the end opposite the camera): the wife opens the door, rushes out, and goes downstairs, exiting the frame at its lower boundary.

Within the film's narrative system, the wife's speed suggests that she has overcome her compunctions and resolved to seize this opportunity to find a lover.

- 40 Close-up of Batcheff on the ground; the back of his head rests against the edge of the sidewalk; his body is motionless, while one of the bicycle's wheels, raised from the ground, spins.
- 41 The doorway of a building fills the frame; the wife rushes out, then comes to a standstill—she looks distressed, holds her hands together, clenched towards her chest; she then runs forward and crouches down before him.

The wife experiences a twinge of conscience, but her holding her clenched hands against her breast suggests that the desire she feels is very strong.

- 42 A low-angle view with the bottom of the doorway in the background: the wife kneels next to the cyclist, holds his face, and kisses it repeatedly.

The passion expressed by the repeated kisses would seem out of place if we were to fail to grasp the film's narrative implication: the wife kisses the cyclist repeatedly because she is desperate for passion.

- 43 Fades to a close-up of the striped box: it is being held with one hand at the bottom and another hand, with a ring, in front; the hand with the ring turns a key in the keyhole; the lid opens downward—a hand reaches inside the box and removes the striped wrapping paper from within.
- 44 Medium view of the wife beside the bed (which is mostly out of frame); she holds the wrapping in one hand and picks up a shirt collar from the bed, unfolds the wrapping, and removes a striped tie from it, then attaches the tie around the collar.
- 45 A close-up of the bed's surface: Mareuil places the collar on the bed (we see only her arms and hands), then lays out the tie, crossing the two ends at the top, next to a ruffled white shirt front; the camera pans down the shirt front to show the striped box being carefully set among the items of clothing. As it does so, we see a skirt beneath the shirt and the woman's hands as she fusses with the garments.

Mareuil, a wife whose marriage has become routine, imagines a lover on her bed—she is an Isolde pining for a Tristan.

We note the many striped forms that appear in the film. These visual rhymes cannot be given a simple discursive meaning and so point up the limitations of reason. Nonetheless, their proliferation suggests a universe of mysterious *correspondances*; thus, they indicate the influence of the metaphysics of Symbolism on Surrealism.

The clothing Mareuil lays out on the bed is androgynous: the shirt and tie are men's wear, while the skirt is clothing for a woman. This has many implications. In the first place, the ambivalence of the costume (which, of course, is associated with the cyclist) suggests both androgyny of early childhood (hence the woman's fussing over the clothes) and a polymorphous sexuality. As *Le bébé polymorphe de Freud* (Freud's Perverse Polymorph or Bulgarian Child Eating a Rat, 1934) evidences, Dalí seems to have been disgusted by the indefiniteness (the a-morphism) of childhood androgyny/polymorphism. Finally, the cyclist represents the woman's hoped-for lover but also her child. The incest theme should be clear.

- 46 The wife is at the side of the bed. She moves her hands along the bed one last time; the camera follows her as she walks around the bed and passes the window. She sits in a chair to the right of the bed, with her back turned to the camera. The door is behind her.

The wife ponders the possibility of love.

(When we were first shown the room, there was no chair by the bed; now there is.)

- 47 A view of the bed with the garments laid out on it (ruffled shirt front, striped box, stiff collar, and striped tie), spread out as they would be if the man wearing them were lying on the bed; all of a sudden (in a sort of jump-cut), the untied tie knots itself.

(There are several inconsistencies between shots 45 and this shot, but one jarring inconsistency is this: the tie was uncrossed at the beginning of this scene, while in shot 45 the ends were crossed over each other.)

- 48 Medium view from the side of Mareuil, the wife in the narrative, who sits in the chair and stares at the bed.
- 49 The bed with the garments laid out on it: the unknotted tie, with its ends crossed over each other, dissolves into a knotted tie (so that the tie appears suddenly to form itself into a proper knot).

(The tie was knotted at the end of shot 47 but is unknotted again at the beginning of this scene; the occurrence that took place between the end of shot 45 and the beginning of shot 47 is here given an image and made explicit.)

- 50 A three-quarters view of the woman in close-up (head-and-shoulders view): she stares attentively to the left of the frame, blinks her eyes, and turns her head and body to look over to the right.
- 51 Batcheff, the would-be lover, now in a suit, stands next to the door, holding his arm up. His left shoulder faces the door. He stares anxiously into his hand, his other arm bent behind, with the hand positioned to support his back.
- 52 Close-up of the would-be lover's palm (and the lower part of the sleeve of his suit jacket); ants crawl out from the centre of the palm.

It was Dalí who suggested the idea of the ants.¹⁸ The five-year-old Salvador had discovered ants crawling over the dead carcass of his pet bat. Ants are a common image in Dalí's paintings: they appear in both *Le grand fourmilier* (The Anteater 1929–31) and *Le grand masturbateur* (The Great Masturbator, 1929, where a rotting stomach churns with ants). Dalí's painting *Le jeu lugubre* (The Lugubrious Game, 1929) associates ants with pubic hair, and *Combinaisons* (Combinations—or The Complete Dalianian Phantasms: Ants, Keys, Nails, 1931) juxtaposes ants in the pubic region with a key (an obvious phallic symbol). Ants appear as well in *L'accommodation du désir* (1929)—there on a seashell (and so connected with a bony form); *Premier*

portrait de Gala (First Portrait of Gala, 1931); *Le rêve* (The Dream, 1931); *Visage aux fourmis* (literally, Face with Ants, but usually referred to as Ant Face—a drawing for the jacket of the exhibition catalogue for Dalí's exhibition at the Alex Reid and Lefevre Gallery in London, 1936), in which, as with *Le rêve*, the ants crawl over a face without lips (much as the pubic hair grows over the face without a mouth in *Un chien andalou*); and *Les fourmis* (The Ants, 1936–37). The first painting Dalí produced entirely in accordance with the paranoiac-critical method, *Métamorphose de Narcisse* (The Metamorphosis of Narcissus, 1937), shows (on the right-hand side of the painting) ants crawling on a hand that is holding an egg between its thumb and forefinger—a flower breaks through the egg. (That painting, so obviously concerned with themes of death and rebirth, is Dalí's reworking of the myth of Narcissus, which explains the allusion to the daffodil—in Greek mythology, Nemesis punished Narcissus for looking at his reflection by turning him into a Poet's Daffodil. Furthermore, the daffodil, likely because of the time of the year it blooms, is connected in Christian countries to Easter, the time of Christ's death and resurrection.)

In Dalí's paintings, then, ants are linked with eros (with pubic hair and with the pubis), with putrefaction, and with death; so, in *André Breton le Tamanoir* ([“tamanoir” is a synonym in French for “grand fougilier” or great anteater], 1929–31), Dalí presents Breton as an animal that will devour death (one thinks of Bataille's condemnations of Breton's Icarian ambitions) while being at the same time devoured by ants (death).¹⁹ Though within the corpus of Surrealist works ants are especially prominent in Dalí's oeuvre, they do appear elsewhere in Surrealist art. The following line, anticipating Dalí's use of ants to suggest putrefaction and death, appears in an early work by André Breton and Philippe Soupault, “Les modes perpétuelles” (The Perpetual Modes, 1919): “On découvre un cerveau il y a des fourmis rouges” (You discover a brain there are red ants).²⁰ Artaud also associated ants with death, through the mediating image of bones: “Une sorte de nuit lui remplit les dents. Entre en mugissant dans les cavernes de son crâne. Elle entr'ouvre le couvercle de son sépulchre avec sa main aux osselets du fourmi” (A kind of night fills his teeth. Enters moaning, into the caverns of his skull. She lifts the lid of his sepulchre with her insect-bony hand).²¹ A marvellous image, condensing the themes of the erotic and death, appears in Benjamin Péret's “Ici l'on rase gratis” (Here One Opens It for Free) in Chapter 3 of *Mort aux vaches et au champ d'honneur* (Death to the Pigs and to the Field of Glory, 1923): “Cedependent, Messieurs, il y a deux manières da ravalez les nez. La manière la plus simple consiste à les fratter avec une râpe à fromage jusqu'à ce qu'il en sorte quelques dizaines de fourmis; mais ce n'est pas la manière la

plus rationelle” (However, sirs, there are two ways to shorten the nose. The simplest method consists in grating it with a cheese grater, until several dozen ants come out of it; but that is not the most rational method).²²

53 Return to medium shot of lover next to door, examining his hand anxiously (same as shot 51).

54 Medium view of the wife in the chair, with her body turned to the right, staring; she stands up. The door is directly behind her.

(Mareuil should be looking directly behind her, towards the door, in order to see the man.)

55 The wife is seen from a different angle, with her back turned from the camera; she walks away from the chair, which is situated in the lower-left corner of the frame, and towards the man (who is still in the same position) standing beside the door in the background; she walks up to him.

56 A closer, frontal view of the wife and lover, from their waist up: they stare at the man’s hand.

(For continuity, the door should not be behind the woman. This indicates that the position of the two actors has been changed, placing the woman closer to the door with her back to it.)

57 A large close-up of the man’s palm (same as shot 52) with the ants crawling out the hole in its centre.

(This view of the hand, presumably from the man’s perspective, should have changed with the new spatial organization of shot 56—it is also inconsistent with the point of view of the woman in shot 56.)

Dalí once cited, as an important memory from his childhood, the feeling of having thorns in the palm of his hand. That prickly sensation may have given rise to the image of ants crawling out of the hole in his hand.

58 Shot 56 continues. The wife looks up at the lover and, in response, he turns to look at her. She then turns her head back, so that she is looking at his hand; he, too, turns his attention back to his hand.

59 Large close-up of the man’s palm, with ants crawling out of a hole in its centre.

(Same inconsistency as in shot 57.)

60 Fades to a close view of a woman’s armpit—we can see, at the edges of the frame, a bathing suit, some grass, and a white hat that covers the face (and that protrudes beyond the frame edge), leaving an ear visible. (This

is a good example of cinema's proclivity for metonymy, for we take the shot to depict a woman lying on the grass, sunbathing.)

- 61 Dissolves to an image of a sea urchin on the sand: the shot emphasizes the sea urchin's spines.

The transition from image to image has both psychosexual and linguistic determinants: the sexual implications are obvious, the linguistic less so (at least to an audience whose first language is English). Liebman points out that we see ants—*fourmis*—coming out of the man's armpits; then we see a crowd milling about—*une foule qui fourmille*—and, next, a sea urchin—*un oursin*.

- 62 Dissolves to a view from directly above of an androgynous woman, who is dressed in the *garçonne* style (a natty style of men's dress), popular among bohemian women of the time (and whom many viewers at first take to be a man); she pokes a stick at a hand on the ground; the centre of the image is more brightly illuminated than the sides. The woman might be blind.

The dissolves between shots 60 and 61, and between shots 61 and 62, create the impression of one form transforming into another; transformation is a key Surrealist theme.

Furthermore, the woman seems asexual, an impression that is reinforced by having her poking at the severed hand (which, of course, evokes associations concerning both masturbation and castration): the nature of the gesture itself suggests masturbation, and the indifference with which she performs the actions allude to impotence (and so, to loss of sexual function and castration).

Dalí produced paintings of severed or seemingly severed hands around the same time that he and Buñuel made this film: *La miel es más dulce que la sangre* (Honey Is Sweeter Than Blood, 1927); *Appareil et main* (Apparatus and Hand, 1927); *La main coupée* (The Severed Hand, 1928); *San Sebastián* (Saint Sebastian, 1927); *Beigneuse [sic]*, (Bather, 1928); and *Les désirs inassouvis* (Unsatisfied Desires, 1928). Paul Moorhouse in *Dalí, Rafael Santos Torroella in La miel es más dulce que la sangre: Las épocas lorquiana y freudiana de Dalí* (Honey Is Sweeter Than Blood: Dalí's Lorcanian and Freudian Times, 1964) and Ian Gibson in *The Shameful Life of Salvador Dalí* (1997) all point out that from late 1926 to 1933, masturbation was an obsessive theme in Dalí's work.²³ Rafael Santos Torroella especially connects this theme to the sexual interest that Federico García Lorca had in Salvador Dalí, mostly from the autumn of 1924 until the summer of 1927 (though, Dalí maintained, the matter never reached the point of Lorca's consummating his desires).

The androgynous woman may be blind; accordingly, her poking at the hand may be an effort to identify what lies on the ground—construed in

this way, there is something amusing in thinking of the woman feeling a severed penis (which, after all, is the primary meaning of the image of the hand).²⁴ The androgyne's (possible) blindness also relates to the scene of slicing Mareuil's eye that appears at the beginning of the film, as well as to masturbation and the primal scene (which may render seeing/imagining intolerable).

The image of the stick, moreover, resembles the hoe that the man in Millet's *L'angélus* has stuck in the ground so that he can pray. Recall that for Dalí, *L'angélus* was an Oedipal painting, the unconscious theme of which was the burying of a child (killed for his sexual sins), and that the woman in the painting was not guilt-free. If we make that connection, many other associations follow: the box the woman clutches resembles the coffin—it contains a severed hand, which we associate with the severed phallus: so it links ideas of castration and death.

- 63 More distant view, still from a high angle, of the woman poking at the hand with a stick; the circular illuminated area widens out; a crowd of people have surrounded her, while officers try to keep the people back. (The shadow of the woman is visible.)
- 64 Another view of the androgyne, not from such a high angle: officers control the crowd who have gathered around the woman.
- 65 A closer view, still from a slightly high angle, of the androgynous woman—this angle shows her from the waist up as she looks down towards the ground and moves her upper arm (poking at the severed hand); we see a woman's legs (and the bottom of her skirt) in the background.
- 66 Close-up of the severed hand being prodded by the rod, compressing its soft flesh. The legs of the woman in the background and the bottom of her skirt are visible.

The severed hand invites associations: the hand had been performing masturbatory acts and so had been cut off (i.e., its owner had undergone castration—that is why the androgynous woman is andro-gynous).

- 67 Close-up of a man who steps out of the crowd to get closer—an officer pushes him back.
- 68 Similar to shot 65: a high-angle shot of the androgynous woman from the waist up—the policemen's legs move across in the background.
- 69 Onlookers stare curiously; an officer walks across the frame from the right.

The police officer—*un flic*—represents repression, social and (especially) psychological. In this case (as is usual with repression), his influence seems

to be calming, though we know that seeming effect is merely illusory—desire will not be stilled. Batcheff, watching from above, eludes the officer's pacifying influence (see shot 81).

- 70 Closer view of a few of the bystanders, staring intently; one man looks very uneasy.
- 71 A high-angle shot of the androgynous woman's legs extending from beneath a skirt (she is wearing women's shoes); she pokes the severed hand on the ground with the stick.
- 72 A low-angle view of three bystanders (against the background of a building): there is a woman in the centre and a man on each side—they stare at the ground.
- 73 A window, seen from the outside, and a plant in front of it that fills the frame; Mareuil and Batcheff, the wife and the would-be lover, look out from inside the apartment (Batcheff holds the curtain back so he can peer out).
- 74 Shot 68 continues (high-angle view of the *evirato*/androgynous from the waist up); an officer's legs in the background.
- 75 Shot 73 continues (exterior of the window with Mareuil and Batcheff, the wife and the would-be lover, looking out); the man smiles in amazement.

The androgynous and the would-be lover are near-doubles. The similarity imposes a fate on Batcheff: he too is to become, if not an androgynous, then at least a child at the latency stage (see section beginning with shot 175).

- 76 A more distant (full-length) view, from the front, of the androgynous woman with the rod, with bystanders around her; an officer (his back turned to the camera) turns from the crowd and walks towards the woman, and raises his arm with his hand towards the rim of his hat to salute.
- 77 Close-up, from the side, of the officer facing the woman; he lowers his arm, exchanges some words, and stoops down (as though to pick something up).
- 78 A high-angle shot: the officer, with the open box in one hand, bends down in front of the woman to pick up the severed hand; the crowd encircles them.
- 79 Shot 77 continues (close side view of the officer facing the woman): the officer puts the severed hand in the box, closes the striped lid, and politely hands it to the woman.

The published photoplay says this: "As the policeman hands her the box, [the woman] must appear to be carried away by an extraordinary emotion that

isolates her completely from everything around her. It is as though she were enthralled by the echoes of distant religious music, perhaps music she heard in her earliest childhood.”²⁵ Like the peasants at prayer in Millet’s *L’angélus*, she is moved to an almost transcendent passion by something invisible, something that is conveyed through acoustic space.

- 80 A close-up: the head and shoulders of the *evirato*/androgynous—she seems to be in a trance, for she seems oblivious to others (her behaviour suggests she may be blind); she clutches the box against her chest.
- 81 A two-shot close-up of Mareuil and Batcheff, the wife and the would-be lover, in the window; the androgynous woman still seems in a trance while the cyclist, submitting to the effect of what he sees (of the woman’s androgyny and her being in a trance), looks up, deep in thought (as though entering into a trance, or becoming aroused, himself).

The published photoplay says this:

This scene will have been seen by the characters whom we have left in the room on the third floor. They are seen through the window panes of the balcony from which may be seen the end of the scene described above. When the policeman hands the box over to the young woman, the two characters on the balcony appear also to be overcome to the point of tears by the same emotion. Their heads sway as though following the rhythm of this impalpable music.

Like the couple in Millet’s *L’angélus*, this couple is also in the sway of an invisible music. The photography emphasizes the resemblance—the *correspondances*—between the androgynous woman and the couple in the window (especially the cyclist); they are all fused by a music they hear together. The Symbolist influence in this scene is evident.

- 82 Shot 80 continues (bust of the *evirato*/androgynous); gripping the box towards her chest and staring ahead, the androgynous woman smiles subtly.
- 83 Shot 81 continues (two-shot close-up of the cyclist and the wife in the window); the cyclist, somewhat unsettled, turns his head slightly to the left and stares off, as though lost in thought.
- 84 A high-angle shot of the crowd, which forms a circle in the street; the officers disperse the crowd and the people move off, leaving the street empty but for the *evirato*/androgynous woman, who still clasps the striped box to her breast. The woman faces the pavement and there is a shadow to her right.
- 85 Medium view of the androgynous woman in the road, clasping the box to her chest, smiling and staring ahead—the far side of the street forms

the background; a car rushes by close behind the woman (who is likely blind), almost running her over; she remains unaffected (as though in a trance and oblivious to the danger).

(The street has been empty of cars until now—the people standing in the middle of the street seem to believe that this is what one should expect.)

On Dalí's interpretation, Millet, in *L'angélus*, interweaves themes of sex and death; Buñuel and Dalí do the same here.

86 A close-up exterior shot of Batcheff peering through the window; he bites his lip (a sadomasochistic reaction to what he sees).

87 Shot 85 continues (androgynous woman in the road); a couple walk by on the sidewalk in the background.

88 Inside the apartment; a three-quarters view of Mareuil and Batcheff, wife and lover, by the window: Mareuil's back is turned towards the window on the right, Batcheff's elbow and forearm rest along the window on the left; he turns to Mareuil, makes a quick remark while motioning with his chin towards the scene outside; Mareuil turns towards him as he speaks.

(Cyclist is now leaning against the window with the curtain [which is pulled back] drawn over the window.)

89 A high-angle view of the *evirato*/androgynous, who stands motionless in the middle of the road (perhaps made more vulnerable by her possible blindness); a car sweeps by her, narrowly missing her.

(The androgynous woman now faces in the opposite direction, and her shadow is no longer visible.)

90 An exterior close-up of Batcheff peering through the window—he grimaces strangely and bites his lip in nervous excitement and anticipation, mixed with a dose of masochism.

(The curtain is drawn back again.)

91 Continues shot 89 (a high-angle shot of the *evirato*/androgynous on the road); again a car sweeps by, narrowly missing her.

92 A close-up of the head and shoulders of the androgynous woman; she clasps the box to her chest, her head turned, staring to the right; people pass her by—some pass behind her, then one person goes by in front of her.

People and cars pass by the androgynous, very close, but pay her no attention—it is as though they are out for a stroll and do not see her. It is as though she is blind, or her trance has cut her off from the world and—in a sort of mirroring

operation of the sort that Roger Caillois wrote about—the world has become oblivious to her.

- 93 A view up the street: a car in the middle of the road approaches the camera.
- 94 Shot 92 continues (head and shoulders of the *evirato*/androgynous); she notices the car.
- 95 A view from the car as it travels down the street (the auto's hood is visible at the bottom of the frame); the androgynous stands in the middle of the street (at the centre of the frame), with her hands raised in the air as the car speeds towards her. (The box and rod are on the ground in front of her.)

We have remarked on the persistence of archaic modes of thinking in Dalí and Buñuel's film. Yet both artists also wanted to create an art that would be contemporary. Dalí was one of the authors, along with Lluís Montanyà and Sebastià Gasch, of the "Manifest groc" (Yellow Manifesto, 1928). The manifesto declared in favour of the machine and the new mechanical world (that is probably one of the reasons Dalí became involved in filmmaking). The "Manifest groc" declared, "*Mechanization* has revolutionized the world... *A post-machinist state of mind is in the process of being formed: The artists of today have created a new art in harmony with this state of mind. In harmony with its time... There are motor and aeronautics shows... There is a gramophone which is a little machine... There is the camera which is another little machine... We denounce the absolute lack of youth in our youth.*"²⁶

Including automobiles in this work, whose psychological themes are so ancient, creates a sort of conceptual dissonance: their presence links a story grounded in fossilized psychological traces with the utterly new—it brings distant realities into conjunction. Furthermore, for Dalí, as we have seen, one of the attractions of the cinema was that it was a mechanical art, characterized by speed (he set out these values of new art in "Poesia de l'útil standarditzat").

- 96 Shot 94 continues (head and shoulders of the *evirato*/androgynous): she grips the box closely with her arms and chin, grinding her teeth in fear.
- (The box, which was on the ground, is now back in the woman's hands.)
- 97 A view from the side of the car, speeding towards the woman, who still holds her hands in the air; the box is on the ground to her right and the stick on her left; the car hits her and she topples beneath it.

(The box is back on the ground.)

(There is an inconsistency in the position of rod and box by way of comparison with shot 95.)

- 98 Shot 90 continues (close-up of Batcheff in the window); he bites his lip, his eyes widen, and his head jerks, as though in reaction to what he has seen.
- 99 A high-angle view of the road: the androgyne lies on her back towards the bottom of the frame (the sidewalk comes into view on the lower left of the frame); one man moves towards her from the upper left of the frame and another from the top of the frame—as they hurry towards her, a third man enters the frame (comes towards her) at the top and a woman enters at the bottom.
- 100 Shot 98 continues (close-up of Batcheff in the window): with an excited, perhaps sadistic expression, he turns to the left and closes the curtain.
- 101 Shot over Batcheff's shoulder, with his back towards the camera. We see Mareuil looking down through the window; she looks up at Batcheff, unmoved.
- 102 A reverse-angle shot of Mareuil, with her back turned to the camera, and Batcheff, who rests his elbow and forearm against the window—the would-be lover tries to arouse the wife by pointing out the violence below (he motions with his head towards the scene).
- 103 The wife responds calmly and looks back towards the window; the would-be lover moves very close to her (facing her); she looks up towards him, somewhat puzzled.
- 104 A reverse-angle shot: the would-be lover grimaces peculiarly, looks up at her face, then down at her chest.
- 105 Mareuil and Batcheff, wife and would-be lover, in a view from the side: they are in front of the window, facing each other; Batcheff suddenly grabs Mareuil's breasts; she moves away, out of the frame.
- 106 Close-up of the would-be lover, pressing towards the wife—he looks possessed and wears a malicious grin.
- 107 View from the waist up of Mareuil moving back—she has a frightened expression.
- 108 A shot of the would-be lover, continuing to press towards the wife.
- (Near the end of the shot we see, for just a moment, that a tennis racket has been substituted for a crucifix that was hanging on the wall near the door—we saw the crucifix in shots 30 and 54. Later shots, e.g., 121, 173, 197, and 233 also present a tennis racket where the crucifix had been.)

(The door comes into view at this point. But Batcheff and Mareuil seem to have gone quite a distance to get past the door, which, as an earlier establishing shot has shown us, is actually close to the window—they have travelled much farther than we would have expected.)

109 Mareuil moves backwards, away from the cyclist, but is stopped by a piece of furniture behind her; the cyclist walks into the frame, back turned from the camera (he is facing towards the wall), and corners the wife against the wall; she slips out and he follows her; suddenly, he jumps in front of her (the scene is choreographed as a dark parody of American action thrillers). Mareuil gasps in fright and tries to move back; the man suddenly grabs her by the chest. They move up and down the wall as if they were each doing the steps of a tango—an Argentinian tango is playing at this point on the soundtrack. (Though sound was added to the film only in 1960, the sound that was added corresponds to that which accompanied the film in its first public screening.)

There had been much debate in Europe—and especially in France—in the early years of the twentieth century about the corrupting effects of tango music. Originally, the tango dance acted out the relationship between a prostitute and her pimp. It probably entered France through the port of Marseille, where Argentinian sailors would dance it with local whores. There is evidence that a tango was performed on stage in Montmartre in 1909. Its popularity—or infamy—was boosted when in 1910–11 the Argentinian playboy Ricardo Güiraldes put on a number of performances of the dance. The tango was strikingly different from the dances of the time, so different that it was considered obscene, a challenge to conventions of public mores of the time, because couples had never before danced with their hips touching. On seeing a demonstration of the dance in 1912, the comtesse Mélanie de Pourtalès asked, “Is one supposed to dance it standing up?” It was also the first dance performed by couples in polite European society that involved improvisation—and that spontaneity contributed to the sense it is a menacing dance.

Tango music is passionate music—often mournful and seemingly longing for the ultimate climax, in which the two dancers will fulfill their longing by merging in death (there are many tango pieces that go by the title “*El tango de la muerte*”—the Tango of Death). The tango here is both passionate and dark.

110 Close-up of Batcheff’s hands fondling Mareuil’s breasts; she grabs his wrists.

111 Wife and would-be lover face each other; she forcibly removes his hands; looking up at him, she gives him a stern look, opens her mouth, breathes a sigh of submission, and gives up her resistance; the would-be lover begins

to fondle the woman's breasts, and the woman closes her eyes and turns her head.

112 Close-up, from the side, of the lover's hands fondling the woman's breasts through her dress; the dress disappears (through a dissolve) and the hands now fondle her naked breasts.

113 Close-up of a man's face (supposedly the cyclist, but the face appears to be that of a different person); the man's eyes are rolled up.

(The man's appearance here is inconsistent with his appearance in earlier shots.)

Batcheff's face takes on the appearance of a death mask; Dalí frequently linked sex and death.

114 Shot 112 continues: a close-up, from the side, of Mareuil's breasts being pawed by Batcheff, the would-be lover; the dress reappears (through another dissolve).

115 Back to the close-up of Batcheff's face; he is now drooling and seems quite mad. (He is possessed by *l'amour fou*.)

The angle of the face and its demented expression invite association with St. Sebastian, a favourite subject of Dalí's (and of Federico García Lorca). Erotic arousal is an exquisite agony, like the suffering of the saint.

116 Batcheff's hands fondle Mareuil's breasts through her dress; the breasts dissolve into naked buttocks and then back to Mareuil's clad chest—the hands continue to fondle the breasts throughout.

The exchange of buttocks for breasts, and breasts for buttocks, suggests the mental process of a displacement. Buñuel said of *Un chien andalou* that it does not attempt to recount a dream but "profits from a mechanism analogous to that of dreams."

117 Close-up of Batcheff looking down with his mouth open in arousal, appearing somewhat crazed (*l'amour fou*).

118 Medium view of the man and woman facing each other; the woman, now angry, forcefully pushes him away (as he's getting aroused) and runs off.

119 View of the room; the woman runs across the room to the bed as the would-be lover chases her.

120 Medium view of the wife climbing over the bed and running past the window—at first the camera follows her, but she moves out of the frame and the camera swings back to show Batcheff, the would-be lover, climbing

over the bed; the camera follows as he passes the window and tracks her into the corner.

(The chair, which earlier was in front of the bed, is now to the left of the window.)

- 121 Mareuil stands behind the chair to the right of the window and grabs hold of a tennis racket hanging on the wall to the left of the door. She takes it down and holds it threateningly above her head, signalling that she will swat the would-be lover if he does not desist.
- 122 Medium view of the would-be lover and the woman: the woman stands behind the chair; the man first approaches her, then turns and walks away. He then changes his mind again, and turns back towards the woman.
- 123 Close-up of Batcheff (from the shoulder up): he moves forward with a determined—even cruel—expression on his face; he clenches his teeth as though to intimidate Mareuil.
- 124 The wife, seen in full length, holding the tennis racket over her head, breathing heavily, prepared to defend herself.
- 125 Back to Batcheff, who presses towards the wife, then stops.
- 126 A closer view of Mareuil (from waist up); she maintains her stance and sneers at him.
- 127 Discouraged by her self-defence, the would-be lover's threatening, fear-some, mean expression crumbles—he seems to realize that it has no effect.
- 128 Back to the wife, still breathing heavily, though confidently, relieved that he has failed to arouse her.
- 129 Back to Batcheff: he rummages through his suit pockets in search of something; he turns his head to look at the floor behind him, turns back, and smiles; he walks over to the spot he had looked at, looks down again, looks up, smiles, looks down again, then lowers himself towards the floor.
- 130 The camera looks down at the floor; Batcheff, who is crouched down, moves his hands over the floor as though searching for something; he grabs hold of two ropes, takes an end of a rope in each hand, then pauses and looks up.
- 131 Back to the wife, her arm still raised, reacting with shock to what she sees—she opens her mouth and takes a deep breath.
- 132 Wider view, from behind the would-be lover, his arms extended behind him, pulling on the ropes that are attached to something outside the frame; he struggles as the weight of something holds him back. The door

- is to the side of him, in the background. The woman stands in the corner, at the very left of the frame—she looks very uneasy.
- 133 A medium shot, from the side, of Batcheff pulling so hard that his body leans sharply forward—he strains with all his strength against the two ropes over his back; two cork mats that resemble fishermen’s nets (from Dalí’s home) hang from the ropes.
- 134 The view returns to Mareuil: she is wide-eyed, has her mouth open, and seems shocked by what she sees—she lowers the racket slowly.
- 135 The view returns to Batcheff, who is struggling to pull himself forward. He has moved slightly closer to the door.
- 136 Wide view of the room. The woman is in the midground in a corner. In front of her (nearer to the camera) is the would-be lover with a rope over each shoulder. In the foreground are two pianos with their lids open (the keyboards facing the camera); a carcass lies atop each (the animals’ heads are draped over the keyboard). Two priests (Buñuel referred to them as seminary students) are dragged by the ropes behind the piano. Stone tablets hang near the priests (their shape suggests a biblical allusion—they resemble the tablets that Moses holds in traditional paintings and on which the Decalogue has been inscribed), just behind a pair of melons. The would-be lover drags the load farther into the room. The woman in the corner drops the racket.

In Salvador Dalí’s *Le mythe tragique de l’angélu de Millet* (The Tragic Myth of *The Angelus* by Millet; the book was written in 1938 but not published until 1963), Dalí explains that dragging a heavy object is a symbol of impotence. The would-be lover lusts for the woman, but he cannot consummate the desire; the melons represent his testicles, the tablets represent prohibition (the Decalogue speaks in the language of “thou shalt not”), the pianos represent official culture, and the priests represent religion.

The Surrealists associated the piano with death. Thus, *Minotaure 7* contained a reproduction of a painting by Francisco Borès (1898–1972), titled *Femme au piano* (Piano Woman, 1933), which depicts a skeletal (deathly) woman playing the piano. The piano sequence contains many images of putrefaction. The rotting donkeys refer (in addition to Dalí’s and Buñuel’s childhoods) to the popular children’s tale *Platero y yo* (Platero and I), a prose poem about a writer and his donkey by the Andalusian poet Juan Ramón Jiménez—Jiménez was an esteemed writer (he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1956), and Buñuel and Dalí had nothing but contempt for *Platero y yo* and, in early 1929, sent the “great hairy putrefact” a letter telling him so.

The motif of the putrefying ass appears many times in Dalí's work—and not just in the famous essay that takes its title from that motif. The theme also appears in the text “Mon amie et la plage.” Two rotting donkeys also figure in two paintings from 1927, *Le miel est plus doux que la sang* (Honey Is Sweeter Than Blood) and *Senicitas* (Little Ashes). Rotting donkeys also appear in *Âne en putrefaction* (The Putrefied Ass, 1928), *Vache spectrale* (The Spectral Cow, 1928), and *Guillaume Tell* (1930)—in the latter, a donkey is draped over a piano (as in *Un chien andalou*) while a horse soars above it, thus suggesting death and resurrection (the painting also shows, at the bottom, a nest with eggs).

As the alchemists knew, putrefaction is a transformative process; in world mythology, the idea that putrefaction is a magical, even a divine, process is almost commonplace (Bataille was to make much of it); that idea is also suggested by the presence of the priests. In this connection, one might recall the association of the figure of the Christ (especially the Christ on his way to Jerusalem on Palm Sunday with the donkey).²⁷ The scourged Christ, the emaciated crucified Christ that is so central to Western Christianity's iconography, resembles a Christ about to enter the first stages of decomposition.

What is more, putrefaction's transformative process passes through a stage of liquefaction: the bodily shape of the decomposing animal breaks down and returns to formlessness, out of which new form emerges. (Dalí associated a piano with liquids in another work, *Source nécrophilique surgissant d'un piano à queue* [Necrophilic Source Emanating from a Grand Piano, 1933], which depicts a stream pouring out of a piano through which a cypress tree has grown.) Thus, the idea of putrefaction is also associated with notions of fecundity and new life. The blood that oozes out of an animal body (and harbours the templates for life) suggests this fecund but formless substance that is the bearer of life; in the Christian tradition, this substance is identified with the Saviour's redemptive powers, and in the alchemical tradition, with the *materia prima*.

The Bataillean idea of a dissolution of form is connected with Dalí's idea of a multiple image: the multiple image suggests the interconvertibility of objects, while the liquefaction of form creates the conditions in which any form can be transformed into any other.

137 Close-up of the head of one of the carcasses, draped over the keyboard.

In the early 1920s, “putrefaction” was one of Dalí's favourite expressions. He used it as a term of derogation, to condemn whatever he loathed in art: that which was old-fashioned or backward; that which was socially, politically, and artistically retrograde. Thus, the conjunction of the putrefying asses

with the priests, the piano, and the Decalogue condemns the Church, art, and morality as reactionary. Yet at the same time (as noted in the comments on shot 136), putrefaction can lead to renewal (as old art can give rise to new).

In 1928, Dalí set out to paint *L'âne pourri*. While he was working on that piece, a letter arrived from a childhood friend, the writer and photographer José (“Pepín”) Bello (1904–2008), who recalled Dalí’s taking a detour on his way home from school so that he could see a donkey’s rotting corpse. And Buñuel wrote to say that he had dreamed of a donkey’s swollen, rotten corpse, like those he had seen in his childhood in the fields of Calanda. Both stories relate to childhood and the child’s confrontation with death. (For Dalí, the rotting ass is probably linked to the terrors he experienced in childhood, when he learned that a brother, also named Salvador, had died.)²⁸

138 View of the room with Batcheff straining to pull his load and Mareuil in the corner. He keeps pulling the cork mats, pianos, and putrefying asses across the room.

139 Close-up of Mareuil, still in shock over what she sees. She buries her face in the corner of the wall.

140 Batcheff, seen from the side, straining at the ropes; the ropes extend across the frame and the cork mats are in view; Batcheff is at the extreme left of the frame.

141 Close-up of two men (Marvel and Salvador Dalí), dressed as priests, on their backs, also being dragged by the ropes. The priests’ bodies are motionless. The load moves forward only slightly.

Three years after *Un chien andalou*, in *Hallucination partielle, six apparitions de Lénine sur un piano* (Partial Hallucination of Lenin on a Grand Piano, 1931), Dalí again associated pianos with authority and with old, hoary culture; he also associated them with Lorca—Dalí, it seems, continued to be haunted by the sexual interest the poet had taken in him. (Dalí dismissed Lorca’s interest in traditional Catalan culture, so the association of Lorca with the piano was overdetermined.)

142 Batcheff, seen in a shot from the front and from slightly above, leaning forward as he struggles to get traction; the two priests are dragged along behind him. (Here, again, the priests—Buñuel referred to them as seminarians—were played by Marval, who also served as the film’s production manager, and Dalí.)

(Now the priests push with their legs, as though to help move the load.)
(The cyclist is no longer making progress moving the load forward.)

143 Close-up of Mareuil; as she turns her head from the wall to look, she opens her mouth in amazement and shock.

144 The head of the bleeding carcass draped over the keys of the piano.

Dalí reveals that he gave the donkeys' heads the appearance of putrefying by using great pots of sticky glue that he poured over them; he also emptied out the donkeys' eye sockets with scissors, cut their mouths to make the teeth show to better advantage, and stuffed one jawbone inside another to emphasize the teeth.

(The editing suggests that Mareuil is reacting to the donkeys' heads. But she would have difficulty seeing them from her corner in the room, since they are hanging over the keyboards, facing away from her).

145 A medium close-up, showing the upper bodies of the two priests being dragged across the floor—they seem to be very anxious.

(The actors playing the priests are different from those in previous shots: the taller and slimmer figure, now on the right [played by Dalí], was previously on the left; and the shorter, plumper figure on the left is a new character we have not seen before—he was played by Dalí's old school friend, the communist writer Jaume Miravittes [1906–1988]).

(Neither priest does anything to help the would-be lover, who strains to pull the load. Compare this with the next shot.)

146 Shot 142 continues: a view of Batcheff from the front, pulling.

(The two priests are now pushing with their legs, helping Batcheff move the load. But Batcheff is having little success moving the load forward.)

147 Shot 138 continues: a wide view of the entire room.

148 Shot 132 continues: the door is in the background, to Batcheff's side, who strains to pull the load harnessed to his back (which is turned to the camera); he has just passed one edge of the door. Mareuil is at the far left back of the frame.

149 Close-up of Mareuil, who suddenly turns to the right and moves quickly out of the frame.

150 Shot 148 continues: back to the wider view, as Batcheff struggles with the load. Mareuil dashes for the door and escapes. Batcheff notices, drops the ropes, and rushes after her.

151 Medium close-up of Batcheff. His right arm is caught as he tries to push his way through the doorway. The wife tries to pull the door shut, but the

man's arm is caught between it and the jamb. (The door opens towards him—it is being pulled against his upper arm). Batcheff squirms and winces with pain.

(His arm, up to about midway between his elbow and his shoulder, extends through the doorway; it is his upper arm that is caught in the jamb.)

152 Close-up (from shoulders up) of the wife: she presses the side of her body against the door (now towards her side); she pushes back as the door is being pushed from the other side.

(There is an inconsistency in how the door is hinged: if everything were the same as in the previous shot, she should be pulling the door closed; but instead she is pushing it.)

153 Full-length view of the would-be lover, who is unable to remove his arm.

(In this shot, it is his left arm that is stuck in the door.)

154 Medium close-up of Batcheff. He is now in incredible discomfort, squirming and grinding his teeth. He is transported by his agony.

155 Close-up from directly behind Mareuil. Her back is to the camera and her head is turned, in profile; she pushes against the door.

156 Close-up of Batcheff's hand sticking out of the door.

(In the previous shots in this sequence, Batcheff's arm, to just below his shoulder, protruded through the doorway. In this shot, we see only a wrist and a hand.)

(It is his left hand that is caught in the door.)

157 Medium close-up of the wife pushing against the door.

158 Back to the close-up of the would-be lover's hand, now clenched into a fist.

159 Back to the wife pushing against the door (not pulling it shut) with a dazed expression, as though daydreaming.

160 View of the entire room: the would-be lover lies stiffly on the bed, wearing the white hat and ruffled shirt front and skirt (resembling a French maid's) that we saw earlier laid out on the bed; a window can be seen on the right.

161 Medium close-up, from above, of the would-be lover in the bed (the ruffled fabric surrounds his face and neck). He looks up—his expression is calm and innocent.

The wife is about to consent to love.

162 The wife pushes against the door; suddenly, she pauses and looks towards the hallway, relaxes her body, and stops pushing.

163 Close-up of the would-be lover. His head suddenly shifts and looks puzzled as though he has heard something. His eyes move to the right and back; he begins to grin mysteriously, then stares to the right again.

164 The wife is no longer trying to push the door shut; she stares straight ahead. (Mareuil appears to be staring at Batcheff on the bed. But when we last saw her [shot 162], she was outside the bedroom.)

165 The would-be lover stares to the right, looks up, then to the right, then up again, all the while grinning mysteriously.

166 White words against black: “Vers trois heures du matin.”

The last reference to time that we saw was “Huit ans après”—eight years later. “Vers trois heures du matin” (towards three in the morning) doesn’t give us any clearer understanding of the time. When is 3:00 in the morning of a day eight years after “Once upon a time”? Such is the chronology of fiction and dream, of course—but the Surrealists took it as a task to expose that raw, everyday unreality and the mind’s temporalizing power.

167 A hallway leading to a pair of closed doors. The back of a man in a suit and a hat comes into the frame; he mounts the steps towards the door, then reaches to the side.

168 Close-up of the stranger’s lower arm, viewed from the side; a hand presses a buzzer.

169 The lower part of two arms, in white shirt sleeves, extending from two circular holes in a wall; the hands are holding a silver cocktail shaker, which, for a short time, they shake. The hands and arms rhyme with the image of the cyclist’s lower arm caught in the doorway (as part of its attack on *cinéma pur*, the film contains numerous, often inexplicable, visual rhymes).

Another image with a verbal genotext—this time a dual-language genotext (a phenomenon with which we have grown familiar by studying Duchamp’s work): we can break the word “cocktail” into parts, “cock” and “tail”; the French-language equivalents are “queue” and “cul,” both words that have played a part in generating the film’s imagery.

170 Similar to shot 165 (medium close-up of Batcheff): he turns abruptly, looks to the right as though responding to the “bell,” and seems alarmed.

- 171 Similar to shot 169: the silver cocktail shaker being shaken.
- 172 Similar to shot 170: Batcheff looks to the right and lowers his eyebrows, seemingly annoyed or puzzled.
- 173 Medium view of Mareuil in front of the door and near the bed: the camera follows her as she walks across the room, passes Batcheff (who lies on the bed), walks up to the door (to the right of the window), extends her arm, pulls the door open, and walks out.

(This is a different entrance door than we saw previously: it seems, implausibly, that there are two doors to the apartment. We saw the landing where the man ringing the bell stands in shot 37, when Mareuil ran down the steps to reach the fallen cyclist; then she exited the room from the door by the bed. This time, Mareuil reaches the landing directly from the door by the window.) (The tennis racket that Mareuil dropped on the floor in shot 136 is now back on the wall.)

- 174 Low-angle close-up: a man stands in the hallway in front of the door. He wears a suit and hat and has his back turned to the camera, standing in front of the door. The door opens, he walks in, the door closes. (We do not actually see who opens the door for the man, though he seems to be expected.)
- 175 The would-be lover, his lips flaring, becomes perplexed.
- 176 An opening appears in black frame (as though a door was opened), and we see the silhouette of the man (his back is turned towards the camera) as he walks into the room, goes straight to the bed (in the background) and stands to its side; as he approaches the bed, he gestures towards the would-be lover.
- 177 A closer view of the back of the stranger as he swings his hand again, then lowers his shoulders and raises his hands, gesturing to the man to get up.

The man in the suit looks quite like Batcheff—we take him as the imago of male authority (to use Lacan's phrase, *le nom de père*) that the boyish cyclist has internalized. The introjected image of the father elicits the boy's identification and, through that identification, encourages the boy out of his latency phase to enter into a relationship with a woman. His subsequent actions—taking the box away from Batcheff and throwing it out the window as well as snatching his ribbon (the little boy's frilly object)—reinforce this suggestion. The schoolhouse furniture (desks, etc.) that appears magically in Mareuil's apartment suggests a schoolboy phase (the latency phase), from which his identification with the paternal imago draws the developing boy;

the magical appearance of the school furniture in the apartment shows that primal thinking is time-binding (as well as space-binding).

- 178 Fades back to Batcheff (slightly wider view—the striped box can be seen on his chest); he tilts his head up, looks perplexed, lowers his head, raises his eyebrows, flares his lip, and becomes serious.
- 179 On the left, close to the camera, the upper arm of the strange man; on the right, slightly farther away, Batcheff’s head rests against the bed’s headboard—he looks sheepish.
- 180 Close-up of Batcheff’s chest and head; he is clutching his striped box (developing that visual motif); he looks up, seemingly perplexed.
- 181 Reverse angle (similar to shot 179): the stranger leans towards Batcheff and extends his hands.
- 182 Close-up of Batcheff: he looks worried as he is being shaken by the stranger, then becomes angry.
- 183 Reverse angle (similar to shot 181): Batcheff gets off the bed and grabs hold of the stranger.
- 184 View of the room: the woman and the stranger stand to the side of the bed (which is on the left of the frame, while the window takes up the right half); the man pulls Batcheff up and they stand facing each other (the man’s back turned to the camera); he removes Batcheff’s hat and the ruffled panels (his force causes the box to fall to the floor); he holds the garments in one hand, picks up the box from the floor, then walks determinedly to the window.
- 185 Close-up of the stranger in front of the window, his back turned towards the camera; the stranger opens the window and tosses Batcheff’s feminine garments out.
- 186 Exterior low-angle shot: the façade of a building, showing a window with a balcony in front of it. The garments come flying out from the window and fall (leaving the frame in the lower-left corner).
- 187 Back to the stranger in front of the window; he tosses the striped box out the window.
- 188 Similar to shot 186: the box flies out the window and falls towards the lower left.
- 189 Similar to shot 187: the stranger in front of the window, who straightens up after throwing the box out the window.

- 190 Batcheff (we see only his upper body) stands at the left of the frame; a bed's headboard is visible in the lower centre of the frame. The last item of the French maid's outfit he is wearing is a ribbon or strap around his neck. He pulls the strap off, realizes that the box is missing, then quickly shoves the strap into his pocket, hoping to hide it.
- 191 Similar to shot 189: the stranger closes the window and turns his head to the left.
- 192 Batcheff, startled, realizes he has been seen and reluctantly offers the strap to the stranger; the stranger's arm enters the frame on the right and takes the strap.
- 193 A view from behind the stranger, as he takes the strap from the cyclist.
- 194 Similar to shot 192: Batcheff stands at the left, in front of the bed, and stares straight ahead.
- 195 Close-up of the back of the stranger as he throws the strap out the window.
- 196 Similar to shots 186 and 188: the strap flies out the window and down the side of the building.
- 197 Three-quarters full-length view from behind the stranger: the would-be lover and the stranger face each other, the former on the left side and the latter to the centre right; the stranger raises his arm (it leaves the frame on the right edge) and directs the would-be lover to the wall; the would-be lover shakes his head; the stranger gestures assertively, as if to issue an order; Batcheff, the would-be lover, then turns and walks towards the right, offering little resistance, like a child who follows a command reluctantly; the camera follows him by travelling along the stranger's outstretched arm; the would-be lover goes up to the wall and presses his face against it, as though he is being punished; the window curtain can be seen on the left, a chair next to it—Batcheff stands next to the chair with his head against the wall next to the tennis racket and the door to its right.
- 198 Close-up view of Batcheff; he turns around as though he has been given another order and then quickly turns back.
- 199 View from behind the stranger, who has his arms raised in a gesture (as though instructing the lover); the would-be lover is in the background against the wall; he turns his head to look.
- 200 Similar to shot 198, a close-up of the would-be lover: he turns his head towards the wall and raises his arms.

- 201 Similar to shot 199: the stranger exits frame right.
- 202 Similar to shots 198 and 200: a close-up view of Batcheff; he faces the wall and has his arms raised.
- 203 A more distant view of the stranger (his back turned to the camera), who keeps watch over the would-be lover in front of him; the door is now near the centre of the frame; the stranger moves back (the shot cuts as he turns to walk out).
- 204 White words against black: “Seize ans avant.”

(This is another arbitrary time, with no temporal connection to “Vers trois heures du matin” from shot 166.)

- 205 Similar to shot 203: the stranger turns to face the camera and walks forward, clenching his hands together in front of his chest; his movement is artificially retarded, creating a bargain-basement oneiric effect; he slowly pulls his hands apart.

(The man’s movement changes between shots 204 and 205.)

(Lighting changes here—the scene is brighter.)

(There is no longer a chair to the left of the door.)

The slow motion that begins the shot announces that the following sequence represents a dream. Buñuel was probably introduced to this use of slow motion during his apprenticeship with Jean Epstein; however, in *Les pas perdus*, Breton, in the course of commenting on the cinematic quality of collage, notes that the cinema can easily produce a marvellous effect by slowing down or accelerating action—moreover (he claimed), in doing so, the cinema confirmed that truth of “relative time” revealed in Einstein’s theories.

- 206 High-angle shot showing the top of a desk, like those in elementary schools of the 1920s, with notebooks, textbook, and papers scattered about and stained with ink blotches; a pen and a bottle of ink sit in the middle. There is a textbook on the desk, at the lower left of the screen, lying open.
- 207 A more distant view of the stranger with his hands apart, approaching the desk. His movement is artificially slow; he reaches for the notebooks.
- (The stranger approaches the desk directly from the side.)
- 208 Similar to shot 206: view of the desktop, from the point of view of the stranger—his hands grasp an ink-stained sheet of paper and remove it from the desk, then close the notebook and textbook and remove them.

(The textbook in this shot is now open, face up, and at the lower-left corner of the desk.)

(The stranger approaches the table from an angle, then turns so he is facing it directly from the rear.)

209 Similar to shot 207: a wider view—clutching the books, the stranger turns around slowly and (following a cut to regular motion) walks towards Batcheff in the background.

(Slight jump-cut—with loss of continuity—from slow to regular motion; furthermore, the man is now, once again, standing at its side.)

210 Close-up view of Batcheff against the wall; he looks up.

(The lighting has changed again, making the scene darker. The shadows on the walls are also more pronounced.)

211 Side view of the stranger, who stands in front of the door (at the right of the frame), clutching the books—he faces Batcheff (on the left of the screen), who turns towards him.

212 Close-up of Batcheff near the wall, turned to the side; the stranger reaches out (we see only his arms and hands, on the right) to hand the notebooks to Batcheff. Batcheff takes them, then turns back and again faces the wall (like a schoolboy who is being disciplined).

213 Close-up, soft light: the stranger, seen from the shoulders up, slowly shakes his head to indicate incredulity.

(The lighting has changed again—the scene is even darker, and dark shadows surround the two men.)

214 The film switches to slow motion, and the image softens. We see a side view of the stranger (from the waist up) on the right; a part of Batcheff can be seen on the left, standing against the wall. The stranger reaches out towards Batcheff, then backs away, turns towards the camera, and advances towards it (and away from Batcheff), shaking his head and rolling his eyes (as though to express it is no use and he is giving up).

215 The image is no longer soft—we get a medium view of Batcheff, who turns from the wall; he holds up the textbooks, looking at once contemptuous and possessed. (Part of the door can be seen on the right.)

216 Reverse angle (from Batcheff's point of view) of the back of the stranger; the stranger strides towards the door on the other side of the room (we see apartment furnishings to the right).

(The shot of the stranger's back as he walks towards the door seems to be from the point of view of the would-be lover. However, there is an inconsistency here: Batcheff, who holds the books/guns, does not face the door by the bed, but is turned from the door at a right angle.)

217 The scene returns to the would-be lover (near the wall): the books in his hands turn into revolvers as he assumes the stance of a gunslinger in a Western movie—he points the guns at the stranger and, with a commanding expression, orders the stranger to raise his hands.

(The lighting has changed: the scene is brighter.)

218 Similar to shot 216: the stranger walks towards the door, stops in his tracks, and turns around.

219 Reverse-angle close-up: we see the back of the stranger's head and Batcheff, who points a revolver at him (the stranger).

220 Similar to shot 217: medium view of Batcheff with guns—he issues another order and grins maliciously.

221 Similar to shot 219: the back of the stranger's head. Batcheff in the background gestures with a revolver, ordering (in the manner that gunslingers in Western movies use) the stranger to raise his hands.

This scene suggests Dalí's and Buñuel's enthusiasm for popular movies.

222 In soft light, seen from the shoulders up, the stranger holds his hands in the air, looking afraid.

(The man once again moves in slow motion.)

(The scene is darker again.)

223 Medium close-up of the gunslinger/cyclist (we see his upper body). The tennis racket hangs to the right; he gestures with one hand, instructing the stranger to keep his arms up.

(This scene is lighter.)

224 Similar to shot 222: the stranger seems very afraid.

(The scene is darker, its motion is unnaturally slow, and the image is blurry.)

225 Back to the gunslinger/cyclist: he pulls a crude face as he fires both revolvers.

(Scene is brighter, the motion at normal speed, and the image is sharper.)

226 Close-up of the back of the stranger's head as he sinks (shot); the gunslinger/cyclist is farther from the camera but faces it and continues to shoot as the stranger falls.

227 Slow-motion shot of the stranger, seen from the shoulders up: he tilts his head back, his hands move down, and he opens his mouth open wide.

(The scene is darker, the movement retarded; the image is blurry.)

228 Close-up of the two revolvers held at waist level, firing.

(The scene is brighter, the motion is at normal speed, and the image is sharper.)

229 Similar to shot 227: the stranger's eyes roll back as he takes more shots.

(The scene is darker, the motion is artificially slow, and the image is a bit blurry.)

230 The stranger's face moves close to the camera (as he falls); he is out of doors, in a field.

(The action is at normal speed.)

(The action unaccountably shifts from an interior to a field.)

231 Exterior long-shot of a meadow, with a stream and trees in the background: the stranger, in side view, falls to his knees. As he falls, he reaches out and caresses the naked back of a woman. Her back is turned to the camera, and she is wearing only a string of pearls and a drape wrapped around her buttocks.

The woman's pose and white skin indicate that she is an idealized figure (an impression reinforced by the park setting). It is appropriate that the idealized male (the male imago) possess the idealized female (the female imago); however, the woman vanishes (dissolves from the scene—see note on shot 233) as the man attempts to grasp her—she eludes his grasp; this suggests that the character played by Pierre Batcheff is growing up and abandoning his illusions.

The presence of pearls suggests an association with Vermeer—and indeed, the shape of the woman's body is reminiscent of the females in Vermeer's paintings. The image also associates pearls with death. But the pearls can be related, too, to the moon that we see in the film's prologue and to the eye (both links are common in world mythology)—and the moon, the pearl, and the woman all invite associations with transformation and death.

232 Close-up of the woman's upper back, with the man's hands sliding down it.

233 Back to a full view: the man falls to the ground (so that his body lies parallel to the stream), behind the woman who vanishes (dissolves out of the frame).

234 Long wide-angle of the bucolic environment, with the man lying on the ground; several men enter and, one by one, approach the wounded body.

(There is no stream in the background of the shot—the man's position on the ground has changed, so the stream is now at his feet.)

- 235 Two men stroll in the park while carrying on a conversation; one of them has his hands in his pockets, the other carries a cane. They occupy the left half of the frame and approach the camera. There is a large bush on the right side of the screen.
- 236 Close-up of two of the men crouched down and hunched over the wounded body on the ground; they turn him over, while two other men stand beside them (one to their left and one to their right) and observe what is going on. The two men who crouch over the stranger open his jacket to check his pockets, then one of them presses his head against the man's chest to listen for a heartbeat while another leaves the frame to get help.
- 237 Similar to shot 235: two strolling men approach the camera.
(An inconsistency in comparison with shot 235—the two men should be a little closer to the camera at the beginning of the scene.)
- 238 Similar to shot 236: the men tend to the wounded body.
- 239 A long wide-angle shot of the two men out for a stroll; a third man (we presume he is the man who left for help in shot 236) enters the frame and runs up to them. The two men brush him aside and continue their recreation, ignoring him.
(The man who left the scene in shot 236 was wearing a dark suit, while this man wears a light suit.)
- 240 Close-up: the two men out for a stroll (seen in side view) cross the frame, while the man who approached them stands still in the foreground, facing the camera; the two strolling men walk by and exchange a few words with the man who approached them.
- 241 Similar to shot 239—a wider view of the pair of men out for a stroll: they walk away at a leisurely pace (exit screen right), while the man who had approached them runs off to the left.
- 242 Similar to 236, long shot (full view) of the two men, crouching down and hunched over the body, while another stands beside them (to their left); we also see their environment. The two men who are crouched down tend to the stranger's wounded body (or corpse). A fourth man, whom we saw at the end of shot 236, runs in, as though to announce that help is coming. The men out for a stroll (one has a cane) enter the frame from the left; the man with his hands in his pockets instructs the four men as he walks across the frame towards the right. Led by the man with the cane, the four who had been watching over the wounded body (or corpse)

pick it up and carry it away (exiting screen left). The man with his hands in his pockets stands to the side, at the right of the screen.

(The two strolling men had paid no attention to the man in shot 239. Yet they now appear in the scene as though they had followed the man, while in shot 241, they departed in a different direction from that of the man who was looking for help—they also enter the scene as though they had continued all the while to walk in a straight line, even though the man who tried to get their attention in shot 241 made a ninety-degree turn when he left them—consequently, they should not have reached the same destination as the man who gave up in despair and set off in almost the opposite direction.)

243 Long shot of the strollers approaching the group surrounding the body. The man with the cane walks at the front of the procession; the four men carrying the body in the middle and the one with his hands in his pockets bring up the rear. (The group resembles a funeral cortège.)

(The two men from shot 239: one walks at the front of, and the other at the end of, the procession. They seem to be taking charge—nothing in their manner in shot 239 prepared for this.)

244 Closer view of the procession.

245 Back to a long shot.

246 Fades into a very long wide shot, from behind, as the cortège exits the frame and the image fades to black.

247 Fades in from black to a door inside the apartment: the door opens and Mareuil walks in, closing it behind her.

248 Close-up, from the front, of Mareuil closing the door behind her; she stares ahead and is startled by, or seems to take notice of, something.

249 The wall with a moth on it.

250 Extreme close-up of the moth, moving.

Consider Dalí's claims for the capacity of the close-up to create the effect of the marvellous. (The section in Chapter 3 under the heading "The Verbal Image" offers commentary on the atropos moth as a Surrealist image.)

251 Similar to shot 248: Mareuil stares at the moth.

252 Similar to shot 250: close-up of the moth.

(The moth is positioned differently, as though being viewed from another direction.)

253 Dissolve to an even more extreme close-up of the moth; there is an image of a skull below its head; an iris closes in on the skull (blackening the rest of the frame).

254 Extreme close-up of the skull.

255 A close-up of Mareuil (from the shoulders up), staring intently.

256 Medium shot of Batcheff, whom we last saw brandishing revolvers, staring towards the bottom right of the frame (apparently at Mareuil); an iris directs our attention towards the centre of the frame.

(For the man to be looking at Mareuil and to meet her gaze, he should be looking straight ahead.)

257 Mareuil (we see only her upper body) against the door: she too stares—an iris directs our attention towards the centre of the frame.

258 Back to the cyclist/lover/gunslinger, staring. He now faces the camera, but his head is tilted up, and he looks towards the top right. He suddenly clasps his mouth with his hand; an iris again directs our attention to the centre of the frame.

(Again, for Batcheff to be looking at Mareuil, he should be looking straight ahead.)

259 Close-up of Mareuil, appearing somewhat startled (she is reacting to the man).

260 Back to the man, who takes his hand away from his face to reveal that his mouth has disappeared.

261 Similar to shot 259: Mareuil makes an angry remark, holds up a compact (mirror), and begins to apply lipstick; she glosses her lips repeatedly and watches him intently.

262 Similar to shot 260: hair (like armpit hair) appears over the mouth (through a dissolve), compensating for his loss of his mouth.

(Now the lover's/cyclist's/gunslinger's eyes are directed imploringly at the woman.)

263 Similar to shot 261: Mareuil is shocked—her mouth is wide open and she examines her armpit, which is hairless.

264 Close-up of Mareuil inspecting her armpit.

265 Close-up of the back of the man's head against the background of a wide view of the room; Mareuil gets angry and stands in front of the door, as though in a huff.

266 Close-up of an angry Mareuil; she grabs a shawl and wraps it around her shoulders; then, while keeping her eye on him, she reaches out for the door.

267 Similar to shot 262: Batcheff—his mouth has been replaced by armpit hair, and he is staring.

The main figure in Dalí's *Le grand masturbateur* is a stylized self-portrait of the artist himself. The man's mouth has been replaced by a grasshopper whose stomach is covered in ants. The image is evocative of a praying mantis (whose peculiar copulation practices we commented on above); the ants represent the tingling sensation that desire produces. Furthermore, ants, which we have seen are linked (in Dalí's mind) with pubic hair, occupy the place of the mouth in Dalí's *Le rêve*.

268 Close-up of Mareuil: she opens her mouth, sticks out her tongue, and, feeling empowered, leaves, closing the door behind her.

269 View of the back of the man's head, with a wide view of the room in the background.

270 Close-up of Mareuil as she pokes her head back through the door to stick her tongue out (in response to the man's lack of a mouth).

271 Medium view, from the other side of the door, of Mareuil holding the door open, making faces inside, then closing the door as she turns around. (When she has finished turning around, we see her from the front.) A breeze lifts her shawl; she grabs it to hold it down and looks ahead, smiling.

(Mareuil leaves the building—she reaches the outside through a single set of doors. Previously, when someone left through this exit, he or she had to pass through a series of doors to reach the exterior.)

272 A long shot: a man, carrying a hat on his left arm, stands on rocks on the edge of a beach; his back is turned to the water (somewhat askew to the water, for his right shoulder is closer to it), and his hands are on his waist; he turns around.

273 Back to Mareuil, who smiles: she raises her hand, waves, and runs out of the frame, towards the camera.

274 Close-up of the man, seen from the front (he stands to the left of the frame, and there are rocks and water in the background)—he wears a shirt and tie with a patterned V-neck sweater and knickerbockers. He stands with his hands at the waist, looking ahead, holding a hat in his right hand. Presumably, he is the woman's husband, whom she was waiting for while reading (both dress as comfortable members of the bourgeoisie).

(The man has no watch on his left wrist.)

(The man is carrying the hat in his right hand, while in shot 272 he has it in his left hand.)

275 A more distant view along the beach: the man is seen from the front, standing to the left of the beach; Mareuil (her back) enters the frame as she runs towards him, greets him, and presses herself against his arm.

(The beach seems to be only steps away from the building the woman has just left. Leaving the building in shot 40, she exited onto a street, and there was no indication that a beach was so close by.)

(The man's left shoulder is now the one closer to the water, while in shot 272 it was his right shoulder that was closer to the water.)

(The man now has a watch on his left wrist, while in shot 274 he was not wearing a watch.)

276 A two-shot of the man and woman: the man looks off, while the woman holds on to his arm and says something. Still looking off, he raises his wrist to show her his watch (he seems to be accusing the woman of being late—the man shows the woman the time, even though she has a watch on).

(The man and woman are positioned differently in relation to the water than they were in shot 275.)

(The man's watch is now on his right wrist.)

277 On the left side of the frame, a close-up of the woman (in profile), and on the right, the (man's) wrist with the watch on it; the woman looks at the watch and then towards the man, smiling lovingly, in the manner of a wife; she tugs on his arm to lower it, then exits the frame, moving towards him. View of a cottage with a small field and fences.

(The view of the fenced cottage and field appears to be inconsistent with—out of place in—a beachfront.)

278 Medium shot of the couple: she has one arm around him; with her other hand, she holds his face lovingly. She presses her face against his, but he does not reciprocate the affection. She turns his face towards hers (saying something briefly), kisses him passionately and holds him tightly and he finally reciprocates by putting his arms around her.

279 Dissolves to a wider shot: the couple's arms are around each other's waists. They walk along the beach, away from the camera, kissing each other as they go. The man drops his hat on the sand (and ignores having done so).

(Had the geography of the previous scene been respected, the man would be holding the woman's waist with his right arm and walking with his left shoulder to the water. Instead, he holds her with his left arm.)

280 Reverse shot: the couple, seen from the front, walking along the beach towards the camera; they cling to one another for balance as they stumble over the rocks.

281 The striped box and ruffled garments sit on the sand among rocks, weathered and torn; the couple's legs enter the frame and approach the objects.

(These appear to be the items thrown from the window of the building onto the street [in shots 184 to 197]. They now reappear on the beach, with the box, now in pieces.)

282 Close-up of the broken box and worn-out garments; the man prods the box with his feet.

283 Back to a more distant shot: the woman picks up the garments; the camera swings up as she lifts them up and passes them one by one to the man; he inspects them, then tosses them aside; the woman says something to him, and they grab hold of each other and move forward over the rocks.

284 Continues shot 280 (wide shot of the couple, their backs turned to the camera); the man and woman walk off, kissing each other affectionately.

285 Fades to white words against black: "au printemps..."

The intertitle "au printemps..." might be an ironic invocation of an advertising slogan of the era, "Au Printemps [one of Paris's *grands magasins*], j'achète tout les yeux fermés" (At Au Printemps, I buy everything with my eyes shut)—which would extend the film's theme of blindness.

286 Image fades in from previous shot; effigies of the couple, covered by insects, protrude from the sand—the woman's head leans to the side and the man's head leans forward.

The scene is (at least) doubly referential. The couple in the sand are posed to resemble both the couple in Millet's *L'angélu*s and the woman in Dalí's *Remords ou Sphinx enlisé* (literally, Remorse, or Sunken Sphinx, though usually the "or" is omitted: Remorse Sunken Sphinx, 1931). They also resemble the two gravestones at the end of Buster Keaton's *College* (1927), a film on which Buñuel had written (expressing admiration) shortly before making *Un chien andalou*.²⁹ In my commentary on the image of the atropos moth, I pointed out that *Minotaure 7* was a special issue that offered paranoid thoughts of death as the ultimate, conquering reality. Moreover, in shots

278 and 279, we saw the woman being assertive, so the film encourages us to believe the couple's plight was brought on by the devouring female's behaviour. The image of the seemingly dead couple in the sand conforms to that view. Further, the shot likely produced the central image of Samuel Beckett's *Happy Days* (1961), in which Winnie is buried in the sand, like the two characters at the end of *Un chien andalou*. (Beckett is said to have been impressed by the Dalí-Buñuel film, and it is likely significant that *Film* [1965] is set in 1929—the year in which *Un chien andalou* was made and in which it had almost five and a half months of its nine-month run at Studio 8 in Montmartre—and it begins and ends with close-ups of a sightless eye—indeed, Beckett's original title for *Film* was *Eye*.)

287 White word: "Fin," against a textured grey background; fade to black.

NOTES

- 1 Luis Buñuel in his preface to the script in *La révolution surréaliste* 12 (December 1929); quoted in Freddy Buache, *The Cinema of Luis Buñuel* (London: Tantivy Press, 1973), 9, whence I have taken it.
- 2 That idea is one of the themes of Breton's *Nadja*.
- 3 Dalí, *Dalí by Dalí* (New York: Abrams, 1970), 97.
- 4 Dalí, "The Stinking Ass," in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, eds., *Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 487.
- 5 Luis Buñuel, *My Last Sigh* (New York: Vintage, 1984), 125.
- 6 "Buñuel lui-même m'a raconté que cet épisode était de l'invention de Dalí auquel il a été directement suggéré par la vision réelle d'un nuage étroit et long tranchant la surface lunaire." Georges Bataille, *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 211.
- 7 Dalí, *Salvador Dalí: retrospective 1920–1980, 18 décembre 1979–21 avril 1980*, ed. Daniel Abadie, 2nd ed. (Paris: Centre Georges Pompidou, Musée National d'Art Moderne, 1980), 48.
- 8 J. Francisco Aranda, *Buñuel: A Critical Biography* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975), 67.
- 9 The idea that film was the optimal art for the modern world generated an interest in modelling literary works on the film script. On the topic of the cinema's influence on Spanish writers of the 1920s and 1930s, C. Brian Morris's *This Loving Darkness: Cinema and Spanish Writers 1920–1936* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) is absolutely indispensable.
- 10 For the text of the play, see Federico García Lorca, *Federico García Lorca: Impossible Theater: Five plays and Thirteen Poems*, trans. Caridad Svich (Hanover: Smith and Kraus, 2000).
- 11 On *El paseo de Buster Keaton*, see R.G. Havard, *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies Liverpool* 54, no. 1 (1977): 13–20.
- 12 Ado Kyrou, *Luis Buñuel: An Introduction* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 143.
- 13 George D. Painter, *Marcel Proust: The Later Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), 320.
- 14 Marcel Proust, *La prisonnière*, ed. Jean Milly (Paris: Flammarion, 1984), 285–86.

- 15 Dalí, *Salvador Dalí: retrospective 1920–1980*, 202.
- 16 The remarks, and the document, are reproduced in Robert Descharnes and Gilles Néret, *Salvador Dalí 1904–1989: The Paintings, Part II, 1946–1989* (Cologne: Taschen GmbH, 2002), 476.
- 17 Buñuel subsequently made a film, *Ensayo de un crimen* (1955), in which a man who fantasizes disaster causes what is imagined to occur.
- 18 John Baxter, *Buñuel* (London: Fourth Estate, 1994), 75.
- 19 This mirroring (mimetic) operation of devouring death and being devoured by death brings to mind the writings of Roger Caillois and the French tradition in psychoanalysis dealing with the mirroring process.
 André Breton was known among his fellow Surrealists as “le tamar noir,” likely due to his tyrannical bent. Breton must have liked the sobriquet, for he chose the ant eater as an emblem and had Dalí make up bookplates with the animal’s image.
- For Dalí, the ant eater shows evidence of the savagery of reality. Expounding on his notion of documentary when presenting *Un chien andalou*, he wrote, “Side by side with a reality concocted to suit stupidity and its requisite safeguards . . . there are facts.” He gives this example of a savage fact: “The great ant eater reaches sizes bigger than the horse, possesses enormous ferocity, has exceptional muscle power, is a terrifying animal. The great ant eater eats only ants, availing itself of a tongue half a meter long, as thin as a thread.” Salvador Dalí, “Un film d’en Dalí,” *Mirador* (Barcelona), 23 May 1929.
- 20 André Breton and Philippe Soupault, *Les champs magnétiques* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 112.
- 21 Antonin Artaud, *Héliogabale ou l’anarchiste couronné* (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), 139.
- 22 Benjamin Péret, *Mort aux vaches et au champ d’honneur* (Paris: Arcanes, 1953), 43–44.
- 23 Paul Moorhouse, *Dalí* (San Diego: Thunder Bay Press, 2002); Rafael Santos Torroella, *La miel es más dulce que la sangre: Las épocas lorquiana y freudiana de Dalí* (Barcelona: Seix-Barral, 1984); Ian Gibson, *The Shameful Life of Salvador Dalí* (London: Faber and Faber, 1997).
- 24 The androgyne was played by the sculptor Fano Messan (1902–1998). After moving to Paris, Messan learned that women were not readily accepted as artists, and she began wearing men’s clothing. An article in the *Chicago Tribune*, reporting on the opening of an exhibition that included some of her work, stated that everyone on the Left Bank was amusing himself trying to guess Fano Messan’s sex.
- 25 Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí, *Un chien andalou*, transcription and introduction by Phillip Drummond, foreword by Jean Vigo [from “Vers un cinema sociale,” orig. pub. 1930] (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), 5.
- 26 Salvador Dalí, Lluís Montoyà, and Sebastià Gasch, “Anti-Artistic Manifesto (Yellow Manifesto),” reprinted in Salvador Dalí, *Oui: The Paranoid-Critical Revolution Writings 1927–1933* (Boston: Exact Change, 1998), 47–49.
- 27 Those whose intellectual proclivities might make them skeptical of this association would do well to recall Robert Bresson’s magnificent *Au hasard, Balthazar* (1966).
- 28 Dalí claimed that his brother (also named Salvador) had died of meningitis at age seven, three years before he was born. Carlos Rojas gives solid evidence that he was born thirty-one months before the second Salvador and died only nine months and ten days before the birth of the second Salvador, that the first Salvador lived not seven years but only twenty-two months, and that he died not of meningitis but of tuberculosis and gastroenteritis. Carlos Rojas, *Salvador Dalí, or the Art of Spitting on Your Mother’s*

Portrait (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 26ff. All this would make even more clear that the younger brother would have been traumatized on learning of the death of his sibling, whose name he assumed—he was conceived immediately after his older brother’s death, and he likely imagined that his brother’s spirit entered him at conception.

- 29 Luis Buñuel, “Buster Keaton’s *College*,” in *Unspeakable Betrayal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 109–11.

LAND WITHOUT BREAD: A SHOT ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

Note: I focus this analysis on the relation of the sound to the image, with the purpose of showing that inconsistencies among the elements of the film (and especially in its sound-image relations) imply a diegetic incoherence (similar to that which our analysis of *Un chien andalou* revealed)—both films convey the texture of reality but actually offer an impossible real. In the case of *Las Hurdes*, this impossible real constitutes a reflection on documentary and its authority (key topics for the *Documents* circle). To keep the descriptions of the sound and image in sync with each other, I often break the narration in the middle of a sentence and then pick it up in the next part of the transcription, starting in the middle of a sentence.

Credits—white letters against a sky with clouds:

UNPROMISED LAND (*Unpromised Land* was the American title for the film.)

Directed by LUIS BUNUEL

Photography: ELIE LOTAR

Assistants: PIERRE UNIK

SANCHEZ VENTURA

Notes on the personnel: Buñuel's cameraman on *Las Hurdes*, Eli Lotar, had collaborated with Antonin Artaud in his theatre, worked with the left documentarian Joris Ivens, and had published in *Documents* 6 an immensely horrific series on the slaughterhouses of Paris (whose Bataille themes, of the common abjectness of animal and human life and the resemblance between the abattoir and the place of worship, reappear in this film). Lotar first went to Spain in 1932, with the Trotskyite Yves Allégret, to make a film of Legendre's *Las Jurdes*, but Spanish authorities expelled them (and Lotar made a film on the fishers of Tenerife instead). Around that same time, he helped form the group Octobre, around the left Surrealist poet Jacques Prévert.

Co-writer Pierre Unik was an active Surrealist and belonged to the Communist Party in France. In 1932 (around the time the film was made), the precocious Unik, along with Aragon, quit Breton's circle as a result of differences arising from the 1930 Kharkov Congress for Intellectuals of the Revolution—there, Aragon proclaimed the primacy of Socialist Realism over Surrealism. Buñuel, for the most part, sided with Aragon.

Assistant Rafael Sánchez Ventura was a labour organizer, an educator, and an anarchist.

Funding for the film was provided by the artist Ramón Acín, also an anarchist.

For many years, film historians accepted Buñuel's testimony and maintained that the film was shot on location between 23 April and 22 May 1932, and was shown to the press in December of that year. However, as a result of examination of Buñuel's correspondence with Charles Voailles, it has been established that the film was shot in 1933—this is significant because the political situation that year was fraught, and conservative forces rejected the Republican authorities' proposals for agrarian reform and secular education. The script, by Buñuel and Unik, was completed in March 1934. In 1936, the film was approved for screening.

Following the credits, the screen fades to black and the narration begins.

Narration: The Hurdanos were unknown even in Spain until a road was built for the first time in 1922. Nowhere does man need to wage a more desperate fight against the hostile forces of nature. In light of this, the film may be considered as a study of human geography.

Commentary: There had grown up around *Documents*, the journal of the dissident Surrealists who congregated around Georges Bataille, an interest in the confluence of ethnography and Surrealism. The notion that the film is an exercise in human geography was probably also the result of Maurice Legendre's influence.

Eli Lotar's camera work is scrupulous in its efforts to preserve the relationship between the figure and the environment, so as to affirm this work is an essay in human geography.

If *Un chien andalou* had dealt with a bourgeois couple and the irruption of passion in their overly conventional life, *Las Hurdes* deals with a very different order of existence.

IMAGE 1 Map of Europe.

IMAGE 2 (fades in) Map of Spain.

Narration: In certain hidden and unknown spots in Europe, there still exist remnants of the most primitive type of human life; a typical example is to be found in Spain.

Commentary: The narration, together with the first map, establishes that *Las Hurdes* is not singular, that it is one of a number of communities where affliction determines a community's physiognomy. The use of the phrase "most primitive" suggests something primal. It implies the film will show us something appalling, terrifying, and brutal that lies at the "origin" of our civilization.

IMAGE 3 (fades in) Closer view of a map of Spain, highlighting the name of the region, "Las Hurdes," and shows it is positioned between Salamanca (at the time a Catholic Corporatist Republican bastion) and Portugal (at the time under the control of the Catholic Corporatist dictator António Salazar); fades to black.

Narration: Only sixty [sound skips, inaudible, probably should be "kilometres from"] Salamanca, with its own university, famous for its literary and scientific traditions, live the...

Commentary: Legendre's study of *Las Hurdes*, which Buñuel stated inspired his film, is titled *Las Jurdes: Étude de géographie humaine* (1927). Human geographers deal with the relation between physical geography and social and human phenomena. They seek places where the phenomenon being studied found exemplary expression. Human geographers used maps as Buñuel does here, to show that the physical features of a terrain give rise to an exemplary expression in a human phenomenology (here, affliction). So close to Salamanca, a centre of high civilization, is a realm that remains in an elemental state.

IMAGE 4 High-angle view of a narrow road in a village—in the distance, several women walk down a lane.

Narration: ...Hurdanos. They're cut off from the rest of the world by a lofty range of mountains. To reach the Hurdanos we are obliged to go through the...

Commentary: The film to this point has something of the quality of a travelogue—but the journey will become a voyage into the heart of darkness. Buñuel uses the travelogue form to suggest we will see reality as it is—that the film is a documentary and what it shows is real. The Hurdanos exemplify the mysterious, marvellous, bizarre, grotesque element that inhabits actual reality—so the film suggests. This is consistent with Surrealism’s fundamental aspiration, of showing that the fantastic inhabits the real. Furthermore, the narration emphasizes the interrelation of physical geography and the human condition—the theme of Jean Brunhess’s (1869–1930) and Maurice Legendre’s human geography—this implied scientific viewpoint amplifies the film’s realistic force. However, Legendre commented that his arrival in Alberca at nightfall “was an unforgettable revelation of the prettiest village in Spain, a medieval corner that has remained almost intact”—we see no evidence of that here.

IMAGE 5 (fades in) View of a road within the village. A man rides a donkey, and another man walks behind him, pulling a donkey, while a young boy moves up the street. Fades to black.

Narration: . . . village of Alberca, a comparatively prosperous community, where the feudal system is still in existence. Alberca has a decisive influence over the Hurdanos, who’ve always been its unofficial vassals.

Commentary: The phrase “where the feudal system is still in existence” offers an autobiographic allusion: the Aragon where Buñuel was raised was still feudal. He once remarked that in his hometown, Calanda, “the Middle Ages lasted until World War I.” In his autobiography *Mi ultimo suspire* (My Last Sigh, 1982), he noted, “As in the Middle Ages, death had weight in Calanda; omnipresent, it was an integral part of our lives.” In an interview concerning *Simón del desierto* (Simon of the Desert, 1965) that is reprinted in *Objects of Desire* (1992), Buñuel expressed nostalgia for that way of life:

Silence is nearly impossible today. . . . Can you imagine what the silence must have been like in the Middle Ages? Leaving a town or city, within a few steps you could find silence, or natural sounds, which are marvellous: songs of birds, of cicadas, or the murmur of rain. We have lost this in our time. There is an infernal instrument that really could have been invented by the devil or by an enemy of mankind: the electric guitar. What diabolical times we live in: crowds, smog, promiscuity [for all his Surrealism, Buñuel was to a remarkable degree sexually abstinent, and he and his wife kept separate bedrooms during their entire life together], radios, etc. I would

happily return to the Middle Ages, so long as it was before the Great Plague of the fourteenth century. (178)

The longing Buñuel expresses here is undoubtedly connected to his feelings for the devotion people of the Middle Ages felt for the Church (Buñuel felt an attraction to such devotion, but he could not give intellectual assent to faith)—Luis was raised with a passionate love for the Church, and embracing Surrealism may have been one of his attempts to find an alternative belief system. (Many thinkers were attracted to Bataille's philosophy for similar reasons.)

IMAGE 6 Camera tilts up the building.

Narration: This is the church of Alberca.

Commentary: This image is rather similar to one at the end of Legendre's book.

IMAGE 7 A slightly canted view of the church, from below.

Commentary: Eli Lotar has created an image that evokes the pictorial conventions of nineteenth-century documentary photography.

IMAGE 8 Medium shot of a religious structure, with a skull on each side and a cross on top.

Narration: These two skulls seem to preside over the destinies of the village.

IMAGE 9 Close three-quarters view of a building.

IMAGE 10 Wider view, camera tilts up to show a number of buildings in their entirety.

IMAGE 11 A boy stands against a wall, between two doorways. A bull comes out of the first doorway, along with a young boy; a dog peeks his head out of the other doorway. The two boys walk with the bull, as a man walks by with a donkey.

Narration: Most of their houses here have three stories. This type of architecture is unusual in Spain, giving the village a quaint, Medieval air.

Commentary: Eli Lotar's image that evokes the pictorial conventions of nineteenth-century documentary photography.

IMAGE 12 Detail of an inscription over a doorway—it is worn down, but seems to say

AVEMA RIAPVPISI-
MASINPE CADOCN

ANOECE VIDA, 1830

Narration: Over the threshold of the house is engraved the following inscription: “Ave Maria the Immaculate, who was conceived without sin.”

Commentary: The text is probably “AVE MARIA PURISIMA SIN PECADO CONSEBIDA.” In the nineteenth century, in some parts of the Extraduran region, this expression was used as a greeting—hence, it was appropriate to inscribe the text over entrances to houses. Buñuel would have been alert to the Hurdanos’s seeming moral turpitude and their show of faith—the shot conjoins realities that are distant from one another. (The phrase “Ave María Purísima” was also used as a vulgar exclamation.)

IMAGE 13 An older woman tends to another woman’s hair; a young girl sleeps in the background.

Narration: The day of our arrival, we found the women of Alberca arrayed in their finest dress, busily putting their final touches to their charms. We were told...

IMAGE 14 A wide-angle shot overlooking a crowd.

Narration: ... that it was in honour of their annual celebration. Going to the village square...

IMAGE 15 Several men in identical dress, on donkeys, in front of a building.

Narration: ... we find the whole population gathering around six young horsemen, the latest newlyweds of the year.

Commentary: This shot begins a new passage. The film has a very porous, episodic construction and often juxtaposes incongruous elements (suggesting incompatible or even impossible realities). In this sense, the construction of the film resembles collage. Furthermore, the ritual we are about to observe concerns death and sacrifice, and Bataille has written on the binding effects of death: its horror provides an occasion for an ecstatic feeling of togetherness, as we assemble to share our experiences of its accursed, fickle power.

IMAGE 16 View of three of the horsemen, young men in traditional, formal dress, smoking.

Narration: The costume requires that each one of these young men prove his prowess in a weird tournament of the cob.

Commentary: This image, too, evokes the pictorial conventions of nineteenth-century documentary photography.

IMAGE 17 A man lets go of a cock hanging from a rope; the camera pans up as he lets go—the bird is held up from the rope by its feet.

Narration: Villagers tie a cock to a rope by its feet and suspend it from one street corner to another. Each one of the bridegrooms on horseback must gallop by and wrest the cock's head from its body.

Commentary: Eli Lotar's shooting in this sequence evokes images he published in *Documents*, showing the nightlife of Paris and the abattoirs. *Un chien andalou* virtually began with an image (slitting a woman's eye) of violence; *Las Hurdes* has a scene that suggests violence at the core of Hurdano existence near its beginning. *Un chien andalou* suggests that violence is redemptive (it redeems life from tedium). With scenes such as this, *Las Hurdes* suggests that violence makes sacrificial victims of the Hurdanos (their acting out mirrors the savagery to which their lives subject them). Nonetheless, following Bataille, we will see this makes them sacred (sacrifice=*sacer*, holy + *facere*, to make—the holy outcast is never far from Buñuel's mind).

IMAGE 18 A close three-quarters view: each horseman rides by and tries to pull the bird's head from its body.

Commentary: In December 1933, *Las Hurdes* was banned for being degrading to the Spanish state. Buñuel tried to enlist Dr. Gregorio Marañón, who had accompanied King Alfonso XIII on a visit to Las Hurdes, to help with efforts to lift the ban (Marañón had been Buñuel's physician when he was at the *Residencia*). Marañón refused to help: on seeing the film, he noted that Alberca "has the most beautiful dances in the world, and its folk dress in magnificent seventeenth-century costumes," and was irate that rather than showing them, Buñuel chose to show this fiesta.

IMAGE 19 An older woman watching; children stand behind her—they too are watching the contest.

IMAGE 20 A high-angle shot of the crowd, separated into a number of groups—people walk by the camera.

Narration: After the ceremony, the bridegrooms parade the heads triumphantly all over the village. Then they offer wine...

IMAGE 21 Wide view of the men in traditional dress offering wine to people sitting along a curb.

Narration: ...to the assembled population.

IMAGE 22 A medium shot of some people pouring wine and others crowding around to get the wine.

IMAGE 23 A medium close-up, from the front, of one young man pouring wine, passing it to someone out of the frame.

IMAGE 24 Men sit on a curb, drinking and talking.

Narration: The cup bearers also distribute thousands of these wafers, and the crowd drinks to the health of the heroes...

Commentary: It is evident that this ritual is a strange variant of the rite of communion. Communion is the celebration of sacrifice.

IMAGE 25 Close-up of a man sitting against a pole, biting into bread.

Narration: ... of the day.

Commentary: We will soon be told that Las Hurdes is a land without bread. If, when we hear that, we remember this image, we take note of the contradiction, typical of those on which the film is based. Such inconsistencies among the elements of the film (and many of them occur in the relations between images and sounds) create an incoherent, and so impossible, diegesis. As we noted regarding *Un chien andalou*, the film does not cohere on the paradigmatic plane—it offers an impossible (one could say “missed”) real. This hollowed out non-reality is traumatic.

This sort of dialectical relation between image and sound is a remarkable achievement if we consider that the film was made just when the cinema was making the transition from silent to sound film. (Indeed, the film was shown silent until 1937, when the sound was added; prior to this, Buñuel read the voice-over from the projection booth.) The soundtrack offers an extraordinary reflection on the travelogue’s use of narration.

The narration on the sonorized version was written jointly by Luis Buñuel and Pierre Unik, and was read by Unik.

IMAGE 26 Back to shot 24 (men drinking and talking).

IMAGE 27 Back to shot 25: Now the man takes a drink.

Narration: Look at this infant literally covered by the silver trinkets. Though actually...

IMAGE 28 Close-up of a baby—the camera pans down, silver trinkets wrap the baby; hands come into the frame, showing off the various shapes.

Narration: ... Christian, these trinkets are amazingly like the charms of African natives.

Commentary: The exotic primitive appears within Spain’s borders—the desires that fuelled Spain’s extraterritorial adventures have brought forth the “exotic” and the “primitive” within its own homeland.

IMAGE 29 Distant view of the area in the village where the crowd stands.

Narration: Evening has come and we prepare to leave Alberca. By this time, most of the inhabitants are tipsy. From a high hill, about two miles from the village,...

IMAGE 30 (Fades in from black) Camera pans across a landscape (mountains and sky).

Narration: ... we perceive a range of mountains. In their folds lie fifty-two villages with a total population of eight thousand. Here live the Hurdanos. Over the threshold of most of the houses is engraved the following inscription: "Ave Maria the Immaculate, who was conceived without sin."

Commentary: Buñuel emphasizes the Christian concern with purity. The Hurdanos's concern with purity cannot be reconciled with their abjection. The two can exist together only in an impossible (irrational) reality. But Bataille's heterology understands that this impossible reality is actual—lame reason, however, cannot fathom its existence.

On the other hand, as Eli Lotar's work for *Documents* shows, photographs can make manifest the impossible real's actual existence. This is a privilege that attaches to photography (and to cinematography).

IMAGE 31 A distant view: the camera pans over a landscape of shrubs and comes to a standstill with a view of a church.

Narration: But first, we cross over the magnificent valley of Batuecas. For four centuries this valley was inhabited by the White Friars, who preached the gospel in the...

Commentary: In its viewpoint and framing, the image resembles one at the end of Legendre's *Las Jurdes*.

IMAGE 32 Medium shot of the tower of the church.

Narration: ... main Hurdano villages. Today, one friar alone remains, the sole inhabitant...

IMAGE 33 (fades in) The camera tilts up to show detail of a religious building, with a woman standing in front of it.

Narration: ... of what is left of the convent.

IMAGE 34 Close-up of the woman, from the front; she has wrapped a shawl around her head and tied it under her chin.

IMAGE 35 Close-up of a religious sculpture, embedded in an arched, framed opening in the wall of the church; the camera quickly moves down to an old, worn-out sign that hangs on the wall beneath the sculpture.

Commentary: Reason cannot reconcile the religiosity implied by the presence of the church in the midst of the Hurdanos's abjection. This is another example of the actual existence of the impossible real.

IMAGE 36 The camera pans down a wall with a sculpture in it, an archway appears, and the camera moves forward, into the valley.

Narration: In this valley, there are many caves, which have preserved traces of prehistoric life. On the walls, we found remarkably fine paintings of bees, goats, and human beings.

Commentary: The narration emphasizes how common bees, goats, and humans are in the area: Buñuel often associates—in this film and in many others—human beings with other forms of animal life.

The text also throws into relief the dialectical relation between the sound and the image. The narration refers to something we are not shown. That device brings the authority of narration into doubt. (In fact, there are nearby caves with prehistoric drawings.)

The impossible real is an amalgam of presence and absence. This allusion to something missing highlights the absence that is invested in the missing (or impossible) real.

IMAGE 37 The camera pans and the screen turns black (as the camera's view is obstructed). The pan continues past the obstacle. We see trees and, in between the trees, a view from above of the village's buildings.

IMAGE 38 The camera tilts up from the ground, over the architectural details of another ornamented religious building, and ends up on the sky.

Narration: Toads, adders, and lizards are the friar's only companions.

Commentary: The holy coexists with the abject. One of the purposes of Bataille's heterology is to dismantle hierarchies of every sort. Toads, adders, and lizards are generally thought to be at the bottom of the hierarchy of life forms, because they are among the simplest forms of life, and mammals to be at the top. Buñuel here associates humans with other strange beasts, stressing humans' proximity to what is strange, even dangerous. He challenges hierarchical thinking with his ironic reference to exalted religious figures.

IMAGE 39 Close-up of a water fountain squirting water in all directions; the camera pans to the ground, to a crawling toad.

Commentary: The shot brings together incompatible realities. It makes manifest that the impossible real is actual (a key implication of Bataille's heterology).

IMAGE 40 Extreme close-up of a toad moving across the frame.

IMAGE 41 View of a garden/orchard.

Narration: The vegetation is very luxurious. There are more than two hundred...

IMAGE 42 Close view of a snake moving over rocks.

Narration: ... varieties of trees growing in utter abandonment.

Commentary: Buñuel once again puts the strangeness of some living forms on display. Of course, the snake in the garden has religious (sacred) implications—the sacred and the abject actually coexist in the snake (and the serpent).

IMAGE 43 Camera pans at a distance, over trees and shrubs.

IMAGE 44 Medium view of trees by the side of a river.

IMAGE 45 A high-angle view, overlooking the river (with rushing water); the camera follows the water's movement.

Narration: But three miles from this valley, the soil changes abruptly; with the exception of a few fruit trees, there ...

IMAGE 46 Out-of-focus shot, medium view of bare branches.

Narration: ... is nothing but briar and heather.

IMAGE 47 Camera pans across a rocky, mountainous landscape.

Narration: The convent is surrounded by a wall ...

IMAGE 48 Camera quickly moves diagonally across the land overgrown with shrubs and trees; it stops at one chapel and then moves along to another.

Narration: ... about six miles in circumference. It protected the friars against the hordes of wolves and wild boars. Within the walls are the ruins of eighteen chapels.

Commentary: There are moments when the camera movement seems to suggest exhilaration and freedom. This is one. Ecstasy and religion are thus associated (in a Batailleian fashion).

IMAGE 49 A landscape (a hill and trees).

IMAGE 50 View of a chapel from a distance, in between trees.

IMAGE 51 A wider view of the same chapel and surrounding land.

Commentary: These last three images are rather similar to ones found in Legendre's *Las Jurdes*.

IMAGE 52 View of the sky and low hills along the very bottom of the frame.

IMAGE 53 Deserted hills.

Narration: Over these mountaintops, and we shall be in the midst of the Hurdanos.

IMAGE 54 Distant view of a small village, La Aceitunilla, is nestled in a valley, against a mountain.

Narration: This village is situated in one of the poorest of the valleys (technology in this era was still primitive, and the recording here is unclear). The white...

IMAGE 55 A village street, a woman walks with a child between stone houses.

Narration: ... building is a recently constructed schoolhouse. In the streets, we catch glimpses of...

Commentary: This image is similar to ones that appear in Legendre's book. The schoolhouse was likely built for King Alfonso XIII's visit in 1922. Juxtaposing the new to the old brings incongruous realities together.

IMAGE 56 A young boy with a pig walks up a small, narrow street.

Narration: ... everyday life.

Commentary: The introduction to this region is designed to make us believe that the everyday life is utterly remote from that of any other place on earth. In his introduction to a screening of *Las Hurdes*, Buñuel noted,

We must mention the most precious document of all, a book written in 1927 [not long before Buñuel would have begun thinking about making *Las Hurdes*] by the French scholar Maurice Legendre. For twenty consecutive years he visited the region and conducted a study that is admirable for its depth and scientific rigour.

Professor Legendre says that Las Hurdes resembles no other region in existence, and this on account of two characteristics: misery and pain.

Without any doubt there are many places in the world where people live in precarious and miserable conditions: villages in the Moroccan Atlases, Chinese hamlets, Hindu shantytowns, and so on. But in general, if conditions for the existence of a people become impossible, permanently impossible, that people emigrates en masse in search of a less hostile environment. This is not what happened in Las Hurdes. Individual inhabitants may emigrate, only to return at once.¹

Buñuel's comment tells us much about his interest in this region: Buñuel sees Las Hurdes as an exception to the banal reality of all that reason can organize into a system. It belongs to the realm of the heterogeneous. The contrast with

any other place where the people live in precarious and miserable conditions is complete: it is so abysmally different that it belongs to another order entirely, one that cannot be fathomed. Such transgressions of reason test the limits of documentary realism.

IMAGE 57 A man rides a donkey through the village, and the villagers (to his sides) tend to children.

Narration: Though the Spaniards as a race are naturally driven to song, never once did we hear anyone singing in these...

IMAGE 58 A group of children idle away their time, standing about on a street corner.

Narration: ...dreary streets.

Commentary: Buñuel repeated this point in an introduction to a screening of *Las Hurdes*. He stated,

Another incredible aspect of this region [Las Hurdes] is that there is no folklore. In all the time we were there, we didn't hear a single song. The people work in complete silence, without the help of song to ease their difficult tasks. The silence of Las Hurdes is unique in the world. In fact, it is not a silence of death; it is a silence of life. Perhaps less poetic than the former, but far more terrible.²

I doubt very much that this is true, but the remark does say much about the "traumatic realist" aesthetics of the film. A traumatic form of a "documentary" realism, not the extravagant poetic realism of distant realities fused in a unity, is called for when the subject is so terrible as to be fantastic ("fantastic" here referring to whatever defies reason).

IMAGE 59 A young girl, bent over at the side of a stream, washing household objects.

Narration: Occasionally we came across a wretched little stream trickling through the village. In some places, this...

IMAGE 60 A pig drinks from the stream.

Narration: ...is the only water available, and man and beast may come and use it.

IMAGE 61 A young girl holds a still younger child; with her cupped hand, she ladles water from the stream onto the child's face.

IMAGE 62 A young boy bent over the stream stretches forward, puts his mouth into the stream, and drinks; camera moves up as he gets up.

IMAGE 63 The camera moves along the length of the stream in an arc, until it reaches two older women using the stream to wash bowls and pots.

IMAGE 64 A closer view of one of the women washing a bowl.

IMAGE 65 A woman holds a baby over the stream to wash his head.

IMAGE 66 Three children by the stream dip bread in the water and eat it.

Narration: Until very recently, bread was unknown to the Hurdanos. The bread these children are eating was given to them at school. The master usually...

Commentary: The last ten shots have seemed to be examples of a rather straightforward documentary realism. This narration shifts the register of the image to the extraordinary. The religious implications of eating bread cannot be overlooked: by them the image unites the sacred with the abject (to be sure, that unity is implicit in the ritual of eating flesh and drinking blood).

IMAGE 67 Close-up of two of the children biting into the bread.

Narration: ... makes them eat it in front of him for fear that it may be taken away from them by their half-starved...

IMAGE 68 A large window with a flag hanging in it; a young boy looks out and rings a bell.

Narration: ... parents.

IMAGE 69 An older girl goes up to the three children and gathers them up to go to school; the camera tilts down along them as they walk.

Narration: And now to school.

Commentary: Here begins another episode in the film's loosely jointed, collage-like structure. Collage, as we have noted, is a form that seems appropriate to the cinema and to be rooted in its very character (which unbridles juxtaposition). Buñuel's (dissident) Surrealist form yokes collage and the abject—both of which are cinematic (photography/cinematography has an affinity for gritty reality).

Collage is an appropriate form when one wants to bring together elements that are inconsistent—that create an incoherent diegesis, evoking an impossible reality. The fact that the photographic or cinematographic image possesses the force of reality can be used (as Buñuel and Lotar do) to assert the actuality of the impossible real.

IMAGE 70 Inside a classroom, a teacher stands by the doorway, watching the children enter.

IMAGE 71 Close-up of a doorway, with young children entering (the school) . . .

Narration: These barefooted urchins receive exactly the same primary education as children all over the world. The clothing, or . . .

IMAGE 72 . . . and we lose sight of them behind a desk.

Narration: . . . what there is of it, is brought into this region by those of the Hurdanos who go to Castillo and Andalusia for . . .

IMAGE 73 Similar to shot 70: the teacher stands by the doorway watching the children enter.

Narration: . . . several months every year. Upon their return, they exchange their clothes for potatoes.

IMAGE 74 Medium shot of two young boys, sitting calmly in their desks.

IMAGE 75 Camera pans across the grim faces of the children.

IMAGE 76 The teacher, moving from one row to the next, lays out a book in front of each child.

Narration: These children are famished, but they are taught that the sum of the angles of a triangle equal two right angles.

Commentary: The narration mocks the ridiculously optimistic program of the Patronato de Misiones Pedagógicas, founded to bring culture to the rural populations of Spain. Buñuel was aghast at such ameliorationist programs—his increasingly Bataillean politics were grounded in the conviction that the true revolution would arise from that which is soiled, base, abject.

IMAGE 77 The camera pans beneath the desks, across the children's bare feet.

Commentary: There seems to be an incongruity here, with bare feet being introduced into the scene of instruction. This incongruity is richly overdetermined. Bataille's description of "The Big Toe" (*Documents* 6:23) notes that peasants associated feet with "the most nauseating filthiness." This leads him to celebrate the transgression involved in showing feet: the overcoming of taboos leads to a widening of consciousness, the result of unveiling what is deemed necessary to cover. In fact, the image of bare feet constitutes a real scene of instruction.

IMAGE 78 Medium shot of two young girls resting their heads over the desk.

Narration: Very frequently in Hurdanos villages, most of the children are *pilus*—that is, abandoned children. The Hurdano . . .

IMAGE 79 A girl stands up from her desk and walks towards the camera.

Narration: . . . women walk days across the mountains in order to get a *pilus* from the orphanage of Ciudad . . .

IMAGE 80 The girl, seen from behind, as she walks up to the front of the class, where the teacher sits.

Narration: . . . Rodrigo. They are paid fifteen cents a month for taking charge of them.

IMAGE 81 A boy picks up his book and gets up from the desk.

Narration: This sum was used to feed a whole family, until very recently, when the *pilus* trade was forbidden by the . . .

IMAGE 82 The boy from the previous shot walks over to where the girl stands—at the front of the class, near the teacher.

Narration: . . . government.

IMAGE 83 Close-up from a somewhat high angle: camera looks down on a boy as he takes in the lesson, then moves to a picture of a “fair lady” (with an elegance of a Louis XIV sort) on the wall above him.

Narration: And what is this fair lady doing here?

Commentary: The narration emphasizes the incongruous juxtapositions arising from the clash between the squalor of places like Las Hurdes and the social “advances” of the city. Such juxtapositions, which occur frequently, highlight the disruptive, heterogeneous character of squalid reality. Bataille’s revolutionary politics were grounded in the soiled, the base, the abject. They also critique the official optimism of the Second Republic. The politics of pessimism implied here relies on photography’s/cinema’s evidential power to contradict official “aestheticized” presentations.

IMAGE 84 The children hand their books in to the teacher, who stands at the front of the class.

IMAGE 85 Camera pans over the classroom, showing the children sitting behind their desks.

IMAGE 86 At the front of the class, a boy writes on the blackboard as the teacher watches.

IMAGE 87 Close-up of two boys as they look up from their writing books.

Commentary: These several shots have raised the possibility that education might improve the lot of the Hurdanos. However, the film lets us

know that such rosy Enlightenment optimism is misplaced when it comes to these people. A comment Buñuel made as he introduced the film to an audience, about one conceivable ameliorationist effort, makes clear that he had come to share Bataille's repudiation of such schemes:

Many solutions have been proposed to resolve this vexing social problem. We are not able to examine these now. We can only say that none of those put into practice has been effective. Perhaps the best solution was offered to us by an elderly woman of Las Hurdes whom we ran into one day on an improbable path. Upon seeing us, she set down the load of kindling she had been carrying and came toward us. "Are you engineers," she asked us, "and have you come to remedy our poverty? Well, you should know there is no remedy. If you want to save us from this hell, take us away from here by force, since we won't leave of our own free will."

And indeed, to end the problem of Las Hurdes would require moving its inhabitants by force, sending them to other parts of Spain, and destroying their wretched villages forever.³

The assessment is brutal. As harsh as we may find it (I certainly do), we might note that Miguel de Unanumo proffered that very remedy. He had contended that what keeps the Hurdanos in their wretchedness is that the free-thinking Hurdanos prefer "la majestad du su indigencia" (the majesty of their poverty) to living off the spoils of charity or doing day labour and sleeping on a friend's floor.

I have remarked on the difficulties that Buñuel had with Dr. Gregorio Marañón when he showed the film. Some of the difficulties may have stemmed from the fact that Dr. Marañón, as president of the Patronato de Las Hurdes, had taken part in such "ameliorationist efforts," in his case bringing medical care to the Hurdanos. He might have realized that the film, and Las Hurdes itself, brings those efforts, and the intellectual commitments that led to them, into doubt—and that might account for the fury with which he attacked Buñuel.

IMAGE 88 Close-up of the blackboard: a boy is writing words on it; he finishes and leaves the frame.

Commentary: Buñuel was struck by the conflict between the primitive civilization and the modern culture of Las Hurdes: the Hurdanos have the same needs and the same religion and moral principles as other moderns, but their means for satisfying those needs are hardly better than archaic people's.

Narration: But even these children are taught the golden rule.

IMAGE 89 The boys we saw in shot 87 look up at the blackboard, then back down at their writing books.

IMAGE 90 Pan across a mountainous landscape.

Narration: This valley is relatively prosperous with its walnut, cherry, and olive trees. And there is the village of...

Commentary: Here begins another episode in the film's loosely jointed, collage-like structure. As is so often the case in this film, the episode begins by establishing the physical context for the human phenomenon that will be studied. It will turn out that the physical context and human phenomenon are virtually in contradiction—though they are syntagmatically contiguous, their paradigmatic coexistence is impossible. Nonetheless, that coexistence is actual (and film can make its actuality manifest).

The camera movement evokes a sense of freedom.

IMAGE 91 A hillside and roofs of a village that look almost like shells on the hill's surface.

Narration: ... Martilandrán. Those round objects that you see, like the shells of fabulous turtles, are simply the village...

IMAGE 92 Closer view of these strange roofs; a woman holding a child stands to the side.

Narration: ... rooftops.

IMAGE 93 View down a small, narrow street in the village—on it are a woman with two children and (prominent in the foreground) a pig.

Narration: On arriving in Martinandrán, we are greeted by the ugly rasp of coughing. Most of the inhabitants of this miserable village are sick.

Commentary: Martilandrán had a special meaning for Spanish viewers at the time the film was made. In 1932, the ultra-conservative Dr. José Albiñana was accused of aggression against the Republic for his work as head of the radical monarchist Spanish National Party, and was sentenced to confinement in a farmhouse in Martilandrán. He described his experience of being brought there: the town, he said, was filled with a pestilential emanation like that from one hundred latrines. He described it as being made up of miserable huts, populated by a fecal, secular humanity who are disgustingly promiscuous and an animal species. The impoverished land is beset by a hostile nature. The Hurdanos he described as

a neolithic tribe that conditions repugnance. Whole families go a week without eating, lying in piles of ferns, waiting for a handout of bread. The house where Albiñana stayed became a pilgrimage site, which a thousand people (including bishops) sought. The authorities banned visitors, and this triggered an international campaign (led by the Fascist Action Française). As a result, his case was sent to trial, and he was exonerated. He wrote a book on the case—its cover showed bread being dipped in water and carried the caption “El pan, negro y duro, hay que remojarlo en el río para poderlo llevar a la boca” (The bread is black and hard, and must be soaked in the river before lifting it to one’s mouth). Buñuel incorporates this in *Las Hurdes* (see comment on image 66 and the description of image 111 and its accompanying sound).

IMAGE 94 Close-up of a sickly looking young girl, walking alongside a woman (not fully in the frame) who clutches her hand.

IMAGE 95 A pig in a ditch.

Narration: Goitre. The plague of the upper Hurdano mountains.

Commentary: Marañón recorded in his notebook that Martilandrán was an “espectáculo horrendo dantesco” (horrendous Dantean spectacle). Images of goitre, of a dead donkey’s head being eaten by flies, and so on, are images that expose the *informe*. Buñuel used the local honey to attract flies and bees to the dead animal—the image is constructed, not found.

IMAGE 96 A man sits holding a child.

IMAGE 97 Three grim-faced children stand against a wall; the camera moves up and to the right to show an older woman standing next to the children.

IMAGE 98 A young child, his hand held by an adult, walks towards the camera (the adult is not fully in the frame).

IMAGE 99 An older woman breastfeeds a child; another child sits next to her; fade to black.

Narration: This woman is only thirty-two years old.

Commentary: No viewer is likely to credit this statement. If it hadn’t already happened, with this claim the contract between viewer and narrator—the trust the viewer has in the narrator’s discourse—would be broken. Consequently, we are forced to rely on the photographic evidence. But in an irrational zone, even photographic evidence is suspect.

IMAGE 100 A vista along a stone fence by the side of a street; in the distance is a child with her head propped up on a rock.

Narration: In a deserted street, we come across this child. Our guide tells us that she has been lying there for the past three days, but no one seems to know...

IMAGE 101 Close-up of the child; the back of a man moves into the frame as he approaches her.

Narration: ... what her ailment is. One of our companions examines her. The child's throat and tonsils are terribly inflamed.

IMAGE 102 Close-up of the child's face; she opens her mouth wide.

Narration: But unfortunately, we could do nothing about it. Malady and infestation is their lot.

Commentary: It is moments like this that throw into relief the film's Batailleian framework. The left's idea of progress is a legacy of French Enlightenment thought: human misery, poverty, superstition, disease, and all forms of violence that humans perpetrate on each other would be eliminated by the progress of history, the course of which was inevitable, since its path was dictated by reason. Bataille's admiration for Kojève led him to dissent from that sunny view. Life is irredeemably cruel.

The close-up of the open mouth makes us aware that the camera / the image is being used as a scientific tool. But science depends on reducing everything to matter in motion, to make it amenable to a common set of measuring implements. But *Las Hurdes* is heterological—that is, the region resists being reduced to what can be measured (or assessed) by the standard tools.

Bataille had commented on the open mouth as a sign of infection. That comment led Eli Lotar to produce an image of a mouth gaping open for *Documents*.

IMAGE 103 Large close-up of her mouth, held open by a man's hands so that he can examine her; fade to black.

Commentary: Bataille's dictionary entry for "mouth" in *Documents* (15:299) is accompanied by a photograph by Jacques-André Boiffard (of "Big Toe" fame). Boiffard's image and this one, by Lotar, are strikingly similar.

Narration: Two days later, they told us that the child had died.

Commentary: Reality is defined by sacrifice and unproductive expenditure. The word *sacrifice*, Bataille reminds us, derives from *sacer* and *facere*, and means "to make holy." The Hurdanos are made holy through being sacrificed.

IMAGE 104 An older woman sits on a ledge in front of a doorway tending to a small pig and peeling potatoes over a bowl; the back of a man moves into the frame as he walks through the doorway.

Narration: What do the inhabitants of this barren country eat? As far as meat is concerned, only the most favoured of families possess a pig, which they save for a year and then devour in three days.

Commentary: Another episode in the film's collage-like structure begins here.

IMAGE 105 A woman peels potatoes—a child sits by her side, helping.

Narration: Otherwise, nothing but beans and potatoes; and during the months of June and July, not even that.

IMAGE 106 View of a plate at their feet, with potato peelings.

IMAGE 107 A very long shot of blooming olive trees.

IMAGE 108 Close-up of the branches.

Narration: Olive trees grow on more fertile spots, but the meagre crops are often destroyed by insects.

Commentary: A fleeting example of the “yes, but” rhythm of the film.

IMAGE 109 The camera tilts up to show two goats descending a rocky cliff; the camera follows them.

IMAGE 110 A long shot of rocky, mountainous land.

Narration: The goat is the only animal able to survive in this parched region. Goat milk is saved for the sickest members of...

IMAGE 111 Camera tilts up at the cliff face as one of the goats jumps from a high-up ledge and then the other follows.

Narration: ... the community; a rare treat is a crust of bread moistened with a few precious drops.

IMAGE 112 Same as shot 110.

IMAGE 113 A long shot: the camera pans (from a distance) across a mountain with a goat on it.

IMAGE 114 The goat begins to descend the mountain.

IMAGE 115 Close-up of the goat moving down the steep slope.

IMAGE 116 Long shot of the goat stumbling and plunging off the steep wall of the mountain. At the far right of the screen, there is a puff of smoke.

Narration: Goat meat is eaten only when this happens.

Commentary: In fact, the Hurdano diet consisted largely of lamb and goat prepared in a variety of ways. Staples of the area included *caldereta de cordero* (mutton stew), *cabrito en cuchifrito* (baby goat with fried pork), *frite de cordero* (mutton fry), *cabrito a la sal* (goat with salt), *cabrito al pol'en* (baby goat with pollen), and the *cabrito a la hortelana* (lamb stew with vegetables).

IMAGE 117 View from above as the goat plunges down the side of the mountain; fade to black.

Commentary: The implications of shots 111 to 117 are signal. First, far up a mountain, we see a pair of mountain goats scaling a treacherous precipice. The narrator continues with the theme that the Hurdanos' life is one of deprivation by remarking that goat meat is eaten only when an animal happens to slip on a loose stone and to fall to its death—an incident that happens only very rarely. Then, almost as if by an extraordinary *hasard objectif*, that rare occurrence takes place. But—and here is another example of the film's "yes, but" structure—the impression that the incident occurred by a remarkable (perhaps even miraculous) coincidence is dispelled when the spectators notice (as they almost without exception do) a puff of smoke at the right edge of the frame. The puff reveals that the goat has, in fact, been shot. The next shot confirms the revelation: Buñuel moves to a reverse-angle shot of the goat tumbling down the mountainside. Because no camera had been visible in the previous shot, the thoughtful spectator comes to the disturbing realization that the goat was carried back up the mountain, to be dropped once again so that the spectator might witness it tumbling down the mountainside in close-up.

The sequence raises important questions about the authority of documentary realism.

IMAGE 118 The tops of large, apparently primitive, containers in a field.

Commentary: A new episode in the film's collage-like structure begins here.

IMAGE 119 A wider view of these containers that allows them to be seen in their entirety. (They are beehives.)

Narration: The chief source of industry is beehives, which produce a very poor and a very bitter type of honey. The...

Commentary: The honey of the Extremadura region is famous—hence the remark brings into doubt the film's claim to truth.

IMAGE 120 From the side: the beehives, with a swarm of bees.

Narration: ... hives actually belong to people in Alberca, but are left with the Hurdanos during the winter months ...

IMAGE 121 Close-up of the swarming bees.

Narration: ... because of the comparatively mild climate.

Commentary: Another example of Buñuel's interest in exotic (marvellous) life forms: cinematography gives evidence that the marvellous inhabits the real—it establishes the actuality of the impossible real.

IMAGE 122 A swarm of bees on a textured surface.

IMAGE 123 Close-up of the bees crowded together.

IMAGE 124 Two of the beehives.

IMAGE 125 Close-up of the swarming bees.

IMAGE 126 Same as shot 119.

IMAGE 127 View from a hilltop: in the foreground, two men and a pack donkey follow a path across the hill.

Narration: In the spring, the hives are taken back to their owners.

Commentary: This sentence throws into high relief a common feature of Buñuel's use of narration in *Las Hurdes*. The narrator seems to be providing a rather bald interpretation of what we are seeing. But the narration typically does so much more: by highlighting one feature of what we are seeing, it blocks our seeing other features. In this film, narration often conveys the official interpretation of the lives of the Hurdanos, and that interpretation is repressive. That statement is true enough, but it obscures a deeper reason for the narration's banality—and a deeper issue of heterology's political hermeneutics. The reason the narration is banal is heterological—Hurdano reality defies any interpretation. It is utterly beyond understanding.

This insight allows us to see the dialectical relation between narration and image in another way: it embodies the antithetical relation between banal Western reason (which has been banalized by its alliance with power) and the wonder and disgust provoked by its heterological images.

IMAGE 128 Reverse shot, from below: the two men and the donkey wend their way across the top of the rocky hill.

Narration: One day, we met these two Hurdanos taking a load of hives to Alberca on a donkey.

IMAGE 129 Shot 127 continues.

IMAGE 130 The donkey stands over a shattered beehive.

Narration: Later in the day, we suddenly heard somebody shouting for help. One of the hives had fallen off the donkey.

IMAGE 131 Close-up of the bees swarming at the donkey's heels.

Narration: While desperately trying to shake off the greedy swarm, it upset the other two hives.

Commentary: A very Surrealist image—we could imagine it in a Dalí painting. Images 127, 128, and 129 depict an (almost) normal commercial life, something reason can understand. This image carries us elsewhere—into the heterological realm of wonder and disgust that reason cannot fathom (and that, consequently, is marvellous).

IMAGE 132 Close-up: the bees swarming around the neck of the donkey as it twists its head and contorts its neck to shake them off.

Commentary: An image of death—another mystery.

IMAGE 133 Close-up of the donkey, desperately trying to shake the bees off.

IMAGE 134 Close-up: the donkey twisting its head.

IMAGE 135 Shot 133 continues.

IMAGE 136 Close-up: the camera moves from the donkey's legs up to its head as the bees swarm the donkey.

Commentary: Foreign, alien, heterogeneous (in the sense that it refuses to be reduced to that which is commensurate with banal experience), Las Hurdes is traumatic.

IMAGE 137 Close-up of the donkey's face decaying, swarmed by bees.

Narration: An hour later, the donkey was dead. We were told that a few days before, three men and twelve mules had perished in...

Commentary: Humans cannot dominate death, and so cannot understand it. It belongs to the realm of the heterogeneous. When one is dealing with the heterogeneous, photographic realism itself is surreal. The image here has a semblance to the sliced eye in *Un chien andalou*.

IMAGE 138 Longer shot: a dog inspects the dead donkey, then picks at the carcass.

Narration: ... the same way.

Commentary: Not the slightest hint of banalizing aesthetics in this image; it is surreal.

IMAGE 139 The camera follows as a flock of birds fly out from a mountaintop and into the sky.

Narration: May and June are the two hottest months of the year for the Hurdanos. By that time, the stock of potatoes has long been exhausted. There is nothing to eat...

Commentary: A new episode in the film's loosely jointed, collage-like structure begins here.

IMAGE 140 A young man and woman sit down to eat berries.

Narration: ...nothing but these unripe cherries; the Hurdanos have no choice but to eat them, and as a result suffer...

IMAGE 141 Close-up of the woman's hand holding a small bunch of unripened cherries.

Narration: ...from chronic dysentery. Those of the men who have been spared by disease and fever set out for Castille and Extremadura with the hope of...

IMAGE 142 A tiny street in a Hurdano village; men come out of their homes, gather into groups, and go down the street together.

Narration: ...getting work in the harvest.

Commentary: Dr. Gregorio Marañón's tragic history of the Hurdanos presented the information that not only had some Hurdanos never eaten bread, but "algunos pasan dias enteros sin comer más que alguna yerba, algún nabo" (some go days without eating more than grass or a turnip). The import of this narration would be familiar to viewers acquainted with earlier commentary on Hurdano life—and that familiarity would bolster the impression that the film presents (documentary) truth. But this impression of truth, even though that of a work of traumatic realism, is undercut by scenes such as the goat's tumbling down the mountain (111–117). Thus, the narration here offers an example of the unresolvable tension between the reality effect of the confirming intertextual knowledge the film imports and the challenge to that effect of previous scenes in the film. This tension can be understood as arising from the dialectic between hearing (or reading) and seeing—between text and image.

IMAGE 143 Exterior close-up: a man leaving his home.

Commentary: A new episode begins here.

IMAGE 144 Long shot: a group of men going down a village road.

Narration: These groups are of ten, of thirty or fifty men, with only a blanket on their backs, empty hands...

IMAGE 145 Medium shot, low angle: the men against the sky and mountain; they are wearing hats and have blankets over their shoulders—they move towards the camera.

Narration: ... empty stomachs, mile after mile, in an endless search for food.

IMAGE 146 Closer view of the men as they advance towards the camera.

Narration: Several days later, the same group of men, returning as they went, with empty hands and empty...

IMAGE 147 The men, seen from behind, in a wide view (long shot) walking across a field; fade to black.

Narration: ... stomachs.

IMAGE 148 Medium shot, first of a river, then (as the camera tilts up) a field; two men appear (through a dissolve) in the field, chopping shrubs.

Narration: How do the Hurdanos build a field, which is their only source of nourishment? First, they pick out a plot of ground near a river, then with the help of friends and relatives, they ...

Commentary: A new episode begins here. Once again we are returned to an ordinary reality that can be understood by (homological) reason.

IMAGE 149 (fades in) Close-up of the two men, at work in the field, their backs to the camera.

Narration: ... clear off the thick undergrowth. They have only the most primitive tools, a pick and a shovel. Most of the ...

IMAGE 150 Fade-in to a medium shot: the camera pans down rocky land towards the river.

Narration: ... Hurdanos have never even seen a plough.

IMAGE 151 (fades in) The camera pans across a wall made of stones piled on top of one another: at the end, two men pile stones to construct the wall.

Narration: After having cleared the strip of land, they built a sort of stone barricade around it to protect the field from winter floods.

Commentary: Narration and image highlight the interrelations between physical environment and human actions (even though the previous

remark did nudge the information being provided here a little beyond what is fathomable).

IMAGE 152 Full-length shot: the men shovelling soil.

Narration: When this barricade is up, they go to the surrounding mountains and fill...

IMAGE 153 A view from a distance of the men walking across rocky land carrying sacks.

Narration: ...sacks with richer soil; this alone usually takes them several weeks.

Commentary: This reinforces the suggestion that *Las Hurdes* is an essay in human geography. The narration that follows offers another example of the film's use of the "yes, but" construction, which carries us beyond conventional science (even human geography) into heterology.

IMAGE 154 Close-up of one of the men dumping the soil from the sack to provide foundational support for the stone barrier.

IMAGE 155 Medium shot: rushing water, the camera tilts up to the land; we see a man's legs—he is cultivating the soil.

Narration: See how thin this precious layer of soil is—the first year, the harvest is good, but the soil soon loses its minerals and becomes barren once again.

IMAGE 156 A high-angle long shot of the cultivated land by the river; the camera pans over it.

Narration: These narrow strips of land along the river bank are the only cultivated areas, but when winter comes, the river often rises and wipes out the whole year's labour.

Commentary: Another example of *Las Hurdes*'s "yes, but" structure. Luis de Hoyos, an anthropologist who accompanied Legendre to Las Hurdes, wrote a piece for Spain's national press arguing the need for agricultural reform. He noted that the average Hurdano is typically disfigured by "hernias, bocio, cretinismo, viruela y otros enfermedades ad quiridas con harapos contaminados" (hernias, goiter, cretinism, smallpox and other illnesses from contaminated rags). He also remarked in the unfathomability of the Hurdanos's continuing efforts to raise crops, when the meanness of the land's surface precluded success.

IMAGE 157 A high-angle shot of rocky land with sparse vegetation—the land slopes down to the river; fade to black.

Narration: Here is a typical Hurdano river weaving its way through a miniature field.

IMAGE 158 The camera follows a man as he walks through a field, then it pans further, to a woman walking ahead of the man. Then it pans faster, to another woman who walks ahead of the first, and then further, to another man who walks ahead of the other three.

Narration: But with no money or domesticated animals, the Hurdanos have no way of procuring fertilizer. This family walks for miles up the steep mountain paths searching for the wild strawberry tree [an evergreen fruit tree of the arbutus family].

Commentary: Music swells over this image, one of the places in the film where Brahms's Fourth Symphony is heard. The contrast between the lofty music and squalid existence of the Hurdanos is telling.

The noble music may have to do with the connotations of the strawberry tree for Spaniards. The strawberry tree is the symbol of Madrid and evokes royalty and the court (as the tree was used as an emblem on the king's coat of arms). The painting by Hieronymus Bosch we now ordinarily call *The Garden of Earthly Delights* (done between 1490 and 1510) was not originally known by that name. Earlier writers sometimes referred to it as *La lujuria* (The Lust), because the central panel—which raised speculation that Bosch was an Adamite (a sect that practised nudity in the hope this would eventually, through the magic of imitation, return faithful practitioners to paradise)—shows scores of nude bodies cavorting among the fruit of strawberry trees. King Philip II bought the painting in 1593, and it has belonged to the Spanish crown since (in 1939, it was moved to the Prado for display). Inventories of the Spanish crown's possession referred to it as *La Pintura del Madrono* (The Painting of the Strawberry Tree) so as to avoid mention of its sexual character. There is a striking irony in the possible intertextual imports.

The camera movement elicits feelings of freedom and exhilaration that reinforce the effects of Brahms's music.

IMAGE 159 A low-angle shot looking up at a mountain: the backs of the heads of the family enter and advance towards the camera.

Narration: This plant effectively produces an inferior type of fertilizer; in spite of this, the peasants will endure the...

IMAGE 160 The family advances (through large shrubs) towards the camera (crossing the frame).

Narration: . . . greatest hardships in order to obtain it.

IMAGE 161 Medium close-up: the lower legs of the group, walking down a path.

Narration: Shoes are a rare luxury and the roads are cruel to naked feet.

IMAGE 162 View from behind, as the group breaks up and disperses among shrubs, carrying their sacks with them.

IMAGE 163 Close-up: an old bent woman carries a sack and picks at the shrubs.

Narration: Here at last are the precious strawberry trees. But their trials are not yet at an end. For this apparently harmless plant is the haunt of the . . .

IMAGE 164 A woman bent over the shrubs, while a young man stands over her, holding a sack.

Narration: . . . deadly adder.

Commentary: Buñuel associates the serpent with life and death—the serpent is an image of a menacing super-reality.

The last three sentences of the narration illustrate how Buñuel/Unik highlight our uncertain relationship with reality. We are appalled by the struggle the Hurdanos go through to find a strawberry tree, then delighted they find one, then aghast that discovery itself can be deadly—this is another instance of the “yes, but” trope.

IMAGE 165 Close-up of a man from the front: he holds up his wounded hand.

Narration: The peasants are frequently bitten. This is seldom fatal in itself, but the Hurdanos generally infect the wound . . .

IMAGE 166 Close-up of his hand.

Narration: . . . by their unhygienic efforts to cure it.

Commentary: Another example of the “yes, but” structure.

IMAGE 167 Close-up of the man’s face.

IMAGE 168 Similar to shot 165: the man stares at the wounds on his hand.

IMAGE 169 The back of a woman carrying a stuffed sack through a field.

IMAGE 170 The camera follows a peasant carrying a stuffed sack into the village up a path towards his home; he opens the front door and walks in.

Narration: When the leaves have been gathered, the peasant returns to the village to spread them over the floor of his house. Human beings and animals alike will make a bed out of them.

IMAGE 171 Interior of the house: the peasant enters with his sack, pours its contents onto the floor, and spreads them out.

Narration: Little by little, these leaves will rot and can then be used as fertilizer.

IMAGE 172 Interior of the house, in low light: a man's legs step across a floor spread with leaves.

Narration: This is a house in Pragosa; as in all Hurdano homes, the floor is strewn with leaves of the strawberry tree.

IMAGE 173 Reverse angle, still of the house's interior: a man, seen from the back, moves away from the camera.

IMAGE 174 A woman and two children sit on a ledge in a primitive kitchen; the woman prepares the stove.

Narration: A typical house; the few kitchen utensils are of the most primitive type.

Commentary: These last six shots, and the next four, seem like shots from a run-of-the-mill social documentary (especially one from the era when the film was made). But soon the film undercuts that sense, by making us see what they present as troublingly extraordinary. The film repeatedly returns us to ordinary reality (and presents itself as an exercise in human geography) only to expose it as traumatically sur-real: the Hurdanos are crushed (abjected, made holy) by what is beyond them.

IMAGE 175 Low-rise rooftops of the peasants' homes; smoke gathers.

IMAGE 176 Close view of the smoke escaping between the stones of the home.

Narration: No windows or chimneys. Cooking becomes a dangerous and unhealthy enterprise.

Commentary: Menace haunts everyday reality. Reality is not benign—it is fraught with an abhorrent super-reality.

IMAGE 177 Close-up of the smoke moving along the stones that make up the house wall.

IMAGE 178 Similar to shot 175.

IMAGE 179 Wide view of a plot of land.

Commentary: Here begins a new episode in the film's loosely jointed, collage-like structure, which allows Buñuel to construct relations among elements that, though seemingly syntagmatically well formed, because of inconsistencies among the elements, do not form a coherent diegesis. (This

incoherent diegesis—this impossible real, whose reality effect depends almost entirely on the power of the cinematograph—has no discernible relation to the Hegelian Real, which can be identified with Reason).

IMAGE 180 High-angle long shot: a man walks over rocks in a very shallow stream.

Narration: In the summer, the rivers are nearly all parched; this is one of the reasons for the prevalence of a particularly venomous type of mosquito. A great majority of the Hurdanos have swamp...

IMAGE 181 High-angle close-up: the man lifts a ladle from the water.

Narration: ...fever, in spite of the desperate efforts of the medical units in the trading posts.

Commentary: Another example of a strange and menacing life form.

IMAGE 182 Close-up of the water in the ladle; there are tiny creatures swimming in the water.

Narration: The larvae of the fever mosquito are obliged to come to the surface of the water in order to breathe. It is easily recognized because it always stays parallel to the water, whereas the...

Commentary: The menacing super-reality has the quality of something otherworldly. Buñuel would later use insect forms in his films to suggest that nature is replete with mysterious, surreal, heterological forms.

IMAGE 183 A textbook diagram of the Anopheles mosquito, the species of mosquito that transmits malaria to humans. The female is among one of the most capable vectors of human disease.

Narration: ...ordinary mosquito takes a vertical position.

Commentary: The diagram shows how bizarre the forms that nature produces are: nature is propelled towards what, in its strangeness (marvelousness), is supernatural. Insects belong to the night world—we consign them to the realm of the aberrant, even though they are natural forms. They collapse the distinction between the aberrant and the normal. Reality is abject—and that makes heterology necessary.

IMAGE 184 An illustration/diagram of an ordinary mosquito.

Commentary: Marañón in “Notes on the Pathology of Las Hurdes” (*Medicine Ibera*, 8 March 1924) offers a catalogue of conditions one sees among the Hurdanos, starting with malarial fever and continuing with typhoid, syphilis, smallpox, trachoma, ringworm, and anxiety hysteria.

These diagrams suggest (imaginatively) that the vectors for disease proliferate throughout Las Hurdes. Science reports on nature's menacing creativity. With this section, the film assumes something of the pastiche form so appropriate to a heterological work.

IMAGE 185 A man sitting on a rock, shaking.

Narration: This man is in the advanced stages of a fever. Everywhere, we meet these...

IMAGE 186 A woman lying on rocks near a pigsty, leaning forward so that her face is obscured; the camera pans to a road or pathway.

Narration: ... pitiful human wrecks, suffering in stolid silence.

Commentary: The woman, or girl, is outside trying to cool her fever. The camera's un pitying view helps make the image an indictment of the failure of the many efforts to improve the lot of the Hurdanos. Lotar's camera work almost always keeps the figure in the environment: we are required to recognize the role the miserable countryside plays in creating the Hurdanos's lot.

IMAGE 187 Exterior of a home: a woman rests in front of it.

IMAGE 188 Close-up of the woman; fades to black.

Narration: Dwarfs and morons are very common in the upper Hurdano mountains.

Commentary: The life force produces these aberrations—these “monstrosities” in abundance. Bataille considered such aberrations as transgressions: here they are sometimes the result of incest, but always of topography. Marañón offered a related comment or a reason for the Hurdanos' misery: a priest told him that “hay bastantes sodomitas” (there are many sodomites). He also commented on the many polygamous families and cohabitation. Hurdano society is made abject by practising what every civilization holds to be taboo.

IMAGE 189 Three childlike men run along a pathway and set themselves down on rocks.

Narration: Their families employ them as goatherds, if they're not too dangerous.

IMAGE 190 Close-up, from the front, of one of the dwarfs: he smiles and runs his hands over the ground.

IMAGE 191 Similar to shot 189: the three dwarfs.

IMAGE 192 Close-up of another dwarf with a toothless smile.

Narration: The terrible impoverishment of this race is due to lack of hygiene, under- . . .

IMAGE 193 Close-up of two of the dwarfs; the camera pans over to the third (the smallest of the three).

Narration: . . . nourishment, and constant intermarriage. The smallest one of these dwarf creatures is twenty-eight years old. Words cannot even express the horror of their mirthless grins as they play a sort of hide-and-go-seek. The realism of a Zurbarán or Ribera comes a poor second in the face of a reality such as this.

Commentary: Buñuel provides another example of a grotesque sur-reality. The remark on Zurbarán's and Ribera's realism suggests the cinema's superiority over painting when it comes to moral concerns.

IMAGE 194 The three dwarfs.

IMAGE 195 A pile of rocks, from beneath which another dwarf emerges.

IMAGE 196 The three other dwarfs laugh while they watch the goings-on.

IMAGE 197 Close-up of the man that appeared from beneath the rocks; he is grinning.

IMAGE 198 He moves forward.

IMAGE 199 Another man sits, propped up by a rock.

IMAGE 200 Medium close-up of two dwarfs talking and laughing; fade to black.

IMAGE 201 A group gathered in front of a home.

Narration: What is this gathering, here?

Commentary: A new episode begins here.

IMAGE 202 A baby.

Narration: We are told that a baby just died.

IMAGE 203 A young woman.

Narration: And here is its mother.

IMAGE 204 A man carrying the baby moves through the crowd outside a home.

Narration: Death is one of the few events that break the monotony of these wretched lives.

Commentary: Bataille pointed out that the awesome power of the sacred will consume and destroy the one it consecrates—as it has this baby.

IMAGE 205 A number of women and children cross the frame.

Narration: Women of the village are all hastening to the bereaved's home.

IMAGE 206 The man carries the baby across a field.

Narration: There are no cemeteries in most of the villages. The tiny corpse is therefore put into a trough and carried for miles...

Commentary: The narration is correct to say “trough”—the baby's body is put into a tray used to make bread. The symbolism is clear: elsewhere, this device is used to produce bread, the “staff of life,” but in Las Hurdes it is used to carry the dead. Las Hurdes is an inverted realm where all customs are upside down. Furthermore, the trough is used as a boat to transport the dead, as we read of in mythology.

IMAGE 207 View from a different angle of the man carrying the baby across a field, with another man following.

Narration: ... across the brush to the nearest one, in Nuño Moral.

IMAGE 208 A lake.

IMAGE 209 Two men sit at the edge of the lake pulling up their pant legs.

IMAGE 210 Close-up of a man uncovering the trough/coffin.

IMAGE 211 Close-up of the baby.

IMAGE 212 Similar to shot 210: the man, covering the trough/coffin.

IMAGE 213 The man walks across the water and hands the trough to another man.

IMAGE 214 Close-up of the trough/coffin floating across the water.

IMAGE 215 Trough/coffin floating on the water: another man picks up the trough and carries it.

IMAGE 216 Long shot of the rocky landscape; the camera moves down to a silhouette of a structure with a cross over top.

Narration: Here's a typical Hurdano cemetery.

IMAGE 217 Camera pans across a field to a tombstone.

Narration: A wooden cross or stick in the guise of a tombstone.

IMAGE 218 A wooden cross or stick that serves as a cross stands in the centre; hands (seen in close-up) prepare the ground for the interment.

IMAGE 219 Interior: a church.

Narration: The only thing of luxury in the Hurdano villages is the churches.

IMAGE 220 A church interior; fade to black.

Narration: This one is situated in one of the forest villages.

IMAGE 221 Interior of a house: a family sits around a cooking pot.

Narration: This is one of the more comfortable homes.

Commentary: A new episode begins here. Once again, we are returned to an almost comfortable human reality that has not been invaded by forces from a menacing beyond.

IMAGE 222 A close-up of a man stirring the pot.

IMAGE 223 Interior of the home.

Narration: Note the efforts at interior decorating.

IMAGE 224 Similar to shot 221: the family around the pot.

IMAGE 225 An old woman rings a bell in a dark alley as she walks away from the camera.

Narration: When someone dies, it is customary for an old woman to ring the funeral bell through the deserted streets at the fall of night.

IMAGE 226 The woman, seen from behind.

IMAGE 227 Similar to shot 221: the family around the pot.

Narration: All the inhabitants of a Hurdano home eat, sleep, and dine in the same room.

IMAGE 228 The other side of the room—a man walks through the doorway.

Narration: This type of house, with a stable on the ground floor and the combined kitchen and bedroom above, is considered a luxury.

IMAGE 229 Reverse shot (from the side with the pot): we see the man who entered through the doorway.

IMAGE 230 Another reverse shot (returns to the same point of view as shot 228): the man in the doorway removes his outerwear.

Narration: Exceptionally, it even contains the bed.

IMAGE 231 High-angle shot onto a stone gable and the alley beneath it: the old woman walks up the alley, ringing the bell.

Narration: During the winter months, Hurdanos sleep in their clothes; they wear them year after year until they fall into tatters.

IMAGE 232 A closer view: the camera scans a sleeping family.

IMAGE 233 Close-up of the old woman.

Narration: A woman calls out into the night:

IMAGE 234 A closer view of the old woman who is speaking.

Narration: “Awake! Awake! May the angel of death steal upon you unawares. Awake and say an Ave Maria that his soul . . .”

IMAGE 235 A medium long shot of the old woman standing in the alley.

Narration: “ . . . may rest in peace.”

IMAGE 236 Wide view of a mountainous landscape.

IMAGE 237 “FIN”—in white against black.

NOTES

- 1 From Buñuel’s introduction to a screening of *Las Hurdes*, as “Land without Bread,” in Luis Buñuel, *An Unspeakable Betrayal: Selected Writings of Luis Buñuel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 219–20.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 221.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 222.

ANALYSIS OF LAWRENCE JORDAN'S *DUO CONCERTANTES*

PART ONE: THE CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION

(Intro shot 1) A handwritten jittering Roman numeral “I,” in white on a black ground (the figure “I” is scratched into the film).

(Intro shot 2) The frame moves down, revealing the words “Gaiety Theatre” and, on a new line, “no fees for booking programmes, or cloak rooms.”

(Intro shot 3) [blank, then words appear] “The Centennial Exposition”

[small text below, unreadable]

“No Fees”

Various figures appear around these words; possibly characters from unidentified theatrical presentations.

1. A still image: the camera/frame moves out to give a full view of the exterior of a large building; possibly an arcade (flags hang at the end of peaked roofs).

Commentary: The building's dome resembles that of a Cabalistic-Alchemical temple, such as that depicted in an altarpiece of a church in Bad

Tenach (near Calw). Tommaso Campanella, in *Civitas Solis* (The City of the Sun, 1623), writes of an alchemical temple with flags flying over its dome. Furthermore, Jordan might have associated the image with the old Ocean Beach pavilion (and its nearby windmill).

2. Inside an arcade—in the background is a woman looking into a shop window: the collage presents the upper body of a moustachioed man with a book, who “slides” across the frame—he enters at the right and leaves at the left; the book is open to an illustration of a birdcage; he holds open a page and peers at it, then looks up.

Commentary: As Benjamin’s writings show, an arcade, with its wondrous collection of objects severed from their usual context and implausibly assembled according to no discernible rational principle, but in such a way as to elicit desire, is an inherently Surrealistic form.

3. Birds sit on a ledge below an opening (a window), among bushy plants; a hand, with a bird sitting on an outstretched finger, enters through the opening (window); the hand rises to let the bird fly off (it leaves the frame on the left).

The movements of the figures vary from the time it would take to perform them in reality: sometimes the time is distended, sometimes contracted, and sometimes it is difficult to determine the relation between screen time and “real time.” This endows the sequence with a marvellous quality—in the course of commenting on collage and its cinematic origins in *Les pas perdus*, Breton specifically cites the expansion and contraction of time, an effect readily achieved by film, as a means of engendering the feeling of *le merveilleux*.

Commentary: Ernst frequently used avian imagery to suggest transcendent knowledge—and the volatile spirits that escape during the alchemical process (which is akin to the distilling process).

Even by this point, viewers will have recognized the film’s oneiric character—it presents itself as a familiar, even comforting, dream. Jordan’s mentor, Robert Duncan, spoke of this dreamy state as being that in which deep understanding emerges, in the form of myth.

4. The man with the book moves along the bottom of the frame, from the right towards the middle, and stops; he tilts his head back and looks up; in the background, various groups of people stand around in the arcade’s interior (a narrow structure with a doorway at the end); as the man looks up, the camera/frame tilts to show the rest of the structure, which, we discover, is a windmill or, perhaps, an arcade/entertainment centre in the form of a windmill (after the style of Paris’s Moulin Rouge); the camera/frame stops on the rotating windmill and its peaked roof—a bird flies by, entering from

the top-right corner and leaving the frame at the left, then another enters at the left and perches on the roof, then two birds enter from opposite sides.

5. The man with the book moves along the bottom of the frame, entering at the right and leaving at the left; in the background is a building with flags of various nations on a number of gables; there are also several groups of people in the background.

Commentary: A reader is a fascinated subject. The building itself resembles traditional illustrations of the memory theatre.

6. A ball bounces down chairs arranged in tiers; the camera/frame tilts down as the ball moves down to the lower tiers; various chairs are gathered together behind a barricade: a boy in a white mask stands to the side and watches as the ball bounces out of the frame on the right.

Commentary: The idea of fascinated spectatorship is associated with absence of the self, with being taken over by another, with the idea that "Je est un autre."

7. A display of pharmaceutical bottles (of various sizes) in a case of shelves behind a small barricade; the ball enters on the left, bounces across the base of the display, and leaves the frame on the right side; a small figure (the person is not much larger than the bottles) stands looking at the display.

Commentary: The medicine bottles evoke the idea of magical elixirs. Many alchemical texts depict apothecaries very much like this.

8. A larger ball comes down from the top-left corner, and the camera/frame moves along a canopy frame attached to a glass display case; a man stands behind two women at the left side of the structure, examining the display case; the ball bounces across the display, leaving at the right side of the frame.

Commentary: Sequence 6 suggested the decreation (absence) of the spectator who is consumed by fascination, and sequence 7 suggested magical elixirs. Sequence 8 evokes the associated idea of the reliquary.

9. A man with a moustache, wearing a suit, stands in a lake: his legs are covered by water—he faces left and holds a plate with one hand. He raises and lowers the plate, bouncing a ball on its surface (the plate serves as a racket); the ball bounces to the top of the frame; the man draws his hand back behind his body (it disappears in the process). When the hand reappears, it is holding a cup, which he continues to use to bounce the ball; again, he draws his hand back behind his body, and when it reappears, it is holding the plate, which he uses to bounce the ball. He again draws his hand behind his back, and when the hand reappears, it holds a cup, which he uses as a racket.

Commentary: Alchemists made use of an instrument known as a cupel, a small cup or plate made of porous material. (It is interesting that Jordan's image combines both.) Cupellation is the process of heating a substance in a current of air, to transform it (ultimately into gold).

10. A ball (quite large, almost the size of the person) bounces in front of a pyramid—which is some sort of display, enclosed by a small fence (the pyramid looks almost like a scale of the sort that amusement parks have to measure strength); a Turkish or Arabic man stands in front and two women to the side, all watching what is going on.

Commentary: Once again Jordan suggests the sense that a mystery evokes a fascinated spectatorship. The pyramid is a sort of three-dimensional triangle, and in alchemy a triangle represents the three heavenly principles of Sulphur, Mercury, and Salt.

11. A large circular object (three-quarters of the width of the person), with a tube extending out at the bottom sways side to side within a window of what is likely a shop; a man and a woman watch from one side and a single man from the other.

12. Two large (size of the person) potted flowers (a poppy and a lotus with numerous pointed petals) sway side to side; a man stands to the left side with his back to the spectator.

13. The face of a bandaged man at the left side; a bandaged hand holding a medicine bottle comes up from the bottom and places the bottle inside a boxy chemist's device, then puts a second bottle inside the chest; the man moves out of the frame. A ball at the end of a bar rotates; the bottles begin to float up and new bottles appear where the old ones were; they also float up; bottles enter from the left side of the frame and float up too.

Commentary: The bottles perhaps contain the volatile factors released through distillation; note in this connection the film's emphasis on levitation.

14. The sequence starts with the face of the bandaged man in the lower-left corner; the head and shoulders of a mustachioed man (the man with the book) comes into the frame at the lower-right corner; the background appears to be the interior of a store with a number of displays; a flat display case can be seen next to the man in bandages. A bandaged hand enters the frame from the bottom and comes to rest in front of the display case; simultaneously, balloons rise out of the case and float out of the frame.

Commentary: The display case represents the human body, and the balloons, the spirits rising out of it (volatilization).

15. An eagle flies across a black frame, entering at the top-left corner and leaving at the bottom right.

16. The eagle flies into a black frame at the top-left corner and a balloon rises above a building (the roof of the arcade); the eagle passes across the frame, takes hold of the balloon, and leaves the frame in the lower-right corner.

Commentary: Wondrous conjunctions occur, suggesting the power of the imagination. In alchemy, the eagle symbolizes the element air.

17. A flickering ball in a black frame moves with a jittery motion (like that of a spark); it explodes into stars and a butterfly flies out of the frame at the right.

18. A building in the lower-right corner, and, above a starry sky with a ram enclosed in a white circular border—occasional white flashes issue from the top of the building, scattering stars, butterflies, birds, and flickering balls about—they circle the sky; a small boy pops up at the bottom of the frame.

Commentary: These circular motions (like those of the medicine bottles) evoke ideas of ritual perfection.

I noted in my commentary in the main text that Jordan believes his films offer healing or instructive stories whose forms resemble those of Surrealist narratives (in requiring viewer/reader participation). By this point in the film, many viewers, I suspect, will have come to realize that if the film offers a narrative, it is of a form closer to that of Ernst's *Une semaine de bonté* than to that of Buñuel and Dalí's *Un chien andalou*. But Jordan goes even further than Ernst, inasmuch as there is no narrative progression to the work (the film does not, for example, recount the stages in one's spiritual evolution). Lacking that sense of development, the film dissolves into a series of awe-inspiring wonders—the slight sense of narrative cohesion depends almost entirely on the presence of a common figure in many shots. The lack of a narrative propulsion and the awe-inspiring cabinet-of-wonders character of the work strengthens its images' presence—and that serves the "healing moment" effect (discussed below) which, as Sitney notes, depends on the coincidence of film time and real time, or, we might say, the actual moment's presence.

19. Slightly off-centre, and against a black background, there is a balance scale under a glass cover—a bandaged hand protrudes from the top; a ball attached to the scale flickers. Two skinless men enter from the sides of the frame, greet each other (grasping each other's hands in front of the balance scale), then move side to side, as though arm wrestling; a shell appears, obscuring the face of the man on the right.

Commentary: Alchemy speaks of the person who has undergone calcination as being skinless (as that process results in more fragile aspects of the self being exposed). Furthermore, it results in darker and more aggressive aspects coming to the fore. The strife is between the Soul and the Spirit.

20. The men separate: the man on the right moves down on the right side; the man on the left moves higher up on the left side; the balancing scale and banded hand disappear, and the flickering ball binds with the left man's fist—his arm is raised and the ball flickers at the end of it; two balls and two glass bell jars appear simultaneously and move around the flickering ball in a circle.

Commentary: More circular motions.

21. A man in a suit bouncing a ball with a plate (which serves as a sort of tennis racket) enters a black frame at the left—he faces the left side, moves towards the centre of the frame, then moves back towards the left.

22. A hand with its index finger extended (pointing) and a sphere with a tube attached to a flickering ball enter a black frame from the bottom; the flickering ball balances on the end of the finger and oscillates, moving from side to side as though trying to keep balance.

23. A hot-air balloon with butterfly wings that move from side to side attached to its sides (near one end); it enters a black frame and moves from the bottom up, leaving the frame at the top.

Commentary: Wondrous rhyming action: the ball in sequence 21 and the hot-air balloon in this sequence exhibit similar (sympathetic) movement. They inhabit a world of magical correspondences. The transforming power of the imagination is suggested. (In this book, we examined the conditions that led to artists' proclaiming that the imagination furnishes a higher truth than reason.) In an untitled collage from 1921, Max Ernst shows four schoolboys in a classroom, staring out a window at a hot-air balloon: presumably their imaginations were floating away with it.

24. The hand balancing the sphere with the tube occupies the right half of the black frame; butterfly wings appear on the sphere and it flies away, leaving the frame at the top-left corner. The hand moves out of the frame.

25. A ball, the sphere with the tube, and a balloon pass through a black frame (they enter at the lower left and leave at the upper right).

26. The ball, the sphere with the tube, and the balloon (smaller in proportion, as though being seen from an increasing distance) move towards the moon in the upper-right corner.

27. An illustration of the surface of the moon (with a number of craters) fills the frame; the ball, the sphere with the tube, and the hot-air balloon rise from the bottom of the frame, and each disappears by entering a different crater.

Commentary: A series of wondrous visible rhymes (correspondences). Another way of describing this would be that this is a realm of complete harmony, where all strife has been overcome. Such a realm has an affinity for the timeless, for it is a relative of the oceanic realm, experienced through primary identification. It therefore escapes time. (Jordan's films are characterized by a remarkably subtle and complex interplay between the realm of time and change and the realm of the timeless.)

The sequence comprising images 23 to 27 suggests the journey to a higher place. Jordan published the poem "Rockets" in Wallace Berman's hand-printed, free-form art and poetry magazine *Semina* 3 (1958) that connects blast-off with oxidation (i.e., uniting with the alchemical element air) and combustion (i.e., uniting with fire), and returning "more purified than we know." Jordan uses the image of an enigmatic journey in a hot-air balloon again in his film *The Visible Compendium* (1990).

28. Two large flowers (the same flowers we saw in sequence 12) sway from side to side at the bottom of the frame; a man with a top hat sits in a chair in the background, reading a book; a woman in a formal dress, with her back turned, stands to his right, holding a cloth; the rest of the frame is filled by the image of the moon's surface (the same illustration presented in sequence 26).

Commentary: Another fascinated reader. The flower and the moon form a visible rhyme, suggesting the esoteric principle that as things are above, they are below.

29. A hand protrudes from the bottom centre of the black frame; a ball with bird wings enters at the top right, lands in the hand, and simultaneously turns into a flickering ball; instantly, stars come out of the ball and move out of the frame in all directions. There is a ram in the starry sky.

Commentary: Another magical correspondence: the ball has bird wings just as the balloon did in sequence 22. Because of this magic, the ball begins to pulse, which causes it to emit stars. The most perfect form gives birth to the celestial beings—in alchemy, the sphere symbolizes unity, or the One Mind of God and, psychologically, a higher a-rational consciousness, beyond the duality of reason. The ram is an alchemical image for solar energy, so here sun and moon, day and night, are united.

30. The left of the black frame is filled by a balance scale with the flickering ball on it—it sits underneath the bell jar cover (which has a bandaged hand atop it).

Commentary: The bell jar resembles an athanor, associated with magic and transformation. Alchemists considered the athanor to be an incubator and so referred to it as the “House of the Chick.” It also symbolizes the fires of the human metabolism and, accordingly, transformation (especially the transformation of the body into the Second Body of Light).

31. The balance scale with the flickering ball sits inside the bell jar covered, with a bandaged hand (as a sort of handle) on top—the ensemble is smaller than in sequence 31 and occupies the centre of a black frame. Butterflies, moths, and two birds enter simultaneously from all sides of the frame, converging at the centre, and obstruct our view of the scale—but the ball remains visible.

32. Butterflies, moths, and two birds fill a black frame; they quickly exit (leaving in all directions); as they do so, they uncover the face of a bearded man.

33. Butterflies leave the frame; a full moon occupies the top-left corner of the frame (the background is black); a young girl with large bird wings enters the frame at the bottom, flies across the frame, and exits at the top; a young boy with larger butterfly wings enters at the bottom-right corner and leaves the frame at the top left.

Commentary: The butterflies are symbols of transformation—here, a transformation gives a girl wings to fly. A number of collages by Max Ernst—for example, “Und die Schmetterlinge beginnen zu singen” (And the Butterflies Begin to Sing, from *La femme 100 têtes*)—incorporate images of butterflies (and, in the example mentioned, butterflies are associated with a glass container/alchemical vessel).

34. At the sequence’s beginning, a hand, gripping a rod with a flickering ball at its top (like a torch), enters a black frame from the left (first an outstretched arm and then the rest of the body enters the frame): the rod is carried by a Greek statue of a male wearing a cloak, which moves into the frame, turns clockwise, and leaves the frame at the bottom.

35. The head and shoulders of the bandaged man enter the frame at the lower right and move up to a telescope that points towards the sky; the upper part of a building can be seen in the background; part of the moon moves into the frame and settles in the upper-left corner. Simultaneously, a butterfly enters at the lower-left corner, flies across the frame, and leaves at the top-right corner.

Commentary: The telescope links the terrestrial and the celestial orders, which helps the bandaged man. This linking of heaven and earth results in spiritual liberation. The telescope suggests investigation and seeing afar. Furthermore, it resembles the projector we see in sequence 37. Since

the projected film images suggest thought processes (see commentary on sequence 37), this similarity links seeing afar with seeing within.

36. The moon spins in the centre of a black frame, and while it does so, it expands to nearly fill the frame (it touches the top and bottom edges on the right side); a butterfly enters at the top, orbits the left side of the moon, and leaves at the bottom of the frame.

37. A mustachioed man in a suit stands on a cloud on the right side of the screen; he holds a projector from which emerges a flickering ball of light—with each flicker, a beam of light emanates from the projector, and the moon in the top-left corner turns a few degrees counterclockwise. The man's hand moves up from behind the projector (as though adjusting a control on it)—as it moves, the flickering ball disappears and the moon stops turning; when the hand stops moving (having finished making the adjustment), the flickering begins again and the moon turns in the opposite direction. The hand is lowered again, the flickering pauses (the ball disappears), and the moon stops revolving; then the flickering begins again and the moon resumes its counterclockwise revolutions. The hand moves up once again, the moon stops rotating, and the flickering stops; a row of butterflies, moths, and one bird come out of the lens and fly out of the frame towards the top-left corner.

Commentary: A set of magical correspondences, involving circular motion of various sorts, suggests the power of the imagination for harmonization. Furthermore, the sequences the projector throws on the screen evoke the mind's operations. We surmise that the screen within the screen presents a projection of the contents of the projectionist's magical consciousness, and this leads us to believe that *Duo Concertantes* presents the contents of Jordan's magical, fascinated consciousness. (In this regard, Jordan's work joins with Man Ray's in proposing there exists an isomorphism between the characteristic shape of a film sequence and the flow of conscious experience.) The image of the projector might lead one to think about Joseph Cornell's "Monsieur Phot (Scenario)" (1936), the mind of whose eponymous protagonist operates like a (still) camera. He observes (and is sometimes overwhelmed by) miraculous correspondences between the inner and the outer world.

I remarked above that the Cabala offers an emanationist metaphysics. The ratio (in their reality values) between the projector beam and the object forms that light creates is a strong metaphor for the derivation, according to emanationist thought, of objects from light (of course, that is another reason for attaching privilege to the cinema)—I have pointed out elsewhere that analogy helps explain why the Canadian Surrealist-influenced painter

Jack Chambers accorded the importance he did to the “foto” and film, why he tried to recast painting on the model of photography, and why he turned, however briefly, to filmmaking.

38. The head and shoulders of the bandaged man, facing right (in profile), appear on the left side of a black frame; a large snail shell sits atop his head (like a hat); a large seashell (of the kind you put up to your ear to hear the ocean), the size of his head, rises up from the bottom of the frame—it is held by a bandaged hand that comes up towards the man’s face. He tilts his head towards the shell as though to look inside, then returns it to its original position. A large lotus flower appears (the blossom, with numerous pointed petals, is the size of his face)—it protruds from his forehead and extends to the top of the frame. The seashell moves down the frame—the bandaged hand is no longer visible; the flower begins to sway. A moth emerges from the seashell and flies out at the top-right corner; a large butterfly (its width is greater than that of the man’s head) appears in front of the flower; the flower disappears, and the butterfly flies out at the top-right corner.

Commentary: The seashell resembles labia, so the man examining the seashell suggests the integration of male and female, leading to enlightenment. The lotus flower’s appearing from his forehead implies he is being enlightened. It also closely resembles an image from Robert Fludd, illustrating resemblances between the human mind and the cosmos (the parallels between microcosm and macrocosm) (*Ultriusque cosmi maioris scilicet et minoris*, tomus II [1619], tractatus I, sectio I, liber X, *De triplici animae in corpore visione*). The similarity lends support to our claim that Jordan’s film has the character of a memory theatre.

Cabalists speak of the “flower of life” (and it bears comparison with the lotus flower). The flower of life is drawn as overlapping circles, and circles are a key theme in this film. The flower of life is a relative of the egg of life, the seed of life, and the tree of life, whose forms are suggested in this film.

39. A candlestick, with a translucent flickering ball in front of the flame, stands against a window; a motionless hand holds a match to the flame; a bandaged hand enters through the window, takes the flickering ball, and pulls it out of the frame.

Commentary: The candlestick represents the alchemical element of fire.

40. A bandaged hand and its arm (without a body) sit vertically in a black frame (on the left side), reaching towards the top; the hand holds the flickering ball.

41. A cat (in the background) watches a flickering ball that moves while rotating; the camera/frame moves in closer.

Commentary: Magical events arouse fascination. Jordan depicts the triumph of the imagination.

42. A hand (to screen left) holds a magnifying glass in front of a bottle (to screen right) that contains a string with a small object at the end; a beam of light (a thin white line) enters at the top-left corner and passes through the magnifying glass and the bottle; a ball flickers in front of the magnifying glass—it quickly passes across the frame and exits at the lower-right corner. Simultaneously, a bird's head appears in the top-left corner, positioned as though looking through the magnifying glass; at the same time, a small arm (one-third the size of the hand) holding a cane appears in front of the bottle (it enters the frame at the lower right); the camera/frame closes in.

43. A boy in a suit is seen from the front—his arms are raised and bent towards his body; in each hand he holds a thin stick, each raised to horizontal in front of him, and he watches a large flickering ball (almost the size of his face) positioned between the sticks (as though the sticks support the ball); two birds emerge from the flickering ball and fly out of the frame, one exiting at the top-left corner and the other at the top right. Two hands with hemispheric lids enter at the bottom, one from each side, and enclose the flickering ball; the left hand is rather large (larger than the boy's head)—twice the size of the right (a female's or child's) hand.

Commentary: The flickering ball releases spirits that soar skywards—what happens here is similar to the transformation that takes place in the athanor.

44. The hemispheric lids enclosing the ball appear against a black frame—the hands holding the lids move apart, opening the lids; the ball pops out (but does not flicker). A new scene appears with chicks in the background, and the ball lands atop a vertical bar on a stand (two fingers from a hand on the left secure the stand); the ball repeatedly raises itself from the bar and then comes back down, all the while rotating. It then rotates its way out of the top of the frame; a hand pointing its index finger enters on the right.

45. Hands closing the hemispheric lids around a flickering ball occupy the lower-left third of the black frame; the hands move out of the frame, pulling the lids apart, and a large potted flower (occupying half the frame) appears (the flower has six large petals and stamens protruding from its centre).

Commentary: The hemispheric enclosures function as an athanor, out of which forms appear by magic.

46. The potted flower (which appears in sequence 45) shows up on the left third of a black frame; on the right, the man with the projector (whom we

saw in sequence 37) stands facing the flower (the flower, the projector, and the man are all roughly the same size); lower parts of clouds move across the top of the frame from the left; beams of light flicker from the projector's lens; the clouds stop moving, and the beams of light disappear as the hand operating the projector moves down; the hand stops and the beam starts to flicker again, while the clouds move back out of the frame on the left.

47. A gathering of bird-people (human bodies with bird heads): a ball (the size of the people's heads) enters at the top, bounces about, and eventually bounces down to the ground and along to the left, leaving the frame; a male on the left holds a female's hand—the female is at the centre of the screen and her head is turned towards a male on the right side, who has one leg extended forward and his hand to his chest (as though about to bow).

Commentary: The figures resemble Ernst's Loplop. Loplop represents transformations and the person who has a spirit that can soar. (Therian-tropic figures with bird heads are not uncommon in alchemical literature and art.)

48. A ball bounces along the top of a large egg in a forest (the egg occupies one-third of the frame)—the egg is oriented horizontally and has a cracked opening on top; a man (half the size of the egg) crouches in the bottom-right corner, his back turned as he examines the egg; a ball (the size of the man's head) bounces along the top left of the egg, then moves over to the right and suddenly becomes (about four times) larger; it continues to bounce along the top of the egg, eventually landing on the ground to the left of the egg, then bounces back up and enters the egg through the crack. A large butterfly (the width of the egg) emerges from the crack and flies out of the frame at the top left. A hand (one-third the size of the egg) holding a rod enters from the right and uses the rod to crack the egg—a beak emerges from the crack, and the hand moves to the top of the frame as a bird's head (slightly larger than the hand) emerges, facing to the right—it tilts to the left (as though looking up), then back, and the bird returns to the egg; the hand follows, tapping the crack again; a small bird's head (smaller than the man's head) comes out, then the rest of the body (which is the size of the egg, with slightly longer wings); the hand moves to the top, then moves down slightly, and tilts the rod in the direction of the top-left corner. The bird flies off, exiting the frame at that corner.

Commentary: Imagery of the new birth (and rebirth) and transformation (the butterfly that emerges from the egg/athanor). The *ovum philosophicum* is a common image in alchemical literature and art. The egg is symbolic of the hermetically sealed vessel of creation. During the alchemical

process, the subject, hermetically sealed in the egg, would go through a symbolic death and rebirth. When the egg was cracked, a new mystical substance emerged, an elixir that prolonged life and acted as a catalyst capable of improving any substance that it came in contact with. This substance, called the philosopher's stone, could change lead into gold and an ordinary person into an enlightened master. One of the symbols for this perfection was the rose, the ideal flower. I have hinted that Jordan's films allude to his personal interests. The interest in flowers evoked here is an example, for Jordan is an avid gardener. But the associations his films record, too, are documentary.

49. In a black frame, the bird (same as previous, but smaller) flies from the centre, to exit at the top-left corner.

50. At the beginning of the sequence, we see the face of the mustachioed man in the lower right of a black frame (the frame cuts off the rest of the head) and the balancing scale with the ball under a glass cover being raised from the bottom centre by a hand beneath it (the man's hand). Then the scale lifts off the hand and moves across the frame, exiting the frame at the top left.

51. A bird (the same bird that we saw in sequence 48) moves across the black frame from the lower-right corner.

52. Along with the chicks (that we saw in sequence 43) in the background, the flower we saw in sequence 44 (about three-quarters the size of the chick) enters the frame at the top-right corner. A ball appears at the flower's centre (the ball is approximately the same size as the chick's head), falls down to the ground, bounces back up, turns into a butterfly, and flies out at the top-left corner.

53. The man with a book, whom we saw at the film's beginning, appears in the lower centre of the frame; he is in an interior with highly decorated walls; he holds the book with both hands and brings it up to his face—one hand holds open a page with an illustration of a birdcage.

Commentary: The first part of this film is drawn to an end by returning to its beginning. In alchemy, this universe, the universe of nature as different from the universe of God, turns in an unending cycle of birth, life, and death.

54. Two hemispheric lids are positioned in front of a flower with large protruding butterfly wings; the lids and the flower are situated in front of a skinless man's chest—a flickering ball obscures his face and his left arm is extended towards his chest and grips the top lid. The scene begins within close-up of the man's chest; the top lid is lifted by the hand, and first one

ball, and then another, pops out; simultaneously, the frame opens out to give a fuller view of the body—it is in the centre of the frame, and the bottom frame edge cuts off the body at the knees; the two balls are circling the top of the body. Two glass-covered containers appear, circling with the balls.

Commentary: The idea of magic circles is evoked again.

55. The Greek statue of a male figure (the same statue that we saw in sequence 33), still holding the rod that we saw in the earlier sequence, stands on the left side—its head is concealed by a covering that resembles a beehive; the top part of the frame shows the lower portions of clouds; the upper part of a building can be seen in the bottom right of the frame (its height is less than half that of the statue), and a child stands in the bottom-right corner (the child is the same height as the building). A large hand (the size of the child) with its finger pointing towards the rod emerges from behind the clouds and then retreats behind them again. A flickering ball appears instantly on top of the bar; a face (probably female) enters horizontally in front of the clouds.

56. A handwritten star/asterisk (*) appears in a black frame; its movement is jerky (as the star is scratched into the film's emulsion).

PART TWO: PATRICIA GIVES BIRTH TO A DREAM BY THE DOORWAY

(First title for Part II)—a handwritten Roman numeral “II” (it is animated by a jittering motion) appears on the left side in a black frame (the “II” is scratched into the film's emulsion).

(Second title for Part II)—words appear across a black frame, in elaborate cursive letters: “Patricia Gives Birth to a Dream by the Doorway.”

1. A woman stands to the side of a doorway with her back leaning against it; her head is turned away from the camera/viewer (or where the camera would be were this a photographed film)—she looks out at a view framed by the doorway. The sky overhangs a lake, and just beyond the doorway, a dog sits in front of the lake with its body facing it.

Commentary: The scene remains fixed for the remainder of the film—all the succeeding events occur in the field that Patricia peers into.

The woman in this scene is not identified as a specific, real person. But Jordan's wife at the time this film was made was named Patricia; Patricia Jordan appears in Lawrence Jordan's film from 1969, *Hildur and the Magician*, and Wallace Berman made several collages of/for “Larry” and “Patricia.” The specificity of the reference, which admittedly is transcended by

the universality of the tale the film recounts and the indefiniteness of place and time of the action represented, connects the emotional ambience of the film to Jordan's own life and testifies to his longing to enter a world of magic devoid of conflict. In alchemy, the dog is associated with mercury, because mercury readily fuses with other metals, which suggests amicable bonds. In alchemical lore, a dog represents primitive matter that the Great Work purifies (presumably Patricia giving birth stands for the Great Work, which results in a child's, the Young Prince's, birth).

2. An elephant (half the size of the woman) enters the frame at the top left—it has a flower with its trunk and is suspended by some kind of lifting device. When the elephant has been lowered halfway down the frame, it is released from the device but continues its descent until it leaves the frame at the bottom: the device remains hanging at the top of the screen—it disappears only after the elephant has left the frame.

Commentary: The elephant represents the element earth—however, it enters from the top (from the air); thus, it represents the conjunction of the higher and lower principles. The following scenes involve small objects that appear within the woman's field of view.

3. A hand with a finger outstretched enters the frame from behind the left side of the doorway and moves back out; it points at the sky where a white statue of a woman, without arms, appears—its base rests on the surface of the lake; a nut comes into the frame at the top right; it releases a seed/ball (the seed is larger than the head of the statue) that falls to the surface of the lake and disappears as two fish jump out of it, leaving the frame behind the left side of the doorway.

Commentary: Jordan again evokes the ideas of new birth (rebirth) and transformation. Thus, Patricia's dream continues the themes of the film's first part. There are several images of seeds in this part of the film—hardly surprising, given that it is about pregnancy, birth, a new, higher being coming forth, and a new world emerging. Many cosmogenic myths depict the universe as being born from a primordial seed, and among them is the Cabalistic cosmogeny, in which Binah (the Mother, or the Great Sea, who represents the powers of human consciousness) harbours the seed of Hokhmal (whereby she is impregnated with the archetypes of subsequent beings) and eventually produces seven lower Sephirots through successive emanations. In his first years as an artist, Lawrence Jordan associated rather closely with Wallace Berman (1926–1956), the moving force behind *Semina* magazine (1955–64), to which, as was noted above, Jordan contributed. Jordan also helped Berman with his great unfinished film

Aleph (begun in 1956), on the tree of life, which combined, in intricate collage diaristic live-action footage, layers of overpainting, Letraset lettering, photostatted collages, and Hebrew letters (which for Cabalists are connected to the tree of life)—Lawrence and Patricia appear briefly in the film. Berman was an avid student of the Cabala, which, he discussed with Harry Smith, who had studied with a New York expert on Jewish mysticism, Rabbi Naftali Zvi Margolies Abulafia (1870–1955) and Reb Abulafia’s son Lionel Ziprin. Absolutely central to Berman’s work is the idea of the primordial seed, from which the whole of creation emerges.

4. A square movie screen appears; on it, we can see an elephant walking through water; large butterfly wings (that are as large as the elephant’s ears) extend from the place the eyes would normally be—they move up and down.

Commentary: Like Patricia’s dream, the film within the film contains the same elements as the framing film does. This suggests the identity of illusion and reality, and of dream and reality (and thus of cinematic illusion, dream, and reality). This is a paradigmatically Surrealist theme.

5. The screen disappears, revealing the statue and the nut; the nut releases another seed/ball that falls to the surface of the lake—when it touches the water, it turns into the hemispheric lids. They open up and release a person with a spear and a fish, and then move out of view in opposite directions, the figure to the left and the fish to the right. The hemispheric lids close and become a seed/ball once again; the statue disappears and the seed/ball moves up behind the flower and the flower exits the frame.

Commentary: The nut is another form of athanor. But the nut also has a (compatible) significance in Cabalistic thought—Cabalists sometimes refer to the Torah as the *ergoz* (nut) because it has a hard shell and a rich, soft, nourishing core: the core can be reached only by difficult Cabalistic techniques (such as *gematria*, *notarikon*, and *temurah*). When the nut is opened, all manner of bounty appears.

6. The seed/ball descends from the top right; midway, its sides sprout butterfly wings; the seed/ball flies around above the lake and exits at the lower-left corner (as though entering the interior).

7. A woman in a dress and hat, holding a cloth, appears in profile to the left of the dog—she is looking down at the lake (contemplating). A large image of an old man with a beard appears in the lake; a crescent moon appears in the sky; a young boy (smaller than the dog) rises up from underneath the old man’s face; butterfly wings appear from his back and he flies away, leaving the frame at the top right. The woman and the old man’s face disappear.

8. The sequence begins with the small male figure (the same size as the dog) with his arm raised. A spinning flower appears, projecting from his arm (the flower's width is almost the height of the man). The flower separates from the man, disappears and re-enters the frame from the top, now held by what seems to be a twisted claw; the flower takes a leap and lands in front of the man; simultaneously, the dog turns into a highly decorated, regal-looking object of some sort (it resembles a long crown or a decorative stool, but cannot be identified, for its fine details cannot be discerned). This strange regal object turns into another wondrous object that resembles a long, rectangular glass case—a plume of smoke arises from its top (the smoke is motionless)—there is possibly plant life inside. The young boy pops out from behind the object; the man with his arm raised grabs the boy with the one arm and shakes him. Butterfly wings fall from the boy to the ground. The man sets the boy down, and simultaneously a volcano with a plume of smoke attached to it (the smoke does not move) appears at the centre of the frame (it appears to be at the end of the lake). The man lifts his arm higher, and the flower begins to spin again—as it does so, the man floats to the centre of the sky, and instantly, the flower appears at his arm. A knotted cloth appears where the flower was; the man and the flower disappear and a small (toy) horse (slightly smaller than the boy) emerges from the top of the glass case and floats across the sky, exiting the frame at the top right. The boy with wings on his feet rests them on the ground, then begins to boost himself by flapping them. Everything but the volcano disappears.

Commentary: In alchemical literature and art, a flower (especially a rose) often stands for enlightenment. In alchemy, roasted rocks (or a volcano) emit a reddish smoke the colour of mercury sulphide. This smoke is the volatilization of the formerly hardened habits created in the terrestrial marriage of soul and spirit, which must be sent asunder (through calcination) to free the essences on which the alchemist operates.

9. On the left, the seed/ball falls from the sky, bounces once on the volcano, and exits at the lower right, behind Patricia.

10. A wheel on a stand appears to the left of the volcano (it is twice the volcano's height). A feather appears, bouncing along the top of the wheel, and instantly the feather turns into a hot-air balloon (similar in size to the wheel on a stand) that floats to the right; when it reaches the right side of the sky, it begins to float upwards, towards the top of the frame, and turns into an egg (similar in size to the wheel) that descends gradually towards the wheel. A large hand (the size of the egg) points from the left, and instantly, the spinning flower (the size of the egg) appears in front of it; the flower spins while the egg moves in front of the wheel.

Commentary: Another set of magical correspondences. By the principle of correspondence, all rising forms imply levitation, and levitation is a key motif in Jordan's—and Ernst's—art. I have commented on the image of the *ovum philosophicum*.

11. A lion with bird's wings enters from the right, gliding over the surface of the lake; the hand appears on the top left, pointing down, then moves out of the frame; a screen appears on the stand on which the wheel was mounted—on the screen, a picture of a man attempting to approach a wildcat (tiger, jaguar, etc.) is projected; the screen and the lion disappear.

Commentary: The film within the film presents the same elements as the framing film. In alchemy, the griffin symbolizes the conjunction of fixed and volatile principles. The griffin's egg symbolizes the *vas Hermeticum*, or the living Vessel of Hermes (Mercury), that is the human being who possesses more or less ethereal natures—Hermes, in alchemy, is the guide to the above and the below.

12. An egg rests on the stand, and from it tears fall, plunging into the lake. Meanwhile, the boy enters at the right—he has fluttering butterfly wings on his feet, but when the boy reaches the middle of the screen, the wings fall from his feet to the ground and disappear. At the same time, the boy levitates (rises to the centre of the sky), the seed/ball appears on his right, touching his back, suspended slightly above the boy, and a crescent moon appears above his face; as the boy floats upward, the face also moves up until it combines with the crescent moon (as though it was the face of the moon). Bees/wasps suddenly appear and fly from the moon out of the frame; the moon continues to move up towards the left, while the ball/seed attaches itself to the top of the boy's head and raises him up and out of the frame at the top right. The egg sprouts butterfly wings and, with its wings fluttering, the egg rises, uncovering the wheel on the stand, then flies out of the frame at the top.

13. A square movie screen appears on top of the stand, centred against the sky; the picture projected on the screen is of two birds on a branch; their wings flap periodically. The screen begins to flicker, and a new picture appears of a boy with his hands in his pockets in front of two large (slightly longer than the boy) serpent-like fish lying on the ground. A small egg (similar in size to the boy's head) with butterfly wings appears at the bottom of the screen and flies off, exiting at the top right of the frame; the nut enters at the top right, releases the seed/ball into the picture on the screen, then moves back out. The seed/ball falls onto the ground, and a large, full-grown poppy pops up (slightly larger than the boy); it begins to sway from side to side; the screen flickers and a new picture appears—a wasp on a flower. The screen

flickers (matching the wasp's flapping wings) and a new picture appears, of a penguin standing next to a beehive. Bees/wasps fly around in and out of the picture (some disappearing when they are about to leave the screen); the screen flickers and a new picture appears—a machine with two wheels atop its sides (against a white screen). The machine topples over, falling out of the picture and into the water behind Patricia (there is a splash, and then ripples form on the right); a sketch of a woman's profile appears on the screen; the screen then disappears.

Commentary: Jordan again gives the theme of transformation a central place. But several devices (e.g., having the bees fly off the screen) suggest the continuity of illusion and reality (a paradigmatic Surrealist theme). In alchemy, bees are associated with the rose, and the rose with fire and wisdom. The screen assumes the role of mentor/initiator.

14. Three pillars made up of parts of statues piled atop one another appear—they stand on the surface of the lake and rise against the sky; two pillars have male busts on their capitals, while the third one has a small statue of a man carrying a boulder on his back. The small man (whom we saw in sequence 8) appears in front of the lake, to the right of the dog; he raises his arm, and the star-shaped flower (that we also saw in sequence 8) descends into the frame from the top and falls into the water behind Patricia (there is a splash, then ripples form on the right); the stacked elements of the pillars begin to sway. The small man disappears; the pillars collapse and disappear as well.

Commentary: Earlier, we saw a lion standing on the water; here, we see pillars standing on the water. Water is a common alchemical symbol and suggests, *inter alia*, the floating world of flux—in Jordan's film, all things flow and change. The flickering screen and flapping wings are two other motifs that suggest vibration, flux, change, and ephemerality.

15. A large egg (the length of the lake) with butterfly wings on its sides sits horizontally on the surface of the lake—the egg rocks as the wings beat. The small toy horse (that we saw in sequence 8) emerges from behind the egg, floats up, and disappears out of the frame at the top right.

Words against a black frame: "The End" in cursive letters, with four hand-drawn flowers around it (at the two sides, the top and the bottom).

Duo Concertantes Musical Form: Tables

Symbol Definitions

| | | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|--|---|
| | Object is within the frame; remains in one position | | Object moves up to a position | | Object bounces in position |
| | Object disappears during the scene | | Object moves down to a position | | Object moves in from the left top, bouncing across and out |
| | Object appears during the scene | | Object moves right to a position | | Object moves in from the left, bouncing across and out |
| | Object spins or turns | | Object moves left to a position | | Object moves in from the top left, bounces across bottom, and out |
| | Object moves across the frame, leaving at the top of the frame | | Object moves diagonally from the top left to a position | | Object bounces across at the top and moves down and out |
| | Object moves down the frame, leaving at the bottom | | Object moves diagonally from the top right to a position | | Object bounces across at the top and moves down, bouncing out |
| | Object moves across the frame, leaving at the right side | | Object moves out of position, leaving the frame at the top left | | Object in rotational movement |
| | Object moves across the frame, leaving at left side | | Object moves out of position, leaving the frame at the top | | Object sways side to side |
| | Object moves across the frame, leaving at the top right corner | | Object moves in from the top right and remains at the top right | | Object enters or leaves the frame from an interior in the scene |
| | Object moves across the frame, leaving at the bottom right corner | | Object moves left and down, then moves left and up | | Object leaves the scene, entering an interior |
| | Object moves across the frame, leaving at the top left corner | | Object moves up and down | | Object moves into position from the bottom, swaying |
| | Object moves across the frame, leaving at the bottom left corner | | Object(s) move across from the left and from the right | | Object moves into position from the bottom, curved movement out |
| | Object moves across horizontally, then up vertically | | Object moves into the frame from the left then leaves at the left | | Object moves across and out at the top in a curved movement |
| | Object moves across horizontally, then leaving at the top left corner | | Object moves in and out at the top right corner | | Object moves across and out at the bottom in a curved movement |
| | Object comes in at the right, moves up, leaving at the top | | Object moves into position at the top, then moves out | | Object circles the frame and moves out at the left |
| | Object(s) move out of the frame in all directions | | Object moves into position at the left side, then moves out | | Object moves down from top right around and out at the bottom left |
| | Object(s) move toward the centre, from all directions | | Object moves into position at the top right, then moves out | | Object moves in a curved movement into position at the bottom |
| | Object(s) move out of the frame, mostly at the right and bottom | | | | Object moves up from position to another position above to the left |

Duo Concertantes Part 2: Patricia Gives Birth to a Dream by the Doorway

| Character | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Balloon | | | | | | | | | | ↑ | | | | | |
| Bees/Wasps | | | | | | | | | | ● | | | ● | | |
| Birds | | | | | | | | | | | | | ● | | |
| Bird wings | | | | | | | | | | | ● | | | | |
| Butterflies | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Butterfly wings | | | ● | | | | ○ | → | ↪ | | | | ↑ | → | ● |
| Child | | | | | | | | → | ↪ | | | | ● | ↑ | ● |
| Hard-shelled flower | | | ↙ | | ↔ | | ● | | | | | | ↙ | | |
| Crescent moon | | | | | | | | | | | | ↖ | | | |
| Egg | | | | | | | | | | ↻ | | ↑ | ↻ | | ● |
| Elephant | | ↓ | | ● | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fish | | | ↖ | | → | | | | | | | | ● | | |
| Flower(s) | | ● | | | | | | | | | | | ● | ↔ | |
| Hand | | ↔ | ↔ | | | | | | | ↔ | ↑ | ↓ | | | |
| Screen | | | | ● | | | | | | | ● | | ● | | |
| Seed/Ball | | | ↙ | | ↔ | ○ | | | ↘ | | | ↑ | ↙ | | |
| Small man | | | | | | | | ● | ↑ | | | | | | ● |
| Star flower | | | | | | | | ↔ | ↻ | ○ | | | | | ↘ |
| Statue(s) | | | ● | ● | | | | | | | | | | ● | |
| Toy horse | | | | | | | | ↗ | | | | | | | ↗ |
| Two hemispheres (lids) | | | | | ● | | | | | | | | | | |
| Water splashes | | | | | | | | | | | | | ↖ | ↖ | |
| Wheel on a stand | | | | | | | | | | ● | | ● | | | |
| The stand without the wheel | | | | | | | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| Volcano | | | | | | | | ● | ● | ● | | ● | ● | | |
| Other | | | | | ● | | ● | ● | | | ● | ● | ● | | |



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